✓ Encs

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WAR DEPARTMENT

File 2055-454

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: ADDITIONS TO COMBAT MONOGRAPH OF CHINA

MONOGRAPH REPORT

From: CHINA

No. 2818 Date: May 25, 1921. , 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

REC'D M.I.D., G.S. JUN 29 1921

100 - Critical Points
AMOY - Fukien Province.

It is requested that the following be added to the Combat Monograph of China.

Only one copy each of the maps is available. Following is a list of enclosures:—

Kip's map of Amoy District.
Chinese map of Amoy (scale 1-:-5,000)
Map of Japanese Concession
Plan of British and so-called American Concession
Amoy (1:40,000 - Jap. Guide Book map)
Amoy & Environs (1:150,000 (Jap. Guide Book map)

Copies of report to:

(3) M.I.D.
(1) Tientsin
(1) Manila

Encs attached

Binding Margin.

QUESTIONS-ANSWERED
two report

This Office would appreciate very much any assistance you can render in securing military information.

The following is suggested as information that is of value :

1. Map of the city.
   Note: Telegraph service , post office , electric light plant and water works should be clearly indicated and especially noted on any maps submitted .

2. Map of the district coming under your observation. Note: All maps should be reliable , new and of as large a scale as can be secured . Names on map should be indicated in both English and Chinese . This office would expect to refund the cost to you of securing the map and any other incidental expense to which you may be put. Check will be forwarded immediately upon receipt of necessary information.

3. Any information that you yourself may deem necessary to Commanders of troops arriving in your city and locality, viz:

   (a) Buildings that may be occupied for quartering troops; i.e., any buildings or compounds that might be used to quarter 100 or more men each, exclusive of private dwellings.
   (b) Suitable camp sites for troops and animals within five miles of the city.
   (c) Available water supply for command, and its location; i.e., city water works , best streams , large wells etc. -it being understood that all water must be boiled . The mere information that there are water works or wells available is important.
   (d) Available fuel supply - coal and wood. Are there coal mines in the vicinity so that an ample supply could be depended upon ?
   (e) What food supplies - beef , rice , potatoes , beans etc. - are available for purchase locally for subsistence of troops ?
      a. In storehouses
      b. In adjacent districts .
   (f) Local supplies of gasoline and oil .

   (g) Equipment of wireless , radius , etc locate same on Map.
   (h) If on railroad the amount of siding and rolling stock available ; if seaport the number and size of docks.
   (i) If no docks are available , the depth of water and suitable location for landing troops by launch.

   (i) Size and location of barracks for local garrison if any . Same for any foreign garrison, Locate same on map.
   (j) The location of water-works , electric light plant , telephone and telegraph stations is important.
   (k) Give name and location of arsenals , steel works, powder factories and other industrial enterprises that you deem of military importance.
   (l) Any information regarding motor or other improved roads , specifying width, nature of construction, grades , condition of roads in different seasons. In this connection maps are of especial importance .

(m.) In addition to railways , what kind of , and howc much transportation is available for troops and supplies ?-Wagons, animals, coolies , carts, boats etc. would come under this head - and figures should show the average or approximate number obtainable on a few days notice.

(n) List of Americans living in or near the city and their address.

(o) List of Chinese known to you or your friends to be unquestionable pro- American, and who could be relied upon to be with us in time of war against another foreign nation.

(p) Places in which aero lanes can land or take off.

Note: Level, open fields - rectangular or square, with dimensions of three hundred yards or more.

In submitting this report you may be put to considerable inconvenience and loss of time . However, you are urged to give t this matter your immediate , personal and careful attention,as the information contained therein is considered very important.

Ypu are cautioned to consider this request for information as confidential .

This office expects to reimburse you for clerical or other assistance employed by you in getting and compiling this information.

Data is requested by December 1st, 1919.

AMOY (FUKIEN PROVINCE), CHINA

1. MAP OF DISTRICT. The Consulate submits two (2) copies of a map of the Amoy district (South Fukien), 2nd edition (1900) prepared by Rev. L. W. Kip, D. D., an American missionary long resident in Amoy. The romanization is in the Amoy dialect, but a romanization corresponding to the Mandarin is given (and underlined) for the important places. No map with both English and Chinese names is available here.

Another useful map, of all Fukien Province, is the British War Office Map (G. S. G. S. No. 2165) with Handbook, giving Chinese characters and pronunciation for the names shown on the map--Chinese characters--Wade transliteration and local pronunciation. This detailed information appears in the handbook; the map itself contains only the names in English on the Wade transliteration. Published in 1908; prepared in the Geographical Section, General Staff, War Office; obtainable from Edward Stanford, agents for the sale of maps published by the Geographical Section General Staff, London.

The Kip map, first mentioned, is the one in general use here, and the routs indicated are those used by the missionaries in traveling about in the interior. These 2 maps cost $4 Mexican ($2 each). (Enclosures Nos. 1 - 2)

2. MAP OF CITY OF AMOY. This request has been very difficult to meet. The Consulate has been unable to obtain a satisfactory map of Amoy, and so far as extended inquiry develops, there is no accurate map, in English or Chinese, in existence.

Amoy is located on an Island; and opposite Amoy is the island of Kulangsu,--an international settlement. For a satisfactory map of Kulangsu, which shows also the harbor of Amoy, some of the Amoy waterfront, mainland, etc., you are referred to U. S. Navy map, China-East Coast Amoy. No. 1285; and chart 2157, U. S. Navy, is also useful to show something of the Amoy waterfront. Unfortunately I am unable to obtain copies of these maps in Amoy; although I have had an opportunity to examine copies.

A small map of the Environs of Amoy--not submitted as accurate but as being generally correct is submitted. (Enclosure No. 3). This map shows Amoy Island, with its relative position in respect to the mainland, Sung-su the Amoy terminus of the railroad running toward Changchow, and the route of the railway.

The railway does not reach Changchow; railhead is at Kiang-tongchiau; I have corrected this map accordingly. This map is taken from the Imperial Japanese Railway Guide to China, taken from my personal copy of this book, no other copies being available here.

A smaller map of Amoy, shows Kulangsu and Amoy city on small scale. It is not entirely accurate; I attempted to make corrections on the Amoy waterfront, but the map is so small that it has not been possible. However it may serve some purpose. This map is also taken from the Imperial Japanese Railway Guide to China. Enclosure No. 4.

A Chinese map of Amoy (said to have been made by Japanese) is also submitted. This map was found only after considerable inquiry and search, and only one copy, somewhat old is available. It is not submitted as accurate, but as the only map available to serve the purpose of your inquiry and my reply. On this map I have endeavored to indicate the following:

1. The British Consession on Amoy Island, comprising the principal business section of the Amoy Bund.
2. The so-called American concession; over which concession rights are not claimed by the United States--the status of this small section will be discussed later.
3. The area set aside (boundaries somewhat in dispute) as a Japanese concession, but which has not been organized or administered as such, remaining in Chinese occupancy. A large section of this concession is unreclaimed foreshore.
4. Various important places, including the Chinese Post Office, Chinese Telegraph Office, Great Northern Telegraph Office (whose main office, however, is on Kulangsu), the Amoy dockyard, electric light plant, and official yamens.

This map is marked Enclosure No. 5. I regret that it is so unsatisfactory, but it is the best obtainable.

There /

[illegible] also enclosed a tracing from a copy of a map of the Japanese [illegible] (Enclosure No. 6). As previously stated, the boundaries of this [illegible]sion are somewhat in dispute.

There is frther enclosed (Enclosure No. 7) a photographic copy (in duplicate) of an official plan of the British & American Concessions, Amoy, from a survey of the Amoy Customs) with facsimiles of the seals of the British Consulate and local Chinese authorities. The two plots marked X are the so-called American concession. The dark colored plot is owned by Jardine, Matheson and Co., Ltd. and occupied by the Chinese Post Office; the other plot in the so-called American concession is occupied by the Fukien Railway offices (and other Chinese official offices) being in actual fact owned by the Ministry of Communications, which took over the Amoy-Changchow railway several years ago. These two plots of land are registered in the American Consulate, and are often referred to as the American concession; they have n not been claimed as as American concession, however, and so far as actual jurisdiction is concerned may be considered as Chinese territory. However unsatisfactory these maps may be, they are the best obtainable; and an effort has been made to provide material for possible guidance in preparing a map on your own account, the British and Japanese concessions being indicated, and the location of the principal offices, etc.

3. Information for Commanders of Troops.

A. Buildings for Quartering Troops. The only buildings which might be obtained for quartering troops are the godowns (warehouses) in the British concession on the Amoy bund, especially the godowns of Messrs. Butterfield and Swire, which are the largest and best situated and best adaptable. On Kulangsu (the international settlement) will also be found a number of foreign (principally British owned) godowns, which could also be converted into barracks for troops. Outside of these godowns, I can only indicate Tung Wen Institute (shown on the map as just above the Japanese concession, Enclosure 5) This is a Chinese school, with attached dormitory building, originally established in 1899 by an American Consul and certain Chinese gentry and still conducted under American auspices although strictly speaking a Chinese institution. Quarters for troops could be had here without difficulty.

As to the city itself, it is notoriously filthy, and consists of narrow streets and broken-down Chinese shops; while the Chinese Government has 10,000 troops quartered on the island the quarters occupied are scarcely to be considered for white troops--small, old temples, commandeered houses, etc. The quarters for troops in the walled city where the present military headquarters are maintained are limited and could not be made to accomodate any considerable force.

B. It is believed that the best available space for camp sites will be found--having consideration for water supply--in the direction of Kang-'tau village (see Enclosure 3), and possibly in the neighborhood of Nam-po-te temple, but here the question of water supply would be difficult.

C. The water supply of Amoy is a difficult problemas indeed it is as well for Kulangsu--the international settlement. Surface wells, with often failing supply during the winter season, are found on Kulangsu, and also on Amoy Island, back of the city, being most numerous in the Kang-t'au section indicated in my answer "B" above. In the city itself, there are a very few surface wells; otherwise the city and the British concession and bund are supplied by Chinese water boats which bring down fresh water of very poor quality from Chieh-be (Shih-ma) on the river leading to Changchow. These water boats supply shipping as well; their capacity and number is limited and in time of trouble they could not be depended upon unless the route to Chieh-be was kept open by force.

D. Available fuel supply.

Coal stocks are held by the following dealers: Boyd & Co. (British), N. Mealle (Chinese and Kian Guan (a Chinese-Japanese firm). Before the war Amoy usually carried stocks up to three thousand tons. Stocks were exhausted during the war and have been only partially replenished, and no high class steaming coal is now to be had. The present stock of coal is about 1700 tons, including about 900 tons of Kaiping lococlump, the best available coal on the market at this time.

There are/

There are coal mines--open mining--at Lungyenchew, but the coal--a poor quality of anthracite--can only be brought down in small quantities; under the most favorable conditions, 500 tons a month. The river is broken by rapids in the upper reaches and this requires transshipment from boat to boat, although some effort was made--and with some success--to blast a channel through the rapids.

The coal supplies are, therefore limited. Wood for fires--household purposes--is brought down from Chieh-be (Shihma)--whence the water supply is also derived. The supply is, however, limited.

D. Available Food Supplies. Beef; scarce. Small quantities obtainable in Kulangsu and Amoy, locally butchered. Cattle found only in the interior of the district and not in considerable numbers. Rice: The ordinary stocks on hand at all times run to 6,000 sacks (of 130 catties--a catty is one and one-third pounds) minimum; potatoes, (white) 4,000 pounds; Chinese (sweet potatoes and yams), 25,00 pounds. Beans, about 4,000 bags of 130 catties, minimum. Flour, minimum, 15,000 bags of 50 pounds (Chinese milled flour).

This district produces but a small percentage of its food supply; some rice is available in the adjacent districts, and sweet potatoes, but the remainder comes largely from Shanghai and other China ports.

A military force would be very largely dependent for supplies on outside sources, and stocks on hand cannot always be easily replenished on account of the poor shipping facilities from the North.

E. Local Supplies of Gasoline and Oil.

Kerosene (Standard Oil Company of N.Y., Asiatic Petroleum Co. (South China) Ltd., and Tait and Co. (British) agents. The Taxes Company. Average total stocks: 150,000 units of 10 American gallons.

Gasoline (Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. and Asiatic Petroleum Company South China Ltd), average stock 250 units of 10 American gallons, total.

Fuel oil (Asiatic Petroleum Co. South China, Ltd), average stock 100 units of 10 gallons, only.

G. Wireless. None.

H. Railroad. The railroad, on which construction work was begun in 1908, was planned to run from Sung-su (on the mainland immediately adjoining the Standard Oil installation) opposite Amoy, on the mainland, to Changchow, a distance of 33 miles, was opened to traffic in 1910 as far as Kiangting (or Pohlam Bridge, between 17 and 18 miles. It has never been extended to Changchow. The original equipment consisted of 2 locomotives, 10 flatcars and 8 converted flat cars used for passenger traffic. All of the rolling stock is now practically useless; only one engine can operate at all, and that is in very poor condition. During the occupation of this district by the Northern troops the wooden ties have at points been used for firewood, with the result that the railroad is not now operating. The steel rails in very poor condition. Gauge, 4 ft 8½ inches.

Amoy is a seaport. There are no docks available, except the one landing, at the Standard Oil installation at Sung-su, on the mainland, opposite Kulangsu. Oil steamers come alongside the dock here, but extreme care must be used in docking, and the currents in this section of the harbor are understood at times to be uncertain.

Amoy is one of the best harbors and most easy of access on the south China coast. The harbor is divided into the inner harbor (to the north and east of Kulangsu) and the outer harbor (to the southwest, west, south and southeast of Kulangsu). The inner harbor is narrow and has in all 17 berths. Only 2 will accomodate vessels more than 400 feet long. The minimum depth of the anchorage ground at low water is about 30 feet; holding ground, fair--rock and mud; vessels anchor about 1/8 mile off shore. Maximum rise of tide, 18 feet; minimum fall of tide, 7 feet. Deepest draft steamer than can safely navigate the harbor, 34 feet. Abundant anchorages in the outer harbor.

Small launches can land at the various jetties along the British concession bund; at very low tide it is difficult to reach jetties along the remainder of Amoy city stretch and on Kulangsu. Sandy beaches along the forts at the entrance to the inner harbor will permit of landing through the surf.

I. Barracks. The Chinese troops--to the number of some 10,000 are scattered throughout the city in small native houses, old temples, ancestral halls, etc.

The barracks/

Barracks proper will be shown on Enclosure 5. These barracks are very poor Chinese structures; will accomodate 1,000 Chinese troops at the most. No barracks for any foreign garrison; no foreign garrison at Amoy.

I. Waterworks, etc. No waterworks; electric light station in Amoy is indicated on maps. Telegraph stations in Amoy and Kulangsu indicated on maps.

K. Arsenals, etc. No arsenals, steel works, powder factories. Amoy dockyard is indicated on map 5.

L. Roads. No roads available for vehicular traffic. Roads indicated on maps are principally paths for foot traffic; some of them paved with heavy stones.

M. Transportation. Railroad already noted. No wagons, or carts, or animals for hauling, available. There are approximately 500 registered lighters in the harbor, averaging 7 tons each. These in general use for foreign shipping, 130, of from 10 to 14 tons each.

There are approximately not more than 500 burden and stevedering coolies available in the port; and this number could only be mustered under satifactory circumstances and at several days notice.

N. Americans. Without exception, all Americans reside on Kulangsu--the island administered as an international settlement. A list of American residents will be appended. There are also a number of Philippine citizens (of Chinese race) scattered through the villages on Amoy Island.

O. Chinese who are pro-American. This question is broad and it is impossible to answer it without qualifying reservations, such as the nation with which we might be at war, their occupation of this port, etc. etc. A brief list of prominent Chinese who could be relied upon is, however, appended.

P. Aeroplane Landings, etc. It has been difficult to find, within easy distance of the port, aeroplane landings, etc. In this work I have had the assistance of Fred. H. Steele, (formerly lieutenant, instructor at Kelly Field, Texas). Amoy is decidedly hilly, and what comparatively level stretches there may be are covered by graves, or are paddy fields, or hide ditches. The only place available on Amoy Island, within easy reach of the city, is the parade ground immediately back of the inner forts, on Amoy island, on entering the harbor. Here is a level stretch of some 1500 X 1500 feet, and with little effort a field 2,000 X 2,000 could be established. This landing and taking-off place for aeroplanes is indicated on the small map Enclosure No. 4.

This property is included in a tract which local Chinese are endeavoring to obtain from the Government for the purpose of a Chinese university, but the field itself would probably be retained as a recreation field. Surveys of this property have been made by Chinese, and it is possible that I may be able to obtain and forward with this report a copy of the plan covering the field in question, showing the ditches partly dividing it and the telegraph poles and wires bordering it, behind the fort. The value of this copy of the plan I am unable to judge; however, it might serve some purpose in indicating the possibilities of the field and the obstructions now bordering it, likely to cause difficulty on first landings.

American Consul.

Amoy, China,
Nov. 12, 1919

AMERICAN CITIZENS RESIDING AT AMOY, CHINA.

Address in all cases: Kulangsu, Amoy.
No street addresses.

H. J. Morse	Manager, Standard Oil Co. of N. Y.
V. W. Davis	Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. (formerly Lieutenant, Philippine Constabulary).
Fred H. Steele	Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. (formerly liutenant and instructor, Air Service, U.S.A.
Chas. J. Wood	Tung Wen Institute
Roy Allgood	" " "
Dr. M.J. Strick	Hope Hospital
T. M. Elliott	Y.M.C.A.
John Bradshaw	"
H.P. Best (Rev)	Reformed Church Mission
H. Renskers	"
F.J. Weersing	"
Henry Peppen (Rev)	"
W. C. Hankins (Rev)	Seventh Day Adventist Mission
F. E. Bates (Rev)	"
G. S. Luther	"
C. E. Gauss, A	American Consul (Transferred)
A. E. Carleton,	American Consul (Assigned)
H. L. Milbourne,	American Vice Consul (Assigned)

LIST OF PRO-AMERICAN CHINESE.

In general it may be stated that most Chinese residents of the port are pro-American, and it is difficult to give a particular list which would be useful and yet not too detailed. The following names are giben as those of prominent Chinese persons, or useful persons. Others could always be ascertained on the ground, through the Consulate and American residents, with careful discrimination in consideration of existing conditions.

Mr. Uy Siulieng, Philippine citizen of the Chinese race; head of Siulieng and Co. (Peng Kee Chan), bankers. Residence in Kulangsu. Member of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and a Chinese of considerable prominence and influence in the business community.

Dr. Tan Thian Un, Chinese, physician; prominent in Christian Chinese circles. Residence in Amoy.

Dr. David Huang, Chinese physician; Hope Hospital, Kulangsu.

FOR OFFICERS ONLY
NOT TO BE QUOTED

(See Letters of Instructions to Military Attaches)
Number of copies: 1
Copy No.: 1

PRIVATE CHIEF OF STAFF
WAR COLLEGE DIVISION
APR 7 1917
2055-476
4370-8
Noted R. H. V. D.
WAR DEPARTMENT

REC'D W.C.D., O.C.S. APR 6 1917

SUBJECT GENERAL INFORMATION ON HONGKONG:
(Copy of Naval Attache's Report).

From N. A.

No. 1532 Date February 23, 1917., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

The following copy of report from the Naval Attaché, Peking, is for file in your office:-

HONGKONG.

A. Anchorage
B. Drydocks and Wharves
C. Fortifications, Ammunition Factories & Naval Stations.
D. Fuel Supply
E. Provisions.
F. Cable and Telegraph Communications.
G. Railway Communications.
H. Steamship Communications
I. Sphere of Influence.

I. American Consul
II American Vice Consul
III. Prominent Americans.
IV. Prominent Foreigners.

Hongkong. A. Anchorage. (January 1917).

The harbor of Hongkong is 5 to 9 fathoms deep and covers a water area of 10 square miles, being one of the finest harbors in the world. Ships coming from the direction of Singapore generally enter the harbor from the west by a narrow passage called Sulphur Channel, between the N.W. coast of Hongkong and Green Island. Vessels coming from Australia, America, Japan and North China, enter from the east by the narrow Lyee-mun channel.

All ocean liners moor either at the pier of the Kowloon Warehouse Company or at that of their own company, or else at the anchorage not far from the Bund.

B. Drydocks and Wharves

There is excellent dock accomodation in Hongkong.

1.- British Naval Dockyard inside the Naval Station, comprises a machine shop, workshop, and a dock which is 559 feet long at the bottom, 95 feet wide at the entrance, 70' in the middle of the basin, and 120 feet at the

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3—1907

Binding Margin.

top, with a depth of 39 feet at full tide. To the east is a well protected water space of 9 1/2 acres, with a depth of 32 feet at low tide.

2. The Hongkong and Whampoa Dock Company have three extensive establishments, one at Hunghom, Kowloon, one at Tai Kok Tsui, and the third at Aberdeen, on the south side of Hongkong Island. The establishments of this company are fitted with all the best and latest appliances for engineering and carpenters work. The docks and slips have the following dimensions:- Hunghom:- No.1, (Admiralty) dock- 576 feet long, 86 feet wide at entrance at top and 70 feet at bottom, and 30 feet of water over sill at ordinary spring tides.

No.2 Dock: Length on keel blocks, 371 feet: breadth at entrance 84 feet: depth of water 18 feet 6 inches.

No.3 Dock: Length on keel blocks, 260 feet: breadth at entrance 49 feet: depth of water, 14 feet.

Patent Slips:- No.1, length on keel blocks, 240 feet: breadth at entrance 60 feet: depth on the blocks, 14 feet. No.2, length on keel blocks 230 feet: breadth at entrance 60 feet: depth of water on the blocks, 12 feet.

Tai Kok Tsui - Cosmopolitan Dock - lenght on keel blocks 466 feet; breadth at entrance, 85 feet: depth of water over sill 20 feet.

Aberdeen - Hope Dock - length on keel blocks, 430 feet, breadth at entrance 84 feet; depth of water over sill 23'.

Lamont Dock - length on keel blocks 333 feet; breadth at entrance 64 feet; depth of water over sill 16 feet.

The Hungham and Cosmopolitan Docks are in close proximity to the shipping in port and are well sjeltered on all sides. The approaches to the docks are perfectly safe and the immediate vicinity affords capital anchorage. The docks are substantially built. Powerful lifting shears with steam purchase at Hunghom and Cosmopolitan Docks stand on a solid granite sea wall alongside which vessels can lie and take in or out boilers, guns and other heavy weights. The shears at Hunghom are capable of lifting 70 tons and the depth of water alongside is 24 feet at low tides.

3. Butterfield & Swire's Dockyard at Quarry Bay consists of one dry-dock, two depositing docks and a workshop.

The dock has been built to British Admiralty requirements, is the largest out of England and is capable of accomodating the biggest vessels afloat. The dimensions are: 787 feet extreme length: 750 feet on the block: 120 feet wide at coping: 77 feet wide at bottom: 34 feet depth over side of sill at low water Spring tides: It can be filled in 45 minutes and pumped out in 2 hours 40 minutes. Founded on a solid rock bottom, it has been built of cement concrete and lined with granite. A feature of the dock is the caisson, of the new box sliding type, weighing 400 tons and electrically controlled.

There are three slipways.

No.1, is 1,030 feet long and 60 feet wide, capable of taking up two steamers, each 300 feet long, drawing 18 feet and having a displacement of 2,700 tons.

The other two slipways are each 993 feet long by 60' wide, capable of taking two steamers 500 feet long, drawing 17 feet with a displacement of 2,000 tons.

The building yard is 550 feet long and 300 feet wide, and has been equipped with a view to the construction of passenger and cargo vessels, turbine steamers, steam yachts, torpedo destroyers, steam launches, tugs and lighters. The chief motive power is electricity, generated by gas engines, the gas producing plant being the largest installed in the Far East. The electric shears situated on the sea wall, lift 100 tons at a radius of 70 feet, and wagon and crane roads run the full length from end to end. This sea wall which is 3,200 feet long forms the boundary of the yard and is built of concrete blocks of an average weight of 15 tons. There is a depth of 39 feet at high water Spring tides for the greater length of the wall which will enable ships of any size to berth alongside for the removal or fitting of heavy boilers, machinery, etc.

Hongkong. C. Fortifications, Ammunition Factories and Naval Stations. (February 1917).

The approaches to the harbor are strongly fortified, the batteries consisting of well constructed earthworks. The western entrance is protected by three batteries on Stonecutters Island and two forts on Belcher and Fly Points, from which a tremendous covering fire could be maintained, completely commanding the Sulphur Channel. Pine Wood battery, on the hill above and west of Richmond Terrace, has a wide range of fire. The Ly-eemun Pass is defended by two forts on the Hongkong side and another on Devil's Peak on the mainland, and if vessels survive that fire they would then have to face the batteries at North Point and Hunghom which completely command the eastern entrance. Another battery on the bluff at Taim-tsa Tsui, Kowloon, commands the whole of the entrance of the harbor. The batteries are armed with the latest breech loading ordnance. For obvious reasons, details regarding these fortifications cannot be obtained.

There is also a small squadron for harbor defense.

Hongkong. D. Fuel Supply. (February 1917).

(a) Quantity of steaming coal, fuel, oil, and gasoline ordinarily carried in stock and available for purchase.

Ordinarily the average stock of steaming coal in Hongkong varies from 100,000 to 200,000 tons out of which perhaps 50,000 tons may be required for the ordinary supply of local consumers, the balance being free for sale. Normally there is on hand in Hongkong 6,000 to 7,000 tons of fuel oil and 50,000 gallons of gasoline.

(b) Sources from which those items are obtained and, if practicable, specifications with regard to quality.

By far the greater mass of coal comes from Japan, a considerable supply also being obtained from Indo-China and North China and at times a small amount from Australia. In normal times a limited amount of Welsh coal may be obtained.

Fuel oil is obtained from the East Indies and the United States. That usually sold is bunker fuel oil 14 to 17° Baume gravity. Gasoline is 63-65° Baume gravity.

(c) Minimum average stocks which may be relied upon as at all times on hand.

From 10,000 to 20,000 tons of coal may be had at any time. At present fuel oil is very limited in quantity but after the war the above amount can be taken as a minimum. Gasoline can be had in quantities up to the amount above given.

(d) Names and nationalities of regular dealers in these supplies.

Among coal dealers are the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Mitsu Bishi Goshi Kwaisha, both Japanese: the Kailan Mining Administration of which Dodwell & Co. are agents and which is Anglo-Chinese: and Messrs. Bradley & Co: Gilma & Co: and Hughes & Hough, all British. In fuel oil the Standard Oil Company (Am.) and the Asiatic Petroleum Company (British). Both these companies also furnish gasoline.

(e) In the case of coal, trade names and whether supplied to or used by foreign navies .

No particular trade names are recognised in this field. The principal coal supplied for warships is the "Tagawa lump" .

(f) Current market prices.

Prices have been varying greatly because of the immense variation in freight and in supply and demand. In a general way coal for steaming purposes may be had from $22 to $25, local currency f.o.b. and t.i.b. Fuel oil is priced at 60 shillings per ton: gasoline at $10 local currency per case of 10 gallons.

(g) Effect present European war has had on supply and prices.

In coal the war has chiefly affected the market through the shortage of tonnage and immensely increased freight rates, the shortage of tonnage so limiting the supply that at times an actual coal famine has been in sight in Hongkong and Canton.

In fuel oil and gasoline prices have advanced since the war from 40 to 60 per cent due to increased freight rates, but at present the supply is normal.

(h) Local harbor conditions, including lightering and stevedoring; also notice required to make deliveries in various quantities.

With respect to coal the fuel is handled in lighters and coaling is rapid and usually satisfactory. Amounts exceeding 300 tons require some notice. For fuel, oil and gasoline, the Standard Oil Company has a pier at Laichikok where ships can be fueled. This company and the Asiatic Petroleum Company can each supply lighters for gasoline subject to certain harbor regulations. In fuel oil and gasoline, they can deliver anything up to the normal quantities shown above on 24 hours notice.

(i) Particular advantages and disadvantages of the port for refueling vessels.

Minimum depth of water at Standard Oil Company's pier at Laichikok is 29'8" with a soft mud bottom. The pier is 280 feet long. This plant is equipped with a 10" fuel oil pipe line which would insure quick and efficient fueling of naval vessels providing harbor authorities would permit naval vessels to proceed to Laichikok, otherwise lighters would be necessary. At present time the Standard Oil Company is not prepared to supply fuel oil

oil lighters except in case of grave emergency, but should the United States Government wish to enter into a contract after the war, lighters could be provided.

(j) Comment on any special local conditions which may have any bearing on the procuring of the items referred to by United States naval vessels.

In general trans-shipment service of alllsorts in Hongkong is among the cheapest in the world. The port, of course, is accustomed to handle large quantities of fuel and supplies of all sorts for warships as well as for other vessels. It is usually taken as the headquarters of such things in the Far East.

Hongkong. E. Provisions: (February 1917).

Hongkong being one of the shipping centres in the Far East, all kinds of provisions, imported as wellas native, can be obtained in large quantities.

Hongkong. F. Cable & Telegraph Communications.

The Chinese Telegraph Administration accepts messages to all parts of China, and the different cable companies connect Hongkong with the other parts of the world.

Hongkong. G. Railway Communications (February 1917).

Canton-Kowloon Railway runs from Kowloon (opposite Hongkong on the mainland) to Canton, a distance of 111 miles.

As soon as the Canton-Hankow line is completed, Hongkong will be connected with North China, Japan, and Siberia.

Hongkong. H. Steamship Communications.

1.- Chinese Coasting Service.

(a) Hongkong-Foochow, via Swatow and Amoy (twice weekly).
(b) Hongkong-Tamsui, via Swatow and Amoy (weekly)
(c) Canton-Hongkong-Takow, via Swatow, Amoy, Anping.
(d) Hongkong-Tientsin, via Shanghai-Nagasaki (monthly).
(e) Hongkong-Vladivostok, via Shanghai-Nagasaki (monthly).
(f) Canton-Hongkong-Tientsin, via Swatow and North China ports (every two weeks).
(g) Hongkong-Tientsin-Newchang.(once in 3 weeks)
(h) Canton-Hongkong-Shanghai, via Swatow (twice weekly).

2.- Amoy-Hongkong-Singapore Line.(once in ten days).

3.- French Indo-Chine Service.

(a) Hongkong-Hoihow-Haifong-Pakhoi-Haifong. (weekly).
(b) Hongkong-Kwangchauwan-Haifong. (every two weeks).
(c) Hongkong-Haifong (weekly).

4.- Hongkong-Bankok Service.

(a) Hongkong-Swatow-Bankok , irregular. Chinese Company. (The regular service of the Norddeutsche Lloyd is at present suspended).

5.- Hongkong-North Borneo.

(a) Hongkong-Sandakan. (monthly).

6.- Hongkong-Java Service.

(a) Kobe-Hongkong-Surabaya, via Moji-Singapore-Batavia-Samaran.
(b) Hongkong-Japan-Java (monthly).
(c) Surabaya-Hongkong-Yokohama, via Batavia & Kobe (monthly).
(d) Batavia-Hongkong-Shanghai. (monthly).

7.- Hongkong-Philippine Islands.

(a) Hongkong-Manila, via Cebu and Iloilo. (3 lines, weekly).
(b) Hongkong-Manila, (7 lines, a steamer every few days).

8.- Japan-China and Hongkong-India Service.

(a) Hongkong-Calcutta. (weekly).
(b) Kobe-Hongkong-Calcutta (every 10 or 14 days)
(c) Kobe-Hongkong-Rangoon (every two weeks)
(d) Japan-Hongkong-Bombay (every two weeks).
(e) Hongkong-Bombay (monthly).
(f) Kobe-Hongkong-Bombay (monthly
(g) Shanghai-Hongkong-Bombay (every two weeks).

9.- Australian Service.

(a) Melbourne-Kobe, via Sydney, Brisbane Port Darwin, Manila, Hongkong, Shanghai, Moji.
(b) Hongkong-Sidney, via Manila, Port Darwin, Thursday Is. Townsville, Brisbane (monthly).
(c) Yokohama-Melbourne, via Kobe, Moji, Nagasaki, Hongkong, Manila, Thursday Is. Townsville, Brisbane, Sydney.

10. North American Service.

(a) Hongkong-Seattle, via Shanghai, Moji, Kobe, Yokohama, and Victoria (every two weeks).

(b) Hongkong-San Francisco, via Honolulu, Yokohama, Kobe, Nagasaki, Shanghai (once a month Manila) every 7 or 10 days.

(c) Hongkong-Vancouver, via Shanghai, Nagasaki, Kobe, Yokohama (once in 3 or 4 weeks).

(d) Hongkong-Tacoma, via Shanghai, Manila, Moji, Kobe, Yokohama, Victoria, Seattle (every two weeks).

(e) Hongkong-Portland, via Shanghai, Moji, Kobe, Yokohama, Victoria, Vancouver, Seattle.

11. South American Service.

(a) Hongkong-Valparaiso, via Yokohama, Honolulu, Manzanilla, Salina Cruz and Callao.

12. European Service.

(a) London-Yokohama, via Gibraltar, Marseilles, Malta, Port Said, Suez, Aden, Colombo, Singapore, Penang, Hongkong, Shanghai, Nagasaki, Kobe, (every two weeks).

(b) Yokohama-London-Antwerp, via Kobe, Moji, Shanghai, Hongkong, Singapore, Penang, Colombo, Port Said, Marseilles.

(c) Marseilles-Yokohama, via Port Said, Suez, Aden, Colombo, Singapore Saigon, Hongkong, Shanghai, Nagasaki, Kobe.

(d) Yokohama-Hongkong-Antwerp-Liverpool.

(e) Yokohama-Genoa-Liverpool.

(f) Yokohama-Hongkong-Havre-Liverpool.

(g) Glasgow-Hongkong-Hankow.

(h) Copenhagen-Japan Service, via Hongkong and intermediate ports.

(i) Petrograd-Copenhagen-Antwerp-Vladivostok, via Hongkong, Shanghai and intermediate ports.

Hongkong. I. Sphere of Influence. (February 1917).

A British Colony.

Hongkong. I. American Consul (February 1917).

George A. Anderson, Consul General.

High class type of American business man who is willing to assist in any possible way.

II. American Vice Consul.

A. E. Carleton.

Hongkong. III. Prominent Americans.

Walker, W. B. Assistant General Manager, Standard Oil Company.

A fine type of American business man who is willing to assist in every possible way.

Hongkong. IV. Prominent Foreigners.

1 incl.

WAR COLLEGE DIVISION
JUL 6 1914
#370-6
2055-476
GENERAL STAFF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 27, 1914.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of War and has the honor to enclose for his information a report from the American Consul General at Hongkong, China, dated May 9, 1914, entitled "Markets in Hongkong".

Enclosure:

As indicated.

ASSISTANT AND CHIEF CLERK
JUN 30 1914
WAR DEPT.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
REC'D JUN 30 1914

Rec'd W.C.D., G.S., JUN 30 1914

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War

Incl.

WAR COLLEGE DIVISION
JUL 6 1914
4370-6
GENERAL STAFF

[illegible] for the Government of the Philippines.

MARKETS IN HONGKONG.

The system of public markets under control of the colonial sanitary department maintained by the government of Hongkong is gradually being extended throughout the whole of the colony's territory including the districts inhabited solely by Chinese. In the city of Victoria, that portion of Hongkong usually known to the tourist and European resident, there is a system of modern markets of more or less architectural pretensions maintained primarily for the protection of non-Chinese residents in the source of their food supplies. Into these markets meat killed only under the supervision of the colonial veterinarian's department can be sold while the control of the vegetables and similar goods is such as to protect the community in a general way from ordinary disease infection. Vegetables are produced not only in the colony, including both the island of Hongkong and the mainland portion known as the "new territory", but in various portions of the Pearl River delta. In common with most portions of the far east the source of the vegetable supply is such that uncooked fruits and vegetables are dangerous but the improvement made in these matters in the past few years through the work of the authorities superintending the markets is remarkable. Careful attention is paid to the fish

supply

supply in these markets, also, a fresh supply of live fish being brought into the market each evening for consumption the next day and all fish must be cleared out before night either by sale or by disposal for curing. The income from these several large markets is considerable, that of the Central Market in 1912 being $60,850.80 local currency or $32,757 gold. The new Western Market earned $22,625.20 local currency or $11,085. gold the same year while two others earned $15,288 and $14,761 local currency respectively. The total earnings of the various markets for the year amounted to $142,224.90 local currency or $69,690 gold as compared with $135,892 in 1911, $122,446 in 1910 and $106,712 (all local currency) on an average during the ten years from 1899 to 1908. The policy of extending these markets to outlying districts has been especially regarded in the past year and several new markets were established in the city and country districts. In the colony there are now sixteen markets in operation in addition to those maintained at various smaller towns in the colony.

George E. Anderson,
Consul General.

Hongkong, May 9, 1914.

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A true copy of the signed original. EC

[See Letters of Instructions to Military Attaches.]

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War College Division
General Staff.
4370-5.
2055-476

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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MAY 10 1913
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SUBJECT HONG KONG.

From Major A.J. Bowley, F.A., Military Attache, Pekin, China.
H. A.

No. 1016 Date April 1, 1913., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

1. The following notes were principally made from the records of the U.S.Consul General in Hong Kong. They are in no way complete but may serve to add some new information. The "Directory and Chronicle for China" contains a very full decription of Hong Kong.

2. Situation:

The island of Hong Kong is situated off the coast of Kwangtung provimce, near the mouth of the Canton ~~Province~~ River. It is distant about 40 miles from Macao and 83 miles by water and 110 miles by rail from Canton. It lies between 22°9' and 22°17' N/ Latitude and 114°5' and 114°18' E.Longitude. The port usually called Hong Kong is the City of Victoria.

3. History:

Hong Kong is a CrownColony and was ceded to Great Britain by the Chinese Government in 1841. For a detailed history and account of Hong Kong see " Directory and Chronicle for China, etc."

4. Area:

The island of Hong Kong is about 11 miles long and from 2 to 5 miles broad. Its circumference is about 27 miles.

5. Commercial Importance:

Hong Kong is free port and there are no duties except on intoxicating liquors and opium. It is the distributing center for the trade of South China and it is estimated that about one-fourth of the imports and one-third of the exports are financed and distributed through Hong Kong, the balance being handled by Shanghai and to a small extent by subsidiary ports.

6. Political Importance:

It is the strategic position of Great Britain in the Far East, both from a commercial and military point of view.

7. General Description:

See "Directory and Chronicle for China".

8. Suburbs:

Shaukiwan, situated at the east end of the island, population about 11,227.

Form 17, O. C. S.
Ed. 4-8-12—5,000.

3—1967

Binding Margin.

Aberdeen, situated at the southwestern part of the island, population about 3,273.
Stanley, situated at the south of the island, population 723.
Kowloon, situated directly across the north shore of the island, population 13,693.
Hunghom, situated directly across the north shore of the island beyond Kowloon to the east.
Yaumati, situated to the west of Kowloon.
Kowloon City, northeast of Kowloon, population 53,873.

9. Consuls:

There are 5 consuls general, 15 consuls and 2 vice-consuls as follows: Austria-Hungary, Consul; Belgium, Consul; Bolivia, Consul; Brazil, Consul; Chile, Consul; Denmark, Consul; France, Consul; Germany, Consul; Italy, Consul-General; Japan, Consul-General; Mexico, Consul; Netherlands, Consul-General; Nicaragua, Consul; Norway, Vice-Consul; Panama, Consul-General; Peru, Consul; Portugal, Consul; Russia, Consul; Siam, Consul; Spain, Consul; Sweden, Vice-Consul; United States, Consul-General.

10. Buildings:

See "Directory and Chronicle for China".

11. CLIMATE:

See "Directory and Chronicle for China".

12. Inhabitants:

The total population of the colony is about 445,000 composed of about 437,000 Chinese and about 11,000 Europeans including 5,000 soldiers.

13. Rivers:

None.

14. Canals, Esteros and Bayous:

None.

15. Manufactures:

The following are the chief products and industries: Aerated water, artemesia oil, artificial flowers bakeries, bamboo ware, boat building, box making, boilers, brewery, bricks and tiles, carving, cement, cigars, clocks copper ware, cotton mill, distilleries, docks, dyeing, fire-crackers, furniture, ginger, glass, gold beating, gold and silver ware, hand weaving, ice works, images, incense sticks, iron founderies, iron ware, ivory carving, jinrickshaws, knitting factories, lanterns, leather boxes, matches, mats, mirrors, mosaic bricks, stone and artificial marble, oars, prepared opium, ornamental masons, paper boxes, paper factory, rattan ware, rope and sail works, sandal wood ware, sapan wood, soap, soda factories, soy, spectacles, sugar refineries, tanneries, tin beating, tin foundries, tinned provisions, tin ware, tobacco, umbrellas, varnish, vermillion works, white lead.

16. Commerce and Trade:

Commerce is carried on with all parts of the world, mainly China, Japan, America and Great Britain.

17. Supplies:

All supplies are brought from other ports.
A very fair quantity of nearly all supplies are on hand at all times.

18. Fuel:

Chiefly wood. There is little variation in the import of coal into Hong Kong. Roughly it amoints to about 1,200,000 tons annually. Japan dominates the market, supplying about 73 % of the trade, then comes Hongay in Tonking, closely followed by Fushun in Manchuria, Kaiping and Cardiff. Australia has dropped out of the market, likewise the Philippines. The wood is supplied from the mountains in the surrounding country.

19. Streets:

Most streets are wide and modern, being macadamized. The city being built on the hill sides the grades of many of the streets are steep. There is no planting of trees.

20. Street Railways:

There are two tramways in Hong Kong - the Hong Kong Tramway Company which operates on the town levels, and the Peak Tramway which runs up the hill to Victoria Gap, the Peak.

The Hong Kong Tramway runs through the city of Victoria from Belcher's Bay to East Point and Happy Valley and then on to the village of Shaukiwan, a total length of nearly 10 miles. This company has a rolling stock of 46 cars, of which 13 are double-decked, 12 open type and 21 semi-enclosed type. All of this equipment is of British manufacture. The generating station, car shed and repair shops are in Russell Street, Bowington, where a staff of approximately 100 men are employed.

The Peak Tramway is on the wire rope system and runs to Victoria Gap where the stationary engine is placed, the lower terminus, being close to St.John's Cathedral. The general managers are John D.Humphreys & Sons. Two cars are in continual use, and one is held in the shed for emergencies. The cars hold 42 passengers each. The motor to haul the cars consists of two pairs of compound locomotives under type engines with cylinders 13" x 19" x 24" stroke with a pressure of 120 pounds to the square inch. All machinery, etc., are of British manufacture.

21. Surrounding Country:

Hilly.

22. Communications:

Entirely by water. Railway connections are in Kowloon across the harbor.

23. Roads and Trails:

Only about the island.

24. Wheeled Transportation:

Rickshaw for passengers and low carts for goods. Very few horses.

25. Telegraph and Telephone Lines:

The telephone routes, about 38 miles, are owned by the telephone company. About 27 miles of underground cable are owned by the telephone company.

The Cable Company owns about 10½ miles of aerial telegraph cable, about 9nmiles of underground cable and 7.596 knots of telegraph pipe lines.

The Government owns 180 telegraph and telephone lines and about 39nmiles of submarine cable.

26. Submarine Cables:

About 39 miles owned by Government. There are submarine cables leading to Saigon, Labuan Island, Manila, Amoy and Foochow. The Amoy and Foochow cables connect with Woosung (Shanghai).

27. Wireless Telegraph Stations:

None except on men-of-war in the harbor.

28. Railways:

The Canton-Kowloon Railway terminus is at Kowloon.

29. Illumination:

Electricity, gas and kerosene. The streets are lighted by means of electric arc lamps.

30. Police:

European police	Inspectors	16
. . . . .	Sergeants	54
. . . . .	Constables	63
Total		133
Chinese police		.398
Indian police.		.346
Water police (Chinese)		.143
Other departments - Europeans		3
Chinese		.13
Indians		.25

Total strength approximately 1061.

31. Water Supply:

The island of Hong Kong is well watered by numerous streams, many ofnwhich are perennial. The city and the suburbs are supplied with water from the following reservoirs with capacity as follows:

Pokfulum	.68,000,000 gallons.
Tytam	.390,000,000 gallons.
Wongneichung	.27,000,000 gallons.
Bye Wash below Tytam	.30,000,000 gallons.
Dam at Tytam Tuk	194,000,000 gallons.

32. Diseases:

Tropical diseases are prevalent during certain periods. During the last twenty years bubonic plague has been an annual occurrence in the summer. Malaria and dysentery are common.

33. Hospitals:

Ample accomodations are provided in the following hospitals: Aline Memorial Hospital, Government Civil Hospital, Ho Miu Ling Hospital, Kennedy Town Hospital, Matilda Hospital, Military Hospital, Nethersole Hospital, Peak Hospital, Royal Naval Hospital, Tung Wah Hospital, Kwong Wah Hospital in Yaumati, Victoria Hospital.

34. Attached is a guide book for Hong Kong.

2055-476

November 5, 1936.

4370-F

Carded G. P. B.

To the Attache in Charge,
Military Information Division, General Staff,
Manila, P. I.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that on September 2, and September 12, 1936, Major John Willis, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, forwarded to the Chief of Engineers notes relative to the defenses of Hong Kong and vicinity in connection with work under his charge, with three charts, 14 photographs of views and newspaper clipping. As these notes contain some valuable information, which it is thought will be of use to your office in collecting Military Information concerning the Far East, I have requested Major Willis to give you a copy of the report and enclosures or loan you his retained copies long enough to have copies made (as per copy of letter herewith). It is suggested that you communicate with Major Willis upon the subject and if practicable secure copies of this report and any further information he may be able to furnish you.

I consider this a very valuable report and hope to be able to secure for the home office as well as your office similar data relative to like points and would request your cooperation as far as practicable with Major Willis and other officers in the matter.

Very respectfully,

R ED POTTS

Colonel, General Staff,
Chief 2d (Mil.Inf.) Division.

1 enclosure.

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4370-3
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4370-3
Carded G.P.B.

November 5, 1906.

Major John Millis, C. E.,
Manila, P. I.,
(Through the Chief of Engineers)

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communications of September 5, and September 15, 1906, addressed to the Chief of Engineers and referred to this office submitting notes relative to the defenses of Hong Kong and vicinity in connection with the works under your charge, together with the original maps and photographs therein mentioned; and, in reply, to inform you that this interesting and valuable report has been placed on file in the Military Information Division for use in answering calls for information contained therein.

In this connection I would request that if practicable you kindly furnish a copy of this important report and letter with inclosures to or loan your retained copies to Captain J. K. Thompson, General Staff, Chief of the Military Information Branch, Manila, P. I., long enough to have copies made as the information contained therein will be of especial use to the Manila Office. If it is not practicable to do so, I can have a copy of the report made here and sent from this office, but it is believed as the charts relate to that section of the country that duplicate copies can be obtained in Manila and the data indicated on them for Captain Thompson's use as well as copies of the photographs

submitted, as I presume you have the negatives and can give Captain Thompson copies with the forts indicated on them. If this is practicable, I would greatly appreciate this further courtesy on your part. I have written Captain Thompson (as per copy of letter herewith) to communicate with you upon the subject and any data you may be able to furnish him will be greatly appreciated by both Captain Thompson and the home office.

Again thanking you for the valuable information in question and anticipating further information along the same lines, I am,

Very respectfully,

R D POTTS

Colonel, General Staff,
Chief 2d (Mil.Inf.) Division.

1 enclosure.

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~~4370-2~~
2050-476

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Carded G. P. B.

September 15, 1906

Brig. Gen. A. Mackenzie,
Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.

Card G. H. S.
confidential

General:-

1. Referring to my letter of the 5th inst., sending notes relative to defenses of Hongkong, I have the honor to send herewith a clipping from the South China Morning Post of September 5th, 1906, giving public notice of proposed gun-practice. The announced range and direction of fire from west of Stonecutters Island indicate guns of about six inch calibre. I am unable to find the place designated as "Elliott" on any chart or map I can find here now, though it may be found on one of the charts sent. The range and direction of fire from Elliott show that this is most probably in the vicinity of Belches Point, and the guns may be of larger calibre than six inch.

2. On a map of the City of Victoria in the Directory and Guide there are some three or four areas back of Belches Point marked "W. D. Land", and the following batteries are shown by name:- Victoria Battery, Belches Battery, Fly Point Battery.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

John Mills

Major of Engineers, U. S. A.

JOHN MILLS

11/5/06 - copy to MDO Manila

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Inc.-1
M.I.D.
4370-2

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

FROM

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST

Hongkong, September 5, 1906

Card G. H. S.

Harbour Master's Department.

Information has been received from the Military Authorities that Gun Practice will be carried out as undef:—

On Monday, 3rd September:—
From West of Stonecutters Island, in a South-Westerly direction, at ranges up to 6,000 yards, commencing at 8.30 a.m., and finishing at 12 noon.

On Wednesday, 5th September:—
From Elliott, in a North-Westerly direction, at ranges up to 8,000 yards, commencing at 9.30 a.m., and finishing at 11 a.m.

On the 14th, 15th, 17th, 18th and 19th September, from West of Stonecutters Island, in a South-Westerly direction, at ranges up to 6,000 yards, commencing at 8.30 a.m., and finishing at 12 noon.

If the weather is unfavourable on any of the above dates, practice will take place on the following day.

All ships, junks and other vessels are to keep clear of the ranges.

L. BARNES-LAWRENCE,
Captain, R.N.,
Harbour Master, etc.

Hongkong, 30th August, 1906.

forwarded as enclosures to this report filed in Map Section as Map No. 574.911 574 China

Carded Library.
2055-476

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

September 5, 1906.

Confidential.

Carded G. P. B.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
No. 1320-1
OCT 20 1906
MILITARY INFORMATION DIVISION

Hon. A. Mackenzie,

Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.,

Washington, D. C.

General:-

1. I have the honor to submit the following notes relative to a recent trip to Hong Kong and vicinity on duty in connection with the works under my charge.

2. Authority to make this trip was requested by letter of April 24, 1906, to the Chief of Engineers, but before action on this was received circumstances required that the trip be made in anticipation of approval as already reported.

3. Major Taylor had advised me that during a similar visit made by him the year previous he had called on the Royal Engineer officer in charge of fortification work at Hong Kong and requested permission to see something of the defenses but though he was treated with marked consideration he did not receive the desired permission. The lists of names of persons engaging passage on commercial vessels leaving the Islands are accessible to the public, and are usually published in the local papers, as well as lists of passengers arriving. It was assumed that a similar system probably obtained in Hong Kong and I therefore engaged passage on the steamer both going and returning in the name of one of the clerks employed in this office. I sailed from Manila on the afternoon of Tuesday, June 5th and arrived at Hong Kong on the morning of Friday June 8th after a very

smooth passage for the time of year. During the season of typhoons and south west monsoons, from May to November, the China sea is liable to be very rough at times. While in Hong Kong and vicinity I made no attempt to conceal my identity.

4. The weather was clear both while entering and leaving the harbor and during most of my stay. In connection with the examination and test of steam launches and tugs and visits to ship building establishment, which constituted one of the objects of my trip, I went quite generally about the harbor and made one trip on a tug through the western entrance and to the south side of the island. This gave very fair opportunities to get a general idea of the defensive works so far as these could be seen from the water.

5. As is well known, Hong Kong is a British Crown Colony. The name was originally applied to the island on which the principal city, Victoria, is situated, but it is now generally used to designate the harbor, the city, or the whole colony. It is sometimes referred to as "Hong Kong, China" but it is British territory, the same as any other crown colony. The total area of land and water now controlled by Great Britain under cession and lease from China is about 40 miles in extent east and west and 25 miles wide north and south, comprising several islands besides that of Hong Kong and a large area in the main land. The town and harbor are about 90 miles southeast of Canton, the most important city of southern China, and 40 miles east of Macao, a Portuguese colony, and the original European settlement within the limits of China. Hong Kong is a place of the greatest importance to the commercial and military interests of Great Britain in the Far East, and as it is a free port this is

also true for other European interests to a considerable extent. In the total annual tonnage of vessels entering and clearing at Hong-Kong appears to exceed all other ports in the world but this is somewhat misleading as it does not represent the actual commerce of the harbor, since for a considerable number of the vessels arriving and departing the place is only a port of call.

6. The "Directory and Chronicle" for China, Japan etc. for 1906, which is the general commercial directory for the orient, states as follows relative to the defenses of Hong Kong.

"The Garrison consists of three companies Royal Garrison Artillery, 740; one company Royal Engineers, 207; one battalion of Infantry, 858; Army Service Corps, 31; Royal Army Medical Corps, 62; four Indian infantry battaliens-two in North China and two at Hong-Kong- and the Chinese regiment at Wei-hai-wei; four companies native artillery and one local company native engineers, 4,769, details 41; total 6,720. There is also a Volunteer Corps consisting of one troop of Mounted Infantry, two companies of Garrison Artillery, and one Company of Engineers. On the initiative of H. E. Sir Matthew Nathan, a Volunteer Reserve Association was formed in 1904 composed of British residents over the age of 35.

"The approaches to the harbour are strongly fortified, the batteries consisting of well-constructed earthworks. The western entrance is protected by three batteries on Stonecutters' Island and two forts on Belcher and Fly Points, from which a tremendous converging fire could be maintained, completely commanding the Sulphur Channel. Another small battery, on the hill above and west of Richmond Terrace, has a wide range of fire. The Ly-ee-mun Pass is defended by two forts on the Hong Kong side and another on Devil's Peak on the mainland, and if vessels survived x that fire they

would then have to face the batteries at North Point and Hunghom which completely command the eastern entrance. Another battery on the bluff at Tsim-tsa Tsui, Kowloon, commands the whole of the centre of the harbour. The batteries are armed with the latest breech-loading ordnance.

"In addition to the fortifications the Colony possesses a small squadron for harbour defence. This consists of the obsolete turret ironclad Wivern, 2,750 tons, now dismantled and being used as a distilling ship, and six torpedo boats. The crews of these vessels are borne in the receiving ship Tamar, which is also the headquarters of the Commodore and his staff. The Naval Yard is an extensive range of workshops and offices east of the Artillery Barracks, and the Naval Authorities have another large establishment on the Kowloon side near to "Yau-ma-Ti".

7. Comparison with previous editions of the Directory indicate either that the defensive conditions have remained stationary for some time or that the above statements have not been very recently revised.

8. The following is quoted from "The Far East" by Alexis Krausse, Second Edition published in 1903. p. 154-155:

"Hong Kong, the chief naval station of Britain in the Pacific, is a rocky island properly belonging to the Ladrones, and situated on the north side of the estuary of the Canton river. It is nine miles long, and from two to six miles wide. Its total area is twenty nine square miles. The greater portion of the interior is mountainous. The residential settlement, known as the city of Victoria, lies on the north side of the island, facing the Chinese mainland, which

is a mile away. The harbour is one of the finest and safest in the world, and is closed in by the promontories of Kwangtung and adjacent islands. The rapid development of the colony of Hong Kong and the growth of British interests in China served early in the history of the island to make it desirable to obtain an extension of territory on the mainland across the strait, and in 1861 a portion of the promontary of Kowloon, some three miles in extent, was ceded to England by the treaty of Tientsin for that purpose. The newly acquired area was utilised for the construction of dockyards, docks, and barracks, and forms a part of the colony under the jurisdiction of a governor. Owing to the formation of the mainland opposite the island, the strategic position of Hong Kong was regarded as unsafe by military men who were charged with the safeguarding of the harbour. It was pointed out that the height of the mountains behind Kowloon rendered it possible for an enemy attaining the position, to bombard the harbour and destroy the shipping. In order to meet this objection, an agreement was arrived at between Great Britain and China in June, 1898, under which the whole of the peninsula behind kowloon became leased to this country as far as the heights which stretch from Deep Bay to Mirs Bay in the direction of Canton. This extension, which covers close on 400 square miles, was taken over by the British on the 16th April, 1899.

"Hong Kong, which is frequently referred to as the Gibraltar of the Far East, is the Chief naval port in Chinese waters. Its harbour, which covers ten square miles, affords a safe anchorage for vessels of any size at any time of the year, and the facilities it

efforts for commerce are practically unrivalled. The population of Hong Kong is 262,000 of whom about 10,000 are Europeans.

"The defences of Hong Kong, which was at one time considered impregnable, have latterly been neglected, and are at present in an unsatisfactory condition. The forts on the north side of the island are for the most part armed with muzzle-loading guns, while those on Stonecutter's Island opposite Victoria have been removed. The south coast is entirely without protection, and in the event of a surprise attack, might be shelled by an enemy without being able to reply. Public attention has, however, been recently drawn to this state of things, and it is probable that it will be shortly remedied. The dockyard accomodation of Hong Kong is on the mainland, and is considerable. The largest dock will berth a vessel 560 feet in length.

"As a commercial port Hong Kong stands alone. Its annual trade is approximately 50,000,000, and it is believed to be increasing. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that Victoria is a free port, where the ships of any nation can land a ship's goods without duty, and the facility thus obtained serves to attract the merchant vessels of all countries."

9. I am inclined to think that the above reference to the condition of the defenses is more likely correct than the statement in the Directory and Chronicle, but there are now evidences of work of improvement as explained later in these notes.

10. As might be expected no maps or charts could be found that gave any definite information relative to the defensive works, but

and the U. S. Navy chart of the harbor and the British admiralty charts, and with these and the aid of a field glass it was practicable to identify a number of batteries and defensive works and to obtain what I think was at least a fairly correct general idea of the defensive plans.

11. The country about the harbor is made up of high irregular hills much cut up by valleys and ravines and showing marked evidences of erosion. The slopes of the hills are generally steep, rising directly from the water or with very limited areas of flat surface between the water and the hills. In the immediate vicinity of the city of Victoria the hill sides are quite generally covered with trees and shrubbery said to have been artificially planted, but elsewhere the vegetation is grass which covers the surface quite generally, though there are many "raw" surfaces of rock and earth probably caused by rain wash. The underlying rock is generally granite and the covering soil appeared to be quite thin as a rule. There are many large quarries from which this rock is taken for building purposes. The general appearance of the hills around the harbor was not unlike those on the west side of Subic Bay, except that the latter are covered with trees at an elevation far above any practicable battery sites, the lower slopes being bare of vegetation except grass. The conditions at Hong Kong are generally unfavorable for the concealment of defensive works.

12. We entered and left the harbor through the eastern or Kathong Channel. Inspection of the chart suggests a defense of this entrance on a line from Hong Kong Island to Tunglung Island, with perhaps an inner line from Cape Collinson to Slope Island or to Junk Island. I could not however detect the slightest indication of de-

fensive works on the eastern side of the channel in this vicinity, and as the hills were entirely bare except the covering of grass, with no buildings or structures of any kind visible and no indications of roads or any other work that would disturb the surface, I think it a safe conclusion that nothing in the way of direct fire batteries here has yet been undertaken. Even if batteries of mortars or howitzers on concealed sites or torpedo operating casemates had been started, it should have been possible to see some indications of landings or wharves, as the chart shows that the depths of water and nature of the shore are such that no landing place would be practicable that could be concealed from view from the main channel, while the shore topography is such that heavy plant or construction material could not be brought over land.

13. On the west side of the entrance channel the only indication of defensive works that I could detect outside of the batteries near the Lye Mun Pass, was what appeared to be a look-out or signal station on a high hill in rear of Cape Collinson.. There was a mound apparently of earth with flag staff near, and a line of telegraph poles leading up to it. It may of course have had nothing to do with defenses.

14. At the Lye Mun Pass several defensive works were plainly visible. On the west, on the high hill marked "657" on our chart, and designated "Chai Wan 640" on the British Admiralty chart, was what appeared to be a battery or fort in process of re-construction. The slope of the hill in front was strewn with debris, presumably the masonry of an old scarp wall that had recently been thrown down, and new earth work in rear could be made out. There were also men

moving about as if at work. From inside the harbor a road leading up to this site could be made out. Nearer the point abreast of the channel could be seen an old scarp wall or battery, and there were two openings looking like tunnel entrances, in the low rock bluff near the waters edge on the point. A road ran partly around the point, there were some small buildings near the tunnel entrances, with a fresh pile of material in the vicinity that looked like broken stone for concrete material. The place had the appearance of construction work in progress, and I surmised that the tunnels had something to do with a torpedo defense. One of the openings was at the level of the road, the other came down to the water. Back of the old battery above referred to were some masonry buildings marked "barracks" on the charts. I could also see some guns mounted near the new battery work above mentioned, with buildings near which could be seen from rear or inside the harbor only.

15. The batteries that were most plainly visible were those on the hills on the north side of the Lye Munn Channel. There was one near Devils Peak, one nearer the channel, and at a lower elevation, in both of which guns were visible, and there were evidences of a third battery where no guns were seen. There were masonry buildings near the higher battery, with roads leading up to the works on the rear slopes of the hills. All work in this vicinity had the general appearance of being comparatively recent, and this is consistent with the fact that it is located on the area that has only been under control of the British Government since 1899. This may be one reason why defensive work on lines further removed from the harbor does not seem to have yet been taken up. I did not make out more than two

guns to any one battery, and the batteries were widely separated. The guns seen appeared to be of large caliber, they were of course above the parapets and all had shields which would indicate that they were not on disappearing mounts. All the earth work appeared to be covered with grass, except in a few places where rain wash had evidently occurred, but nothing was seen of any attempt to conceal the batteries by bushes or trees. This would in fact be out of the question since the surrounding country is bare of such vegetation. The most conspicuos features of the batteries were the guns themselves, the long front slopes which were blended into the original surface, and in one case a long slope on the hill side that rose in rear of the battery. This appeared to be an artificial blanket of earth and sod probably designed to cover rock that came near the surface, and to diminish the destructive effect of shells that might pass over the battery and strike in rear.

16. At a considerable distance from the flank of one battery near Devils' Peak and at a level somewhat higher than the battery was what appeared to be a range finding or observation station. It was connected with the battery by what looked like a protected path or road running along the face of a slope that would be exposed to fire in action. I could make out a horizontal opening or window in the station facing the field of fire, with a short flank opening looking towards the battery. A grass covered earth slope extended up to the sill of this opening, and the low roof was blanketed with earth or sod which merged into the slope rising in rear.

17. A noticeable feature of the guns and shields was an apparent attempt to render them less conspicuos by painting. All had a dark ground or body color with broad and irregular bands and blotches of

a lighter color. Possibly the effect is to render the guns somewhat less easily located in certain conditions of the weather, but with a fair light and with a glass I should say a man who has some idea where to look for guns and batteries would have not the slightest difficulty in finding them. What the effect at night may be I am not prepared to say.

18. In the inner harbor there are two old batteries one on North Point, south side, and one on the point opposite near Hunghom. These are evidently only relics of former days when the British controlled nothing on the north side except the Kun Lung Peninsula proper, and had not long range guns to fear. This is confirmed by the fact that both works are plainly shown and each marked "battery" on the Admiralty Charts. No guns could be seen in either. There is however a work on a hill near the west side of Kun Lun peninsula about opposite Stone-cutters Island, in which guns could be seen, and which therefore appears to be still a part of the effective defense. This may be the battery referred to in the quotation from the Directory and Chronicle as "on the bluff at Tsim-tsa Tsui, Kowloon" but I can not find such a name on the charts.

19. Stone-cutters Island is owned by the Government and I learned it was occupied exclusively by the Military establishment. The chart shows a number of buildings and a rifle range on the Island. Three batteries could be made out, one on a hill on the east end, one on another hill on the west end, and a third on a lower level on a slope or terrace on the south east point of the island. Construction work appeared to be in progress on the eastern battery, and the south east battery appeared to be recent or recently rebuilt. Two guns could be seen here, but none could be made out at the other

other places on this Island, and it is somewhat doubtful if the other two batteries would have been identified as such without a clue as later explained.

20. In connection with the trial of a tug which I inspected I passed out through the Sulphur Channel and into the East Lamma Channel on the south side of the island, returning the same way. The weather was clear, but careful search with a glass did not disclose any defensive works in this vicinity. Subsequently however while on a vessel at anchor in the harbor I located a battery of two guns on the high slope in rear of Belchers Point. There is considerable shrubbery in the vicinity, and also on Stone-cutters Island, so the conditions for concealing works are fair. As the chart shows, the channels leading to the western entrance to the harbor are neither very straight, very well defined or very deep, and I was told that the larger commercial vessels and men-of-war rarely use that entrance.

21. I called at the office of the Royal Engineers to inquire about their experience with the Green Island Cement. My interview here was with Mr. H. W. Monon, a civilian having the designation of "District Surveyor". I was referred to him for the information I was after and he appeared to have immediate charge of the office from which construction work on the defenses was administered, though he went out to consult with the "Commanding Royal Engineer" relative to giving out a copy of printed specifications I asked for. His position seemed to be about that of one of our principal Assistant Engineers.

22. I happened to take a seat in the office opposite a set of drawers evidently containing drawings and I noticed the following labels on them which were significant:-

"Stone-cutters Island, Revision of 10-inch and 6-inch Replacements"

"Stone-cutters Island, Northeast Battery"

"Stone-cutters Island, Southeast Battery"

"Stone-cutters Island, West Battery",

"Military Road ---?--to ---?-----

"Belchers' Point Battery"

"Devils Peak, 6-inch Battery"

23. There may of course have been other drawers and other labels which I did not see, but it seems reasonable to conclude that had there been defensive works in progress at other localities, not identified from the water, some hint of same could have been observed in the office, as no theory can be found to explain the grouping of the particular labels I saw in one case of drawers, and placing all other drawings somewhere else. If there were more extensive works it would be natural to suppose for instance that the drawings would be grouped according to locality, ~~placing all~~ those at one entrance to the harbor or all those on one side of the harbor in one case. Other arrangements might have been to place new construction work in one place, and repairs and rebuilding in another, or battery work by itself and road work in a separate place. I think the indications were rather strong that there is not much of importance in the way of defensive work completed or in progress except as herein referred to.

24. So far as I could see or could learn no especial provision has been made against attack by land, and no defenses have been constructed on the south side of the island. The topography is such however as to make any operations on shore that would involve hand-

ling and moving siege or over field ordnance and material exceedingly difficult. There is quite an extensive shipbuilding and dry dock establishment in Aberdeen harbor on the south side of the Island. I remarked to the Manager of the Company controlling it, who went with me on the trial trip of the tug, that this would be rather an exposed location in the event of a war but he replied "Oh well I guess the fleet should take care of that".

25. All the buildings I saw that appeared to be connected with the defensive works were evidently brick and masonry. Mr. Moxon gave me a copy of the printed "specification of the Work proposed to be Executed in the Erection of Buildings for increased Garrison Accomodation, Stone-Cutters Island". The buildings are "Soldiers Barrack Block", "Sergeants Mess, Cook House, and ablution room", "Canteen, Chinese Latrine, and Latrines". The specifications contemplate doing the work by contract, and they are in great detail, describing work of the most substantial character. Brick walls with cut stone (granite) trimings like coners, door and window sills and lintels, etc., lower floors largely concrete, roofs of tiles, and nearly all the wood work like doors, sash, roof frames, etc. as well as much of the flooring is specified to be of hard wood.

26. Mr. Moxon informed me that they had used no steel reinforced concrete in the defensive works, except steel I beams in roofs of room. He also stated that they had had a considerable amount of surface cracking in their concrete work and troubles from leaks and condensation in room. They use only English and Green Island Portland Cement. The broken stone is granite, largely broken by hand by Chinese labor and this is often performed by women and girls. Disintegrated granite is extensively used for concrete and mortar.

27. The defensive lines at both entrances seem to be very close in. At the eastern entrance it looks as though there should be an outer line, at least as far out as Cape Collinson and perhaps across from Tathong Point to Tsito Chau, near the settlement marked Shiabo. In that case Petowkan Pass would of course be closed perhaps permanently. The Lye Mun Pass is however only about 500 yards wide and 150 feet deep, and the conformation of the shores affords sites for batteries which permit a strong defense. This defense is also probably supplemented by submarine mines and perhaps by some form of projectile or mobile torpedo like the Brennan. On account of the high hills there is no place outside this pass from which the harbor or city of Victoria could be reached by direct fire from vessels except a very limited area where they would be under direct fire from shore batteries.

28. The defense of the western entrances presents a less satisfactory problem on account of the numerous approaches though none affords a very deep or direct channel. What appears to be the present line of defense, from Stone-cutters Island to Belcher's Point, is certainly very near the main anchorage, and it looks as though there should be some obstruction of the narrow channels about Chung Hue and Ladrone Islands, with batteries on Green Island and on the main island near Shiktongtsui Point with possibly defensive works on Kau I Chau Island. Careful search with a glass disclosed nothing that looked like defensive works at any one of these places, and I had a good view from points outside, where direct fire batteries could have been detected if there had been any.

29. Of course there is a large measure of uncertainty about information concerning the defensive system of the harbor obtained

by the method herein described and practically nothing was learned about any submarine mine system, or indirect fire guns like mortars and howitzers. Considerable weight can however be attached to the fact that I could identify the locations of the several batteries referred to in the labels on the drawers in the Engineer Office, that these covered all the localities where I did identify batteries except those on the south side of the Lye Munn Channel,* and that I saw no reference among there labels to localities not identified except the Military road.

30. The main points of interest that have a bearing on our own defensive works may be summed up as follows:-

a. The General defensive system by shore batteries, so far as it can be observed from the water, appears rather meager considering the great importance of the place to British interests in the Far East, and the lines of defense seem to be surprisingly close in.

b. Sites at very high elevations seem to have been selected for the batteries wherever such sites are available. Batteries defending the Ley Munn channel are on sites as high as 600 feet above the water. Nothing seen to indicate rapid fire batteries of small caliber or batteries on low sites.

c. All barracks and other permanent buildings of masonry of substantial construction. No evidences seen of permanent wooden structures in connection with the defenses.

d. Attempt made to render the guns and shields less conspicuous by painting them in two colors in irregular patterns. Did not seem to be especially successful.

e. No reinforced concrete used in battery construction, and indications that the same troubles from leaks and condensation that

* and west side of Kiau Lung peninsula.

have had have been encountered.

f. The construction of Military roads and barrack and other buildings connected with the defensive system appears to be under the same administrative office and in charge of the Royal Engineers, as well as the work of building the batteries themselves.

31. At the works of the Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock Co. I saw a steel tug that had been built for the British War Department by that company. She was for general harbor service in connection with the defenses, for transportation of troops and supplies about the harbor, for target practice etc. The vessel had a steel hull, was 87 feet long, 17½ feet beam and 9 feet depth of hull. She had very little upper works, the wheel being on an open bridge and all the crew and passenger accomodations, except as afforded by the decks which were covered by awnings, being below. One rather interesting feature was a steam winding engine aft which I was informed was for use in target practice. By using a very long tow line and by steaming ahead and winding in the tow line at the same time a speed approaching that of a man of war could be given to the target. I secured a copy of the general plans of this boat and was promised drawings of the winding gear, but the latter have not yet been received.

Target Practice.

32. I finished the business I went to Hong Kong to attend to by Sunday afternoon the 10th excepts seeing the Superintendent in charge of the Green Island Cement works and he was not expected back till the following Tuesday. I therefore took the night boat on Sunday for a trip to Canton, returning on Monday afternoon. The distance to Canton is 90 miles and most of the way the country is the extensive delta formation of the lower Canton River, consisting of low flat islands and marshes, generally bare of trees or other

vegetation, with large areas protected by dikes and under cultivation. The whole region is cut up by an intricate system of channels and sloughs or bayous and this locality as well as the upper reaches of the river has been for many years the stamping ground of the Chinese pirate. This class of citizen exists to this day, their prey being the various craft that ply on the river, including even the modern steamers under European management. In many of its features the country strikingly resembles the marsh region of the coast of Georgia between Brunswick and Savannah.

33. Canton is conceded to be one of the most interesting cities in China, and it is the place where European and American Commercial interests first got a foot hold in the celestial empire. It is generally regarded also as a hotbed of anti-foreign agitation, and some recent events appear to fully justify this reputation. The passenger steamers running between Hong Kong and Canton would compare favorably with those on the Hudson, though they were scarcely up to the mark of the larger steamboats on the Sound.

34. A number of forts and defensive works are to be seen along the river and many of them have been the scene of active hostilities at various times during the "Opium Wars" and later conflicts, principally with Great Britain. All the works are of an old type frequently of necessity on very low sites, with much masonry visible, and a conspicuos feature consisted of small wooden houses or shelters built where the guns should be, and apparently used to shelter the armament. Several ancient "pagodas" are seen along the river, some of them of great height, but they appear to be only monuments and not adapted to any defensive propose. The chart shows the remains of several obstructions that were placed in the channel during the

fortifications above referred to.

35. A number of old batteries where fighting occurred in former years are still in existence around the city, particularly on the west & north sides outside the walls, and I saw a number of old cannon on the city wall, some of them apparently of English make.

36. My efforts at taking photographs were not very successful in results, owing principally to the difficulty of getting fresh films and of keeping them after they are obtained. Such prints as are at all presentable are however sent herewith and the point and direction of view are indicated on lists as far as practicable.

On the charts herewith the various names referred to are underlined in red, so they can be more readily identified.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

John Mills

Major of Engineers, U.S.A.

JOHN MILLIS

/ Inclos.
3 charts accompg. in
JW. exp. corps

REPORT OF A TRIP THRU YUNNAN, EASTERN TIBET AND SZECHWAN, JANUARY 17 - JULY 11, 1921.

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Prepared by

Major John Magruder, F. A.,
Assistant Military Attache,
Peking, China,
July, 1921.

On January 17th, [illegible] Interpreter, American Legation, Peking, I left Peking, [illegible] Yunnan, for the purpose of making general observations of conditions in the provinces of Yunnan and Szechuan, particularly having in view the conditions in the areas where these two provinces border on Burma and Tibet. There are no American officials resident in these areas and, so far as is known, no representatives of our Government have ever visited them in an official capacity.

We proceeded via Shanghai, thence by ship to Hongkong. While awaiting our ship at Hongkong, we spent two days in Canton where interviews were had with the principal leaders of the Southern Military Government, a report of which was made to the Military Attache. From Hongkong we went to Haiphong by rail to Hanoi, the capital of Annam; and from there to Yunnanfu via the scenic, meter-gauge railway which the French Government built with great engineering difficulty and now maintain at considerable expense due to frequent landslides during the rainy season. Both at Haiphong and Hanoi visits were paid to the French Officials who received us with great courtesy and consideration. We arrived at Yunnanfu on February 6, 1921.

At this time, Yunnan was disrupted with civil disorders. General Yeh Kuang, a Division Commander of Governor Tang Shi-yao, was in rebellion and conducting a sporadic attack on Yunnanfu, while another of Tang's subordinates, General Ku Pin-chun, was advancing against him from the northeast. On the 8th, General Tang fled from Yunnanfu, and the next day, without any disorder, General Ku Pin-chun entered the city and took over the functions of Governor. Current reports were made of this affair.

As a result of the civil disruption and the cessation of all business during Chinese New Year, it was necessary to remain in Yunnanfu until February 17th before arrangements could be completed for a caravan, local permits, escort, etc. Reports of banditry were rife; permits for travel would not be granted without large escorts; and escorts could not be obtained because of the "military" situation and because the incumbents of the various offices were awaiting the word of the new Governor before being assured of their authority to act. The delay permitted the observing of the developments in Yunnanfu and the paying of respects to the old and new officials. The Yunnan officials were found to be very friendly and courteous in all their dealings and noticeably free from the obstructionist methods of the Northern officials.

Every assistance was accorded in facilitating our travel and providing for our safety en route. In fact, we were embarrassed by the thoroughness of their arrangements. All officials along our route were notified in advance of our coming, and they frequently were more solicitous for our welfare than was comfortable after a long day's journey. Also their insistence on furnishing us escorts of size "as befitted our station" was a source of great annoyance and greater expense. We could never see the necessity for the escorts as a protection against the exaggerated prevalence of bandits. No reason was apparent why a white man, armed or unarmed, not interfering in local matters could not travel in comparative safety on the usual caravan routes of Yunnan. We spent much time in trying to reduce the useless escorts which were forced on us for "face", evidently as the result of well-meant instructions from Yunnanfu.

In the report which follows, the observations are arranged as shown in CONTENTS. The numerous appendices contain some material of practical value to anyone contemplating a like trip, as well as some information along lines not essential to the report but relating thereto. Since the trip was made at no expense to the Government, some liberty is taken in recording details intended only for future travellers along these trails. The difficulties encountered in interior travel in China are so great that any hints as to how these difficulties have been overcome will save the traveller much time for more important considerations. A glance at the CONTENTS will permit the reader to eliminate what is not wanted.

The general itinerary was as follows:—

Yunnanfu, Yunnan,	Kanze, Szechwan Marches,
Szemao "	Tachienlu, " "
Tulifu "	Ya chow, Szechwan
Li chiang "	Chia ting, "
A wan tau "	Sui fu, "
Batang, Szechwan Marches	Chungking "
Gartok, Tibet	Hankow, Hupeh
Dengo, "	Peking.

The route through Tibetan territory was only planned after our arrival at Batang. Here it was found, due to the extreme danger of the Batang-Litang-Tachienlu trail and the Batang-Dengo trail, that no other route was available without retracing our steps to Yunnan.

The whole area of Yunnan is mountainous. Aside from the mineral possibilities, it is a poor province. Less than half of the population is Chinese, the remainder being aboriginese and tribesmen the more important main divisions of which are the Lolos, Moses, Minchias, Lisos, Yunis and Shans. In the extreme north-west Tibetans predominate. The ethnological distribution and origin of the Yunnan tribesmen perplexes the scientists. The discussion of the tribesmen in the area about Szemao in Appendix 5 well illustrates the utter confusion in the ethnological grouping to be found in this corner of China. For a more general discussion of the subject, as well as a complete description of the Province, see Davies' "YUNNAN". The map compiled by Major Davies accompanying this volume is the best available map of Yunnan and, among its other excellent features, shows the general distribution of the tribes.

The Chinese population is found in the larger towns and in the more important villages along the main trade routes. Away from the populous centers, only tribesmen are encountered. In certain of the river valleys in the southern part of the Province only tribesmen can survive a very virulent form of malaria prevalent there. The trade is practically all in the hands of the Chinese, and where cultivation is easy and profitable, the land is largely owned by Chinese, the inaccessable places being left to the "Savages" to eke out a bare existence.

Although the population of Yunnan is small as compared with the other provinces of China, (about eight and a half million), the country seems to be supporting its capacity. Cultivation is carried on wherever anything will grow. In the south, large mountains are terraced to the summit where the soil and climate favor growth of crops. Some of the engineering and hydraulic accomplishments are stupendous. The more open valleys are intensely cultivated, but the small water courses as well are followed-up with terraces almost to their sources. Each widened valley is a center of population which varies in size almost directly with the area of cultivatable land.

There is no wheeled transportation in Yunnan. This statement is true of Tibet and Szechwan as well. There are no roads, but only trails in these areas. As for the trails, they seem to follow the route taken by the first man who traversed the country and to have been improved only by the traffic itself. No effort has been made to reduce gradients. On the contrary, the Yunnanese appears to have selected the highest point and to have made for it by the steepest route, attaining the elevation by short zig-zags. In the more populous districts, there are frequently long stretches of trail paved with rounded stone worn smooth by years of traffic. These places make hard footing and slippery footing for animals. Approaching villages, one often encounters road "improvement" in the nature of huge boulders thrown haphazard onto the surface, and the pony must pick his way from boulder to boulder or slip into the bogs between. In wet country the trail is generally a series of foot-holes, filled with mud, formed by innumerable ponies stepping in the same holes. In such places floundering is frequent. Many times the trail was utilized by the farmers as part of their irrigation system, and as a dumping ground for boulders from the fields. This does not seem to cause resentment on the part of those who must regularly travel the trail. Sometimes there is no defined trail, but the bed of a river is followed. Divides are not infrequently approached by wading for hours up small, rocky stream beds. The best trails in dry weather are those with clay surfaces often

[illegible] way like mountain goats. [illegible] themselves travelling free, these remarkable ponies carry their 160 pound loads with comparative ease. The only difference observable between the principal trails, the "good" trails and the minor trails was that of width. On the poor ones it is often necessary to unload the animals and carry by places too narrow to permit the loaded animals to pass. The minor trails are often much more pleasant to travel due to the lack of "improvement" according to the Chinese ideas.

(b) Military Observations.

A special report giving the organization of the Yunnan Army was previously submitted, the material of which has been incorporated in the Combat Monograph.

The Yunnanese soldiers enjoy the reputation of being determined fighters, according to Chinese standards. The foreigners in Szechwan who have seen much of the Yunnan troops in the past few years speak highly of their bravery and of the state of discipline in their organizations. It is noticeable that one does not hear of the Yunnanese troops looting in their own Province. Szechwan was their normal field for gain, but even there, the troops were generally well in hand, and the looting organizational rather than individual. The troops are poorly equipped and uniformed, but one is impressed by the seriousness with which officers and men appear to take their duty.

I was in Yunnanfu when General Tang Chi-yao fled before the approach of General Kou Pin-chan's column, and the change of governors took place. In the north this would have furnished occasion for disorders, but in Yunnanfu the City was well guarded by General Tang's troops until the arrival of the new troops, when the most orderly relief was accomplished. The City was full of soldiers at this time. Only subordinate, disciplined soldiers would have withstood the temptation to loot.

The local soldiery, enlisted and controlled by civil officials thruout the Province, are of a different type. They are merely poorly armed and uniformed coolies. It is usually this type which are detailed to accompany travellers in the country. They do not contemplate fighting off bandits. Their presence in numbers may cause bandits to desist, but in case the bandits attacked, the guard think only of escaping with their arms. In one case, when we were approaching a village in which bandits were known to be, our "guard" insisted upon leaving uniforms and rifles, and proceeding with us as coolies. In another case our guard told us they were on their way to join the bandits, as the life was more profitable and safer than being soldiers.

(c) Political Observations.

Yunnan is spoken of as the "Independent Province". Even the people of the Province use the term, but upon their being questioned, it is quite clear that there is no idea of independence from China meant by the term. The Yunnanese feel themselves a part of China just as strongly as do the people of Chihli. However, they are independent of the Pekin Government because the provincial leaders have said so. These leaders in asserting their independence declare that they will have nothing to do with a government which brings responsibilities and obligations and gives no benefits in return. They will not divide the revenues of the Province with men in Peking. Yunnan is so distant, geographically so isolated and

[illegible] of the independent status, there are no differences in the political organization of the province. The title of "Tuchun" is changed to "Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Yunnan". The civil governor is powerless as in other provinces, and instead of being appointed by Peking is appointed by the military official, as are all the other provincial and minor officials. None of the voice in affairs is given to the people as is contemplated in the provincial autonomy movement.

The people of Yunnan have no enthusiasm for this independence; they have no provincial patriotism and sentiment directed against all the rest of China. They do not hate the Szechwanese into whose territory they are so frequently led. The Peking gets no revenues from Yunnan, the people are no less squeezed. On the contrary, the Yunnanese are taxed to the very limit of their meager resources. The local officials get rich, and their independence consists in not dividing the spoils with Peking.

As mentioned before, the people of Yunnan are, in most parts, wretchedly poor. I have seen nowhere else in China the same evidences of extreme poverty, and yet the tax gatherer is nowhere more active. Much of the banditry so prevalent in Yunnan is not the activity of regularly organized bands, but the desperate attempts of otherwise peaceful neighborhoods to exist at the expense of unguarded caravans. During my visit in the Province, there were a few large bands of organized bandits still existing, but the most dangerous ones such as Yang Yin Fu's had been incorporated into the army and the leaders appeased by substantial gifts and titles. From time to time a group of disaffected soldiers desert with arms and equipment complete and operate as bandits almost unmolested in the more isolated areas. It is only rarely that the Yunnan bandits will molest foreigners, as this results in bringing soldiers against them. In the case when Yang Tien Fu took Dr. Shelton, it was a drastic political stroke on the part of the Bandit Chief to bring the Governor to terms, and to grant certain benefits and immunities which the Chief had been demanding.

The Chinese Shan States are now divided into eight districts for administrative purposes, each district being under an official called Weiyuan. These officials are under an Administrative Commissioner at Chin Lung Chiang who is subordinate to the Taoyin at Szemao. The total population (mostly Shans) is estimated at 180,000, which works out roughly at 24 inhabitants per square mile.

The Tibetan inhabited Marches in Yunnan are not under a special commissioner as in Szechwan, but the area is divided into hsiens and the civil administration conducted just as in the remainder of the province.

I was told by the Taoyin at Szemao that all the boundaries of the Province resting on French Indo-China and Burma were definitely settled, except the still open controversy regarding Pienma. An intelligent British subject assured me that there was no controversy over Pienma - that a Frontier Commission had included Pienma in Burma, and that is where it would remain.

(d) Economic Observations.

No attempt will be made to do other than outline the principal trade routes of the Province, and note a few observations made on the trail.

The two important trading centers are Yunnanfu and Talifu (or more accurately Hsia-kuan, 10 miles south of Talifu). The main points of entry are Yunnanfu, at the terminus of the French railway from Haiphong; Tengueh, about six days north-west of Bhamo a river port on the upper Irrawady; and Szemao, the least important, in the extreme south of the Province, on the trail leading to Rangoon.

[illegible] into Tibet; one southeast to [illegible] joins the Yunnanfu-Rangoon trail; and one via Kun-long Ferry on the Salween to Lashio, the rail head of a branch running up from Mandalay.

Our route to Szemao was via the Yunnanfu-Rangoon trail. Principal traffic was salt from the mines at Mo-hei, "Puerh" tea from the area south of Szemao, and cotton from Burma. At the customs station in Szemao, the receipts show the values of imports to be in the following order - tea, cotton, and medicines. Great quantities of deer horns, tiger bones etc., are brought in for medicines. However, since the customs station does not collect sufficient receipts to cover the expenses of the office, the total imports are not great. Most of the traffic on this trail, except salt, originates south of Szemao and goes thru to Yunnanfu. Perhaps from a third to a half is transported on the backs of tribesmen.

A few days south of Yunnanfu no foreign products were for sale in the villages except some cotton piece goods and kerosene. The life is primitive, there is nothing for export, and the people are too poor to import. The principal corps are rice, beans and rape seed. Patches of poppies were grown rather generally but not in abundance.

Very little traffic was seen on the Mo-hei - Talifu trail until Meng-hua was reached. Much of the Black River Valley is barren and thinly populated, but where the Valley broadens out there is considerable cultivation Aside from rice, sugar cane is the principal crop. North of Ching Tung-hsien the poppy is the predominate crop and continues so to Talifu and beyond. Here it is raised in large fields instead of in patches. Two crops a year are grown in Yunnan. The poppy is raised in the summer season and as a result greatly reduces the amount of beans and corn produced. The price per ounce of opium is, locally, only about thirty cents. There is no official obstacle whatsoever to the growing of opium.

Hsia-kuan is a busy and prosperous trade center. Talifu, ten miles away, is more of an official and residential city, prettily located on the lake and enjoying an excellent climate. The surrounding plains, between the lake and snow-capped mountains, formed by the gradual drying-up of the lake, are very productive.

The trail to Lichiang is much better than the average one in Yunnan. There is a busy traffic between Talifu and Lichiang, the greater part of the transport being carriers from the Minchia and Moso tribesmen. Lichiang is a busy market town of perhaps thirty thousand population, situated in the center of a large, fertile plain which appears to have once been the bed of a lake. As Tachienlu is "The End of China" from the direction of Szechwan, Lichiang is "The End" from the Yunnan way. The demarkation line here is not so definite however as at Tachienlu. Going north from Lichiang, one passes for about four days thru country almost entirely inhabited by Mosos (Nassis) and then enters purely Tibetan country.

Tibetans carry their raw wool, woven wool, rugs, furs and musk to this point to trade for tea, silks, jewelry, etc., from China. Except for several large, annual caravans from Lhasa which go all the way to Szemao for tea, Tibetan caravans are seldom seen south of Lichiang. Much of the Tibetan trade is accomplished at Atuntzu, and the products reshipped to Lichiang. Atuntzu, about twelve days to the north, is a Chinese outpost for Tibetan trade, and the last town of any importance in north-west Yunnan.

[illegible] one as being physically inferior to the [illegible] and, for mountain people, are noticeably lacking in resistance. [illegible] they proverbially are stupid. It is a local saying that the Szechwans occupy all the positions in Yunnan which require any degree of mentality, and that the peaceful invader becomes wealthy while the natives become poorer.

Both among the Chinese and the Tribesman goitre is very prevalent. In some localities it was rare to see a native without a goitre. It is said that a young girl lacking this mark of beauty is the object of sympathy in some communities. The goitre always produces mental weakness, and after several generations usually causes imbecility. On every hand, one observes dullness of eye and simple-mindedness. In every gathering there are to be seen imbeciles.

Another cause of physical deficiency in Yunnan is said to be the prevalence of Malaria in the lower valleys. The smoking of opium is very general. In some localities, men, women and children use the pipe.

The country is so isolated from the outside world, and even from the rest of China that the natives are concerned only with their local affairs. These local interests are extremely narrow due to the physical difficulties of communication and intercourse. The greater part of the population live in little holes of valleys surrounded by high mountains or else on the most inaccessible heights. They seldom see a stranger and they seldom go farther from home than their most distant rice terrace. They have even less chance for mental development than the average Chinese villager in the open country. It is not surprising that they talk only of seasons and crops; of food for their bellies; and of money of which they have so little.

There was no evidence among the Chinese of any religious devotion. The temples generally were in an utter state of disrepair, were dismantled of all decorations, and unoccupied by priests. There were family alters in the houses and the ceremonials of ancestral worship were often observed. Superstition was encountered everywhere among Chinese and Tribesmen.

Great respect is shown to foreigners, and no anti-foreign feeling was manifest anywhere. Some of the tribes people met on the trails were exceedingly shy, if not a little fearful of us. We had many requests for medicine. Their faith in our drugs and skill seemed unbounded, but one is led to believe that their ultimate faith is in their own remedies if the foreign stuff does not produce an immediate cure. Some of the thrifty ones solicited our pills with the intention later to sell them.

The villages are less clean than in most parts of China. The people themselves and their homes are dirtier than elsewhere.

Suicide is very frequent, particularly among the Chinese Women. Swallowing opium is the usual method resorted to.

(a) General.

The portion of our trip through Tibet was made, as was mentioned before, in order to avoid an extremely dangerous area of territory in the Chinese controlled Marches. To go from Batang to Tachienlu (a seventeen day trip by the direct route) it was necessary to take a very circuitous route to the west, then north to Derge, thence south-east to Tachienlu - a thirty-three day trip instead of seventeen. When the decision was made to adopt this route, letters were sent to the military commander at the frontier and to the Ma Kham Tiji at Gartbok telling them of our plans, and requesting that they give their assistance in expediting our journey thru Tibetan territory. This they did in the fullest measure. Our travel in Chinese-Tibetan territory had been accomplished with considerable hard-ships and with difficulties which we had to overcome without official assistance. From the moment of our arrival at the Tibetan frontier our travel became as easy, pleasant and safe as the officials could make it. We were furnished with the best transportation the country afforded, and were furnished with officers to personally conduct us and smooth all difficulties. Officials and inhabitants all along the route were notified in advance of our arrival. We were received everywhere with marked honors as if we were official visitors on a mission of importance to their country. In a number of instances, in fact wherever troops were stationed, the troops were paraded to escort us into the village, and the next day to escort us out. In some cases, the receptions were arranged on a magnificent scale and were extraordinarily picturesque.

We were the first American officials to visit Tibet, and the circumstances attending our visit were most surprisingly agreeable and interesting. Our reception convinces me that in the future should Americans have occasion to enter Tibet for any proper purpose, they will be received with great courtesy.

The excellent standing of the American missionaries at Batang, and the respect which they have commanded from all classes on both sides of the Tibetan-Chinese frontier, I feel sure, are responsible in a large measure for the great consideration shown us by the Tibetan officials. I might add, in this connection, that my recent experience has convinced me that such trips into the interior of China are today made comparatively safe and comfortable because of the pioneer work accomplished in these areas by devout missionaries, the majority of whom are honest, sincere workers for a cause in which they believe, despite the careless aspersions flung in treaty ports.

(b) Military Observations.

Tibet has a regular military establishment under the control of the Central Government at Lhasa. The details as to strength, organization and stations were not obtainable. In fact, to get any definite information regarding Tibet was almost impossible owing to the difficulties of interpreting and to the evasive answers given by the officials. Evasion did not seem intentional on the part of the officials, but the oriental tendency to answer foreign to the question was pronounced, as was also ignorance of their own political and military affairs.

The strength of the regular Army was variously stated at from twenty to thirty thousand men. The greater part of this force is believed to be stationed along the Chinese frontier, especially along that part of the frontier resting on Szechwan. There is also some form of Militia supplied with uniforms, arms and equipment. No estimate of the strength of this body could be obtained. One company of militia paraded for us at Lham-dun. This company

appeared to exercise some control over the troops in his area, and yet all the officers questioned stated they received their orders from Lhasa. In Dergo, the army officers apparently exercised both civil and military functions. As in China, there is a confusion of authority between civil and military officials too complex for the western mind to grasp. No confliction and jealousy was evident, however, in Tibet.

No information could be obtained regarding staff organization, the supply service and technical services. There is, however, some form of general staff in Lhasa. Arms, ammunition and equipment are supplied thru the Central Government. So far as could be ascertained, the only supplies furnished the troops are rifles, ammunition, personal ordnance equipment and uniforms. Pay and food are obtained by a tax on the local population in which the troops are stationed. The men are billeted in the villages. Transportation is requisitioned as needed.

There is no artillery in the area thru which we passed. We were told that there was some mountain artillery stationed at Lhasa. A few small detachments of cavalry were seen. No technical services seem to exist. The officials have no maps of the country, not even of the frontier they are defending. When shown maps, they appeared to comprehend nothing of how they were made or of their purpose. The technical ideas of the officers are those of children. There was no apparent attempt at military education. I was told, and I think truthfully, that they have no printed manuals or publications of any sort. There are probably some beginnings along this line at Lhasa.

The Tibetan troops are armed with the pre-war model of Enfield rifle, sold to the Government by the British. The uniforms are of the Indian Army pattern. Some of the original uniforms furnished from India are still seen, but for the greater part, the present uniforms are made of native woolens after the old pattern. The British buttons are used. The higher ranking officers wear uniforms and helmets made in India.

For some time, possibly since 1914, Tibetan non-commissioned officers have been sent to India for instruction, and are used upon their return as drill instructors. Many of the officers, too, have received training with the Indian Army. The Indian Army drill methods are used, and all commands, curiously, are given in English. Scotch bag-pipes are employed as field music, as are also bugles. Some of the organizations did a very good close-order drill and manual of arms. No extended order was observed.

The morale of the troops was good. In all the drills and exercises, the men evinced a lively interest and pride. The discipline was not harsh, but seemed the result of cheerful obedience and the natural subordination of the Tibetan to his superiors. Any disobedience would likely be treated with severe measures. The officers are chosen from the higher class of people who have always been accustomed to respect from the lower classes, but intimacy with their men is quite to be expected in a country where even the slaves eat at the same table and live in the same quarters as their masters.

The Tibetan is a good shot. Every boy is accustomed to the use of rifles and is taught to waste no ammunition. They all are good riders and understand the care of animals. They are inured to the hardships of camp and trail. Their normal ration is the simplest in the world. The Tibetan soldier would prove a worthy antagonist in his own country.

	[illegible]	Field Martial or Chief of Staff,
2.	Dai Ben	Commander of 500 men, corresponds to our general
3.	Zu ben	Commander of 250 men, [illegible]
4.	Ja ben	Commander of 100 men,
5.	Haien wu	Commander of 25 men,(Lieut.)

(c) Political Observations.

There is no hope for any great political or economic development in Tibet so long as Lama-ism retains its present overwhelming control over every phase of life and every human activity. In Tibet the lamas not only influence the lives of the people and the affairs of the country but they dominate every thought, they direct every situation. The most unimportant undertaking would not be started without the approval of the lamas. No important undertaking would be initiated except by them. The most absolute temporal ruler existing is the Dalai Lama. Spiritually he is revered no less than a god. He is the political head of Tibet. Many of the most important civil officials are lamas. A third of the male population are non-producing lamas. Every community which produces enough to place its inhabitants a march ahead of poverty finds itself possessed of a lamasery filled with just as many lamas as can subsist on what should be the prosperous surplus of the community. The inhabitants have no resentment against this religious luxury. On the contrary, they live in awe of its very walls and feel an added virtue for each sacrifice they make for its maintenance. They are mentally, spiritually and bodily enslaved by the lamas, and so benumbed to all reason that they cherish their enslavement.

All the culture and education, such as it is, centers in or about the lamaseries. There is no independent thought in Tibet. So little intercourse has been had with the outer world that it has been simple for the lamas to maintain that ideal of fixed religious orders - status quo. It seems inconceivable to the western mind that there exists today such blatant religious tyranny without any rebellious movement to destroy it. Tibet does not suffer the evil of religion in politics - but is afflicted with a religion which controls or is its whole political structure.

Such a thing as popular voice or popular representation not only does not exist in Tibet, but is as yet unheard of. Civil and military officials form a class and their sons automatically are eligible to become officials. None but the decendants of the princely lines would dare aspire to such honors. The sons who become lamas are not prevented from holding official positions, and frequently do hold them. The influence of the lamas over the more intelligent ruling class seems to be quite as strong as their hold on the ignorant villagers. So far as could be learned on the eastern edge of the country, no voice has yet been raised in denunciation of the religious order.

Despite this condition which arrests all progress, it is a fact that the people are unconscious of any rights withheld. There is not the slightest stir of radicalism in Tibet - a situation almost unique in the world today - and the people appear quite happy and contented with things as they are. Compared with their kinsmen just across the border in Chinese territory, their lot is fortunate. The country is tranquil; the trails are safe; authority is exercised with mildness and justice; they cultivate the land and herd their flocks without molestation. The lamas benefit/ too. largely from the labors of the devout, and at the present time, taxes are complained of as being excessive. These plaints are no more serious than the growling of our unfortunate rich over the income tax. Some Tibetans expressed a longing for the good old days when the bandits came only once a year,and deplored the present orderliness which costs them monthly tax collections.

[illegible] with Radis, there was a [illegible] on the part of the officials to hear of out-[illegible] questions were childlike, but at least they were interested. Several expressed a desire to go abroad "when our country sends representatives to other countries", as they put it. There seems to be a growing tendency to apply foreign methods in their administration. They are of a much more open mind than the Chinese. If it were not for the obstacles placed in their way by British policy, I believe that the Tibetans would heartily welcome the coming of foreigners for all purposes except for the spread of other religions. Sooner or later the lamas would find that all the ideas brought by the foreigners are equally as damaging to their position as the foreigner's religion. Then the lamas would the lamas abandon their present serenely secure and indifferent attitude toward the alien.

The idea of the British in 1914 was to make of Tibet proper an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty and British protection. The British "protection" exists, but Tibet has declared her independence of China, and so far as one can judge, the Tibetans consider themselves free from all future Chinese interference in Tibetan affairs. There were at the beginning of this year (1921) a British Resident, a Doctor, and two secretaries in Lhasa. The Doctor died in the spring. Rumors that British troops were in Lhasa were denied by Tibetan officials, but they further stated that the British Resident was building a house there.

The form of government would be difficult to define. After painfully long questioning the following higher ranking officials were identified. They are listed in order of rank:-

1. Dalai Lama (Chinese title). "Jawa Rimbo Che" is the Tibetan title, meaning "Precious Regal or Victorious One". He is the supreme religious and civil ruler.

2. Teashi Lama (Chinese title). "Ben Chen Rimbo Che" is the Tibetan title. He is the equal or superior to the Dalai Lama in religious matters but does not figure in secular affairs. He lives at Shigatse.

3. Begi Jabo (literally, King). Second only to the Dalai Lama. A sort of premier. The Begi Jabo recently died and there were great ceremonies in Lhasa this spring when a young Regent was installed.

4. Galun. The title means "To take orders from". There are four Galuns in Tibet and they take orders from the Dalai Lama only. There is one Galun living at Chiamdo who seems to be the supreme official in Eastern Tibet. He happens to be a Lama as well and is always spoken of as the Galun Lama.

5. Tiji. This official corresponds to the Governor of a province. The one best known in Eastern Tibet is the Ma Kham Tiji (Governor of South Kham) who is spoken of elsewhere in this report. He is stationed at Garthok, near the frontier.

6. Jasa. Of equal rank with the Tijis. They are Governors of Lhasa and do not leave there.

Both the Galun Lama and the Ma Kham Tiji are extremely agreeable to foreigners. They are both considered by the foreigners who know them as very just officials, and for their lights, very progressive. The missionaries at Batang are on the friendliest terms with them both. We were urged by the officials at Garthok to go by the way of Chiamdo in order to call on the Galun Lama. They assured us that the Galun would be greatly disappointed not to see visiting foreign officials.

[illegible] To show how strong [illegible] official circles, the following story [illegible] We were accompanied from Batang to Garthok by Dr. Hardy and Mr. MacLeod, missionaries at Batang and personal friends of the Ma Khan Tiji. Upon our arrival at Garthok, we were received most hospitably by all the Governor's staff and lodged in the palace. The Governor deeply regretted that he was unable to receive us personally, explaining that he was in religious retreat for sixty days and still had three days until the end of it. He remained in his room engaged in devotions for all this time, seeing nobody but his Chief Secretary. He was solicitous of our comfort and insisted on our remaining until his retreat was finished, saying, "If I break my vow, I shall lose all the virtue stored up in my past life". At first I suspected this was a ruse to prevent any complications that might have arisen from his having received us, but all such suspicions were proven entirely unwarranted. Here was a Governor who could withdraw from official duties for two months to satisfy a religious need.. One cannot resist the speculation on the power of an intriguing lama who can prescribe a prolonged retreat to an inconvenient but devout civil official.

The present frontier between Tibet and Szechwan from the information available is only approximately as follows; the coordinates of the points being given:—

Lat.	28° 55'	Long.	98° 15'
"	29° 12'	"	98° 33'
"	29° 27'	"	98° 49'
"	30° 45'	"	98° 50'
"	30° 55'	"	99° 48'
"	31° 42'	"	99° 40'
"	32° 30'	"	99° 25'

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(d) Economic Observations.

THE deadening effect of Lama-ism is best exemplified in its obstruction of economic development. If it does not actually forbid mining operations, it discourages mining by creating superstitious fears regarding the practice of taking minerals from the ground. A few years ago, the Dalai Lama was ill. To assure his recovery, a ban was placed for five years upon the killing of any game and the catching of fish in Tibetan territory. A source of considerable income to the inhabitants was the killing of musk deer to obtain the costly pockets of musk. In Southern Tibet, some profitable local fishing industries were affected. The greater part of the trade and commerce in Tibet is, however, conducted by the lamas themselves. The longstanding fear of the British from Russian encroachments and the treaties and agreements resulting therefrom have prevented scientific and commercial exploration as well as the investigation of the mineral possibilities of the country. The British are not blameless for retarding free economic development.

Due to the extreme elevations and climatic conditions, Tibet will never produce much agriculturally, if any, in excess of her needs. Large areas will produce nothing, and where the climate and soil are good, the narrow valleys afford only limited terrain which is cultivatable. Transportational difficulties are so great that profits can be made only on valuable cargoes. It is for this reason that all foreign attempts at exporting wool from the Chinese side have ended in failure. It is difficult to see how Tibet can ever be in the market for foreign products unless her mineral resources prove workable and productive.

Most that was said of the difficulties of the Yunnan trails could be repeated in describing the Tibetan. Where practicable and the population warrants, some work is done in Tibet to improve the trails, such as leaving the natural surface and simply throwing off the loose rocks. In Yunnan it is absurdly true that the rocks are oftener thrown on the trail, the

[illegible] be pleasant to travel. However, there are [illegible] which cannot be eliminated that will always cause [illegible] be hard on man and animals. In the high country, are long, desolate, uninhabited valleys, the surfaces of which are loose stones and and frequently bogs. The trail in such places is not defined - it is simply the valley itself. There is nobody to work the trail, and only an occasional caravan or traveller hurries to put the place behind. In the winter the passes are closed; in the summer they are difficult at best. The daily, rapid changes in temperature and altitude quickly wear out the strongest ponies. It will frequently happen that for several days in succession one will leave summer in a valley, climb to a pass where he encounters a blizzard, and descend to mild summer weather for the night, having passed thru a range of from three thousand to five thousand feet in altitude. All of this is occurring at elevations never lower than ten thousand feet above sea level.

The approaches to Tibet from China have become so dangerous as a result of the continuous disorders in the Marches that the trade with China steadily decreases. The routes to India are safe and less difficult. From Lhasa to Darjeeling is only about sixteen days and Darjeeling is a rail-head. From Lhasa to Tachienlu is a good sixty days via the North Route (which is comparatively safe from bandits). This trip is physically difficult, and, having arrived at Tachienlu, it is still more than twenty days to Shanghai. It is not strange that the Tibetans are shifting their trade to the easier and surer markets of India. If it were not for the decided Tibetan preference for Chinese tea, communication between the two countries would scarcely exist. Tea in Tibet is not a luxury, but due to the important part it plays in the daily diet, it is a necessity, and tremendous quantities are used. The Indian Government has long tried to make a market for Indian tea, even to the extent of distributing it free for a time, but the Tibetans will have none of it. All the transportational difficulties are overcome to obtain the poorest quality of Chinese brick tea, into which the thrifty merchants have pressed used tea leaves, stalks of the plant, rubbish and what-not.

The most important tea market is Tachienlu. It is carried here in huge quantities from Ya Chou and vicinity, eight days away, on the backs of men. One sees thousands of these carriers toiling up the trail under loads heavier, literally, than the loads packed on the mules. At Tachienlu the tea is repacked by shrinking wet raw-hides over packages the size of half a yak load. Large caravans of Yaks, often 500 to a caravan, carry it north-west to Kanse and Derge, from where it is distributed all over Tibet.

In the Tibetan territory visited it was noticeable that no shops exist. There are no small merchants. What few articles are used by the people are not made in the homes are obtainable only by inquiry about the community. In no place are articles on display. The needs of the people are so small and their tastes so unvaried that there is little trade in a community. All clothes are made in the homes, as well as are all foodstuffs. There are no craftsmen nor specialists producing the best articles of a kind for sale. The province of Derge is famous for artistic metal tea-pots, cut brass trimmings for horse equipment, inlaid bits and stirrups, bowls, etc. The products are used all over Tibet. But there are no small factories, nor shops for disposing of the wares - the whole industry is a home one.

Wheat, barley, peas, beans, and corn are the principal crops. Quantities of wild apricots, cherries and currants are gathered. The former, dired dried in sugar, are a great delicacy. Parched barley meal, milk and butter constitute the greatest food products of the country. The meat of the sheep, cattle and yaks is used, but the two latter are raised primarily for milking and for transport. The Tibetans drink quantities of milk and use butter for the most surprising number of purposes, among which are as medicine, cosmetics, art figures and bas-reliefs in the lamaseries, lubricant and illuminate. In

buttered tea, and is sipped all day. It is made by boiling all the strength and color from brick tea and churning the product (slightly salted) with butter, preferably rancid, until thoroughly mixed. This is both food and drink. The one staple food of all classes is tsamba. This is made by partially filling an individual bowl with buttered tea, on top of which is floated a cone of parched barley meal. By poking with the finger this meal is mixed with the tea, and gradually worked with the fingers into a dough ball which is eaten without further preparation. Tsamba is very nourishing, and not unpalatable.

The money used in Tibet is the rupee, both Indian and Szechwan coined being current. The latter is an imitation of the Indian rupee and contains less silver, but is quite acceptable. To make a half rupee the coin is simply cut in two. There is a thin silver coin made in Tibet, the tenga or tunka, worth about 1/3 rupee, and three copper coins of very odd denominati ons which are little used. The Srang is a unit of value represented by an ounce of silver.

The only available figures on trade between China and Tibet are those for Tachienlu, the most important center, for 1913. It does not appear that 1913 was a normal year since the exports to Tachienlu exceed the imports. The table is given mainly to show the articles. Amounts given in English pounds.

Exports to Tachienlu.

Musk	75,000
Gold	30,625
Materials for medicine	15,000
Wool	10,000
Skins and hides	5,625
Carpets and rugs	3,125

Imports.

Tea	72,187
Cottons	25,000
Silk	15,000
Miscellaneous	13,750

(e) Ramphologic Observations.

The Tibetans are of Mongolian race and are the latest survivals of the Turco-Mongol stock, which was once general thruout high Asia. As with the Mongols proper the cheek bones are prominent tho not so high, the lips often large and thick, but the nose more flat.

The commonly accepted figure for the population of Tibet is 3,000,000, but this is believed by good authorities to be too high. It would appear that owing to celibacy, polyandry, and disease, not to mention the high rate of infant mortality, the numbers of the population are stationary if not declining.

"The Tibetan language belongs to the Tibeto-Burman family of the Indo-Chinese group, and is spoken in a variety of dialectal forms, in many districts beyond the frontiers of Tibet, by, it is said, some 8,000,000 people in all.----The language is properly monosyllabic and uninflected----.. It was reduced to writing in the seventh century, a syllabic alphabet, based on that of Sanscrit, being introduced from India for the purpose." There is no similarity in the sound of the spoken language to the Chinese.

The universal religion of Tibet is Lama-ism, a branch of Buddhism greatly corrupted. Perhaps nowhere in the world today does religion so generally and so deeply influence the lives of the people as in Tibet. On every hand one sees evidence of devotion on the part of the faithful. Prayer wheels are turned by the old people while walking or riding along the trails; mechanical prayer wheels are turned endlessly by water power; prayer flags flutter over every village; innumerable "Mani piles" are placed on each trail, the piles being built of thousands of prayers carved on stones; the cliffs are cut with huge prayer inscriptions; "Om Mani Padme Hum" appears written in Tibetan everywhere, and is muttered monotonously wherever Tibetans are; and pilgrimages to holy places, sometimes lasting for months, are made by men and women of all ages. While the people are blindly devout in this stupifying religion, the very nature of their faith lulls them into a state of laissez faire to the point of killing all missionary zeal. They are, therefore, not fanatics, and not in any sense dangerous because of their religion, unless goaded to the extreme. Their belief attributes no virtue to killing, even of unbelievers. I know of no case where a Tibetan has killed with the hope of future reward as a motive. This immunity extends to animals as well. Because of their belief in reincarnation, the necessary killing of animals is accomplished with fear and hesitation, lest the death pains are inflicted upon the spirit of one's grandmother or one's best friend.

The Tibetans are children of nature. They live largely in the open, and are capable of withstanding great rigors of climate. They have all the lack of modesty of children, and appear to obey their impulses as naturally as the cattle and sheep in their herds. They are often playful and exuberant, and ready to laugh upon all occasions. Under the influence of alcohol, they frequently become boisterous. Despite reports to the effect that they are drunkards, I observed very little drinking, but if they could afford to buy much liquor, one might expect them to be heavy drinkers like most mountain people. The men are generally big, upstanding, healthy specimens, and the women strong and capable looking. Due to the altitude, and the exposure to which the children are subjected, the infant mortality is high. The Tibetans truly represent the survival of the fittest.

The relations between the sexes is unique in Tibet. There seems to be no differentiation between men and women in the tasks assigned and duties performed by an assembly of inhabitants, unless it is that the women usually perform the harder task. They voluntarily assume the more difficult work and show no resentment in doing so. The men spend the greater part of their g time around the house, while the women work in the fields, carry loads on the road, and operate the local caravans. The story is current that the Tibetan men perform the normal household duties rather than the women. This is certainly not general. The actual condition appears to be that the women do most of the work of all kinds, while the men conserve their strength and dignity. Nor does it appear that the women are downtrodden and in virtual slavery. The women show spirit, they speak out with an air of equality, and they demonstrate much more initiative and ability than the men. In a mixed group of Tibetans, there seems to be a total elimination of sex differences. Women, both wives and daughters, are sent on the trail with a caravan in company with men. They suffer the same exposures, and eat and sleep together indiscriminately just as so many men.

The Tibetans are lacking in a high moral sense, but they do not impress one as being immoral. The women are not promiscuous, and, except in villages like Batang where they have been contaminated by the Chinese, there is no prostitution. But if it may be said that cattle in the fields are immoral, then the Tibetans, who are almost as natural as their flocks, are immoral. There seems to exist none of the nobler affections and sentiments between men and women, nor does one hear of jealousy. The man has none of that monopolistic attitude toward his wife which is otherwise so universal. For these reasons, it becomes quite natural that the existence of both polygamy and polyandry is purely an economic question and not an ethical one. Neither the church nor the community concerns itself with the matter

or how many wives a man has. The man's concern is how many he wants and how many he can support. The religious of both sexes (there are female lamaseries too) practice celibacy. In lay circles polygamy is found among the prosperous land owners while the poorer classes, as a rule, practice polyandry, several brothers having one wife. The small bit of farming land belonging to a family, or a valley in the high grazing land leased to one family will support only a limited number of heads. Consequently, if each son married and had a family, in a little while famine would inevitably result. The eldest son takes a wife in common with his brothers and one family only is perpetuated. The children are all the legal heirs of the eldest brother.

The Tibetans are much given to lying. Their lying is not malicious, but is simply a result of the oriental tendency to avoid fact. They are radically fearful of being definite, and they abhor the statement of a bald truth. I have heard that petty thieving is natural to them. Personally, we had only one experience of the kind. They are extremely superstitious and the tendency is exaggerated by the lamas. They believe in all manner of portents and omens.

No extravagance can be charged to the statement when it is said that the Tibetans are bodily just as dirty as they can be. The majority of them literally never take a bath. Their garments are utterly filthy, covered with soot from their open fires, and the grease of years. Their hands are never so clean as when they just finished kneeding their tsamba.

Their houses are very unclean, and the most unsanitary conditions prevail about them. One wonders that there is not more sickness, but due to the cold and to the dryness of the climate, there is actually little disease. Small pox is the greatest scourge of the country. Their medicine consists for the most part of charms. There are no graves in Tibet as a result of the custom of disposing of bodies by throwing them in the river, placing them on the mountains for the vultures, or cutting them into bits for the birds to dispose of.

The Tibetans are by nature most hospitable. It is the custom of the country to find shelter in the first house available, and one enters with the same freedom as if the house were a public place. The houses by day are open to friend and stranger who roam at will about the place. Certain customs provide that the traveller is furnished as a right with wood and water. Milk and buttered tea are always available to the passer-by. The personnel of a caravan seldom fail to refresh themselves as they pass shepherd tents or the camps of other caravans. These same hospitalities are extended to foreigners in a very gracious manner. There was never the slightest evidence of anti-foreign sentiment, but on the contrary only the most marked interest and friendliness was shown by the inhabitants. The officials everywhere were hospitable, eager to assist us at all times, and spared nothing to show us honor and courtesy.

OF SZECHWAN MARCHES.

By the Szechwan Marches is meant that area of high country in western Szechwan, which is ethnologically Tibetan, lying between the border of Tibet proper and a line roughly north and south thru Tachienlu, the southern end curving south-west to Chungtien, in Yunnan. In this area are included various tribes of people, some aborigenese and some closely related to the Tibetans. Except for certain officials, the troops in scattered garrisons, a few merchants in the larger villages, and some fugitives from Chinese authority, no Chinese inhabit this country. The old Tibetan nobles and churchmen still have some historic rights and privileges in the Marches, but these are fast disappearing, or have disappeared, wherever the Chinese authority is established. There are some areas of "Independent Tribesmen" in the interior of the Marches which retain the status because of their inaccessibility, and the inability of the Chinese to control the fierce inhabitants.

The Marches are not under the provincial government of Szechwan, but are presumably governed from Pekin thru the Defense Commissioner of the Marches, resident at Tachienlu. This official is supreme in his authority over the civil as well as military subordinates. To those who know China, it is needless to say he has and freely exercises power over life and death. While he is delegated great authority by Pekin, he must also assume the responsibility, at the present time at least, of administering the area without financial assistance from the Central Government. This is not simple, considering the great distances, the difficulties of keeping communications open, the relatively small area actually under control, and the general poverty of the inhabitants. The result of this situation is the most excessive squeezing of those unfortunate inhabitants available to the grasping officials. The lot of the Tibetans under Chinese authority is deplorable. They are squeezed to the very limit by the officials, and are robbed recurrently by the outlaws and tribesmen which the Chinese are too inefficient to restrain. It is not surprising that one finds, on this side of the frontier Tibetans who have been goaded by suffering and injustice into hopeless, sometimes surley, and often desperate creatures. Their hearts are filled with hatred for their oppressors.

In the center of the Marches is an area, extending roughly from Nyarong, northeast of Litang, south to the border of Yunnan, in which Chinese dare not venture, except along the Tachienlu-Batang trail with very heavy escort. For the past six years, this trail has practically been abandoned but for large convoys. In this area are numerous bands of outlaws who will kill and rob upon all occasions. In other cases there are whole communities who resist all attempts of the Chinese to pass into the country. The latter would probably not object to the travel of foreigners, provided they were informed that the foreigners had nothing to do with furthering Chinese aims. The most important of the independent tribesmen are the "Hsiang chen People". Their name is on all lips in the Marches. Not only have they successfully defeated all attempts of the Chinese to control them in their own country, but frequently have raided out into the surrounding country, carrying off animals and all valuables, killing and laying waste the countryside.

Under the conditions described, it is not an exaggeration to say that no roads in the Marches are entirely safe for travellers or trade. Natives and Chinese are much less safe than foreigners. Aside from the large tribes, there are local malcontents and outlaws who frequently make the least dangerous trails unsafe for small parties. At the time of our visit in this area, the trail from Atuntzu to Batang had just become passable after several months interruption. The mail service had not been in operation. Arriving at Batang, both the direct trail to Tachienlu and the trail north to Derge were considered impassable. The telegraph station in Batang has not been in operation for about five years. The main commercial trail from Tachienlu to Kanse is generally kept open. It was this trail that we succeeded in reaching by going thru Tibetan territory. But even on this trail, the merchants will not dare transport their goods except by very large caravans.

[illegible] and injustice of the Chinese rule, and [illegible] of the officials in authority. Their normalized more unrestrainedly in handling these alien people,--the "Savages", as the Chinese choose to call them. With the friendship and support of the law-abiding Tibetans, which justice and fairness would obtain, the suppressing of the dangerous elements would be made so easily possible. As it is, the most peaceful of peasants are driven to become desperate outlaws.

The capital of the Hsiang chen Tribesmen is at Sampiling (or Kiatchrina) about eight days south-east of Batang. These people have for many years been notable for their unconquerable spirit, and for their hatred of the Chinese. During Chao Erh-feng's regime, Sampiling was taken after a siege of six months and most of the male inhabitants put to the sword. Several times since then the Chinese garrisons have rebelled, killed their officers, and gone over to the Hsiang chen cause. All attempts to reinstate garrisons have been very costly to the Chinese. Finally in 1911 there was a rebellion in which the Commander led his troops in a mad raid thru Tachienlu and out into Szechwan, where his band was broken up. Since then there has been no garrison in the Hsiang chen country. Scarcely a year has passed that these lawless tribesmen have not descended upon some of the surrounding towns, robbing and burning and spreading terror. They are employed by the ruthless Chinese officials in their private feuds and inter-provincial intrigues. (See Appendix 6)

In our passage thru the Marches we encountered three instances of Hsiang chen activity, all of which happened just in advance of our arrival. Chungtien, in northern Yunnan was burned in March. The country north of Atuntzu as far as Batang had been overrun by them up until within a few days of our arrival in April. We encountered great difficulty in making progress thru this area where the animals had been driven off, the houses largely destroyed and the people scattered. Later, in June, we again passed thru a region a few days north-west of Tachienlu which had suffered a raid. On this occasion, the outlaws had made so bold as to send a challenge to the official at Tachienlu demanding a ransom for sparing the city, which, incidentally, was not given.

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MARCH ITINERARY.

Leaving Tientsin on February 17, 1931, we arrived the same day at

Ching tung hsien		40 li
Hsi chao yu	Feb. 18,	80 "
Hsin hsing chen	" 19,	60 "
Shi hsu hsien	" 20,	60 "
P'ing chen	" 21,	40 "
Tung wu yu	" 22,	90 "
Hsing lung chang	" 23,	80 "
Tsun chiang	" 24,	70 "
Ho lung yu	" 25,	50 "
Hsi shan	" 26,	70 "
Yu lung	" 27,	60 "
Lao tsung pao	" 28 ,	50 "
Nan yu fung	Mar. 1 ,	45 "
Hsia pa pien	" 2,	70 "
Kung chao p'in	" 3,	70 "
Puerh	" 4,	70 "
Ha ko li	" 5,	55 "
SZEMAO	" 6,	55 "
Ha ko li (From Szemao)	Mar. 9,	55 "
Puerh	" 10,	55 "
Ho hsi	" 11,	60 "
Ho po	" 12,	60 "
Nan pieh	" 13,	55 "
Tao hua chi	" 14,	40 "
Hsin fu	" 15,	80 "
Ha chio tien	" 16,	60 "
Ma lo	" 17,	60 "
Chih hu	" 18,	60 "
Ma wo ying	" 19,	60 "
Ching tung hsien	" 20,	60 "
Lung kai	" 21	85 "
Ohu kai	" 22	60 "

Ma 6 li S. of Mao kai	March 25,	[illegible]
Pu chiao	" 26,	70 "
Hsia li ssu	" 27,	80 "
Tung hsu	" 28,	70 "
Hsin chiao	" 27,	70 "
SAIPUW	" 28,	80 "

Hsia ping (From Salifu)	April 1,	75 "
Hsiao (6 li S. of Fu kai)	" 2,	85 "
Tien wei	" 3,	80 "
P'ao cha	" 4,	90 "
LI CHIANG	" 5,	75 "

(Via Na pu or as called locally the La Pu Trail)

Lumpsury (West of Li chiang)	April 8,	30 li
Group of houses (15 li NW of Shih ku)	April 10,	65 "
20 li N. of Sam kai tsu	April 11,	65 "
Chi tien	" 12,	60 "
Shan hun fai	" 13,	55 "
Chi tsung (Camp 3 li beyond village)	April 14,	45 "
Camp in foothills beyond Na pu	April 15,	50 "
Ron Sha (Camp)	April 16,	55 "
Camp	" 17,	50 "
Camp 10 li S. of Kari	April 18,	55 li
Camp(45 li N. of Kari)	" 19,	55 "
Camp 35 li N. of 13,500 ft. divide	" 20,	35 "
Camp 15 li NW of Tung chu ling	" 21,	40 "
Camp 40 li NW " " " "	" 22,	25 "
Camp 30 li S. of A tun tsu	" 23,	35 "
A TUN TSU	" 24,	30 "

(Via the Tsa lei Pass Trail)

Dung	April 27,	40 "
Camp (approaching Tsa lie Pass)	" 28,	45 "

[illegible]	"	[illegible]	20 "
[illegible]	"	[illegible]	10 "
[illegible]			[illegible]
[illegible]			[illegible]
[illegible]	"	30,	10 "
[illegible] of house	May	1,	70 "
[illegible] place (Ke [illegible] te)	"	2,	—
[illegible]	"	3,	55 li
[illegible]	"	4,	45 "
[illegible]	"	5,	45 "
[illegible] or [illegible]	"	6,	75 "
[illegible] or [illegible]	"	7,	60 "
[illegible]	"	8,	30 "
[illegible]	"	14,	60 "
[illegible]	"	15,	90 "

(Entered Tibet proper)

Gu she (30 li N. of Lham dun)	May	16,	65 "
GANENGK or SHIANG KA	"	17,	60 "
[illegible]	May	19,	60 "
U Sang gue (remained 2 days)	"	20,	65 "
Tara	"	22,	55 "
Dut (Dree)	"	23,	70 "
Dotem (Kung chem)	"	24,	125 "
Aga (Aker)	"	25,	65 "
Jam bai	"	26,	70 "
Sang dra jo	"	27,	40 "
Ran do	"	28,	65 "
Gung tum	"	30,	95 "
Dorge Gung ra (½ day from Dorge Gruneham)	"	31,	25 "
Bao pom	June	1,	70 "
Nai shi	"	2,	55 "
Dee lung	"	3,	50 "
Ming kue	"	4,	45 "
Tarundo	"	5,	40 "

(Reentered Chinese Territory)

Kan ho an	June 6,	125 li
KANSU	" 7,	65 "
Sui or Sui wo	" 8,	85 "
Chang kou	" 9,	100 "
Chang chia chao	" 10,	80 "
Sao wu	" 11,	75 "
Kwo cha	" 12,	40 "
Resting (rested a day)	" 13,	90 "
First Kan on trail	" 15,	120 "
SAGHIEHEN (SAGHIEHEN)	" 16,	70 "
Wa sai kou	" 19,	60 "
Liu ting chao	" 20,	60 "
Kua lin ping	" 21,	75 "
Ki to	" 22,	75 "
Ching chi ling	" 23,	75 "
Kung ni yu	" 24,	75 "
Kuan yin yu	" 25,	95 "
Ya Chou	" 26,	40 "

(From this place travel was by river)

Chia Ting Fu	" 28,	
Sui Fu (SUI FU)	" 29,	
CHUNG KING	July 2,	
ICHANG	" 7,	
HANKOW	" 9,	
((By rail)		
PEKING	" 11,	

(Note) The unusual speed between Ya chou and CHUNGKING is possible only in the season of high water.

The total overland travel, considering only that part by pony and caravan, was 2215 miles (taking the li as 1/3 mile).

Appendix A.
[illegible]

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SUGGESTIONS OR REMARKS.

GENERAL:- The following suggestions are made not with the view to establishing a list of all articles needed for out-of-door travel, but are enumerated articles which were found particularly useful for Summer travel in China, and which may or may not be essential elsewhere. A few articles found to be useless will also be mentioned.

The transportation in Yunnan and Szechuan is "pack" and never "wheel". In packing cargo the lash ropes are always pulled as tightly as the packer's strength permits, pony protests notwithstanding. Packing, to the traveller, appears to be a competition in destructiveness. Anything breakable is broken unless it is contained in a rigid case which itself is strongly built. Two kinds of containers are practicable - canvas bags holding nothing but soft materials, and strong boxes or cases for breakable articles, books, etc.

The extreme weight for a pony-load is from 140 to 160 pounds. Accordingly, the extreme weight of a single package should be 80 pounds - preferably less, in order to permit of some top loads (afterthoughts in packing). In Tibet 60 pounds should be the extreme weight of a package. The limit of size should be about 20x12x28 inches, but smaller sized packages are much preferable as large boxes soon break from impinging on embankments, door sills, and other loads encountered on the trail.

Mafoos sometimes provide felt waterproofs, but it is advisable to make the packages as waterproof as practicable, since the efficacy of the mafoo covers is to be suspected.

Except perhaps for some kitchen utensils no equipment can be obtained after leaving the large treaty ports.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION:-

We carried each a sporting rifle (one Savage High-power, 25 cal. and one Savage High-power, 22 cal.) and a 45 cal. Colts Automatic, with ammunition therefor. We had only one shot-gun, a Winchester Pump, twelve guage, cylinder bore. The rifles were quite satisfactory for self defense and for deer shooting. They were carried on the saddles in boots. The Colts pistols were satisfactory, but I should carry a smaller calibre, lighter pistol in the future. We should have found good use for another shot-gun as doves were always plentiful, and at times there were many wild chickens, pheasants and ducks obtainable from the trail. A double-barrel, half and full choke, would be the most convenient type. The number of rounds of assorted shot-gun ammunition would depend upon how much shooting is contemplated.

BAGGAGE:

Heavy canvas dunnage bags with locks on them were found excellent for articles not injured by rough handling. SPecially made wooden boxes, with locks, sized so as not to exceed the limiting weight when packed, are best for all other articles. The pattern later described were found to be satisfactory. Any good pieces of luggage will soon be ruined by the methods of packing. A regulation Company Field Desk (Army pattern) proved almost indispensible for carrying small typewriter, stationery, money, books, etc.

BEDDING ROLLS:

The regulation Army Bedding Roll cannot be improved on for carrying the bedding and cot. We found both very warm and very light bedding necessary. Sleeping bags of some type are much superior to blankets both for convenience and comfort. I used a camel-hair bag lined with sheep-skins (made in Pekin) for cold nights, and two weights of blanket bags for warmer nights. This combination was light in weight, not bulky, and was wholly satisfactory.

BATH TUB:

There are no means whatsoever for bathing in the Chinese inns. A folding bath tub of canvas or rubber is a necessity. Hot water can always be obtained. Small wash basins too should be folding.

CAMP CHAIRS:

The Gold Medal folding chair will add sufficient of comfort to more than justify its weight. We, being unable to obtain them, wished for them always. Literally, we never sat in comfort on the trip.

CLOTHING:

During the trip, tropical heat and piercing cold, from wind and altitude, were encountered. Although the dry season was on, it rained sufficiently upon occasions to require rain coats. A Trench Coat was quite satisfactory both as rain coat and overcoat. Summer and winter garments are needed - the former for the greater part. Our usual clothes we sent back from Tunnanfu, retaining a few summer garments for occasions, and the whole trip was made in riding garments. Sun helmets that will withstand rain make the best headgear. Footwear is according to the individual taste, but since the trails are usually very steep and rocky and much walking is done to assist the ponies, hobnails and heavy soles will generally be desired on boots or shoes. The trip will well use-up two pairs.

COTS:-

A folding cot is indispensable. The regulation Army Cot (Gold Medal) is unequaled.

FLEA PREVENTATIVE:

By the use of our own cots, and by carefully sweeping the floor where they were placed, we experienced little or no trouble with vermin. However we were harrassed by fleas until we used a remedy which had been advised before leaving Tunnanfu. Crush about two pounds of moth balls to a powder; sprinkle this with creosote a few times and thoroughly mix the creosote in the powder. This spread about the cot will keep the fleas away. To economize the mixture and to save trouble, we made some small cotton sacks filled with the powder and kept these always about the opening of the sleeping bags. This was quite effective and, compared with other odors encountered, not ~~the~~ in the least disturbing.

GIFTS:

In China gifts were not needed. In Tibet, however, the custom of the country requires that gifts be used in return for the presentations of food, grain, Etc., always made by the officials and important hosts. Such articles as pencils, metal mirrors, safety razors, cheap watches or alarm clocks would be found useful. All foreign trinkets are highly prized.

KITCHEN BOXES:

Kitchen boxes of ½-inch pine, 19x11x28 inches (outside dimensions), strongly built, were found to be very satisfactory. The joints should be either dovetailed or bound with strap-iron. The top (the 11 x 28 dimension) should be made with the middle fourth permanently covered, while hinged covers with hasps should be made on both ends. When the boxes are lashed to the pack frame the lashing passes over the middle fourth but not over the ends. Consequently, the box can be entered from the top on both ends

while on the trail. This arrangement also permits using the boxes without detaching them from the pack frames, which is a great advantage as a time saver.

READING LAMP:

The average daily stage is completed at 4.00 P.M. This, when not fatigued by the day's trip, allows much time for reading or other work. We started with two lanterns which were finally abandoned due to the difficulty of obtaining oil. Candles are always obtainable, and easy to transport and placed in biscuit tins make good reading light even in a (4) fair breeze. For a prolonged trip I consider an oil lamp very impracticable.

MEDICAL:

There is no limit to the amount nor the variety of medicines that can be disposed of in the interior. At each stopping place we had many applicants for treatment for every kind of disease, from "cold belly" to advanced cases of tuberculosis and trachoma. Babies were carried to us with distended stomachs from malnourishment. All of these we were expected to cure in passing with our foreign pills. In short time we had to limit our daily clinics to members of our caravan and to such inhabitants as had evident cuts and bruises. The faith in our skill was unbounded, but some thrifty villagers were suspected of desiring our pills for marketing purposes - especially those who, when informed we had nothing for decaying teeth, immediately declared "belly" symptoms.

We carried a No. 231 Burroughs and Wellcome "Tabloid" Brand Medicine Case. It was very complete in all the sundries for minor operations and had a big assortment of tabloid medicines. Many of these we found of no use, and some familiar remedies were lacking. It would be advisable to replace some of the medicines by others advised by your physician. The case was, on the whole, very satisfactory. We carried additional cotton, bandages, iodine, etc. We found iodine so generally useful and so difficult to carry that we should have brought some iodine crystals for preparing the solution in small amounts.

MESS OUTFIT:

On a trip of any duration, the importance of a complete and comfortable messing outfit cannot be overstated. Fatigue and ennui will be lessened by having food served as nearly as practicable as at home. Chinese servants expect to do this and can do it under the most trying conditions. We carried an outfit for four persons consisting of aluminium plates; plated knives, forks and spoons (large and small); China bowls, cups and saucers which nested; water glasses; napkins and table cloths; and a folding table (Gold Medal). The China dishes, while they lasted were enjoyed, but they were ultimately broken where they could not be replaced. An outfit entirely of aluminum would be preferable.

Each Chinese cook will have his own ideas about the cooking utensils necessary. So far as possible, we used aluminum utensils, and they were satisfactory while materially reducing the weight.

MONEY:

It will be necessary to compute the approximate cost of the expenses from one place where funds are available to another, and then carry this amount in actual silver. Even the best secured paper money will be current only in the larger towns. The silver should be in dollars, halves, twenty-cent and ten-cent pieces (about one fourth of the total amount will do for the two latter denominations). In some localities, fear of counterfeit coins is so great that dollars and halves will be accepted only at a discount.

Since there are no foreign banks from which to obtain funds enroute, it was necessary to arrange with the British-American Tobacco Company in Shanghai for a credit with their branch in Yunnanfu, which branch in turn notified their agents in Szemao, Tsilifu and Lichiang to give us funds. This courtesy of the B. A. T. was indispensible to us.

In Tibet (this includes the Marches) only rupees are accepted - either Indian rupees or Szechwan rupees. They are worth from 2 ~~1~~/5 to 2 1/4 to the Yunnan or Szechwan dollar. While indispensable, they are difficult to obtain. One should not enter Tibet or the Marches without enough rupees to see him back into Chinese territory at Tachienlu. They are more easily obtainable than at Lichiang and A tun tzu.

In Szechwan currency can be obtained from missionaries on Shanghai or Chung tu checks.

MOSQUITO NET:

We found mosquito nets necessary only after reaching Szechwan but they should be carried.

PHOTO APPARATUS:

Apparatus for developing (and perhaps finishing) pictures will be necessary if serious photography is contemplated. Due to the long interval before films can be got to the parts, the danger of loss or deterioration, it is essential to develop on the route.

PONIES AND PONY EQUIPMENT:

Many missionaries and other travellers use chairs in making trips in Yunnan and Szechwan. We were advised by most people to do so. For those who know anything of riding, and who are strong enough to enjoy alternating riding and walking, I can see no reason for using chairs. In Tibet the chair is practically unknown.

"Riding" ponies can be hired together with the pack ponies, but they are usually caravan animals accustomed to following the leader, and are very unsatisfactory mounts. The equipment, too, is poor. In spite of these facts, however, if one does not understand the care of animals or has not a private mafoo known to be qualified, he had best hire a riding pony and leave the care of it to the owner.

We purchased ponies in Yunnanfu, hired a mafoo for them, and were pleased throughout the trip with the arrangement. We got the two ponies for $110. We also bought two sets of equipment complete for the astonishingly small sum of $70.00 (Yunnan Currency). They were of local manufacture. The saddles were made on the plan of the officer's field saddle, with pommel and cantle pockets, and proved satisfactory until the stocks gave way and began causing back trouble. Would advise carrying a good foreign-made saddle or else the use of real, local equipment.

TABLE:

The Gold Medal folding table mentioned under messing equipment was found to be most essential upon all occasions.

TENTAGE:

Good tents of light weight, easily pitched, will be found very useful and in some of the Tibetan country almost essential. We had only tent flies but we should have camped out more often had we had tents. Usually the protection was needed from cold winds rather than rain. One is much more independent having complete camping equipment, but every method of reducing weight must be kept in mind.

APPENDIX #3.
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[illegible] ON FOOD TO CARRY.

Estimates were made for the foreign food carried, taking into account the following considerations - all articles of food necessary for a balanced ration for two people when supplemented by chickens, eggs, meat and vegetables of the country, to be packed in two boxes of equal weight; each two such boxes being a complete unit to last as many days as the limiting weight of a pony load would permit; the limit of weight of each box to be 80 pounds; the boxes to be carefully packed, strongly made and bound with strap iron. Sincere and Company at Hongkong furnished our provisions. Both the quality of goods and method of packing were satisfactory - not an article was lost by breakage or spoiling.

The following is a list of actual articles we estimated as sufficient for a two-week period, and which was found to be generally satisfactory. The weight of the packages was a little below the limit, and a few changes would improve the unit without increasing too much the unit weight. These will be mentioned.

14 six ounce tins of bacon
1 Two-pound tin oatmeal
2 One-pound tins coffee
1 Bottle Bovril (beef extract)
6 Tins, jam assorted,
1 Bottle Horlicks Malted milk ($1.00 size)
1 Small tin baking powder
1 Three-pound tin butter
7 Packages chocolate
2 Candy in bottles
10 Pounds flour
7 Pounds white sugar
7 Two-pound tins water biscuits
1 Two-pound tin mixed sweet biscuits
4 Tins pork and beans
1 Bottle tomato catsup
1 Bottle table salt (Placed in alternate units only)
1 Bottle pepper " " " " "
1 Roll Toilet paper
14 Boxes matches
1 Bottle J.W. whiskey

Suggested changes: -

(a) The addition of some acids, such as bottled lime or lemon juice.

(b) Small increase in amount of coffee and oatmeal, if liked, in quantity.

(c) Addition of another bottle of Bovril, thus assuring good soup daily.

(d) Malted milk was found to be superior in every way to tinned milk. An extra bottle would have been desired.

(e) Addition of some brandy, if entertaining officials.

It should be remembered that, once in the interior, none of the food articles listed, except very poor native salt and sugar, can be obtained. In Chinese territory it is generally easy to get meats, chickens, eggs, as well as a fair assortment of fruit and vegetables in season. We were usually able to shoot some one of the following: doves, ducks, wild chickens or pheasants.

In Tibetan territory (including the Marches) one can obtain excellent mutton, fresh milk (necessary to boil), butter (of most doubtful quality), generally chickens and eggs, but never any vegetables.

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SERVANTS, INTERPRETERS, CARAVANS, ETC.

We left Yunnanfu with three servants - one Peking boy, one Szechuan cook, and a Yunnanese mafoo. The boy was brought from Peking. The other servants were employed in Yunnanfu. This staff was satisfactory in Chinese territory for the work required, for furnishing knowledge of local conditions and for interpreting local Chinese dialects. A good servant for a home may make a poor one on the trail and they should be selected, if possible, with previous experience in overland travel.

If it is contemplated to camp out, an additional coolie for assisting in making camp would be advisable.

For communicating with the Chinese encountered, your servants should be sufficient, provided you speak Mandarin. If you do not, an interpreter familiar with proper official form will be found necessary. For communicating with the numerous Yunnan tribesmen, special interpreters are necessary for each tribe. In Tibet, and in the Marches as well, a Tibetan interpreter is indispensable. Except for the few officials and soldiers in the larger towns and an occasional merchant, there are no chinese-speaking inhabitants in the Tibetan areas.

Leaving Yunnanfu our caravan consisted of 12 cargo animals and three riding animals (for the servants) in addition to our personal riding animals. At the end of the trip it was practically the same, we having been able to reduce it by only two pack animals. Caravans are best obtained by going to foreigners who know the local conditions. In those towns where there are no foreigners it is usually necessary to go at once to the officials. Head mafoos are in the business for a living, but they always appear to be disinclined to want employment for their caravans. This of course is the oriental policy for affecting the best bargain. The caravans generally travel on a very definite route and will go on no other but for the most exceptional reasons. To travel by an unfrequented route, it will usually be necessary to pay high rates or else have the officials "fang" (impress) the caravan. All the details as to the route, price, days necessary for the trip, or approximate length of daily stages should be clearly understood before the bargain is completed, else the mafoo will attempt to impose his own plans in spite of your desires in the matter. As with all men who deal in horses for business or pleasure, the mafoo has irritating vices along with his virtues.

Even if it were possible to obtain a caravan permanently for the trip, it would be a bad plan unless much rest-time were allowed. Twenty days is about the extreme trip a caravan can make without a rest. We employed caravans as follows:

one	caravan	from	Yunnanfu	to	Szemao	18 days,
"	"	"	Szemao	"	Talifu	20 "
"	"	"	Talifu	"	Li-chiang	5 "
"	"	"	Lichiang	"	Tsalei	22 "
					(Three days rest en-route)	

From Tsalei thruout the Tibetan country all travel was by ulag (oola) as far as Tachienlu.

One caravan from Tachienlu to Ya Chou 8 days.

Ulag is the official method of transportation by which the authorities exact of the inhabitants the transportation from one designated village to the next. A very low official rate is paid per animal. An ulag stage may be a whole day's stage or as short as a fourth of a day. At each change, all personnel and animals are replaced, your baggage rehandled and a most irritating delay occasioned. However, there is no way to avoid this trying method. It is practically impossible to employ a caravan, and if you owned a caravan, in certain localities and in certain seasons it would be impossible to obtain forage for the animals. In the high altitutdes animals can do few days continuous work, and there is practically no grazing permitting rest and recuperation.

As between ponies and mules there is no preference. These are the usual cargo animals, but in Tibetan areas one is obliged to use, in most cases, yaks which are very slow. We always tried to get enough ponies to carry our kitchen and bedding, letting the other baggage follow on yaks.

A notation on the prices actually paid for service is given (all prices are local currency):—

Cook, $20.00 per month (presumably boarding himself)

Boy, 15.00 " " and 60 cents per day for board

Mafoo, 8.00 " " " 35 " " " " "

Caravan, from 65 cents to 75 cents per day per animal.
Gumshaw to be added to all of the above amounts.

Ulag, The official price in Chinese territory is ½ rupee per daily stage per animal. Foreigners always pay not less than 1 rupee (about 40 cents) per animal.

In Tibet the official rate is 1/3 rupee per daily stage per pack animal and ½ rupee for riding animal.

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THE NATIVE RACES OF THE SHEMAO DISTRICT AND CHINESE SHAN STATES.

The following is a brief description of these curious people whose name is legion, whose variety has bewildered so many travellers, and whose origin [illegible] is as yet uncertain. The author is Fred W. Sharp, the Commissioner of Customs. The article was prepared in 1904 as an introduction to the catalogue of Shemao exhibit at the Paris Exposition.

The Chinese are only immigrants into Yunnan, and constitute not more than one-half of the total population. They are mainly to be met with congregated together in or near the large towns which are generally situated in fertile plains some 4,000 feet above sea-level. The mountains throughout the province are the homes of aboriginal races of various stocks; whilst the river valleys in the South, the low-lying plains of the Chinese Shan States, are peopled by the Shans.

At present the nomenclature employed by travellers when treating of these origin[illegible] is most confusing. Each tribe calls the other by a different name, which often merely refers to some peculiarity of dress or custom; and the same people are therefore frequently described under various names. In treating of the numerous tribes of the Chinese Shan States I think it best to arrange them under generic headings which may be done by comparing their language and customs. In any attempt at classification, it is necessary first to take into account the principal circumstances which have produced this apparently inextricable medley of curiously costumed people. The gradual intrusion of the Lolos, with a distinct language and literature from the North; the retrogressive movement of the Shans, who were formerly masters of a large part of South and West Yunnan; rebellions and petty wars, and the consequent breaking up of once powerful races into scattered tribes; even the mountainous and unproductive nature of the country itself; all these facts have to be considered. Again, for the last two hundred years there has been a steady immigration of Chinese settlers who, too poor to import their own women from Eastern centres have intermarried freely with the Lohei, Heiang Tan, and other hill tribes. The result is a confusion of language and customs most difficult to analyze. In India, Burma and the Straits we have the same conditions and consequences; and future researches may prove that the Bhils, and the Khakyens and the Jakums now vaguely described as the Tibetan tribes are related to some of the numerous races scattered throughout Yunnan and the neighbouring provinces of Szechuen, Kweichow and Kwangsi.

We have then in the Chinese Shan States as parent races the following Lolo, Woni, Shan, Yao and Kawa. These for the purpose of clearer classification may be sub-divided thus:

Lolo

Nisu, or Lolos proper who have immigrated from North Yunnan and Szechuen.

K'u Ts'ung, to be distinguished from the Tibetan tribe of Ku Tsung.

Heiang Tan, who call themselves Lolos.

Lohei or Lahu, divided by the Chinese into Ta Lohei and Huang Lohei.

Woni.

Pai, or White, Woni, sometimes called by the Chinese "Pai Chio Woni".

Hei, or Black, Woni.

Nahe, of Talang, Puerh and Szemao.

Pen-jen, i.e. "original inhabitants". Named according to the district they reside in, e.g., Ipang Pen-jen, Tulo Penjen, etc.

Pu Tu, of Szemao and district.

[illegible]

[illegible], found West of the Mekong in great variety.

Shan or Tai.

Shai Pa I, or Tai Ma, of the Sip Song Panna.

Hua Pa I, or Tai Ho, Shans who have adopted Chinese dress and customs.

Hei Pa I, or Tai Hei, the "black Shans" of Weiyuan and Chen Pien districts.

Hua Lua Pa I, or Tai Lum, the inhabitants of the independent States of Hanglien or Hanglim.

The Pa Hsang, though possibly of Wani stock, have lost all trace of their original language, and are classed with the Shans.

Yao.

Only one tribe, the Lin Yin-yao, occurs near Szemao.

Kawa.

The "Shih", or civilized Kawa, living in the Chen Pien district.

The "Yeh", or wild KAWA, who inhabit the high mountains of the Burma-Yunnan frontier, Northwest of Hanglien.

The Nisu, or Lolos proper, who at Szemao are known to the Chinese as Ta T'ou (Big Head) on account of their large turbans, are distinguished by the possession of written, a scanty literature and a complicated religious ritual. There are only a few villages in the Szemao district, and the inhabitants are poor and often ugly specimens of their race. Many of them have intermarried with the Chinese tillers of the soil; and only the "Pama", or village teacher, is able to read and write. In the north of Yunnan, and near the Ning Yuen prefecture of South Szechuen, the Nisu are noted for their good looks and fine physique: and to the present day they exist as independent tribes. But generations of poverty and hard work and contact with the Chinese have had an injurious influence on the Lolos around Szemao; and only their books and a few quaint customs prevent them from becoming uninteresting. Their most curious diversion - the dance - seems to be fast dying out, and it is only by payment of hard cash that half a dozen of the more unprepossessing damsels can be induced to meander around in half-hearted fashion.

Of Lolo stock, but possessing no books and a slightly different dialect, are the K'u Ts'ung, Hsiang Tan and Lohei. The K'u Ts'ung near Szemao live with the Nisu, from whom they are scarcely to be distinguished except by the slight difference in speech. The Hsiang Tan may be found in the hills near I Pang and Iwu, and also west of Mekong in the Meng Wang district. They call themselves Lolo, a curious fact, for the name is considered rather opprobrious by the Nisu, Pula and other Lolo tribes. The Lohei are scattered over a very wide area from the Mekong to the Salween. They are divided into the Huang Lohei, who style themselves "Hei Pa Lahu" or Chinese Lohei, and Ta Lohei, a tribe not so much under Chinese influence. The ordinary dress of the Hsiang Tan and Huang Lohei women resembles that of the Nisu - a turban, plain blue jacket and trousers. The Ta Lohei wear a much prettier costume consisting of a long jacket falling the neck to the ankles, and ornamented with silver beads and square patches of red and white cloth. Both the Hsiang Tan and Lohei are passionately fond of music and dancing; and the young men and women take advantage of every fine moonlight night to trip it on some level sward near their villages.

Seeing the resemblance which exists between the Wani dialects and the Lolo language, it has been suggested that the two races should be classed together. There is, however, enough diversity of custom and costume to make a division advisable. The various Wani tribes exhibit extraordinary differ-

cases in physique and phisiognomy, some being almost Caucasian in stature and the regularity of their features, others suggesting a "Negrito" origin. Many of the mountain tribes of Tonkin and Annam - known to French explorers as "Moi" and to the Annamites as "Mois" - are related to what we, for purposes of classification, call the Wani; and there is almost enough evidence to prove that the Wanis are the original inhabitants of Indo-China and South Yunnan - and the present variety is a modification caused by superstition, the intrusion of the Shan, Annamite and Lolo races, etc. At or near Szemao we have the following tribes:

The Pai, or White, Wani - distinguished by the white skirt which forms part of their costume, and the bulging turban.

The Hei, or Black, Wani - whose real home is in the Talang district.

The Mahei - existing in wretched little settlements around Puerh and Szemao. They are a swarthy people with black hair and shapely limbs. They originally came from the mountains north of Talang, and their customs and language bear a strong resemblance to those of the Ak'as.

The Pu Tu also speak a dialect much like the Mahei, but there the resemblance ends. Even the women of this tribe to be seen in Szemao - poor firewood carriers - are good-looking, having fair skins and regular features; indeed some of the younger girls are quite pretty. There are only one or two villages of Pu Tu near Szemao. The inhabitants are somewhat shy, and very little is known of their religion and customs.

Kados exist in the mountains a few days away from Szemao. By some travellers they are classed with the Lolos. Their villages show every sign of direst poverty and the people are uninteresting.

Ak'as, divided into many different tribes, are to be found to the West of the Mekong, in the mountains of Lohei and the district of Chenpien. The women of nearly all the numerous Ak'a tribes wear the same costume; but the headdress exhibits remarkable variations. The best example is that of the "Chien T'ou", or Pointed Head Ak'as. This is a towering mass of complicated headwork on a bamboo and cloth foundation, ornamented with cowrie shells and silver beads. It is worn only by the married women and has much the same significance as the wedding ring. From the day of their marriage they spend their leisure time in its decoration, and when they die it is buried with them, only the silver ornaments being removed. Most of the superstitious beliefs of these Ak'as seem centred in this remarkable headdress, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that one is procured.

Mention must also be made of the curious gates which bar the entrance to Ak'a villages. These are made with many pieces of wood arranged crosswise. On top, above the doorway, is usually placed the skin of dog with head intact, its mouth open and its teeth grinning defiance to the evil spirits who are always so eager to enter Ak'a villages. Sometimes the model of a rat keeps the dog company; and at each side of the doorway are placed the nude figures of a man or woman, roughly carved from the branches of a tree.

Of the Wani tribes there remains to be described the Pen-jen - a word signifying "original inhabitants". There are several varieties of this tribe, and to distinguish them the name of the district they inhabit is added to their appellation, thus: Pu Yuen Pen-Jen, Ipang Pen-jen, or Yulo Penjen. The Pu Yuen Pen-jen women wear a striking costume, constituting a cloth hood, an open jacket and a pair of short white trousers reaching barely to the knee. But the most important, though the least noticeable part of their costume, are the cloth gaiters. These the women are obliged to wear as it is believed that without them they would be able to fly away, leaving their husbands desolate. The Ak'as wear similar gaiters though the same importance is not attached to them; and with the Pu Yuen Pen-jen they are probably the emblem of some old custom of which the true significance has been forgotten.

Pa I (i.e., barbarians of the plains), are too well-known to need much description. They are related to the Cambodians and the Siamese. They may be found almost anywhere south of the Red River, living in low-lying plains, and seem to be proof against the pernicious malaria of these places which is so deadly to the Chinese and hill aborigines of Yunnan. The Tai Nü, or Sui Pai I, who form the bulk of the inhabitants of the Sip Song Panna, extend from a few miles south and west of Szemao and extend to the Burmese frontier. The Sip Song Panna is a name given to the twelve States under the control of semi-independent Tu Sze or Chiefs who owe a nominal allegiance to the Prince of Kiang Hung (also written Kengtung and Xiengtung). Two of these Panna - Wa Tai and Hung Wa - now belong to France. The others form part of what are known as the Chinese Shan States. The Shans are earnest Buddhists, and they have an alphabetic writing. The women are attractive and as rule wear gay attire - made from a certain cloth, the weaving of which is one of their industries.

The Tai Ne, or Hua Pa I, are Shans who have adopted Chinese customs and dress. Hei Pa I, or Tai Nai, living in the Weiyuan and Champien districts are called by travellers "Black Shans" on account of the sombre-hued garments worn by their women.

The Tai Lem, or Hanglien Pa I, are the inhabitants of the independent state of Hanglien, adjoining the Burmese frontier. The women wear a dark coloured but pretty costume. Nie Tai Ya is a tribe known to the Chinese as "Hua Yag" i.e., coloured bodice - "Pa I". These Shans exist in scattered villages from Shihping to Burma. Some travellers have suggested that they are of Lolo origin on account of their good looks, regular features and pretty costume. But the writer's inquiries have led him to the conclusion that, as they are to be found further North than most of the Shan tribes, they must have come into contact with other races, and may have modified their original costume by partly adopting the gay attire of some Lolo tribe.

Among the Shans live the Pumang, whose appearance and stature indicate a Woni origin. In some districts their language contains a percentage of Kawa words; but they know nothing of their origin, and though they were formerly a distinct tribe, their present language, dress and customs necessitate that they be classed with the Shans.

Of Shan origin also, but not met with near Szemao, are the T'u Lao of Mengtsz, Lung-jen of Kaihwa and Kwangsi, and the Sha-jen of the Red River valley.

There is only one variety of the Yao family in the Chinese Shan States and they call themselves Lin Tin Yao. The original home of the Yao race was probably Kwangtung. They are found everywhere amongst the high mountains from the West River to the Mekong. They are a hardy race, nomadic in their habits; and the women are good-looking, and as fearless and independent as the men. The Yao cultivate medicinal plants (such as the San Ch'i) for sale to the Chinese; they also hunt the elephant for his ivory, and the tiger for his bones, which occupy with deer horns and other peculiar products of the chase an important position in the Chinese Pharmacopoeia. They make their own weapons, and their guns are huge instruments - cannons in miniature - carrying a large iron bullet and needing an immense quantity of coarse powder. When within gunshot of their prey they rest this fearful weapon on their shoulder, and the recoil carries it some distance behind them. To prevent losing the gun in the thick undergrowth of the forests, one end of a long cord is attached to the stock, the other end being fastened round the hunter's waist. They will run alongside an elephant in the woods and discharge their guns within a few yards of its body; and they will follow a wounded animal for days until they run it down.

The Kawas are divided by the Chinese into two varieties: The "Yeh", or wild, and the "Chia", or civilised. The latter term is applied to certain tribes of the Champien district, who have become amenable to discipline, and have more or less adopted the dress and customs of the Lohei amongst whom they dwell. The wild Kawas are head-hunting savages inhabiting the high mountains of the Burma-Yunnan frontier - aboriginal Ishmaels, their hands against every

man and every man's hand against them. The only people with whom they have any intercourse are the Shans whose market they frequent for the purpose of barter. Their appearance is picturesque, but not reassuring. The men are fierce-looking rascals with unkempt hair falling down over their shoulders, and wear only a narrow loin-cloth. Their women are just as scantily attired though their market costume is a little more presentable. The chief amusement of the Wild Kawas seem to be the chasing of helpless travellers and the raiding of small villages on either side of their territory. They worship the heads of human beings and tigers freshly killed; and they decorate the interior of their cave-like dwellings with the skulls of the animals slain in the chase. Their weapons are bows with poisoned arrows and spears; but of late years they have become skilled in the use of a kind of fuse-gun which they purchase from the Shans. They build their villages near the tops of high mountains, and their habitations are holes in the hillside with a rude porch-like structure outside. The language of the Kawas is entirely different from that of the other native races of Yunnan and includes such double-consonant sounds as Klaga, Kla, Kruak, etc.

The Burma-Yunnan frontier runs for some distance through the Kawa country. It is to be defined this winter, (1900) and some member of the boundary commission may take sufficient interest in ethnography to inquire as to the habits and beliefs of the Kawas and so lift the veil which has hitherto obscured our knowledge of this savage race.

The study of the aboriginal races of Yunnan is a most fascinating occupation; but this article must necessarily be brief, and no mention has been made of the Miao-tzu of Kweichow, and other interesting tribes who are met with in the Szemao district or the Chinese Shan States.

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Historical
Conferences Leading Up to and Brief
Summary of Recent Disturbances Along the Chinese-
Tibetan Border.

Chronological Summary.

A.D.
[illegible] Songtsan Gampo introduces Buddhism.
[illegible] Treaty of peace with China.
1279 Kublai Khan extends his dominion into Eastern Tibet and invests Phagpa with sovereign power.
1447 Gedundub founds Tashilhunpo monastery.
1560 Reform movement of Tsongkapa
1576 Sonam Gyantso, Dalai Lama.
1642 The Dalai and Panchen Lamas tender allegiance to the Manchu Sovereign.
1684 The Emperor K'ang-hsi invests the Deba (temporal Governor) with the title of Kue Wang of Tibet.
1725 Two Chinese High Commissioners control Tibetan affairs.
1750 Suppression of the temporal sovereignty - government by the Dalai and Panchen Lamas with a council, under two Chinese Residents.
1788-1791 Invasion of Nepal by the Ghurkas.
1792 Decree of the Emperor Ch'ien-lung regulating the choice of a Dalai Lama.
1792 The Chinese defeat the Ghurkas -- peace with Nepal.
1856 Treaty between Tibet and Nepal, both acknowledging dependence on China.
1872-5 Attempts to open up trade between India and Tibet.
1876 Chefoo Agreement between China and Great Britain.
1886 Burma Convention.
1888 Tibetan aggressions in Sikkim.
1890 Calcutta Convention, setting boundary between Tibet and Sikkim.
1893 Trade regulations signed at Darjiling.
1903-4 British expedition under Colonel Younghusband.
1904 Occupation of Lhasa and flight of the Dalai Lama. Convention (September 7).
1905 Chao Erh-feng's campaigns begin.
1906 Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Convention of Pekin (April 27).
1907 Russo-British Convention of St. Petersburg concerning Tibet (August 31).
1907 The Dalai Lama arrives at Pekin (September 28).
1908 Decree issued (March 9) at Pekin on Tibetan affairs. Chao Erh-feng appointed Amban.
1908 Trade regulations with Tibet signed at Calcutta (April 20).
1910 Chao Erh-feng's troops occupy Lhasa - flight of the Dalai Lama to Darjiling (February 12).
1910 The Dalai Lama deposed (February 25).
1912 Siege of Chinese troops at Lhasa.
1912 Mandate of President Yuan declaring Tibet, Mongolia, and Turkestan Chinese Provinces (April 21).
1912 Expedition from Szechwan under Chung-Ying to relieve the Lhasa garrison (July).
1912 Hsiang-t'chen People attacked Batang in some force, but were repulsed.
1912 Peace concluded at Lhasa (August 12). Chinese garrison withdrawn through India.
1912 The titles of the Dalai Lama restored by mandate (October 29)
1912 Surrender of Chung Ying without his having made any serious progress toward Lhasa. 800 of his prisoners withdrawn thru India.
1913 At Urga (January 11) a treaty of alliance concluded between Tibetans and Mongolians (of little importance, but interesting as it is said to have been initiated by Tibet) in which both people declare themselves freed from Manchu domination, to be independent states. They recognized each other's independence, agreed to work together for the advancement of Buddhism, and to assist each other against external and internal dangers.

1913 The Dalai Lama returns to Lhasa (January 23).
1913 Tripartite negotiations begin at Simla (October 13).
1914 Draft Convention agreed to (April 27).
1914 The Convention disavowed by the Chinese Government (April 29).
1914 The Chinese Government informed that Great Britain and Tibet regard the Convention as concluded (June 6).

Since the disavowal by China in 1914 of the Tripartite Convention at Simla, no arrangement for the settlement of the Chinese-Tibetan-British question can be considered as complete, China having withheld her agreement to all arrangements attempted by Great Britain since that time. As a result of the unfixed adherence, or partial adherence, of Great Britain and Tibet to the Tripartite Convention, and China's inability to maintain the old status, the conditions along the undefined Chinese-Tibetan frontier became more unsettled. China never, except perhaps for the brief, iron-handed regime of Chao-erh-feng (1908-10), ever exercised complete authority nor maintained an orderly, just government west of Tachienlu - that area which is ethnologically Tibet.

Beginning with 1914, Tibet proper began to crystalize a national resistance to Chinese occupancy. The Simla Convention had failed but Great Britain did not give up the policy of making Tibet an autonomous, buffer state between India and China. The moral sponsorship, if not the physical aid, of Great Britain was assisting Tibet, and in 1915, small Chinese garrisons were holding on but precariously to posts a little west of Chiamdo. The Chinese were constantly being menaced by bands of Tibetans, the latter capturing arms and ammunition, and frequently exterminating scattered groups of Chinese.

The political disorganization in China at that time was exaggerated in the distant Tibetan Marches. This resulted in the outlying troops shifting for themselves. They were neither paid nor supplied. Between the troops in contact with the Lhasa Tibetans and Szechwan proper (Tachienlu), was an area abandoned to the outlawry of disaffected Tibetan tribesmen and other disorderly elements. The trails were unsafe for traveller or caravan, mail service was interrupted, and telegraph service was practically discontinued. Chinese authority was weak or non-existent, and wholly without supporters. The officials were normally inefficient and grasping. No evidence is available, but it is likely that some Lhasa influence was at work among the Tibetans of the Marches thru the Lamas. A little later there were local insurrections in rear of the advanced Chinese troops.

This was the condition of the Chinese outpost against Tibet, a Tibet which was awakening to a patriotic and nationalist feeling - a stirring probably fostered by British policy, since British rifles and uniforms came to be used by Tibetan troops; commands were given in English; bagpipes furnished the march music; and Indian Army-trained non-commissioned officers were drill masters. When this assistance was first given, it is not known, but by the fall of 1917 the Tibetans were organized and operating as trained soldiers. The Dalai Lama had an Army.

In the spring of 1918, the Tibetans advanced, and the more or less isolated posts of Chiamdo, Draya and Garthok were overcome with little resistance. The prisoners were well treated. There is another evidence of British training, for the Tibetans are not innately more humane in their treatment of prisoners than are other Orientals. It is said that the prisoners were given ten rupees each, a feast, and sent on their way home via Lhasa and India.

The tripartite Convention of 1914 defined a boundary between what was to constitute Inner and Outer Tibet. Whether the Tibetans contemplated advancing beyond this frontier is not known. They were able to do so, but whatever were their plans, the advance was stopped by negotiations instituted by Mr. Teichman, the British Consul at Tachienlu, who had arrived on the scene. Mr. Teichman arranged a truce, and conducted the negotiations for a frontier settlement. In these negotiations, during the summer and fall of

1918, China was represented by Liu Tsan-ting, then commander of troops at Batang. It is not clear that were Mr. Teichman's or Liu Tsan-ting's credentials for the negotiations. At any rate, they resulted in a frontier delimitation, and a one-year truce to permit ratification. This settlement was agreed to and signed by Colonel Liu in the latter part of 1918. Immediately a storm of protest was raised in Szechwan against Liu's alleged "selling out" to the British. The settlement was not ratified by the Pekin Government. The Commissioner of the Tibetan Marches at Tachienlu stated that Liu had "sold out to the British", which statement Mr. Teichman forced the Commissioner to publicly deny. Colonel Liu was discountenanced; became a fugitive from Pekin authority; allied himself with General Tang Chi-yao, Governor of "independent" Yunnan; and thereafter engaged in intrigues which were at the bottom of most of the recent disorders in the Marches.

The frontier outlined by the unratified agreement is only approximately known, but it is believed to be that suggested in the also unratified Tripartite Convention for the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet. Although lacking ratification by China, the Tibetans are regarding the frontier as established, and are holding it with troops (May 1921) The Chinese are perforce respecting the frontier, but, from intimations gathered, are only biding the time until China is in position to re-assert older claims as to rights in Tibet.

Since 1918 there has been no conflict between Chinese and Tibetan troops.

At this time, (May 1923), the conditions in Tibet are quite peaceful. The Lhasa Government seems to be functioning satisfactorily to the people, and is as centralized as the utter lack of communicational and transportational facilities permit. The inhabitants, while complaining somewhat of the high taxes, are otherwise unmolested by the officials, and appear to have a reasonable degree of patriotism. The countryside visited appears happy, prosperous and as peacefully rural as any community at home. It is a boast, believed to be reasonably justifiable, that an unarmed man can travel on any trail in Tibet without Danger. The writer passed thru Tibet in order to avoid a more direct but exceedingly dangerous trail through Chinese territory.

Contrast the conditions in Tibet with those existing just across the border on the Szechwan Marches. Robberies and killings are frequent on all the trails; many of the trails are considered too unsafe for any travel whatsoever; large areas of the country have recently been raided by the uncontrolled Hsiang-t'chen people who burned the homes, killed many inhabitants, drove off all the cattle, and destroyed many growing crops by grazing over them; officials "squeeze" the people beyond all reason; and the whole population is so discontented and fearful that they are lacking only the boldness to throw off Chinese misrule.

(See Appendix 7.)

[illegible]

The following notes are given in some detail, and some unimportant occurrences are noted for the purpose of showing the utter disorder existing in the Eastern Marches due to Chinese intrigue and misrule. The notes will also furnish a background for future reports on this situation. It should be stated that Batang is the focus of events in this area, and what happens here is indicative of conditions on the Marches.

EARLY SPRING OF 1918.

Tibetans had taken Chiamdo, Derge and Garthok. (See Appendix 6). General Liu Tsan Ting, Commander of Chinese garrison at Batang, prevailed on Dr. Shelton, American Missionary at Batang to arrange a conference for peace talk with the Ma Khan Tiji (Tibetan Governor of South Kham) at Garthok. In the meantime, Mr. Teichmann, British Consul at Tachienlu, had appeared at Chiamdo with a view to stopping the hostilities; he arranged a conference with General Liu and the Galun Lama which ended in a frontier settlement, cessation of hostilities, and a year's truce. Mr. Teichmann and General Liu returned to Batang in December, having spent the greater part of the year in the negotiations. Mr. Teichmann attempted to go to Tachienlu via the Litang trail, was fired on by outlaws who killed members of his guard, had to retrace his steps and go out via the North Road.

During the fighting near Chiamdo, Mr. Teichmann requested Dr. Shelton to come there to treat the wounded. The Galun Lama (one of four high officials taking orders only from the Dalai Lama) complimented Dr. Shelton, called him a great man, and hoped he would build a hospital at Chiamdo. The Doctor immediately requested the Galun Lama to get the permission from the Dalai Lama. The reply of the Dalai Lama was interesting. He stated that no objections would be made to the Missionary project———"provided there was no treaty or agreement preventing."

1919.

By this time, General Liu's two hundred soldiers in Batang had become almost mutinous. They were not paid, were poorly fed and scarcely clad. He claimed that the Commissioner of the Marches was sending neither supplies nor money. This was probably true but, meanwhile, Liu was getting money from the sale of public lands and houses - those properties which had been confiscated in 1905 by Chao Erh Feng from the old Tibetan Princes and the Lamas.

Presumably as a measure of defense against the constant danger of an attack by the Hsiang-chen people, the Twan Shang was organized in Batang. This was a sort of combined Secret society, town meeting, and home guard. Members took the oath of blood brothers, after the Tibetan fashion by drinking chicken blood; each family had to furnish at least one member; all old arms were brought from hiding; Liu sold extra rifles to members; and weekly drills were held. The Chinese soldiers, meanwhile, were stealing their subsistence, and conditions in Batang were very unsettled.

Since Liu had signed the Frontier Agreement, strong feeling had been stirred-up against him in Pekin and Szechwan. The Commissioner of the Marches at Tachienlu, charging him with selling-out to the British, was sending a party to arrest him. Accordingly, General Liu escaped in August to Atuntzu (Yunnan). The Civil Official went with him.

The Twan Shang was the only real authority remaining in Batang and this was gradually losing its color as a home guard, becoming instead an anti-Chinese organization. There were two Majors present with Chinese troops, Wen Han Chin and Tsai Deng Yun, who will later be mentioned. The former was at

[illegible] with the Twan Shang, thru the Bao Lama, head of the [illegible] Lamasery, and a man influential in Tibet.

In November, Doctor Shelton left Batang en-route to the United States.

1929

In January, Mr. Shelton was captured by the Bandit Yang Tien Yu near Tumenfu.

In February General Yang Teh Shih, the new military official, arrived in Batang. He at once adopted very forceful methods in disbanding the Twan Shang. The Tibetans were made to deliver all the arms sold by General Liu, and the native guns as well. He took efficient steps to counteract Liu's misgovernment. Even the Tibetans considered him just, the severe. But trouble soon arose.

The widow of the Prince of Batang (killed by Chao Erh Feng) purchased her old palace from General Liu. This building had been used as a yamen by Liu and was taken over by General Yang. The widow appeared in the latter part of May and claimed her property. General Yang refused, whereupon A-tao, the leader of the Twan Shang, wrote to General Yang telling him that if he did not vacate the Yamen in three days the Twan Shang would drive him out. Yang sent men to arrest A-tao and they were fired on from A-tao's house. There were only two hundred Chinese soldiers in Batang, and of these Yang was sure only of the twenty men in his own body guard. Major Wen Kan Chin was playing to be on winning side and hopeful of assuming command after Twan Shang successes. His men were not available to General Yang. The Twan Shang were confident of annihilating the Chinese garrison.

The Bao Lama and the Catholic Father intervened to affect a compromise, which resulted only in permitting A-tao and his men to escape from the town. The members of the Twan Shang assembled up the river, and on the night of June 19th attacked the town, effecting an entrance nearby the barracks of Wen's troops. Digging from house to house they spread over the town. The civil official was killed; looting began in which Wen's men joined; and General Yang's yamen was attacked. In the morning Yang's men were holding out. A field piece was firing from the yamen roof into the attackers, and from time to time men left the yamen and set fire to nearby houses. Many houses were destroyed and the Tibetans finally were burned out and forced from the town. Wen's soldiers seeing the situation joined Yang's men and killed many of the fleeing Tibetans. General Yang displayed great bravery and ability in handling this situation.

Shortly afterward the two rebellious leaders were killed and their heads displayed. All others were offered amnesty, but many refused to return and became robbers. The roads leading to Batang, never quite safe, became even more dangerous.

In July Major Wen and his men were ordered to Tsong-tsa, presumably to gather grain taxes but in reality to rid Batang of their presence. A little later he was dismissed and ordered to Batang for trial. Naturally he refused to obey. He joined-up with Liu Tsan Ting, who had in the meantime received a commission from Tang Chi Yao of Yunnan and was busy on the Yunnan-Szechwan border stirring up trouble among the Hsiang Chen people. Wen went to Sam Pi ling, the headquarters of these disorderly tribesmen.

In October, General Yang sent about seventy soldiers from Batang out on the Litang trail to escort an official arriving from Tachienlu. Returning the party was attacked by tribesmen. Forty soldiers were killed and the party stopped until, by a compromise, a certain number of rifles were given the outlaws for permission to pass. There was general unrest and disorder caused by robbings and killings on the trails about Batang.

In January Wang Wei Wei arrived to take over the seal of civil official. About this time Major Tsai was sent with fifty soldiers to garrison Bjong-ng-ai (one day from Yerkalo) as an outpost against the Hsiang Chen people.

Wang Wei Wei disliked General Yang and, as a result of adverse reports, succeeded in having him replaced by General Wang Cheng He. Thus the boldest, most forceful and best-spoken-of military official was removed by an unprincipled man who is cordially hated, and who has since been removed.

About this time the Hsiang Chen tribesmen attacked Chung tien, in Yunnan, burning the place and killing many Chinese inhabitants. Liu Tsan Ting it seems was present there with some soldiers, but permitted the outrage in return for some obligations to the Hsiang Chen people resulting from his intrigues with them. At this time he furnished the tribesmen with ammunition and some 285 rifles. These rifles were later used in the attack on Batang. The Hsiang Chen people now began overrunning the area about Yerkalo (Yenching), and Batang began to fear an attack.

Major Tsai, at Bjong-ng-ai, sent urgent requestsfor support. After some delay, Major Hsiang, with two hundred men, went to his assistance. He cautiously delayed at Pan-u-tang (Bong) until Tsai surrendered. The latter's men were all married with Tibetan women closely related to the Hsiang chen tribesmen, and had no spirit to fight. Yerkalo was taken without a fight by the raiders.

General Yang Deh Shih, now without a commission in Batang but full of fight, volunteered to retake Yerkalo. Accordingly, he left with 50 men, picked up Major Hsiang's detachment at Pan-u-tang, and after a three hour skirmish retook the town. The Yerkalo Lamasery was completely looted by the soldiers.

Up to April first, the whole countryside between the Yangste and the Mekong and south of Pan-u-tang to the Yunnan border had been harrassed by the outlaws. About two-thirds of the houses were burnt, many people were killed, the cattle were all driven off, the growing grain had been grazed over, and the inhabitants were hiding in the mountains. After April first, the tribesmen moved north toward Batang spreading destruction. The Chinese authorities did not dare face the outlaws. The inhabitants were left to their own devices while the Chinese garrisons made themselves secure in Batang, and Yerkalo.

The seven Tribes, living just to the North of Batang, were operating with the Hsiang chen people. Toward the middle of April the Seven Tribes were raiding south of Batang and after dark driving their lifted cattle to the north right under the walls of Batang. The garrison never came out to stop the depredations.

On the night of April 19-20, there was a combined "attack" on Batang It was accompanied by Tibetan battle yells and by random firing lasting throughout the next day, but there was no determined attack. Calls were made to the garrison to surrender. These were answered by the [redacted] sniping of a small field piece mounted on the yamen roof. The following night the attackers withdrew, and in a few days the Hsiang chen people had all retired to the east of the Yangste.

Major Wen and other of his Chinese officers were conducting the Hsiang chen operations. Liu chan ting was directing the whole affair. So far as is known, Wen is still intriguing with the Hsiang chen people. Liu Chan-ting has since been recalled to Yunnan fu for punishment for action at Chung tien. However he is a "prisoner" with great liberty, and the Governor of Yunnan will not deliver him to his enemies in Szechwan.

The property and lives of the American missionaries were scrupulously respected by all parties during the trouble. Notice was even sent them beforehand telling them of the coming attack with assurances of their safety. The standing of the American missionaries is so high and their work so much appreciated by all parties on the frontier that they occupy a uniquely safe position in the midst of the disorders.

The following is an extract from a letter from an American missionary at Batang. It shows very well the attitude of the Governor of South Kham (Tibet proper) toward foreigners. It also shows the existence of definite moral influence of the Lhasa authorities over Tibetans in Chinese territory.

"In talking about the trouble in Batang in April, we were told by the Governor that the attacking party came from the part of Tibet (Chinese Territory) not governed by Lhasa; that he, the Governor, had done what he could to prevent the attack; but when he saw he could not prevent it, he warned these Chinese-Tibetans to do no harm to foreigners or foreign property in Batang; that in case this warning was disregarded, "no good would come of it" as they would have to settle with him as the representative of the Lhasa Government. The Governor received sufficient promises from the leaders of the attacking party in the matter of our safety, but some of the party entered Tibet near Rantang and were driven out by the Tibetan Army. "

We were also told that in case of threatened trouble in the future, the Governor would send word to the Chinese-Tibetans to respect foreign property and that if he could not secure satisfactory promises for our protection, he would either send troops to Batang (Chinese soil) to care for us or to take us to a place of safety. This does not sound like the Chinese officials who said in a letter that they could not protect us in our homes and asked us to come into the city. We were told that these Haiang chen people were a law unto themselves, none of them recognizing Chinese rule, tho they live in China, and that some of them might even refuse to listen to friendly advice from the Lhasa Government. However, we had nothing to fear, as the Governor would provide protection and refuge if the Chinese could not!"

[redacted]

Submitted [redacted] Forwarded [redacted]

[redacted] Intelligence Officer. [redacted] Commanding Officer.

	Operat.	Stats	Commerce	M. I. D.	Gen. Board	War College	Bureau	Bur. Ord.	C. & R.	Eng.	Y. & D.	S. & A.	M. & S.	H. O.		

No second page is needed for a report, use ordinary ship's stock thin paper, this size.
Make all drawings, etc., perfectly to size with this form where practical. Submit extra copies of clipping, carbons of sketches, etc., where practical.

4—6233

Submitted _____ Forwarded _____

Intelligence Officer. Commanding Officer.

	Orders	Duty	Commerce	M. L. D.	Gen. Board	War College	Reserv.	Ser. Ord.	C. & R.	Eng.	Y. & D.	S. & A.	M. & S.	H. O.		

If a second page is needed for a report, use ordinary ship's stock thin paper, this size.
Make all enclosures, etc., uniform in size with this form where practical. Submit extra copies of clipping, carbons of sketches, etc., where practical.

4—5233

1055-50

[redacted]

Submitted _____ Y. L. [redacted]
[redacted] Intelligence Officer.

Forwarded _____ L. S. [redacted]
Commander, USN Commanding Officer.

Office	State	Commerce	M. I. D.	Gen. Board	War College	Bureau	Bur. Ord.	C. & R.	Eng.	Y. & D.	S. & A.	M. & S.	H. O.		

[illegible] page is needed for a report, use ordinary ship's stock thin paper, this size.
[illegible] all sketches, etc., uniform in size with this form where practical. Submit extra copies of clipping, carbons of sketches, etc., where practical.

4—5233

[redacted]

Submitted [redacted] V. L. KIRSCH, Intelligence Officer.

Forwarded [redacted] R. S. ROOT, Commanding Officer.

FOR O. N. I. USE ONLY	Supply	Pers.	Contracts	H. I. D.	Gen. Board	War College	Bureau	Bur. Ord.	C. & R.	Eng.	T. & D.	S. & A.	M. & S.	H. O.		

If a second page is needed for a report, use ordinary ship's stock thin paper, this size.
Make all sketches, etc., uniform in size with this form where practical. Submit extra copies of clipping, carbons of sketches, etc., where practical.

4—6233

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

At present, there are no airplanes, equipment or facilities of any such nature at Kapsan. Four planes of the Soviet type were seen in Kapsan during Chosen revolution. These were poorly piloted and did not leave the field. There is no Soviet-Korean defense organization at present. During the revolution the Koreans and Americans had planned to make a stand in Kapsan in case of emergency.

Kapsan is built on a delta land. The low lying plain spread inland for from twenty to thirty miles to an undulating region of low mountains. The sea approaches are well guarded by high rocky hills. Only water approach is thru Sugaitsu Inlet.

This might easily be made impregnable by proper placing of batteries. The coast line for the most part is low and muddy. Landing might easily be arrested for infantry without artillery.

Enco. not mkd.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MOV 18 1921

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2701-J-304

September 27, 1921.

RECD. M.I.D. NOV 9 1921

(Note:-)

This report dated January 8, 1920, has been held in an endeavor to obtain maps showing road available for motor car and horse drawn vehicle use. Only one copy of this map has been obtained and that is being forwarded herewith.

There is also attached to the original report a list of Industrial Enterprises in Foochow Consular District as well as certain "Tart Directory Data" furnished the Navy by the U. S. Consul.

Further information on Foochow is contained in "Reconnaissance Report on Foochow, Fukien Province, China, and Vicinity," by Captain F. Le. J. Parker, 12th Cavalry, dated April, 1912.

W. S. Drysdale,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

By: William B. Pulloon.
Maj. Inf.
Asst. Attache.

No. _____ FOOCHOW, FUKIEN PROVINCE, CHINA.

From _____ M. A. _____ CONSUL.

No. 2072 _____ Date _____ January 8th, 1920. _____, 19

Replying to No. _____ Date _____ 19

REC'D. M. I. D., G. S. NOV 9 1920

13 ----LOCATION.

The following report dated November 7, 1919, was received from a most reliable source in Foochow, Fukien, Province, China.

1. Map of the city of Foochow, showing road available for motor car and horse drawn vehicle use, is hereby forwarded. Points of interest are noted in Chinese characters.

2. A postal map of Fukien showing the Foochow and Amoy Consular District is enclosed. The names of places are given in both English and Chinese.

3. (a) There are many buildings on Nantai Island, where the foreigners have their offices, mission schools, and residences, and at Pagoda Anchorage, where there are schools, workshops (Chinese Government owned) saw-mills and oil companies' installations. These buildings could be used for quartering troops.

(b) Troops could be quartered below Kushan Point on the bank of the Min River on the present site of the Fukien Union University grounds and on the race course grounds.

(c) There are no waterworks at Foochow. Springs in the hills back of Kushan Point furnish good water and there are many wells which are now used to furnish the city with water. River water is also used.

(d) The leading coal dealers at Foochow are Mitsui Busan Kaisha, (Japanese), Hsin Hsing, Hsin Chi, Tai Mou, Kung Ping, Ho Chi, (Chinese), Dodwell & Co. and Peng Hing, (British). Formosan (Japanese coal is largely sold for steaming purposes, although a little of the Kailan Mining Company's (British) coal is found on the local market. The average stock of coal that might be relied upon is 3,000 tons. Very little coal is mined in Fukien because of restrictive mining laws and poor transportation facilities. As Fukien is a lumber producing province, no difficulty would be experienced in securing large quantitires of wood fuel.

(e) The following food supplies for troops can be secured from local merchants: beef, rice, Irish potatoes,

beans./

SUBJECT FOOCHOW, FUKIEN PROVINCE, CHINA.

From M. A. COMBAT.

No. 2270 Date January 8th, 1920. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

13 --- LOCATION.

beans, eggs, fish, flour, game, spices and fruits in season. There can be secured from adjacent regions beef, rice, sweet potatoes, fish, game, eggs, and fruits.

(f). Gasoline and kerosene oil, but not fuel oil, can be obtained from the Asiatic Petroleum Company (British) and the Standar Oil Company (American). Stocks of gasoline are small, averaging about 5,000 gallons. 2,000,000 gallons of kerosene oil are imported each year, so that large stocks of this oil are available.

(g). There is a Chinese Government owned wireless station in Foochow city manned by a force of 10 operators. It connects with Shanghai and is not available for commercial business.

(i). Barracks for local garrisions are located at Tung Hu and Nan Chiao Ch'ang, both in Foochow (See city map) and at Chang Men below Pagoda Anchorage (See district map). 13,000 men may be accommodated in the Tung Hu barracks, 3,000 in the Chang Men barracks which are near the forts which guard the Min River entrance to Foochow.

(h). There are no railways in the district.

(j). The electric lighting plant and telephone system are owned by the same Chinese interests, who are anti-Japanese and pro-American. The location of their company, the Foochow Electric Company, is shown on the city map, as are the offices of the telegraph companies. The Chinese Government Telegraph Administration maintains stations at Hankong, Santuao, Shuikow, Yenping, Chienyang, Chienning, and Pucheng. The Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company (British) has a station at Sharp Peak, an island at the mouth of the Min River, where the Company maintains submarine connections with Shanghai and Hongkong. A land line connects Foochow with this cable.

(k). The Government Dock and Engineering Works owned by the Chinese Government are furnished with modern machinery. They are situated at Mamoi (Pagoda Anchorage) 20 miles from the sea. The Works build ships and make ship repairs. The Hung Shan Chiao Arsenal is a small affair located 8 miles above Foochow on the Min River. Small arms and ammunition are turned out in small quantities.

(l) See map of city already sent to Peking.

(m) Many coolies and small river boats are available for troops and supplies. The number made available on a few days notice is difficult to estimate as, so far as coolies are concerned, the matter is largely one of [illegible] always either going up the river or

arriving/

SUBJECT FOOCHOW, FUKIEN PROVINCE, CHINA.

From L. A. COMBAT.

No. 2270 Date January 8th, 1930. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

15 --- LOCATION.

beans, eggs, fish, flour, game, spices and fruits in season. There can be secured from adjacent regions beef, rice, sweet potatoes, fish, game, eggs, and fruits.

(f). Gasoline and kerosene oil, but not fuel oil, can be obtained from the Asiatic Petroleum Company (British) and the Standar Oil Company (American). Stocks of gasoline are small, averaging about 5,000 gallons. 2,000,000 gallons of kerosene oil are imported each year, so that large stocks of this oil are available.

(g). There is a Chinese Government owned wireless station in Foochow city manned by a force of 10 operators. It connects with Shanghai and is not available for commercial business.

(i). Barracks for local garrisions are located at Tung Hu and Nan Chiao Ch'ang, both in Foochow (See city map) and at Chang Men below Pagoda Anchorage (See district map). 13,000 men may be accommodated in the Tung Hu barracks, 3,000 in the Chang Men barracks which are near the forts which guard the Min River entrance to Foochow.

(h). There are no railways in the district.

(j). The electric lighting plant and telephone system are owned by the same Chinese interests, who are anti-Japanese and pro-American. The location of their company, the Foochow Electric Company, is shown on the city map, as are the offices of the telegraph companies. The Chinese Government Telegraph Administration maintains stations at Hankong, Santuao, Shuikow, Yenping, Chienyang, Chienning, and Pucheng. The Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company (British) has a station at Sharp Peak, an island at the mouth of the Min River, where the Company maintains submarine connections with Shanghai and Hongkong. A land line connects Foochow with this cable.

(k). The Government Dock and Engineering Works owned by the Chinese Government are furnished with modern machinery. They are situated at Mamoi (Pagoda Anchorage) 20 miles from the sea. The Works build ships and make ship repairs. The Hung Shan Chiao Arsenal is a small affair located 8 miles above Foochow on the Min River. Small arms and ammunition are turned out in small quantities.

(l) See map of city already sent to Peking.

(m) Many coolies and small river boats are available for troops and supplies. The number made available on a few days notice is difficult to estimate as, so far as coolies are concerned, the matter is largely one of price. Boats are always either going up the river or

arriving/

Binding Margin.

A.

SUBJECT FOOCHOW, FUKIEN PROVINCE, CHINA.

From N. A. COMBAT.

No. 2879 Date January 8th, 1920. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

18 --- LOCATION.

arriving at Foochow. A hundred or so cargo boats would be available. Wagons, animals or carts for transportation are not in use locally.

(n). A list of Americans resident in the district on January 1, 1919 is enclosed herewith.

(o). A list of pro-American Chinese is enclosed. It is believed that these could be relied upon to be on the side of the United States in a war gainst Japan.

(p) Aeroplanes can land and take off at Tung Hu and Nan Chiao Ch'ang Barracks.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

LIST OF AMERICANS RESIDING IN FOOCHOW., Jan.1, 1919.

Mr. and Mrs. F. P. Beach	American Board Mission, Changle.
Miss G. H. Blanchard	" " " "
Mr. & Mrs. C. L. Gillette	" " " "
Miss L. D. Ward	" " " "
*Miss J. Adams,	American M. E. Mission, Foochow.
Miss B. H. Allen,	" Board Mission "
Mr. & Mrs. W. L. Beard,	" " " "
Mr. & Mrs. H. B. Belcher	" " " "
Mr. & Mrs. H. C. Bennett*	" M. E. Mission "
Mr. & Mrs. A. W. Billing,	" " " "
Mr. & Mrs. F. E. Black,	" " " "
*Mr. & Mrs. A. R. Bowman,	Chinese Customs, "
Miss D. D. M. Brown,	American Board Mission, "
Mr. R. E. Buchanan	Y. M. C. A. "
Mr. & Mrs. W. J. Cannon,	China Import & Export Lumber Co. "
	B. & A. Tobacco Co. "
*Mr. H. S. Carey,	American M. E. Mission "
Mr. & Mrs. F. T. Cartwright	American Board Mission "
Mr. & Mrs. L. J. Christian	" M. E. " "
Miss E. G. Clark,	" " " "
Miss S. M. Cook	Installation Dept. Standard Oil Co. "
*Mr. G. L. Dains,	American Board Mission "
Miss E. M. Deahl	China Import & Export Lumber Co. "
*Mr. Jay Dinsmore	American Board Mission "
Miss. L. G. Dyer,	" M. E. Mission "
Mr. & Mrs. J. B. Eyestone	" " " "
Mr. & Mrs. E. L. Ford	" Board Mission "
Mr. & Mrs. R. Gardner	" " " "
Miss E. M. Garretson	" " " "
Mr. & Mrs. P. S. Goertz	Y. M. C. A. "
Mr. R. G. Gold	American M. E. Mission "
Dr. & Mrs. J. E. Gossard	

Mr. G/

SUBJECT FOOCHOW, FUKIEN PROVINCE, CHINA.

From H. A. COMBAT.

No. 8810 Date January 6th, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

13 --- LOCATION.

Mr. G. C. Hanson	American Consulate	Foochow.
Miss H. Harshaw	Y. M. C. A.	"
Miss L. M. Hefty,	American M. E. Mission	"
Miss E. S. Hartwell	" Board Mission	"
*Mr. & Mrs. C. N. Holwill	Chinese Customs	"
Miss F. M. Hostetter	" Board Mission	"
Mr. & Mrs. G. H. Hubbard	" " "	"
Mr. & Mrs. J. H. Irish	" M. E. Mission	"
Mr. H. C. Jones,	" " "	"
Miss Annie L. Kenfield	" Board Mission	"
Dr. & Mrs. H. N. Kinnear	" " "	"
Mr. & Mrs. W. N. Lacy	" M. E. Mission	"
Miss Alice M. Lacy	" " "	"
Mr. & Mrs. R. A. Leake	Y. M. C. A.	"
Mr. & Mrs. S. H. Leger	American Board Mission	"
Mr. & Mrs. H. W. Livingston	Standard Oil Co.	"
Miss Mary Mann	American M. E. Mission,	"
Nuss Grace McCarty	" " "	"
Mr. & Mrs. T. C. McConnell	Y. M. C. A.	"
Miss Llewella Merrow	American M. E. Mission,	"
Mr. & Mrs. G. S. Miner	" " "	"
Mr. & Mrs. C. C. Morris	7th Day Adventist Mission,	Foochow
Mr. & Mrs. E. H. Munson,	Y. M. C. A.	"
Mr. & Mrs. R. D. Nelson,	American M. E. Mission,	"
Mr. C. A Neff	American Board "	"
Miss J. H. Nevitt	" M. E. Mission	"
*Mr. & Mrs, Newell	" Board Mission	"
Mr. & Mrs. L. P. Peet,	" " "	"
Miss E. Perkins,	" " "	"
Mr. & Mrs. S. T. Polk	China Import & Export Lumber Co.	"
Mr. & Mrs. R. Scott	American Board Mission	"
Miss C. E. Simpson	" M. E. Mission	"
Dr. & Mrs. C. M. Lacey Sites,	" " "	"
Miss Ø. B. Steel-Brooke,	Y. M. C. A.	"
Miss G. C. Steinbeck	Y. M. C. A.	"
Miss E. T. Thomas	American Board Mission	"
Miss M. H. Wanzer	" M. E. Mission	"
Miss P. C. Wells	" " "	"
Mr. & Mrs. P. P. Wiant	" " "	"
Mrs. T. M. Wilkinson	T. M. Wilkinson & Co.	"
Miss K. H. Willis	American M. E. Mission	"
Mr. & Mrs. H. W. Worley	" " "	Fuching, Fukien
Mr. & Mrs. W. B. Cole	" " "	Hsinghua, Fukien
Miss E. E. Ehly	" " "	Haitan "
Miss J. D. Jones	" " "	" "
Mrs. E. F. Brewster	" " "	Hsinghua "
Mr. W. F. Brewster	" " "	" "

Miss C.M. Brown/

Binding Margin.

SUBJECT FOOCHOW, FUKIEN PROVINCE, CHINA.

From E. A. COMBAT.

No. 8370 Date January 5th, 1920. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

15 --- LOCATION.

Miss C. M. Brown	American M. E. Mission			Hsinghua,	Fu
Miss Mabel Davis	"	"	"	"	Fukien.
Dr. & Mrs. C. E. Draper	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. & Mrs. P. P. Jones	"	"	"	"	"
Miss J. A. Marriott	"	"	"	"	"
Miss F. P. Mason	"	"	"	"	"
Miss E. H. Suffern	"	"	"	"	"
Miss A. M. Todd	"	"	"	"	"
Miss L. W. Varney	"	"	"	"	"
Miss Pauline Westcott	"	"	"	"	"
Miss M. E. Wilson	"	"	"	"	"
Miss May A. Wilson	"	"	"	"	"
Dr. Emma J. Betow	"	"	"	Hsienyu	"
Mr. & Mrs. G. W. Hollister	"	"	"	"	"
Miss E. L. Johnson	"	"	"	"	"
Miss J. E. M. Lebeus	"	"	"	"	"
Miss Mary M. Thomas	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. & Mrs. W. S. Bissonnette	"	"	"	Kutien	"
Dr. & Mrs. Coole	"	"	"	"	"
Miss H. L. Frazey	"	"	"	"	"
Miss Mary Peters	"	"	"	"	"
Miss E. F. Abel	"	"	"	Lungtien	"
Miss G. M. Bartlett	"	"	"	"	"
Miss Floy Hurlbut	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. & Mrs. H. V. Lacy	"	"	"	"	"
Dr. Mary E. Carleton	"	"	"	Minching	"
Miss R. Jones	"	"	"	"	"
Miss U. Tyler	"	"	"	"	"
Dr. & Mrs. E. L. Bliss	American Board Mission,			Shaowu	"
Miss F. K. Bement	"	"	"	"	"
Miss Lucy P. Bement	"	"	"	"	"
Miss G. A. Funk	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. & Mrs. E. D. Kellogg	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. & Mrs. R. W. McClure	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. & Mrs. C. H. Riggs	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. & Mrs. C. L. Storrs	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. J. E. Walker	"	"	"	"	"
Miss J. Walker	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. & Mrs. F. Bankhardt	"	M. E. Mission		Yenping	"
Mr. & Mrs. W. F. Lacy	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. & Mrs. B. H. Paddock	"	"	"	"	"
Dr. & Mrs. J. E. Skinner	"	"	"	"	"
Dr. & Mrs. C. G. Trimble	"	"	"	"	"
Miss M. C. Hartford	"	"	"	Yuki,	"
Mr. & Mrs. E. C. Parlin	"	"	"	Yungchun	"
Miss G. Strawick	"	"	"	"	"
Mr. & Mrs. F. F. G. Donaldson	American Board Mission,			Yungtai,	"

Miss/

Binding Margin.

SUBJECT FOOCHOW, FUKIEN PROVINCE, CHINA.

From L. A. COMBAT.

No. 2270 Date January 8th, 1920. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

18 --- LOCATION.

Miss L. V. McReynolds	American	Board	Mission,	Yungtai,	Fukien
Mr. & Mrs. G. T. Smith	"	"	"	"	Fukien
Miss M. E. Waddell	"	"	"	"	"
Dr. & Mrs. H. T. Whitney	"	"	"	"	"

NOTE: * - Have now left the port.
Foochow, China, November 7, 1919.

- - - - - - - - - -

LIST OF PRO-AMERICAN CHINESE
In
FOOCHOW.

- - - - - - - - -

Mr. S. H. Song	Foochow Electric Co.,	Foochow,	China.
Mr. C. M. Wang	Hung Chieng & Co.	"	"
Y. B. Li	T. M. Wilkinson & Co.	"	"
I. S. Yu	Y. M. C. A.	"	"
S. W. Lu	Native Customs	"	"
S. Y. Lee	Fukien Union University	"	"
C. T. Cheng	Y. M. C. A.	"	"
Y. H. Twan	Fukien Union University	"	"
B. H. Li	Nantai, Foochow		
C. C. Yen	Government Dock and Engineering Works	"	"
G. S. Hsin	" " "	" "	"
G. C. Wong	" " "	" "	"
T. Wong	" " "	" "	"
P. T. Mar	" " "	" "	"
F. T. Yeh	" " "	" "	"
Y. T. Barr	" " "	" "	"
S. F. Wong	" " "	" "	"
G. W. Liu	Foochow Electric Co.	"	"
D. K. Liu	" " "	"	"
Admiral Sah Chen-ping	Foochow, China.		
D. K. Liu	Y. M. C. A.	"	"
Paul Ciong	Foochow, China.		
Se U. Lu	Foochow city.		
Char Chen-meng	Standard Oil Company	"	"
Ting Yuek-ming	Union Theological School	"	"
Cheng Chi-ming	Foochow, China		
Ding Neng Kuang	Salt Revenue Inspectorate	"	"
Hsu Pa-hsi	San Pao, Hantai, Foochow.		"

- - - - - - - - - -

Binding Margin.

Qeustions answered in report 2370
~~[illegible]~~, as of January 8, 1920.

This Office would appreciate ~~[illegible]~~ much any assistance you can render in securing military information.

The following is suggested as information that is of value :

1. Map of the city.
Note: Telegraph service , post office , electric light plant and water works should be clearly indicated and especially noted on any maps submitted .

2. Map of the district coming under your observation. Note: All maps should be reliable , new and of as large a scale as can be secured . Names on map should be indicated in both English and Chinese . This office would expect to refund the cost to you of securing the map and any other incidental expense to which you may be put. Check will be forwarded immediately upon receipt of necessary information.

3. Any information that you yourself may deem necessary to Commanders of troops arriving in your city and locality, viz:

(a) Buildings that may be occupied for quartering troops; i.e., any buildings or compounds that might be used to quarter 100 or more men each, exclusive of private dwellings.
(b) Suitable camp sites for troops and animals within five miles of the city.
(c) Available water supply for command, and its location; i.e., city water works , best streams , large wells etc. -it being understood that all water must be boiled . The more information that there are water works or wells available is important.
(d) Available fuel supply - coal and wood. Are there coal mines in the vicinity so that an ample supply could be depended upon ?
(e) What food supplies - beef , rice , potatoes , beans etc. - are available for purchase locally for subsistence of troops ?
a. In storehouses
b. In adjacent districts .
(f) Local supplies of gasoline and oil .

(g) Equipment of wireless , radius , etc locate same on map.
(h) If on railroad the amount of siding and rolling stock available , if seaport the number and size of docks.
(i) If no docks are available , the depth of water and suitable location for landing troops by launch.

(i) Size and location of barracks for local garrison if any . Same for any foreign garrison, Locate same on map.
(j) The location of water-works , electric light plant , telephone and telegraph stations is important.
(k) Give name and location of arsenals , steel works, powder factories and other industrial enterprises that you deem of military importance.
(l) Any information regarding motor or other improved roads , specifying width, nature of construction, grades , condition of roads in different seasons. In this connection maps are of especial importance .

(m.) In addition to railways , what kind of , and howc much transportation is available for troops and supplies ?-Wagons, animals, coolies , carts, boats etc. would come under this head - and figures should show the average or approximate number obtainable on a few days notice.

(n) List of Americans living in or near the city and their address.

(o) List of Chinese known to you or your friends to be unquestionable pro- American, and who could be relied upon to be with us in time of war against another foreign nation.

(p) Places in which aero lanes can land or take off.

Note: Level, open fields - rectangular or square, with dimensions of three hundred yards or more.

In submitting this report you may be put to considerable inconvenience and loss of time . However, you are urged to give this matter your immediate , personal and careful attention, as the information contained therein is considered very important.

You are cautioned to consider this request for information as confidential .

This office expects to reimburse you for clerical or other assistance employed by you in getting and compiling this information.

Data is requested by December 1st, 1919.

Industrial Establishments in Foochow Consular District
(Fukien Province).

CHEMICAL FACTORY:- The Columbia Alkali Factory, German, was unsuccessful in its operations, and was closed several years ago.

ARSENALS:- The Fukien Arsenal, Pagoda Anchorage, Foochow, was founded by the Chinese Government in 1868, and has been utilized entirely for naval and general Government work.

BRICK WORKS:- THERE are in the vicinity of Foochow many native brick and tile making plants. A plant, employing modern brick making machinery, was erected by Portuguese interests in 1917, but was forced to close on account of large losses in 1918.

CANNING FACTORIES:- There are about seven milk canning factories at Foochow. No machines other than those for making tin cans to contain the milk are used. The Yok Kwai Sei ( ) Condensed Milk Co. is the largest in Foochow. The total local annual production of condensed milk is never in excess of 150,000 tins. None of the milk is exported, the product being consumed in Foochow and interior districts.

The Mei Ie ( ) Canning Company at Foochow, which employed modern machinery for canning stewed fruits, bamboo shoots, vegetables, ducks, and fish, was started by Chinese interests about 15 years ago. But owing to heavy losses the Company closed its plant in 1917.

DOCKYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS: - The Government Dock and Engineering Works founded by the Chinese Government are furnished with modern machinery. They are situated at Nanci (Pagoda Anchorage), on the north bank of the Min river about 20 miles from the sea. The length of the Dock is 340 feet at the top and 285 feet at the bottom, and the width is 68 1/4 feet. Depth of water at entrance at ordinary tide is 21 feet. The works build ships and make ship repairs. There are at present three shipways capable of constructing ships from 4,000 to 5,000 tons. There is room for expansion.

ELECTRIC LIGHT WORKS:- The Foochow Electric Company is owned by Chinese shareholders. The electric light service has been extended to Hung Shan Chiao ( ) about 8 miles from Foochow. The Company is located at Foochow. The authorized capital of the company is $1,200,000 Mexican, and the paid-up capital $657,580 Mexican, and net profits amounted to $100,000 Mexican. The number of lights (16 candle power average) installed by the company was increased to 47,500 in 1918.

The company has a monopoly of the sale of electrical energy in Foochow and suburbs. It meets no competition. The company has planned to extend the plant by installing a street railway system at Foochow.

FLOUR MILLS: There are no flour mills at present, but Chinese interests contemplate the building of a flour mill in the near future.

FURNITURE FACTORIES:- There are numerous native furniture factories at Foochow, which make native and foreign style furniture of a good quality.

GLASS AND POTTERY WORKS:- There are eight native glass factories for making lamp chimneys. The leading ones are the Hsin Kung Sing ( ) at Cheng Pu Tou ( ), Nantai, Foochow; The Kuang Li ( ) at Yangtou ( ); The Iung Hsing ( ) at Peng Chou, and the Chien Hsing Hsiang ( ) at Peng Chou ( ), all in Foochow. Owing to the stoppage of the supply of European lamp chimneys, the factories have recently made fair profits. The average capital of each factory is $1,000 Mexican. The products manufactured are mostly consumed in Foochow and interior districts. No foreign machinery is used. Attempts have been made by some of the factories to manufacture window glass, but these failed owing to lack of skilled labor. The average number of laborers in each factory is 20.

There are numerous pottery works engaged in the manufacture of Chinese

[illegible] in the district. Its output is large.
[illegible] rather than for the good quality.

[illegible] tea sold locally is manufactured by the [illegible] TEA & ARRAZED [illegible], British, the Foochow Tea Company, Japanese, and the Tung Kee ([illegible] (Ho Chung Kee Hsueh), Foochow. Total annual output is about [illegible] of tea.

[illegible]:- The mining companies in operation are the Tung Kee ( ) [illegible] Mining Co., the Chung Shih ( ) Mining Co., and the I Chi [illegible]) Coal Mining Co. There are 17 other companies registered at the [illegible] Mining Bureau, some being in the course of organization, and some having ceased operations owing to brigandage or lack of money. The [illegible] Kee Molybdenum Co., with a reported capital of $25,000 Mexican, have their molybdenum mine in the Tungtai ( ) district. [illegible] They own 10 acres of land. Their annual output is said to be about 20 tons of molybdenum, and the number of laborers employed is about 80. The Chung Shih Mining Company have molybdenum and lead mines at Tungtai ( ) and Ningte ( ). They claim to have a capital of $100,000 Mexican, and to own 825 acres of land in Fukien. The annual output of the company is said to be about 25 tons, and the number of laborers employed is about 50. The I Chi Coal Mining Co. have a capital of $1,000 Mexican. They own 25 acres of land. Their mine is located at Shawu ( ) This is a small mine, and its output is insignificant. All of the head offices of the companies are located at Foochow. They all use ancient native mining methods. The future of the mines is hopeful. There are coal, iron, copper, gold, lead, zinc and molybdenum mines in Fukien. The introduction of foreign capital and modern mining machinery would make mining profitable in this district. No mines are operated by foreigners.

OIL TIN FACTORIES:- The Standard Oil Company of New York and the Asiatic Petroleum Company, (British) maintain factories for the manufacture of oil tins at Foochow.

Paper Mills:- There are more than 1,000 native paper mills in the interior manufacturing paper by ancient methods. There are no paper mills at Foochow. The paper exported from Foochow is made of bamboo fibre.

PRINTING WORKS:- There are several native operated printing works at Foochow. Both Chinese and foreign styles of printing are done. The Anglo-Chinese Printing Press and the Foochow Printing Press are the largest. The Methodist Publishing-House of Shanghai maintains a branch at Foochow.

RICE MILLS:- The Chia Ho ( ) Rice Mill, Chinese, is the largest rice mill, and is located at Tien-Tang, Nantai, Foochow. The capital of this mill is reported to be $10,000 Mexican. There are 17 rice polishing machines of 2-3 horse-power capacity operated by electricity at Foochow. These machines are rented to rice mills by the Foochow Electric Company. Native machines made of bamboo and clay are still used for hulling rice. After hulling, the polishing machine is used.

ROPE FACTORIES:- At Foochow and in its vicinity there are many small native rope making factories. Both coir and bamboo ropes are made.

SALTWORKS:- THE important places where salt is produced are as follows: Putien ( ), Chienyin ( ), Leinho ( ), Hsiaei ( ), Hantsoliao ( ), Chienhsia ( ), Shanyao ( ) and Chaopu ( ). For many years this industry was a Government monopoly, but in August, 1918, the free trade system was instituted in about 30 districts, and it will be gradually extended throughout the whole province.

SAWMILLS:- THERE are five important sawmills at Foochow. Among these five, the China Import and Export Lumber Company, British, ahas done the largest business. Its head office in China is at Shanghai. The Chieng Hing ( ) Sawmill, Chinese, at Ya Mou Chou ( ) Nantai, Foochow, has a capital of about $200,000 Mexican. About 400 logs can be cut each day. The number of laborers employed about 150. The gross annual profit realized is about $25,000 Mexican.

[illegible]) Sawmill [illegible] Ice and Aerated Water Co.), Ltd., [illegible] Nantai, Foochow, has a capital [illegible] than 200 logs can be sawed each day. There are [illegible] employed. The gross annual profit is reported to be about $[illegible],000. [illegible]) Sawmill, Japanese, situated at Mei Tang ( ), [illegible] has a capital of about $[illegible],000 Mexican. About 100 logs are cut per day. The number of laborers employed is about 60. The Ko Shang Kee ( ) Sawmill located at Chiang Tan ( ), Nantai, Foochow, was formerly Japanese, but is now believed to be Chinese, as it is reported that the Chinese partners have bought the machinery. The capital invested is said to be about $[illegible],000 Mexican. About 400 logs can be cut each day. The gross annual profit is reported to be about $[illegible],000 Mexican.

THE FACTORIES:- There are now no tea factories operated by machinery here except the brick tea factory. All teas are manufactured in the interior by ancient native methods before shipment to Foochow. A tea factory with modern machinery established by British interests at Pei Liang ( ) about 30 miles from Foochow, was closed 22 years ago owing to heavy losses.

The brick tea factory at Foochow is Chinese owned, and is called "The Shih Ho ( ) Brick Tea Factory". The factory only works several months in the year, owing to the loss of the Russian market, because of recent troubles in Russia. During 1918, about 5,000 bamboo crates of brick tea were produced by the factory. Each crate contained 80 bricks of a total weight of 200 pounds.

TELEPHONE:- THE FUKIEN TELEPHONE COMPANY, Ltd., at Foochow is controlled by the same group of Chinese that control the Foochow Electrical Company. The operators total 40 in number, and the subscribers 592. The authorized capital of the company is $300,000 Mexican. During 1918, there was done a total business of $[illegible],000 Mexican, of which $35,000 Mexican were profits. [redacted]

PORT DIRECTORY DATA.

PORT OF FOOCHOW (Fukien), CHINA.

Name of Port: Pagoda Anchorage, Foochow; County: Fukien Country: China. General Location, Min River; Population 650,000.

PILOTAGE:—

The pilotage ground for the port of Foochow is divided into two sections, viz., outside and inside. The outside ground is defined as extending from the line White Dogs and Matsu and Quing Islands in as far as the Sharp Peak Anchorage; and the inside ground, as extending from Sharp Peak Anchorage to the Upper Limits of the Pagoda Anchorage.

Communications for the Captain of Port should be addressed, "Harbor Master, Pagoda Anchorage, Foochow."

RADIO:—

There is a radio station at Foochow owned by the Chinese Government and controlled by the Ministry of Communications. This station handles commercial messages as well as government.

The spark type apparatus - undamped system - made by the German Telefunken Company-is used. Its call letters are "X O W"; length, 600, 1200, 1600, 2100; and the normal sending radius is by day 650 and by night 1300 miles. The station communicates with the radio stations in Peking, Shanghai, Wuchang and Vessels at Sea. There is no port regulation preventing or limiting the use of wireless by visiting men-of-war. No other particular data obtainable in this regard.

TIME:-

There is no Time Ball or Observatory. China Coast Zone time, the only time kept throughout the country, is used and this is reckoned from the meridian 120° E. of Greenwich.

OFFICIALS and COURTESIES:

Residing at or near the Port are: The Civil Governor and Military Governor of Fukien Province, at Foochow; Engineering Admiral, Chinese Navy at Pagoda Anchorage; Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Foochow.

BOAT LANDINGS:-

There is no special landing place for Men-of-war, boats could land at Pagoda Anchorage and at Nantai (Foochow), at the Customs Jetty. At night it is not lighted. The Customs jetty is good at all tides.

SHORE BOATS:-

The Sampans only are obtainable and for these there is no tariff. The boats are under the control of River Police. There is no legal tariff for shore boats.

FACILITIES FOR FRESH WATER:

There is an abundant supply of River and Well water which is of a fair quality as boiler water but must be boiled before drinking. The water is carried to ships by water boats of which any number are available. Any quantity of water is available and can be secured for an "uncertain" price upon application to pilots or customs.

COALING FACILITIES:

Soft Coal is usually on hand, from the Kailan Mining Administration, North China and Formosa. 1000 tons can be easily obtained by early application.

COALING FACILITIES: (Continued)

There are several large coal dealers in Ya Mou Chou, Nantai, Foochow, Bidwell & Company and Jardine, Matheson & Co.,, Foochow (Kinds of coal handled by respective dealers not specified.) The price of coal "uncertain". If sufficient coal is obtainable any number of ships may be coaled at one time. Any number of lighters are available, of various capacities, and the number of tons delivered on board per hour depends upon the number of coolies employed.

OIL FUEL:-

There is none on hand (June 1921) but stocks of 20 tons expected in fall, kind unknown. To be delivered to ships in barrels. There are no tank lighters. The price to be about $75 per ton - depends upon the rate of exchange. Dealers: The Standard Oil Co., New York (American) and the Asiatic Petroleum Co., (British, can arrange to have fuel oil here if notified some time in advance.

GASOLINE:-

About 20,000 gallons on hand. A good quality is handled by the Standard Oil Co., New York and the Asiatic Petroleum Co., Foochow and can be obtained at about Mex. $1 per gallon, depending on the rate of exchange.

SHIPS' SUPPLIES.

Ships' (Chandler's) supplies are not plentiful nor are all varieties available; the prices are high. Engineers' supplies can be purchased in limited quantities from Government Dock and Engineering Works, Pagoda Anchorage.

COMMISSARY SUPPLIES:-

Plentiful - general varieties, beef, tinned goods, vegetables and fruits. Possibly fruits in season can be purchased to advantage. The addresses of principal provision dealers are: T.M. Wilkinson & Co. (American), Tak Kee & Co., (Chinese) Tai Song & Co., FOOCHOW.

PORT REGULATIONS:-

Ships can enter the Port freely night and day.

SANITATION and HOSPITALS:-

The condition of sanitation of the City and Port is fair for a Chinese City. Dr. Gillett's (American) hospital at Pagoda Anchorage and Dr. Moorhead's (British) at Foochow are both privately owned, very sanitary institutions which are recommended for "Navalseamen". Special sanitary precautions,such as boiling milk and water and not eating uncooked food, must be taken at all times.

RAILROAD AND STEAMSHIP LINES:--

There are no railway lines to the port.

CABLES:-

The Port has cable communication with Hongkong, Amoy and Shanghai, by Eastern Extension Telegraph Company (British).

TELEGRAPHS.

Chinese Government Telegraph Administration's lines connect Foochow with all parts of China.

MAIL FACILITIES:-

There are Chinese, British, French and Japanese Post Offices. Mail for the United States should be forwarded by way of Chinese Postal service. Applications for mail from the United States should be made to the Chinese Post Office, if from Shanghai, and to the British Post Office, if from Hongkong, as transshipment points.

" Sanitary Regulations," "Chinese Pilotage Service," and "American Consular Service" circulars pertaining to Foochow are also submitted. Only 1 copy of each available.

REPORT ON THE CITY OF CANTON,
KWANGTUNG PROVINCE, CHINA.

Prepared in the Military Intelligence Division,
Headquarters Philippine Department,
Manila, P.I.,
January 1922.

Compiled by Captain S.V.Constant, Cavalry,
under the direction of Major John C.H.Lee, General
Staff Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military
Intelligence.

Distribution:

M.I.D., Washington----------2
Military Attaché, Peking, China----------1
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet---------1
File----------2

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CITY OF CANTON,

KWANTUNG PROVINCE, CHINA.

Population: 1,500,000 (1921).

Map of Canton - Appendix B.

1. LOCATION AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE:

(a) LOCATION:

Canton (Kwan Chow Fu) is situated in lat. 23° 06' N., long. 113° 15' E., on the north bank of the Pearl (Canton) River, about 90 miles north-west of Hongkong.

The name Canton includes the old walled city, and the more recent suburbs. The former begins at the river and extends north about 2 miles to the base of the White Cloud Mountains which overlook the town from the north-west. The walled city proper is approximately 2 miles from east to west but with the new districts, the city extends nearly 5 miles along the river.

Canton is located on the marshy delta of the Pearl or Canton River which near the city forms a harbor about 5 miles long, varying from 200 to 1,000 feet in width according to reports of the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet. The average rise of tide is 9 feet, and steamers of 20 foot draft can navigate the river as far as Whampoa, just below Canton proper. In the latter place, the average depth of water is 16 feet.

(b) MILITARY IMPORTANCE:

From a military point of view, Canton is of importance for the following reasons:

1. It is the provincial capital and largest city and port of Kwangtung Province. At the present time it is the seat of the Southern Republican Government headed by Dr. Sun

Yat-sen.

2. It is the southern terminus of the Kwangtung-Yueh-han Railway. The importance of this line as a feeder for troops from the south of China to the Yangtze Valley, and thence to Peking has been discussed in a separate report on the uncompleted Hankow Railway, of which the Kwangtung-Yueh-han Railway is the southern section.

3. It lies on the main artery of water communication, the Pearl (Canton) River, between the ocean port of Hongkong, and the interior, north of the South China Sea, and is the trans-shipping point for much goods which are carried north in small junks on the many tributaries which compose the Canton Delta.

4. It is connected by a first class railway, the Canton-Kowloon line, with the fine harbor of Hongkong accessible to the largest ocean steamers. The Canton-Kowloon Railway is the subject of a separate report.

(c) FOREIGN CONSULS:

The most important consular offices located on the Shameen are:

American,
British,
French,
Japanese.

(d) TROOPS:

No accurate figures can be given as to the number of Chinese troops garrisoned here as they are constantly changing. At the present time only about 2,000 soldiers are in Canton as

the greater part of Dr. Sun's forces are concentrating at Kweilin, Kwangsi Province, for the proposed expedition against North China.

There are 4,046 policemen, 224 police captains, and 140 chiefs and assistants in the Canton Police Department. The city is divided into 12 police wards, under the Department of Public Safety.

The clothing and equipment of both soldiers and police are far above the average for the rest of China.

2. TERRAIN AND VEGETATION:

(a) TOPOGRAPHY OF THE CITY:

Canton is located at the head of the river delta, as noted above, and is generally flat, with a rise to the north at the base of the White Cloud Hills.

To the north there are numerous rice paddies, and low marshy land is prevalent to the south and east.

At the present time there are no roads connecting the city with the interior of the province, and all traffic is carried on over innumerable foot paths which radiate from the city in all directions, winding among the rice paddies. This should be particularly noted since for movements of large bodies of troops by land from Canton, the railroads are the only possible solution.

(b) CHARACTER OF THE CITY:

The "old" walled city is typical of China, very densely populated, with the usual narrow, crooked streets where the shops and walls are separated by a distance of generally less than 10 feet. There are many ancestral temples, etc., which could be used as temporary quarters for about 10,000 troops.

Canton, looking south from old North Gate. The "Flowery Pagoda" on the skyline is a good landmark. October 17, 1921.



Typical street in northern outskirts of Canton. This leads south from just inside the old North Gate. October 17, 1921.

The old city wall is gradually being torn down and the narrow winding streets, usually paved with stone slabs, are being replaced with broad paved "malus" or boulevards, see Appendix B. The wide streets already constructed are shown in broad red lines, and the proposed new streets are indicated in white. It will be noticed on this map that the old Chinese city lies to the west of the newer part, and between it and the track of the Kwangtung-Yueh-han Railway.

The "Shameen" is an island just south of this old part of the city, separated from it by a canal crossed by two bridges. This island was inclosed by a wall and filled in to its present size - 2,850 feet long x 950 feet wide. Four fifths of Shameen is known as the British Concession and the remaining portion as the French Concession. On this island are located the principal foreign business firms, banks, etc., in modern buildings. Due to the small foot-bridges no wheeled transportation can get on to Shameen. The roads on the island are first class.

Property in the Concessions is held usually on a 99-year's lease dating from 1861, from the British and French Governments. The former has a perpetual lease from the Chinese Government, which does not however, relinquish the right of eminent domain (Tientsin Treaty, 1858).

The industrial section of Canton is mostly in the new city and on the island of Honam, south of it.

(c) VEGETATION:

The country in the vicinity of Canton is cultivated intensively. Rice is the important crop, and the fertile districts of the Canton Delta give two and sometimes even three crops [illegible] yearly. Rice requires a very low-lying soil

and plenty of water for its cultivation, and this is afforded by the annual rise of the rivers and also by irrigation, for which latter purpose water wheels, tread mills and buckets on poles are extensively used.

The production of sugar cane and the manufacture of sugar is becoming one of the principal industries of this region.

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE CANTON MUNICIPALITY:

The Canton Municipality, organized under the Provisional Charter of the City of Canton promulgated December 23, 1920, by the Civil Governor of the Province of Kwangtung, came into being on February 15, 1921. From the ancient Chinese theory and form of administration whereunder any centre of population, no matter how large, was regarded merely as a portion of the "Hsien" or "District" in which it happened to be situated, the administration of this centre of population of 900,000 souls has, by this act, been put in the hands of a separate governmental organ created for the purpose. By the Charter of the City of Canton a certain area was carved out of the two Districts of Nam Hoi and Pun Yu and made a separate political entity, designated the Canton Municipality, and under the Charter made responsible directly to the Provincial Government of Kwangtung.

The Municipality is composed of three parts:

the Municipal Executive Council,
the Advisory Council, and
the Audit Bureau.

In the Executive Council consisting of 7 members at present appointed by the Provincial Civil Governor direct, are vested the entire executive functions of the municipal administration. These 7 members hold individually thefollowing executive offices:

Mayor of the City, who is also chairman ex-officio of the Executive Council,
Commissioner of Finance,

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Commissioner of Public Education,
Commissioner of Public Health,
Commissioner of Public Works, and
Commissioner of Public Utilities.

The Municipal Advisory Council is composed of 30 members chosen in different ways; 10 are appointed directly by the Provincial Civil Governor; 10 are chosen by general election, and 10 are elected in the following manner:

3 by the Canton Chamber of Commerce,
3 by the Labour Organizations,
1 by the Educational Association,
1 by the Medical Profession,
1 by the Engineering Profession, and
1 by the Lawyers' Association.

The function of the Municipal Advisory Council are:

(1) to transmit petitions from citizens to the Executive Council,
(2) to decide on matters submitted to it by the Executive Council, and
(3) to form a sort of board of inquiry to examine the administration of the various executive departments.

The Audit Bureaus, with a chief auditor appointed by the Governor, is empowered to audit all municipal accounts.

4. HEALTH AND SANITATION:

(a) DISEASES:

Since Canton is located on the water, the climate is effected thereby. There is a distinct rainy season, generally In June, July, August and September, with numerous typhoons from the China Sea. October to February is the pleasant season. The temperature varies from about 40° F. in winter to about 95° in summer. Heavy fogs are common in February and March.

Flies are very prevalent and swarm in the city particularly. Mosquitoes also abound, and though their bite is painful, residents appear to suffer no ill effects.

No serious epidemics have broken out recently, but

The Bund, Canton, looking east. The large building on the left is the Sincere Company, one of the large Chinese department stores, with branches in Hongkong and Shanghai. August 9, 1911.

Canton looking east from the Sun Company's building on the Bund. Honan Island is shown to the left, and the Shameen on the right with its stone bund and many trees. August 9, 1911.

dysentery, typhoid and diptheria, scarlet fever and small pox are prevalent.

Plague and Cholera are endemic. Venereal diseases in all forms are very common.

(b) UNHEALTHY SECTIONS:

The most unhealthy section of Canton is the old city which reeks with foul odours.

The island of Shameen is considered more healthy than any other part of the town.

The Department of Public Health has now in force a new set of sanitary regulations governing restaurants, hotels, theatres, public latrines and other public buildings.

The Department realises that it is necessary to educate the mass of the people to the need for sanitary precautions and to this end distributes pamphlets and circulars outlining the dangers of lack of sanitation and hygiene. It has also held a series of public demonstrations and exhibitions.

This Department has divided the city into 6 sanitary districts. For each district there is a staff of five officers consisting of a chief, 2 inspectors and 2 overseers. The Department employs about 1,000 men as street cleaners. Rubbish is removed in the narrow streets by burden carriers and in the large streets by cart. Each sanitary district submits a daily report of sanitary conditions in the district, and statistics on the subject are kept in the Department.

(c) HOSPITALS:

There are 5 large hospitals in Canton and some small Chinese hospitals.

The main Onesare:

1. CANTON HOSPITAL:

Location - the Bund. Controlled by American and British Missions. Capacity - 450 beds. Buildings - 4 two-story brick buildings and buildings for nurses, doctors, coolies, laundry and kitchens. Equipment - very good. Three operating rooms; general surgery, infected cases, and ear, eye, nose and throat. Water supply - city water and two wells which are used for washing only. All water is sterilized before use. Light - electric from city.

2. HOSPITAL DOUMER:

Location - the Bund. Supported by French Government. Physicians in charge belong to the Medical Corps, French Colonial Army. Capacity - 100 beds. Buildings - 6 modern brick buildings. Equipment - good and modern; includes x-ray and other electrical apparatus. Water supply - city water. Light - electric from city.

3. KUNG YEE HOSPITAL:

Location - 2 miles from Bund. Supported by Chinese, with an American doctor as superintendent. Capacity - main hospital 125 beds, branch hospital 40 beds. Buildings - good. Equipment - good and modern. Water supply - main hospital from wells in compound, branch hospital from city supply. Light - electric from city.

4. DAVID GREG HOSPITAL:

Controlled by American Presbyterian Mission in connection with the Hackett Medical College, both of which are open to women only. Capacity - 75 beds. Buildings - good. Equipment - good and modern. Water supply - city water. Light - electric from city.

5. KWANG WAH HOSPITAL:

Controlled by Chinese entirely. Capacity - 150 beds. Buildings and Equipment - fair. Water supply - city water. Light - electric from city.

6. KONG CHUEN HOSPITAL:

Location - 13 miles north of Canton on the Yueh-han Railway. Supported by the British. Capacity - 75 beds. Buildings - brick and tile. Equipment - modern.

(d) SEWERAGE:

There are about half a dozen streets in Canton provided with sewers, the total length being about 3,000 feet. All other drainage in the city is by canals and open gutters. Buildings on the Shameen are provided with modern plumbing which drains into the Pearl River.

Canton was famous as one of the dirtiest cities in the world. What sewers there were had practically become useless through lack of repair and cleaning. The Department of Public Health of Canton claims that in the course of 4 months, that is, April to July, 1921, inclusive, the Department has had thoroughly cleaned 126 drains, with a total length of about 53,121 feet. Much repairing was also necessary to make these drains serviceable. The Department is faced now with a very difficult problem. These drains so far put in condition are but the effluents or distributaries of the "Eight Great Sewers", a system of some 42,000 feet of very old drains running all through the old section of the city, over which houses have been built in many places. These drains are said to run under 300 private dwellings. Hence, apart from the question of the engineering skill involved in cleaning and repairing this sewer system, many delicate problems arising out of the property rights of the persons who have built over these drains must be faced. The Department is now studying the problem and hope for a satisfactory solution.

(e) FILTERS:

All drinking water should be filtered and boiled. Clean

sand and charcoal are used for filtering and are easily obtainable.

(f) SOURCE OF WATER SUPPLY:

The chief source of water supply is the river. The water is taken at Chang Po about 8 miles above Canton. It is not considered safe and should be boiled for drinking purposes.

5. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS:

(a) EXTENT OF COMMUNICATIONS:

Canton is connected to the north with Shiu Chow, Kwangtung Province, and the the west with Samshui, Kwangtung Province, by the Yueh-han Railway, and to the south with Hongkong by the Canton-Kowloon Railway.

Canton is connected by water with Hongkong and is practically the head of navigation for vessels of any size. The North River connects Canton with northern Kwantung, and the West River connects it with Kwangsi.

There are no tramways.

The new city streets as shown in Appendix C are the only good roads in Canton and there are nothing but foot-paths outside the city.

Canton has a total of 24 miles of modern roads and streets within the city limits. Of this total mileage approximately 8 miles were completed before the establishment of the Municipality, 9 miles have been built in the fraction over half a year since its establishment, and the remaining 71/2 miles are at present in process of construction. The streets range in width from 80 to 150 feet, including sidewalks, and are constructed of cement concrete or lime concrete. At the same time the Department of Public Works is utilizing as much as possible of the bricks and rock obtained from the demolition of the city wall, in the making of the road bed. To accomplish the present project of street building 3,000 houses had to be condemned and torn down, 1,300 feet of old canal

On the Pearl river near Canton. These two stone burial places are typical of South China, and are very different from the dirt mounds used in the North. October 17, 1921.

Type of river steamer operating on the Pearl river, between Hongkong and Canton. Victoria, Hongkong, looking south. October 17, 1921.

filled in and about 61/2 miles of city wall demolished. Much of the present roadway has been built on the site of the old city wall and of canals which have been filled in.

(b) RAILWAY FACILITIES:

See special reports on Canton-Hankow and Canton-Kowloon Railways.

(c) DOCKING FACILITIES:

There is a good stone Bund along most of the water front, and a great part of the Front Reach is in process of reclamation. There are many poorly built Chinese docks along the north and south shores. The best of the docks are as follows:

(Fleet Intelligence Officer) (Asiatic Fleet)	Length (ft.)	Water (ft) alongside
In Pearl River:		
Kwangtung-Yueh-han Railway.....	105	9
Kwangtung-Yueh-han Railway (Samshui Branch).....	60	12
In Front Reach:		
Hongkong Steamer Docks.....	120	8
Hongkong Steamer Docks.....	120	10
Customs Docks (3 docks).....	90	2 to 10
In Back Reach:		
Asiatic Petroleum Co.....	300	12-16
Butterfield & Swire Co. (3 docks)...	180	18
Shell Transportation & Trading Co...	75	7
Standard Oil Co.....	90	18

A new plan of harbor development is under consideration by the Canton authorities which will materially improve the docking facilities of the port. Diagram of this plan is shown in Appendix C.

(d) ANCHORAGE: (Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asistic Fleet).

Except for junks and small craft it is at present necessary for all ships to moor to buoys in the harbor of Canton, owing to the limited anchorage space. The holding ground is not especially good, being of gravel, sand and mud.

Following is a list of the buoys in the harbor with depth of

"Flower boats", Canton. Hundreds of these scows are moored in the Pearl river, and serve as restaurants and lodging houses. October 17, 1921.

Looking south toward Honan Island, from Shameen, Canton. The sampans in the foreground are taxicabs of the Pearl river, and on such craft live thousands of Canton's river population. October 17, 1921.

water and size of berth:

Ownership.	Type.	Make (ft)	Size (ft)
Jardine Matheson Co.	Double.	12	450
Butterfield & Swire	Single.	20	300
China Merchants Co. (No. 1)	"	18	360
" " " (" 2)	Double.	17	300
British Naval Buoy (" 1)	"	8	210
" " " (" 2)	"	12	150
" " " (" 3)	"	15	300
Canton Navigation Co.	"	7	210
U.S.Naval Buoy. (No. 1)	"	15	330
" " " " (" 2)	"	8	150
Customs Buoy (No. 1)	"	7	150
" " (" 2)	"	14	225
" " (" 3)	"	17	300
French Pontoons (No. 1)	"	10	150
" " (" 2)	"	10	150

Maneuvering space for all except the most shallow vessels is very limited.

(e) VEHICLES:

There are 175 automobiles in Canton; 120 of these are passenger cars, and 20 are trucks for commercial uses. The remainder are privately owned.

The Canton Tramway Company has 20 motor busses, each having a carrying capacity of 30 persons. These operate on the improved streets of the city on a regular schedule and give fair service.

Rickshaws are used also on the wide streets, but in the old city, sedan chairs are the only means of transportation. Wheelbarrows are used to some extent for water, etc., but most of the transportation of goods is done by coolie labour, any amount of which is available. As mentioned before, there are no roads outside the city.

On the river there are some 20 tugs which are used for towing. Junks are the universal means of water transportation for cargoes and sampans for passengers. There are also an increasing number of small motor boats used in the vicinity of Canton.

(f) TELEPHONES, TELEGRAPHS, RADIO AND CABLES.

The Canton Telephone Administration owns and operates a system of 1,700 telephones and over 5,000 miles of single strand copper wire. The equipment of the exchange is Japanese and the instruments are either Japanese, Norwegian or Swedish.

The Chinese Telegraph Administration operates lines from Canton to Hongkong and Shanghai and important towns of the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kweichow. Shanghai is connected with Canton by two lines, one going by way of Kiukiang and Hankow, and the other by way of Swatow and Foochow. The Kwangtung-Yueh-han Railway and the Canton-Hankow Railway have telegraph systems which are described in the respective railway reports.

There are four radio stations in Canton. The Central station is located in lat. 23° 10' 00" N., long. 113° 20' 00" E. It was constructed about fifteen years ago by a German engineer and is on the East Parade Ground. The instruments are of Telefunken make and the set is of the type known as the "quenched spark". Power is obtained from a 50 H.P. oil, internal combustion engine, which drives by belt a dynamo having the following specifications: K.W. 15,115/100 v., 130/194 amps., R.P.M. 900, direct current. There are 62 ampere storage cells, 50 of which are in use constantly and 10 being reserves. The motor-generator set is as follows:

Motor - 110 v., 91 amps., R.P.M. 1100/2200 direct current.
Generator - 220 v., 45/48 amps., R.P.M. 1500. Frequency 500, K.W. 8, alternating current.
The sending range of the station is about 700-800 miles in the day and from 1300/1500 miles at night. Wave lengths of 600, 1200, 1600, 2100 and 3000 can be used.

A smaller set, 1/2 K.W. is located at the Yamen and a similar one at the Arsenal. These three stations are also equipped for radio telephone.

The Canton Government intends to instal an extensive radio telephone system as shown in the attached print.

At present the only station operating in this system, other than the Canton stations are: those at Yuenkong, Kochow, Shiu-king and Wuchow.

There is a small Naval Radio Station which works up to about 200 miles and is used to communicate with river gunboats, Hongkong, Macao, etc.

Canton has no direct cable communications. Messages are sent by telegraph to Hongkong where they are put on the cables. The Pacific Commercial Cable Co. connects with the United States via Guam and Honolulu.

6. SHELTER AND SUPPLIES:

(a) GENERAL ESTIMATES:

It is estimated that the available shelter for troops, considering suitable public and private buildings within the city limits, would accomodate 50,000 men.

There are practically no suitable camp sites in the vicinity of the city, with the exception of the North Parade Ground which could accomodate a division of infantry.

(b) PRINCIPAL BUILDINGS:

The principal buildings in Canton are those of the Sun Co., Government Administrative Buildings - (Post Office, Mint, etc.), the Chinese Maritime Customs, the Hospital and the buildings of foreign firms. These are the Victoria Hotel, International Banking Corporation, Asia Banking Corporation, Standard Oil Co., Asiatic Petroleum Co., Vacuum Oil Co., Andersen-Meyer Co., the the General Silk Importing Co., and some Japanese firms. The buildings named above are of stone or brick construction, and in an excellent state of repair.

On the island of Shameen will be found the majority of

Municipal Building, Canton. August 9, 1921.

Provincial Treasury of Kwangtung province, located in Canton.
August 9, 1921.

the buildings listed above. In addition to these there are, on Shameen many residences and Consulate buildings, etc., which are modern in every respect and most suitable for quartering troops.

(c) OTHER BILLETS:

There are many native buildings of fairly modern construction located along the Bund, which could be used to quarter troops. There are also numerous ancestral temples and other temples which could be used temporarily. Some of the native buildings in the old city might be used as emergency billets, but on the whole this section is too congested and far too unhealthy.

(d) WATER SUPPLY:

The Canton Water Works Co. is owned partly by the Canton Government and partly by private share holders. The equipment comprises a purification plant, and three purificating engines, all the machinery being of Japanese manufacture.

As noted above the source of water is the Pearl River and the intake at Chang Po about 8 miles above Canton. After the water is taken from the river it is run through three sets of sand filters. A new system is being installed which is calculated to increase materially the present supply of water, which is now 5,600,000 gals. per day. There are a few wells in the various compounds throughout the city.

All water should be boiled for drinking purposes.

(e) FOOD SUPPLIES:

Canton is in the rich, fertile Canton Delta District and the famines of North China are unknown here.

The most important products are rice and fish. Among others of importance may be mentioned wheat, potatoes, sugar cane, oats, barley and rye.

There is considerable live stock available in this dis-

An ancestral temple, Canton. Any of these would make a fair temporary billet. July. 7, 1921.

Interior of an ancestral temple, Canton, showing altar. All large Chinese families have such a temple and are generally very careful in taking care of it. July 7, 1921.

The old city of Canton, from the Shameen. They are separated by a narrow canal on which sampans ply unceasingly. Many remain tied to the sides of the canal as can be seen. July 7, 1921.

One of the larger junks on the Pearl river. This type does not as a rule get far away from Canton. July 7, 1971.

trict, including some cattle and hogs. Poultry is also raised and large flocks of geese are seen in all directions. Fish, as noted above is the most important natural resource and the Chinese depend a great deal on this product of the Pearl River and its tributaries.

Beef is available in limited quantities, but rice, fish, large supplies of potatoes could always be depended upon, as could the supply of eggs and poultry. Several thousand eggs are sent daily to Hongkong.

There are a number of large commercial firms, hotels and ship's chmpradores, all of whom carry a supply of canned goods. The nearness of Canton to Hongkong, however, makes the storage of large qbantities of provisions unnecessary. The majority of firms keep their stock in Hongkong and bring up enough to meet the demand.

(f) FUEL:

In Canton there are no bunkering facilities on hand and practically no coaling facilities. The coal used in power plants and steamers is Japanese mostly, with some Kaifong or Manchurian bituminous coal. Companies handling coal are Dodwell & Co., the Hing Lee Coal Co., which keep not more than about 600 tons of coal on hand. The general method is to order coal from Hongkong and have it brought up on junks as needed. There is some coal in Shiu-chow, Kwantung Province, north of Canton, which has been discussed in detail in report on the Canton-Hankow Railway.

There are three companies in Canton dealing in oils, etc. The Standard Oil Co. has storage capacity for

Gasoline.....	20,000 gals.
Kerosene	10,000,000 gals.
Lubricating Oils.....	50 barrels.
Fuel Oil.....	30 tons.

The company contemplates a new dock from which to supply vessels with fuel oil, and if this is built, instead of the present stock carried,

a stock of about 3,000 tons is anticipated. The SOCONY lighter which carries oil up from Hongkong has a capacity of 360,000 gals. of kerosene, or about 600 tons of fuel oil.

The Asiatic Petroleum Co. has storage capacity for:

Gasoline.....10,000 gals.
Kerosene.....3,000,000 gals.
Lubricating Oils.....50 barrels.
Fuel Oil.....3,000 tons.

The Texas Oil Co. has storage capacity for about 300,000 gals. of kerosene.

(g) FORAGE:

There is practically no forage available. Limited amounts of rice-straw may be obtained. There are no grazing facilities near the city.

V. INHABITANTS:

(a) NATIONALITY:

The population is composed almost entirely of Cantonese Some Mandarin is spoken by the officials, but the Cantonese language is universal. Various figures have been given as to the native population of Canton, but it is generally considered as being 1,500,000 of which about 125,000 have their home on the water, and are known as "Tan-min". These "Tan-min" are a class of people who live in boats where they are born, married and die. Their origin is unknown but it is generally believed that they are partly descended from political refugees, who, at various times and under different circumstances attending the past dynastic changes and political troubles, fled to these southern waters. The "Tan-min" engage in the carrying trade sometimes, making the journey between Canton and Hongkong. To them also belong the numerous little "slipper boats" and other types of sampans which carry passengers from one point to another on Canton's busy river front.

The Bund, Canton, looking east. August 9, 1921.

The Bund, Canton, about half a mile east from the Sun Company's building. In the foreground are the little boats where live the "Tan-min", Canton's boat people. August 9, 1921.

The foreign population of Canton is as follows:

American	459
Japanese	352
British	210
Portuguese	117
French	105
German	100
Indian	40
Danes	24
Dutch	15
Swedish	9
Italian	6
Norwegian	2
Belgian	1
Total	1424

The number and distribution of Americans in the Canton Consular District are as follows:

KWANGTUNG PROVINCE:

CITY:	NUMBER:	CITY:	NUMBER:
Canton	459	On Fun	2
Do Sing	3	Paknai	2
Fatshan	10	Sainam	12
Heungshan	3	Samshui	1
Heihow	9	Shetan	3
Heiping	3	Sheklung	14
Hop Sui Hui	11	Chiuchow	1
Kachek	11	Shiu Hing	9
Kiunchow	11	Sinlam	17
Kochow	2	Sze Wui	1
Koming	1	Taai Lik	1
Kongmoon	17	Tak Hing	16
Koonshan	3	Toi Shan	8
Lappa	2	Tsing Yuen	1
Liuchow	6	Tung Chun	3
Lopau	2	Waichow	8
Loting	12	Wang Kong	1
Macao	3	Yung Cheng	16
Nodoa	10	Ying Tak	9

KWANGSI PROVINCE:

Kwai Ping	4	Lungchow	1
King Yuan	1	Nanning	15
Kwei Lin	12	Poseh	4
Liuchow	4	Wuchow	45

KWEICHOW PROVINCE:

Chenyuan	3	Ta Lang	1
Tung Jen	10	Zalifu	2

Some of the old gunboats of the Cantonese Navy anchored off Honam Island, Canton. July 7, 1921

Looking south from Shameen. The H.M.S. "Robin", typical shallow draft British gunboat is shown on the right. July 7, 1921.

Hangar of the Cantonese Air Service on the Pearl river a few miles down from Canton proper. July 7, 1921.

Kin Lung Kiang...	9	Tung Yuch.....	11
Mengtse.....	2	Tsu Yung.....	1
Meng Meng.....	4	Yunnan fu.....	12

Total Americans - 836.

The most prominent of the reliable Americans are:

Mr Lee A.Berghalz.....the Consul.
Mr.M.O.Clark.....Manager, Standard Oil Co..
Mr.C.S.Peget.....Architect and Constructor.
Mr.James A.Rabbit.....Engineer. Very close to the Canton Government.
Mr.G.E.Lerrige.....General Secretary, Y.M.C.A.

A great many of the Chinese both in official and business life are American educated, and hence the feeling towards Americans is exceptionally cordial, probably more so than in any other part of China. The attitude towards all foreigners is respectful, but there is a strong anti-Japanese and anti-British sentiment, particularly so among the educated classes.

(b) MILITARY TRAINING:

Many of the natives have had training of a sort with the Chinese Army, but as a soldier type must be considered generally inferior. The troops, however, next to Chang Tso-lin's Japanese-trained soldiers and Wu Lei-fu's "Own Division", were better equipped and better trained and disciplined than any observed.

8. OCCUPATIONS AND INDUSTRIES:

(a) CHIEF INDUSTRIES:

The principal industries of Canton are the reeling of raw silk, the weaving of silk and linen piece goods, embroidery work on silk and "Canton Linen", ivory carving, and the manufacture of various articles of silver ware, fans, fire-crackers and mats.

There is a cement-works on Honam Island which turns out 400 barrels of cement a day. This is mostly exported and cement imported from Hongkong for local use.

The lack of docking facilities has created quite a demand

for small-power craft and several companies are making very good small boats. The most important of these are the Chu Kong Motor Boat Co., Hip Tung Wo and Kwang Wo On Co's. The Hip Tung Wo Co. makes a good crude-oil engine (according to Navy Reports) but do not build their own hulls. The Kwang Nam Dock Co. is the largest ship-building plant in Canton. The yard is equipped with nearly all British machinery and has built iron and steel vessels up to 2,000 gross tons. There are facilities for making boilers and engines for the vessels constructed.

There are two Chinese Government docks at Whampo, where the Chinese gunboats are over-hauled and some commercial work is also done. The largest known as the Cooper Dock is 450' x 75' x 18', and the other, known as the Lecksun Dock is 430' x 65' x 16'.

(b) ELECTRIC LIGHT PLANTS. (Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet).

The Kwangtung Electric Co. Ltd., is the only electric supply company in Canton and the vicinity. It supplies electric power to all of Canton and to the territory within a radius of 30 miles from Canton. A few of the rice mills have their individual power plants - usually of 25 K.W. output and run by crude-oil engines.

At present the Kwangtung Co. has an output of 2040 K.W., 2200 K.W. is firnished from 10 crude-oil, Diesel engines of various sizes and makes. The remaining 840 K.W. is furnished by 4 small steam reciprocating engines. The company is just installing two large General Electric turbo-generators of 5000 K.W. This forms the main part of the plant and will soon be in use. All of the equipment in connection with the turbo-generators is the very latest.

There are 4 large B. & W. boilers of 750 H.P. each, equipped with superheaters; 2 large condensors; 2 circulating pumps with capacity of 9000 gals. per minute; 2 feed heaters; 2 vacuum pumps and 2 exciters. 28" of vacuum is obtained at 80° temp., circulating water,

and 28" of vacuum at 68° temp. of the water. Water upon reaching the boiler is at a temperature of 310°, the turbines are 4 stage turbines and carry 215 lbs. steam at throttles. The switch boards are of the very latest type and the plant is fitted with automatic protection from damage by lightening striking along the line. At present the company is running with 50% increase of the output. The voltage of the primary circuit is at present 1400 volts when it should be 2300 volts.

The plant is backed entirely by Chinese capital, all of the stock owners are Canton citizens. The present manager and superintendent is a Cantonese Chinaman. In time the company expects to replace the crude-oil and reciprocating engines with another 5000 K.W. turbo-generator set. Japanese and North China coal is used. Some is purchased from local dealers and the remainder from Hongkong.

(e) DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIONS:

About 125,000 of the population of Canton are "Tan-min" or boat people who live by fishing, and carrying small cargoes, passengers, etc. on the Pearl River and its tributaries.

Of the land population the occupations are distributed between coolie labor, small shop-keeping and vending, rice growing and truck-gardening, and miscellaneous other methods of support.

8. FACILITIES FOR REPAIR AND MUNITIONS MAKING:

(a) ARSENALS AND POWDER PLANTS:

The Arsenal is located 12 miles from Canton. Four hundred sets of German Krupp machinery are used and the plant turns out 20 6.5mm. German Mauser Rifles per day. Vickers Machine Guns are handmade with British appliances at the rate of 8 per month. None of the parts are interchangeable. Automatic pistols are also being hand - made at the rate of 20 per month, and like the Vickers guns, no parts

"Flowery pagoda", Canton. One of the prominent landmarks of the city. October 17, 1921.

Tea garden near the "Flowery pagoda". In such places the Chinese pass their leisure time. October 17, 1921.

are interchangeable. Cartridges are made with 140 sets of Krupp machinery at the rate of 750,000 per month. About 1200 men are employed making guns and 200 making ammunition.

The Powder Works is located at Yeung Po, near the Arsenal, and turns out 100 lbs. of very good smokeless powder per day.

(b) There are 25 so-called "garages" in the city but these are hardly more than individual repair shops for the owners' cars. The ship-yards mentioned above offer the best repair facilities. The railway repair shops have been covered in reports on the Canton-Hankow and Canton-Kowloon Railways.

10. OUR OWN AND FOREIGN INTERESTS:

The most important business interests in Canton are:

International Banking Corporation -	American.
Asia Banking Corporation ----------	"
Standard Oil Co. of New York ------	"
Vacuum Oil Co. ----------	"
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Co. -	British.
Asiatic Petroleum Co.----------	"
Butterfield and Swire Co.----------	"
Jardine Matheson Co.----------	"

11. LANDMARKS FOR AERIAL NAVIGATION:

(a) NATURAL FEATURES:

Canton is situated between the White Cloud Mountains and the Pearl River and would be hence easily located from the air as can be seen from the map in Appendix D.

(b) ARTIFICIAL FEATURES:

It would be very easy to find Canton from the air by following the railway tracks which enter from the north, west and east, as can be seen from the map in Appendix D, and the terminals, while not large are easily seen.

The island of Shameen is also easily recognized, and a prominent landmark there is a large black water tank, which is located near the Victoria Hotel. Another prominent mark on the skyline

is the large 2-spire church, which cannot be missed from the ground or from the air.

The East Parade Ground is large enough to make a very good landing field for airplanes, but the surface would require leveling somewhat. The sheltered Pearl River makes an ideal landing place for seaplanes.

14. PERMANENT DEFENCES.

(a) PERMANENT WORKS:

LAND DEFENCES: The defences of the city consist of 4 old works which appear to be in the same condition as they were in 1857. They run along the lower spur of the White Cloud Mountains. They are armed with old smooth-bore guns mounted on one tier and fire through embrasures. Many of the mounts are old and rotten, but the locations are good and quick-firing guns could easily be mounted there. The same description applies to the condition, etc., of Gough Fort, Marine Fort and Lin Fort. Magazine Hill or City Hill is the key to the city and once captured the defence of the city would no longer be possible. On this are mounted 4, 32-pdrs., smooth-bore guns. All of these defence works could at the most be used as "points d'appui" for infantry. At Teling Pao there is a fair position for artillery from which to shell the city.

COAST DEFENCES: (Note: Maps of these defences were furnished the Military Intelligence Department, Wash., and the Military Attaché, Peking under date of March 3d, 1921.)

(a) Of the defences from the water, the Duane Island Group are the most formidable. This covers the Front Reach and the Back Reach, and the entrance of the Canton River from the East River by Junk Passage and Escape Creek. On the way up the river Cambridge Barrier and Steel Barrier would have to be passed. The former is made of heavy wooden piles and stone ballast. At this point the width of the

channel is 440 ft. and the depth 16 ft. at low water. Steel Barrier was nearly removed in 1917. Up stream are the following barriers:

Whampoa Barrier, made of stone and wooden piles. The entrance at this point is 400 ft. wide and 16-1/2 ft. deep at low water. It could easily be closed to navigation.

Tai Shek Barrier, made of stone. The entrance at this point is 400 ft. wide and 10 ft. deep at low water.

FORTS ON DUANE ISLAND:

1. New Shan: Commanding Flat Island. Guns 2-17 cm. Krupp, B.L.R., 2-21 cm. Krupp, B.L.R., 1-15 cm. Krupp, B.L.R., 2-5 ton M.L.guns. These last are worthless.

2. Sai Tao Shan: Commanding Cambridge Reach. Guns 1-15 cm., Krupp, B.L.R. Field of fire 180 degrees.

3. Yu Chu. Commanding Cambridge Reach. Guns 2-15 cm., Krupp, B.L.R., 1-17 cm. Krupp, B.L.R. Field of fire 180 degrees.

4. Bai Shan: Commanding Cambridge Reach. Guns 1-15 cm. Krupp, B.L.R., 1-12 cm. Krupp, B.L.R.

5. Sha Lu: Commanding Cambridge Reach. East fort guns - 3-15 cm. Krupp, B.L.R., 2-12 cm. Krupp, B.L.R., West fort guns - 1-17 cm. Krupp, B.L.R., 2-12 cm. B.L.R.

HONAN ISLAND FORTS:

There are two forts here. The landing is at the lower one and a good road leads to the upper one, which is on a hill 20 feet higher, and is old and useless. The lower fort has heavy walls on all sides, and has 5 guns on the south-east face - 1-15 cm. Krupp, B.L.R., 3-Ruelle, B.L.R. about 6 inch, 1-Armstrong, M.L.R., about 6 inch-70 pdr. The magazines are in the pound in the centre of the fort.

COUCH ISLAND:

There are two forts here. The northern one is 50 feet above water and mounts 6 old guns in covered casemates. The southern has 7 old guns, 2 of them being Ruelle B.L.R., about 6 inch, like those on Honan Island.

LOWER FORTIFICATIONS OF THE CANTON RIVER: BOCA TIGRES FORTS:

Begin with Chuen Pi Island on the Easy River mouth 3 miles above Lankt Island, Chuen Pi and Anunghoi Islands on east bank; Taitau Island on west bank and north and south Wangtong Island in the stream of the river. It is 5 miles from Chuen Pi Forts past Anunghoi and Wangtong Island forts.

Chuen Pi: This is the most important of the Boca Tigres forts. All the guns are of the barbette type. They are isolated and offer small targets. There are:

4-24 cm. B.L.R., Krupp, long.
8-21 cm. B.L.R., Krupp, short.
1-8 inch, B.L.R., Armstrong.
2-7 inch, M.L.R., Armstrong.
1-10 inch, B.L.R., Vaivasseur.
9-15 cm., B.L.R., Krupp.
3-6 inch, M.L.R., Krupp.
2-6 inch, M.L.R., Krupp.
2- cal. and type unknown.

To the east is a small house in a commanding position, very likely contains guns, judging from its location. Below this is a 6-inch M.L.R. pointing toward Herber Point. Heaviest fire could be given toward the south. There is an electric light plant at the base of the hill on which the search light is mounted (North Signal Station). Owing to the position of the Chuen Pi forts it is thought that neither a bombardment nor a direct attack from the sea offers much chance of success as the depth of water within decisive range only permits use of ships of 2nd class cruiser style. The guns though old are more numerous and heavier than those that could be brought against them from ships at short notice.

ANUNG HOI FORTS:

On Anung-hoi Island about 8/10 miles from Wang tong Island, 3 miles north-west of Chuen Pi, guns are located as follows:

Dunne Island on the Pearl River, looking north. July 9, 1921.

Opposite Dunne Island on the Pearl River. July 9, 1921.

Spur No. 1,	Gun No. 1,	1-10" M.L.R.,	Armstrong,	200ft	high.
" " " "	" 2,	1-21 cm. B.L.R.,	Krupp,	short, 300ft.	high.
" " " "	" 3,	1-21 cm. "	"	" 400ft.	high.
" " 2, "	" 4,	1-21 cm. "	"	" 400ft.	high.
" " " "	" 5,	1-15 cm. "	"	long, 300ft.	high.
" " " "	" 6,	1-15 cm. "	"	" 200ft.	high.

6 mounted on central pivot mounts.

Spur No. 4,	Gun No. 7,	1-21 cm. "	"	short, 400ft.	high.
" " " "	" 8,	1-15 cm. "	"	" 400ft.	high.
" " " "	" 9,	1-15 cm. "	"	" 400ft.	high.
" " " "	" 10,	1-10 cm. "	Armstrong,	250ft.	high.
" " " "	" 11,	1-15 cm. "	Krupp,	short, 200ft.	high.
" " " "	" 12,	1-15 cm. "	"	long, 150ft.	high.

6 mounted on central pivot mounts.

Spur No. 4,	Gun No.13,	1-6" M.L.R.,	Krupp.		
" " 5,		1-8" "	Armstrong,	350ft.	high.
" " "		1-156m. B.L.R.,	Krupp,	350ft.	high.

Ridge No. 3, half way up there are 4 small guns, of no value, however the location is good.

There are underground passages to all the guns in this fort, and they can easily be traced by the ventilators.

TAI KOK TAU FORT:

On the left entrance of the Canton River, on Tai Kok Tau Island, about 2 miles from Chuen Pi. The arrangement of guns is much the same as on Chuen Pi. They are:

1-24 cm., B.L.R.,
1-24 " " Krupp,
6-15 " "
1-10" M.L.R.
2-6" "
8 old smooth-bore guns.

DUANE ISLAND PROPER:

There 6 forts mounting 15 guns from north to south. These are:

No. 6, Chang-Chao,	2 guns with large field of fire. 1-17 cm. Krupp, B.L.R., can train 270°. 1-21 " " " " " "
No. 7, Pei Ho,	2 guns. 1-24 cm. Krupp, B.L.R. 3-17 " " "
No. 8, Ta Po Ti,	3 guns. 1-15 cm. Krupp, B.L.R. 1-17 " " " 2-21 " " " } Train from north to south through east only.
No. 9, Si Kong,	2 guns. 1-17 cm. Krupp, B.L.R. 1-24 " " "
No.10, Lin Sai,	1-21 " " " very large field of fire and walls have unusual strength, thick concrete.



Mason Fort, Pagoda Island, on the Pearl River. July 9, 1911.

Chuen Pi Fort on the Pearl River. July 9, 1911.

No. 11, Hu Chieh Kong, 1-15 cm. Krupp, short, trains 180°.
1-17 " " " " "

The garrison of these forts is not known, and there is no information with ferencence to the condition of mines and torpedoes, or the amount of ammunition or number of shells.

MACAO FORTS. PAGODA ISLAND:

Forts are all stone and there are 4-21 cm. Krupp, B.L.R. casemated in the southern wall.

SOUTH WANGTONG ISLAND:

This is the second best fort in the river. It is 2 miles north by west from Bower Point, Tai Kok Tau Island, and 3 miles north-west by west from the north-west battery on Chuen Pi Island. The guns are as follows:

2-24 cm. B.L.R., Krupp, long.
2-15 " " " "
2-15 " " " short.
1-8-26" " Armstrong, short.
1-10" M.L.R., Vavasseur.
1-21 cm. B.L.R., Krupp.

NORTH WANGTONG ISLAND:

This 1/2 mile north-north-west from south of Wangtong Island. The guns are as follows:

No. 1, 15 cm. B.L.R., Krupp, short.
" 2, 21 " " " "
" 3, 21 " " " "
" 4, 21 " " " "
" 5, 10" M.L.R., Armstrong.
" 6, 15 cm. B.L.R., Krupp, short.
" 7, 21 " " " "

TIGER ISLAND:

This was formerly a fort here but it is now in ruins. It was evidently a low stone battery enclosed by gorge wall.

(b) NATURAL DEFENCIVE POSITIONS:

The most important natural defencive position near Canton is the White Cloud Range of hills which skirt the north of the city.

The country surrounding Canton would prove fairly easy to

North Wang Tung Island Fort on the Pearl River. July 9, 1921.

Looking east from near Wang Tung Island on the Pearl River. July 9, 1921.

defend due to the fort that it is so cut up with streams and is practically continuous rice paddy land. Strong points established in this kind of terrain would have a large field of fire, and be hard to approach due to the difficulties of troop movement over wet rice paddies.

15. LANDING PLACES FOR TROOPS:

Landings can be made in Cantom, Honam and Fati at almost any place, owing to numerous small wharves, landings and steps. The whole water front of Canton from and including Shameen to the eastern end of the city is practically one large landing space. In Fati and Honam where no sea-wall has been built, the beach rises gradually and is of mud, gravel and sand. No great difficulty would be encountered in landing even at very low stages of the tide. Landings could be made in almost any kind of weather as the harbour is exceptionally well protected. In event of a military force making landing in Canton, it would be nexessary to first shell thoroughly the section of the water front on which the landing was to be made, owing to the fact that the buildings approach to within about 50 feet of the sea-wall and would afford excellent protection to defencive forces. (Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet).

APPENDIX A.

Report on the Canton Government.

The trouble in South China came to a head with the renewal of hostilities between the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi on June 14th, 1921, after a truce of seven and a half months. This lasted from November 2nd, 1920, when General Ch'en Ch'iung Ming occupied Canton, the troops under General Mo Yung-hsin having fled on October 27th, 1920 into Kwangsi, to June 14th, 1921, when the Kwangsi leaders reopened the fight by taking Ling Shan and Lim Kong near the south-western border of Kwangtung and Lin Shan in the north-west part of the province on the North River.

The main object in attacking Lin Shan in the extreme north and Ling Shan and Lim Kong in almost the extreme south, was so that by dividing the Kwang-tung forces, stated to number some 60,000, the Kwangsi troops numbering about 40,000, would be able to take Pakhoi. This would give Kwangsi a port to the sea and thus enable Peking to send reinforcements of men and munitions to the Kwangsi leaders. Kwangsi is deprived of all direct ocean communication and can only be reached by means of the West River, through Wuchow, wholly controlled by Kwangtung. On June 27th, Mr. Bergholz, the American Consul in Canton wired the Legation in Peking requesting them to inform the State Department that Kwangtung troops had invaded Kwangsi and captured Wuchow, an important treaty port across the south-west border of Kwangtung. No details of the fighting have so far been published nor has the Government at Canton issued any communiques on the subject. It is known, however, that a number of bombs were dropped on Wuchow, from either a hydroplane or an airplane, which did little damage beyond frightening the populace and driving many of the inhabitants to Hongkong. All Americans at Wuchow who desired to leave were taken to Hongkong on the British gunboat "Tarantula".

A report by Lt.W.L.Marsh, commanding the U.S.S. "Pampanga", dated July 14th, 1921, of the attack on, the negotiations between himself, Mr.E.A.Sly, the British Vice Consul, and the Commander of the British gunboat "Tarantula" on the one side, and the Commanders of the Kwangtung and Kwangsi forces on the other, which led to the surrender and evacuation of Wuchow by the Kwangsi Commander, is inclosed herewith, (Exhibit "A").

Since the occupation of Wuchow, in which about 10,000 Kwangtung troops took part, who, to the credit of their officers, committed no excesses, and indulged in, practically no looting, the city has been the headquarters of General Ch'en Ch'iung Ming.

Mr. Bergholz states that according to a positive statement made to him by Dr. Sun Yet-sen, there are a number of Japanese artillery officers serving with the Kwangsi artillery. One of these is said to be Captain Nagamura of the Japanese General Staff. Mr. Bergholz has advised the State Department of these facts.

The present struggle between the Republic of South China, embracing the province of Kwangtung, represented by President Sun Yat-sen, and the province of Kwangsi, controlled by General Lu Yung-ting is practically a

continuation of the conflict which began when General Ch'en Ch'iung Ming, the present Civil Governor of Kwangtung and the Commander-in-Chief of its forces, was Civil Governor of the southern part of the province of Fukien under the Military Government of General Mo Yung-hsin at Canton, revolted in August of 1920 against the Government. Within a few days General Ch'en captured Swatow and easily succeeded in reaching the vicinity of Waichow on the East River where the principal fighting during that campaign took place. On September 27th, 1920, owing to General Wei Pang Ping and General Lee Fu Lim at Canton throwing in their lot with General Ch'en Ch'iung Ming and establishing an independent government on the Island of Honam, opposite Canton, which however never exercised any real authority, General Mo was compelled to withdraw his troops from Waichow, for his own protection, as his antagonist had seized the Canton-Samshui Railway, thus cutting off all communication with Kwangsi by water, the naval vessels in port having also joined the revolt against him. The result was that General Ch'en easily captured Shekiung, the only fortified point between Waichow and Canton. The seizure of the arsenal by his enemies prevented further ammunition coming to General Mo and on October 27th, 1920, he evacuated Canton, with his troops, and fled to his home province of Kwangsi. On November 2nd, 1920, General Ch'en reached Canton and took peaceful possession of the city which had escaped looting by the Kwangsi forces. On November 10th, 1920, General Ch'en was nominated by the Provincial Assembly to be the Civil Governor. Dr. Sun Yet-sen, Dr. Wu Ting-fang and Mr. Tang Shao Yi, all former Administrative Directors with General Mo under the Military Government, returned to Canton from Shanghai on November 28th, and on December 1st, 1920, the Military Government again began to function with only four Administrative Directors instead of seven as required by law, namely the three men named above and General Tang Chi-yao of Yunnan. On April 7th, 1921, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was elected President at a meeting of the extraordinary session of the National Assembly by 218 votes out of 222 and was inaugurated into office on May 5th, 1921.

These facts are taken from the files of the American Consulate in Canton, and serve to give a resume of the situation up to date.

With reference to the present Government of South China, represented by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, I talked with a number of Americans in Canton and elsewhere. These included the American Consul General in Canton, officers of our South China Patrol, bank employees, representatives of the Standard Oil Company, and missionaries who had been in South China for fourteen years. They, as well as the American Association of Canton, voiced by the Executive Committee of that organization, believe as follows: That the present Government of the Province of Kwangtung has by its benevolence and democratic policies, already secured the confidence and respect of the Chinese people in that district to a degree hitherto unattained by any previous form of government. This is evidenced by the voluntary public contributions of the people to help the Kwangtung soldiers, and also the voluntary aid given to them by the labour unions. The Americans, and in fact all foreigners engaged in business and professional pursuits of all kinds, have been

extended more courtesy and encouragement than under any previous government. The social and political reforms instituted by this administration have been real and their ideals and aspirations as exemplified by the principles which they have applied are more akin to those of Americans than those of any previous administration in China. The abolition of gambling and of the production of opium has been drastic and effective. The taking of this step, which deprived the government of a revenue of ten millions of dollars at a time when it was in dire financial straits, speaks volumes for the sincerity of the new regime and places their action foremost among social and ethical reforms in China. They have extended the franchise granted to the people, convoked Parliament speedily and invited all the provinces to return their duly elected representatives, granted charters to cities to establish municipal government, selected magistrates from the districts in which they function and have given many other instances that form a practical demonstration that their motives are to set up a Democracy. The new Republican Government has been very magnanimous in treating claims against it, even when these have been the result of questionable dealings with the military activities of the former Kwangsi clique. They have not used coercion in any form for the collection of taxes and they have not sacrificed any legitimate revenue due the Treasury by offering bonuses or discounts for advance payments on taxes, a practice which had been common with previous administrations. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Kwangsi people, when in power, collected the land tax up to July 1st, 1921 in advance. Dr. Sun's administration takes this into consideration, and has made no attempt to repudiate this collection or collect in advance, but has announced its intention of waiting for the next tax due date, December 1st, 1921, before asking for land taxes. This in itself is very unusual, and seems to be in line with their whole policy. Up until the present trouble with Kwangsi, the Southern Government made a substantial reduction in their military forces and paid the troops that were retained, so that looting and mutiny among Kwantung troops has been practically abolished. Notwithstanding the present financial stringency, the government has shown a distinct effort to conserve the natural resources of the province, as shown by their refusal to accept the Kwangtung Collieries Agreement in its original monopolistic form. There are several things in connection with this agreement which I will take up later. The Canton Government has not repudiated the Collieries Agreement, but will acknowledge it only with certain features removed, despite the strong opposition from the Hongkong Government. This attempt to protect the rights of the people, at a time when funds are needed so badly, marks an epoch in Chinese government stewardship quite in contrast to the example of Peking. The action of Dr. Sun Yet-sen with reference to the Collieries Contract has been a great advantage to American interests in Kwangtung. The "open door" is fast closing in that province due to Hongkong, whose government is doing all in its power to close the port of Canton. The Americans in that city state that special favours are being shown to them, and they believe this due to the number of young Chinese officials in Dr. Sun's government who have been educated in the United States. The Executive Committee of the American Association of Canton have em-

bodied practically what I have included in this paragraph in resolution form, and have sent it direct, by their representative, to the Secretary of State in Washington.

The Cassell Contract, sometimes called the Kwangtung Collieries Agreement, was drawn up by a retired British colonel. On the face of it, this contract was connected with the collieries, as its name implies, but it was really drawn up for the purpose of getting control of the province of Kwangtung in general for the British, and to give them the right to construct a connecting railway between the terminus of the Canton-Hankow Railway and the terminus of the Canton-Kowloon Railway. At the present time Canton is the terminus of the uncompleted Canton-Hankow trunk line. When this is finished Canton will be the clearing house of Southern China. The British of course desire Hongkong to remain the greatest port in the South, and are bending every effort in that direction. The connecting line between the two stations in Canton would only have to be six miles in length and would run over level country. It was in order to build this line and ensure the future of the port of Hongkong, that the Cassell Contract was negotiated. Colonel Cassell paid Lu Yung-ting $100,000 squeeze money for the signing of the contract, and has tried the same tactics with Sun Yat-sen, but so far has proved unsuccessful. In the meantime, the British have tried in every to help the Kwangsi organisation, and to discount everything that Kwangtung is trying to do. They tried to send arms up the river and protested when the Kwangtung authorities wished to search the ships. Dr Sun's government did not argue the matter but simply said that the river would then be closed. This sort of took the wind out of the British, and the feeling between the two governments is as a result anything but friendly. It is evident that any news received from Hongkong or from the north of China will be only such as the Peking and the British Governments desire to have known. I was very much surprised at the anti-British feeling in South China. Many Americans and Chinese told me that the anti-British feeling is nearly as strong as the anti-Japanese. It appears that the British are out for themselves with no regard for the Chinese. A reliable informant told me that one of the men instrumental in drawing up the Cassell Contract stated to him that the way to handle the Chinese was "to boil them in oil." This is in contrast to the American policy t ere, which according to numerous Chinese officials with whom I talked, is to give the Chinese a square deal.

I was very much interested in trying to find out the source of the Kwangtung Government's revenue, as, knowing the past history of Dr. Sun Yet-sen and others in the government, I thought it might be possible that Japan was behind the screen. An informant whom I have every reason to believe is reliable, and who advises Dr. Sun on many subjects, stated to me that the only Japanese loan was handled as a regular bank loan through the Bank of Taiwan. This I think has no particular bearing on this case in view of the fact that a loan for the same amount was handled through the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. As I have mentioned before the present government of Kwangtung is not hypothecating its taxes in advance, but is running as low financially as

it can until December 1st of this year, when the taxes will be due which have not been pledged, and the Republic will, so to speak, be on its feet.

With reference to the Kwangtung Collieries Contract I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I was able to obtain from an American Engineering firm in Canton, to its financial bankers (I think). The address had been torn from the original letter, but its contents are interesting (Exhibit "B"). The Mr. Yung spoken of in the letter is a graduate of Yale and is half American, his mother, a wealthy Washington D.C. girl having married the elder Mr. Yung, when he was in our Capitol at the Chinese Legation.

Though a friend of mine, who is very close to Dr. Sun Yat-sen I was invited to his house for tea, and had a very interesting talk with the President. He is strongly pro-American and just as strongly anti-British and anti-Japanese. His trump card is the Canton-Hankow Railway, all of the southern part of which lies in the province of Kwangtung. His main idea I think is to get American financial aid for the completion of his part of the line, and I understand that his agents in New York are working with this end in view. Dr. Sun believes that if he can get American capital interested in his provinces, that the Americans involved will have enough political influence to cause the United States Government to back the Southern Republic. He spoke quite frankly on the Japanese question. The Japanese, he said, would not risk a war with the United States until China was under their control. When this was accomplished, it would be necessary for the Japanese to make a cause for war in order to hold the Chinese under their dominance. He stated that the Chinese hated the Japanese and the only hope for Japan would be to turn the Chinese against some enemy that they could fight on a common ground and thus gain the co-operation of China in "the brotherhood of arms."

On reaching Shanghai, I found that the attitude of the people there had changed, and that they were looking forward to a Kwangtung victory. It is the general opinion that Dr. Sun or General Ch'en Ch'iung Ming may not emerge from the South China struggle in the predominant position, yet it will be one of their party, one of their younger men, who seem to be more progressive in Canton than in any part of China. The Cantonese guilds in Shanghai are also now backing Dr. Sun. For some time they did not back the Southern Government, due to some trouble within the guilds, which began prior to Sun's regime. While they were in sympathy with him they could not join together without loss of much "face." The reason they are now backing Sun is that a common ground has been found on which the two parties within the guilds can co-operate without losing "face"! This common ground was the recent seizure of arms in Shanghai which the Peking Government was shipping to Kwangsi on a Japanese boat. For some reason the Japanese captain of the ship stopped in Shanghai, pressure was brought to bear and the cargo seized. There seems to be a question as to the legality of the affair, but the fact remains. It is interesting to note that the Japanese Chamber of Commerce sent a note to Tokio protesting against the use of Japanese ships to carry munitions and then sent a letter to the Chinese merchants in which they held up the first letter as an evidence of good faith, and expressed themselves

as hoping that now the friendly relations between the Chinese and Japanese merchants would be as it formerly was.

From everything I could find out it looks to me as if Dr. Sun's Government was trying to really set up a good democratic rule in Southern China. The Americans there speak nothing but good of it, and of the many young Chinese, American educated, who are associated with it. Dr. Sun states that just as soon as he has crushed the Kwangsi militarists, he will withdraw from the province, and let it be self governing under Kwangsi men whom he has already named. His government is trying very hard for American support, and at least moral support from the United States. If Kwangtung is victorious over Kwangsi, the general opinion is that they will be joined by the provinces of Hunan, Kweichow and possibly Yunnan. Against their chances stands the British opposition in the first place. Wing Yung Tai, the Peking representative is being entertained by the Hongkong Government, and it is well known that the Peking Government will approve the Cassell Contract in the advent of victory by the Kwahgsi forces. The Canton Government has locked horns not only with Kwangsi, but also with the Hongkong Government, and the outcome is as yet uncertain.

EXHIBIT "A".

Lieutenant W.L.Marsh to Mr. Bergholz.

U.S.S.Pampanga, Canton, China, July 4, 1921.

Sir:-

I have the honor to submit the following report on conditions in Wuchow, China, between the dates of June 21 and June 29, 1921.

Shortly after noon June 21, hostilities in Wuchow commenced by an attack from a Kwangtung airplane which dropped four bombs and a number of handbills on the city. Three houses were damaged and three civilians were slightly injured. At about 5:00 o'clock the Kwangtung gunboats lying just below the border commenced shelling the Kwangsi forts and entrenchments. All the native population of Wuchow were greatly alarmed and many commenced fleeing from the city.

Next morning, June 22, the artillery fire was resumed and word was sent to all the Europeans residing in Wuchow that in the event of trouble, they should repair to the Standard Oil compound, as it would be impracticable to protect the various missions scattered throughout the city. On this date the blockade was established and until June 27, no merchant ships were allowed to pass the Kwangtung-Kwangsi border.

At 3:00 a.m., June 24, General Chan Ping Kwan left Wuchow. At about 10:00 a.m., I received word from the Chamber of Commerce that the defence commissioner, General Kwi, was willing to evacuate Wuchow if General Ngai Bong Ping would give him time to peacefully withdraw his troops. At 4:00 p.m., the British Vice-Consul, the commanding officer of H.M.S.Tarantula, and I, called on General Kwi. He denied intending to leave Wuchow and said that, on the contrary, he intended to defend it. He agreed however, to allow vessels, accompanied by a British or a United States man-of-war, to pass the forts at 4:00 p. m. each day.

The following morning, June 25, at about 11:00 o' clock, General Kwi called upon the British Vice-Consul and announced his willingness to evacuate Wuchow in order to avoid bloodshed and promised that his troops should not loot the city. He asked for eight or ten days time, but agreed to Mr. Sly's suggestion of a twenty-four hour armistice to discuss terms with General Ngai Bong Ping.

At 3:00 p.m., the U.S.S.Pampanga left Wuchow bearing a letter from the British Vice-Consul, a copy of which is herewith enclosed. General Ngai Bong Ping refused to allow the merchant vessels, lying at Dosing to pass the border, stating that it required the permission of General Chan Kwing Ming. He also refused to consider the proposed twenty-four armistice on the same grounds, but

promised to reply to the Vice-Consul's letter on the following morning. The U.S.S.Pampanga therefore returned to Wuchow. She was not fired upon by either side during the trip, but the Kwangtung gunboats resumed their attack as soon as the U.S.S.Pampanga was out of range.

At 4:15 a.m., June 26, the British Vice-Consul and Mr. Cumbart, the Standard Oil representative came on board the U.S.S.Pampanga, and reported that Dr. Levell, of the Wuchow Peoples' Mission Hospital, had telephoned them and reported as follows. He said that the Kwangtung forces were attacking the city and were being resisted; that fires had broken out by the North Gate; that looting was going on; and that the fighting was nearing the hospital every minute. He said that he deemed it absolutely essential that a force be landed immediately to escort his wife and child and the three American nurses at the hospital to a place of safety.

A landing force of six men, equipped with rifles, was accordingly landed and proceeded to the hospital where it was found that conditions had quieted. The landing force remained at the hospital until daylight when it was deemed safe for the hospital to be left unprotected, and then returned to the ship.

The disturbance lasted for about an hour. The fighting was between two factions of Kwangsi soldiers, one of which wanted to defend Wuchow, the other wanted to leave immediately. General Kwi had already left the city. About twenty-five Kwangsi soldiers were killed and many wounded, including a few civilians. Very little looting took place, no European or United States citizen was attacked, and no foreign property damaged.

At 10:00 a.m., June 26, the commander of the remaining Kwangsi forces in Wuchow sent word to the British Vice-Consul that he was ready to hand over the city to the Kwangtung forces and to join them himself. Shortly after this, Kwangtung soldiers appeared on the hills across the river from Wuchow. They were fired upon by some private guards of refugees who were taking refuge upon the gounds of the unoccupied British Consulate. The fire was returned and the British Vice-Consul crossed the river to inform the Kwangtung forces of the surrender of the city. A Kwangtung airplane then appeared and dropped four bombs on Wuchow. In order to avoid a recurrence of this unfortunate incident, the U.S.S.Pampanga got underway and stood down the river with the British Vice-Consul, the Kwangtung representative, and the Kwangsi representative. General Ngai Bong Ping was informed of the surrender of the city and proceeded to the city immediately arriving at about 7:30 p.m. The city was occupied in an orderly manner, no looting being done by either the Kwangsi of Kwangtung forces.

June 27 was quiet. Looting broke out on a small scale but was stopped by the Kwangtung authorities.

On June 28, General Chan Kwing Ming arrived. He states that he intends to make his headquarters at Wuchow and appears to have the situation well in hand. He stated that there are 10,000 troops in the vicinity of Wuchow and that he had 80,000 under his command. He intends to attack Pingnam and says that when it falls it will all be over, inti-

mating that Kwangsi will go to the Canton Government. The Kwangtung forces seem to be very well organised, equipped and disciplined. It is not thought that looting to any great extent will take place in Wuchow while he has his headquarters here.

A Standard Oil motor-boat, the Manhattan, left Wuchow on June 28, to rescue two missionary women at Pingnam, and two at Sunchow. They beleng to the Canadian Alliance Mission, but are all United States citizens. The motor-boat was furnished with a safe-conduct through the lines signed by General Chan Kwing Ming, she was flying the United States ensign aft and the British ensign forward, and no trouble is anticipated. Word of her had not been received when the U.S.S.Pampanga left Wuchow on June 29.

If more detailed information is desired on any part or the whole of this report, I shall be very glad to furnish it to the best of my ability.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) W.L.Marsh,
Lieutenant, (j.g.),
U.S.Navy.

(TRANSLATION).

From Mr. Vice-Consul Sly to
General Ngai Bong Ping.

I have the honor to thank you for the kind reception accorded to me on my visit to you yesterday. I found on my arrival at Wuchow that General Chan Ping Kwan had left. I then saw the Defence Commissioner, Wei, who informed me that if you would grant an armistice for a few days, he would order all his troops to retreat from Wuchow, so as to avoid the calamities of war, and also preserve the safety of the whole city. I am, therefore, writing this letter to be delivered to you by favour of the American man-of-war, and should be glad if you would formulate your terms and send them to me when the British gunboat returns. I will then hand them personally to the Defence Commissioner and discuss the terms with him. As soon as I have ascertained his views, I will immediately come to see you and discuss the matter.

In my opinion, for the sake of the safety of the foreigners and your own countrymen here, I have the honour to request that you will kindly grant a truce for one day, and on receipt of your reply through my gunboat, I will give the matter full consideration and endeavour to arrange for representatives from both sides to meet on board the British gunboat to discuss your terms.

Should you be so kind as to grant a truce for one day, I should be glad if you would inform the American Commander, and I will see the Defence Commissioner and request him to instruct his troops accordingly. In the meantime, I would ask you to give similar instructions to your troops.

I would add that a very important and just condition should be that when the Kwangsi troops retire from Wuchow, they guarantee that there will be no looting, and that when the Kwangtung troops enter Wuchow they should likewise guarantee that they will keep strict order and allow no looting.

Wuchow, 3:30 p.m., 25th June, 1921.

My card in enclosed.

EXHIBIT "B".

April 23rd, 1921.

Dear Sirs:

After our interview with the President on the 21st inst., the writer introduced Mr. Wier to Mr. Norman B. Yung, Technical Adviser to the Mining Board of the Constitutional Government, and they had a long conference with regard to the mining and transportation possibilities.

Mr. Yung is at present engaged in compiling a code of mining laws, which, if possible, will permit the use of foreign capital and at the same time protect the Chinese against undue exploitation. In discussing with Mr. Yung the various factors in the problem, we are convinced that he has a very difficult task. For instance, when the question was put to the writer as to what he considered a reasonable contract for foreigners to operate mines on, the writer could think of no better basis than that which has proved successful in connection with the Kailan properties. To this Mr. Yung stated that in principle the Chinese of this province and the present Government are absolutely opposed to the recognition of extra-territoriality in all the Lailan contracts. Herein lies the crux of the whole mining situation in China. The Chinese have not suffered acutely from this clause in connection with the Kailan contract, but where the same clause has been inserted in Japanese contracts, the latter have sent troops and taken full possession of all properties as well as transportation lines leading thereto.

This certainly makes the problem more serious, and we sympathise with their position. He has requested the writer's co-operation in this matter, and will gladly welcome any contract which we present and further offers to bring his influence to bear on getting us the right to a specific property if he locates anything which will stand on its merits.

When put to the test, Mr. Yung could not give us the name of any definite property in Kwangtung, and he states very frankly that he could not think of any property, either coal or iron, which offered on the face of it substantial evidence to warrant extensive operations. Nearly all the samples which he had in his office failed to indicate any attractive proposition.

Mr. Yung brought out a point in regard to the Kwangtung Collieries contract aside from the fact that it does not call for any actual operation, that the British syndicate would not in any way reduce the price of coal in Canton even if they might be successful in shipping 1,000 or more tons of coal per day into this market. On the whole,

Mr. Tung's idea of the market capacity for the consumption of coal is that it is very limited. We came away with the definite impression that there is no more chance of the successful conclusion of the Kwangtung Collieries than there is for the proverbial snowball.

Yours very truly.

Note: The writer asked that the source of this be kept confidential for the present.

68966

This copy is for _____
Copy also sent to _____
and to _____

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
SEP 22 1922
WAR DEPARTMENT

In quintuplicate to the Department of State.

(A copy of this report has been forwarded to the American Legation at Peking, same to be also available for the use of the American Commercial Attache.)

ADVERTISING MEDIUMS AND METHODS.

From Consul-General EDWIN S. CUNNINGHAM.

Shanghai, China, August 18, 1922.

(Forwarded in accordance with the Department's instructions of May 5th, 1922 (File No. 600. 11274/250.)

The following is a list of newspapers and journals in Shanghai which are regarded as suitable for advertising mediums:

THE CHINA PRESS	American
THE EVENING STAR	"
FAR EASTERN REVIEW	"
THE WEEKLY REVIEW	"
FINANCE AND COMMERCE	British
ORIENTAL MOTOR	"
SHANGHAI TIMES	"
NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS	"
SHUN PAO	Chinese
SIN WEN PAO	"
SHANGHAI JOURNAL OF COMMERCE	"

Individual periodical reports in duplicate of all the above journals accompany this report.

All the above publications are printed in the English language, except the following which are

published

published in the Chinese language: HSIN WEN PAO, HSIEH PAO and SHANGHAI JOURNAL OF COMMERCE.

This list is not an exhaustive one, but contains those periodicials which are regarded as most useful for advertising, although it omits a number of well known legal publications.

-4-

THE CHINA PRESS (American).

This is an old established journal incorporated under the laws of one of the states of America, though the shares are owned almost exclusively by British investors.

It is suitable for general advertisement, irrespective of the industry.

There is no possibility of securing a reliable report in regard to the effectiveness of the press as an advertising medium.

In general character it is American.

Policies are anti-Japanese.

Political leanings are inclined to be with the Southern China party.

It is not anti-American but rather as strongly American as any local journal.

The circulation is stated to be 4549 which is regarded as practically correct.

EVENING STAR (American).

This is a daily afternoon paper owned by THE GEZETA TEXEN, and all of the statements made concerning that newspaper are applicable to the EVENING STAR.

The circulation of 1460 is regarded as correct.

FAR EASTERN REVIEW (American).

In connection with the individual periodical report of this paper there is attached to the original a copy of a letter addressed to this office by the editor and proprietor of the FAR EASTERN REVIEW. (Also see despatch No. 1017 dated August 16th, 1928.)

By reference to the despatches from this office it will be remembered that Mr. George Bronson Rea, owing to his pro-Japanese propaganda conducted at the time America was in the World War, was under very great embarrassment, notwithstanding he was serving his country in Europe; and naturally American advertisements were withdrawn to a very large extent.

The journal is a monthly and is extremely well edited and furnishes a wonderful opportunity for advertising of all kinds of machinery - provided the circulation in China is not too limited, and provided further that American business firms can forget what was considered by practically all Americans in the Far East as being a disseminator of Japanese propaganda during and for one year after the war.

So far as can be ascertained at the present time, the views of the FAR EASTERN REVIEW are in accord with those of a patriotic American, but some months ago this certainly could not have been said.

The

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The FAR EASTERN REVIEW was established in 1904, and until 1916 it was exceedingly ably edited, and the old files of the Journal contain articles of great value. The advertising in this Journal was to a large extent by American firms prior to 1917. Since that date practically all has been withdrawn (See above reference).

If properly and patriotically issued it fills a want and furnishes an excellent medium for machinery advertisement.

The circulation is estimated by the editor. The 5000 monthly copies seems exceedingly large, but one can not without reference to the book determine the number of copies that are subscribed for outside of China.

It is a journal that is very useful to those who are interested in China, or as a matter of fact in the Far East.

THE WEEKLY REVIEW (American).
(Formerly Millard's Review).

This is an American magazine issued weekly.

It is eminently suitable for general advertising. Its editorials are particularly good.

There is no possibility of securing a reliable report in regard to the effectiveness of the press as an advertising medium.

It is decidedly pro-American, regarded by some as anti-Japanese, and it is one of the strongest advocates of the closest cooperation between America and China.

The circulation figures of 5000 have been furnished this office by the publishers and are believed to be correct.

GENERAL MOTORS (American).

This is a new and very well edited magazine. It is suitable for advertising of the motor and allied industries.

It is impossible to furnish a reliable report in regard to the effectiveness of the journal as an advertising medium; although it may be stated that its editor was to a very large extent responsible for the motor exhibition held in Shanghai during the autumn of 1921 (See report from this office entitled "International Automobile Exhibition" dated September 2, 1921).

Its general character and policies are not unlike those of similar magazines in the United States. It is issued in the interest of motor cars and is very useful to the trade and to the public.

It has no political leanings. If it could be regarded as having such it would be friendly to America and strongly in support of American, Chinese and British cooperation.

The circulation figures are furnished this office by the publishers.

THE NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS (British).

This is a British daily paper, perhaps the most important one in the Far East. It is exceedingly well suited for general advertising directed at English speaking peoples of China. Its influence in China exceeds that of any other journal published - be it daily, weekly or monthly.

It is of course impossible to secure a reliable report in regard to the effectiveness of the press as an advertising medium.

It is exceedingly British.

Its character and policies are to give a clear statement of the news of the world; and its political reviews in regard to China, Great Britain and even the rest of the world are read invariably with great interest.

Its political leanings are toward the closest cooperation between British and Chinese, and often times it professes to have fairly warm feelings for the American people; but it is rather remarkable that it criticises American politics, policies and public men more severely than would be expected of a professedly friendly journal.

The paper can not be regarded as anti-American, but it certainly is not as friendly to the Americans as those would like it to be who are endeavoring to bring about the closest relations between the nationals of the two countries. It professes well, but its

actions

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editors are not what would be desired by Americans or probably British.

Its circulation figures are furnished by the publishers and are believed to be correct.

THE NORTH CHINA HERALD is the weekly edition of this journal.

MORNING TIMES (British).

This is a British publication. It is suitable for general advertising.

There is no possibility of securing a reliable report in regard to the effectiveness of the paper as an advertising medium.

Its general character and policies are to furnish an accurate statement of foreign news, and it makes a special effort to procure a record of local happenings.

Its policies and political leanings are British with a strong Japanese tendency. It is understood that this journal has large Japanese financial interests invested in it. Judging from its editorials it can not be regarded as anti-American. In fact often times it appears that this paper is very much more friendly to the United States than is its older contemporary, THE NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS.

The circulation figures, 3500 daily and 5000 Sundays, as furnished by the publishers are believed to be correct.

FOR DOMINATION ONLY

FINANCE AND COMMERCE (British).

This is a recent weekly publication of finance and commerce. Its title is correctly stated, because it is one of the very best journals of its character that can be found in the Far East. It is well edited and its trade items are as accurate as could be expected of a journal published in a country where there are very few statistics given.

It is suitable for general advertising.

There is no possibility of securing a reliable report in regard to the effectiveness of the journal as an advertising medium.

The general character of the journal is just what its name indicates.

Its policies are to advance the intercourse between China and the rest of the world.

It has no political leanings that are prejudicial.

It is a British journal edited by British who have lived for many years in China. They leave the impressions on the Americans that they deal fairly with all nationals.

It is not anti-American; it is very friendly to our national.

The circulation figures are furnished by the publishers and are believed to be correct.

SIN WEN PAO (新聞報).

The SIN WEN PAO established February 18, 1893 is published in the Chinese language.

It is suitable for general advertising in the Chinese language. American firms generally speaking should be encouraged to insert description of their articles that they have for sale to the Chinese in this newspaper. The SIN WEN PAO, SHUN PAO and SHANGHAI JOURNAL OF COMMERCE are all excellent mediums for advertising directed at Chinese.

It is impossible to obtain reliable reports in regard to the effectiveness of these papers as an advertising medium. However commendation has been heard from many old, established firms in China who have used the Chinese press as an advertising medium.

This journal is of high standard so far as Chinese journals go.

Its policies are to support the central government in Peking and its political leanings are in that direction; and at the same time the paper is extremely pro-American.

It is published in the Chinese language, but it is registered as an American concern.

The circulation figures are probably correct and have been furnished by the publishers.

SHUN PAO (申報).

This is a publication in Chinese established April 30, 1877 and is under Chinese registration.

It is an excellent means for general advertising. Its circulation is large and extends over a vast part of China.

There is of course no opportunity of securing a reliable report in regard to the effectiveness of the newspaper as an advertising medium; but certain firms have commended it on more than one instance.

The general character of the paper is to furnish Chinese news though often garbled.

Its policies are to support the central government toward which it has political leanings.

It can not be regarded as anti-American, nor can it be considered as friendly to the United States as are both of the other papers.

The circulation figures are given by the publishers and are believed to be correct.

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SHANGHAI JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (商報).

This journal has been established shortly over 18 months.

It is under American registration and considerable American capital is invested in it. Its foreign editor and general manager is an American citizen.

It is extremely suitable for general advertising, particularly in the city, and Americans should, so long as it is edited by the present staff, find it to their interest to insert advertisements therein.

It is of course impossible to secure a reliable report in regard to the effectiveness of the journal as an advertising medium; but due to the peculiar friendly attitude toward America, its American registration, and to a certain extent American edited, it should be favorably considered by those seeking a means of presenting their goods o the Chinese.

Its general character and policies are to support the central government toward which it has political leanings.

It is extremely friendly to Americans.

Its circulation is regarded as correct since it was furnished by the publishers. It will be noted that its circulation is very much less than either of the other Chinese publications, but it must be remembered that it is but of recent establishment.

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II. The magazines, trade papers and professional journals so far as they are suitable as advertising mediums are furnished in the foregoing list.

There are some 400 newspapers published in China, but only about one-fifth of this number are regarded by those experienced as being worth while publicity mediums.

III. Foreign publications: If it is intended to inquire concerning the foreign periodicals circulating in China and published in Chinese the list given at the beginning of this report furnishes the most important ones; and their importance as determined by their circulation is as follows:

SIN WEN PAO	90,000
SHUN PAO	47,141
SHANGHAI JOURNAL OF COMMERCE	12,000.

If the inquiry is in regard to foreign publications circulated in China and published elsewhere, only an answer based upon observation can be made. It would appear that THE LONDON TIMES has as large a circulation as any foreign periodical. Others that circulate to a considerable extent in Shanghai are the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER and SAN FRANCISCO JOURNAL.

The American magazines that circulate here are ASIA, CENTURY, HARPERS, SATURDAY EVENING POST etc.

IV. The names and addresses of concessionaires that sell advertising space for any form of outdoor advertising and the rates charged on such advertising mediums are as follows:

FOR GUARDED DISSEMINATION ONLY.

THE CHINA PUBLICITY COMPANY (Chinese) 0485 Nanking Road, Shanghai.

(a) Posters and painted boards:

Size	Charge per 1000
16" x 20"	Max $ 2.00
20" x 30"	5.00
30" x 40"	12.00

The advertisers are to pay bill-posting tax if necessary.

Rate for mailing advertising matter is Max $10.00 per 1000 envelopes.

THE ORIENTAL PRESS (French) 115 Avenue Edward VII, Shanghai.

(a) Posters and painted signs:

Size	Charge per 1000
31" x 43"	Max $15.00

Illuminated slides $15. per month on yearly basis - shown many times during day and night.

(b) Advertising display on inside and outside of cars:

Interior advertising is $20 Max per month per panel in 1st class trams and $8. Max per month per panel in 3rd class trams.

Exterior advertising - for 2 boards on each end of the tram $100 Max per month.

Yearly contracts are accepted for street car advertising.

(c) Electric signs:

Almost same charge as posters with additional cost for current used.

(d) Motion picture slides:

$15. per month per slide on yearly basis.
$20. per slide monthly rate.

CARL CROW INC.

EARL SUNG INC. (American) 6A Kiangse Road, Shanghai.

(a) Posters and painted signs:

6¢ to 4¢¢ per sq. foot for painted signs.
$12. per 1000 upward for posting of 1 sheet posters.

(d) Motion picture slides:

$9.00 to $30. per month for display of slides in motion picture houses.

HARVEY'S ADVERTISING & BILLPOSTING AGENCY (British)
9 Ezra Road, Shanghai.

(a) Posters and painted boards:

Painted signs -
10' x 10' - 10 painted signs displayed in International and French Settlements on contract for 1 year.....$1440.

20' x 16' opposite railway station, per annum.....$ 180.

Billposting -
30" x 40" 2¢ per sheet. 20,000 posters will last one year.
Posters for Chapei and Chinese city will require translation fee and special tax.
For Chapei (200 per month) 2600 posters for 1 year.
For Chinese City (500 per month) 6000 posters for 1 year.
Tax for Chapei and Chinese City will cost 3¢ Max. each poster equally to the number suggested above $288. plus $3. for translation fee making in all $291.

(d) Motion picture slides:

Apollo Theatre	monthly	contracts	$20.	per	mo.
"	"	6 months	"	18.	"	"
Victoria	"	monthly	"	18.	"	"
"	"	6 months	"	15.	"	"
Olympic	"	monthly	"	18.	"	"
"	"	6 months	"	15.	"	"

The names and

V. The names and addresses of firms doing a business in preparing, placing and handling of advertising are the same as those contained in Title IV last given, wherein are given the names and addresses of concessionaires.

(a) The Oriental Press handles the greatest amount of advertisement and is the oldest organization for this specific purpose in China, and while all are regarded as responsible this unquestionably has a very high standing in the entire community; and its efforts have been recognized by many old and well established foreign firms attempting to do business in China. Its organization is apparently very complete and the general manager states:

"We are in touch with practically all of the papers mentioned above which are of any importance (referring to all papers in China) and can give efficient service in the way of the placing of advertisements, checking same and billing clients with vouchers at the end of each month. Our efficient staff of "copy writers" are in a position to furnish for our clients copy that is suitable to the Chinese. In order to get the proper results in preparing this copy a consultation is held between the advertiser, ourselves and one of our Chinese copy writers. We then allow our writers to proceed and make up the copy according to their own ideas. After this has been done the copy is translated back into the English language and corrected by the foreign staff and again put back into the Chinese. By this method of checking the results obtained are usually a salesmessage that will make an impression on the mind of the Chinese at whom it is aimed. Also our Chinese copy writers are from different provinces, so that the numerous dialects are secured.

It must

It must always be taken into consideration that the mind of the Chinese is not practised in the psychology of advertising. It is therefore very difficult for them to write any sort of copy. They have not like us westerners been brought up in an environment of publicity which has influenced our lives from childhood. It is however imperative to get their view points and make use of their knowledge of customs, traditions and the language of their own land but it is just as essential that a trained foreign mind direct the psychological appeal of the salesmessage which is like human nature the same the world over."

Carl Crow Inc. is the only American concern here, and while it has only been in existence some four years it has secured a very enviable position and has gained the confidence of many large advertisers. It is suggested that those interested in advertising should consult him for national reasons as well as on account of the reputation which he has gained during the short existence of this firm.

(b) The question of service offered and the rate of payment is indicated under Title IV.

VI. Percentage of population illiterate:

It is absolutely impossible to form any estimate in regard to the percentage of illiteracy in China. It is doubtful whether there is 5% of the people of China as a whole who would be susceptible to advertising through the press. Of course all may be broached by advertising of some character, such as a tom-tom beaten on the corner of a street and other well known

devices

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devices to attract the public.

VII. It is true that there is a very large percentage of illiteracy, and it is equally true that this percentage is being reduced, and that the Chinese newspapers particularly furnish the best medium possible for advertisements and reaches the largest number of Chinese than any other medium. It is true that the posters and painted boards and to an extremely limited extent electric signs are useful. This is more or less a new vocation, but it will develop as the years go by; and the firm which intends to reach the large consuming population of China must use some means of bringing his wares to the attention of the consumer.

The order of importance of the foreign mediums of advertisement can only be inferred from the statements contained in the entire report. It is impossible to state in what order the mediums of advertisement should be regarded. That would depend upon the locality in which the advertisement is conducted, and also upon the article advertised. There is no question but that electrical advertisement is extremely effective in places where electricity is obtainable, but of the large population of China it is questionable whether 10% is reached by electricity.

There are

VIII. There are about eight different dialects used throughout China, but the characters are the same in all of the provinces. If it were not for the illiteracy the printed advertisement could be used in every part of China. When it is only the reading public that is addressed, advertisement by printing is the most effective; but owing to the great illiteracy there is considerable doubt as to the method which should be conducted in the various parts.

IX. The foreign merchants use practically the same methods as are used in the West. The Chinese merchants in the Chinese cities use various means, though none are pushed to the extent that they are in the Occident. Some of the well known methods of advertising by local merchants are the following:

Advertising by motor cars running along the streets and by electric lights illuminating the sign boards are becoming more and more widely used in China. The electric lighted bill board is perhaps the most effective method of advertising. Not more than 5% of the Chinese public can read a newspaper; the billboard however does reach the masses and in a striking and attractive way. The package of the commodity advertised may be featured with an illustration that will leave an impression on even the most ignorant mind. Simple slogans can be used

that will

that will be understood by even the majority of the illiterate. The results that have been obtained through this medium of advertising is shown by the tremendous business that certain well known cigarette people have built up. The Chinese people are fond of colored designs and they are quick to respond to an attractive painted billboard. The illuminated signs are very effective as Chinese crowds will stand and watch them for hours. The flashing of advertising slides and films on the top of buildings is very successful. Hundreds of Chinese gaze open-mouthed at these messages from the sky.

The very effective way to reach the interior is by Chinese houseboats. This boat is some 54 feet long with a good beam and is decorated on all sides with billboards which at night are electrically illuminated. On the fore part of the boat there is a screen which is erected at night on which advertising slides and films are shown to the crowds. In the day time sampling is done, distribution secured and posters posted. Sales are made and many prospects secured. The vessel is in charge of a foreign captain and there are foreign and Chinese salesmen on board for the advertisers represented. The vessel is propelled by power supplied by a motor. This motor was installed as a publicity proposition and already a great number have been sold to customers

that

that have seen the machine in action. As a usual thing a crowd of twenty thousand people on the banks watch the films at night. The cost to the advertiser is $2500. Use for the entire trip; and it is stated that no other method of reaching the interior of China has been found that is so effective and so economical for the foreign manufacturer.

Mail advertising is also an excellent one in China and it is quite an event in the life of most Chinese to receive a letter. Added to this the reverence that the Chinese have for the printed word makes this form of advertising very effective for reaching certain classes of people.

Show cards and window displays are very important, although they must be of a very different type from those used in western countries owing to the fact that there are practically no show windows in any of the Chinese stores except those in the large cities. Dealer literature is very helpful and can readily be designed and prepared in this country.

The point of advertising is to make a quick and strong impression upon the public mind, and it must be simple, concentrated and influential for it gets but a hasty glance from the various persons, and unless it attracts immediately it will not be read.

It is

2. It is decidedly preferable to handle advertisements through a local agency, or manufacturer's distributor. Due to the very small number of such agencies, however, practically all foreign advertisement is handled through agencies established in the United States, or other parts of the world. Some of these agencies have facilities for inserting their advertisements in various journals and can be regarded as efficient. It is far better however, in the event that facilities exist, to make the arrangement in China for advertisements.

From a consultation recently with an editor of one of the well known journals it was ascertained that 90% of the American advertisements published in his journal were contracted for through his agent in the United States. This was rather a surprise, but when one realises that almost all contracts for advertisements of American products are made by the principal firm or the export house in the United States, this does not seem unreasonable. It is understood that agencies of American advertisers submit annual recommendations to the principal in America, and the principal determines the amount and the design of the advertisements required during the succeeding year.

Following are names of agents in the United States who accept advertisements for newspapers and periodicals in Shanghai:

in Shanghai:

J. Roland Kay Co. 161 East Erie St., Chicago.
Export Advertising Agency, Transportation Bldg. Chicago.

National Export Advertising Co. 2 Rector Place, New York City.
British & Colonial Press, Inc. Knickerbocker Bldg., New York City.
J. Roland Kay Co. 18 E. 41st St. New York City
World Wide Advertising Corp. 1 W. 34th St. New York City.
Kinney & Murray 25 Church Street, New York.

A true copy of the signed original. Br

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3-1 1923 2055-327

FEB 28

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT HANDBOOK INFORMATION on route KWAN YIN TANG (HONAN) to SIANFU, SHENSI PROVINCE. (G-2 Report.)

From China.

2055

No. 5075.

Date January 12, 1923. 19

Replying to No.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. FEB 26 1923

Date 19

Handbook Information on route Kwan Yin-tang, Honan, (present western terminus of Lung-hai R.R.) to Sian-fu, Shensi Province.

Note: - For information on Lung-hai R.R. see report made by officers of the China Expedition in 1920-1921 in connection with reports on Peking-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow R.R.s.

This route is the principal artery leading to the rich agricultural sections of southern Shensi, eastern Kansu, it is also the outlet to North China for a part of the furs, hides and wool of Kansu, Tibet and Sinkiang. There is no other practicable commercial route to Sianfu. Until the arrival of the railroad at Sian, which should be within four years, all of the huge quantities of cotton grown in this entire area of South Shensi and eastern Kansu must be transported in carts, wheelbarrows, or on the backs of coolies and pack animals.

The route is entirely in the loess country, although from Tung Kwan to Sianfu (the last half of the journey) the road leads over the loess soil while the first half of the route, Kwan Yin-tang to Tung Kwan is literally through the loess, in places the road having been worn down so that for miles at a stretch it is from fifty to one hundred feet below the surface and so narrow that carts can pass only with difficulty at wide intervals. There are several streams along the road that would be difficult to cross during the high water season. One river just west of Shihchow and another at Ling-pao being the largest. In the spring and summer the mud is likely to be so deep that wheel transportation is all but impossible while pack transportation is extremely difficult. During the remainder of the year the dust is extremely deep and disagreeable.

The route from Kwang Yin-tang to Sianfu normally consumes eight days (eight stages) for caravans and leisurely travellers, four from Kwan Yin-tang to Tung Kwan and four from that place to Sianfu. By pushing the cartmen or litter men each half can be done in three days. A very poor motor service on a very poor road may be utilized between Tung Kwan and Sian. If you are lucky this will cut the time to one day between these places. The country is very irregular in contour due to the erosion and is entirely lacking in trees. The hillsides are everywhere terraced and every bit of ground is cultivated. To the traveller who must plod along day after day in this country the brown terraced hills and valleys, the same brown mud or cave houses, mud fences, etc., become monotonous.

Binding Margin.

The ordinary two-wheeled Chinese cart, camels, mules, donkeys, wheelbarrows, and coolies are all commonly used in carrying burdens while mule litters are the most comfortable and practicable mode of conveyance for individual travellers.

Towns and villages are numerous along the way. The usual Chinese food, grains and forage for animals is purchaseable. Straw and dung are used for fuel. Water of the usual muddy Chinese type is obtainable at villages and of course must be boiled before using. Inns are poor as they are everywhere in China.

The telegraph line follows the road closely all the way to Sianfu.

Detailed Description.

Note: - The best map available for this area as well as for that farther west is the French map "Asie, 1,000,000°", "Dessiné, heliogravé et publié par le Service Geographique de l'Armee". Echelle de 1/1,000,000. Kaifong-fou and Singan-fou sheets.

Note: - Distances below are given in Chinese li. Chinese measurements of road distances are very inaccurate, the li to them meaning the expenditure of a certain amount of energy on the road rather than a certain distance. Invariably, when the road was hilly and required an additional expenditure of physical energy the distance was correspondingly reduced. The best method of measuring li proved to be by means of the time required in travel. Both while travelling by litter and on saddle mule or pony accompanied by cart it was found that ten li per hour was the best unit of measure. This same unit, I learned later, is used by another foreigner who has travelled extensively in the interior of China. Roughly, three li is the equivalent of an English mile.

Li from Kwan Yin-tang	
0.0	KWAN YIN TANG. A very dirty, large Chinese village the present terminus of the Lung-hai R.R. With the extension of the railroad the town will sink to the level of the ordinary Chinese village. Several French and other foreigners employed by railroad are residents. Mule litters, carts or other transportation desired for a journey can be hired through the Chinese inn-keepers. The usual Chinese bargaining is necessary. Animals should be carefully examined before payment is made to avoid being given lame, sick or otherwise unsuitable animals. A written agreement is best. Final payment should not be made until the end of the journey has been reached.
	Road between Kwan Yin-tang and Shen Chow is over hilly country. Much work has been done on the railroad extension as far as Shenchow. Several tunnels, one a mile long, and many bridges are required. Much more than half the work, practically all the grading, most of the bridge abutments and tunneling, has been completed. Foreigners employed on the extension stated that they expected the railroad to be running to Shenchow within a year.
100.00	SHEN CHOW (French - Chan Tcheou). A walled city of about 10,000 people. This city, on the bank of the Yellow River will have a new importance when the Lung-hai R.R. is open to it, as it is above the San Men Rapids and will give a direct connection between the upper Yellow River and the railroad. At certain times of the year it will then be possible to load boats and rafts with cargo as far up the Yellow River as Lanchow and bring them to Shenchow for trans-shipment by rail to the coast or to other parts of China.

Li From
Kwan Yin-tang

160 Ling-pao (French Lin-pao.) Small walled city of no special importance.

220 Wen Siang Hsien.

280 TUNG KWAN (French Tong Kouan) A walled city of perhaps 15,000 people. Border of Honan and Shensi provinces and on Yellow River. Has always been a strongly garrisoned city. A road from Taiyuanfu, Shansi, crosses the Yellow River by ferry. From Tung Kwan there is a very poor motor road to Sianfu. The Fords with Chinese chauffeurs are equally poor. The road leaves the Yellow River valley which turns north and follows to Sian the fertile valley of the Wei River (French Ouei Ho) although from the road one does not see the river. On the whole the road to Sian is level. There are no hills that should give a motor any trouble. At present there are only about four very badly battered Fords and one Dodge that can be used on the road. The military commander at Tung Kwan has a very lucrative post owing to his control of the gateway from Shensi and Kansu to the east. His tax on opium alone yields large returns.

390 Hwa Chow (French Houa-tcheou).
440 Wei-nan (Ouei-nan).
530 Lintung (Ling-tong).
570 Sianfu (Si Ngan-fou).

Total, Kwan Yin-tang - Sian-fu 570 li = 190 miles.

Litter for one person and baggage Kwan Yin-tang to Tung Kwan should cost about $16.00 Mex. From Tungkwan to Sianfu, ~~could~~ cost would be slightly more on account of difficulty in obtaining return passenger. Motor bus, special trip, for party and baggage Tungkwan to Sianfu costs $58.00 Mex. One should wire or write in Chinese at least two days ahead to the motor company, to ensure a special car or turck on a given date.

For description of Sianfu, see "Reconnaissance at Sianfu (Shensi Province)" by H.A. No. 756, August 25, 1911. Since the above report Sianfu has changed but little. The country about Sianfu has become a great cotton raising area, large quantities of the raw cotton being purchased by Japanese firms in Hankow and exported to Japan.

There is a Y. M. C. A. in Sianfu with an American acting as advisory secretary. There is also at least one American family in the Scandanavian Alliance Mission.

During the past few years the growing of opium has again become one of the most important occupations. Various officials in need of money have forced the people to grow opium by imposing a large tax on those who did not grow opium and a smaller "fine" as a"punishment" on those who did produce it. The general cultivation of opium on the land caused wheat to be sold at almost famine prices in the fall of 1922. Vast quantities of it were being brought to Sianfu from Kansu. This unusual drain on Kansu had caused a similar rise in the price of cereals there.

Coal is brought to Sianfu from Shansi chiefly in wheelbarrows, and is expensive.

Sianfu has telegraphic communications with Lanchow, Kansu, as well as lines to the east via Tung Kwan.

Standard Oil Company imports illuminating oil into Sianfu. Native vegetable oils are also used as are candles. Nothing was heard of any native coal oil being used.

The former imperial palace grounds in the old Manchu City were reconstructed into a military cantonment for the tuchun's body guard. There are now barracks for probably 3,000 men. On the parade ground space would permit the camping of at least another 3,000.

The Mohammedans are still required to live in the northwestern quarter of the city. On the whole, in Sianfu they are financially poor. A large proportion of the butchers are Mohammedan. While the majority of the Mohammedans cannot be distinguished from the Chinese, for a large number of them are largely Chinese by blood, many can be recognized by the unmistakable Turkish or Arabic type of features. Many Mohammedans, but not all, wear a light colored (practically white) skull cap rather than the common black type of the Chinese.

While we neither encountered nor saw any evidences of unfriendly feeling toward foreigners among the inhabitants, all foreign residents, British, American and Swedish, seemed to think that under the surface there was an anti-foreign feeling that might break out again some day and do violence. All foreigners seemed to agree that the seat of this feeling was chiefly in the schools.

Notes made by Maj. W.C.Philoon, Ass't M/A after a trip from Peking to Chengchow, Honan, to Sianfu, Shensi, to Lanchow, Kansu, to Ningsia, Kansu, to Paotow, Suiyuan, to Peking.
Oct., Nov. & Dec., 1922.

For notes on routes Sianfu - Lanchow and Lanchow - Paotow, see Reports 5077 and 50__ dated January 13 and January 18, 1923.

Copies to : Tientsin
Manila.

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FEB 26 1923
WAR DEPARTMENT

3-1 2055-578 (1)

SUBJECT HANDBOOK INFORMATION ON ROUTE FROM SIANFU, SHENSI, TO LANCHOW, KANSU. (G-2 Report).

From CHINA. 2055

No. 5077. Date January 13, 1923. 19

Replying to No. Date RECEIVED G/2 W.D. FEB 26 1923 19

HANDBOOK INFORMATION on Route Sianfu, (French - Singan Fou), Shensi Province to Lanchow (Lan-tcheou Fou), Kansu Province.

Map: Sheets "Si Ngan Fou,""Lan tcheou,""Song Pan Ting" of the French map "Asie 1,000,000e" Eschelle 1:1,000,000. "Desine, heliograve, publie par le Service Geographique de l'Armee".

There are two routes between Sianfu and Lanchow-fu, the capital of Kansu although only one, the road through Pinchow and Pingliang is passable for carts. The other more southerly route follows the valley of the Wei (F rench Ouei) River through Fong-Siang and is never used by the caravans to and from Lanchow and beyond.

The road through Pinchow and Pingliang is the commercial outlet for Central Asia to Central and South China. The roads leading to North China pass through Ningsia and points north thereof but any articles coming out for Shanghai or Hankow come over this road. Large camel, mule and donkey caravans, ox, mule and horse-cart trains are moving constantly over this road carrying out wool, hides, tobacco, skins, grains, licorice, Chinese medicines, etc., while coming in are cotton cloth and other manufactured goods.

This road passes almost constantly either over or through the loess soil though the road canyons are by no means as deep or as frequent as they are between Kwan Yin-tang and Sianfu. The principal reason for this is that the road generally follows closely either a river valley or a mountain ridge. When however it becomes necessary for the road to change its position from the ridge to the valley or vice versa steep hills and deep cuts are sure to be found.

During the late summer, autumn and winter this road presents no serious obstacle to pack transportation and to moderately loaded wheel transport. There are several very steep and very long hills to be encountered however, the longest and most difficult being at the crossing of Liu Pan shan, (Lo Pan), about forty miles north west of Pingliang. Here the road reaches its highest point, an elevation of 7670 feet. In the spring or during the rainy season many of these hills would be very difficult of ascent for heavily loaded carts.

Binding Margin.

The Wei (Ouei) River is crossed by Chinese ferry forty li from Sianfu. During low water the animals ford the stream. Under foreign supervision this ferry could be made to handle all traffic without difficulty. The boats are large enough to carry at least a four ton truck. Forty li from Lanchowfu the road comes out on the Yellow River. The crossing of the tributary at this point, Hsiao Shui Tze, in the high water of spring is very dangerous, several lives, animals and carts being lost each spring. Unexpended famine relief funds are now being used under foreign supervision to construct a ~~road~~ bridge over this stream.

Water is of poor quality along the whole length of the road. Uncooked food such as mutton, chickens, eggs (except in cold weather), grain and native flours, cabbage, carrots and potatoes are obtainable at practically all the numerous villages and towns along the way. Many of the numerous types of Chinese bread and other native foods obtainable are palatable to the not too fastidious foreigner. Forage also is obtainable at nearly every habitation and usually in considerable quantity. Dung and straw are used as fuel.

Chinese troops when passing along the road billet themselves in the cities and larger towns at night. One does not meet large forces moving in a mass but encounters them in small units of companies and battalions at irregular distances along the way.

Lanchow may be reached also by way of Ningsia from Paotow, the terminus (Probably by March 1, 1923) of the Peking Suiyuan R.R. and by way of Taiyuan-fu, Shansi. The latter route is not possible by cart however and is rarely used by travellers from Lanchow. The route through Ningsia is frequently used but is longer also it necessitates crossing the edge of the Gobi Desert and along great stretches of country that are now uninhabited. For further information on this road see report No. 5080 dated January 15, 1923. During the spring and summer the most practicable, easiest and quickest route out of Lanchow is via raft or boat on the Yellow River to Paotow and thence by rail via Peking. Lanchow to Paotow has been made in 14 days in the high water season. The river usually freezes in November so that this route is closed from that time till about March. Going up stream, Paotow to Lanchow is practicable only to Ningsia and of course requires a much longer time.

The telegraph line follows the road along the entire way to Lanchow with telegraph offices in the larger towns.

The road is traversed by the caravans in 18 stages. For the traveller this is very comfortable going and can be cut down if necessity requires. The writer covered it in 16 days and might have eliminated at least another day had it been necessary. 90 li - 30 miles - is the average cart or caravan stage. The Chinese cartman likes to start early in the morning (between four and six A.M.) and stop about ten A.M. for his breakfast and for the animals' midday meal. This stop, if left to the cartment will be for about 1 1/2 hours but may be cut down to about one hour. Both Chinese and animals seem to cover the ground better on this system than that of the foreigners noon-day rest.

Li from Sianfu	- Note: 3 li = 1 mile.
0.0	Sianfu El. 1508 feet.
45.00	Wei (French - Ouei) River to ferry. El. 1300 ft.
48.00	Sien Yang (Fr. Hien Yang) - Large village.
90.00	Chien Chang Yi - Small village.
120.00	Li Chuan (Li Tsiuen) - Walled City. Mission station.
160.00	Error in French map. Cart road does not go to Kienchow (Fr. Tsien Tcheou) but goes 10 li east of it.

Li from Sianfu

210 Tsien Tchun Tien (French Map - Tsien Tin Tchow). Small village. Caves for houses. Wheat growing country. Several difficult hills between Tsien Tchun Tien and Pinchow.

320 Pinchow (Pin Tcheou). El. 2770 ft. Walled City. Mission Station. Entrance to Pinchow is down a long hill. Good road along King He.

360. Ting Kou (Ting Kou Pou). Small town at crossing of Hei Shui River (French - Hei Choui He).

400 Chang Wu (Tchang-ou). Small walled city with little business.

445. Yao-tien, small town on Shensi-Kansu boundary. From Kansu border the road is lined on each side with willow trees which continue with few long breaks to Lanchow. In dry season an auto would have little difficulty in getting this far from Sianfu.

500. Kinchow (Kin-Tcheou). El. 2770 ft. Walled city of about 10,000 people. Business center of a large district. Earthquake of Dec. 1920 did much damage. Road leads down a long hill in approaching the town.

570 Pei Shui (Pe Choui).Small walled village.

640 Ping Liang. Population 70,000. 10,000 of these are Mohammedans. Walled city. Mohammedans not permitted to live inside walls. Largest city between Sianfu and Lanchow. Mission station and Mission hospital. Wheat grown as far west as Pingliang is exported to Sianfu by cart or pack donkey.

710 Hao-tien. French map is incorrect. San Chi Li-pou should be at point when Hao Tien is indicated, Ngan Kou at point marked San Che Li-pou and Hao-tien at Ngan Kou. Hao-tien small village.

730 Wating (Ouating). El. 6240 ft. Road north to Ningsia from here through Ku Yuan (Kou Yuen). Earth quake of 1920 did most damage along this road to the north.

760 Hou Chang-pu. Small village. From here to Liu Pan Shan (Lo Pan) mountain pass is a very steep hard climb. Very difficult for carts.

765 Crest of Liu PanShan (Lo Pan) range. El. 7670 ft. Road down western side also long and steep.

790. Lung-teh (Long-te). El. 6942 ft. Town destroyed by earthquake of 1920 but being rebuilt. Mud walls around town. Little business Fertile country. Large flocks of sheep, goats, cattle and horses. Good road to Tsingning.

880. Tsingningchow (King Ning). El. 5148. Walled town of some commercial importance. From here to Tsing Kiang Yi the destruction caused by the earthquke is much in evidence. Mountain sides have slid into the valleys filling them up causing lakes to form, roads have been carried away by slides and others have been buried. Villages have been destroyed, caves, collapsed or buried and new houses have taken their places.

970 Tsing Kiang Yi. Walled town.

Li from Sianfu.

1015 Enter deep narrow valley, stream bed (in low water season) and continue in this canyon to Hweining.

1060 Hweining (Heuei ning) El. 5447 ft. A poor city with little business. Two complete walls entircle the town.

1120 Road ascends mountain ridge and continues on same beyond Tsing Lan-shan. Wonderful view.

1150 Tsing Lan-shan (Tsing Lan-chan). Small village on mountain ridge.

1180 Anting (Ngan-ting) El. 6136. Small walled city on bank of tributary of Yellow River. Main road does not enter town. Error in French map. Road from Shih-pa-li-pu (Che pa-li-pou) to Tsai-keou continues on west bank of stream instead of crossing stream as shown on French map.

1240 Tcheng Kou Yi - village. Road leads up and along a high mountain to Kan Tsao-tien.

1290 Kan Tsao-tien. Village.

1330 Chia Kou Ying - Village.

From Chia Kou Ying to Hsiao Shui Tze the road leads down a tributary of the Yellow River which furnishes water to irrigate the bottom of the valley. Large quantities of tobacco, vegetables, rice and other grains are grown.

1380 Hsiao Shui Tze. Small village at junction of tributary with Hwang Ho (Yellow River). During the high waters of the spring time the fording of this tributary here as is necessary to proceed to Lanchow is dangerous. Each spring several carts with their animals and drivers are swept away and drowned. In November, 1922, the unexpended famine relief funds were being used under foreign supervision to construct a bridge at this dangerous point.

1420 Lanchow. Capital of Kansu Province. El. 5200 ft. Population estimated at 300,000. Perhaps 75,000 of these are Mohammedans.

LANCHOWFU, the largest and most important city in China west of Sianfu, lies on the south bank of the Yellow River on a flat plain. Mountains to the south are very close to the suburbs of the city and are within about a mile of the river. The city wall is in excellent repair. It surpasses in height and condition the walls around the Chinese City of Peking.

Lanchow is the Chinese political center of the province, while Ho Chow, about 100 miles southwest of Lanchow is the Mohammedan center of not only Kansu but of all China. Lanchow is of strategic importance to China in their struggle with the Mohammedans to retain their political control of the province. Also because of its situation on the caravan routes leading westward to Tibet and to Sinkiang and eastward to Sianfu, and because it is at the head waters of down stream navigation on the Yellow River during the open season it is important. There is also a road to Ningsia which is used chiefly when the river is closed. Rapids below Lanchow prevent boats from coming up stream to Lanchow. Hence rafts of logs from Tibetan forests, or of goat and sheep skins are the usual mode of transport down stream

There is a single wire telegraph line direct to Sianfu and the east, another runs north to Ningsia thence to Paotow and Peking, while still another goes northwest along the caravan route to Tihwa (Urumtchi) and Kashgar in Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang). There is a small and poor telephone service in the city. Also a very small electric light plant which lights

the tuchun's Yamen and a few other buildings.

Foods, meat, grains and vegetables are plentiful and cheap. Of American canned goods a limited amount are obtainable but expensive. Coal, the usual fuel, is fairly good and fairly cheap. Water is carried in buckets by coolies from the Yellow River to the houses. The climate is conducive to health -- January and February are quite cold, July and August quite hot. There is some snow in winter.

Perhaps 1/4 of the population are Mohammedan, the remainder being Chinese. Of this Mohammedan population estimated at 75,000, probably one half of the males could be identified as Mohammedan on sight either because of their distinctive Arabic or Turkish cast of features or by the white skull cap worn by many Mohammedans. Many cannot speak Chinese.

Chinese pipe tobacco is prepared in and exported from Lanchow. There is also a small woolen mill with old style foreign machinery. A considerable quantity of furs come to Lanchow for export. Wool and hides are also exported in large quantities.

Chinese ponies are very common and cheap in Lanchow. The horse raising centers are south and west of Lanchow, at Hochow, Sining, Kanchow. Lanchow is the natural outlet.

The garrisons are all quartered outside the city walls. There are no buildings of ~~universal~~ unusual size within the walls except the tuchun's yamen. There is a China Inland Mission station with a school near the tuchun's yamen. On the north side of the Yellow River is a suburb which contains a large C. I. M. (China Inland Mission) hospital with a capacity of about 125 beds. This hospital is run by an English doctor with English supervising nurses. This northern suburb is joined to the City by an American made steel bridge which is in excellent condition. The road to Ningsia crosses this bridge.

Economic Conditions in Lanchow are very bad due to the lack of a stable currency. Silver ingots (seise), ounces of silver, is the medium of exchange among business men while a very much debased copper coin is the means of exchange on the street. In Nov., 1922 one Yuan Dollar was worth about 71 tael cents (71/100 of an ounce of silver) and also was worth about 470 Lanchow coppers, the latter amount varying from day to day.

Travellers entering the interior should carry a limited amount of silver dollars at all times and should arrange with the Directorate of Posts in Peking to carry a Letter of Credit upon which silver can be drawn at various larger cities along the route where additional funds are likely to be needed.

The average cost of a large cart from Sianfu to Lanchow is $34.00, a small cart $27.00, a riding mule $18.00. These should be obtained preferably through the Postal Commissioner in Sianfu or Lanchow as they are most likely to obtain good animals through the Mail contractor. A written agreement should be obtained and final payment not made until the final destination is reached.

"For information on Kwan Yin-tang -- Sian-fu and Sianfu--Ningsia-Paotwo road see reports Nos. 5076 and 5080, January 12 and Jan. 18, 1923." Due to isolation of all these routes only very general information has been furnished. Also, Misc. Notes, Rept. 5081, 1-18-23.

Copies to:--

Tientsin
Manila

Memorandum by Maj. W. C. Philoon, Ass't M/A after trip to Peking-Chengchow and Kwan Yin-tang, Honan - Tungkwan and Sianfu, Shensi -- Lanchowfu and Ningsia, Kansu -- Paotow, Suiyuan, Peking. Oct. 19th - Dec. 21st, 1922.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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FEB 28

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
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3-1 1923 2055-579

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT HANDBOOK INFORMATION ON ROUTE LANCHOW-FU, KANSU TO PAOTOW, SUIYUAN (NORTHWESTERN TERMINUS OF PEKING-SUIYUAN RR.)

(G-2 Report.)

From CHINA

No. 5080 Date January 18, 1923, 19

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. FEB 26 1923

Replying to No. Date, 19

Map: French, Asie 1,000,000° Echelle: 1:1,000,000. Dsiné, heliogravé, publié par le Service Geographique de l'Armee" -- Sheets, "Southern, Ning Sia-fou" and others of same series as available.

This route has no particular importance at the present time but with the extension of the Peking-Suiyuan R.R. west from P aotow and then south to Ningsia and Chung-wei and eventually to Lanchow this route which lies entirely in the Yellow River valley will be the general line of the railroad and will see a tremendous development. Millions of acres of now untouched land will through the construction of extensive irrigation systems be made to produce bountiful crops, furnishing homes, food and prosperity to hundreds of thousands of Chinese. With the completion of the railroad the large quantities of grain raised in the Yellow River valley, the fine quality of coal, both anthracite and bituminous of the mountains of Kansu, the wool and hides of Tibet, Kansu, Sinkiang, and Mongolia will all be much nearer the centers of population and the great markets.

This route as stated lies in the Yellow River valley. From Lanchow to Chung-wei, 198 miles, the road crosses a rather barren rolling country, about half of which is desert country. From Chung wei to Paotowchen - 517 miles - the route is almost literally as level as a table top. Except for a few sandy stretches where sand dunes have been blown down from the gobi desert there are no hills whatever. There are many irrigation ditches, large and small, along the way. In the winter season when these are frozen a motor car could make the journey from Paotow to Chungwei with little difficulty. There are a few sandy stretches that would cause trouble.

During the spring and summer this route is rarely used by travellers from Lanchow to Paotow as the river itself is both easier and quicker. In the autumn as the water drops the current becomes less rapid and the liklihood of boats and rafts grounding becomes greater. In November the river freezes. In the spring time the down stream trip has been done in 14 days while by ordinary cart stages from Lanchow to Paotow requires 26 days. (Lanchow - Ningsia, 12 days; Ningsia-Paotow 14 days.)

Log rafts from the Tibetan forests or rafts of inflated goat and sheep skins are used from Lanchow to go down stream. Because of some bad rapids below Lanchow there is no upstream traffic to that city. In fact boats rarely come above Ning An-pu (French - Ning-ngan-pou). Boats and rafts are towed up stream.

Binding Margin.

When it is necessary to make an over land trip between Lanchow and the coast it is usually done via Pingliang and Sianfu rather than via Ningsia and Paotow, the former route being shorter, more generally inhabited and freer from bandits.

From Ningsia the caravan and mail routes generally used lead to Taiyuanfu, Shansi, while from Teng-kou and other points north of Ningsia the caravan route leads across the Yellow River and the Ordos desert country. Neither of these routes is possible for carts and the latter route is only for camels.

The most serious obstacle along the road is the sand dunes between Tchang-lieou-choui and Cha-pono-ti, southwest of Chung-wei (Tchong-ouei) The dunes here for about two miles are banked up against the Yellow River. to the height of 200-300 feet. Carts are transported around these dunes by boats on the river.

Food, water and forage are not plentiful along the route except in the Chung-wei-Ningsia Ping-lo section and the irrigated areas north of Ningsia and west of Paotow.

Coal in quantities is obtainable in the Chung-wei-Ningsia Ping-lo Section. Elsewhere straw and brush are used.

At present troops could move over this route only in small bodies owing to the limited amounts of food and water available over wide stretches.

The telegraph line from Lanchow to Ningsia runs south and east of the Yellow River while the usual cart road goes a considerable distance north and west of the river. From Ningsia to Paotow it passes through the important towns west and north of the Yellow River.

Li from Lanchow. 3 li = 1 mile.

0.0 Lanchow. Elevation 5,200 ft.

1.0 Cross Yellow River on American-made steel bridge capable of supporting medium sized motor trucks. Width of river 300 yds. Road to Shui Pu Ho leads between barren hills. Very little cultivation.

70.0 Shui Pu Ho. Small village.
Road continues between barren hills.

120.0 Shan Tze-tun. Village on wide plateau. Elevation 6,500 ft.
Grain country. Many villages.

150.0 Lo Tung Tze. Village on same plateau, El. 6,435 ft.

190.0 Sha Ho Chin Village. Elevation 6800 ft.

195.0 Cross roads. Road from western Kansu joins main road. El. 7,000 ft.

205. Divide. El. 76,31 ft.

256 Ta La Pai, Small village. Small coal-workings in hills.
Small irrigation system. Road follows down gravelly valley.
Stream nearly dry in dry season. El. 6,175 ft.

296 Lo Han Pu. Large village in a wide dry valley. Extensive growing grazing ground for camels. Motors could easily travel from Lanchow to Lo Han Pu.

316 Yi Tiao Shan. El. 4940 ft. Small village on edge of desert. Salt Gabelle storehouse with English speaking Chinese in charge in summer. Salt lake several miles west. From Yi Tiao Shan to Ying Pan Shui (Ying Pan Schoui) the road runs through the desert with no habitation from 90 li. To Yi Tiao-Shan from Lanchow road passable for motors in dry season.

356 Road passes through Great Wall. Road gets sandy.

386 Ching Ai Tsao. Very shallow well with abundant supply of water.
Formerly a village now only ruins with no shelter for man or beast. Many sheep and some camels grazing on desert grasses.
Road very sandy to Ying Pan Shui.

Li from Lanchow.

406 Ying Pan Shui. Very small village in middle of desert. Practically no feed or grain available for travellers.

456. Kan Tan Tze. Two small inns in desert. Water is brought by pack animals for 40 li. Very sandy road.

489 I Wan Chuan. Two very poor inns in the desert. Very deep sandy road.

524. Chang Liu Shui (Tchang Liecu-choui). Elevation 4290 ft. Small village on high bank above fordable stream flowing into Yellow River 20 li to the east. Very difficult road read down stream bed to River.

539. Cross roads. Road for caravans and animals leads over sand dunes 200-400 feet high to Cha Pou-ti. Impracticable except for empty carts.

544 Yellow River. Carts must be put on small ferry boats and float down stream to Cha-pou-ti. Animals go over sand dunes. Coming up stream boats art towed up stream by coolies from Cha-pou-ti About 12 boats available in time of emergency. No ramps worthy of the name for embarking and disembarking carts.

554. Cha-pou-ti. Village of about six poor inns on down stream side of big sand dunes. Road skirts river around smaller sand dunes through deep sand and cobble stones for 20 li where it crosses the first irrigation ditch of the Chung-wei system.

574. Road crosses large Chung-wei irrigation ditch. Road very level and smooth to Chungwei. Very prosperous country along river. Grain and food obtainable in abundance.

594. Chung-wei. Elevation 3705. Very prosperous city in prosperous agricultural section between desert and Yellow River. Area approximately 60 li long and twenty li broad. Population of City, 15,000. Mission station. Telegraph ~~Mission~~ station is at Ning An-pu, 100 li to the east on the other sideof the Yellow River. Road leads to Ning An-pu. Ferry at Mo Chia-lu on Yellow River, fifteen li from Chung Wei. English speaking Chinese Salt Gabelle representative at Chung-wei. Excellent soft coal and coke obtainable. Mutton, sheepskins, wool, wheat, rice, kaoliang, millet, walnuts and linseed grown in quantities. Excellent road, level and hard, to Chu Kung. All irrigated country. Many ditches cross road. Thickly populated country. Many cattle. Ox carts have wheels seven feet in diameter

639. Mountains and Yellow River meet. Pass through old gate of Great Wall.

679. Chu Kung (Che Kong Sse) Elevation 3640 ft. Small village in irrigated and intensely cultivated section which extends to and beyond Ningsia. Excellent road to Kuang Wo.

729. Tsao Yuan-pu. Distances as shown on map are inaccurate. Village. Good road.

789. Kuang Wo (Kouang Hou) Walled village. Good level road. Elevation 3540 feet.

829. Ta Pa. Small village. Large intakes for Ningsia irrigation system constructed under direction of the Jesuits in 17th Century. Good road. Telegraph line crosses river from the east and follows road to Ningsia. Good road.

889. Yeh Sha Pu (Yai-Che-pou). Walled village. Map distance between villages are inaccurate. Good road. Salt Gabelle storehouses. Elevation, 3470 ft.

Li from Lanchow

934 Yen-ho-pu. - Village. Map is inaccurate. Road keeps well away from Yellow River.

974. Ningsia. Elevation 3455 feet. Walled City of 45,000 people. Controled by Mohammedans. Mission station. Chinese population contains many descendants of criminals banished from the eastern part of the country. Little business in City. A center of licorice production. Wool and sheepskins of a specially fine quality grown in vicinity. Ningsia is 40 li west of Yellow River in the middle of a very level plain. 45 li west of Ningsia is the high and rugged Ala Shan (Ala Chan) (Ala mountain) range with few passes leading through and the Gobi desert of Mongolia beyond. These mountains have proved to be an efficient barrier to keep out the drifting sands of the Gobi from the very fertile irrigated country along the Yellow River. One main caravan route enters Ningsia through Ala Shan from the Northwest. Caravans (camels) from or through Ningsia and the postal service as well all lead southeast and east to Taiyuanfu, Shansi, as the shortest route to the Railroads. Ningsia as a city has little importance at the present time except to the Mohammedans who are strengthening their hold there, forging a strong link in the chain which apparently they hope some day to have completed around the big north bend of the Yellow River to Paotow and thence to Kweiwhating. The walls are kept in good repair. Within the wall there is much space unoccupied by buildings. There are few large or noticeable buildings. There is one eleven storied pencil pagoda within the walls and another similar one some ten li north of the City.

Excellent coal is obtainable in abundance. Food and forage are plentiful. Limited quantities of foreign canned goods obtainable. There is nothing distinctive about the city. Only a very limited number of carts are obtainable in Ningsia as the usual exportation and importation of commodities is done by camels. A few are usually available however for the individual traveller. Nothing is as plentiful as in Lanchow. Kerosene is brought in via Paotow but native vegetable oil is in general use along the road for illuminating purposes. Telegraph station.

1074. Ping Lo. Walled small city. Good road from Ningsia. Coal, food and forage plentiful. Good road to Shih Shui Tze.

1164. Shih Shui Tze (Che-tsouei-tse). Elevation 3455 ft. Village. End of Ningsia irrigation system. Good road. Semi-desert country to the north. Unsettled. With irrigation would be fertile. No food or forage for two days.

1254. Ho Kuei Tze (Ho Kouai-tse). Two inns. Level Semi-desert country. No habitations between stations. Some stretches of drifting sands from the desert to the west. Otherwise excellent country road.

1294. Pe Tse-ti. A poor inn for people, not for animals.

1344. Tung Kou (Kouan-ti or Teng-Kou). Error in map. The town, one of 2,000-3,000 people lies in Southeast corner of bend in river. Mohammedan population and Mohammedan military garrison. Telegraph line crosses river from the east and follows road to north for some distance. Many boats on river bank. In Summer, Tung Kou is eastern terminus of caravan route from Mongolia and Western Kansu. Wools, hides, etc., of caravans being transferred to boats for shipment to Paotow. In winter, with river closed, caravans continue through Tungkou across the Yellow River and the Ordos country to Paotow. Fuel is straw and desert brush. Food and forage not plentiful. Upon leaving Tung Kou the road for 20 li leads over a very bad stretch of sand. After crossing this the road is good.

Lanchow.

Lo Liang Tai. Catholic village. Catholic irrigation project. Forage and grain plentiful. P rosperous communities along irrigation systems.

1454. San Shang Kung. Walled Catholic village with foreign priest.

1514. Porer-ner. Catholic village. Foreign priest. All prosperous.

1564. Huang Yang Mu To. Catholic village. Catholic bishop here. irrigation systems continue. Developed land is fertile. Comparatively small portion developed however. Good road. Many irrigation ditches.

1674. Yah Fu or Lao Tai Chi. Very small village. Two roads lead from here to Paotow. The one shown on this route follows more closely the Yellow River, is 70 li shorter and probably is impracticable except during the frozen season because of the number of irrigation ditches to be crossed. The second road leads through Lung Ching Chang. Our route is excellent when the very numerous irrigation ditches are frozen. No bridges over ditches. Food scarce.

1734. Achan. Small village. Good road.

1774. Chiao Fa Lu Tien. Small village. Good road.

1884. Hsi Shan Chwang. Inn at base of "Hsi Shan", western end of Wu La Shan. From here on to Paotow there are always mountains not far north of the road. Good road. Little cultivation.

1964. Ta Tze Tien - Mongol Inn. Few dwellings and little cultivation along road. Good road. Mongel country. Many cattle and sheep grazing. 10 li north of Yellow River.

2074. Ha La Pu Ta. Village.
Much cultivation. Many flocks and herds of sheep, cattle, camels and horses.

2144. Paotow. Walled City, with suburbs. Population 40,000.
By March 1st, 1923, will be the terminus of the Peking Suiyuan R.R. A very busy town to which many caravans of wool and hides, etc. come from all over Mongolia, Kansu and Sinkiang and from which various sorts of manufactured goods are sent to the vast country to the north, west and south. Mission station. Coal, food and forage in abundance. Mohammedan garrison. Inhabitants largely Chinese. No buildings of note. Many Chinese inns and large merchandise compounds". Telegraph office.

Paotow is 10 li from (north of) the Yellow River. Undoubtedly the railroad will be extended to the river shortly after it reaches Paotow. Hundreds of camels, many mule and ox carts are always available in Paotow for hire, as are saddle mules and Chinese ponies for purchase.

Carts from Lanchow to Paotow cost about $75.00, drivers to feed their own animals en route. Written agreements should be made out and final payments not made until arrival at destination. Animals should be inspected prior to starting to avoid having lame, sick or otherwise unsuitable animals. Carts are recommended for baggage and servants, riding animals for foreigners.

A post office Letter of Credit should be arranged for prior to starting on such a trip, thereby avoiding the necessity of carrying a large quantity of silver in a bandit ridden country.

Notes of Maj.W.C.Philoon, A/M/A, after a trip Peking-Chengchow, Honan--Sianfu, Shensi--Lanchowfu-and-Ningsia, Kansu--Paotow, Suiyuan--Peking, in Oct.-Dec., 1922. Owing to isolated position of this route the information is abreviated. For notes on routes KwanYin-tang-Sianfu, and Sianfu-Lanchow see reports Nos. 5076 and 5077 of Jan. 12 and 13, 1923.

Copies to: Tientsin, Manila.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
FEB 27 1923
WAR DEPARTMENT

3-1 1923 2055-680

SUBJECT MEMORANDUM OF MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION OBTAINED BY MAJOR PHILOON OCTOBER 19-Dec. 21, 1922, on a trip, Peking-Chengchow, Sianfu - Ningsia - Paotow. (G-2 Report.)

From China.

No. 5081 Date January 18, 1923. 19

Replying to No. Date RECEIVED G/2 W.D. FEB 24 1923 19

SHENSI.

The Tuchun who is concurrently civil governor and all other officials were most friendly and desirous of making our stay pleasant.

The tuchun is the principal owner of the very poor motor car line from Tung-kwan to Sianfu. He apparently realizes its condition and brought up the subjects of improving the motor road and replacing the present old Ford cars by some better type such as the Dodge.

While we were in Sianfu a Japanese vice-consul from Hankow, a representative of a Japanese cotton buying firm from Hankow and another Japanese were in Sianfu endeavoring to obtain a settlement from the Tuchun for the lives of two Japanese subjects, employees of the cotton buying firm, who were killed during the fighting in the province in 1920. Apparently the affair was about settled as the Japanese were on the day of our departure giving $250 Mex to each of four Buddhist charitable organizations at a public ceremony.

Shensi is a most backward province. Very little foreign influence has been felt in the province. The Chinese schools are inefficient and are apparently the nests where anti-foreign feeling is nursed along. All foreigners agreed that there was such a feeling and that it only needed a fancied provocation to make itself shown and perhaps felt by the foreigners.

Opium growing, selling and smoking is rife throughout the province. While our journey was made too late in the year to see the popies growing in the fields, it was generally talked about. It was most common when traveling through the country to see persons of all classes stretched out on kangs at the inns and tea houses smoking opium. Opium lamps and pipes were carried openly by the users and were displayed openly for sale. Apparently most of the revenues of the province come from opium. Last year, 1922, heavy taxes were said to have been laid on those farmers who did not plant poppies and a less severe fine was imposed on those who did. The 20th Division was siad by the foreigners to be a real fighting force, the best troops in Shensi. They were also said to have prospered financially on the opium taxes they had collected in southeastern Shensi. This division is a Wu Pei-fu division and holding the gateway to Shensi at Tung-kwan hold the Shensi Tuchun in line.

The present tuchun is not considered by the foreigners to be a strong man. The only foreigner, however, who did not seem to be more or less afraid of him was Mr. Newman, British, the Postal Commissioner.

The concensus of opinion seemed to be that the tuchun was a Wu Pei-fu man only because he could not be otherwise and hold his job, that he was being forced to contribute to the limit to Wu's support. The tuchun's

Binding Margin.

troops were not considered efficient but that they had improved both in efficiency and in their attitude towards civilians since the advent of Feng Yu-hsiang and his troops into Sianfu. The tuchun first became civil governor during the tuchunship of the notorious Chen Shu-fan. It was felt that the presence of the comparatively efficient 20th Division on the road between Sianfu and Tung-kuan had a quieting effect on the tuchun and prevented him from attempting any independant action.

Footbinding of women is still the universal thing in Shensi. The footbinding is started when the girl is about five years old. Hardly a woman was seen in the province without bound feet. Furthermore in many instances they have been bound so tight that the foot is no larger than the ankle and leg.

The extension of the Lunghai railroad to Sianfu should have a wonderful effect on the province which at present is tremendously handicapped. Undoubtedly it will improve the condition of the province economically. It will, I believe, also serve to remove the anti-foreign feeling whihh exists largely among the students.

At present some students from Shensi are going to Peking and other centers in China to attend school. Practically none are going abroad. It is probable also that very few of those who leave the province to go to school ever return to Shensi.

All the foreigners in Sianfu except the postal commissioner are missionaries. Due to the troubles foreigners have had in Shensi in the past they seem far from agressive. From my observations on three days in Sianfu, I should say they are very apprehensive of the future and their first thought always is to do nothing to arouse the anger of the Chinese.

KANSU.

Immediately upon our entering the province of Kansu from Shensi all foreigners reported everything as peaceful and friendly between themselves and the natives, both Chinese and Mohammedan. No anti-foreign feeling is evident or anticipated as is the case in Shensi.

The population of Kansu is generally estimated at about 5,000,000. Of this population the foreigners in Kansu estimate that not more than 1/3 are Mohammedans. The struggle between the two peoples is perpetual

MOHAMMEDANS (Whei Whei).

It must be realized that in Kansu and to a lesser extent in Shensi a Mohammedan is not only a man with a different religion from the usual inhabitant of China but he is usually a man with some if not a preponderance of Turkish, Arabic or Mongol blood. These types of faces are common and unmistakable. Of these types of Mohammedans the Turkish and Arabian types came through immigration while the Mongol came through the early conversion of some Mongol tribes to Mohammedanism. For more complete information on Mohammedanism in China, see "Islam in China" by Marshall Broomhall and "Mohammedanism in North West China" by E.F. Andrew.

One finds in Kansu a race problem that is as difficult of settlement as the Irish problem or the negro problem in America. The Mohammedans, while in the minority, appear to be the more agressive and the more progressive. They desire political recognition and control of the province, whereas in fact they are treated largely as a conquered people. In Sianfu, Shensi, they are confined to one quarter of the city. In the larger cities and towns between Sianfu and Lanchow, the Mohammedans are not permitted to live within the city walls but must live outside in a suburb. Every town of any size along the road has its fortress outside on top of a high hill apparently kept as a refuge in case of another mohammedan uprising. Such uprisings have occurred in the past on several occasions. Every foreigner with whom I talked in Kansu felt certain that another uprising would come some day. None would set the date however, each stating that some unforeseen and untoward incident would be the spark to cause the explosion.

While the Mohammedans are not given political recognition they already have military supremacy in Kansu. The Mohammedan in Kansu is said to be a natural soldier. Practically all the males are supposed to have a knowledge of and to possess arms. They are all horsemen. The eastern edge of Kansu together with the area bordering the Sianfu-Lanchow road as far west as Lanchow is held at present by Chinese military units.

The southwestern defense district with headquarters at Ho Chow is also nominally commanded by a Chinese military officer. Hochow is, however, the center of Mohammedanism in China and the Chinese General is permitted by the Mohammedans to remain because he is a mere figurehead. Ningsia in northeast Kansu is controlled by the Mohammedans as is all of western Kansu. The present tutuh of Suiyuan, Ma Fu-hsiang, at Kwei Wha-t'ing is probably the best nationally known Mohammedan. He is however, half Chinese by blood. With Ma Fu-hsiang's nephew in command at Ningsia there is a line of Mohammedan soldiers around the northern bend of the Yellow River. There are also many towns in that section where one can conceive that the Mohammedans are strengthening their position.

In Central and Western Kansu the Mohammedans seem to be more prosperous and more energetic than the Chinese. Foreigners all stated that the Mohammedans came to them to learn of and to discuss political affairs in China much more frequently than the Chinese. Although the missionaries all stated that they could do nothing in the way of converting the Mohammedans, they all had many friends among them who came to them for help and advice. They also go to the missionary hospitals for treatment.

The thieves and robbers of Kansu are generally Mohammedans and the Mohammedan soldiers frequently combine their profession of arms with that of the thief.

At present there seems to be no outstanding individual who is the acknowledged political and military leader of the Mohammedans. As a matter of fact undoubtedly the thing that has contributed most to retarding the growth of Mohammedan power in Northwestern China has been the lack of unity among themselves. There are different sects as well as different races among them. These facts have caused serious friction between various groups and have prevented a concentrated agressive move either politically or militaristic.

Undoubtedly a Mohammedan uprising was prevented by the earthquake of December 1920 which buried in a cave a mosque where they were holding a meeting of the group of leaders of the proposed rebellion. At present Ma Fu-hsiang is the best known Mohammedan but he is not considered their outstanding leader. Nor is any other. Ma Chi, Defense Commissioner at Sining, Kansu, is evidently a leader of ability and worth watching.

PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF KANSU.

The present tuchun is an easy going, opium-smoking Chinese who has no idea of government or finance. In Lanchow the provincial bank is bankrupt. The ordinary Chinese coppers have been melted and by adding mud been debased and remolded. The Lanchow coppers were worth in Nov. 1922 in Lanchow about 470 to the Chinese dollar. These coppers each are supposed to have the value of two ordinary coppers. Silver dollars are not obtainable in Lanchow except at a premium. The silver in use is in the shape of ingots or pieces thereof. One must carry a set of accurate scales or balances to ensure his making and receiving proper payments. As the wages of the laboring class are paid in coppers and as their pay has not increased correspondingly with the decrease in value of the coins, there is great poverty and discontent among the laboring class.

Fortunately the tuchun controls only a small portion of Kansu so that these debased coppers are accepted only in the area around Lanchow.

COMMUNICATIONS.

The tuchun and many business men are interested in the establishment of a motor road to Lanchow from the end of the Peking-Suiyuan R.R. line at Paotow. This project would be possible but doubtful of financial profit. Very little expense would be entailed in putting the road in shape from Paotow to Chung-wei. From the latter place to Lanchow the desert sand is encountered for long stretches on the usually traveled road so that it would be necessary to seek another route either on the southeast side of the Yellow River or west of the mountains that parallel the river some ten to twenty miles to the west.

The extension of the Peking-Suiyuan R.R. around the bend of the Yellow River and thence south to Ningsia, Chung-wei and Lanchow would seem practicable. There are now thousands of acres under irrigation which produce fine crops of wheat, kaoliang, millet, buckwheat and linseed. There are millions of acres more waiting to be irrigated. The construction of extensive irrigation systems of canals and embankments would be required however as the Yellow River is in places 50 miles in width and very flat. The present extensive irrigation system which extends along the valley for 100 miles with Ningsia in the center was constructed by Jesuits as engineers in the 17th century. Another extensive system of more recent date is that around Chung-wei. Farther north in Inner Mongolia the ground has barely been touched by the modern systems of the catholics at numerous places around the northwestern bend of the river, while farther east the Scandinavian Alliance Mission of North America at Patsebolong have a growing colony. At all these places there is an air of plenty. People and cattle looked well fed and the communities prosperous. Food stuffs were cheap and plentiful. Together with the fertile soil waiting to be developed there is an abundance of excellent coal. At Chungwei and Ningsia and along the way between these towns excellent soft coal was in general use. In Ningsia anthracite of an excellent quality is obtainable in quantities.

With proper financial and mechanical organization the extension of the railroad from Paotow via Ningsia and the development of irrigation projects along the railroad would furnish employment and permanent homes for thousands of Chinese.

OPIUM.

Poppy cultivation and opium smoking while not as prevalent as in Shensi is nevertheless common. The Anti-opium Bureau in Lanchow was said to have become in reality an opium tax collection office.

CATHOLICISM.

North of Ningsia on the west bank of the Yellow River there are many Catholic mission stations. Each station is the center of a catholic village. The irrigation systems have evidently been built by the catholics and only those who acknowledge that faith are permitted to settle in their villages. The priests in that vicinity are chiefly from Belgium and Holland. The villages all showed every sign of prosperity. In one village a detachment of Mohammedan soldiers from Kwei Wha-ting en route to Lanchow arrived at the same time we did. While we were calling on the catholic priest the officer in charge came to see the priest about getting some carts to carry them to the next good sized town. They came to the priest recognizing him as the real head of the village.

While we were at Pingliang, Kansu, we saw many "students" who were bound for Loyang to join Wu Pei-fu's forces. We were told that "a great many" were going east to join him.

FENG YU-HSIANG.

Prior to our departure for Sianfu, I spent three days at Kaifeng-fu Honan. The greater part of my time there was spent with General Feng Yu-hsiang's 11th Division. General Feng's American unofficial adviser and friend was my guide and interpreter.

In Shensi some of the foreigners feel that General Feng is anti-foreign. After seeing a great deal of him in my stay at Kaifeng, I do not believe it. General Feng is constantly referring to China as being almost decadent, that China is on the decline and if the people do not wake up and get busy China will be another Korea. He had two Koreans with his division whom he asked to remain with his troops These Koreans are constantly telling Feng's soldiers the fate of Korea.

General Feng is very outspoken in his hatred and distrust of the Japanese. He spoke with great feeling about their arming and inciting the bandits in Shantung where a hundred of his men had been sent after a personal appeal by C. T. Wang to help form the Chinese railroad police force. He also asked particularly about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, whether or not it still existed. Apparently he doubts at all times the sincerity of the Japanese.

Feng's troops are often referred to as the hymn singing soldiers. They certainly know the hymn tunes. One detachment I met while out in the country were marching while singing the tune of "Onward Christian Soldiers". The singing of hymn tunes does not necessarily mean that they are singing translations of the Christian hymn. The "Doxology" sung at each meal as sung by them is an appeal for all to work to save their country from decadence and obliteration. "Hark the Herald Angels Sing" as sung by them night and morning has for its theme "Save your Ammunition" while "Bringing in the Sheaves", sung very often by the 11th Division, invokes them to "Get your Man".

In addition to this complete division which was over-strength in point of numbers he had a mixed regiment of students and also a newly organized 7th Mixed Brigade under General Chang Chih-chiang. In all he had about 20,000 men.

On the Sunday morning while I was there I attended a communion service at which over 500 officers participated. Naturally Feng was there but he did not take a leading part. In fact he spent a large part of his time in a small side room, washing and filling communion cups. Finding that the one man detailed for the purpose was not sufficient he started work himself and later sent in for a brigade commander, his chief of staff and the provincial chief of police to help him. During the service one could plainly hear military commands of troops at drill not far away as well as the rattle of machine guns being tested at the arsenal. In the afternoon I saw many of his troops out on a field problem.

I do not believe Feng is anti-foreign. He is pro-Chinese and in order to have a background against the work, he naturally must tell his men that if the Chinese do not wake up and save themselves and their country the foreigners will take it over. In view of the fact that many foreigners are now advocating international control, I am inclined to think he is justified.

Feng's soldiers, compared to those I have seen of other commanders, do not lose by the comparison. The one outstanding thing about them is they are more alert than the other soldiers.

WU PEI-FU.

One day was spent at Loyang. As General Wu was out at one of the daily maneuvers of his troops that were to continue for a month, I did not see much of him. He returned to headquarters at about five P.M., having been out at maneuvers all day. At six-thirty o'clock

dinner was served. General Wu excused himself from the foreigners, stating that it was necessary for him to discuss and settle matters with some Chinese from other provinces at that time as there would be no time later. Shortly after dinner we saw General Wu but I refrained from talking politics with him. The impression I received as the result of my short stop in Loyang was this: If Wu spends his days and the greater part of his energy with his troops and settles his political problems at the dinner table where wine is flowing freely there is little doubt that he is at heart a soldier and that politics are obnoxious to him. Furthermore there is little wonder that he is successful in the former and unsuccessful in the latter.

By comparison on successive days General Feng was not the loser although of course he has by no means had the experiences and situations to meet that have come to General Wu Pei-fu.

Information on the route covered has been submitted in China Reports:

5076 "Handbook Information on Route Kwan Yin-tang to Sianfu".
5077 "Handbook Information on Route Sianfu to Lanchow".
5080 "Handbook Information on Route Lanchow-fu to Paotow via Ningsia.

Copies to: Tientsin
Manila.

SUBJECT: REPORT BY MAJOR JOHN MAGRUDER ON A TRIP TO HARBIN, MUKDEN, AND ALONG THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY IN COMPANY WITH THE AMERICAN MINISTER, AUGUST 29 to SEPTEMBER 12, 1923. (G-2 Report).

FROM: CHINA.

NO. 5189 Date September 20, 1923.

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RECEIVED G/2 W.D. OCT 29 1923

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3. LAND OFFICE DISPUTE.

4. ATTITUDE OF CHANG TSO-LIN REGARDING LAND OFFICE DISPUTE AND ON OTHER QUESTIONS.

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A. LIST OF OFFICIALS ACCOMPANYING ON TRIP ALONG THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY.

B. PROGRAM OF TRIP.

* Detach for Information Digest.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1923
OCT 31
2055-604
WAR DEPARTMENT

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(1) PURPOSE OF TRIP AND ITINERARY.

The Minister, Mr. Jacob Gould Schurman, pursuant to his policy of personally visiting all of the Consulates in China, had for some months planned to visit Harbin and on that occasion to travel the length of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It was a mere coincidence that his trip occurred at a time when the dispute between the Railway officials and the Chinese authorities over the Land Office was at its height. This fact gave to the Minister's trip a political aspect which was not intended but since both Russians and Chinese construed his visit with much significance he was not hesitant to make thorough investigations of the dispute with a view to justifying the position taken by the representatives in Peking of the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan, and with a view to using his influence in bringing about a just and legal settlement of a dispute which, if allowed to continue, was fraught with serious consequences.

The Minister invited Mr. Willys R. Peck, Chinese Secretary, and myself to accompany him on the trip. Leaving Peking on August 29th we proceeded without delay to Harbin, arriving there on the afternoon of the 31st. At Changchun we were met by Mr. Hanson, the American Consul at Harbin, in company with numerous officials of the Railway, both Chinese and Russian, and officials of the Special Administrative Area (Railway Zone). A special train was here put at our disposal on which we lived during the following ten days. September 1st and 2nd were spent in inspecting the Railway from Harbin to Pogranichnaya. September 3rd, 4th and part of 5th were spent in inspecting the line from Harbin to Manchuli. September 5th to the morning of the 9th was spent in Harbin. On the night of the 9th we arrived at Mukden where we remained until the morning of

the 11th, returning to Peking the morning of September 12th.

During our trip along the Chinese Eastern we were accompanied by numerous officials (See Appendix A). An active program was prepared and adhered to (See Appendix B), during which we observed all of the activities of the Railway proper and the varied side industries. An equally strenuous social program was carried out in Harbin (Appendix B). In addition to the appointments on the programs there were numerous conferences with the heads of departments of the Railway, with Chinese officials, and with heads of various organizations. The hospitality of both the Russians and Chinese was lavish and nothing was left undone to show the greatest honor to the American Minister. At all the stations visited troops and railway guards were drawn up and flourishes played. Russian and Chinese school children were paraded, polite speeches made and flowers presented in profusion. The progress of the Minister was triumphal but, considering the conflict of feelings in the Railway Zone, the competition between Chinese and Russians in showering honors sometimes caused embarassment.

(2) GENERAL STATUS OF CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY AT TIME OF VISIT AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES AT WORK.

One can scarcely picture a more complicated situation than that which exists in the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone. Without going too greatly into details a brief historical resumé is necessary. The construction of the railway was begun in 1898 as the result of an agreement between Russia and China signed in 1896. This agreement provided for

the recognition of the Russo-Chinese Bank which was intrusted with organizing the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which in turn was granted the concession to build and operate the railway. It was 1905 before the railway was entirely completed, when it comprised the lines from Manchuli to Pogranitchnaya and from Harbin to Dairen. By the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, all of the rights of Russia in that part of the line south of Changchun were transferred to Japan and became part of the South Manchurian Railway system.

According to the original and supplementary agreements of 1896 certain lands were turned over by China and the rights granted to purchase privately held lands such as were necessary for the construction, operation, etc. of the railway. The French versions of these agreements pertinently contains the word "exploitation" and it is upon this word largely which the present case of the railway rests in connection with the Land Office Dispute. For some years the railway (one can as well say Russia) pursued a course of taking over public lands and purchasing private lands either without objection from China or with such feeble objection as was not seriously considered. Probably the only reason more land was not taken over was because more could not be utilized for railway purposes and for leasing to a slowly increasing population. It was officially denied that the Railway Zone was being used for purposes of Russian colonization, but Russian aims in the Far East prior to the Russo-Japanese war were so boundless that the Railway Zone was only incidental to Russia's territorial ambitions. Certainly the local officials of the railway proceeded with colonization schemes and their efforts were curtailed only by the limited number of Russian colonists which were available. The Railway Zone became

to all intents Russian territory, and so remained as long as Russia was able to enforce her demands. There were occasional objections on the part of China to the amount of land which was being included in the zone and in 1907 an adjustment was concluded after four years of negotiations. In 1910 a further agreement was signed returning certain lands, partially delimiting the boundaries and providing a total area which should not be exceeded. Meanwhile the Land Department of the Railway took census, built roads, leased lands, rented property and collected taxes, while a civil administration performed all the remaining ~~prerogatives~~ functions of government. China had voluntarily by agreement alienated certain rights in the Railway Zone; strong Russia siezed all the remaining ones.

Then came the War and the Revolution in Russia. After the war came the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovaks from Siberia, the allied intervention, the Kolchak débacle, the long-drawn-out White activities and finally the allied evacuation. Only the Inter-Allied Technical Board kept the Chinese Eastern Railway from collapse or from passing into the hands of the Japanese. But in spite of its efforts, by 1920 the Railway was almost ruined. In its vaults were millions of worthless paper roubles, its roadbed was in disrepair and its locomotives and rolling stock in wretched condition and its revenues greatly diminished. Mr. Stevens was predicting that without foreign financial assistance the Railway would either cease to operate or would pass into the hands of the Japanese.

It must be remembered that the road had never paid dividends. Under the Russian regime the most flagrant dishonesty was practiced. What revenues were not dissipated or stolen were put back into the Zone in building cities, roads, parks, resorts, and, in general, in creating a Russia in China. The deficit was made up from the Russian treasury. According to the original

agreements only Russians and Chinese could own shares in the Chinese Eastern Railway. Actually these were held by the Russo-Chinese Bank. The financial relationship between the Governments of Russia and China, the Chinese Eastern Railway Company and the Russo-Chinese Bank (in which French capital predominated) is exceedingly involved. The relationship became more involved in 1910 when further French interest was introduced by the merger of the Russo-Chinese Bank and the Banque du Nord into the Russo-Asiatic Bank. After the Bolshevik revolution the fiction of ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Russo-Asiatic Bank began to be declared by the Bank as a fact and there was no recognized Russian Government to refute it, altho the Soviet has done so loudly and persistently. The Russian Legation, which had continued to function in Peking without a home government which recognized it asserted that the Russo-Asiatic Bank constituted the sole owner of the Railway.

A great change took place in September 1920, when the Chinese Government withdrew its recognition from the diplomatic and consular representatives of Russia in China, cancelled the right of extraterritoriality of ~~the~~ Russians, and assumed the obligations of trustee for Russian interests until such a time as there was a recognized Russian Government. This resulted in far-reaching readjustments in all administrative affairs in the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

At that time the French flag was run up on the Russo-Asiatic Bank in Peking on the grounds that, due to the large French interests in the Bank, it would be given French protection. As a result of financial and political measures, but dimly understood, the head office of the Bank was announced to have appeared in Paris. And recently the announcement has

been made that 70% of the shares of the Bank are owned by the French. So in 1920, four parties were involved in the Chinese Eastern Railway; the reactionary Russians claiming to be share holders in the Bank or patriots looking after the interest of a future Russian Government; Soviet Russia; China, thru whose territory the Railway runs and whose property, according to existing agreements, it will ultimately be; and the French, who legally or otherwise had transformed obligations due from the Russian treasury which were invested in the Railway into ownership of the highly technical politico-financial organization known as the Russo-Asiatic Bank.

Meanwhile, Soviet Russia was becomming more insistent upon demanding Russian rights in the Railway matters. On the grounds that White bands were being sheltered and permitted to organize in the Railway Zone, the Soviets threatened to invade it. On the grounds that it was Russia and not the Russo-Asiatic Bank which owned the Railway, Moscow demanded the recognition of its rights. To consolidate their position against the Soviet and to disarm the aggressive Chinese diplomacy itself, the French and the reactionary Russians enlisted the assistance of China. On October 2, 1920, an agreement was signed by the Russo-Asiatic Bank and the Chinese Government which gave China increased representation in the management of the Road and certain advantages which were more apparent than real. It was this agreement and the trusteeship of Russian interests assumed by the Chinese Government at about the same time which were considered by the Four Powers at the Washington Conference in the agreement fixing China's responsibility in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Since 1920 the Chinese have gradually recovered most of their

sovereign rights in the Railway Zone. The courts are Chinese; the troops responsible for the security of the zone are Chinese; The Railway Police are commanded by Chinese; the city police of Harbin, as well as the police of all the municipalities along the Railway, are Chinese; and the administrative functions, including the collection of taxes, excepting only in the land controlled by the Railway Land Office, are conducted by Chinese. That land considered as property of the Railway is administered, taxed and sub-leased by the Land Office of the railway and the functions of this office are indeed varied. With their administrative rights in the Railway Zone restored and with their representation in the management of the railway itself increased the Chinese have conducted a persistent policy of boring-in with the evident intention of obtaining the Railway for themselves regardless of any agreements with Russia, whose trustees they are, and regardless of the agreements with the Russo-Asiatic Bank. The Chinese are proceeding as far as they dare, as a few of them frankly admit, to avail themselves of the present opportunity to recover rights they alienated in the past and to secure a valuable property in the development of which they expended nothing. The legal aspect of the agreements means little to the Chinese who will abrogate those agreements just as far as they are permitted to do so by the outside powers. The matter has now proceeded so far that the reactionary Russians and French, both represented by the Russo-Asiatic Bank, are on the defensive against the Chinese whose assistance was enlisted against Soviet Russia. Even Soviet representatives are secretly believed to be favorable to the maintenance of all rights granted the Railway by agreements, looking to their future control of Russian interests, altho publicly they pretend to resent the activities of the Russo-Asiatic Bank which they insist in no sense is the rightful owner of the Railway.

Soviet Russia, from various considerations unwilling forcefully to sieze the railway, is impatiently observing old Russian rights falling alternately to the Chinese and to French interests and she hesitates over the choice of which she shall deal with.

At the time of our visit the dispute over the Land Office (to be described later) was at its height and the feeling between the Railway and Bank officials and the Chinese officials was strong - Chinese officials holding office at the pleasure of Chang Tso-lin and acting under his orders. Considerable propaganda was being conducted among the Chinese people who were said to be stirred with a strong anti-Russian sentiment. There is little doubt that in all activities controlled by the Railway the large Russian populace is greatly favored; the administration is conducted mainly for their benefit. Conversely, a Russian may expect little protection and no justice from that part of the administration controlled by the Chinese. Harbin is the largest settlement of white people in the Far East. It is estimated that there are about 60,000 Russians in Harbin and about 300,000 in the Railway Zone. It will thus be seen that a serious racial situation exists in which the racial feeling is fanned by the political conflict over the Railway.

There has been friction between the members of the Board of Directors appointed by the Russo-Asiatic Bank and the Chinese members. It is evident that the relations between them is only formal. It is evident also that the Chinese members are incapable political appointees who have little interest in the Railway and less knowledge of its operation. They are not responsible in any way for the improvement of the financial or physical condition of the Railway. They vote upon questions originated by the Russian members and, in their ignorance, obstruct constructive measures

as often as they defend Chinese interests, due to their utter ignorance of their duties. The Russians probably intentionally leave them in ignorance of the secrets and policies of the management, but Chinese indifference and inefficiency furnishes a reasonable excuse for this.

The bad financial and physical condition of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1920 has been mentioned. Since the appointment in February 1921 of Mr. Ostroumoff tremendous improvements have been made in all the Railway activities. Roadbed, rolling stock and all equipment have been put into excellent condition. In spite of the absence of traffic of Siberian origin and the loss of terminal facilities at Vladivostok, and in spite of strong competition on the part of the South Manchurian Railway, both freight and passenger traffic have been increased. Effective economies have been introduced in all operating expenses and the efficiency of the service has been vastly improved. The financial status of the railway is very obscure but it is believed that under the present management and conditions, if run purely as a commercial venture, the Railway could show earnings but could not pay any appreciable dividends on the enormous cost of construction (met by the Russian treasury). The Chinese officials are impatient for the appearance of dividends. Why China deserves them or how they are to be earned makes no difference to the officials. It is the privately announced policy of the Russian Railway management that no earnings will be declared that the Chinese can lay hands on. Huge reserves of locomotives and rolling stock are being completely overhauled and other construction undertaken which is not immediately essential. These expenditures are charged to operating expenses in order that no earnings will appear for the Chinese to sieze upon. The improvements according to Mr. Ostroumoff, are

being made to enhance the value of the property when it is turned over to a recognized Russia, since Russia invested millions of roubles therein. Whether or not this policy is dictated by political or financial considerations of an entirely different nature, it is undeniably just from a Russian point of view. The improvement of property now claimed by the Russo-Asiatic Bank, the majority ownership of which is French, would give to France additional prestige in her future negotiations with Soviet Russia, and from this point of view the activities of Mr. Ostroumoff and his assistants may well be considered anti rather than pro Russian.

(3) THE LAND OFFICE DISPUTE.

The friction between the Chinese and the Russian members of the Board of Directors has been mentioned. The greatest friction, if not antagonism, however exists between the Civil Administration of the Zone and the Board of Directors of the Railway together with the Russo-Asiatic Bank. The Civil Administration, as everywhere in China, is in reality a military administration. The personalities representing the Administration are General Chu Chin-lan, Commander of the Special Administrative Area, and his Chief of Staff, General Chang Huan-hsiang, who also commands some of the troops in the Railway Zone. General Chu has the reputation of being one of the best and most honorable of Chinese officials. He is not a notably strong character and perhaps incapable of handling the situations which arise in such a complicated area. His Chief of Staff, the Evil Genius of the Railway Zone, is a shrewd, unscrupulous intriguer who has the ear of Chang Tso-lin.

The Chinese are one in attempting to sieze every advantage in connection with the present railway situation. There can be little doubt but that, agree-

ments notwithstanding, they would take over the Railway completely if it were not for the obstacles placed in their way by Russia and the Powers. As it is they avail themselves of every opportunity offered for entering wedges to this end. The attempted Land Office siezure is the most flagrant case in point.

The Land office of the Railway is the source of large revenues from taxes and rentals, and has large administrative powers over that land which has been turned over by the Chinese Government or purchased from private individuals. In accordance with the Railway's interpretation of the Agreement the Land Office still has the right to purchase private land or demand public land needed for strictly railway purposes or for"exploitation". This right has been contested effectively only since Russian prestige in China disappeared.

On July 31, 1923, General Chang Huan-hsiang appeared at the Land Office and announced that on the following day, in accordance with orders from Chang Tso-lin, all records would be turned over to a newly organized Chinese Land Office, and that the Railway Land Office would cease to function. Information had leaked out that this step was to be taken (instructions had come to C. C. Wang, President of the Chinese Eastern Railway more than a month before) and the demand was resisted by the officials of the Railway and the Russo-Asiatic Bank. An appeal was made to the Consular Body who advised the Chinese against the step they were taking, placed their seals upon the chests containing the records, and individually notified their governments of the affair. Even the title deeds for lands purchased by the railway were included among the records demanded by General Chang. The Chinese hesitated in enforcing their demands in the face of the official foreign

objection. The Ministers of the United States, France, England and Japan protested to the Central Government against the failure of China to fulfil her duties as trustee of a future Russia's interests, a duty China had voluntarily assumed in 1920, and a responsibility to which she was held by agreements reached at the Washington Conference.

Meanwhile, although the rendition of the records was not further demanded, the Chinese authorities proceeded with their policy by indirect methods. Branch land offices in the outlying cities were closed by Chinese soldiers; lessees of property were ordered to cease paying rentals to the Railway Land Office and to pay to the Chinese Office; instructions were given that all existing leases and new leases to be valid must be recorded in the Chinese Office. The whole question of real estate is chaotic, and no lessee knows what his status will be. Foreign banks that hold mortgages on real estate are doubtful of their securities.

This was the situation at the time of our visit. The Minister was importuned by both Railway officials and Chinese officials to listen to their contentions. All manner of extraneous arguments were introduced, principally by the Chinese. The railway based its whole case on the interpretation of the agreements which had been valid for twenty years, which, in brief, permitted them to control lands necessary not only for the railway proper but land essential to the exploitation of the zone upon which the railway depended. Considering that the total lands controlled by the Railway is about 300,000 acrea, and which there is evident no intention to increase, the railway argument seems logically based upon the agreements. The Chinese without exception argue in generalities. They speak of sovereign rights, they speak of evils and discriminations foreign to the point in

question. They ignore the exact wording of the agreements, which certainly alienated more land that that precisely necessary for the railway plant, and blandly contend that the agreements provide only for that land. They insist that all land not covered by the actual railway plant be turned over to the Civil Administration. Agreements notwithstanding, they see huge rentals for which they lust. Their argument is sovereign rights; their motive is the partial abrogation of an agreement which would result in bringing the militarists large revenues to misappropriate.

So the matter stands today. Certainly there have been injustices on the part of both the Railway and the Chinese and the whole land question calls for an unbiassed readjustment to furnish a just method of proceedure until such time as a Russian Government can formulate new agreements with China. Meanwhile the Chinese will secure every advantage possible so long as they are not estopped by the foreign powers. It is to be noted that the Chinese operations as regards the land question, as well as all other matters in the Railway Zone are dictated entirely by Chang Tso-lin and not by the Peking Government which does not even recognize him.

(4) ATTITUDE OF CHANG TSO-LIN REGARDING THE LAND OFFICE DISPUTE AND OTHER QUESTIONS.

Like all other Chinese, Chang Tso-lin talked in generalities when discussing the Land Office question. It was clear that this man who wields such arbitrary power in Manchuria, who lives as a voluntary prisoner in his own Yamen, was acting in this as in other matters upon the mistaken advice of his subordinates. He knows nothing of what goes on from his personal observations, he is afraid to travel in his own provinces, and all that he hears comes from subordinates who contort the facts to suit their own purposes. He is a child

in questions which assume international proportions and is assisted by no one capable of advising him wisely. In Harbin the Minister had stated his views as to the necessity for legal proceedure in the land dispute and announced reasons for the protest of the Four Powers against the Chinese action. Chang Tso-lin at first assumed the attitude that the Minister had interferred in matters which did not concern him - that the land question was purely a local matterbetween himself and the railway. This attitude disappeared as the Minister outlined the international features of the dispute. Chang then proceeded to plead the demand of the people for the restoration of sovereign rights, to talk of all manner of unjust practices in the Railway Zone without citing specific instances, and to introduce matter entirely foreign to the issue, namely, the abrogation or non-abrogation of a specific agreement which had stood practically uncontensted for a score of years.

The Minister mentioned the possible consequences to China and to Chang's political future in running counter to the wishes of the foreign powers.

As the conversation continued, as the more serious nature of the controversy was made clear to him and as the Minister intimated that there was a method of quieting the situation without the loss of face to any parties concerned, Chang Tso-lin visibly brightened and almost eagerly asked to be told the method the Minister had in mind. It was only then that Chang disclosed the fact that his bravado was bluff and that solicitude for sovereign rights disturbed his soul considerably less than did the bear he had siezed by the tail in starting the land dispute. He was plainly eager to know what suggestion the American Minister had which would permit him to receed from an ill-advised position without loss of face. Then the

Minister stated that he appreciated the loss of prestige to Chang if he cancelled his order instituting the Chinese Land Office, however orders could be issued to the effect that its activities be postponed for a reasonable period, for instance, until the disputed questions be settled by an unprejudiced tribunal or say until a new Russian Government could relieve China of her duties of trusteeship. There is no doubt but that Chang Tso-lin was happy to receive the Ministers suggestion and, tho he stated it would be necessary to confer with his principal subordinates who were then in Mukden, he plainly intimated his intention of availing himself of the way out of an awkward position. He showed no desire to assume a just and legal attitude but he did desire to free himself from his entanglements.

As to affairs in general in China, Chang was very pessimistic. He stated that the situation was growing steadily worse and that he saw no indication that offered hope for any improvement. One of the worst misfortunes to China would be the election of Tsao Kun as president. He said that he feared Bolshevism would spread in China and that already it had taken a strong hold on labor and other organizations. When the Minister admitted that the collapse of government and law and orderliness furnished fruitful ground for the spread of the destructive tenents of Bolshevism but that he doubted the acceptance of communism by the Chinese who held so strongly to the principles of private ownership, Chang replied that the danger lay in the spread of Bolshevism among the soldiers. He said at present the troops still took orders from their officers and in a manner obeyed some authority, but if they got out of hand no one could foretell the frightful consequences to foreigners as well as Chinese. He added,"I have 360,000 troops (he may believe this, but the number is grossly exaggerated) which now obey my

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orders but if they accept Bolshevism Heaven only knows what they would do."

He then made the most surprising suggestion - paradoxical in view of his erstwhile concern for Chinese sovereignty - to the effect that nothing could prevent the impending chaos in China except a warning from the foreign powers. The powers should demand that China set her house in order, leaving the method to the Chinese, stating firmly that if it were not done the powers would intervene. The warning should not be too mild, and the purpose of the warning should be made known to all of the people, to the merchants, and to the unofficial classes. He said if this were done with sufficient firmness and if the objects of the measures were fully acquainted to the people, the official classes would be forced to come together in conference at which the present difficulties could be adjusted. He insisted that the resentment of the people would not be aroused if they understood the spirit of the warning.

This astonishing suggestion from Chang Tso-lin leaves one in wonderment as to the particular benefits he would derive from such a course of action. It causes one to feel that Chang Tso-lin is not the man he once was, that he is out of touch with political affairs in his yamen hermitage, and certainly that he never did understand Chinese politics and does less so now. It is possible that he hoped to use the foreign announcement as a preventative against the impending election of Tsao Kun.

He repeated the formula that he was not concerning himself with affairs south of the Wall but was busy with the development of Manchuria. He intimated, however, that in the event of certain vague developments in China proper that he would be forced to take action. This statement means

that he reserves the right to sieze upon any developments in China proper which would permit him to intervene and dominate the situation.

Both Chang Tso-lin and his subordinates declared that no results were obtained in their conversations with Karahan. Where the Manchurian War Lord hoped for great concessions as regards the Chinese Eastern Railway in the spirit of Karahan's incautions declarations of 1919 and 1920, the latter was said to have demanded even more rights than are claimed by the present Railway regime. No common ground for discussion was said to have been discovered.

(5) MILITARY ORGANIZATION ALONG THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY.

The Railway Zone is completely dominated by Chang Tso-lin. General Chu Chin-lan is in command of the Special Administrative Area (The Railway Zone). His Chief of Staff is General Chang Huan-hsiang, a Japanese educated officer and a very unscrupulous man. He also is in command of all troops from Changchun to Suifenho. The Railway Police and the City Police are commanded by General Wen Ying-hsing, a graduate of West Point 1909. General Wen reports directly to General Chu.

The Administration of the Railway Zone is entirely separate from that of the Provinces of Heilungkiang and Kirin. As nearly as could be ascertained the troops on duty protecting the Railway (apart from provincial troops) are:

Changchun to Harbin	----	1 Brigade under General Li.
Harbin to Hengtaohotze (East Line)	----	1 Brigade (18th) Commanded personally by Chang Huan-hsiang.
Hengtaohotze to Hailin	----	2 Independent regiments for bandit pursuit.
Hailin to Suifenho	----	1 Brigade (3rd) Commanded by Chang Tsung-chan.

West Line commanded by General Weng Fu-lin.

Harbin to Andah (West Line)	----	1 Regiment - personal regiment of General Chang Kwei-wu.
Andah to Hailar	----	1 Brigade (29th Div.) Commanded by General Chang Ming-chu.
Hailar to Manchuli	----	1 Brigade (29th Div) Commanded by General Wen Fu-lin.

Total troops immediately responsible for protection of railway:

---- 5 Brigades and 4 Regiments.

The appearance of these troops was well above the average as Chinese troops go. They were armed with both Russian and Japanese rifles and equipped with Japanese (German type) knapsacks and blanket rolls. They carried en-

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trenching tools.

From reliable Chinese sources as well as foreign, I learned that the troops were generally inefficient and independable for pursuing bandits. They loaf in the Railway Zone and are given to smoking and trafficing in opium. The muster rolls are said to be greatly padded. Many of the soldiers are said to be seasonal hunghutzes (robbers) themselves.

Railway Police.

The Railway Police under General Wen are very smart in appearance and are generally spoken of as being efficient. General Wen states that the Russians in the force are greatly superior to the Chinese. The police are frequently interferred with in their duties by the soldiers. The duties of the police are not essentially bandit suppression but rather the immediate safeguarding of the railway stations, yards, storehouses, and trains. They do not operate away from the Railway itself.

The strength of the Railway Police is 3,380 men and officers of whom 60 officers and 700 men are Russians. About 1400 are in Harbin of whom 500 are in reserve and 300 at school for retraining. There are 3 courses per year of three months each at the school. About one-third of the strength is equipped with Russian rifles, about one-sixth with Russian pistols, about 500 with Mauser automatics, and the remainder with police sticks.

City Police.

These are also under the command of General Wen. The present Acting Chief is Hu Tsung-chi. They perform the usual duties of city police. The total strength is 2,820. In Harbin there is 720 on duty, 200 in school, 500 in reserve, of which 100 are mounted. The other 1200 are distributed in different cities along the line under four commands located at Hengtaohotze, Yaomen, Andah and Manchuli respectively. About one-half of the city police are equipped with Japanese rifles, one-sixth with pistols and the remainder with police sticks.

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(6) PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY PROPERTY, ROLLING STOCK, ETC.

When one arrives in the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone one cannot escape hearing the word "Railway". The whole life, social, commercial and military, hinges about the Railway. The spirit which dominates the Railway is Ostroumoff, the General Manager. Since his arrival in February 1921, he has been charged by his enemies with being a White partisan, an adventurer, a grafter and a thief. No one can remain in the Railway Zone a few days and talk with all classes served by the Railway, including the Chinese, without admitting that, whatever else he may be, he is a railway manager and engineer of the highest order. He is a genius with boundless energy, he is a fanatic of efficiency such as Americans might marvel at, and he is a tyrant over those of his subordinates who might be content upon occasions to leave well-enough alone. Ostroumoff a nervous man, almost ludicrously unimposing, formerly built a railway in Russian Turkestan in the face of great difficulties and in a remarkably short time. Employed by the Russo-Asiatic Bank, he has in a little more than two years brought the Chinese Eastern Railway from a condition of financial dereliction and physical disintergration into a state of organizational perfection in which it actually produces revenues and performs a great service to the public.

When he took charge of the Railway in February 1921 the following are some of the conditions he found as a result of the War, the Russian Revolution and all of the after-consequences in Siberia:

(a) The Railway had ceased to be a connecting link between Russia and the Pacific Ocean. Ceasing to be such, it lost all transit cargo and had to depend solely upon the export of Manchurian grain and the limited import for local needs.

(b) The Railway previously being considered a Russian national enterprise was supported by the government which made up its deficit. A new economical policy necessarily had to be devised.

(c) The high costs of materials and the world-wide economic depression had to be faced by the Railway. The local depression of business in Harbin due to a reaction from the previous year of inflated currency and wild speculation was existing and still exists.

(d) The dicipline among employees and workmen was at its lowest ebb.

(e) The general condition of the Railway can best be expressed in Mr. Ostroumoff's own words from his notes:

" The general state of the Railway at the moment of my taking it up could be depicted as follows: the Chinese Eastern Railway was operating only in the Southern direction, the shortest one towards Chang-Chun, the traffic in the direction of Vladivostok being almost nil, as only 3,000,000 poods had been transported to Vladivostok during the whole year of 1920, which made an average of less than 10 cars a day. There existed no communication with Manchuria, and the Railway Administration considered it undesir-

(6) PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY PROPERTY, ROLLING STOCK, ETC.

#2.

able to renew this traffic. Through communications, formerly existing with Chinese and Japanese Railways, were stopped. Trains for passenger traffic to the South were composed of a mixture of class and freight cars and there existed only one train with decent rolling stock. Trains circulated with great delays, the cars were dirty, neglected and lacking in even elementary comfort.

The goods traffic did not meet the demand, the weight of trains was low, the commercial speed was insignificant and along the Railway the cartage steadily increased. During 1920 about 60,000,000 poods were carried by cartage to Chang-Chun, which is about 56% of the total available grain stock of the country.

The distribution of engines on sections of the Railway was not adequate, repairs were made without any estimate of the cost. Cases of disjointment of trains as a result of neglect, were most frequent; axles took fire constantly.

Expenses on fuel and lubrication were largely exaggerated.

The Railway Administration with its Departments was utterly isolated from the line, which operated without any system, program or accounting.

The way of repairing the track was unsatisfactory expensive and lacking in directions from the centre.

Buildings and constructions of the Railway were in the worst con-conditions. No repairs had been made for many years. Buildings destroyed and burnt, were never restored, but were allowed to decay completely. Some parts of the buildings and constructions had been gradually stolen.

The round-houses on the stations Boohedoo and Miandukhe presented a particularly deplorable sight.

On Manchuli station and the Western division a number of huge barracks which had been damaged by troops of all nations passing through Siberia, were abandoned and left to decay.

All buildings, Harbin included, were dirty to the highest degree and required extensive repairs.

The incapacity of the Railway to meet the requirements of clients during 1919 and 1920 brought on an accumulation of huge masses of cargo on all stations. The obtaining of cars was a source of extraordinary trouble to clients.

Admitting its incapacity to satisfy the public the Railway had invented a system of great speed, though not in the circulation of trains, but in obtaining cars outside of the regular order of applications: provided the

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payment of a higher rate in metal currency the client was enable to get cars and even whole trains with breach of the existing schedule.

And the sums from these extraordinary shipments were not deposited in the usual way into the Cash-offices of the Railway, but were collected by special authorized officers of the Railway Administration and the return of these sums cannot be properly audited up to this time for lack of full account to be rendered on the part of the persons concerned.

Materials were purchased against hard cash, whereby the currency exchange sometimes had been reckoned most disadvantageously for the Railway.

Towards the beginning of 1921, the specific price for fire-wood reached up to .55 - .58 gold roubles per cubic sagen, while coal from Djalainor mines, owned by the Railway, cost -.35 gold roubles per pood.

When tenders were invited for supplies, any free competition was almost entirely waived.

There was created round the Railway a number of monopolist contractors dictating rates at their own discretion. "

The foregoing conditions may be exaggerated, but foreign business men in Harbin unanimously confirm the statements in general.

Since February 1921, the most astonishing changes have taken place in the physical condition of the road. These conditions were actually observed. The figures were furnished by the management and there is no reason to doubt them. Without mentioned all the numerous and varied improvements which have been introduced, the following typical cases will be listed:

(a) where formerly 36% of the 536 locomotives were in disrepair, now only 17% remain and these are gradually being repaired according to a definite program. On August 1, 1923, 110 engines were in service and 333 in good order in reserve. The tractive power of the individual locomotive has been materially increased.

(b) At present passengers are transported in passenger cars(instead of freight cars) completely equipped and scrupulously clean. Of the total number of passengers cars (610),where formerly 50% were in disrepair, many of them entirely gutted of all interior fittings, at present only 26.6% remain unrepaired. There are 249 cars in service and 186 in good order in reserve. Among these are two complete trains de-luxe, the last word in elegance and comfort, ready to go on the Moscow-Vladivostok run when the service starts.

(c) The inventory number of freight cars on the Chinese Eastern

(6) PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY PROPERTY, ROLLING STOCK, ETC.

#4.

Railway is 9562. The cars in disrepair have been reduced from 24% to 5.1%. It will be seen that a huge number of locomotives and cars are in reserve. For example at the busiest season last year a maximum of 181 locomotives were in service. Much of the rolling stock pertains to the Russian State Railways and became concentrated at the time of the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak and Allied troops. The expenditure of moeny for repairs, charged to operating expenses, is defended on the score that the improvements are being made for the future Russian Government which will be the rightful owner of the property. The enemies of the management contend that the improvements go to increasing the value of the property now claimed by the Russo-Asiatic Bank (French) which will be used by France as a lever in their negotiations with Soviet Russia.

(d) Due to efficient organization along all lines, the fuel consumption has been enormously reduced. By freeing the road from monopolistic contractors the price of fuel has been greatly lowered.

(e) The discipline of all employees has been improved. Workmen have been made contented and productivity increased by just treatment and by the introduction of piece-work payment.

(f) Accidents and losses due to technical deficiencies have been reduced to a minimum.

(g) The road bed has been put in excellent condition by replacement of sleepers, rails and ballast.

(h) Station and way signals have been entirely repaired or replaced, stations and buildings of all kinds have been overhauled and now present a most cleanly and substantial appearance.

The above represents only a part of the enormous improvements visible in the Railway Zone. Ostroumoff concerns himself with the smallest details and no irregularities escape his notice. Many dismissals followed his advent. His slogan is, " THE PUBLIC MUST BE SERVED ! " and he resents the statement that any improvement is impossible. As a result, the Chinese Eastern Railway today has equipment that is clean and in repair, excellent and fast service, both passenger and freight; trackways; yards and roundhouses in excellent repair and clean. Ostroumoff demands not only fundamental services but he demands cleanliness even artistic effects and flowers - and he has them everywhere. It is no exaggeration to say that the floors of the fourth-class cars on the Chinese Eastern are cleaner than the floors of the dining cars on the Peking Mukden Line.

The social service run in connection with the Railway is a subject for special consideration. Ostroumoff concerns himself with clubs, hospitals, summer resorts, with the same intense interest as with essential railway activities. These services are available to every man, from the lowest workman to the highest official, and prices are so scaled as to make them really possible. Rightfully or wrongly the Chinese Eastern is more than a railway; it is a

semi-socialistic state as well. The advantages of the latter are not for the Chinese. They do not appreciate the efficiency of the Railway and heartily despise the Russian social organization imposed on Chinese territory.

(M. A. China. G-2 Report No. 5189, Sept. 20, 1923).

(7) MUNITIONS PLANTS AT MUKDEN.

The new arsenal at Mukden has already been described as completely as is now possible. It was discovered however that there is in operation a trench mortar plant, not heretofore reported, details of which will be given under the next heading. A resume will be made of a group of plants at Mukden which constitute Chang Tso-lin's source of supply of munitions.

Going east from the Chinese City at the City Electric Light Plant, at the Mud Wall, is an earth road in fair repair to the north of which are situated the following plants in order stated. There are small intervals between each plant which are gradually being filled with houses for employees.

(a) The Electric Light Plant, owned by the Province (otherwise Chang Tso-lin) which supplies the whole Chinese City with current; a modern plant consisting of four turbine-driven generators supplied by the General Electric Company; plant built and managed by an affable but cautious American of German ancestry named Popper. A large new generator is now being installed the object of which was to furnish power for the new arsenal. This will be idle for some time since Chang Tso-lin's underlings, for their own profit, arranged to contract for a separate power plant which is now being built by Arnold Bros. (See e.).

(b) The Powder Plant of small but unknown capacity in which it is believed only powder for small arms is manufactured.

(c) The power plant for the new arsenal now being constructed by Arnold Bros., a British firm. The material for this plant is in Mukden but the ground is just now being broken for the foundations of the building. Some of the delay has been occasioned by the recent floods and, tho the builders are exerting great effort, the penalty clause becomes effective October 15th. It will not be completed for several months.

(d) The new arsenal (see Information Digest) will not be in operation until January or February 1924. Aside from the Danish material, which has been or is being installed, tenders are being made for additional machinery. Jardine Matheson Co., among others, is known to be bidding for the contract.

(e) Separated by a wall from the above is the Japanese-built arsenal (see Information Digest) which is now in operation. This plant is popularly believed to be unsatisfactory. It is hastily built and is said to contain worn machinery from an old-style Japanese arsenal. One informant stated that it produced only 17,000 rounds of .303 ammunition in August 1923. (Probably capacity is 17000 rounds per day).

(f) The Aviation School (See Information Digest).

(g) Trench Mortar Plant. (See Information Digest). This plant is not on the East Road. Even its location is a secret but is believed to be to the north of the city.

(M. A. China. G-2 Report No. 5189, Sept. 20, 1923).

(8) TRENCH MORTAR PLANT AT MUKDEN.

An informant, believed to be reliable, who knowns Captain Sutton and who has personally visited the plant furnishes the following information regarding a plant for the manufacture of trench mortars and trench mortar ammunition.

The plant was built and is being operated very secretly under the direction of Captain Sutton, an ex-British wartime officer, who lost an arm during the War. Sutton was a Sapper, but is said to have worked with Stokes in the development of the trench mortar. He was once at the proving grounds at Aberdeen, Maryland, in some capacity. After the war he became an adventurer and attempted some mining operations in Siberia. He has been in Mukden for several years where he is said to have obtained the confidence of Chang Tso-lin. Chang is much interested in Sutton's work and furnishes him funds freely.

While the plant is not complete in all respects it has some excellent machinery, new buildings, and is operated along very modern and efficient lines. A Greek (with a strongly American accent) called Andrew, a mining man intimate with Sutton, has charge of the shop management.

LOCATION:

The informant hesitated about giving the exact location of the plant, but it is believed to be just north of the city.

CAPACITY:

Four and one-half inch trench mortars are made. There is a program of 20 mortars per week, which program has been carried out duringthe last three months. There are accordingly more than 240 mortars on hand. The mortars are made from shafting purchased commercially at great expense.

There is at present a reserve of 37,000 rounds of ammunition. A program of 500 shells per day is being exceeded. Actually on September 8, 9 and 10, 516, 504 and 514 rounds respectively were turned out. Japanese explosive is being used for the bursting charge. However, the informant appeared uncertain as to this. A device containing a firing pin acting on the ordinary 12 guage sporting shell and primer is used to ignite the percussion primer of the bursting charge.

Neither the mortars nor the ammunition has yet been issued to troops. Jardine Matheson Co. (British) are at present furnishing quantities of material for the plant, such as, pig iron, steel shafting, tools, etc.

(M. A. China. G-2 Report No. 5189. Sept. 20, 1923.)

(9) &AVIATION IN MANCHURIA.

Aviation activities are conducted in two places only in Manchuria, namely, at Harbin and Mukden.

Harbin.

Little importance is attached to the activities here. One Mr. J. J. Dill, a Russian Engineer formerly in Kolchak's entourage, has for several years been working on his own to perfect a variable angle of incidence device. Reports have previously been made concerning his efforts. A separate report will be made of a conversation held with him and of a flight of his aeroplane observed. Mr. Dill has worked with persistency, inspite of official obstruction and financial difficulties, and has succeeded in building four planes with variable angle of incidence of the wings. These planes were built in the machine shops of Boixo Feres at Harbin from material salvaged from Kolchak's debacle, and from old stuff procured wherever possible. They are crudely built but show considerable ingenuity and ability on the part of the inventor. The original plane about which there has been much correspondence is now in Mukden in disrepair as a result of a crash. The other three are at a simple matshed hangar (without equipment or other housing) at a poor airfield, situatied on the Harbin-Vladivostok line, about one mile east of the wireless station. These planes are:

2 Dill planes, 40 Sq. meters wing surface. Salmson -300 H.P.motors. Angle of incidence 0 to 10 degrees. Are new and have not been flown.

1 Dill plane, 24 sq. meters wing surface. Clerget - 130 H.P. Angle of incidence 0 to 10 degrees. Speed - 90 to 180 Km. Has been flown and inventor claims entirely satisfactorily.

It appears that Chang Tso-lin is now giving encouragement and financial assistance to Mr. Dill. He stated on September 8 that these three planes are soon to be flown to Mukden for delivery.

Mukden.

Chang Tso-lin's air service has not developed in keeping with the rest of his military establishment. There have been no developments not already reported. By way of resume, he has an air-field, hangar, modest repair shop, living quarters and a school for mechanics and pilots situated about one mile east of the City Electric Plant, just beyond the Japanese-erected arsenal. The foreigners connected with the serivee are Captain MacKenzie, an ex-British flyer previously employed in Peking by the Handley-Page Company, Head Instructor, and six Russian assistants. MacKenzie is a temperamental, sensitive Britisher, without any sense of humor, who is constantly in disagreement with his employers and friends alike. He dislikes and conflicts with the Russians and with the Chinese. The service is without harmony, and it caused some surprise when MacKenzie's contract was renewed (at $1000 Mex. per month) in September

(M. A. China. G-2 Report No. 5189, Sept. 20 ,1923.)

AVIATION IN MANCHURIA.

#2.

1923.

The equipment is as follows:

Flying field: ample in size for all planes but low; was partially under water in recent floods.

Hangar: 5 gable galvanized iron structure about 350 x 90 feet.

Planes: 1 Dill plane - variable angle of incidence; not in repair as a result of crash.

3 Handley-Page planes; two serviceable; one in disrepair from a crash.

6 Avro - 110 Le Rhone or Mono.

2 S. E. 5 - 180 Viper Hispano.

2 Curtis-type unknown.

There are about twenty students qualified to fly.

(M. A. China. G-2 Report No. 5189, Sept. 20 1923).

APPENDIX A.

List of Officials Present on a
trip along the Chinese Eastern Railway.

1. V. V. Poushkaroff, Member of the Board of Directors.
2. F. T. Kusnetsoff, Member of the Audit Committee.
3. N. T. Eltokoff, " " " " ".
4. B. V. Ostroumoff, General Manager.
5. A. G. Kalina, Manager, Power Department.
6. E. N. Voitoff, Manager, Traffic Department.
7. A. V. Obolsky, Secretary to the Railway Administration.
8. I. A. Mihailoff, Manager, Economic Bureau.
9. K. Jacobson, Asst. Manager, Maintenance of Way Department.
10. A. A. Varpshovsky, Asst. Manager, Lands Department.
11. T. S. Kaloshin, Manager, Harbin Roundhouse.
12. A. G. Skorst, Interpreter.
13. I. I. Drury, Superintending Engineer Eastern Line.
14. Dr. G. I. Chaplik, Medical Sanitary Department.
15. N. L. Gondatti, Manager, Lands Department. (On Eastern Line trip only).
16. Chen Han, Chairman Audit Committee.
17. Ho Shou Jan, Member Board of Directors.
18. General Ao Suan Chwang, Asst. Chief of Staff of Defense Troops.
19. General Wen Ying Hsiang, Chief of Railway Police.
20. T. W. T'u, Asst. Manager, Maintenance of Way Department.
21. Mr. Ch'en , Secretary to President of the Board.
22. A. A. Petithuguenin, Director General Russo-Asiatic Bank.
23. Mr. H. Mazot, Manager, Banque l'Indo China, Peking.
24. G. T. Flevitsky, Secretary to the General Manager, Russo-Asiatic Bank.

APPENDIX B.

Program of Trip.

Aug. 29	- Left Peking, 8:15 p. m.	
Aug. 31	- 7:23 a.m.	Arrival at Changchun.
		Change of train- train No.6ch, C. E. R.
	7:30 a.m.	Breakfast in dining-car.
	8:15 a.m.	Departure from Changchun.
	12:30 p.m.	Lunch in dining car.
	1:55 p.m.	Arrival in Harbin.
	11:15 p.m.	Departure for Eastern Line.
Sept. 1	- 7:30 a.m.	Arrival at Hantaohedze.
		Inspection of:
		a. Passenger station.
		b. Hospital,
		c. Railway settlement.
		d. Park.
	9:00 a.m.	Departure from Hantaohedze.
	11:10 a.m.	Arrival at Echo Station.
		Inspection of:
		a. Health-resort,
		b. Experimental-field.
	12:30 p.m.	Departure from Echo.
	1:00 p.m.	Lunch in Dining car.
	5:00 p.m.	Tea in dining car.
	6:00 p.m.	Arrival at Pogranichanaya.
		Inspection of:
		a. Passenger station,
		b. School in construction,
		c. Freight office,
		d. Administrative settlement.
	8:00 p.m.	Departure from Pogranichnaya.
		Dinner in Dining car.
Sept. 2	- 7:30 a.m.	Breakfast in dining car.
	8:00 a.m.	Arrival at Shitouhedze.
		Inspection of:
		a. Soap and terpentine factories,
		b. Parquetry work-shop.
	10:00 a.m.	Departure from Shitouhedze.
	11:20 a.m.	Arrival at Imianpo.
		Inspection of Health-resort.
	12:30 p.m.	Departure from Imianpo.
	1:00 p.m.	Lunch in dining-car.
	3:10 p.m.	Arrival at Ertsentsiandze.
		Inspection of:
		a. Station Building,
		b. Health-resort.

APPENDIX B.

42.

- 4:10 p.m. Departure from Ertsentsiandze.
5:00 p.m. Tea in Dining car.
5:50 Arrival at Harbin.

Sept. 3 - 5:00 a.m. Departure by special train leaving for Western Line.
7:30 a.m. Breakfast in dining car.
8:00 a.m. Arrival at Antah station.
Inspection of:
a. Experimental field,
b. Store-house of materials.
c. Loading yards.
d. Railway club.
9:00 a.m. Departure from Antah.
11:20 a.m. Arrival at Tsitsikar.
Inspection of:
a. Passenger station.
b. Freight office.
c. Church.
d. Railway club.
e. Locomotive shed and reserve locomotives.
12:20 p.m. Departure from Tsitsikar.
1:00 p.m. Lunch in dining car.
3:10 p.m. Arrival at Chalantuh.
Inspection of:
a. Health resort,
b. Waiting rooms for locomotive and train crews.
Five oclock tea and dinner at the Casino.
10:50 p.m. Departure from Chalantun.

Sept. 4 - 7:30 a.m. Breakfast in dining car.
10:30 a.m. Arrival at Manchouli.
Inspection of:
a. Station building.
b. Freight yard.
c. Commercial Agency.
d. Visit to the administrative settlement.
12:30 p.m. Departure from Manchouli.
1:00 p.m. Lunch in dining car.
4:00 p.m. Arrival at Hailar.
Inspection of:
a. School,
b. Hospital,
c. Reinforcement of drifting sands.
d. Wool-washing plant.
5:00 p.m. Tea in dining car.
5:30 p.m. Departure from Hailar.
8:00 p.m. Dinner in dining car.

Sept.-5 - 7:30 a.m. Breakfast in dining car.
10:00 a.m. Arrival at Harbin.

Luncheon - General Chu Ching-lan.

APPENDIX B.

Sept. 5	-	Reception at Consulate.
		Dinner - General Ma.
Sept.6	-	Luncheon- Chinese Chamber of Commerce.
		Dinner- Board of Directors, C. E. R.
Sept. 7	-	Inspection of: Railway workshops, yards and roadhouses. Administrative activities.
		Luncheon- American Chamber of Commerce.
		Dinner - By American Minister at Railway Club.
Sept. 8	-	Luncheon - By Chinese Directors of Railway.
		Tea- Russo-Asiatic Bank.
		Dinner- Mr. Ostroumoff.
Sept. 9	-	Left Harbin at 9:20 a.m. Arrived Mukden 11:20 p.m.
Sept. 10	-	Luncheon - Commissioner of Foreign Affairs. Call on Chang Tso-lin. Return call by Chang Tso-lin. Dinner by Chang Tso-lin.
Sept. 11	-	Left Mukden at 10:15 a.m.
Sept. 12	-	Arrived Peking at 10:15 a.m.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 1924
2055-68
WAR DEPARTMENT

May 20, 1924.

Report on Szechuan.

A.C. of S. (G-2) War Department, Washington, D.C.

Enclosed report on "Conditions in Szechuan" is forwarded as of interest to M.I.D. The author of the report is a resident of some twenty years in Szechuan and Tibet and undoubtedly has definite knowledge of the conditions in this section of China. He reports semi-monthly to this office and his reports will be forwarded from time to time.

1-Incl.
(in dup)

Walter C. Phillips,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
Intelligence Officer.

(2- A.F.C.)

2-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 23 1924
WAR DEPARTMENT

2025-5-678

CONDITIONS IN SZECHUAN.

When the Federal (Northern) forces entered Chengtu on February 9th, and the Confederate forces, under General Hsiung Keh-wu, were obliged to leave, the situation entered upon an entirely new phase. That development has continued day by day. The Confederate Army is now completely out of Szechuan, and under the protection of Tang Chi-yao in Yunnan, where they are doubtless planning the "come back". In the meantime General Yang Sen has been left in charge of Chengtu while the other leaders are at Luchow trying to patch up the remnants of the Confederates, and the different elements among the Federals into a body politic. Just how hopeless the situation is must be apparent to every one.

In order to present this situation in its proper light, it will be wise to reconsider some of the events which have led to it. There are in Szechuan a number of men who have been "Govenor" of differing calibre. It is not necessary to mention all of these. The most prominent ones are now:

Yun Chang-hen, the first Governor after the Revolution. He is now on a visit to Wu Pei-fu.

Chow Tao-kang (Marshal), is here in Chentu, interested in public improvements.

Tiu Tsen-hou, Former Tuchun, reestablished by the North last January. He is in Chungking; again called Tuchun.

Hsiung Keh-wu, at one time Tuchun, led the recent Confederate (Southern) attempt to establish a Government in Szechuan. At present in Kweichow, or Yunnan.

Lou Yu-kin. Sometime Generalissimo and Civil Governor. Driven out of Chengtu last February. Present Headquarters at Ksintsing, 90"li" to the southwest of Chengtu.

Liu Hsiang (Fuchen). Former Tuchun. Called at present Director of Reorganization. He has assisted in the recent fighting, and is supposed to be evolving order out of the Chaos.

Yang Sen. Present acting Civil Governor in Chengtu (It will be noted that the Tuchun (see above) is in Chungking.

The present situation is connected with these men. No. one seems to know what to expect from them. The situation is further complicated by the presence of almost innumerable Marshals, Major Generals, Generals, Brigadier Generals, etc.

An attempt has been made to draw up a list of the armed forces at present operating in Szechuan. With the collapse of the Kwo-Tsing Yang, all the troops at present in Szechuan, with few exceptions, are supposed to be loyal to Peking. The former we have called the Confederates; the latter are the Federals. What designation shall we use when the present Allies get to fighting among themselves.

It is not proposed here to deal with Hsiung Keh-wu. He will doubtless try to "come back". He has said that he would be in Chengtu in May. Hw will get as much help as he can from Yunnan and Canton, and keep the kettle boiling if he can. However, it is not expected that he will appear immediately in Szechuan, so we may eliminate him till he again appears on the stage.

To make any regular schedule of the rest now in the province would be almost a hopeless task. We are here in Chengtu and any activities (plans and conferences) there are) are going on in other places far removed. Nearly every one expects that these plans will soon eventuate in some sort of a move, but we cannot yet tell what it will be. It is not to be expected that these hordes of armed men will be content to remain quiet even through the coming summer. In fact General Yang Sen says without hesitation that very little is actually settled. He does not know when they will come and drive him out and at the most he does not hope to remain more than a year in peace, with a possible two years as the most optimistic guess.

It is therefore taken for granted that what we are now seeing is only a passing phase. We will deal first with Yang Sen and the impression he has made here and then deal with the others, more or less in order.

<u>Yang Sen</u> <u>Yang Tze Hui</u> <u>as Civil Governor.</u>

Sen Wei Marshal.
Major General of the Second Szachuan Army.
General Commanding the 16th (National) Division.

(G-2 A.F.C.)

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This interesting man, who is in his 40th year (Chinese calculation), has been an officer in the Szechuan Armies since the time of the Chinese Revolution at which time he was stationed here in Chengtu. He has not been to Japan, or to the Military School in Paotingfu. He spent a short time in Yunnan in study, but has passed the years in this province where he has risen through most of the steps to his present position.

When he entered the city on February 9th last it was the first time we in this Capital city were privileged to see him since he was an unknown officer years ago. But he has made a reputation for himself at Luchow and Chungking for his interest in Schools, Roads, Clean politics and General Reforms. He is unlike the officers and officials we have known here being, we conclude, somewhat after the type of Gen. Feng Yu Hsing, though he is not a Christian.

It has been our provilege to see him on a average of two or three times a week during the ten weeks he has been here. He has visited foreigners freely, making it a point to call on all the Foreign Consuls two days after his arrival in the city. He has been to most of the Missions and inspected the Hospitals, Schools, Churches, and other institutions where he has shown interest in every phase of the work. He has given as freely as he is able to these different institutions. When questioned as to his reason for doing so he has said that he likes efficiency, and finds so little of it among the Chinese institutions.

Without delay he commenced as soon as he arrived to clean up the city and already has a few pieces of new road to his credit. He is determined to carry out as many reforms as possible while he is here. Knowing that his time may be short he wants to make every day count for real service. He encouraged the opening of the Annual Industrial Exhibit which could not be held last year because of fighting. He has also planned (for the 21st- 22nd April) a day of sports for all the schools that promises great things.

This is an indication of the temper of the man. With such a man in control we might have some hope of improvement in this province. But it is not to be expected that the rest of the crowd will permit him to remain here in peace. Their principle is to milk the cow for all she is worth, and so they must resent it when any public spirited man actually gets into the saddle. This is where the whole problem must be solved. A man such as this who has ideals and who represents the defacto Government in Peking comes to us. He will not issue worthless paper money, and refuses to extort money from an already burdened people.

But where is he to get money?. Peking will sand him none. He cannot loan money from these people who have had bitter experiences enough in the past. Foreigners try to influence the Salt Commissioners to give him a little of the Salt Revenue. He has no hope of foriegn loans. So all we can do is to see him come with his ideals and his reforms and wait until some one else with more gun-powder comes and drives him out.

Liu Hsiang — Director of Liu Fu Chen ----------Reorganization.

When he arrived in Chengtu with Yang Sen in February we saw him twice, but always in a separate place from the latter. Liu Hsiang was more in touch with Yuan Tsu-min, the Kweichow General, who has been helping to save Szechuan from the Confederates. His position as Director of reorganization would need a lot of explanation. While he was Tuchun he seemed to be working in with Yang Sen, but we have reason to fear that now, with the Confederates eliminated, there may be cause for friction between the two.

Liu Hsiang's original home was Tayihsien. It is a small district west of Chengtu. A group of the Szechuan generals hail from that district. They are known as the "Tayi Pang". General Liu Yi-kiu, who until recently was supporting Hsiung Keh-wu and the Confederate cause, is one of these. He had "fixed" things with Liu Hsiang before Yang Sen entered Chengtu, and it was then said that no matter which way the fighting went he would remain here as Civil Governor. That plan did not suit Yang Sen and the latter insisted on Liu Yu-kiu getting out when the 16th Division got control of the city. We now believe that this action of Yang Sen's was not entirely pleasing to Liu Hsiang, and it may be that the incident created a division that has been growing ever since.

We now begin to see that Liu Hsiang, is gathering round him a more powerful group of supporters than he has been able to control for some time. His line-up is about as follows:

Liu Hsiang 32nd,33rd and 2nd Divisions, Luchow (at present).

Liu Wen Hwei 9th Division, Suifu (Uncle of Liu Hsiang)

Liu Yu Kiu 3rd Army, Hsintsing.
- Lan Tsing Chi 4th Division, Hsintsing.
- Chang Cheng Hsiao 11th Division, Kiungchow.
- Liu Kwoh Hsiao, 1st Mixed Brigade, Kiungchow.
- Cheng Shih Pin, 8th Mixed Brigade, Kwanhsien.
- Lai Hsin Hwei, 4th Mixed Brigades.

(G-2. A.F.C)

While we cannot as yet be certain it looks very much as if this combination will soon be used against Yang Sen, and possibly Liu Tuchun, at Chungking. It is impossible to tell who will get the support of Wu Pei-fu and Peking in that event. General Yang Sen admits that he will probably have to fight, and that perhaps soon, and also intimated that the fight might be AGAINST THE NORTH. The fact that Liu Yu-kiu is so near to him, and that he is not trying to make peace with the latter would intimate that the first blow may be struck from that quarter. In the meantime the troops between here and Hsintsing are standing on guard.

THE THIRD AND SEVENTH DIVISIONS:

Teng Shih Hou 30th National Division (Old Sze. 3rd)
Cheng Kweh Tung 31st " " (" " 7th)

The third group to be noticed here are two very ambitious Generals who have never had the honor of being more than "Marshal". This hollow title was conferred on them, with others, after the Federal victory here in Szechuan. Marshals are so common now that no one seems to pay any attention to the term. We have not compiled any list of them.

These two divisions have been anti-Hsiung Keh Wu, and have been helping the Northern plans for at least two years. Teng Shih Hou is the acknowledged leader. It is his hope to come out of the present situation as Tuchun, or Civil Governor. At present they are trying to get some sort of a hold at Chungking where Liu Tsen Hou, never very strong, is trying to hold on as Tuchun.

THE KWEICHOW TROOPS:

Yuan Tsu Min

Generalissimo of the Allied Troops to Save Szechuan.

General Yuan Tsu-min was forced out of his own province of Kweichow by the Southern Party and has been in Szechuan for some time, hoping for the time when he might return to Kweichow in triumph. During the year of fighting in this province he has been on the side of the North, though some of his troops have gone from side to side as they thought most of their advantage. When the Federal forces were concentrated at Wanhsien for the final drive that gave them Chungking and Chengtu, and drove Hsiung Keh Wu from Szechuan, General Yuan was given the supreme command as Generalissimo by Wu Pei Fu. The honor of taking Chengtu, and completing the job, falls to him, though Liu Hsiang and Yang Sen were with him, and so share the glory.

(G-2 AFC)

Having succeded he resigned his connection with Szechuan in the hope that he might get support from Szechuan and Wu Pei-fu to return to Kweichow and drive out the "enemy" there. The present bickering may be somewhat connected with that plan. Who is to go from Szechuan?. Will Liu Hsiang go and give up his exceptional opportunity to get the rich province of Szechuan once more into his power?. Will Tneg Shih Hou go and lose his chance at Tuchun, or Civil Governor? Will Yang Sen give up his enviable position wher he believes he is working as no other man would for the good of his province and of China? Is it to be expected that Liu Yu Kiu and Lai Hsin Hwei, who were recently FIGHTING Yuan Tsu Min, will be willing to go and FIGHT WITH him.

THE OUTLOOK:

At present there is very little to take as a basis for prophecy. Just a few weeks ago we saw a solid organization against Hsiung Keh Wu. We knew that Liu Yu Kiu and Lai Hsin-hwei, though they supported Hsiung, were only time-servers ready to make terms with the winning side. With the elimination of Hsiung and his sympathizers it would have seemed a simple matter to establish something like a stable Government. But it is well known that there is no cohesion among the warring elements even when they appear to be loyal to one side.

The possible outcome is that Liu Hsiang will feel himself strong enough to oppose Liu Tsen Hou, the recognized Tuchun at Chungking. If that is the move he will have everything west of Luchow and Tzeliutsing, including Suifu and Kiating and up to Hsintsing where he may expect the support of Liu Yu Kiu. To get the latter it will be necessary for them to oppose Yang Sen, who is to decide which side will be able to give the most to the Third and Seventh Divisions to induce them to join them. At present they are in the territory that would naturally fall to Liu Tsen Hou and Yang Sen.

The next problem is to decide which of the two will find themselves in sympathy with Wu Pei-fu, and what effect the possible return of Hsiung Keh Wu into Szechuan affairs may have on the whole scheme. If things are developing in that way at Luchow where there is more or less of a conference going on, we cannot yet see what they are doing. The move will not be long delayed whatever it is.

BRIGANDAGE:

The whole province is still alive with brigands, and will remain so (and grow worse) as long as the senseless strife between these factions continues. Most of the roads out of Chengtu are infested with robbers. They have come boldly even to within a few li of the city, but conditions are worse farther away from

the Capital. It would be an impossibility to make any list of the atrocities. It is said that a native child was kidnapped on a street of Chengtu to turn up in a city 90 li away with a ransom demanded.

A number of foreigners were stopped for more than two months at Luchow on their way down river. The low water prevented gun boats, and steamers going to their assistance. Finally they were obliged to proceed under escort of a small army overland. The Post Office has been compelled to refuse parcels as they also are held up in Luchow where there is now a congestion of mail. Merchandise coming up is just as uncertain. Bands of robbers are met with frequently and their demands for "escort fees" may not be refused. The military men manage to keep certain roads that are useful to them open, but even on such roads there is always danger. However, foreigners generally are not molested. The strenous action of the British Consul General after the murder of Watt and Whiteside last August, has had a wholesome effect.

THE ARE SEVERAL CLASSES OF ROBBERS:

First, the soldiers themselves most of whom are robbers at heart. General Yang Sen has objected to the statement that he has robbers among his men. We must respect his opinion, but from personal observation we know that they are not all saints.

Second, disbanded, or disaffected soldiers, who are able to get away with sufficient rifles and ammunition to keep up the game.

Third, the Local Constabulary, who are supposed to protect their districts. Many of them are out and out robbers. They do not rob their own people (neighbors) and no one pays any attention to what they do to others. Doubtless the "neighbors" all profit by the trade.

Forth, the Secret Societies. It is well known that in many cases the leaders in the Secret Societies are the leaders of the robbers.

Fifth, a prominent man (usually with property and wealth) who uses his own servants to carry out raids against people who stand in fear of him, and who are helpless to resist. These are often carried out during the night without much shooting or killing. The perpetrators are often known, but it is impossible

to get justice so nothing much is said for fear of reprisals.

Finally, with the country in confusion, lawlessness prevails to such an extent that property is seldom safe anywhere.

It is almost impossible for a man in the position of Civil Governor (as Yang Sen now is) to deal with the brigands. He has only a certain number of troops. About half of his are at Luchow and Chungking where they are needed to protect his interests there. The other half who are here are needed to protect the city and guard against a surprise from Hsintisng. When troops are sent in a certain direction they fail to find the robbers. One noted robber has been captured, and is now in custody. The Chief of Police asked General Yang in the presence of a number of foreigners to put the man out of the way speedily. Incidentally foreigners have been asked to intercede for him. He could easily buy himself off if General Yang would permit it, but it is more than likely that the man will die. If he is dealt with in this way the moral effect among the rest ought to be wholesome, as it will prove to them that General Yang means business. While this is in process of being written we have met a man on the street with a bloody (fresh) bandage. He says he was shot about 50 li north of Chengtu in the Kintang District where a contingent of more than one thousand soldiers from Chengtu engaged the robbers for more than two days, and fighting was still going on. If that is the case it probably means that the robbers realize that they are now up against the real thing and have united to oppose the established authority. We will pay particular attention to this subject in future reports.

TRADE and BUSINESS OUTLOOK:

We are not making any attempt to keep up with statistics in this line. If desired it can be looked into. Speaking generally trade is demoralized. We are constantly finding different articles, than may be usually purchased here, which are now off the market. With the roads in the present condition it is a wonder that anything is moved. There has been almost a coal famine here for months. It was due first to commandeering by the Arsenal (under the former regime) after which boatmen would not bring up coal. After the new regime took over they still had to have coal and now hold up just as much of it as they can (though we understand that it is now paid for). The recent dry weather has lowered the water in the streams so that there is now not sufficient water to transport coal. This is true of other commodities, and of everything that comes up the river route from Shanghai and other ports.

Parts of machinery for the new electric light plant, that are held up not far from the city, delay the completion of the plant. Merchants are very loth to send orders to Shanghai and other places because of all this uncertainty. The silk growing is now proceeding. The products will be ready for market in due time. Small wool and feathers are also to be had. The only possible way to ship these is in small parcels to Shanghai. The rate is very cheap so the C.P.O. does a large business in such parcels. Tons of parcels leave the P.O. every day. At present parcels are not accepted, but the delay is only temporary.

THE TIBETAN BORDER:

We are having continual rumors of trouble in this direction. The General in charge of the Border has been loyal to the North for years in spite of all the changes here. He is General Cheng Hsia Ling. His troops are not now on the Border as he has been opposing the progress of General Liu Yu Kin who seems to have tried to go west of Yachow. We do not understand why the latter retired to Hsintsing. But Cheng Hsia Ling holds the road to Tatsienlu and Tibet. He will probably remain in control as there is no one to dispute his claim. It seems not to be true that the Tibetans have captured Tatsienlu and Batang. Undoubtedly there is some unrest in those districts, but we know of nothing of importance to report from Tibet. It is not to be taken seriously when we hear that the British have recognized Tibet and that they are encouraging the Tibetans to oppose the Chinese. If that had been done the Tibetans might have been in possession of the whole of Tibet as far as Tatsienlu long ago. Great Britain has too much to do in India to bother much about Tibet.

SOURCE: (G-2 A.F.C. May 1924)

WAR DEPARTMENT
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MODERN CHINA.

A Bibliography.

Note: This list is not intended or considered to be exhaustive. With the exception of a few references to articles, it is limited to books and official publications. It has been arranged topically to facilitate the work of the student. Specialists will understand the difficulties which attend any attempt to compile a "select" bibliography. Many more titles might have been included under one or another of the topical headings. It is thought that the selection herein made will enable the student to make a beginning and some progress in almost any field in which research is to be undertaken. There will be found in many of the books, especially the monographs, select bibliographies relating to the particular subject of which the book, in each case, treats.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

March 24, 1925.

1925 2055-6 APR 10

WAR DEPARTMENT

Captain Parker G. Tenney, F. A.,
Fort Sill,
Oklahoma.

My dear Captain Tenney:

The Division has received and read with much interest the report on your travels in French Indo-China, and the Chinese Provinces of Kweichow and Yunnan, which you undertook under the auspices of, and with the National Geographic Central China Expedition, in 1924.

The report is complete, well presented; and a valuable addition to the Division's files.

Very sincerely yours,

James H. Reeves.
Colonel, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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MAILED M : D
MAR 25 1925

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THE CHIEF OF STAFF

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1-1 1925 2055-621

Fort Sill, Oklahoma, March 17th, 1925. To: The Chief of the M.I.D. of the General Staff., Washington, D.C.

WAR DEPARTMENT

1. Herewith the report in triplicate.

2. The copy left with the Military Attache in Peking was complete except for the illustrations. Within a few days I will be able to forward the illustrations to Peking, thereby making the Military Attaches' copy complete.

3. It is regretted that there are but two copies of the map showing our route into Yunnan and Kweichow.

Parker G. Tenney

Parker G. Tenney
Capt. F.A.

RECEIVED
1925 MAR 20 PM 2 33
RECORD SECTION
M.I.D.

1/23/29
Two copies of this report (with photos) on file in Far Eastern Section

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
FEB 21 1925
2055-621
WAR DEPARTMENT

LETTERMAN GENERAL HOSPITAL
San Francisco, California.

Feb. 16, 1925.

Subject : Report.

To : The Chief of the M.I.D.of the General Staff.

1. Within the current month I hope to complete my report on the trip taken with the National Geographic Society's Central China Expedition in Indo-China and the Chinese Provinces of Yunnan and Kweichow. As the illustrations must come from the National Geographic, there is some delay.

2. An incomplete copy of this report was left with the M.A. in Peking before my departure. This copy will be completed by additions I will furnish from here.

3. It is desired to know whether I shall send the copies when complete, direct to the M.I.D. in Washington-, or through the office of the M.A. in Peking to Washington. The latter course was advised in Peking, but as so much time would be consumed in sending it there , it seems the former course might be preferable.

Parker G. Tenney
(Parker G. Tenney)
Capt. F.A.

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RECORD SECTION
M.I.D.

2055-621 1st Ind. NEM/bsp
G-2, W.D., February 24, 1925 - To: Captain Parker G. Tenney, F.A.
Letterman General Hospital, San Francisco, California.

Returned, requesting that the report referred to be sent to G-2. It will be appreciated if an extra copy is furnished which this office may transmit to the Military Attache in Peking.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

N. E. Margetts
N. E. Margetts,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
Chief, M. I. 5.

JUL 2 1947 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2055-621
WAR DEPARTMENT

Peipang, Dec. 28

Govt. WD Agwar Washington

196. 28th. Statement in report 9701, page 9, that authorities both British and French Concessions in Tientsin were accepting Federal Reserve notes in payment official obligations was incorrect as to French Concession which did not begin accept such notes for official purposes until Dec. 24.

BARRETT

RESTRICTED

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Population and Social Conditions)

Subject: Population

Japanese Population in the Occupied Areas

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. MAR 11 1940

1. The following is the text of an article which appeared in the December issue of a fortnightly news letter published in Hongkong entitled "China Air Mail":

The number of Japanese civilians in the occupied territories of China is growing steadily. From April to October 1939, 45,000 new Japanese residents came to China. Their total number, according to the first census taken by the "China Affairs Board" of the Japanese Cabinet, was 261,000 at the end of October. 210,000 are of Japanese race while 40,000 are Koreans and 11,000 Formosans.

In other words, there are now well over three times as many Japanese civilians in the occupied areas as there were in the whole of China (south of the Great Wall) before the outbreak of the present war.

Shanghai, with about 50,000 Japanese residents, ranks first among the big Japanese "colonies". Their growing numbers may help to sweep the Shanghai Municipal Council elections early next year and to bring the International Settlement under Japanese control.

The number of Japanese is also increasing in other cities of Central China. 6,200 are now in Nanking and 4,700 in Hankow. Central China as a whole has 67,000 Japanese civilian residents.

Tientsin comes a close second to Shanghai, with 43,000 Japanese. There are over 36,000 in Peking. 22,000 are in Tsingtao and 11,000 in Tsinan. In North China as a whole there are at present 178,000 Japanese "colonists", none of them, however, outside garrisoned cities and towns.

The number of Japanese settlers in South China is smaller but not insignificant: Amoy now has 9,000, Canton 6,200, and several hundred seem to be on Hainan Island.

There is indeed scarcely a small occupied town in China without some Japanese civilian population. Every day more are arriving, despite the considerable reflux of those who have been bitterly dis-

From: M/A China Report No. 9847 January 24, 1940

RESTRICTED

appointed in their golden hopes. (Not all of them have the funds to finance their return to Japan.)

Japanese civilians represent much the same type of people all over the country: the most numerous are the shopkeepers with a few hundred yen of "capital" who hope to make a better living than is possible for them in Japan, but many of whom have been more or less disillusioned and stranded in China. To the better classes belong the employees of the big Japanese concerns which are seeking to build up prosperous businesses in China or are engaged in remunerative work for the forces of occupation and their Chinese "puppet" regimes. Restaurant keepers, barbers and peddlers - a certain number of whom are probably employed on "special" work for the Japanese military authorities - account for another large group. In addition, there are many sinister fortune seekers out to exploit the sad conditions of a country in which they are more or less free to take the law into their own hands - to the continual embarrassment of the authorities in Tokyo who at last realise the harm these elements are doing to Japan's reputation.

Japanese immigration to China is scarcely regulated by the Tokyo Government. Apart from those few who are being sent out for special tasks of various kinds, the bulk of the new arrivals are people who have lost their livelihood in their home country on account of the rigours of war-time economy or who never had been able to find a decent occupation.

It is evident, and indeed even admitted by the more enlightened among the Japanese military, that the majority of Japanese residents in China are far from being the type of people who might be able, or who would even care, to promote the "New Order in East Asia."

The absence of a rational policy in matter of immigration, and the license which Japan allows her nationals in China is one of the greatest mistakes Japan has made in the present war.

COMMENT:

Until recent months the sudden increase in the numbers of Japanese nationals in the occupied areas has apparently been of little concern to the authorities in Tokyo. Emigration was even encouraged, although so far the number of immigrants has not offered major relief to the overcrowded conditions in Japan. At present a realization has come that - if the occupied areas are to be continued under Japanese supervision - stricter control over the actions of Japanese nationals must be maintained. This is one of the main

functions of the consuls in each city, aided by the Japanese Consular Police. Already the bands of "ronin" formerly used for smuggling and later for intimidation purposes are being dispersed, although there are still many of these in the Shanghai area.

The main inconvenience resulting from this sudden influx of Japanese is felt by the Chinese whose homes they have taken and whose businesses they have appropriated. Naturally the Japanese only come to towns under the protection of the Japanese army, and in finding room for them the Chinese are forced out. Formerly the method of obtaining a house was simple. A Japanese would merely enquire as to the rent, pay two or three months in advance, move in and never pay another cent. If the Chinese landlord became too persistent he was intimidated with threats of action by the Japanese gendarmerie unless he remained quiet. These cases are now being handled by the Consular Police and conditions - at least in Peking - are becoming better.

Another misconception held by many foreigners is that the Japanese in the occupied areas are for the most part "the worser elements which the Government has been trying to get rid of" and "are not the same as one sees in Japan." This is entirely incorrect. After a year of close observation of Japanese in Peking (on and off duty) they appear to be clerks, technicians and skilled laborers employed by the various railway, bus, light and power companies, banks etc. They are average Japanese but it must be stated, however, that for the most part they conduct themselves as if they are in a conquered country and occasionally commit offences which would never be tolerated by the police back in Japan.

Source: Press and study in this office.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Capt., F.A.,
Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
2 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTELL. DIV.
DEC 27 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

2053-635

30 November 1930.

JAPAN.

2050 - Emigration and Immigration.

Koreans and White Russians in Manchuria.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 22 1930

The attached sketch is an attempt to picture the main areas occupied by White Russians and Koreans. This is copy of a sketch furnished by a contact in Harbin who is in a position to really know the truth but is prone to exaggeration. This office has not been able to check the accuracy of this information.

Of course it is well known that there are large numbers of White Russians and Koreans in Manchuria.

The Koreans move over into Manchuria hoping to find a better chance of making a living. Many of them return after failure. It is said that the Japanese try to steer the non-Red Koreans into definite sectors as noted in blue, while the Soviets encourage those communistically inclined to settle in the sectors shown in red.

There are probably not over 50000 Koreans in all the areas shown on sketch.

The sketch is interesting as a strategical study of the opposing forces in Manchuria.

J. G. McIlroy
Lieut. Colonel, G.S.,
Military Attache.

MA/Tokyo

Report No. 1763

November 30, 1930.

C-2 Report 2050

RESTRICTED 6-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Immigration and Emigration

Japanese Residents in North China

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 2 1936

The number of Japanese residents in North China has increased heavily during the period February 29th to March 31st, 1936. Figures available are for Hopei Province only but in Peiping the Japanese population increased by 1,664 persons and in Tientsin the increase was 208. Other important increases of Japanese in the same period are: 68 in Tangshan, 49 in Chinwangtao, 20 in Changli and 5 in Tangku. These figures of course refer to civilians.

The entire Japanese civilian population registered under the Japanese Consulate in Tientsin for Hopei Province as of March 31st is as follows:

Place	Persons	Families
Tientsin	8,613	2,221
Peiping	4,005	1,561
Tangku	225	73
Tangshan	413	223
Luanchow (Lanchow)	363	129
Changli	332	131
Chinwangtao	437	143
Shanhaikwan	508	442
Kupeikow	221	64

Source: Japanese press reports

COMMENTS: With the apparent determined effort of the Japanese to control affairs in North China, the increase of Japanese population there may be regarded as inevitable. As they grow more successful in their control of political affairs the Japanese business man will endeavor to capture the local import markets from the Chinese. The increase in population will demand more "protection" and this may be the excuse given for augmenting the North China Garrison of the Imperial Japanese Army.

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

SVC

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

From M /A, China Report No. 9351 May 7, 1936

RESTRICTED

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 12 1931
2055-635
WAR DEPARTMENT

JAPAN.

October 16, 1931
2010 Population - General

Japanese and Koreans in Manchuria

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 11 1931

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a Japanese Foreign Office Map of Manchuria, giving detailed information of the number and location of Japanese and Koreans in that country.

2. The totals, as shown in the right lower corner, will be seen to be important additional data for Page 3 of the Population Digest.

3. From this map can readily be selected the sections of Manchuria of importance to the Japanese.

Source: The Japanese General Staff.

J. G. McIlroy
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Military Attache.

MA/ Tokyo Report No. 5926 16 Oct. 1931.


Scale 1 in = 65 miles
1930
1930
1930
1930
38,000
3000 White Russians
Settlements
White Russian
Koreans, pro Japanese at least not Rsd.
Koreans, pro-Russian (Red)
N
14000
Harbin
Mukden
9000
15000
Mulling
Vladivostok

G-2 Report

4-1

1926 2090 205 5-635

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Population)

Subject: Japanese Population, Kwantung Leased Territory and South Manchuria Railway Zone.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. / JAN 19 1926

1. The American Consul, Mukden, on November 17, 1925, supplies a translation of the Japanese census return, October, 1925, of the Kwantung Leased Territory and the settlements controlled by the Japanese on the South Manchuria Railway lines in South Manchuria; i.e., Dairen-Changchun and Mukden-Antung. A summary of the census return is as follows:

Census of October, 1920		October, 1925	% Increase
Total Japanese	159,514	186,045	16.6%
Total Koreans	5,818	10,850	86.5%
Total Americans and Europeans	746	2,796	368. %

The Mukden district shows the largest increase; in the last five years the total population in the Japanese railway zone in the Mukden district has increased by approximately 54%.

Distribution:

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File

From: M/A, China Report #5699 December 4, 1925.

G-2 Report

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Conditions in Fukien Province.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. / JAN 19 1926

1. For an interesting report on this subject see enclosure entitled "Observations on a Trip in the Interior of Fukien Province" submitted as enclosure to Despatch No. 335, November 7, 1925, from the American Consul, Foochow, to the Department of State. Observations were made between October 8th and November 1, 1925.

2. For purpose of record in this office the following extracts are made of this report.

3. "Not forming a part of either the forces of the Navy on the one side or of the Army on the other, is an interesting form of armed organization growing up, called the Hsiang T'uan, or Village Constabulary. This .... represents a distinct effort at self government, on the part of local units of population. While said to be still used, in large part, to further inter-clan and inter-village warfare, it nevertheless constitutes an interesting development.

4. "In one region where I spent four days in the home of a private family, a particularly rich and prosperous valley, - I found no evidence of outside governmental control except in the form of annual tax collections. They paid heavy taxes but raised no opium, and tolerated no soldiery. Their strength lay in considerable quantities of arms smuggled in by relatives in the South Seas.

"Everywhere I went the word which spelled anathema to the local populace was "Pei Ping", - Northern Soldiers. The region had been the battle ground between contending forces of northern soldiers for years, and had been ill-used by all. The tale everywhere was of forced and unrequited billeting, seizure of able-bodied men for carriers, ravaging of women, and frequent looting and burning. With the taking over of control by fellow-provincials, a more normal state of affairs seems to be evolving.

5. "Opium. The last crop of opium had been harvested in the spring, and the new crop was only just being planted, so there was little tangible evidence of opium culture. I found a few fields, where the rice crop had been early harvested, being planted to poppy. I examined the seeds, and found the farmers not averse to admitting they were poppy. Opium cultivation appeared to be a general and an accepted thing. I made various and careful inquiries, and ascertained the following general average of opinions: Opium is planted under compulsion of the military forces, whether naval or army. Each farm is required to plant at least one Chinese 'mou' (6.6 'mou' to one English acre), from which a tax of $10.00 is collected. The average opium tax appeared to work out around $3.00 per 'mou' of cultivated land, for those who did not plant opium had to pay anyway, on this basis. The land planted to poppy is that which normally would be used for winter wheat, which at that time, was just sprouting. The lack of evidence of wheat might be taken as evidence that the land was being reserved, or had just been planted to opium. It was, however, impossible at that time to form any accurate idea of the actual acreage that had been or would be in poppy, but it is certainly large.

"Inquiries convinced me that the farmers would prefer not to plant poppy, not for moral reasons but because it is a hazardous crop, the taxes are excessive, and marketing must be done through government agencies. In the region above referred to, where the people claimed they did not plant opium, I was repeatedly told that it was 'because there were no soldiers stationed there.'

From M/A, China Report #5700 December 4, 1925

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Conditions in Fukien Province.

"Opium smoking was open and common along the main roads. Most burden bearers and chair bearers were opium users. The people claimed that the opium smoking inns were all under government management.

6. "Forest Devastation. Millions of feet of forest in embryo are destroyed each year, in the regions traversed. Destruction is accomplished in three ways: 1) by the cutting out of all small hardwood growth for charcoal; 2) by the cutting down of all softwoods before they reach a diameter of six inches; and 3) by fire. My observation was to the effect that 75% of the tree producing areas above the line of possible cultivation are burned over each year. This burning has three purposes: 1) to keep back wild animal depredators, principally tigers and wild pig, the former of which take an annual heavy toll both of human life and of stock, and the latter working havoc each year in the rice and sweet potatoe fields; 2) to keep back brigands; and 3) to form potash to be washed down into the rice fields below by the rains. ....

7. "Girl Slavery. At the village of Yangwei, or Sheep's Tail, I overtook two old women stopping for lunch at an inn. They were carrying two baskets, in which were, altogether, six infant girls, which they had bought in Foochow and were taking to the country to sell. It was an apparently common sight, for the people took no notice of them, and the women appeared glad to assist in taking pictures of their property. They refused to tell how much they paid for them, evidently not wishing to give away trade secrets, but bystanders told me they had probably paid between Mex. $0.15 and Mex. $0.20 (G$0.08 to G$0.12) per child. I was told that only a small percentage of girl babies thus bought were intended for prostitution, the larger percentage being intended for household labor."

Distribution:
4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File

205-5-637
WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH INFANTRY
American Barracks, Tientsin, China.

December 7th, 1925.

The following compilation of data relating to subjects which may be of special interest to newly arrived officers and their families, or to those who expect to be ordered to China for a tour of foreign service, is published for their information. Data as of date, December 7th, 1925. Prepared under the direction of Colonel W. K. Naylor, Commanding 15th Infantry.

Noted in 2-C

Tientsin is situated in the southeastern part of the province of Chihli at the head of the Hai Ho which is a short river formed by the confluence of the Grand Canal and the Pei Ho. The Hai Ho (Sea River), which is about 300 feet wide at Tientsin, is navigable for small steamers and sea-going junks and is a waterway of great commercial importance.

The city lies in a vast alluvial plain which extends beyond Peking 83 miles northwest of Tientsin to the Gulf of Chihli some 20 miles to the east. In all directions, as far as the eye can see, the surrounding country is absolutely flat, the only break in the monotonous landscape being made by small villages, brick kilns and the mounds of countless native graves. Being only 5 to 15 feet above the level of the stream along whose banks it is built, parts of the city have in times past been subject to floods but the construction of an effective dike system has to a large degree removed this menace.

Tientsin has a native population estimated at about 900,000. There are about 4,400 foreigners, about half of whom are Japanese. Of the remaining foreigners, 1,200 are British and 700 Americans. The foreigners all live in the Foreign Concessions, as do many of the rich and well-to-do Chinese.

The foreign business section of the city has the appearance of an American city of 80 to 100 thousand. There are wide paved streets flanked with stores whose show windows display about as varied an assortment of familiar articles of purchase as one could see along the main business thoroughfare of a thriving Western metropolis. But for the presence of an occasional window display of bottled goods carrying more than one half of one percent alcoholic contents and the absence of a red front five and ten cent store, the new arrival might easily forget, for the moment, that the United States is some 7,000 miles away.

CLIMATE.

Tientsin is about seven feet above sea level, twenty miles from the Gulf of Pechili. The climate is good but, owing to the age under which the soil has been cultivated and the methods employed in the cultivation of the soil, the insanitary habits of the natives and the prevalence of dust storms, all of which are not conducive to good health, persons having no resistance against respiratory diseases should be cautioned against seeking service in China. Likewise, those suffering from nose, throat or sinus infection, will find these conditions, as a rule, exaggerated upon their arrival in China. Malaria is also quite prevalent during the late summer and early fall months.

HOTELS.

The hotels in Tientsin are first class and modern and are within comparatively short distance of the American Barracks. The principal ones are listed with the daily rate in Local Currency. The rates include all meals.

Astor House Hotel --- British Concession:
- Single rooms, from $8.00 to $10.00.
- Double rooms, from $12.00 to $15.00.

Court Hotel --- British Concession:
- Single rooms, $9.00.
- Double rooms, $18.00.
- 10% discount to members of the Service.

Imperial Hotel --- French Concession:
- Single rooms, from $8.00 to $10.00.
- Double rooms, $16.00.

Hotel Prior --- Ex-German Concession:
Single rooms, from $6.00 to $8.00.
Double rooms, $14.00.
10% discount to the Service.

Army Y. M. C. A. --- Near American Barracks:
Occasionally rooms are available at the following rates:
Rooms from $50.00 to $70.00 a month.
Meals $50.00 a month.

BANKING FACILITIES.

American banks maintaining branches in Tientsin are the International Banking Corporation of New York, and the American Oriental Banking Corporation. These banks accept deposits in United States money (known locally as "gold") and in local currencies (known as "Mex"). Checks cannot be drawn against gold accounts, nor will the banks guarantee payments from such accounts in United States money.

Amounts may be withdrawn from gold accounts by means of the bank's drafts on New York and such drafts may be obtained by depositors without charge at any time U. S. funds are desired. A charge of approximately 1% is made for drafts on New York desired by persons who do not maintain gold accounts. Amounts on deposit in gold accounts may be transferred to Mex checking accounts at the current rate of exchange and vice versa.

RATE OF EXCHANGE.

The rate of exchange in Tientsin varies from 1.50 to 2.00 Mex Dollars for $1.00 U.S.Currency. The average rate of exchange for the year ending September 30, 1925, was 1.80. A higher rate is usually offered for U.S. gold than for U. S. paper money.

During the few days lay-over in Manila only sufficient Philippine currency should be purchased to cover current expenses, as Philippine currency is discounted considerably in Tientsin. Philippine Island coins are not accepted.

Upon arrival at Chinwangtao, only sufficiant Mex should be purchased from the money exchangers who meet the transport to cover expenses en route to Tientsin, which never exceeds $10.00. A much more favorable rate of exchange may be obtained at Tientsin.

EXPENSES AT MANILA P.I.

Receipts for lodging (European plan) or for board and lodging (American plan) must be furnished in support of claims for reimbursement of expenses during the lay-over at that port. Officers should obtain such receipts prior to departure from the hotel. No expenses of the officer's family should be included in such receipts obtained from the hotels. It is best to settle expense accounts in Manila.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Personal cheques drawn on banks in the United States can be cashed in Tientsin. As the United States maintains no postal agency in China, U.S.Money Orders are difficult to cash. Any funds transferred by Money Order should be in the form of a Foreign Money Order issued by the larger post offices in the United States, in Chinese dollars payable at any Chinese Post Office.

Letters for the United States may be mailed at any Chinese Post Office at a cost of ten cents Mex per ounce or fraction thereof.

Existing laws prohibit mileage for travel performed under orders in foreign countries, but provide for either payment of a flat per diem allowance not exceeding $5.00 per day or reimbursement of actual expenses not exceeding $7.00 per day. Transportation requests are issued by the Quartermaster Corps covering all transportation required under travel orders.

AMERICAN BARRACKS.

American Barracks is the term employed to indicate either the American garrison or the American Compound in Tientsin.

Garrison:

	Officers:	Men:
15th Infantry (less 1st Bn. in Manila and 1 Company at Tongshan)	39	747
Detachment Quartermaster Corps	2	22
Detachment Ordnance Department	0	2
Detachment Medical Corps	5	24
Detachment Signal Corps	0	3
Total	46	800

The Commanding Officer, American Barracks, is also the Commanding Officer, 15th Infantry. (The Headquarters, United States Army Forces in China, though adjacent to American Barracks, operates in a manner similar to a Department Headquarters in the United States. It consists of a General Officer, aide-de-camp, Chief of Staff, Adjutant General, Intelligence Officer, Finance Officer, Engineer Officer, Warrant Officer and 10 enlisted men.

COMPOUND.

The American Compound proper occupies one city block in the former German Concession, (now administered by a special Chinese bureau). There are approximately three parallel lines of buildings running east and west, with some detached buildings--shops, garage, Isolation Hospital, Green House, Wireless Station and Service Club--on the south side. The arrangement of the buildings sub-divides the Compound into three parallel court yards--the largest being 260 by 90 feet--in which regimental ceremonies are usually held.

Practically all buildings are three stories high, with finished basements. Two companies are housed in each barrack building, except the Headquarters Company which occupies a double barracks building. Kitchens and mess rooms are in the basement.

The hospital building was constructed for that purpose,--also a large building known as Recreation Hall which has a stage and is utilized for indoor athletic games, theatricals and moving picture shows. In the basement of Recreation Hall are located the Guard House and the shower bath rooms. The Post Exchange part of a barracks building. On the west side of the Compound and across the street are the stables, corral, ice plant (also furnishes distilled water), bakery, Veterinary Hospital and blacksmith shop.

These buildings were built in 1917 for rental to the American command by the Oriental Real Estate Company, and are maintained, heated, lighted and watered by that company under the provisions of the lease. The construction is poor, and it is difficult to keep the buildings in good repair, but they provide fairly satisfactory barracks though, of course, not to be compared with permanent barracks in the United States.

TRAINING FACILITIES.

Troops drill in the Compound, on vacant lots nearby, and on a large field about a mile from the Compound. Ground for tactical training is found on the outskirts of the city, three

[illegible] is a plain, much [illegible] and brick kilns; and [illegible] under water or boggy. Three miles south of the compound is an open plain, without gardens and with [illegible] villages, which extends four or five miles to the south.

SUB-POST AT TONGSHAN.

The rifle company is stationed at Tongshan, 85 miles southeast of Tientsin. The tour of duty there is six months. This company guards the railroad shops of the Peking-Mukden Railroad. Tongshan is a Chinese city of 50,000 inhabitants, with a foreign settlement (English and Belgian) of about sixty five families. The foreigners live in a restricted quarter in modern houses. Certain houses are held available for rental to the American officers on duty at Tongshan.

QUARTERS.

There are no public quarters available in Tientsin for assignment to officers or married enlisted men, and all officers are on a commutation status.

There are just about enough houses for rent to supply our requirements, but officers on arrival usually have to live at a hotel or with other officers from two weeks to two months before securing a suitable house. This condition can be remedied by writing ahead to the Commanding Officer or Quartermaster, stating requirements and amount of rent you are willing to pay.

Rents in Tientsin are not as cheap as is generally believed by officers arriving here. Houses of from five to ten rooms cost from $50.00 to $250.00, local currency, per month--according to size and location. Nearly all officers live in the Ex-German or the British Concessions. The most reasonable rents are in the Villa Jeanne D'Arc (commonly called "the alley"), but these houses are obtained by roster and are usually not available until an officer has been in Tientsin for at least six months.

Married enlisted men have to pay as much as $25.00 gold per month, in addition to their commutation allowance, for suitable quarters. Flats consisting of two rooms and bath cost about $45 local currency, per month; four rooms, kitchen and bath about $90 local currency per month. The cost of electricity, water and coal for heating and cooking purposes, is in addition to all the above rental rates. Also, electric fixtures usually have to be purchased from the former tenant, or new ones supplied by the new tenant.

FURNITURE.

As a general rule it is best to bring to China only light furniture, as heavy furniture is frequently badly broken on the long trip. Also furniture of all kinds--especially willow--may be bought in China at low cost. Mort houses have no clothes closets and it is therefore necessary to purchase them at about $25 local currency, each. Bring cooking utensils and china. Canton china and some other kinds are reasonably cheap here. Bring silverware, linen, draperies, etc. Rugs, linens and solid silverware can be purchased to advantage here.

There is practically no Government furniture available for issue. The following articles of Quartermaster furniture are issued in emergencies when available:

4 Beds, single, iron	1 Refrigerator	1 Range, Army #3, complete
2 Buckets, G.I.	1 Shovel, fire	6 Spoons, large, S.P.
1 Can, A. & G, small	1 Shovel, short-hand.	6 Knives, S.P.
1 Can, water	4 Pillows, cotton	2 Knives, butcher
4 Chairs, barrack	4 Blankets, wool, OD.	6 Spoons, small, S.P.
2 Hods, coal	6 Forks, S.P.	3 Stoves, heating
4 Mattresses, cotton	4 Covers, mattress	

Servants are plentiful in Tientsin--numerous in quantity but not always efficient in quality. The household staff is headed by the Number One Boy who is paid from fifteen to twenty dollars a month, local currency. His duties in general are supervision of housekeeping, cleaning and cooking. Most of the actual fatigue work is done by a coolie whose monthly compensation is from nine to twelve dollars. As a rule he does not speak English. The cook is a man-servant whose monthly wages are from fifteen to twenty dollars. In addition to preparing the food, he provides his own menus and does most of the marketing.

Persons possessing an automobile often have a chauffeur at a monthly charge of thirty to forty dollars. Others ride in rickshaws. Some families purchase one and hire a coolie to pull it. The rickshaw costs about one hundred dollars and the coolie receives each month from eleven to fourteen dollars. Others hire both the rickshaw and the coolie. Under this arrangement the latter furnishes the former and receives about eighteen dollars a month. Public rickshaws are always available at nominal rates; their disadvantage is that they are frequently dirty.

The only Chinese female servants are the amahs--wash, sewing and baby The two former receive from twelve to sixteen dollars a month. They usually are coolie women, inexperienced in foreign customs and speak little or no English. The latter are coolie women who usually show foreign influence and speak a little English. Some are quite efficient, others not so good. However, of all the servants, they come nearer to earning their monthly compensation of eighteen to twenty dollars than the others.

The average family has five servants--number one boy, amah, coolie, cook and rickshaw coolie--at a monthly expenditure of about 85 dollars, local currency. However, the initial cost does not tell the whole story. The amount of wastage in the household is large. This, added to the "squeeze" or commission that the cook gets on everything he buys and that the number one boy gets on everything the employer buys, makes their total cost quite high.

As a general proposition the average Chinese servant is fairly honest. That is, they do not steal articles of some value, such as clothing, linen or silver. However, according to their code of ethics, it is no offense to take small articles of little value; items such as soap, needles, pins, socks, handkerchiefs, food and coal disappear with great regularity.

COST OF LIVING.

The prevailing idea that in China one can live like a Prince-of-the-Blood on the pay of a Second Lieutenant has as much foundation of fact as the theory that two can live as cheaply as one. It is true that many things which go to make up the family budget are cheaper here than at home, but the low cost of living features of service in China has been greatly exaggerated. Here, as elsewhere, the average officer spends all he gets, the difference being that here he lives on a higher scale. Also, in the course of a tour in China his wife, if he has one, invariably accumulates a rather impressive store of rugs, silver linen, lingerie, embroideries and other impedimenta that would be utterly beyond his means if priced on Fifth Avenue.

COST OF FOOD.

Food products ready for consumption are fairly expensive. Their initial purchasing price is quite low, but during their preparation many factors increase the cost. One is the cook's "aqueeze" or commission on everything he purchases coupled with

[illegible] occasioned by him [illegible] selling articles such as [illegible] etc., previously bought. Another is the [illegible] food is cooked than eaten, a great deal wasted, [illegible] native materials used.

A great variety of vegetables may be obtained in the [illegible] throughout the year. Wild game in season, meat and fish [illegible] plentiful. Foreign fruits like oranges, lemons and bananas [illegible] expensive, while native products--persimmons, apples, pumelos, pears, grapes, walnuts and peanuts--are considerably below the American market.

The following table of prices in local currency, with [illegible] U.S. Currency worth $1.73 Mex, has been taken from a current newspaper:

VEGETABLES.		cents
Artichokes	lb.	04
Beans, French	lb.	04
Beet-root	lb.	03
Bamboo shoots	bundle	04
Cabbage, Chinese	pc.	04
Cabbage, foreign	pc.	08
Carrots	bundle	02
Cauliflower	bundle	30
Celery	bundle	02
Cress	parcel	01
Cucumbers	pc.	03
Egg plant	pc.	02
Green corn	pc.	03
Lettuce	pc.	02
Marrow	pc.	04
Mushrooms	lb.	40
Onions	lb.	04
Parsnips	bundle	05
Peas	lb.	12
Potatoes	lb.	2½
Radishes	bundle	01
Spinach	bundle	02
Tomatoes	lb.	05
Turnips	bundle	04

FISH.		
Bream	lb.	20
Carp	lb.	15
Cod	lb.	10
Crab	lb.	08
Eels	lb.	16
Mandarin fish	lb.	26
Mullet	lb.	16
Plaice	lb.	13
Sea Bream	lb.	18
Sea Perch	lb.	10
Shrimp	lb.	11
Shuttle fish	lb.	13
Soles	lb.	18
Turbot	lb.	18

FRUITS.		cents
Apples, Chefoo	lb.	14
Bananas	lb.	18
Cherry Apples	lb.	10
Chestnuts	lb.	12
Grapes	lb.	10
Ground nuts	lb.	12
Lemons	pc.	10
Oranges	lb.	40
Pears	lb.	12
Pears, Chefoo	lb.	18
Persimmon	3 for	10
Pumeloes	pc.	25
Walnuts	lb.	18

GAME.		
Chickens	ea.	50
Eggs	5 for	10
Duck	ea.	1.30
Duck, wild	ea.	36
Geese	ea.	1.50
Geese, wild	ea.	60
Hare	ea.	42
Pigeons	ea.	12
Snipe	ea.	13
Teal	ea.	15
Turkeys	ea.	2,40

MEAT.		
Beef, roast	lb.	24
Beef, soup	lb.	22
Beef, salt	lb.	24
Veal	lb.	26
Ox Tail	pc.	28
Ox Tongue	pc.	55
Sweet bread	pc.	04
Mutton	lb.	24
Lamb	lb.	30
Liver	lb.	20
Kidneys	ea.	03
Brains	ea.	03
Liver, ox	lb.	14

SHOPS (WEARING APPAREL)

General.

Tientsin has several well-stocked, modern stores. These stores handle some American goods, but the greater amounts are manufactures of England or France.

Every article pertaining to the uniform (except hats and caps) and all articles which compose the civilian wardrobe for men, can be purchased or made to order here. The workmanship and appearance of these clothes is not up to the standard of that made in the States. Better results can be obtained if you can give the tailors an excellent tailored uniform or suit as a model. Chinese tailors can copy a garment perfectly but are not so good in original design.

All service caps, hats and white caps are purchased thru the Post Exchange from the United States or Manila. It is therefore better if these articles are purchased before leaving the United States.

Belts, boots, shoes and leggins are also made here. The quality of the leather and the appearance is not as good as those made in the United States.

The following data gives the approximate cost of the articles made or that can be purchased here.

Uniform	Cost U.S.Cy.	Cost Local Cy.
Caps,O.D.	$7.00	
Caps,white	4.50	
Uniforms,serge		$70.00
Uniforms,whipcord		65.00
Uniforms,gabardine		70.00
Uniforms,Hong Kong khaki		14.00
Uniforms,white		15.00
Mess Jacket		5.00
Boots		25.00
Shoes		10.00
Leggins		10.00
Sam Browne belts	12.00	or 12.00
Overcoats		65.00

Civilian Clothes	Local Currency
Street or business suits	$65.00 to $80.00
Tuxedo	70.00 to 90.00
Full evening dress	90.00 to 115.00
Hats,soft	10.00 to 35.00
Hats,full dress	35.00 to 60.00
Golf suits	40.00 to 60.00
Overcoats	60.00 to 80.00
Underwear,all wool (per garment)	12.00 to 25.00
Sweaters	8.50 to 25.00
Ties	1.75 to 4.00
Shirts,negligee	4.75 to 8.00
Handkerchiefs,linnen (per dozen)	10.00 to 24.00
Gloves,kid	6.50 to 12.00
Raincoats	17.50 to 50.00
Caps	4.00 to 6.00
Socks,silk	1.75 up
Shoes,(street,dress,sport)	10.00 to 25.00
Shirts,evening	6.75 to 8.00

LADIES APPAREL.

There are a number of good shops where womens apparel may be purchased. Some of these shops import gowns from Paris and some of them send a modiste to Paris each year to return with the latest fashions and designs. Hats, gloves, coat suits, sport suits, sweaters, evening gowns and afternoon frocks can be made to order or purchased ready made. Shoes of all kinds are made by Chinese or Russian shops. The shoes do not last like those manufactured in the United States, but are very good. Practically all articles of underwear can be made very reasonably by engaging the services of a sewing amah. The materials for such can be purchased for a very moderate amount.

	Cost, Local Cy.
[illegible]	$ 3.00 to $50.00
Gloves	1.75 to 15.00
Coat suits	40.00 to 80.00
Sport suits	35.00 to 70.00
Gowns, evening	35.00 to 100.00
Afternoon frocks	25.00 to 80.00
Shoes	10.00 to 18.00
Stockings	6.00 to 14.00

CHILDREN.

The large stores carry a fairly complete line of childrens' clothing and serge suits for boys can be made to order by the Chinese tailors. The cost of these made to order suits is about the same as the cost of ready made suits in the States.

Childrens underwear, (wool) is more expensive than in the United States. Articles such as gloves, shoes, sweaters, jersey suits, stockings and socks are cheaper here.

All shoes have to be made to order by Chinese or Russian shops. They are not as substantial as those manufactured in the United States.

SCHOOLS.

Tientsin American School.

Established by American community in 1922. Five minutes walk from the American Barracks. Three terms each year.

Autumn term from September 14,1925 to Dec. 22, 1925.
Winter term from January 4,1926 to March 26, 1926.
Spring term from April 5, 1926 to June 11, 1926.

GRADES	HOURS	TUITION PER TERM
Kindergarten	10 to 12 a. m.	$40.00 Local Cy.
Grade 1	9 to 12 a. m.	50.00 " "
Grade 2	9 to 12 a.m.--2 to 3 p.m.	50.00 " "
Grade 3,4,5.	9 to 12 a.m.--2 to 4 p.m.	60.00 " "
Grade 6,7,8.	9 to 12 a.m.--2 to 4 p.m.	67.00 " "

The above tuition fees are in local currency (mex). A discount of 25% is allowed to all Americans.

Four regular teachers, with special teachers in French, Chinese and Physical Drill. Dancing classes on Saturday mornings by Miss Linda Haymans of the Peking Institute of Fine Arts. Fees for dancing classes $10.00, local currency, for a series of twelve lessons.

The school has a regular medical adviser who makes monthly reports as to the health, general condition and weight if each student. Distilled drinking water is provided through the courtesy of the Commanding Officer, American Barracks. The great majority of American children in Tientsin attend this school.

Tientsin Grammar School (British School).

Founded in 1905 by the Tientsin School Association. Fifteen minutes walk from the American Barracks. Three terms each year.

Autumn term from September 15, 1925 to December 20,1925.
Spring term from January 3, 1926 to March 31, 1926.
Summer term from April 5, 1926 to June 15, 1926.

GRADES	HOURS	TUITION PER TERM
Kindergarten	9 to 12 a.m.	$30.00 Local Cy.
Lower Form I	9 to 12 a.m.--2 to 4 p.m.	Pupils under 9 $35.00 Local Cy.
Upper Form I	9 to 12 a.m.--2 to 4 p.m.	Pupils under 10 $40.00 Local Cy.

GRADES	HOURS	TUITION PER TERM
Lower Form II	9 to 12--2 to 4	Pupils under 12 $50.00 L.Cy.
Upper Form II	9 to 12--2 to 4	Pupils under 15, $55.00 L.Cy.
Lower Form III	9 to 12--2 to 4	Pupils over 15 $60.00 L.Cy.
Upper Form III	9 to 12--2 to 4	A 10% discount is al-
Form IV	9 to 12--2 to 4	lowed for two children and
Form V	9 to 12--2 to 4	20% discount for three.

The school has a staff of ten teachers. A few of the American children in Tientsin attend this school. It is an excellent school but has this disadvantage: that its Forms do not correspond to the grades in American schools. For this reason it is difficult for the newly arrived American pupil to adjust himself to his work.

The North China American School.

Founded in 1913. Located in Tunghsien, Chihli Province, China, about 15 miles from Peking and 65 miles from Tientsin. High School boarding school.

Fall term from September 9,1925 to December 17, 1925.
Winter term from January 6, 1926 to March 26, 1926.
Spring term from April 8, 1926 to June 10, 1926.

Regular Freshman, Sophomore, Junior and Senior High School classes.

Tuition fees, $25.00 local currency, per term. Board $1.10 local currency, per day. An additional charge of $1.00 per month to cover laundry and mending. A few of the older American children in Tientsin attend this school.

CLUBS.

The Tientsin Club, to which about one third of the officers of the garrison belong, has all the features of a well-appointed club in an American city. It is an assembly point for a large percentage of the American and British civilians, between the hours of 5 and 8 P.M. Cards, Mah Jong, and a well-equipped bar are the attractions. The club has an excellent fiction library. Military members pay no initiation fee. Dues are $5.00 Mex a month.

The Tientsin Race Club, situated on the outskirts of the city, about 15 minutes ride by rickshaw from the American Barracks, sponsors a spring and fall race meet which are the great social and sporting events of the year. The pari mutual is well patronized, but to date no army officers have had to pay an income tax on the profits derived therefrom. Race Club membership dues are $30.00 Mex, a year; army officers pay no initiation fee.

The Tientsin Golf Club (initiation fee $50.00, dues $25.00 per annum) has an 18-hole course on the flat where Chinese graves constitute most of the hazards. Only a real enthusiast can obtain much of a thrill from the rather uninteresting course, but the fact that the luxury of two caddies may be enjoyed for the small sum of 40 cents Mex for 17 holes is a compensating feature. Also, the existence of a 19th hole is an attraction for the unregenerated American exile.

The American Tennis Club affords unequaled advantage for tennis at a small cost. Initiation fee, $10.00 Mex and dues $20.00 Mex, per annum.

THEATRES.

Unless you are educated up to the Chinese drama, it is advisable to do your theatre going before leaving the United States. Tientsin boasts of a number of excellent moving picture theatres but, except for the annual engagement of an Italian Grand Opera company and the occasional visit of a second rate British vaudeville troupe, Tientsin's theatrical attractions are confined to the silver screen.

MOTOR CARS.

There are no so-called drives that one can take into the country, as the drives are all short and confined to the city limits. The longest drive is about six miles to the French Arsenal for the round trip. This trip requires a special license. A Sunday afternoon ride without retracing would cover about thirty miles.

Officers who bring light cars of a standard make with them, consider it worth while. There is practically no sale of used cars of the heavier type; but light cars, four-passenger and larger, closed, often sell quickly and at a good price. In the Concessions paved streets are being added gradually, so that a great deal of driving is possible from the home to the Compound, to stores, etc. In the Native City many of the streets are narrow and crowded and not suited for much automobile traffic. The climate is dry and hard on the tires, and driving is confined to the left hand side.

There are thousands of rickshaws that are available for hire at a nominal sum, and the absence of a motor car is not a hardship. In cold or wet weather, however, the ride in a rickshaw is not so comfortable, and a light motor car, closed model, is found very convenient.

The quartermaster does not sell gasoline, oils, greases, chamois skins, sponges, tires, tubes, etc., and these have to be procured locally. All repair work must be obtained locally, and the skill of the native repairmen is not as high as that to which one from the States is accustomed. Free air is obtainable at but one station, hence a good pump ought to be kept in reserve.

The following is a schedule of prevailing prices and rates, in local currency. (See heading - "RATES OF EXCHANGE, ETC.").

Gasoline	.90 per gal.	Tires (30 x 3½)	25.00 ea.
Oil	3.25 per gal.	Tires (31 x 4)	44.00 ea.
Grease	.50 per gal.	Puncture	1.00 ea.
Repairs	1.00 per hr.	Battery charge	3.50
Garage	13.00 per mo.	Hire of car (per hr)	4.00

Straightening front axle and aligning wheel..... 9.50
Chauffeur (he provides his own food)..(per mo)..20.00 to 25.00.
License (payable quarterly & good in all Concessions).21.00 per quarter.

ATHLETICS.

Amusement is a big problem at American Barracks, and athletics is a most important feature of the amusement program.

The chief event of the Spring program is the Organization Day Track Meet held each year May 4. From the results of this meet the entries are selected for the International Track Meet held annually at the French Barracks, Tientsin.

The North China Baseball League, composed of the 15th Infantry, the Tientsin Civilians, the Japanese Civilians and the Peking Marines, along with a few visiting Japanese and Navy teams, furnish baseball for the summer.

The 15th Infantry and the Marines, in the past have been playing American football, but it has been decided that the training is too hard and the expense too great for two and, in case of a tie, three games. Rugger has been substituted, and from last year's results, the Americans will give a good account of themselves in the near future.

In winter boxing and basketball keep our amusement hall busy every afternoon and evening, with the overflow enjoying the Skating Rink, constructed each year just outside the Compound.

POLO.

During the last two years polo has taken on quite an impetus among the American Army officers. One of the great drawbacks about polo, especially for the infantry officer, is the matter of expense, but polo in China is not an expensive game. The Government has authorized the Chinese ponies as mounts, providing they come up to certain specifications. Ponies coming up to the standards can be bought for from $50.00 to $60.00 gold. This takes care of the officers who are on a mounted status. However, other officers are being cared for by the Government authorizing the purchase of Chinese ponies to replace the present Government horses. It is expected that within a year there will be between fifteen and twenty Government-owned ponies available for polo.

There is but one playing field at or near Tientsin; this is at the Tientsin Race Club. In order to belong to the Tientsin Polo Club it is first necessary to belong to the Race Club. The dues for Polo Club are $50.00 Mex, per playing month.

Polo equipment, except helmets and mallets, are furnished from regiment equipment. Mallets and helmets can be purchased here at about one half their cost in the States.

At present there are fifteen officers in the regiment playing polo, and more will turn out as soon as more Government mounts are purchased.

Any one interested in polo will probably find that he will be able to play more polo at less expense here than at any station in the States.

SUMMER CAMP.

The summer training camp of the 15th Infantry is located at Nan Ta Ssu, China, which is along the coast of the Gulf of Chihli, 3½ miles from Chinwangtao (the port of entry of the U.S.Army transports). About 12 miles north of the camp is the town of Shan Hai Kuan where yearly excursions are made by officers and their families to view the Great Wall of China as it enters the sea.

The months of June, July and August are the months designated for summer training and target practice. The two battalions alternately proceed to Nan Ta Ssu each year for a period of six weeks duration. Officers may take their families to camp during their tour of range work and usually the officer's family can be accomodated during the entire three months' period should they so desire.

"Officers' Row" is the name given to the Officers' Camp and is situated about 300 yards from the main soldiers' camp. Tentage is provided the officers as shelter.

Tent floors are bricked and covered with Chinese matting making very comfortable living quarters. The mess hall can accomodate 60 people at one sitting. The cost of meals and incidental camp expenses is about $1.00 gold per day. Tea can be served daily in your quarters at a small extra charge.

A special kitchen is provided for mothers who personally desire to prepare their childrens' food.

An excellent bathing beach is located about 150 yards from "Officers Row."

About 50 yards from the mess hall is the Officers Club, where officers congregate after the trying duties of the daily range work.

The adults usual sports consist of riding, swimming and hiking. For children there are the playground features, such as swings, see-saws, merry-go-rounds, basketball, baseball, etc.

TRAVEL IN CHINA.

[illegible] of travel in China vary from quite modern railway [illegible] down to the wheel-barrow, and chair carried by coolies. For the American army officer arriving by transport at Chinwangtao, however, his trip to Tientsin is of major importance. The officer will be furnished with rail transportation [illegible] for himself and dependents by the Boarding Officer at the dock. Chinwangtao is on the main line of the Peking-Mukden railway and the through trains, having dining and sleeping car accomodations, make very good time and ordinarily are on schedule. The time from Chinwangtao to Tientsin is about six hours for a distance of 165 miles. The passenger coaches are constructed with separate compartments for six persons in day travel or two at night. Baggage is handled in a manner generall similar to that in the United States.

Most of the railways in North China are Government-owned and travel is possible over all lines in times of peace. There are first, second and third class passages, but ordinarily officers travel entirely first class. The "Blue Express" running between Peking-Tientsin-Pukow over the Tientsin-Pukow line, making connections for Shanghai, is the best train in North China, and the accomodations aboard this train surpass many in the United States.

By Department order every officer is allowed one month's detached service during his tour, for travel in North China, north of the Yangtze but including Shanghai and vicinity. This travel is restricted from time to time by unsettled military conditions, but ordinarily all officers are encouraged to avail themselves of this privilege.

The Peking-Mukden Railway permits officers of the International military contingents in Tientsin, or their dependents, to travel from Peking to Shan Hai Kuan on "Leave Warrants" or at a price less than half fare for first class passage. These warrants are issued by the various military headquarters and must be exchanged at the station with payment of the additio al amount for a ticket. Charges on other railways are commensurate with charges in the United States.

Foreign hotel accomodations are available in most of the large cities in North China and all are "American Plan," rates ranging from $8.00 to $12.00, local currency, per day per person.

Rickshaws are used for travel within the cities and the fare varies somewhat for localities, but from 20 to 30 cents, local currency, for one hour is a fair charge.

PURCHASING FOR FRIENDS.

Many requests are made upon members of the command in China, by friends in the United States of America, Philippine Island and elsewhere, to buy articles for them, such as rugs, fur coats, silver, and so on. The general desire of everyone in China is to gratify these requests but too often that is impossible on account of shortage of funds or imcomplete or indefinite specifications.

To begin with, outsiders should bear in mind that business in China is generally transacted on a cash basis and "jawbone" is frowned upon. Cash generally means payment in part, in advance, on delivery, or certainly at the end of the month. After Chinese New Year (which generally falls in February) credit is easier but prices are higher. Before Chinese New Year prices are lower but credit is difficult.

Rug manufacturers or retailers generally require a deposit before making a rug to order. As an illustration: For a $214.00, local currency, rug, a deposit of $50.00, local currency, was required. When money is sent in the form of a check

for the entire amount, to obtain the sum to be paid down, it may be necessary to cash the entire check, holding the balance until delivery. At the time the check is cashed the rate may be $1.74, local currency, for $1.00, gold. After deducting the amount paid in advance, should an attempt be made to reconvert the local currency into gold it would be at the selling price of gold, which is two points higher than the buying price, or it might be impossible to buy gold back at all. As an illustration: An officer received $200.00 gold by check, to buy two rugs. One hundred dollars, local currency, was demanded as a deposit. The check was cashed at $1.74, or for a total of $348.00, local currency. Deducting the deposit leaves $248.00 local currency on hand. Had this entire check been held until delivery of the rugs two months afterwards, and had the officer paid the deposit out of his own pocket, at the later date with exchange at $1.80, local currency, for $1.00 gold, it quite apparent that the check would have netted $360.00, local currency, or an increase of $12.00, local currency. I know of several officers who have lost as much as $16.00, local currency, on a single transaction rather than try to explain the situation to the friend.

Goods should be tried out before final payment is made, as it has been noticed that sellers, particularly Chinese, take more interest in correcting a defect if there is still something due.

RUGS.

Most all rug merchants in China are wholesalers doing a retail business as an accomodation.

Chinese rugs are divided into two general classes,--the typical Tientsin rug and the brocaded rugs. The Tientsin rugs are the common variety one sees at home--the conventional designs having decorations at each corner and the middle done in a variety of colors. In the brocaded rugs the design is carried throughout--the design being cut as in the Tientsin rug.

The choice of rugs rests with the individual. The brocaded rugs, however, are the most popular with the American garrison.

The Tientsin rugs are designed to be washed, and in consequence the nap runs from 5/8" to a full inch. These rugs are made from ninety to one hundred threads per linear foot. A five-eights inch nap rug ordinarily has ninety threads, while the full inch nap has one hundred. The most expensive rugs are made from foreign machine-made wool. The less expensive are made from hand-made Chinese wool.

The brocaded rugs are not designed to be washed, consequently the nap is not so thick, running from three-eighths inch to one half inch. They are normally made with ninety lines per linear foot. The more intricate the design the more expensive the rug.

Rugs are sold by the square foot, varying in price from $1.78 to $2.10, local currency, and on up as high as one cares to go. A very nice library or living room rug can be bought for $2.00 local currency a square foot, dimensions 9 x 12 feet. Bedroomsets consisting of an oval 5 x 8 and two 3 x 5½'s cost a total of $146.00, local currency, and so on. Prices vary with the weave or number of threads or strings to the square foot, 90 being considered very good.

The colors that seem to hold up best are tans and taupes. Solid colors of blue, black, henna, old rose, etc., are quite popular, but are liable to fade or streak. No one but an expert can tell how colors or designs taken from a picture or drawing will appear in a rug. A piece of embroidery or a painting may look beautiful on the wall, but will look hideous in a rug on the floor.

Generally speaking it is not safe to buy rugs ready-made,

there is, from stock, as one runs a chance of getting a "turn back" made-to-order rug that has a defect.

One must not be influenced too much by rumors as to the reliability or unreliability of dealers. It is all a gamble and one may be stuck--not wilfully, of course--by the best of dealers. Most factories guarantee their rugs and, in case they do streak, make a new rug. However, no one will definitely guarantee their rugs against stretching or fading.

Few dealers pack rugs for shipment securely enough, so it is nearly always necessary to have them re-boxed. This applies to rugs purchased at a distance from where the buyer is located, the packing of which he cannot supervise. The following is typical of requests received by members of the command: "Please get me two rugs and deliver them to the 'Thomas' and Mr. So and So will re-imburse you." The buyer in China, under the wording of that order, would have been justified in purchasing two rugs--Jewel Tree (blue, tan and rose) 3 x 3, at $19.00, local currency, each, or two Ninety-nine Motifs, tan, at $216.00, local currency, each. That order should have given the design, size, cost per foot, color, and enclosed a check.

FURS.

The general statement may be made that furs in China are good, cheap, and quite well-cured. Disabuse yourself of the idea that they are "picked off the trees." Some people will tell you that the furs "smell to Heaven" and the hair all comes out.

If one goes out looking for bargains and tries to get them at some Chinese market or on the street, unless one is a registered connoisseur, one will get "trimmed" for fair. On the other hand, if a reputable dealer is patronized no such danger is encountered.

Should an order be received for a leopard-skin coat the following is the proceeding that must be gone through: See a good tailor and get a bid from him--it will be about $160.00, local currency. Find out how much lining is needed and go to a silk store and buy it yourself. The tailor will procure his furs from his friend in the Chinese City and you can go to his shop to match them up. This must be done or the coat will be as variegated in colors as Joseph's. You will have to watch the tailor carefully until delivery, with many fittings. The coat will be worth the money but not cut as smartly as those made at home.

Before sending an order be sure you want what you ask for and don't cancel the order after your friend has started getting it filled, particularly if it is a rug or a fur coat. Every order placed and then cancelled makes it just that much harder to place an order next time.

SILVER.

Silver is very cheap and most anything can be made out of it by the Chinese, but don't get silver knives, forks or spoons, as not enough alloy is put in to keep them from bending when in use.

LINEN.

Beautifully embroidered linen can be bought at very reasonable rates compared with the United States of America. Most of it is made on order by the Convent girls. Prices for table cloths run from $40.00, local currency, to $165.00, depending on size and design.

Camphor-wood boxes about the size of a large wardrobe trunk cost $40.00, local currency, and should you want linen or furs, it is a good idea to enclose money for one of these boxes.

It will be impossible to take up every article that can be purchased in China and enumerate the attendant difficulties in buying it. It may be summed up as follows:

Things cost from 1/3 to ½ less than they do in the United States of America, although nothin g is given away. Articles of wearing apparel are as well but not as smartly or stylishly made as in the United States of America. A better price can be gotten if a little gold or silver can be thrown on the counter--it makes the merchant look at it differently. Send it along in advance, for your friend may be a poor second lieutenant with a growing family, who hasn't enough money laid up to meet a shower--much less a "rainy day."

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

1927

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AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

December 1, 1926

#5992

Subject: Final Report.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

1. Enclosed is the first part of certain conclusions I have reached as to the course of events in China in so far as they affect Chinese foreign relations, with comment on the policies of our own and other foreign powers. The final part, which is concerned with the mission in China of foreign troops will follow in the next pouch.

2. This paper was nearly completed at the time of the receipt of your letter #2055-640 of October 5th, and I therefore did not alter it to conform to the order prescribed in that letter, though I have covered the phases you thought of especial interest.

J. H. Barnard
Lieut. Colonel, F.
Military Attache.

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FINAL REPORT

CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE COURSE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

There are a great many things wrong with China at the present time. The Chinese who have had any other than a Chinese education and an opportunity to compare the state of their country with that of others know this as well as the foreigners. It is absurd to ascribe any of these things to the malign influence of the unequal treaties governing China's relations with certain foreign powers. Yet probably it is impossible that any of the things that are wrong with China will be corrected until there is created a universal or nearly universal Chinese demand for reform. Against many of these things which are wrong the Chinese are not now sufficiently bold to protest. Others must wait until the consciousness of the people has been awakened to their nature.

The politician, the militarist or the reformer, seeking to arouse national consciousness and to gain the support of public approval, knows that at the present nothing is more certain to accomplish both, at the same time with safety to himself, as an attack on the special treaty rights of foreigners.

Following the World War the Chinese found that the array of powers that had made and perpetuated the treaties was broken. Germany and Austria were definitely eliminated for years to come. Great Britain and France were so drained of military and financial resources that a proposal in either country to send an army to China for the purpose of maintaining the treaties would have evoked such a storm of protest as might have had serious results. Russia, not only no longer a member of the group of treaty powers, became an active friend in all efforts against the treaties of her erstwhile associates. Japan, stronger perhaps than before the war, for reasons later to appear, definitely changed her policy toward China to one of determined friendship. The United States could be counted upon to maintain its traditional policy of benevolence and amity. There was further the important factor of the wave of liberalism, tolerance and generosity that had swept over the entire world.

The Chinese were prompt to see in these circumstances an opportunity to force treaty revision. In no doubt as to the essential unimportance of the unequal treaties in the sum of China's ills, and fully aware that certain of the treaty privileges enjoyed by foreigners had been forced on them by the Chinese themselves, this opportunity was seized and has since been exploited by different parties and leaders.

The agitation for treaty revision has not gone forward without some challenge from the Chinese themselves. Fastening upon its proponents the name of radicals, charging them with being under the dominance of Soviet Russia and bent upon the bolshevization of China, certain leaders have carried their opposition to the point of actual war. These latter have been inspired to this course by no genuine apprehension for their country's safety but by a fear that their own leadership was jeopardized; and by aid from one foreign power, at least, that saw its interests in certain special areas imperilled in the general and increasing demand for treaty revision.

THE GENERAL POLICY ADOPTED

In the course of the first few years following the war it became apparent that the Chinese had adopted a definite policy toward the unequal treaties which may be called one of attrition. Attacking the treaties in the press, both in China and abroad, on every pretext and without pretext, ascribing to them all of China's ills, thereby drawing attention to themselves as patriotic leaders and gaining popular support, they invaded treaty rights in a variety of ways and places. These invasions were neither bold nor far reaching at first but were stubbornly persisted in. Recognizing the wisdom of isolating particular nations for this form of attack, and even of permitting certain of them to profit from the misfortunes of such a one attacked, the Chinese made rapid progress, treaty violations becoming bolder and more far-reaching month by month. Protests by the interested powers were met by polite disclaimers from the Central Government of ability, due to disturbed conditions, to control the areas where the treaty violation occurred. It became apparent both to foreigners and Chinese that the campaign must end either in complete victory for or be defeated by the stupidity of the latter. This possibility of defeat was a source of great anxiety to the Chinese directing affairs. They had to maintain a delicate equilibrium, playing up anti-treaty and anti-foreign slogans to their utmost political value, while carrying on a slow, steady process of wearing down the treaties and at the same time so control the public opinion they were inflaming as to prevent such an explosion of anti-foreignism as would force the nations in self-respect to send rescue and punitive expeditions to China. This possibility, as certain to defer for years and perhaps forever the success of their plans, the Chinese leaders above all else wished to avoid.

THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM

A new and livelier factor was injected into the situation during the past two years in the form of nationalism and its objects. Its chief proponents are the leaders of that regime at Canton which broke away from the North in 1916 and has since maintained an independent political existence in Kwangtung as the National Government. Though a thorn in the side of the various governments that succeeded each other in Peking, and though it made frequent threat of an intention to send a column north to punish and drive out those they accused of having subverted the purposes of the Revolution, this National Government was not taken very seriously by the government in Peking. Indeed, in spite of a theoretical state of war existing between the two governments there was maintained always a curious unity of action and policy in certain directions that is of intense significance in these days as explanatory of the rapid spread of sympathy for the south throughout the whole country. An example of this occurred in the spring of 1924, when Sun Yat-sen, the great Canton leader, in an effort to raise money to prosecute warfare against the government in Peking, proposed seizing the Customs House at Canton and diverting to his own use all its receipts. As an attack upon the Maritime Customs this proposal was met and defeated by the concentration off Canton of an allied fleet of war vessels from the treaty powers concerned. The Peking Government vigorously protested against this action of the powers. The explanation of this lies in the fact that not only did the Peking Government know that public approval was to be gained by the gesture of protest, but also they and Canton were in sympathy in resenting the forcible protection of the foreign interests threatened even though this protection resulted incidentally greatly to the advantage and possibly the salvation of the former.

Pursuing a rather precarious existence, during which they had to rely upon methods of government widely at variance with their announced principles, the leaders of the National Government were at times hard put to it to maintain control even of Canton. Nevertheless they were untiring in their efforts to spread their doctrines throughout all China. At first comparatively friendly in tone toward foreign treaty powers, as efforts to enlist their support fell upon deaf ears, these doctrines included ever more violent denunciations of them. Carrying to a much higher pitch than elsewhere in China the resentment against the Shanghai and Shameen incidents, a boycott and strike was declared against Hongkong. In this the Cantonese used the policy noted above of isolating a single power for attack. Logically, certain other foreign treaty powers should have shared at least equally in retaliatory Chinese measures. As a matter of fact not only was Great Britain singled out, but the Japanese in particular instead of being merely exempted have actually profited greatly at Canton from the embargo on British shipping.

It was at this time that the Kuomintang accepted help from Soviet Russia. Its leaders say they would have taken it from any one willing to aid them. At once a change was apparent. With Russian aid in the form of money, munitions and advisers, Kwangtung as far east as Fukien was for the first time brought under control. The Yunnanese mercenaries imported by Sun to maintain his power in his darkest hour, and who had become a Frankenstein, were sharply defeated, many massacred and the few survivors driven out. An honest and efficient government was established and to the consternation of the north there followed an expedition to the Yangtze that is still meeting with successes, and acclaim from the inhabitants of the areas invaded.

Though many of its leaders are as self-seeking and corrupt as any in China, there is no doubt that there are among them more men of integrity of character and honesty of purpose than in any other movement in China, and that they are supported, openly in the south, secretly in the rest of the country, by a growing number of people for the first time becoming aware of patriotism and the power of a united China. The same danger exists with them of a too violent reaction to anti-foreign slogans and propaganda, but as the army appears to be well disciplined it is probably less than would appear from the extremely threatening nature of both.

The doctrines spread by the Nationalists were and continue to be those of liberty and equality for the country, the abrogation of the unequal treaties, the awakening of the people to a sense of national unity and to patriotism. Reiterated for years, spread by meetings of the Kuomintang (the political party dominant in Canton) throughout all China, published broadcast over the land, everywhere these doctrines gained sympathy and secret adherents, while the boldness of the strike and boycott against mighty Great Britain struck fire from the peoples' imagination.

I do not think nationalism is to be considered as a new growth in China. In spite of their numerous civil wars the Chinese have had a strong sense of national unity. But difficulty of communication, natural timidity and a shrinking from the responsibility of leading and expressing movements have kept the Chinese from manifesting it. It must have been from a profound conviction of its latent quality in his countrymen that Sun Yat-sen sought for years to arouse it, though presenting the curious anomaly of appealing in the name of patriotism,

freedom and equality while the head of a government unspeakably corrupt and tyrannical. From such a conviction and also from an understanding of that characteristic of the Chinese which permits them to see and judge men and events not in the terms of their expedients to survive but in genuine essence.

However hopeful as a sign for the future of China nationalism may be - in its ideals, in the integrity of certain of its leaders and in an awakening of popular consciousness to evils to be corrected, the fact must not be lost sight of that it is attempting by bluff and fury and convulsive methods a reformation that cannot actually be accomplished except by patient instruction over years of time. After saying all possible in its favor, the truth still remains that nationalism is embryonic, its followers misinformed as to issues presented, and the Chinese totally unprepared to undertake the duties of popular government. It may be said that as a government it would be no worse than the one it bids fair to supplant. And that the former also was intent upon a course that would result in treaty revision and abrogation. Both statements would be correct. Still the problem remains whether as a government it would be sufficiently responsible to entitle it to recognition and what our relations with it should be. We owe the immediate urgency of this problem to Soviet Russia.

EFFECT OF NATIONALISM ON PREVIOUS ANTI-TREATY POLICY

To the leaders of nationalism, flushed with victory and the consciousness of widespread sympathy, the policy of attrition against foreign treaties is too slow and lacks the boldness of gesture essential to a perpetuation of their reputations. For them, once they are in power, treaties are not to be worn down but denounced. Foreign powers are forthwith to treat with China as an equal or sever all relations. Whether they actually will go so far is yet to be determined. For the moment they are drunk with the result of their boycott and strike against the British and the success of their armies in the field. The latter is not yet complete but there stands between the Nationalists and their ally, the Kuominchun, and final victory only one well organized body - the army of Chang Tso-lin.

Perhaps this success will be deferred for years, and even temporarily defeated as was the first (Taiping) rebellion against the Manchus. But I am convinced that finally nationalism will prevail and that the Chinese leaders, even those now in political power in Peking under the protection and by the will of Chang Tso-lin, share this conviction. The result is that they - those now representing China in Peking, are daily becoming bolder in their anti-treaty attitude and preparing the way for a complete harmony of action with the oncoming southerners. Attrition as a policy is giving way to the boldness of people confident that so long as the necessity for violent repressive measures is avoided they are certain of success. It is this that is partly responsible for the sudden and determined stand in the matter of the renewal of a treaty with Belgium.

A very considerable part in the possibilities for success for nationalism is played by public opinion abroad. Not only is the world more liberal, generous and tolerant than twenty years ago, but a combination of skilful propaganda and misleading reports from China has kept foreign public opinion in ignorance of actual conditions. Chinese

and certain foreign sources have depicted a patient peace-loving people of kindly intent toward all; oppressed alike by their own rulers and by the unjust treaties forced on them by the gunboats of foreigners; now by great effort throwing off the yoke and emerging into the light of peace, freedom and equality. The doctrines of nationalism ring like the Liberty Bell wherever in the United States they are heard. It would be a desperate American statesman indeed who today would propose that an army be despatched to China to maintain treaty rights by force, and his desperation would be changed to disaster when it appeared, as it would, that the National City Bank of New York, the British-American Tobacco Company, and the Standard Oil Co. were America's leading business interests in China.

Yet the fact remains that millions of dollars invested in China by all sorts and conditions of American citizens depend absolutely upon the maintenance of rights included in treaties that the Chinese now demand be denounced, and that stripped of the protection of the practice of the right of extra-territoriality, not only would no foreigner in China be safe in property or life, but the latter would be in danger of torture and extinction in a manner that would command the envious admiration of an Indian.

There is much indulgence in sentimental bosh both in the British Parliament and American Congress, by politicians seeking to capitalize sympathy, to the effect that China is being and for years has been heartlessly exploited by greedy imperialistic powers. They get the alleged facts for these assertions from half-informed, ill balanced professional optimists among certain classes in China, and from others who are deliberate suppressors or distortors of the truth. Actually, far from being exploited by, China has been the exploiter of the foreigner, as an examination of the present status of financial investments legitimately made for the equal benefit of the foreign investor and the Chinese will readily show. Solemn obligations have been brazenly ignored, and costly properties permitted to fall into ruin. It is the foreigner who needs protection from Chinese exploitation, not the Chinese from the foreigner.

POSSIBLE MITIGATING CHINESE INFLUENCES ON PRESENT NATIONALIST ANTI-TREATY POLICIES.

Assuming the complete success of the nationalist movement in China, there will follow at once the imposition upon its leaders of the sobering weight of responsibility for the conduct of China in the family of nations. They know that no foreign power actually feels safe at this time in relinquishing for its nationals in China certain special privileges now assured them by treaty. They also know that this feeling is soundly based on conditions in China that for the present they are unable to correct even if they were desirous of so doing. They also know that China is and will be in desperate need of foreign help and capital in rehabilitating the country so long torn by war. Though they have made free use of Soviet aid in their campaigns, they know that the huge sums necessary for peace time development will not be available from the treasury now so inexhaustible in aiding them in war.

I think that at this assumed juncture the nationalist leaders, having made and used anti-foreignism to its full value in assisting them into power, will endeavor to reduce it to proportions that will make possible guarantees to foreigners as to safety for life and

and investment in China. But this will not be an easy task, complicated as it will be by the desires of the violently chauvinistic among themselves and the persistent efforts of the Soviets to push on anti-foreignism. The former will present the greater difficulty. As to the latter, I am convinced that no Chinese has any other intention toward the Soviets than to use them to the limit and then throw them overboard. The Chinese understand Russians, their natures, aims and plans on the Asiatic mainland better than do any other people and this, added to the centuries of intercourse with Russia in which Russians consistently oppressed, deceived and browbeat them, to my mind makes certain what will be the nationalist attitude toward the Soviets when once they can no longer profitably employ Soviet help.

In the end conservative and temperate counsels will prevail, and relations with foreigners be re-established on bases satisfactory to both Chinese and foreigner. But it will be after a long and trying period in which the patience, tact and forbearance of all parties to the negotiations will be taxed to the limit of endurance, with the ever present prospect of certain factors becoming uncontrollable and a tragedy being precipitated.

INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN POWERS

It may be said at the outset that the conflict of interests on the Asiatic mainland between Russia and Japan has exercised more influence on the course of events in China in the past two or three years than any other external, and possibly internal, cause. Treating separately the treaty powers, it is idle to say that before the World War such treaty violations as now occur daily in China would have been summarily dealt with by them. Not only is that so; they would never have been permitted to reach their present number nor seriousness. But the march of time and events that has emboldened the Chinese bids fair to make impotent the powers that still have "unequal" treaties. And other circumstances than those that have been mentioned contribute their deterrent influences, as follows:

There no longer exists among the treaty powers even the small amount of former mutual confidence in the common advantage to be gained from a united and forcible insistence upon maintaining the treaties, or even on insistence short of force.

Though still without a navy, China has under arms today at least a million men; modern arms; modern arsenals and a dependable source of supply of munitions.

I am convinced that the Soviet regime would do all in its power to embroil the treaty powers in a war with China, and though should circumstances force such a war the powers would win in the end, it would be only after an effort that would involve great loss of life and expenditure of resources and at a constant risk of appalling complications. I think that foreigners, Chinese, and Soviets all recognize this equally, but only the Soviets, desperately anxious for the spread of their "World Revolution", are reckless enough to endeavor to force it. The day of the united front of treaty powers and of the gunboat policy in China is definitely past.

There remains to combat the Chinese anti-treaty policy only such measures as the treaty powers may take peacefully, gaining such strength as may be from such united action as is possible.

I cannot see much hope in these methods, and if the Chinese keep sufficiently cool to avoid some such thing as a general massacre of foreigners and continue their present campaign in its entirety; continued treaty invasion in China; skilful publicity and propaganda abroad; assistance from the Soviets with the menace thereby conveyed; the powers will find themselves fighting a ceaseless rear guard action, relinquishing point after point until the coast and the covering guns of the fleet are reached. The process may be accelerated by the summary abrogation of the treaties if and when the Nationalists get into full power. The result will be the same.

The treaty powers that are of moment at this time are France, Great Britain, Japan and the United States.

France is deeply concerned over the spread of radicalism in China. She sees in it a threat to her interests not only in China but in Indo-China as well. She has aided Chang Tso-lin with advice and by selling him aeroplanes. There is no doubt that she would like to aid him with money if she could herself or if she could persuade others to lend it to him. I do not think that alone, she exerts any appreciable influence on the course of events.

Great Britain's interest in maintaining the present treaties is apparent. Quite apart from the Crown Colony of Hongkong, which has suffered to the point of disaster, are her tremendous investments in China. The problem for her is whether to face with equanimity the gradual snuffing out of the treaties under which these investments were made, with no assurances that new treaties would protect them, or to resist forcibly. The risk of either course is great. If the latter is adopted she has no assurance that the other treaty powers would assist her and she knows that the Soviet regime would give every possible assistance to China short only of war and perhaps including that. The cost of an expedition would be excessive and would meet with much opposition at home. If single-handed she were successful she would alone have to suffer the resultant retaliatory strike and boycott she has already found so disastrous. Yet I cannot see where she is to look for an ally except to France, and I think France both too poor and too canny to join Great Britain alone in such an enterprise.

There are times when it seems that the perplexing nature of the problem has bewildered the British and they appear to be feeling their way. In certain matters their Colonial Office and Foreign Office advise diametrically opposite courses. On one occasion the course of action decided upon by the Legation was set at naught by the business interests and Consul General at Shanghai. It is doubtful if any action in China could have been more asinine in its stupidity or reckless in its possible consequences than the British fleet's attack at Wanhsian. There is every reason to believe that it came as a surprise to the Legation at Peking, which bitterly, if privately, disapproved of it. Apparently it was an affair of navy initiative quite independent of other counsel.

I think the British are going to have to follow the course of other powers, bowing to the storm and hoping that their interests may survive it. But there are many well informed and highly placed Britishers, fully aware of all factors of the problem and of sound judgment, who doggedly insist that when all the courses of patience and good temper have been exhausted, and even if single-handed, Great Britain will step in with ships and men and put an end to the whole bloody mess. It may be. And she may be able to do it. In fact, if

she has no complications and only the Chinese to meet, I think she can. And if she does we may expect to see our own Government profit fully from the result.

In the meantime, as the immediate object of attack, the ostensible bete noir of the Chinese, through such measures of local self-defense as she has taken in China and Tibet, and in the possible role of exhausted patience, Great Britain exercises an influence second only to the result of the conflict between Japan and Russia, and because of her investments probably greater than either alone.

Japan's whole policy toward China has changed. I conceive her present policy to be based upon her own strategical position in which, in case of war, all China must be a source of supply for as long a time as possible and China north of the Wall would be absolutely vital to her as a continuing source of supply. In the past, taking her place with the Western powers, identifying her interests with theirs and thinking that if she did not have their assistance she at least would not have their opposition, she boldly made her bid for control south of the Wall. Her failure and disappointment needs no comment here. A similar failure met her great efforts to colonize and make a Japanese province of Manchuria. She found herself suddenly isolated and frowned upon and the alliance with Great Britain, her great pride, unrenewed. Making the best of a situation that left her pride sorely hurt, she has adopted the policy noted. Outwardly a cheerful co-partner with the other treaty powers, she is ready to go to such lengths in maintaining good relations with China south of the Wall as apparently to justify the charge of defeatism. I am inclined to think that were it not for her fear of the extension within her Empire of bolshevism, she would throw in her lot with China and the Soviets in a Pan-Asiatic movement, always provided she were adequately safe-guarded against Russian ambitions in Manchuria.

I think too that Japan is deriving some solace for her hurt pride over the terminated Japanese-British alliance in the predicament in which the latter now find themselves. Japan and Great Britain acting together could administer a sharp lesson to China. Or if she must act alone Great Britain would feel much more secure did she know just what Japan would do. But Great Britain at the insistence of her colonies and America, terminated the Japanese alliance and America takes no such part in Chinese affairs as did the Japanese nor as the British hoped they would.

There are no special treaty rights that Japan is not prepared to relinquish, and it is quite clear that in some respects she would be better off without some, with the corresponding advantage that would inure to her. But she cannot relinquish her treaty rights yet while participation with the other treaty powers keeps alive an opportunity to have certain monies formerly advanced to China recognized as legitimate indebtedness adequately secured, nor while other advantages from such participation may accrue. When the financial considerations of special treaty right relinquishment outweigh those of maintenance, she will promptly relinquish, being in no way withheld by those other considerations of the safety of her nationals which play a part in the policies of Western powers. She is in a difficult position and one rather deserving of sympathy.

However determined to maintain friendship with China and by every possible act to bring about Chinese forgetfulness of the past, there are certain points upon which Japan is adamant, and these are her status in Manchuria and her policy north of the Wall. The Kwantung Peninsula flatly will not be returned to China. Korea is to remain under Japan. No other foreign power is to gain a further foothold in Manchuria and such Russian interests as now exist there must be kept within their present bounds only until it is possible to obliterate them altogether. Though Japan failed to colonize Manchuria she intends to be the foreign power dominant in that area. She sees the maintenance of this attitude as vital to her continued national existence, and is as ready now to support it by war as she was in 1904 when she staked everything on the issue and only barely won. I think the Japanese people as a whole thoroughly understand and support their government in this intention and that Soviet intrigue to break down this popular support will be ineffective.

Japan would like to make this Manchurian policy as little onerous to the Chinese as possible, even to gain Chinese alliance in its perpetuation. Every friendly effort to accomplish this is being made. But if these efforts fail, then if China doesn't like the policy she can lump it and so may the rest of the world - it is not to be altered while Japan has a man and a gun left.

In pursuit of this policy, Japan has made Chang Tso-lin, the present super-Tuchun of the Three Eastern Provinces that make up Manchuria, and keeps him in power. It is impossible to state the extent of the assistance she has given him at various times when he was threatened, except that it has been enough. It is the possibility that nationalism might threaten this policy that has induced her to permit Chang to attack its forces south of the Wall. For no other reason would she risk embroilment in that area. It is certain that Chang is restive under Japanese control, and that he has even had vague plans to throw it off, with Soviet support, but Japan is too astute for him and his advisers. Chang's narrow escape from disaster at the hands of the treacherous Kuo Sung-ling left him breathless with fright and under a clear understanding of just how much that escape and his continued existence is due to Japan. And he knows quite well that Japan is entirely capable of replacing him with a man more amenable to their wishes should be carry his restiveness too far.

In the event of an anti-foreign demonstration of such magnitude as would require a rescuing expedition, it would be to Japan that we should have to look for immediate assistance. I feel sure she would be equal to the emergency.

The United States, in my opinion, will not intervene for any reason short of a general massacre. This I think sufficiently obvious to make a discussion of it unnecessary. One point might be noted, which is that the cost of an expedition would be greater than our total Chinese investment. There is a counter argument that the cost of the expedition itself would be an investment and if order were established and maintained in China, one that would produce great profits. That is true. Probably never in the history of the world has there been such a frightful and needless waste of natural resources and costly investments as is now going on in China, nor any country that given a strong stable government would produce such revenue and afford such markets. I think in the interests of humanity and civilization the powers should

intervene in China, throw out the militarists and Tuchuns, administer the country and give the wretched farmers, laborers and peasants a chance for the comfort and happiness now denied them. But nations do not act from such motives and any one with a modicum of intelligence knows how far in America a proposal would get that as an investment for our future profit we should send an army to China to cram order down Chinese throats.

I believe that the policy we have so far pursued in China is wrong. Protesting our benevolence of intent toward China, we have participated promptly and fully in benefits that have accrued from the positive action of other nations, notably the British, though professing to deprecate such action - taking the profit not only without risk but also while taking it hoping that we gained credit with the Chinese by refraining from participation in the action that brought the profit. The significance of such conduct was no more misunderstood by the Chinese than by the foreign powers.

Finding ourselves being excluded from China because of its division into spheres of influence among other powers, by our "open door" policy we brought about an end to the only method that so far has shown any genuine results in good order and prosperity in China.

Insisting upon a policy of neutrality toward all contending factions, we have nevertheless under the Arms Embargo Agreement watched the Central Government with which we maintained relations, while refusing to sell it a single cartridge, beset by enemies armed lavishly from Russia; in effect an action distinctly favorable to every radical and subversive movement in China, in no way deterrent to war, and infinitely pleasing to the Soviets.

We have forced Great Britain out of her alliance with Japan, but we offer her nothing in return.

It is true that the Washington Conference cannot be said to have been abortive. It forced the Japanese out of Shantung and Shantung has since been a riot of bloodshed, banditry and war, with its foreign investments rapidly disappearing; the Tariff Conference resulted in the airing of some truths about China before the world; the Commission on Extra-Territoriality will make plain just how unbelievably bad are conditions as to life and property in China. I think in its effects our policy in China has earned us the suspicion of the other powers with no compensating advantage of friendship and admiration from the Chinese.

But such as it is, with all its good intent and actual hypocrisy, it is our traditional policy and for the present cannot be changed. Perhaps some day when we need China as a market - a time when we are not so prosperously idealistic, but not now. And that being so, so far as I can see, all that we can do is to cling tenaciously to every right so long as we can, using force only when necessary to save life and yielding only when every recourse short of war has been exhausted. As noted above, it is going to be a trying time, but eventually working agreements in the form of treaties will be written. They will not be the treaties best either for us or the Chinese but they will have to serve.

Considering the inevitability of events, it may seem that a virtue might be made of necessity, a grand gesture of generosity indulged in and the special rights and exemptions of the present treaties voluntarily relinquished. But this would be to admit what is

monstrously untrue - that China is fit to be accepted as an equal in the family of sovereign states, and all missionaries and touring intelligentia from the States to the country notwithstanding, we should never admit that. Equality must not be granted to China because of sympathetic buncome nor withheld because China is inhabited by Chinese, but should be determined by the facts, which are the last things the Chinese just now wish presented.

With our great wealth and our reputation for fair dealing, I think we might exert a tremendous and beneficial influence on the whole course of events, provided the American public were informed of conditions as they actually exist and would support the measures that should be taken. As things are at present I think our influence negligible. It seems a curious inconsistency of our situation that though we will take no part in Chinese affairs other nations do, frequently to our disadvantage, with money that must find its original source with us.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN CHINA AND THEIR EFFECT UPON CHINESE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

There are two Russian objectives on the Asiatic Mainland. The principal one is wholly national and in its continuity is not dependent upon the form of government in control of Russia, though there has been apparent in recent years an increased efficiency under the Soviet regime in the plans and methods with which it is being pursued over those of the Czarist Government.

This objective is the gratification of the Russian need for an eastern outlet on the Pacific at an ice-free port under their own control. As one of the most significant movements in the world, not only for the present but in the past, during which it brought about one of the greatest wars in history, it requires no other discussion here other than to note it as profoundly affecting the policies of Russia, China and Japan, and if persisted in, as almost certain eventually to precipitate a world tragedy.

In the first intoxication of their Revolution, believing that world movements were controllable by idealisms, and that oppressed people everywhere awaited only the word to throw off oppressors and oppressive laws, the Soviets proclaimed in China the dawning of a new era in the relations existing between their respective countries. All treaties that were unequal were to be torn up, all advantages theretofore gained by such treaties relinquished, and all selfish national plans abandoned. But as they entered upon the duties of government and felt the weight of responsibility, they found that they could not make real their ideals and that they were utterly unable to alter a national movement that in many of its aspects is more biological than political. From the realization of this dates a tacit resumption and an added efficiency in the pursuit of this objective. Correctly analyzing the causes of failure in the war with Japan in 1904-1905, the Soviets are proceeding systematically to provide against their repetition and to improve their chances for success.

I feel sure that they would prefer to gain their objective by other means than war, even though thereby revenge would be foregone. They are approaching the Japanese with the olive branch wherever opportunity presents. I think they would gladly enter into an alliance

with Japan for concerted action in China provided they could be assured of the port of their desires. Or that under the same assurance they would join with Japan and China in a Pan-Asiatic combination against the rest of the powers. Also that they are constantly examining the possibility of bringing about an alliance with China as against Japan. As a plan of action this latter perhaps trends more closely to warlike than peaceful means.

Foreseeing the possibility of failure to accomplish their objective by these peaceful means they are making preparations for a physical clash. These include propaganda in Japan itself designed to weaken the Empire and to create sympathy among the Japanese with the Soviets. They hope by these means, by dwelling on the common interests of the laboring classes of both countries, and the horrors of the last war, to make it difficult if not impossible for Japan again to take up arms against them.

They also include the creation of a new line of communications from their base to the possible theatre of operations in Manchuria, the single line available to them in 1904 having proved so fatally insufficient. This, already planned, is to run from the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal, roughly through Urga and Kalgan, to Peking.

Well aware of the handicap under which they labored in 1904 of operating in an unfriendly country, they are sedulously cultivating Chinese friendship everywhere and endeavoring to erect in or near the prospective theatre of operations states definitely allied with them. There is here presented a curious and perhaps unavoidable anomaly. In the creation of these states, territory that the Chinese persist in regarding as their own must and has been definitely alienated from China. But the Chinese will never cease to regard the area of these new states, Mongolia, as their own nor to make efforts to bring it back into the fold. Russian duplicity in Mongolia, barefaced deceit in treaties concerning it and their obviously detrimental intentions to China make one wonder how they expect to bring the Chinese to believe in the sincerity of their protestations that elsewhere they seek only to help China regain all lost elements of sovereignty and alienated territories and concessions. I think the Chinese are in do doubt as to the actual intent back of these maneuvers, and to their correct assessment of them add a memory of ancient wrongs and grievances. The question presented is whether the Russians are stupid enough to think they are deceiving the Chinese or whether they feel the importance of pushing their main objective, through Manchuria and in spite of the Japanese, is so great as to make other efforts in China of subsidiary value and only to be profited from for as long and as much as possible. In this they are in a position comparable to the Japanese, in that both find a point in their relations with the Chinese when all other considerations must yield to a paramount one in Manchuria.

Whether or not this is the explanation, in any event I think the Russians never understand the Chinese as do the Chinese the Russians. It seems to me that the main Russian objective would have had more prospects of Chinese sympathy if not support had the Russians brought to their efforts a better knowledge of Chinese psychology. A combination of frankness and firmness would have seemed a wiser course, though this is debatable. But Russians, for all their professions of friendship for the Chinese, have for them an impatient contempt (perhaps justified by their relations) that keeps them from an intelligent study of their possibilities.

Summed up, I would say that the Soviets, ostensibly coming today to the Chinese as friends, equals and liberators instead of as the brutal soldiers of the days of the Czar, are forwarding with greater efficiency and determination than the Czarist Government an objective in China that must always profoundly affect the political situation in the Far East and threaten the peace of the world. Today they are not ready to fight for its accomplishment but they are making all plans and great efforts to be ready, and have an increasing confidence in their prospects of success.

There is one consideration that may bring about the actual testing of these plans by war at an earlier date than otherwise would be the case, and that is its possible political value to the Soviet regime. A popular foreign war frequently has been used by governments not too securely in power to gain needed support from the people. As a war of revenge against the Japanese, and to regain lost Russian concessions and investments, one waged to retrieve all lost in 1904-1905 I think would be intensely popular and if skilfully played up would bring under the Red flag many a now intransigent White. It might easily bring about a more united Russia than heretofore has existed. We may be sure that this is given frequent careful consideration.

The second Russian objective in China is one that in its inception was peculiar to the Soviet regime, though in its later aspects it is found to be becoming ever more closely bound up with the first and main objective.

As noted, following the Revolution Soviet protestations to China were of a most exaggeratedly friendly nature - Equality - Brotherhood of Men -- Down with Capitalism - all the catch words of the day were used. But engrossed with their plans to bring about their "World Revolution" and thinking to meet with easier and more impressive success among the western nations, they gave little serious attention to China. It was only when these efforts in the west were defeated and they found themselves confronted by a block of nations preventing the spread westward of their doctrines that they turned to the east.

At first only desirous of gaining in China a convert to their cause, the Soviet regime has of late found desperate need to do so that somewhere among people of the world other than the Russians it holds subject to its tyranny, free acceptance of its friendship and theories of government may be found and it thereby strengthened and justified at home and abroad. If here in China it fails as elsewhere it has, then its hopes of a world revolution are over and when that is gone with the distracting effect of the feverish activity incident to its propagation; when the Russians see not only the doctrines and foreign policies of their Soviet tyrants everywhere scorned and rejected but as well appreciate their own miserable condition, the Soviet regime will be in straits to maintain itself. To my mind this explains the great effort that the Soviets have lately made in China, with its feverishness that has precluded caution and common sense. And I think that the prospect of complete failure emphasizes the danger, or brings it closer, that in such case, realizing the precariousness of their position, the Soviet regime by an appeal to popular imagination and support combined with concessions as to principles of government will seek to retrieve their situation by bringing a united Russia under their banner to a war with Japan. It is a possibility worthy of thought, though I admit it would be a course almost of desperation.

Originally this second objective sought to bring about a revolution in China in the course of which it was hoped that communistic principles would be adopted and a soviet state result. That this would also result in the abrogation of existing treaties with other foreign powers with much consequent trouble and embarrassment to them and the possibility of graver complications, added favor to the plan. The Soviets are eager to promote any discord in, and actually to embroil the powers in war with China, not only for the fishing in troubled waters that would result but also because in the present state of the world there would certainly come about from such a war more opportunities for their subversive tactics against organized society.

But the Chinese a thousand years ago had tried communism and found it wanting. Not only would they have no more of it; the genius of the people is fundamentally and totally against it. It took much time and argument for the Soviet representatives in China to convince themselves of this and more to bring it home to the Soviet regime. In the meantime vast sums of money were spent like water, the nimble witted Chinese making hay while the sun shone. With their tongues in their cheeks they accepted Soviet gold and principles, and obediently organized "communistic cells" all over China, and with increasing demands for subsidies gave assurances of an impatience for decisive revolutionary action that in its actual results when submitted to test was heartbreaking to the honest Soviet workers, pitifully hopeful of at least just a little bloodshed.

For their great object of red revolt and ruin the Shanghai incident as a starting point fell flat, as did Shameen, though both were used by the Chinese for their own ends. This much may be said, that Soviet gold helped the Chinese in both cases though without benefit to the Soviets. Staking much on the sentiment they had paid for and thought they had created, use was attempted of the Taku incident for a demonstration in Peking. Just how far reaching were their plans and hopes is not known. In any event not only did they fail, the then Chinese Government being forewarned, but the failure was accompanied by such a tragedy of wounded and killed among their dupes, the school children, as shocked even the Chinese.

Making the best of the situation, the Soviets changed their policy. Renouncing all efforts to spread communism they devoted themselves to the propagation of nationalism in China. This continues to be their second objective.

In their earlier efforts the Soviets had succeeded in placing with the National Government in Canton as advisors representatives who grew to have considerable influence. As between those under this influence; professed and radical communists; and the more conservative members of the Kuomintang, there developed a division of council that at one time seriously threatened the whole movement.

In the meantime matters had progressed rather favorably for their plans in the northwest. In an attempt to isolate Feng Yu-hsiang and his army, the Kuominchun; Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian leader, had forced him from Peking northwest into the country about Kalgan, where without an arsenal or seaport it was hoped he would become negligible through lack of funds and munitions. The Soviets seized the opportunity presented. They offered Feng money, munitions and instructors for his army provided he would be amenable to and further their plans. Feng proved willing. There followed a period of intense effort to fully equip and prepare the Kuominchun for war accompanied by successful efforts to bring about an alliance between Feng and the Cantonese leaders.

Other plans were made providing for the raising of a supporting army of Mongolians and Buriats; for the creation of independent states in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Kansu allied with the Soviets, and for the spread into Tibet of communistic theories. In Central China great efforts were made, and both in Honan and Hunan considerable progress in communism followed. This was the period of the Soviets' greatest hopes. Everywhere things seemed to be going their way and given but a little more time for preparation they saw communism everywhere triumphant.

But at this point (spring, 1925), Japan became alarmed over reports of Feng's growing strength and the stories of a Mongolian army, with Soviet materiel and instructors, forming on the borders of Manchuria. Chang Tso-lin had always wanted to crush Feng but had been restrained by Japan, the latter wanting him to conserve his strength in Manchuria. I think over-estimating the seriousness of the situation, Japan gave her consent to Chang's attack. There followed the abortive movement of Manchurian troops on Peking, in which Chang and Japan both learned to their dismay the full strength that Feng had developed; and then in rapid succession the Shanghai, Shameen and Taku Incidents, each with its own aftermath and all increasing in seriousness. Inspired thereto by his Soviet advisors, Feng not only denounced the foreigners and made what was practically a declaration of war against Great Britain, but boldly challenged Chang, then attacking him, to join with him against the foreigners. With the eyes of all China upon him, Chang was checkmated and out-generalled by this audacious stroke. A little later, by purchased treachery, Chang was suddenly and viciously attacked in Manchuria and survived by the narrowest of margins.

If the train of events brought about a great Soviet disappointment, and change from a propagation of communism to one of nationalism, it also shocked Chang and the Japanese into a realization of the true extent of the strength in China south of the Wall of nationalism.

Soviet hopes in propagating nationalism are based on the belief that if successful it will result in the creation of a government favorable to them and their main objective; a beneficiary of their efforts; and if not similar in nature to their own regime, sufficiently so to enable them to point to it with pride as their handiwork. They look for material benefits in exclusive trade agreements and preferential treaties, and in the form of concessions for railway and other construction. All embarrassment caused to the treaty powers by the anti-treaty and anti-foreign policies announced by the nationalists will be as acceptable, if not as far reaching, as would have been that following a bolshevization of China. They hope that some one more amenable to them and less to the Japanese will replace Chang in Manchuria. And also that they may firmly establish themselves in a base in northwest China from which they may carry on campaigns against either China or India, or through through Manchuria to the sea.

In the spring of 1926, fully aware of the growing peril, Chang, feeling unequal single-handed to the task, brought about an alliance with his former enemy, Wu Pei-fu, and entered upon a campaign finally to crush Feng and eliminate the Red menace. In preparing for the campaign Chang made earnest pleas to the treaty powers for support, stating that he was fighting a great and common enemy. I feel certain no western nation gave him help, but am not too sure as to Japan. In

any event, the sharpness of the new issue is indicated by the fact that in combatting the Reds, Chang, beneficiary of Japan, was allied not only with an ancient foe but one of the leading Japanese baiters in China, Wu Pei-fu.

The moment to attack seemed favorable. The campaigns of 1925 had left Feng with dimished prestige and depleted stores. Feng himself had gone to Russia, ostensibly crushed in spirit over the great loss of life among his men. Canton was in the throes of party strife with the balance of power veering toward the conservative, corrupt and inefficient Kuomintang leaders.

The campaign was launched and for a while went favorably. But equal to the emergency, the Soviet representatives in Canton acted with great aggressiveness. Centering upon a military leader of proved merit, Chang Kai-shek, they so strengthened him with money and munitions as to enable him to seize power in Canton and throw out the conservatives. The expedition to the north followed and is still meeting with success. It should have resulted before this in complete victory had its ally, the Kuominchun, been able to hold onto the nearly impregnable position at Nankow where it was defending itself and containing the allied armies of Chang and Wu.

Though at the time of this writing the campaign is still going on, it is slowing down as winter approaches. The Nationalist forces seem to intend an attempt to bring the Yangtze under their control from the Wu-Han cities to Shanghai, and until the spring to consolidate their control of all China south of the river. Probably they will move their capital from Canton to one of the river cities. During the winter they will prepare for a resumption of the offensive against the north. In this they expect help from the Kuominchun. The latter, after giving up Nankow, retreated beyond Kalgan, suffering greatly in morale and discipline. It was a time of great depression for the Soviets, who saw a golden opportunity lost when Nankow fell. But after exasperated recriminations new arrangements were made, fresh supplies brought in from Russia and Feng, the mighty, induced to return to the command of his faithful christians. His coming had an electrifying effect and a rehabilitated Kuominchun is again in the field.

I think that a combined movement of the Nationalists from the south and the Kuominchun from the northwest against Chang's and Wu's forces about Peking will be successful. The probabilities of success are the greater because of the universal sympathy with the Nationalist cause, above referred to, and the incredible stupidity of Chang, Wu and their subordinates. These have proclaimed a holy war against the Reds as enemies to the country, denouncing them in unmeasured terms. Yet the people have experienced from Feng's soldiers in the north and Canton's soldiers in the south no abuses nor outrages, while wherever they have appeared, in their own provinces or coming as deliverers to others, the soldiers of Wu and Chang have treated the peaceful inhabitants with the utmost brutality and savagery. Nationalist sympathizers have been punished in exemplary and out of hand fashion, the wholesale executions of youths, however misguided they were, creating a feeling of horror wherever they have occurred. "If", the people say, "these are our deliverers, give us back Feng's men or hasten the arrival of the Cantonese".

EFFECT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES

The effect of the main objective has been alluded to. The effect of the second, while directed to the bolshevization of China, was of no great moment. Great sums of money were devoted to it, but only a fraction remained after embezzlement alike by Soviet and Chinese agents. Reports are full of quarrels and investigations, bitter complaints, charges and counter-charges as a result of this misappropriation. From such sums as actually were expended was created a machinery for the subversion of the government that was most impressive. The Soviets observed with scarcely concealed satisfaction a network of all the usual features. Student societies, groups of laborers, flying squads of destruction, "Dare to Die" corps, "Communistic Cells", Bolshevik Nuclei", travelling and impressive agents and instructors, flags and paraphernalia; all the stock actors, properties and fixtures. And all appeared to be thirsting for gore and fretting with impatience while awaiting the signal that would set them free to burn and destroy in the name of liberty. It was a time of anxiety for the law abiding. Rumors were everywhere of ammunition and arms concealed and bring introduced, of incendiary and assassination plots; of mysterious meetings and midnight conferences. It would be unfair to the experience and technic of theSoviets to omit mention of that final perfect detail - the fascinating, beautiful and clever women plotters. In Peking alone there were several of them at different times.

But as stated above, submitted to the test, the fabric collapsed in a wreck that would have been laughable but for the tragedy of the inspired student demonstration and the traditional "whiff of grapeshot" in Peking. Except for that, the net effects of Soviet effort to bolshevize China were some local disorders; comfort for many Chinese coolies; profitable occupation for some Soviet agents; some anxiety and subsequent relief and merriment among the law abiding.

Changing to the promotion of nationalism and profiting from the wisdom that came from their early errors, the Soviets gave up placing confidence in propaganda among the masses and centered their attention upon leaders, dealing with them in frank terms of barter and sale, dollars and cents. The effect of their efforts has been profound and far-reaching.

General as I believe the support to be for nationalism, it would never have gained the present opportunity for expression had not the Soviets provided funds and leaders. For years its chief proponent was as the voice of one crying in the wilderness with no visible effect upon the country. Soviet leadership, methods, efficiency and gold have infused active effective life into it. I believe that though possibly in years it might have become a significant movement, that as it stands today it is the concrete result of Soviet pursuit of their secondary objective in China. During the past two years the threat that it has conveyed to established order and leaders and to the vital interests of at least one foreign powers, has kept the country in warfare that has cost thousands of lives and millions of treasure. Strikes and boycotts have added their loss to the total. All the possibilities of the present situation and the misery of the present war are due to nationalism, and nationalism today in China is due to Soviet Russia.

But though the Soviets have made the immediate triumph of nationalism possible, I do not believe that in the end they will gain from it other than the satisfaction of having caused the hated imperialistic powers worry, loss and embarrassment. The moment they safely can do so, the Chinese will throw them overboard without compensation or thanks. Not only that, I think we may be sure that the Chinese will not be content before they wrest from them all they fancy they have gained in Mongolia. We can view this with composure. They would gladly have egged on the Chinese to massacre us, or to any other outrage against us. But they took on a task for which their previous relations with the Chinese unsuited them, that on the score of the Chinese alone was too great for them, and in the ambitious nature of their plans in Tibet and against India they encountered a foe in Great Britain who has done much to dash their hopes in the northwest. At the conclusion of all the present movement in China I foresee the status as to Russia restored as it existed before the Great War in all except treaty rights, and these nor any other privileges enjoyed by its nationals no greater than those of any country, and possibly considerably less than those of some.

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Military Attache.

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JAN 8 1927
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FINAL REPORT

PART II

POSSIBLE MILITARY OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE PRESENT COURSE OF EVENTS

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JAN 12 1927

These may be considered for discussion as falling under three heads:

(1) If our policy remains unchanged, and the present course of events is unmarked by such an anti-foreign demonstration as to compel a rescuing and punitive expedition.

(2) A possible rescuing and punitive expedition.

(3) Such a change in policy as would result in our participation in armed intervention for the protection of our interests.

IF OUR POLICY REMAINS UNCHANGED

At present, in addition to a Legation Guard in Peking, we maintain in China a force of approximately 800 officers and men. These are two battalions of the 15th Infantry with certain auxiliary elements of command, staff and supply. Other foreign troops in China - British, French, Japanese and Italian - bring the total foreign contingent to about 5000, of which number some 1100 are in Peking as Legation Guards. The balance are on duty in accordance with the Protocol of 1901. Their principal mission is the maintenance of open communications between Peking and the sea. The sea has been interpreted as the port of Chinwangtao. Originally the combined foreign force on this duty was considerably larger than is now the case. It was further strengthened by two conditions that no longer obtain.

One of these conditions found its occasion in the foreign belief, in my opinion wholly correct, that open communication could not be maintained as contemplated if in Chinese civil war contending parties were permitted to use the railway connecting Peking and the sea, other means of communication, and wharfage. Had practice based upon this belief been rigidly adhered to, eventually it would have required more troops. The cost of these might have been assessed, wholly or in part, against the profits of the railroad thereby protected. Probably, however, other considerations than cost played their part in the decision reached by the Diplomatic Body in 1912 that parties to the civil war then going on should be permitted the use of the railroad, telegraph lines and wharfage. Once granted, the concession could not be withdrawn. A natural consequence has been in time of civil war to place in the hands of Chinese military officers complete authority as to the extent the railroad and all its resources were required by military operations.

At first this authority was exercised with moderation, but with dwindling foreign garrisons, diminishing foreign prestige following the World War, and increasing boldness on the part of the Chinese, it has been used with absolute disregard to the Protocol. I think

the Chinese attitude in this: The treaty powers stipulated that communications between Peking and the sea should be kept open and we agreed. But the treaty powers evidently had no confidence in us for they further stipulated that they should maintain garrisons at indicated points to insure the open communications. Therefore, if these garrisons can keep the line open, we have nothing to say; but if they can't, then let us disregard this treaty stipulation as promptly as may be.

The result has been disastrous. During the warfare of last year the international trains, the running of which in spite of wars and through contending forces had been the visible evidence of a maintenance of communications, were brought to a full stop. On the line between Peking and Tientsin an international train was halted by damaged roadbed, and a party of soldiers under an American officer sent forward to investigate, was fired upon and forced to retire. A short distance east of Tientsin another international train was halted by fire and the train commander, a Japanese officer, informed that he must at once withdraw the train to Tientsin, not even sufficient time being allowed him to communicate by wireless with his superiors in that city. The Chinese commanding officer had artillery placed in position and said if his orders were not carried out at once fire would be opened.

In both cases the alternative to submitting to this violation of a treaty right, upon which in theory at least depends measures to prevent a repetition of the siege of the Legations, was the use of force. This from the conditions was clearly out of the question, fire-eating "old China hands" to the contrary notwithstanding.

There is thus presented an unpleasant but incontrovertible fact; the foreign contingents as at present constituted cannot carry out their principal mission whenever, in the course of the constantly recurring wars, the Chinese do not care to have them do so.

The other condition was that contained in the Tientsin Evacuation Agreement of 1902, to the effect that except for a negligible number for a specified purpose, armed Chinese troops should not be quartered nor marched within 20 li of Tientsin. Tientsin is the base from which the foreign contingents operate and the location of their headquarters. This condition was violated in 1924, and no adequate protest having been made, has now fallen into ineffectiveness. Thousands of armed Chinese troops have been and still are quartered in and about Tientsin within the area from which they were to have been excluded.

To the difficulty this adds to the general problem of preserving intact a base for operations, is the further special problem it results in for the American contingent. All other contingents have concessions in Tientsin, the integrity of which is secured by other treaties than the Protocol of 1901 and Evacuation Agreement. In these concessions are located their barracks, to which they may withdraw their forces, excluding Chinese without provocative measures. As the concessions adjoin each other, the effect is a common base.

But the Americans occupy barracks and land rented from the Chinese and which is under Chinese administration. Thus, the 20 li prohibition having fallen into desuetude, the Chinese might with all apparent propriety move troops into buildings and grounds immediately adjacent to the American quarters. This had to be provided against.

On the initiative and at the insistence of the then American commander, Major General W. D. Connor, a plan for combined action was entered into by all contigent commanders. This plan, among other things, provided for the maintenance intact from entry by Chinese troops of what was known as the "Defense Area". This area included all the foreign concessions; that portion of the ex-German concession necessary to the Americans as a base; and certain small areas under Chinese control that were required to make the Defense Area strategically sound. It was agreed that if all other measures to prevent the ingress of Chinese troops had failed, force should be resorted to.

Submitted to test in December, 1925, this agreement was broken, the British and French permitting columns of Chinese troops to march through area under their control, and their and the Japanese soldiers being withdrawn to their respective concessions from duty on the Defense Area boundary. The Americans and Italians in the meantime had faithfully carried out the agreement, the former at one place at the great risk of an armed clash with a Chinese division.

There followed considerable correspondence in the course of which the British Commandant made a rather natural observation that if the lack of a concession embarrassed the Americans and made it impossible for them to have a base, they had better get one. The French Commandant seems to have shared this view. Their attitude and unspoken comment was that the Americans had for years sought to make capital with the Chinese by being the only great power to give up concessions, adopting a "holier than thou" pose toward, while actually relying upon the concessions of the other powers.

But however much justice there might be in that view, or the further one that America, not a party to the Evacuation Agreement, was by the collapse of the 20 li prohibition exposed in rather a ridiculous position, other factors outweighed them. Confronted by a situation in which the Americans felt their position would have to be made secure or their troops withdrawn, and realizing what the latter would mean, a new formula was adopted at a meeting of the ministers of the powers concerned. In this the former agreement in essence was embodied, it being definitely decided that the Defense Area, with a single exception providing for aid from them to the police power when that was temporarily necessary, should be kept free from Chinese troops by joint force if necessary, and that in preserving order detachments from all foreign contingents, if asked for by the commandant of a particular area, should participate. Thus the onus of keeping territory essentially Chinese free as a base from entry by Chinese troops should be divided among all.

The powers feel that they are justified in insisting upon a base of operations for the troops provided for in the Protocol of 1901, while the Americans feel that all should share in the duty of keeping the Chinese-owned American base intact.

Since the adoption of this formula it has been subjected to one test, Manchurian troops establishing in May, 1926, a headquarters immediately adjacent to the American barracks. Some discussion followed, and eventually joint action having been agreed upon, notice to vacate was served on the Chinese and they left. But two

disturbing things occurred. For a short time the Japanese appeared loath to carry out the formula though finally they acquiesced in joint action, and the Chinese acted in an ugly manner.

I have myself absolutely no faith in the effectiveness of the formula unless the joint action it contemplates is at the time in consonance with the policies elsewhere of the powers party to it. In this problem, as everywhere in China, appears the factor of divided interests among the treaty powers. There is little doubt that both the French and Japanese concessions have been used to aid the Manchurian forces and that as in December, 1925, the Japanese and French permitted the Manchurian troops to pass through the Defense Area to facilitate their retreat, so in May, 1926 the Japanese were reluctant to offend the "Young General", Chang Tso-lin's son, whose headquarters it was that had been established in the American sector of the Defense Area. Whenever they feel that Manchurian army interests may be adversely affected by observing the formula, I think the Japanese will bluntly disregard it. I find it possible to sympathize with them in this, as I do with those Chinese who feel that the foreign concessions harbor troops, no longer able to carry out their mission, that actually participate, directly or indirectly, in Chinese civil war. The attitude of the British is to my mind perfectly explicable on grounds given above by their commandant, and by their reluctance to bring on a clash with Chinese troops after all actuated by no anti-foreign intent.

Considering the foregoing; the present numerical insufficiency of foreign contingents to carry out their mission; the improper use that I feel sure at least Japan has made and will again make of her concession and the troops that guard it; and our own insufficiently regularized position, I think the problem could be settled in one of two ways:

1st: By such reinforcements as would make it possible to carry out the mission, which should be in strength a total of 25,000, and would have to include definite arrangements as to a secure base.

2nd: By withdrawing our contingent. Of course by this it is not meant that the Legation Guard in Peking should be distrubed.

Under the present circumstances, our forces are more apt to provoke than prevent trouble, and by their inability to keep communications open, contribute to the diminishing of foreign prestige. There is also to be considered the fact that Chinese resentment against improper uses of foreign concessions and troops will extend to us, and the further one that they resent our stubbornness in clinging on to our position though unable by ourselves to do anything.

If conditions throughout China were other than they now are, I would recommend withdrawal. But I do not think that course wise at this time. We may have urgent need of a covering force and base for reinforcements, and for that reason, even at the risk of the complications and dangers noted, I think our garrison should remain untouched until times are better. And if that were not sufficient in itself as a reason there is another, which is that were we to withdraw it would precipitate a crisis between the Chinese and the other powers having contingents, and in this we would neither gain credit for a concession nor exemption from any resulting trouble.

There have been other solutions suggested. One is to make a demand to the other powers as the price of our retaining an armed force in China that all unite in re-establishing the 20 li prohibition.

But as the Japanese, to my mind, have ceased to regard their contingent as on its former mission but there for other purposes, I feel sure they would not accede, and unless all acted together there could be no hope of success. I think as a matter of fact that the Japanese would like to see our contingent withdrawn.

Another proposed solution is that we serve notice on China that a definite area has been reserved by us in Tientsin as a base. But this in effect has been done and been badly enough received by the Chinese.

POSSIBLE RESCUING AND PUNITIVE EXPEDITION

Though it might be possible to consider separately rescuing and punitive expeditions, if an expedition were necessary to rescue our nationals in China it would only be after the Chinese had committed such outrages as would result in the column having the double mission.

However serious the situation is and may become as to our interests in China, it is my belief that Chinese leaders, as stated above, wish to avoid any physical clash. Therefore I am of the opinion that while the danger of such a clash naturally is greater than it has been, it is still remote. Of course it must be provided against. I would recommend on general principles and for reasons already stated, such a reinforcement of our armed forces in China as would make it possible for them to carry out their prime mission and also to prevent the occurrence of outrages against us. A large force of soldiers immediately available would be a powerful argument for peace, and preventative measures are always best.

Short of these measures are plans already made that so far as resources go, are doubtless the best that can be arrived at. Concerning them, I would only add that every provision should be made for the utmost celerity of movement and for the maximum in stunning effect on the Chinese. This latter would be most readily attained by the use of a large number of airplanes equipped for a wide range of heavy bombing and machine gun actions.

Gas equipment should be included, but principally for defense, as except for non-poisonous gases, and they only sparingly, gas should not be used in China except as an emergency measure. The reason for this is the densely populated country and the suffering that would be inflicted on harmless non-combatants.

ARMED INTERVENTION

Though I consider this the course dictated by prudence and humanity, it is out of the question unless there is a complete change in our policy. Should such a change ever come about, that of an intervening force should follow the principle of a rescuing and punitive expedition. To discussions already forwarded on this subject little remains to be added.

The objective should be the seizure of sea ports and points controlling the arteries of communication with a reserve mobile column for expeditions. I think a corps of three divisions, supported by the navy, could control China south from the Wall along the coast to

and including Canton, up the Yangtze to Hankow and up the railway from Shanghai through Tientsin to Peking. This should be sufficient for the accomplishment of its mission. But if the Chinese received support from any other power the task would be difficult and more men would be required.

In saying that, with the exceptions noted, a corps could effectively intervene in China, I do not mean to say that there would not be severe fighting and heavy loss. But if full advantage were taken of our superiority to inflict sudden and heavy losses on the Chinese forces, these could be kept within reasonable bounds. The Chinese have arrived at very erroneous conclusions as to the value of airplanes and artillery in warfare. The use of these arms by a modern army, backed up by rapidly moving columns of cavalry and infantry with large machine gun components, would have an absolutely devastating effect on Chinese morale.

J. H. Barnard
Lieut. Colonel, F.A.,
Military Attache.

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AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

1927 APR 1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

February 24, 1927

#6070

Subject: Notes Made During Missionary Conference.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 5 1927

1. The enclosed notes made during a missionary conference held last summer at Peitaiho are forwarded as being of possible interest. Much of the information published in the United States concerning China comes from missionary sources, most of which is very optimistic. It is interesting to note that all missionary opinion in China is not entirely in accord with these views.

For the Military Attache:

S. V. Constant
S. V. Constant
Captain, Cavalry,
Assistant Military Attache.

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file W.D.

Copies to State Dept., O.N.I.

Read by KPB

OFFICE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS
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A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL IDEAS BROUGHT OUT IN A DISCUSSION GROUP COMPOSED OF MISSIONARIES FROM ALL OVER NORTH CHINA. PEITAIHO, AUGUST 22, 1926

QUESTION: What experiences have missionaries in your community had which are causing them to re-examine mission attitudes and policies?

1. Peking Missionary: I am meeting many students who are desirous of becoming Christians, but who do not desire to join the church. They observe the strife within the various denominations, and desire to remain outside it.

Country Missionary: What substitute are the students offering for the church as a medium for reaching the people?

P.M. They seem to be confused and have no substitute for the church; all they know is that they do not want the church.

2. A missionary from the Paotingfu area remarked that the policy of helping the rural districts in the construction of buildings was being altered. There was to be absolutely no financial aid to these people. It has been found that the erection of "too fine" churches gives the people a burden greater than they can support. Let them worship in such buildings as they can get. This is proving very satisfactory. The mistake all along has been that of giving too much to the Chinese materially.

3. The third point and a very exciting one was the response given to the question "What success have you had with turning over to the Chinese the management of finances?" There was considerable discussion on this point, but it was very evident that the large majority were agreedthat the Chinese ought not to handle mission funds as yet for the following reasons:

a) The Chinese treasurer or financial administrator is immediately beset by his friends and members of family for "loans". This is quite all right according to the old Chinese family system. Numerous incidents were given in which one of two things happened - either the treasurer gave way to family inclinations, and got his accounts mixed up as the result, or, refused to accept the position of responsibility rather than face the unpleasant situation just mentioned.

b) The Chinese are not willing to take responsibility in case, under their management, funds have gone astray or been poorly used. One missionary gave this example: A school which had been trusted to the management of a Chinese board, went in debt some seven or eight hundred dollars. When it was discovered, the foreign missionaries suggested that each member of the board be responsible for the raising of fifty dollars to make up the defimit, the entire board including the chairman resigned. The work fell back upon the foreign staff. The Chinese did not give one penny. What was worse, the student body reviled the missionaries for not keeping the school open. Another missionary stated that they had just examined the books of a very trusted Chinese treasurer who had just died. Consternation! One thousand dollars in the hole!

c) A third point is very enlightening. The Chinese ought not to be entrusted with financial management because his own people will not trust him. Example: A certain area in Shantung made a decided cut in the budget. The itinerant Chinese whose duty it was to apportion money informed the people in the various stations of the cut, only to be called a liar, and told that he himself was pocketing the money. The foreign missionaries were called to the scene and it was two days before the quarrel could be quieted. This characteristic of being unwilling to trust each other is very common among the Chinese if one can judge from what one sees of his own servants.

This point of financial management can be summed up then as follows: Although a few optimistic missionaires expressed a willingness to let the Chinese manage mission funds, the overwhelming majority opposed the plan for reasons given above. In every case where missionaries reported satisfactory service of Chinese with funds, it was found upon closer investigation that somewhere in the progress of making and administering the budget, the hand of one or more foreign missionaires was in evidence.

4. The anti-Christian movement came in for some discussion. The rural districts report little trouble. People in the country are very glad to have the missions with their compounds, because these compounds are always a source of refuge to women and children who are fleeing from the ravages of the bandit-soldiery which covers practically the whole of China. It was very evident from the little discussion on this point, specifically, that the anti-Christian movement is dying out. The students are becoming aware of the fact that there are other difficulties in China which are much more in need of solution than the "Christian problem."

5. A Chinese in attendance at the discussion said several interesting things.

a) The C hinese people object to the type of missionary address that is being made in homelands by the missionary on furlough. These addresses maintain the "we are superior" attitude. Even in the local field too many missionaries "preach down" to the people.

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Precisely!!

b) What the Chinese people want is more spiritual leadership from you missionaries, and less emphasis laid upon organization of schools, churches, and campaigns for baptism. The Chinese are puzzled by the rivalry and competition between the various denominations. Give us more spirit and less organization.

c) Believes the anti-Christian movement was a good thing as it got certain Chinese (Christians) to speak out their minds and air some of the complaints which they had been suppressing.

6. Shall we place Chinese at the heads of our schools as principals? One missionary advocated this. Other missionaries objected on this ground: The Chinese student body, and the Chinese teaching staff prefer a foreigner as head of the school. Attempts to place Chinese in first position have failed because the Chinese principal can get no cooperation from his fellow countrymen.

7. Shall we register our Schools under the Government?

This question brought out much discussion. Registration in this manner means that the schools will have to give up compulsory religious education. Many missionaries objected to registering schools because "there is no C hinese government." This point was emphasized by missionaries in charge of a very flourishing school outside the Great Wall, near Shan Hai Kwan and Peitaiho. This school is in Mukden (Chang Tso-lin) territory. Last year the government school in the same city could make no headway because of the desire of the families to send their children to the good mission school. The town governor dispersed the mission school, through jealousy, on the grounds that the school did not conform to the educational standards of Mukden! The school was in perfect agreement with the Ministry of Education in Peking! Why register when the country has about five different capitals? The Chinese say, and with a laugh, "Oh, that's all right. Don't register at all. Nothing will be said to you, because Chinese law is not like Western law, you know!

The second interesting point in connection with this matter of religious education is that most of the missionaries are of the opinion that it must be done away with. They feel that, once the Chinese reaches the age of sixteen or seventeen where he begins to think for himself, worship and the study of the Bible ought to be a voluntary matter. Compulsion hurts more than it helps. Live a Christian life and it will be easy to get the Chinese to follow you to worship. This is much better than compelling a student to take his religion from a teacher who may not interest him, and who may in fact have little religion himself.

But, objects one who favors the continuation of compulsion, the Chinese came to our schools from choice. We do not make them come. Why can we not teach our religion by compulsion? If they did not desire it they would not come to our school. Why do they come to our schools if not for Christian training?

This missionary was quickly answered by two others as follows:

a) The C hinese desires to enter the mission school because he gets better instruction in English, which means a better chance at a job with the Railroad Administration.

b) He desires to enter the mission school because he knows the school will carry him through till graduation, whereas there is little chance that a government school will remain open long enough to do this due to lack of funds or student uprising. If you want to complete your education, go to a mission school.

Some of the missionaries expressed the idea that the future of the mission school might be purely educational, and not religious. Perhaps the greatest service that could be rendered would be giving China schools which would make her people literate.

8. Question: What has been the effect of the "unequal treaties" on mission work?

a) Missionaries from the rural districts say that most of the people know nothing of these treaties, and hence never worry about them. It is the population centers that harbor feeling.

b) Another expressed the opinion that the Chinese people did not object to the presence on Chinese soil of armed forces from western countries for the protection of their nationals. Rather it was the manner under which they were kept there, one of intimidation carried down from the Boxer times. The Chinese people realize their inadequacy to care for the lives of foreigners and would be glad to have a mutual arrangement. But they object to the odius statutes under which the troops are at present in China.

c) The rural people are glad that extraterritoriality is in effect, although they don't know it. For instance, the farmers and villagers in the interior know that there is one place which promises safety in time of plunder - the mission compound. They do not always understand that the militarists let the foreign compound alone because they fear international complications. Thousands of lives are saved from ruin every year by the refuge offered women and children.

d) A Chinese said: The foreign concession in China hurts more than it helps. Whereas a few thousand women and children may be saved in the country, the ousted militarist takes refuge in a foreign concession and lives to come out again and cause more war and more destruction. Were it not for the concession, the defeated militarist would be killed and the trouble over. He cited the example of Li Ching-lin, recent general under Chang Tso-lin, This man is at present in hiding in Tientsin. The Chinese did not answer the question, "Why cannot the man flee to Japan, as Chang Tso-lin was ready to do last year? Will the doing away with concessions remedy the evil of crooked men?"

e) The rural missionaries, especially the British, are in favor of extraterritoriality. They say they cannot stay in the country once it is removed.

f) All persons admit that the Chinese have no judicial system which will guarantee safety and fair dealing to the foreigner. They also admit that the government can not guarantee physical safety to the foreign resident. The whole question is: Are we willing to take a chance on the good will of the people to keep us from harm? Some persons say yes. Others say no.

g) One of the most condemning points raised against the Chinese who favor the abolition of extraterritoriality, is this: In practically all times of danger, those same Chinese are the first to ask the mission to put up their foreign flag and thus insure safety for all. They are the first to run for the concessions with their property and families. In times of quiet the students parade in demonstration against extrality. In trouble they are glad they go to mission schools.

9. One person expressed the opinion that we ought to make a more earnest attempt to understand the aims of the youth of China who are now representative of the new "national feeling". (This remark was really made under the discussion of the anti-Christian movement). The person was trying to point out that since these nationalists were opposed to us we ought to try to lessen the gap by respecting this "national feeling". He was answered quite sharply by another missionary from a rural station who said that he did not consider the opinion of these young people as "national expression". "National expression", he continued, is the articulate opinion of the mass of the people. China's people are not articulate. Until they become so, we have no truly national feeling to respect, or deal with."

TO SUMMARIZE:

1. The Chinese cannot be given positions of administration either executive, or financial.

2. Compulsory religious education must go.

3. Extrality is undesirable in principle, but should be left to the home governments for consideration. They will eradicate the evil as soon as it is wise.

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AN OUTLINE OF CHINESE HISTORY PRIOR TO 1840.

Article prepared for the use of the Foreign Service School by Consul J. K. Davis, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, June, 1926.

INTRODUCTION

a. Objects of This Outline:

Chinese history covers so vast an extent of time and abounds with such a multiplicity of confusingly similar names, that it is difficult for the reader with limited time at his disposal to select and retain in mind those events and personalities that possess real significance. In this outline, therefore, no attempt will be made to give a complete catalogue of dynasties and rulers. Instead an endeavor will be made to sketch briefly only those more important events and trends a knowledge of which is believed essential to the understanding of the China of today.

b. Importance of Present Day China:

With a territory roughly approximating in size that of the United States and located in the same general latitude; with vast undeveloped mineral and other natural resources; and with a sober, industrious, easily governed and potentially intelligent population comprising a quarter of all of the earth's inhabitants, China constitutes the greatest undeveloped market and one of the more important political factors in the world of today.

c. Origin of the Chinese People:

While the origin of the Chinese race is shrouded in the mists of antiquity it is reasonably established that the progenitors of the Chinese people were nomads who came from the highlands of central Asia and first settled in the fertile plains of the Yellow River valley. As in the case of the American people the newcomers found the land already occupied by aboriginal tribes whom they gradually pushed before them in successive waves of invasion.

Although the Chinese are all of a mongoloid type there are considerable ethnological variations observable among them. In color of skin they vary from the pigmentation of the southern

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In preparing this brief outline reference has been made to a number of books by different authors. In particular Dr. F.L. Hawks Pott's "A Sketch of Chinese History" and Mr. Thomas F. Carter's chart "Periods of Chinese History and Parallelism with That of the West" have been freely drawn upon and full acknowledgment to these authors is gratefully made.

the southern Europeans to that of a three quarter black mulatto and in stature from 140 centimeters to 186 centimeters. In general the stature decreases with the latitude and while the average for Chihli is 169 that for Kwang-tung is 161, a variation of 7 centimeters.

Besides the physical variations just noted, the mixture of mongoloid types has resulted in variations in language. In general the Chinese or Mandarin dialect is current throughout all China save in a narrow belt stretching southward from the Yangtze River to the border of Indo China, and varying from 200 to 300 miles in width. It was into this strip that the greater part of the aboriginal remnants were compressed by the Chinese invasions and the diversity of dialects now found there is remarkable. The three dialects which are spoken by groups of considerable size are the Wu, the Cantonese and the Hakka.

d. Unique Position of Chinese History:

The history of China is remarkable in many regards. In the first place the Chinese are the largest race numerically in the world of today, comprising roughly a quarter of the entire human race. Anything, therefore, which enables us better to understand the Chinese people is of value.

A second feature of interest is that of all the great countries of antiquity China is the only one which has persisted intact and independent through the changing centuries to play an important role upon the stage of today.

A third striking aspect is that while as long as thirty centuries ago the Chinese attained a high degree of civilization, up until very recent times they have made but few advances.

A fourth remarkable feature is the peculiarly individual character of Chinese civilization. Separated from the rest of the world by barriers of mountains, deserts and seas, up until the nineteenth century the customs of the people had been but little altered by impacts from without, and the Chinese consequently developed an attitude of self-satisfaction and a contempt for all outsiders.

e. Sources of Chinese History:

Knowledge of early Chinese history is derived almost exclusively from the Shu-Ching, a work in which Confucius has painstakingly collected all that was ascertainable on this subject in his day. Trustworthy Chinese history, however, does not commence until the middle of the Chou dynasty and the first confirmable date was B. C. 776 when an eclipse of the sun was recorded.

From the beginning of the Han dynasty (B. C. 206) Court Chroniclers were instituted who kept continuous and secret records which were stored in iron boxes until the termination of the dynasty concerned. While these records furnish invaluable information they constitute catalogues of events rather than histories.

f. Principal Natural Divisions of Chinese History:

Chinese history falls into four general periods as follows:

I. The arrival in China of the Chinese People and Their Conquest of the Country.

II. The First Conflict with the Tartars.

III. The Second Conflict with the Tartars.

IV. Period of Contacts with Western Nations.

ARRIVAL IN CHINA OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND THEIR CONQUEST OF THE COUNTRY

a. Mythical Period:

The Chinese mind groping about in an endeavor to explain the beginning of things in the dim dawn of the human race has evolved a large volume of myths which although of no historical value are interesting as attempts to explain that which is unknown. However, while entertaining, these stories have no place in a condensed outline such as this.

b. Legendary or Golden Age Period: (B. C. 2852 - B. C. 2205):

Following the period of pure mythology comes that of the traditional Golden Age of China, which from the supposed virtue of five of the principal rulers is commonly known as the period of the Five Emperors. The Chinese believe that each of these monarchs, who were probably much more tribal chiefs than emperors, made some valuable contribution to civilization. It is probable, however, that many of the inventions attributed to them really occurred in a much later age.

Fu Hsi (B. C. 2852) is supposed by the Chinese to have been the founder of their history, and is credited with having discovered fishing, animal husbandry; to have instituted marriage and to have invented a system of writing. Shen Nung (B. C. 2737) is believed to have taught the people agriculture and the use of herbs as medicine; while Huang Ti (B. C. 2697) is credited with the invention of the Chinese calendar, the introduction of sericulture and the weaving of silk.

Yao, Shun and Yü whose reigns correspond roughly with the traditional dates of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, are the heroes of the Golden Age of China and are immortalized in the writings of Confucius and Mencius, where they are pictured as paragons of virtue and wisdom and are held up as models to be imitated by all succeeding Chinese rulers. Unfortunately fact and fiction have become so inextricably interwoven that it is impossible to separate the one from the other. For example it is stated that the pet dogs in the palace became so imbued

so imbued with the virtue of the monarchs that should one dog chance to be absent at feeding time the others would leave their food untouched until the absent one had come.

(1.) Founding of the First Chinese Dynasty B.C. 2205:

Yü, who succeeded to the throne upon the death of Shun owes his fame in history to his labor in draining the flood of the Yellow River and his establishment of the first Chinese dynasty, the Hsia.

During this dynasty important conquests were made of neighboring aboriginal tribes and for the first time gold and silver were used as means of exchange.

Succession to the throne was made hereditary and the downfall of the dynasty was directly caused by the excesses of unworthy and inefficient men who were thus placed in power.

(2.) Characteristics of the Period:

China during the Golden Age period comprised only about a tenth of the territory now contained in the Chinese Republic and was located in the north central portion of China of today.

The form of government was a primitive patriarchal system which towards the end began to evolve into a simple feudal monarchy. Prior to the Hsia dynasty succession to the throne was not hereditary and each monarch designated as his successor that officer whom he considered best fitted to carry on his policies.

The religion of the period was a primitive form of worship of the Supreme Ruler as well as of nature and a host of spirits. Ancestor worship had already been instituted and neglect of the worship of one's forefathers was believed to result in certain disaster.

c. Period of Evolution of Tribal Chiefs into Monarchs During the Shang or Yin Dynasty B. C. 1766-B. C. 1122):

The Shang or Yin dynasty which occupied the six centuries between B. C. 1766 and B. C. 1122 is a period in which Chinese history concerning which very little authentic information has been handed down, and not much is known of it beyond a list of the names of the monarchs.

The most striking characteristic of this time was the gradual evolution of the rulers from tribal chieftains into monarchs, which came about as a natural result of the increased powers of the rulers incident to the constantly enlarging confines of the empire. It was during this era that the emperors began to be regarded as "the Sons of Heaven" and their persons as sacred.

(1.) First Struggle With Northern Tartars:

A short but fierce and successful war which was fought with a Tartar tribe to the north (in B.C. 1292) presaged the long conflict between the Chinese and their northern neighbors which was destined to run through Chinese history like an ever recurring theme in a piece of music.

(2.) Earliest Extant Writing and Bronzes Produced:

While the 600 year period covered by this dynasty was marked by but few events of political importance, it is worthy of note as the time when the earliest extant writing and the earliest extant bronzes were produced. The former consist of omens written upon bits of tortoise shell.

d. Period of Feudalism and Classic Literature. Chou Dynasty (B. C. 1122-255):

(1) Corresponding Period in Western History:

Wu Wang and Cheng Wang correspond roughly with David and Solomon both in time and as the founders and consolidaters respectively of their dynasties. As was the case in Israel, after the reigns of the first two virile rulers the country became divided.

The latter part of the Chou dynasty corresponds closely in time and characteristics with the classical period in Greece, for in China as in Greece the division of the country into a number of small contending states was accompanied by the development of a wonderful classical literature. Other mile posts in time by which the Chou dynasty can be measured are: the founding of Rome; the Babylonian captivity; the rise of Buddah and the conquests of Alexander the Great.

(2) Establishment of Feudalism:

The Chou dynasty was founded by Wu Wang or the "Warrior Prince" who is regarded by the Chinese as one of the most famous characters in their history.

The establishment of feudalism was an adventitious by-product of the setting up of the dynasty, for Wu Wang in order to reward those leaders who had assisted him in obtaining his throne gave them grants of territory and titles. In time these petty chieftains arrogated more and more authority to themselves and the greater part of the history of the dynasty is taken up with accounts of their intrigues and civil wars.

The Chou dynasty which lasted through eight centuries probably would have fallen long before it did but for the jealousies among the various rulers of states, who, so soon as one of their number showed signs of aspiring to the throne would combine to pull him down. It was not

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until a man of outstanding force of character became the Duke of Ch'in that the last weakling upon the Chou throne was overturned.

(3) Advances in Art, Science and Trade:

In spite of the continued civil warfare, the eight centuries of the Chou dynasty were marked by material advances in Chinese civilization and important progress in the arts.

The finest bronzes which China has produced are from this time. Made for religious and ceremonial purposes they conform very closely to certain traditional types but possess great artistic merit.

During the 11th century (B. C.) the first mint was established and copper coins were cast for use as a uniform medium of exchange and in order to impress the people with the unity of the Empire.

The magnetic qualities of the loadstone are also first mentioned in the records of this period, while from the writings of Aristotle we learn that it was then that the first export of silk to Europe occurred.

(4) Development of Classic Literature.

The greatest claim of the Chou dynasty to fame rests upon the fact that it produced China's three world famous philosophers whose teachings have had a profound influence upon all subsequent Chinese life and civilization.

The first of these was Lao Tzu (B. C.) 604, who lived and taught about the same time that Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were making their impress upon Greek life. He wrote the Tao Te Ching, and founded the Taoist system of philosophy. According to Lao Tzu's teaching true peace can only be attained by ceasing to strive and by coming into close accord with Tao, or impersonal nature.

Confucius (B. C. 522) was the greatest of the three. He was of a very serious nature and from his early youth showed great zeal in studying the past and urging the imitation of Yao and Shun.

The greatest contributions to Chinese civilization and morals made by Confucius were (1) his collection in the Shu Ching, or Ancient Book of History, of all the knowledge of his day concerning previous history; and (2) his teachings regarding human conduct which have constituted one of the greatest systems of morality ever produced.

Confucius was avowedly not a creator but a transmitter, and his central theme was the necessity of reverting to the conduct of the Golden Age. He was given but scant glory during his life and it was not until three centuries after his death that he was accorded the position of honor that he has subsequently occupied.

Mencius

Mencius (B. C. 372) the last of the trio is regarded by the Chinese as second only to Confucius. He was, like Confucius, a transmitter but unlike Confucius he was also an original and independent thinker. His writings include his philosophy concerning human nature and the requirements of good government.

e. Period of Unification. Ch'in Dynasty, B. C. 221 - 206:

(1) Overthrow of Feudalism:

Although it lasted for but a short time and produced only one outstanding ruler, the Ch'in was one of the most important of the Chinese dynasties, for it was then that the country was for the first time completely unified and that the history of China as an empire really began.

The dynasty was founded when the Duke of the state of Ch'in overthrew the last of the Chou emperors, and derives its name from the name of the state. It is interesting to note that the word China doubtless owes its origin to the fact that when the Chinese were first known to the West they were referred to as the people of "Ch'in" which later became corrupted to "China".

The outstanding administrative achievement was the overthrow of the feudal system and the unification of the empire under a strongly centralized government. This was accomplished by Shih Huang Ti, also commonly known as Ch'in Shih Huang, who when he came to the throne set himself to breaking the power of the nobles and to the organization of the country into 36 provinces all directly responsible to the throne.

Subsequent to the reign of Ch'in Shih Hwang Chinese history has run in cycles of great uniformity. The founder of each dynasty and his immediate successors have been men of force of character and ability. The houses which they have founded, however, have been unable long to endure prosperity and we soon find that the emperors have become self-indulgent degenerates who, after losing their grip on the country have permitted their line to end in a period of utter confusion. Eventually, and often only after the turmoil has lasted for centuries, a leader of dominating ability has emerged, reunited the country, founded a dynasty and the entire cycle has again been repeated.

So regularly have these phases been gone through by each succeeding dynasty that for the sake of brevity accounts of them will be omitted in the remainder of this outline.

(2) Attempted Destruction of Classical Literature (B. C. 213):

The act with which the name of Shih Huang Ti is perhaps most closely associated in the popular mind was his attempt to destroy all Chinese classical literature.

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There were several reasons for this extraordinary endeavor. One was the extremely reactionary attitude of the literary classes who constantly opposed all of the emperor's reforms and in other respects were regarded by him as obstacles to progress and good government. Another was the desire of the emperor to destroy the records of all previous monarchs and thus to make Chinese history commence with his reign.

The decree commanding the burning of all the books in China with the exception of those on astrology, divination, medicine and husbandry, was difficult to enforce. Although 460 scholars who opposed the order were buried alive, many of the books were hidden and saved.

(3) Completion of the Great Wall:

The Chinese people, remembering only the attempted destruction of the classical literature, are accustomed to regard Shih Huang Ti with abhorrence and to forget his many constructive achievements. After effecting the administrative consolidation of his empire the emperor turned his attention to ensuring its safety from external foes and to improving means of communication. The Great Wall, many parts of which had been built previously, was completed. It stretched across the northern boundary of his empire from the sea westwards for a distance of 1,500 miles and was intended as a barrier against the Tartar tribes. Roads were constructed to connect the more important cities of the empire with the capital and many streams theretofore impassable were spanned by stone bridges.

(4) Western Influence First Felt on Chinese Art:

The influence of the west upon Chinese art was first felt during the Ch'in dynasty and took the form of changes in the designs upon bronze work, caused principally by Scythian influences.

II. FIRST CONFLICT WITH THE TARTARS. (B. C. 206-A. D. 589):

a. The Northern Tartars:

The second main division into which Chinese history naturally falls is the first period of protracted conflict between the Chinese and their Tartar neighbors to the north, who at the commencement of this period occupied Mongolia and had obtained footholds in the provinces of Chihli and Shansi.

While divided into many tribes the Tartars were generally recognized as falling into two main divisions, the Eastern and the Western. The members of the Western branch were known as the Hsiung Nu and included the ancestors of the Turks, the Ouigars and Mongols; while the Eastern branch, or Tung Hu, contained the progenitors of the Khitans, Manchus and Koreans.

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The members of both branches were wild nomadic peoples who practically lived on horseback and constantly migrated from place to place with their herds. They lived in tents, were uncultured and had no written language. However, what they lacked in culture they made up for in physical prowess. Fighting as they always did on horseback, they were the constant dread of the more civilized but less martial Chinese.

The conflict with the Tartars commenced soon after the establishment of the Han dynasty and continued intermittently throughout the 795 years which it occupied. While generally speaking the Chinese managed to keep the northern invaders from securing a permanent foothold this was frequently accomplished not by force of arms but by compromise. In some cases the Tartars were even bought off by the Emperor giving his own daughter as consort to their leader, and in other instances similar results were obtained by gifts of silk, rice and wine.

b. Period of Extension of Empire:
Han Dynasty, B. C. 206 - A. D. 214:

The Han dynasty was a period of wide flung empire, and pride in the conquests then made is still manifest in the term "Sons of Han" which even today the Chinese are fond of applying to themselves.

In time this dynasty roughly corresponds to the beginning of the Christian era and the great Roman conquests. Like their Roman contemporaries the Chinese emperors brought all of their immediate world under their sway and by imposing a Pax Sinica upon Eastern Asia made possible very material advances in the development of civilization.

The greatest conquests were made during the reign of the emperor Wu Ti (B. C. 140 - 86) who extended the empire in all directions. On the west he conquered and annexed what are now the provinces of Kansu, Szechwan, Kueichow and a part of Yunnan. To the south he seized and subjugated Kwangtung, Kuangsi, Tong King and the island of Hainan. On the northeast he conquered the northern end of Korea.

As the result of these conquests China gained much knowledge of the countries to the West, and intercourse was established with Parthia, Mesopotamia, Bactria and Afghanistan. The Chinese also first learned of the great Roman empire at this time.

(1) Introduction of Buddhism A. D. 58-76:

During the reign of the Emperor Ming Ti the Chinese obtained their first extended knowledge of Buddhistic philosophy. This monarch had a dream in which he saw the form of a golden man and upon being told that this vision referred to a wonderful saint who had arisen in India, he sent an expedition to investigate. A copy of the Sutra as well as a number of priests were brought back. The spread of this new religion was slow, however, and

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it was not until three centuries later that it secured a real foothold.

(2) Developments and Inventions:

One of the first acts of the founder of the dynasty was the repeal of the order of Shih Hwang Ti regarding the destruction of books. Those copies which had escaped destruction were sought out and copied, and the classics were restored to their former place of honor. The Han dynasty, however, was not a period of original literary production although many histories, dictionaries and commentaries were produced. In general the literary trend was to glorify the teachers of a past age.

(3) Establishment of Civil Service System:

The emperor Ling Ti in the year 175 A. D. instituted what was perhaps the first civil service system in the world. Examinations were held in the more important cities and those candidates who wrote the best essays on the Confucian classics were made eligible for appointment in official life. The system thus established lasted until after the Boxer disturbance and profoundly affected all Chinese life.

(4) Inventions and the Arts:

The most important invention of this period was that of paper which was first made by Ts'ai Lun. The earliest paper extant is also from this dynasty.

Stone sculpture began during the Han dynasty and many interesting bas relief carvings date from this period while a few specimens of round carving are also from this time.

c. The Dark Ages. A. D. 214 - 589:

The Han dynasty, like the great Roman Empire, fell as a result of internal strife and pressure from less civilized tribes on the north. The 375 years which followed its collapse were characterized by disunion and incessant warfare which greatly retarded the development of Chinese civilization. However, just as Christianity spread during a similar period in Europe, Buddhism at this time made its greatest advances in China.

The great events in western history with which this period coincides were the empire of Constantine, the fall of Rome and the rise of Mohammed.

(1) Development of Art:

Although no great writers or philosophers appeared during the Dark Ages of Chinese History this period was marked by a number of inventions and noteworthy advancement in the development of Chinese art.

It is in the records of this era that we find the first

first mention of tea and the earliest references to the "south pointing chariot" which doubtless refers to the compass. The use of paper also became general throughout China and its dependencies.

Chinese pictorial art had its inception in this period in the person of Ku K'ai-chih, "the father of Chinese painting".

Chinese sculpture as well as all Chinese art, was deeply influenced at this time by Indian and neo-Greek influences. During the fifth century the period of the best Chinese sculpture began which was strongly affected by Buddhistic influences.

(2) The "Three Kingdoms" or Romantic Period:

Immediately following the fall of the Han dynasty there occurred a period of disunion which, from the three separate states into which the Empire was divided, is known as the period of the Three Kingdoms. These were the Kingdom of Wei in the north; the Kingdom of Wu South of the Yangtze River; and the Kingdom of Shu in the west.

This era which continued from A. D. 214 to A. D. 223, is regarded by the Chinese as the most romantic in their entire history, and the feats of daring then performed by the various military leaders form the themes for innumerable novels, and are immortalized in the tales of the public story-tellers. Some of the most famous names are those of Liu Pei, Ssu Ma-i, Chu Ko-liang and Ts'ao Ts'ao.

(3) First Division of the Empire Between the Tartars and the Chinese. A. D. 223-589:

The Tartars in their struggle with the Chinese first occupied that portion of China north of the Yangtze River, just as the Teutonic Tribes in their conflict with the Roman Empire first annexed its northern half.

The immediate excuse for the seizure of northern China was the claim of certain of the Tartar leaders to be of Chinese Imperial blood, a claim which found considerable justification in the fact that Chinese Imperial princesses had frequently been given as consorts to Tartar chieftains.

Following the seizure of North China by the Tartars there ensued a period of confused civil wars south of the Yangtze River. From this chaos a Chinese general eventually emerged who was able to dominate his rivals and who established the first Sung dynasty.

For three and a half centuries China was thus divided between the Tartars on the North and the Chinese to the South. During this time there was incessant warfare but it was not until A. D. 589 that the Chinese were able to drive out the invaders and again to unify the entire country under Chinese rule.

III. SECOND CONFLICT WITH THE TARTARS A.D. 589-1644:

a. Adoption of Chinese Civilization by the Tartars:

The Tartars whose original characteristics and habits have already been described gradually acquired the civilization of the Chinese whom they had conquered. They adopted Chinese customs and manners and to all practical purposes became almost indistinguishable from the Chinese.

b. Period of National Greatness A. D. 589 - 907:

Sui and T'ang Dynasties:

The period which followed the restoration of Chinese control in A. D. 589 was one characterized by renewed vigor and national greatness. Invigorated by the infusion of a strain of new blood, inspired by new religion and stimulated by new contacts with other civilizations, the Chinese entered upon an era of national expansion and of progress in art and letters.

It is interesting to note that this era of Chinese renewed vigor and expansion coincides roughly with the time of the great Mohammedan conquests in North Africa and Spain. Thus, two oriental civilizations, one in the Far East and the other in the West, and with almost no contacts or knowledge one of the other, made simultaneous and significant advances.

c. Progress in Art, Literature and Invention:

Of the two dynasties included in this period, the Sui and the T'ang, the latter was marked by what was perhaps the greatest period of artistic expansion in all Chinese history, especially in painting. Unfortunately, however, almost no original pictures have been preserved and the quality of this art has to be judged by copies and literary references.

The rejuvenation of Chinese civilization caused by the infusion of Tartar blood and the consequent break with the hide-bound traditions of the past was especially manifest in literature. The T'ang dynasty was the "greatest period of Chinese poetic expression" and produced Tu Fu and Li T'ai-po whose poems are still accepted as samples of excellence.

Three of the greatest inventions of Chinese history were also made at this time. The first was the gradual development of the manufacture of porcelain from the beginnings previously made in the production of pottery. The second was the discovery of gunpowder and its use in the manufacture of fireworks. While the third was the invention of printing from hand-carved wood blocks (A. D. 770), the first known printed book having been produced in A. D. 868.

d. Other Significant Events of the Period:

(1). Introduction of Christianity: One of the most striking events of the T'ang dynasty was the introduction of Christianity by Nestorian missionaries from Persia and Nepaul who entered China in the year 506 A.D. and carried on their proselyting for a time with conspicuous success. An interesting record of their endeavors is found on a tablet in the city of Hsi-an, erected by Imperial order and containing an outline of the doctrines of their church.

(2). The Famous Han Lin Academy made up of the most learned scholars in the country was established in A.D. 785. Admission was by competitive examination held once in three years and only the six highest candidates were admitted.

(3). The Court Gazette which was printed for the purpose of giving wide dissemination to imperial edicts was established at this time and is probably the oldest newspaper in the world.

(4). A Serious Rebellion broke out during the year A. D. 765 and it is estimated that during its suppression the population of China was reduced from fifty to twenty millions. This incident throws an interesting side-light upon the character of the wars of this period.

e. The Sui Dynasty A. D. 589 - 619:

The Sui dynasty lasted for only thirty years and derives its importance from the fact that it was at this time that the Tartars were dislodged from Northern China and the country was once again reunited under Chinese rule. The downfall of the Tartar dynasty was brought about by a Chinese general in Tartar employ who dislodged his Tartar master and seized the throne for himself.

Two important wars occurred at this time. The first an invasion of Korea by the Chinese and the second a serious invasion of Shansi by the Turcomans.

f. The T'ang Dynasty: A. D. 620-907:

The T'ang dynasty lasted 289 years and constitutes one of the most famous periods of Chinese history, largely because of the outstanding force of the earlier emperors and the virile character of the literature which was then produced.

It was founded by one of the Chinese generals in the employ of the Tartar kingdom of Wei, and was eventually overthrown as a result of the gradual degeneration of its ruling house.

This dynasty produced two rulers worthy of note, the Emperor T'ai Tsung, and the Empress Wu Hou. The Emperor T'ai Tsung who reigned from A. D. 627 - 650 was an excellent administrator and a patron of literature. His most famous achievements,

achievements, however, were his thorough subjugation of the Turcomans and the large number of bordering countries which he caused to send envoys to his capital to present their homage and pay tribute.

The Empress Wu Hou (A. D. 634 - 705) is remarkable in that she was the first woman to rule over all China. While of strong will and conspicuous ability she is regarded by Chinese historians as a paragon of wickedness.

g. Period of the Five Dynasties: A.D. 907 - 960:

Following the collapse of the T'ang dynasty there came a period known as that of the Five Dynasties and which coincides in time with the struggle of the followers of Alfred against the Danish invaders of England.

One of the interesting characteristics of this period was the influential position obtained by the military leaders who consequently used it in endeavors to seize the throne for themselves. Another was that of the five dynasties which followed one after the other in rapid succession, three were under Turcoman rulers.

h. Second Division of Empire Between Tartars and Chinese A. D. 960-1280.

When the Sung dynasty was established in A. D. 960 the country was once again unified under a Chinese Emperor. This consolidation, however, was destined to be short lived for in A. D. 1125 the Kins or Nu Chen Tartars commenced their attacks upon the empire and quickly overran the northern provinces. The Chinese emperors were forced to remove their capital to Nanking and, as in A. D. 424, the country was divided between the Tartars on the north and the Chinese on the south.

In 1135 A. D. the Mongols from the north-west commenced their attacks upon China and in a succession of campaigns quickly defeated the Kins and other Tartar tribes.

The Sung Emperor Li Tsung, wishing to avenge himself upon the despised Kins, entered into an alliance with the Mongol chieftain, and the combined forces utterly defeated the Tartars. When, however, the Chinese endeavored to occupy their former capital at K'aifeng the Mongols ordered them to evacuate Honan province and upon their refusal to do so, war was declared.

Kublai Khan, the son of the famous Genghis, together with his brother Mangu then undertook the subjugation of the Sungs. The struggle lasted for over half a century and in spite of the stubborn and tenacious resistence put up by the Chinese ended in a complete victory for the Mongols. For the first time China was completely conquered by the Mongols.

This period of Chinese history corresponds in time to the Norman conquest of England and with the Crusades.

(1) Renaissance of Classical Learning:

In spite of the national weakness which characterized this period, it witnessed a striking revival of classical learning and a genuine cultural development. It is characterized by Mr. T. F. Carter as a "Period of philosophic, scientific and historical writing, most closely approaching modern Europe in spirit".

(2) Progress in Art:

The earliest genuine porcelains extant are from this period. They manifest less originality and variation in design than those of the T'ang dynasty but possess greater perfection in texture and form.

The progress made in painting during the T'ang dynasty was continued in the Sung and the best specimens of Chinese paintings extant are from this period.

(3) Inventions:

Among the important inventions of this period were printing from movable type and the use of gunpowder in hand grenades. The first definite description of the compass in connection with navigation is also found in the records of this time.

(4) Attempted Social Reforms of Wang An-shih:

During the reign of Shen Tsung (A. D. 1068 - 1086) a famous social reformer, Wang Anshih, induced the emperor to put the following social reforms into practice:

(1) The nationalization of the Commerce of the Empire. Taxes were to be paid in produce and manufactured commodities, and the surplus produce and commodities were to be acquired by the government and taken to those portions of the empire where a demand existed and then sold at a moderate profit.

(2) State Advances for the Farmers: It was proposed that the central government should advance capital to the farmers at 2 per cent per month.

(3) Income Tax for Construction of Public Works:

It was suggested that in place of compulsory labor a tax should be levied upon each family in proportion to its income and the proceeds used for public works.

(4) The Militia Enrollment Act: It was proposed that each family should furnish one son as a militiaman who would be liable for military service in time of war.

After a brief trial the experiment proved a failure and all the laws putting these proposals into effect were withdrawn.

i. The Yuan or Mongol Dynasty A. D. 1280 - 1368:

The period covered by the Yuan dynasty corresponds

roughly with the reigns of the first three Edwards in England and with the commencement of the Hundred Years War in Europe.

When Kublai Khan had completed the subjugation of the Sung rulers he founded the Yuan or "original" dynasty, thus like Shih Huang-ti evincing a desire to commence an entirely new era. His capital was located at Cambuluc, or Peking.

Under Kublai Khan the Chinese empire not only attained its own maximum size but was larger than any other of which we find records in history. It extended from the Black Sea to the Yellow Sea and from the icy plains of northern Mongolia to the tropical frontiers of Annam.

It has been said that China is "a sea that salts all waters that flow into it" and Kublai soon became more an Emperor of the Chinese than a Khan of the Mongols. Chinese civilization was quickly adopted and the Emperor imitated their customs and acted as a patron of Chinese literature.

(1) Campaigns Against Neighboring Countries: Not content with the vast empire under his sway Kublai Khan undertook campaigns against Japan, Cambodia and Burmah. The first resulted in disaster, the second in a qualified success and the third in a satisfactory victory.

(2) Visit of Marco Polo (A. D. 1271): During the reign of Kublai Khan the famous Venetian traveller Marco Polo arrived in China in 1271 and remained in the Chinese empire for seventeen years. He was finally sent as an escort to a Mongol Princess who was being presented by Kublai as a gift to the Persian Khan, and from Persia he returned to Italy where he gave to the Europeans their first reliable accounts of China.

(3) Reconstruction of Grand Canal: Kublai Khan was as much interested in peaceful developments as he was in military conquests. Among the public works which were put through during his rule was the reconstruction of the Imperial Grand Canal between Hangchow and Tientsin, a distance of over a thousand miles.

(4) Fall of the Mongol Dynasty: The influence of Chinese civilization robbed the Mongols of much of their military vigor and following the death of Kublai Khan in 1294 the grip of the Mongol dynasty upon China was gradually loosened.

Towards the end of the dynasty numerous Chinese secret societies arose whose object was the overthrow of the Yuan dynasty, and rebellions broke out with ever increasing frequency.

Among the leaders of the rebel bands was Chu Yuan-chang who,

who, because of his natural aptitude for leadership, soon acquired a large band of followers. After a series of campaigns against the Mongols he finally managed to overthrow the Yuan dynasty and established himself upon the throne. He founded the Ming or "Bright" dynasty and adopted the title of Hung Wu for his reign.

j. The Ming Dynasty. A. D. 1368-1644:

The Ming dynasty corresponds in time with the European Renaissance, the discovery of America and the Reformation.

As during preceding dynasties, much of the time of the rulers of the Ming dynasty was taken up in waging wars with their various neighbors. The first serious conflict was with the Mongols who made repeated efforts to regain their grip upon China. Among the succeeding struggles the most interesting were those with Japan. Between 1522 and 1567 the Japanese, annoyed at the refusal of trading privileges, made several raids upon the Chinese coast, at one time capturing the cities of Ningpo, Soochow and Shanghai. Although these cities were not long held, an enormous amount of booty was carried off from them. In 1592 Chinese armies assisted the Koreans in repelling a strong Japanese invasion.

After lasting almost three centuries the Ming dynasty was overthrown in 1644 by the Manchus who were a clan of Tartars living to the east of the city of Mukden. The catastrophe was brought about as a result of Chinese interference in a quarrel between two Manchu chieftains and the outbreak of a serious rebellion at a time when the Chinese forces were busily engaged in fighting their external enemies.

After the establishment of Manchu authority in north China, the Chinese still continued their resistence south of the Yangtze River for fifteen years before the entire country was for a second time brought under Tartar rule.

(1) Pioneer European Traders Arrive in China:

The first European trader arrived in China in the person of a Portuguese, Raphael Perestrato who in 1511 came to Canton with a small flotilla. In 1517 Fernando Peres de Andrade arrived in Canton and requested commercial intercourse. He was favorably received and even permitted to go to Peking and reside at the court. Unfortunately, however, Fernando's brother Simon came soon after with another Portuguese fleet and not obtaining the trade facilities desired he committed many acts of depredation along the Chinese coast. This highhandedness led to massacres of Portuguese in China and the putting to death of Fernando. Thus the initial contact with foreign merchants left a bad taste in the mouths of the Chinese.

The advent of the Spaniards during the reign of Wan Li (1573-1620) proved no more fortunate than that of the Portuguese.

Portuguese. They settled not on the mainland but in the Philippine Islands which they held until the Spanish-American war of 1898. Becoming alarmed at the large number of Chinese settlers in Manila they treated them with the greatest of cruelty and staged a massacre in which 20,000 are said to have been killed.

The Dutch soon put in an appearance, and in 1622 after unsuccessfully trying to establish themselves in the Pescadores Islands, they retreated to Formosa where they established two trading posts that were maintained for many years.

During the Ming dynasty the Jesuit missionaries first obtained a foothold in China. First admitted in Kwangtung they subsequently gained an appreciable influence in the capital through their knowledge of mathematics and astronomy.

Character of Period:

While the Chinese regard the Ming dynasty as a glorious era it was in fact a period of arrested development. Up to this time the Chinese civilization had been far ahead of that of Europe but in this dynasty Chinese culture virtually stood still while in Europe great forward strides were made.

It is interesting to note that the population of the Empire was at this time estimated as sixty millions.

Advances in Literature and Art:

While the general trends of the dynasties immediately preceding were continued, there was a marked diminution in originality and virility. During the dynasty two monumental literary works were produced. The first was an encyclopedia which was printed in 1407, containing 22,877 volumes and a table of contents requiring 60 columes. The second was the "Complete Geographical Record of the Empire" which appeared approximately 50 years later. It contains 90 volumes and constitutes one of the best known works in all Chinese literature.

"Great advances were made in the manufacture of porcelain, and in color and design the Ming pieces far surpassed anything which had been previously produced. It was at this time that the famous porcelain pagoda was erected at Nanking and that the art of porcelain making penetrated as far west as Venice.

IV. PERIOD OF CONTACTS WITH WESTERN NATIONS:

a. The Manchu or Ch'ing Dynasty. 1644 - 1911:

The Manchus followed a policy of conciliation in their treatment of the Chinese and after the lapse of only a very few decades the latter became reconciled to their alien rulers. With remarkable quickness even the queue and the shaving of the front part of the head, which the Manchus imposed as a sign of subjection, came to be regarded by the Chinese as a matter of pride.

In order

In order to prevent being taken by surprise garrisons of Manchu troops were stationed in various strategic points throughout the Empire and a large army of Manchu soldiers was retained at the capital. On the other hand, however, the Grand Council, which next to the Emperor possessed the highest authority, was composed of two Chinese and two Manchus, thus giving the former a large share in the highest administration of the Empire.

(1) The Two Famous Emperors K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung:

As was the case in the majority of the preceding dynasties, the first few rulers were men of great strength and ability but as time passed the ruling line gradually became enervated. The two early Ch'ing emperors of outstanding importance were the second, K'ang Hsi, (1662 - 1723) and the fourth, Ch'ien Lung (1736-1799).

K'ang Hsi, who was a contemporary of Louis XIV in France and Charles the Second in England, was a man of remarkable ability. "A great warrior, an able scholar and a wise ruler", he labored self-sacrificingly for the improvement and strengthening of his country and his reign was one of the most brilliant in all Chinese history. During his rule a serious rebellion in the southwest was suppressed. Formosa was conquered, a large area in central Asia was subjugated and a small Russian garrison on the Amour captured.

Ch'ien Lung brought the Ch'ing dynasty to the peak of its glory. During his reign Eastern Turkistan was annexed, Burmah was conquered and compelled to pay tribute and the Gurkahs who had invaded Thibet were overcome and forced to recognize the Chinese as their over-lords. On all sides Chinese arms had triumphed and approximately 400 millions of people recognized him as their ruler.

(2) Endeavors of Western Nations to Establish Trade Relations:

The efforts which the Western nations so inauspiciously made during the Ming dynasty to enter into direct relations with China were continued in the Ch'ing but in a less high-handed manner. Intercourse was gradually although unsatisfactorily established and China's long seclusion from the West was at an end.

(3) Arrival of Russian and Dutch Missions at Peking:

In the year 1664 a Russian and a Dutch Embassy arrived at Peking, the first coming overland across Siberia and the latter by sea. These were accorded the same haughty treatment usually given by the Chinese court to missions from tribute nations, and the Ambassadors were informed that if admitted to see the Emperor they must perform the "kow tow". The Russians refused and returned having accomplished nothing; the Dutch complied but in return only received permission to send a mission to China once every eight years.

(4). First Armed Conflict and First Treaty With a Western Power. 1689:

Russian forces coming across Siberia erected a fort on the Amour River at Albazin. The Chinese fearing that this presaged a general invasion of China from the North, sent troops which captured the fort and brought some of its garrison to Peking as prisoners.

In 1689 peace was declared by the treaty of Nerchinsk and the Amour River was fixed as the boundary between the two Empires. This was China's first treaty with a western power.

(5). Peter the Great's Embassy to China in 1719:

In the year 1719 an Embassy headed by M. Ismaloff was sent to Peking by Peter the Great. It was accorded a very friendly reception and the ceremony of the "kow tow" was waived. However, when the Russians endeavoring to follow up this suspicious opening sent a caravan to China it was only to find that the friendly Emperor K'ang Hsi had died, that the court officials had entirely reversed their attitude and trade relations save at the border were impossible.

(6). Russian and Portuguese Missions to Peking in the Year 1727:

In 1727 Count Sava Vladislavitche arrived in Peking to revise the treaty of Nerchinsk. His mission was successful and a number of Russian boys were permitted to remain in the capital to study the Chinese language. The officers left in charge of them were authorized by the Czar to carry on diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese government.

In the same year a Portuguese mission also arrived in the capital but without enjoying the same measure of success as the one from Russia.

(7). Beginning of Intercourse With Great Britain: 1635 and 1789:

From its inception the commercial intercourse between the British and the Chinese was unsatisfactory and was accompanied by a succession of mutually irritating incidents.

In 1635 Captain Weddell acting on a charter granted by Charles I arrived with a small fleet at Macao, where he was so obstructed by the jealous Portuguese that he proceeded to Canton. As his vessels were passing the Bogue Forts they were fired upon by the Chinese. In retaliation the British captured the forts, and as a result obtained permission for a trading post outside the walls of Canton. The duties charged by the local Chinese officials were so high, however, that trade was exceedingly difficult.

In

In 1759 another British representative, a Mr. Flint, endeavored to establish trade relations at Ningpo. Finding himself blocked he sailed on up to Tientsin where he presented a memorial asking the emperor for better trading arrangements. He was referred back to Canton where after an unsuccessful effort was made to have him perform the "kow tow" he was forced to return to England with nothing accomplished.

(8). Lord Macartney's Mission to Peking in 1759:

Desiring to establish more friendly and satisfactory trade arrangements George III in 1759 sent Lord Macartney to visit the Emperor. He brought many presents with him and was received with much honor. However, without his knowledge a pennant bearing the words "A Tribute Bearer from the Country of England" was floated over the vessel by which he was conveyed to Tientsin. As before, the question of the "kow tow" was raised, but this requirement was finally waived and he finally secured two interviews with the Emperor Ch'ien Lung but at Jehol and not at Peking. The results of the mission was imperial permission for trade at Canton provided the English would obey the local officials there.

(9). Lord Amherst's Mission to Peking in 1816:

In 1802 and again in 1813 the British had temporarily seized Macao in order to prevent its coming into the hands of the French during the Napoleonic wars. This tended to increase the lack of cordiality between the Chinese and the British and in 1816 Lord Amherst was sent upon a second British mission to Peking. On his arrival at Tientsin he met the same problem of the demand for the "kow tow". Although he managed to have this waived his mission ended in failure as a result of his unwillingness to proceed to an audience before the arrival of his court costume and at what seemed to him an unseemly hour.

(10). Progress Made in Art and Literature:

As in the case of the Ming dynasty the literature of the Ch'ing dynasty lacked originality. There occurred, however, a marked movement in the preparation of works of reference and criticism. The Emperor K'ang Hsi was a famous patron of literature and a dictionary known as "K'ang Hsi's Dictionary" was compiled by a group of scholars appointed by him which is regarded as a standard work even at the present time. A huge encyclopedia was also published containing 5,026 volumes, and K'ang Hsi himself wrote out sixteen moral maxims. These were expanded and annotated by his son and arranged in a book called the Sacred Edict which thoughtout the duration of the dynasty was supposed to be read to the populace twice monthly in every city, town and village.

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MAY 27
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

March 28, 1927

#6098

Subject: Trip to Shanghai and Hankow.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

2610-D-S-1

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 16 1927

1. In accordance with instructions contained in your telegram No. 121, I conferred with the Minister who concurred with me that I personally should go as observer to the Yangtze Valley. My two Assistants M/A are due to return to the United States in May and I considered that the value of the trip, especially the close-up impressions of the Nationalist movement, should not be so soon lost to the office. Any of the three language officers soon to become assistants would have been quite efficient for duty as observer, but they were completing their language work and I did not think it advisable to send them. I also considered it important for me personally to establish and renew my acquaintance with contacts in the Yangtze Valley.

2. Accordingly, I left Peking on February 17th and arrived in Nanking on the 19th. After conference with the Consul, Mr. Davis, I decided to go first to Shanghai where a general strike had just started in preparation for the expected entry of the Nationalist forces; Hangchow having fallen on February 19th. I was received by Marshal Sun Chuan-fang on the 20th at which time he informed me of his defeat, which was due entirely to the disaffection of his subordinates and not to superior military strength of the Nationalists. While protesting the evils of Russian methods employed by the Southerners, he appreciated the efficacy of their propaganda and morale factors, and assured me it was necessary for the North to adopt a course which appealed to the people or else there would be little chance of stopping the Nationalists.

3. I reached Shanghai on the morning of February 21st and at once called on the Consul General, Mr. Gauss. During my stay in Shanghai, my relations with him were most genial. We agreed that as a matter of economy we would not duplicate messages relating to military matters but should combine my information with his own despatches. I called on Admiral Williams and staff and then spent hours each day interviewing and conversing with Chinese and foreign officials and observers. I soon discovered that the Police Intelligence Service was the best source

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of information for actual troop movements and current happenings in the area about Shanghai. I at once made contact with the higher municipal authorities and was given free access to all their information. The Intelligence Office of the British Defense Force was composed of officers whom I had previously known and they gave me their material quite freely. My time in Shanghai was most engaged since the city is filled with refugees from the interior, journalists, and all types of people who were seeking or giving information of events. I met Col. Miller, commanding the 4th Marines, upon their arrival and assisted his Intelligence Officer in the way of giving him a background of the situation and bringing him into touch with local contacts.

4. The Northern troops after withdrawing from Chekiang having stopped on a line near Sungkiang, I decided to visit this area. This I did on March 3rd and 4th by motor launch, accompanied by Captain Cole, Marine I.O. Previously I had inspected the defense line being organized by the British and French surrounding the International and French concessions respectively.

5. By March 1st it began to appear that the situation around Shanghai would not be immediately critical. So far as foreign life and property in the concessions were concerned, there seemed sufficient forces to secure them. The British force was capable of offering considerable resistance to the entry even of organized Chinese troops into the Internatinnal Concession, and it seemed highly improbable that the Nationalists would make any attempt to precipitate the issue by armed forces. It also appeared that the Nationalist plan did not contemplate a drive on Shanghai from the South but rather an attempt to isolate the city and cause its fall by cutting the communications of the Shantung Force west of the Tai Hu Lake in the vicinity of Changchow, with raids at other points. The real drive on Nanking was expected to come up the Yangtze River, from the direction of Anking. For these reasons I decided to go to Hankow hoping to see some military activities en route and to return in time to observe what promised to be a decision in the Nanking area. Accordingly, I left Shanghai by boat on March 6th.

6. At Nanking I again conferred with Mr. Davis. There were many rumors of the approach of Southern troops from west of Tai Hu Lake and from up river, but the only definite information was that Chen Tao-yuen, Tuchun of Anhui, had joined the South and that the Southern bank of the Yantze to include Wuhu had passed into Nationalist hands. However, there were at this time some 45,000 of Chang Tsung-chang's troops in the Nanking-Soochow area who appeared to be preparing to resist. Mr. Davis, with naval officers, was preparing evacuation plans for Americans in Nanking. I decided to continue to Hankow hoping to return before the issue could be decided at Nanking.

7. Arriving at Wuhu on the morning of the 8th, I had the good fortune to observe Nationalist methods first hand. This city had gone over two days before and the Nationalist forces had advanced 20 miles in the direction of Nanking. So far there had been no agitation but, while ashore, typical radical agitation started and I found myself in the Customs building with the Customs staff when a large mob outside demonstrated menacingly. The Customs Club was completely wrecked and, but for the arrival of Chen Tao-yuan's soldiers, stationed on a hulk only a few hundred yards away, the Customs House would likewise have been sacked. When it ended, all the occupants of the building, including myself, were huddled in a hallway on the second story to avoid the hail of stones which broke all the windows. The 1500 soldiers could have prevented it all but deliberately permitted the mob to act long enough to do considerable damage. The whole mob action was stirred by agitators with no reason other than to terrorize foreigners, so far as could be seen. Further mob action seemed likely to occur at Wuhu followed by senseless labor organization and the evacuation of foreigners. To give a picture of this affair I shall write a separate report. Our boat left at 5:00 p.m. for up river. One felt like a deserter as we pulled away leaving some 125 terrorized white people widely scattered about Wuhu. The mob of 6,000 was still on the bund but was being quieted by the military in order properly to receive a Cantonese general, Chen Chien, who arrived shortly after our departure.

8. The situation at Kiukiang was relatively calm since the typical agitation following Nationalist occupation had subsided. Chiang Kai-shek's moderate subordinates were in control. Although all British and most other foreigners were still living aboard a boat in the river, tied alongside a destroyer, the British Consulate had reopened ashore. The British Concession had been rendered to Chinese authorities. Labor agitation was being kept under fair control, but the civil authorities were powerless to prevent passing military units from quartering their troops in the foreign buildings in the old concession.

9. I arrived at Hankow on March 10th and was met by Consul General Lockhart and an officer sent by Admiral Hough. I immediately became aware of an atmosphere which can be appreciated only by a visit to this center of Nationalist effort. No matter how foreigners attempted to hide their feelings, there was evident everywhere tenseness and an air of uncertainty as to the future. I have never before observed such a lack of confidence among a large group of white people. This resulted from living for months in the presence of an invisible force which was manifested upon the most unexpected occasions in outward violence and intimidation.

10. Mr. Lockhart was most kind and helpful in arranging for me to interview officials of all nationalities and representative civilians. I talked with a great number of people almost all of whom were unanimous in their opinion that the Kuomintang organization was much more effective

and much more menacing to foreign interests than was generally conceived elsewhere in China. Russian revolutionaries had superimposed their organization and certain purely foreign features on the Kuomintang movement and completely dominated the situation. The extent and real meaning of the Russian effort is nowhere so evident as in Wuhan. The results of my investigations will be covered in a special report.

11. While in Hankow the meeting of the Central Executive Committee was in progress. The deliberations and enactments of the Committee clearly brought to light the internal differences existing among the Kuomintang leaders, the strength of the extremist group in the Central Executive Committee, and principally, the apparent success of the extremists in rendering Chiang Kai-shek subordinate to the Military Committee of the C.E.C. Certain fundamental observations, wholly concurred in by Mr. Lockhart, were wired to the Minister on March 16th. They are as follows:

"Contrary to previous views, I am convinced that Nationalist movement if unaffected by international complications ultimately will succeed. Ankuochun at present a stronger military force but the morale and political cohesion of the Kuomintang Party is unique in China. Party discipline effectively curbs individualism and personal ambition of military commanders. Present rift between Chiang Kai-shek and Hankow extremists defended by Tang Sheng-chih is serious. It may possibly result in attempt of former to compromise with North, thus delaying nationalist expansion, but it is extremely doubtful if Chiang can lead his subordinates to disregard party authority. A serious defeat by Northerners will delay but not prevent Nationalist success.

"Mere nationalism does not express this movement; it is a fundamental revolution. At present numerous Russians and other foreign radicals with willing Chinese extremists dominate the movement. These are highly efficient revolutionaries who have succeeded in overcoming Chinese inertia and individualism by creating sincere support of peasants and laborers, by perfect revolutionary technique, by rigid party discipline and first-rate technical supervision in all matters. Russians are working tirelessly and Chinese in key positions appreciate them. Many difficulties will arise from rapid expansion but momentum of movement will prevent its collapse unless combination of Western Powers seriously intervenes.

"Regardless of present Nationalist pronouncements, the final outcome will be a government modelled on Russia and friendly to Russia. Only foreign institutions generally compatible with modified Russian ideals can hope to exist in China when Nationalist control is complete.

"I am convinced that any manifestation of force short of war on our part can result only in aggravating the violence of the revolution. Believing that no Chinese agencies can forestall the development along Russian lines mentioned above, I can see only three steps

open to the United States: One, war on China, which would involve also Russia; Two, by means of large scale financial assistance as the opening, replace Russia and direct the course of the revolution along more desirable lines; Three, voluntary cancellation of all unequal rights and gradual evacuation, mitigated so far as possible by avoiding all pin-pricking force."

12. I sailed from Hankow on March 18th, hoping to find the trains operating north from Pukow. Arriving at Nanking on March 20th, I talked with Mr. Davis on the 'phone, found the railway north was interrupted and decided to continue by boat to Shanghai. I told Mr. Davis my impressions of the seriousness of the situation and expressed doubt of Chang Tsung-chang being able to resist Kuomintang propaganda, even though at that time he had 120,000 men south of the Yangtze and was still moving troops into Nanking from Pukow. At this time Chang's connection with his Shanghai force had been cut at Changchow, but his lines were held generally on the circumference of a circle about 15 miles from Nanking and were not pressed. Four days later Nanking was in Nationalist hands and violence was done to foreigners of all nations. Chu Yu-pu had moved all his large army across the Yangtze without molestation.

13. The next day I arrived in Shanghai to see the city flying Kuomintang flags. The Marines were going ashore as we came up the river. Shanghai had fallen at noon, though not a Southern soldier had arrived and none did arrive in the city until the next afternoon. The Shantung troops had retired from the South, were deserted by their officers and they became a menace to the city. It was reported that General Pi Shu-chen had turned Nationalist. Later reports stated that the three generals present had each been caused to give up the defense by being convinced that the others had turned Nationalist. Later developments make it seem clear that the abandonment of the city to Chiang Kai-shek was staged as the result of some secret negotiations the details of which are not known.

14. Considerable excitement prevailed in the city, but the presence of the British Defense Force, reinforced by the other foreign contingents, and the volunteer organizations, gave a great sense of security to those within the International and French Concessions. The details of the situation have already been fully reported by the Consul General. During the afternoon, there was sporadic sniping by plain-clothes Kuomintang radicals and disorganized Shantung soldiers, who terrorized the native city, principally in Chapei and the area bordering North Szechwan Road. An armored train manned by White Russians defended itself against all comers at North Station. The shooting and looting in Chapei increased at night, and a fire was started which burned with no attempt to fight it. Barricades were manned and troops prevented numerous attempts of armed men to enter the concessions. The British had one man killed and eight wounded during the day.

15. The disorders in the northern part of the city continued the next day, and all foreigners in the salient bordering North Szechuan were evacuated into the concessions with considerable difficulty. During the afternoon, Nationalist troops began to appear to the south of the city and by five p.m. were fighting the disorganized Shantung troops and Russians in the area about Shanghai North Station. As the Nationalists began to clean up the streets, the Shantung troops and Russians in an effort to escape made attempts against the barricades. Individuals who disarmed were permitted to enter, but later they came in larger numbers and tried to force their way. The British at three or four barricades had to kill some Chinese who approached firing. At one point some five hundred got behind the barricade by working through alleyways between streets, and the British had to fire from two directions along Range Road. The Chinese soldiers soon threw away their weapons and equipment and these 500 were herded into a compound. The Japanese also took and disarmed about the same number of Northern soldiers by the unique device of paying Y-30,000.

16. I inspected the area shortly after the attack on the barricades in company with Col. Hayweed, Intelligence Officer of the British Defense Force. I also called on the C.O., 4th Marines, at his C.P. and inspected some of the bivouacs of the companies which at this time were so located as to constitute local support for the British troops on the line of barricades. Technicalities as to the status of the U.S. Marines were no longer being regarded, and to all practical purposes our Marines had become a component part of the international force and considered themselves subject to General Duncan's orders.

17. Together with Colonel Steward, British Military Attache, I sailed on March 23d on a Japanese ship for Dairen, since all British ships on the Tientsin line were held up by strikes. At Tsingtao it was found possible to proceed to Peking by rail. Accordingly we left the ship and returned to Peking on March 27th without incident via Tsinanfu. General Pi Shu-chang, Shantung commander at Shanghai, travelled incognito by the same Japanese ship, and continued from Tsingtao to Hsuchow to report to Chang Tsung-chang. It is not probable that he would have dared to face Chang had his debacle at Shanghai not been in accordance with Chang Tsung-chang's plans, resulting from some agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. This incident together with the unopposed withdrawal of Chu Yu-pu's large force back across the Yangtze gives color to the belief that Chiang Kai-shek has long been in negotiations with Northern leaders.

18. During my trip it soon became evident that strictly military observations were of little value since nothing was being settled by recourse to arms. Throughout all of the operations leading to the taking of Shanghai and Nanking by the Nationalists there was not a real battle.

Troop dispositions and strength were of no significance when all movements were made as a result of negotiations or as a result of very effective propaganda which caused Northern forces to melt before the Nationalists with no attempt at resistance.

19. Information of military and political nature will be submitted in digest form as time permits.

John Magruder,
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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WAR DEPARTMENT
MAY 31

G-2 Report.

REPORT OF LIEUT. DAVID D. BARRETT, INF.,
ON TRIP TO THE ANHUICHUN FRONT.
April 7th to 19th, 1927.

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RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 31 1927

Pursuant to instructions from the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, I left Peking April 7th, 1927, and proceeded to Shihchiachuang, thence to Taiyuanfu, Shansi, and returned to Shihchiachuang. From Shihchiachuang I proceeded to Chengchow, thence to Hsuchow and Pengpu, and from Pengpu I returned to Peking by way of the Tientsin-Pukow and Peking-Mukden railroads, arriving here on Tuesday, April 19th, 1927.

This report will be confined to comment on general conditions. Notes which it is believed may be of permanent military interest will be submitted in form suitable for incorporation into the Digest.

1. General Conditions on Peking-Hankow, Lunghai and Tientsin-Pukow Railway Lines.

(1) Peking-Hankow Line. The Fengtien military authorities are evidently making a great effort to maintain passenger and freight traffic on this line in as nearly a normal condition as is possible in view of the existing situation. Passenger trains, while not running on schedule, are not subject to any undue delay to give military trains priority on the railway line. A great amount of ordinary freight is being moved. The express train between Peking and Hankow, which is now running once a week as far as Chengchow, runs nearly on schedule time, and conditions on the train are very good. The cars are clean, and service both in the diner and on the sleeping cars is excellent.

Soldiers are not permitted to ride the trains without tickets, and strict discipline is maintained by the train guard, the members of which are very courteous in their behavior.

While the rolling stock of the road has suffered considerable damage during the recent military operations, taking it as a whole it

is in much better condition than that on the Tientsin-Pukow line. Train employees informed me that the engines were receiving sufficient attention to keep them in at least fairly good running order.

(2) Lunghai Railway. Passenger and freight service on this line has been almost completely interrupted by war conditions. Rolling stock is in a very bad condition. I saw no first or second class coaches between Chengchow and Hsuchow. From Lanfeng to Hsuchow the trees which formerly lined both sides of the track have all been cut down to furnish firewood to the Chihli-Shantung troops.

(3) Tientsin-Pukow Line. Conditions on this line are very bad indeed. Train schedules are completely disrupted, everything giving way to the large troop movements south to Hsuchow and Pengpu. Between Lincheng and Tsinanfu travel conditions are a little better, and from Tsinanfu to Tientsin schedules are fairly well maintained.

The rolling stock of the road has suffered damage to an extent which is difficult to estimate. Passenger cars of all classes have been practically gutted by the troops which have occupied them. Box-cars have been very badly hacked up, and even gondolas, about which there is not much which may be damaged, show signs of the worst possible usage. For example, if the sides of the gondolas are not protected by strips of iron on the edges, they have been gnawed by horses to such an extent as to seriously damage the cars.

The engines are all in a very bad condition and are practically never put in the roundhouse unless they break down to such an extent that they cannot be used unless repaired.

Even the cars of the Blue Express have suffered damages, such as marred upholstery, scratched and broken woodwork, and torn carpets. I saw one dining car of the express with practically every window broken out.

2. Attitude of Governor Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi.

I had an extended talk with the governor in which he expressed his views very frankly on a number of subjects. He is evidently very much in favor of the Kuomintang, and in my opinion he is only wait-

ing for a suitable opportunity to go over openly to that party. At the time I talked to him, the fall of Hsuchow seemed imminent, making the prospects of the Ankuochun very bad, and I think that Yen was almost ready to declare his allegiance to the south.

The governor told me that he believed firmly in the "Three Peoples Principles" of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but that he was very much against communism, and would use every effort to fight its spread in his province. He stated that he did not believe there were more than a very few communist agents in his territory.

With regard to the Nanking affair, he said he did not think the outrages were the fault of the Southern Government, but were probably the acts of retreating northern soldiers. I told him that we at the Legation believed the accounts of reliable eye witnesses, such as the American Consul at Nanking, who stated that the outrages were committed by Southern soldiers in uniform, apparently acting under orders of their superiors.

He asked me why our country still continued to recognize the Peking Government. He asked if the Chinese people should by common consent establish their capital at some other point, such as Nanking, would our country send its accredited representatives to that place. I told him that while I was not competent to outline the policy of my country in the event of such an occurance, still I imagined that provided the new capital was established at some other point by common action of the Chinese people, I could not see any reason why we should not send out representatives there, as to despatch them elsewhere would be meaningless.

He inquired my opinion as to what military action, if any, our country contemplated in China in the event of continued disturbance. I told him that all I knew about this was what the newspapers had printed concerning the statements of President Coolidge to the effect that the United States contemplated no action beyond that necessary for the protection of the lives and property of her citizens.

Governor Yen stated that he felt hurt over the action of the foreign powers in withdrawing their citizens from his province without notifying him or consulting him in any way. He said he had protected foreigners for sixteen years and he felt sure he could continue to do so. He further requested me to please inform my legation on my return that he was willing to give every guarantee for the protection of foreigners residing in Shansi.

I pointed out to him that no slight was meant by the withdrawal of our citizens, but the possibility of complete disruption of the Peking-Hankow line in the event of the fall of Hsuchow made it imperative that our nationals be gathered in places where communication was not likely to be interrupted. I further told him that his ability to protect foreigners was not doubted, but that if the Southern Government should gain control of his province, we did not know what might happen as our confidence in the Kuomintang desire to prevent outrages had been greatly shaken by the Nanking affair.

The governor stated that there were no Kuominchun troops in his province, and that the movements in the vicinity of Fenchowfu had been made by old 3rd Kuominchun troops not incorporated into his army, who had come down from the northern part of the province and crossed the Yellow River west of Fenchow. He said he would permit no Kuominchun troops to enter Shansi, and that he contemplated no military action against anyone, but that he was ready to defend himself if attacked.

The French railroad authorities in Shihchiachuang informed me that no request had been made on them for cars to move troops to any point. According to them, their line is not capable of moving any very large body of troops in a short time.

Incidently the Cheng-Tai road is in excellent condition, is not interfered with in any way by the governor, and last year paid a profit of about three million dollars.

To sum up about Yen Hsi-shan, I would say that his attitude is not pro-foreign, but neither is he anti-foreign. Undoubtedly his dearest wish is to maintain the position of comparative independence which Shansi

has enjoyed for the past few years. If he can best do this by going over to the South, he will probably do so, but in my opinion the recent successes of the Fengtien and Shantung troops will probably make him think twice before aligning himself with the Kuomintang, as he does not wish to incur the active enmity of a successful Chang Tso-lin.

I also talked at length with Mr. Lien Yen-pan, secretary to the governor, who has been acting as Yen's representative in Peking for some months past. He is quite outspoken in his dislike of Chang Tso-lin and has partisanship to the Southern cause. He told me that in view of the situation around Hsuchow at the time I saw him, he would advise my immediate return to Peking so that I might look out for my family during the time the Kuomintang were taking control of the capital. He said he did not think there would be any serious trouble, provided the foreigners went into the Legation Quarter and adequately defended it, but there would undoubtedly be a few days of confusion during the turn-over.

Mr Lien outlined to me the present form of civil government in Shansi upon which separate report will be made for the digest.

3. <u>Discipline and Morale of Fengtien Troops</u>.

The general appearance of the Fengtien troops in Southern Chihli and Honan is good. The men are, considering the average run of Chinese soldiers, well set up, and their uniforms in good condition. They appeared well disciplined. All ranks with whom I came in contact were courteous in their treatment of me. In fact I might say here that during the entire time that I was away from Peking I did not once receive anything but the most courteous treatment at the hands of either officers or men.

Apparently there is little friction between the civilian population and the Fengtien troops. Civilians of whom I inquired as to the behavior of the Kuokuochun soldiers said they were "pu Ts'o" (all right).

A missionary doctor stationed in Paotingfu told me that while the Fengtien soldiers were moving southward there were a good many instances of oppression of the people. Soldiers, according to him, would

enter a house at night and take all the bed clothes and make themselves comfortable, forcing the inmates of the place to move outside into the bitter cold. They also made many demands for food upon the civil population because their company officers would collect money for their rations and not buy any for them ~~them~~, thus forcing them to prey upon the people. According to the doctor, however, with the completing of the troop movements and the coming of spring, these abuses have largely ceased.

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Third and Fourth Army Group, whose headquarters is now in Chengchow, told me that as the Fengtien forces occupied territory they attempted to reduce local taxation and in instances where they found people in actual want, tried to relieve their condition as far as possible.

The morale of the Fengtien troops is apparently very good. All ranks with ~~whom~~ I talked seemed greatly encouraged over their recent successes in Honan. The officers and men all admitted that their chief concern had been that Hsuchow would fall, leaving them cut off in Honan by southern forces advancing west over the Lunghai. Since their fears in that direction had been dispelled by Chang Tsung-chang's advance south to Pukow, they felt they had little to fear from the Kuominchun, although all admitted that to retake Hankow would be a most difficult task.

General Yu Chen's 10th Army seems to have recovered completely from its disaster at Kaifeng, although the losses both in men and material were considerable. From the discriptions of the soldiers who passed through the affair, the rout was complete, and in their retreat to Tungming they were forced to abandon much property, such as carts, stores, ammunition and other military supplies. Most of their machine guns were thrown in the Yellow River to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.

Many of the headquarters personnel of the 10th Army, such as secretaries, writers, etc., were left behind in the rout, and were forced to take refuge with missionaries and the Red Cross in Kaifeng.

The I Chun elements which drove the 10th Army out of Kaifeng were only in control of the place about three days, during which time the town was plastered with Red propaganda. Then one night these forces melted suddenly away and the next day the Fengtien 11th Army took over the city and the Red posters were torn down.

I had a long talk with General Yu Chen and he seemed in the best of spirits. He was greatly interested in the raiding of the Russian Legation, as he had had no first hand accounts of this affair. He told me that he had long desired to take this step while he was in Peking, but had never found it possible to carry it out.

General Yu Chen said that the Fengtien Army heads were keeping in the closest tough with the Shantung armies movement around Hsuchow, as they realized that a sudden withdrawal from Honan would be necessary if Hsuchow fell to the Kuomintang.

Both General Yu Chen and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the 3rd and 4th Army Group told me that they were fully aware of Governor Yen Hsi-shan's unfavorable attitude toward Chang Tso-lin and his probable union with the South.

4. Discipline and Morale of Chihli-Shantung Troops.

Chang Tsung-chang's troops are evidently greatly elated over their success in driving the Kuomintang back across the river at Pukow. There are great concentrations of troops at Hsuchow and Pengpu and large bodies are continually moving south. Drilling of recruits is being carried on with great energy both in Hsuchow and Pengpu.

I overheard a conversation between General Ho Chang-pao, commanding the 147th Chihli-Shantung Division, and a lieutenant colonel in which the latter asked the general just how things were really going. The general replied that everything was most satisfactory now, but that about a week or ten days ago they had been very apprehensive that they would not be able to hold Hsuchow, which would have necessitated a retreat to Shantung. The colonel remarked that the Fengtien army heads had been watching the fate of Hsuchow with the greatest interest as the fall of that place would be a

great disaster for Chang Tso-lin.

The appearance of the Shantung troops is not nearly so good as that of the Fengtien soldiers, due probably to the harder campaigning which they have been through. Discipline does not appear as well maintained in the Chang Tsung-chang' forces as in the Fengtien armies.

I was greatly impressed with the youth of the majority of Chang Tsung-chang's field officers, many of whom are in their middle or early twenties. Some of these officers told me that Chang was in favor of appointing young men to positions of responsibility in command, as the older men were not able to stand up under the rigors of campaign life.

From what I was able to ascertain, the Shantung troops do not treat the local population as well as the Fengtien soldiers. A great number of shops were closed in Hsuchow and Pengpu due to the forced circulation of military currency which is worth about two thirds of its face falue.

Chang Tsung-chang is evidently placing great reliance upon his Russian troops. The 65th Division of Russians is now maintaining his most advanced position in Pukow, while the armored trains are patrolling the railroad between Hsuchow and Pengpu as well as helping to hold Pukow by keeping up a continual fire across the river toward Nanking.

Neither the Russians nor the Chinese troops have been paid for about six months, and this of course has an unfavorable effect upon morale. I talked with two privates of the armored train "Peking" and they stated that in addition to having received no pay, their food had been poor, and the clothing issued to them had been of inferior quality for some time. These two men stated that they were only waiting until they could secure the train fare to either Tientsin or Tsinan before deserting.

I asked one of the Russians, a very intelligent young fellow who had graduated from the Russian naval academy in the days of the Czar, if he thought Chang Tsung-chang was wavering toward the South, and he said most decidedly not. I asked if he thought Chang's leaders would stick by him, and he said in the main he thought they would.

The Russians of the armored trains, according to these two men, have no use for Merkuloff, who they say is getting rich through the sale of arms and equipment to Chang Tsung-chang. Merkuloff has no military command over the Russians in the Shantung Army.

5. General Summary of Situation at Hsuchow.

At the time I left Peking, Hsuchow seemed in imminent danger of falling, and the principle object of my trip was to try and ascertain just how long this place could hold out, and if it fell would any decided stand be made by Chang Tsung-chang in Shantung. Before I reached Hsuchow, the situation had already greatly altered in favor of the Chihli-Shantung forces, and from all that I could ascertain by observation and inquiry, the capture of either Pengpu or Hsuchow by Kuomintang troops is extremely unlikely for some time to come.

The Chihli-Shantung troops are fully aware of the internal dissension in the ranks of the Kuomintang, and they believe this has lessened the fighting ability of the Southern forces. They also apparently believe that Sun Chuan-fang is now unlikely to go over to the South.

It is interesting to note that in spite of the northern advance down to Pukow, small bands of Southern troops are still operating within ten or fifteen miles to the west of Pengpu. The night before I arrived as this place, two Russians on outpost duty about ten miles from the city were wounded by a Kuomintang patrol. Both the Russians and Chinese with whom I talked on this subject placed little importance in the presence of these scattered bodies, considering that they constitute no serious menace to the safety of the railroad.

6. Propaganda.

I rode from Hsuchow to Pengpu in a coach which was entirely occupied by a propaganda section of the Chihli-Shantung army, commanded by a brigadier-general, and carrying a great quantity of propaganda material, consisting of posters, handbills, and a small booklet written in simple Chinese. This last was given over mostly to denunciation of Feng Yu-hsiang and an explanation of the fallacy of communistic ideals.

Towns along the Peking-Hankow line are well plastered with

Anhuochun propaganda posters, the main theme of which is to point out the evils of communism. One poster depicts two farmers weeping bitterly because their farms had been taken away from them and turned over to the communist government, leaving them without means of support.

It struck me that such a poster would have great appeal to a farming population which owned its own lands, but in a district where the majority of the farmers were tenants, it would react more in favor of the Kuomintang.

No Kuomintang posters are in evidence in Taiyuanfu, although some posters proclaiming the virtues of the "Three Peoples' Principles" of Dr. Sun Yat-sen are occasionally seen.

7. Attitude toward Foreigners.

During my entire trip I saw no visible evidences of any anti-foreign feeling, all classes of civilians and soldiers treating me with uniform courtesy. I did not even hear a single child call "yang Kuei" (foreign devil) at me in the street.

There is no doubt, however, that the great majority of the people in the districts I visited are definitely anti-British. Almost everyone with whom I talked asked me what nationality I was, and when I told them I was an American, the invariable response was some statement to the effect that America was "ting hao" (very good) and that she was friendly to China. Something was usually added to the effect that the Chinese did not like the British and the Japanese.

The following incident will show the general feeling of Chinese toward Anglo-Saxons. I was waiting for a train in the rain at Chengchow and in order to get out of the wet attempted to enter a boxcar in which were several Fengtien soldiers. They refused to let me in, saying that there was ammunition in the car and they were instructed to keep out all persons except those who had business there. I made no further move to enter the car, saying that I thoroughly understood military regulations.

After a few minutes a soldier asked; "What nationality are you?" "American" was my answer. "Come in and make yourself at home", said the soldier, "we thought you were an Englishman".

To several persons of more than average intelligence with whom I talked, when they disclosed their anti-British attitude, I reminded them that Americans and British were a great deal alike. These people admitted that we had many points in common, but that Americans were lacking in the domineering attitude which characterized the Briton.

I honestly believe that the present dislike of the British in China is not due so much to any feeling concerning concessions, unequal treaties, or extra-territoriality, as it is caused by the attitude of superiority and disdain which so many Britons assume toward the Chinese. As one general's aide put it to me, "The British are too proud".

The head of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs of the 3rd and 4th Army Group in Chengchow, a returned French student, and a man of apparent culture, told me that he hoped America would not be forced into some hasty action against China.

8. <u>Japanese in Chang Tsung-Chang's Army</u>.

A Russian soldier of Chang Tsung-chang's forces told me that many Japanese were serving as enlisted men in Chang Tsung-chang's forces, usually about one or two in a company.

David D. Barrett.
David D. Barrett,
1st Lieut. Infantry.

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General Conditions in Manchuria.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. SEP 21 1927
WAR DEPARTMENT

The accompanying report was written by Mr. Henry W. Kinney, an American employed in the Publicity Bureau of the South Manchurian Railway at Dairen. The material is so excellent that I am forwarding it complete. In all cases where I have information on the subjects covered, my information agrees with Mr. Kinney's. His opinions I consider very sound.

While not confidential, this material should not be released for publication in its present form.

John Magruder,
John Magruder,
Major, G. S.,
Military Attache.

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"Dairen, July 20th, 1927.

"After having traveled in China proper, travel in Manchuria affords an extremely welcome contrast, not only because of the absence of war, the aspect of many thousands of square miles of rich fields being tilled undisturbed by the ravages of warfare, and the evidences of constructive activities where in the rest of China all action seems bent solely on destruction, but also because of the very attitude of the people themselves. Throughout the length and breadth of Manchuria one finds no sign of the anti-foreignism which has become one of the outstanding features of the rest of China. When I was in Shanghai a few weeks ago I could notice a distinct change of attitude on the part of the Chinese populate, a sullenness and a more or less passive, but still very noticeable dislike of the foreigner, which had increased markedly during the period of less than a year which had passed since my last visit there. I found a somewhat similar, though rather less marked, condition in Peking. In Manchuria, however, no evidence of anti-foreign feeling was noticeable in any of the places which I visited. Mr. Hanson, the American Consul at Harbin, recently returned from an extensive trip in northern North Manchuria and he stated that everywhere he found the Chinese entirely friendly, while other foreigners living at various points in the Three Eastern Provinces all report to similar effect.

Politically, also, the situation seems more quiet than usual. My visit in Harbin a few days ago was probably my first one in which I did not hear the usual rumors of an uprising or a Red coup d'etat in the immediate future, which forms the common pabulum for Harbin gossip. Even the report of the Soviet mobilization and armed invasion had died out. As a matter of fact, I am satisfied from reports which I received in Harbin from absolutely reliable authorities that there is no indication whatever of any Russian warlike movements on the Manchurian border. In fact, some recent visitors in Siberia insisted that even if the Soviet authorities might wish to mobilize an army in Eastern Siberia, they would be unable to do so, as the discontent of the population was so great that the Soviet authorities would be afraid to place arms in their hands, fearing that such might be used immediately against themselves.

The extreme quietness of the situation in Manchuria finds its principal explanation in the fact that the center of activity and interest has shifted, with Chang Tso-lin, to the region south of the Great Wall. Chang has now been in Peking for many months, and his principal

lieutenants, such as Wu, Governor of Heilungkiang; Chang Tso-chang, Governor of Kirin; Yang Yu-ting, chief of staff and Chang's most intelligent adviser; the "Young General" and others, spend most of their time in Peking, and as a consequent matters in Manchuria drift along in a sort of routine fashion. The chiefs, having their hands more than full with the extremely complicated military and political situation in China proper, can give no great attention to Manchuria - beyond devising means for obtaining funds therefrom - and the situation in Manchuria therefore depends mainly on the position of Chang Tso-lin in Peking.

It may safely be said that no one in Manchuria, Chinese, Japanese or foreigners, favors Chang's adventures south of the Wall, with the exception of a number of members of Chang's immediate entourage. The latter have potent selfish reasons for wishing their chief to enhance his position, as, of course, their own fortunes soar with those of their leader. It is obviously far better to be, say, a cabinet minister of the Peking government than it is to be a mere official of the provincial government at Mukden. It is probable that the encouragement and flattery of the group immediately surrounding him have contributed largely to fanning into flame Chang's ambition which now expresses itself in his assumption of the title of "Generalissimo", in his living in almost imperial state in Peking, and in his selecting as his bodyguards near relatives of the ex-Emperor. All this must be fairly heady wine for even so shrewd a head as that of Chang Tso-lin, and satisfaction of vain ambition seems to furnish the principal explanation for his venturing from the safety of his Manchurian domain to take the chances which he is taking in the political whirlpool in China. For the time has passed when Peking was a financial asset to whoever held it. The stream of revenues which formerly flowed into the capital from provincial sources has become much attenuated and has in many instances ceased entirely. Chang, when he arrived in Peking, did not find a treasury filled with gold - on the contrary, he found hordes of officials who had not been paid for many months past and who were clamoring for pay. Thus maintenance of the Peking government, coupled with vast expenditures connected with keeping armies in the field, caused a heavy demand on Chang. This has had to be met largely through resources drawn from the Three Eastern Provinces. Taxes and various imposts on goods brought forth some funds, and still more was raised by the issuance of paper money. This deteriorated at an alarming rate, and in some regions, notably Harbin, this circumstance was met by forbidding use of any money other than the native Manchurian paper, whereas usually Japanese money had been generally employed, as this was favored owing to its stability. The government banks bought, for local paper, vast quantities of beans and other produce, which they sold for silver. The effect was that to a large extent the annual inflow of silver into Manchuria, resulting from the sale of its crops (it is estimated that one-fifth of the Manchurian crops are exported) never entered Manchuria. It was employed by Chang Tso-lin for his military and political enterprises in China proper, and the Manchurian population received only rapidly depreciating paper. An idea of the depreciation may be gained from the fact that while the supposed par of the Mukden "fengpiao" is 120 to Yen 100, it has fallen to about 1,150, though it fluctuates constantly in accordance with news of victories or reverses by the Mukden forces.

The effect of this condition on the economic situation in Manchuria is obvious, and when to this is added the fact that men, draft animals

and supplies are constantly being drawn from the three provinces for the purpose of supporting Chang Tso-lin's ambitions south of the Wall, it can be easily understood that these are far from being popular in Manchuria. All the residents, irrespective of nationality, would like nothing better than to have the Mukden Warlord abandon his plans south of the Wall and devote his entire attention to the peaceful development of the vast territory of Manchuria. Such an activity would in fact, seem to offer sufficient employment for even a very ambitious man, and the potentialities would seem most alluring. Of the 380,000 square miles of territory only about onehalf has been developed, and the overpopulated neighboring provinces of Chihli and Shantung afford an almost inexhaustible labor supply which is only too eager to come over to Manchuria and bring under cultivation the great tracts of land which are constantly being opened by construction of new railways.

The present unfavorable conditions prevailing in Chihli and Shantung, particularly the latter, are proving beneficial to Manchuria. Conditions in Shantung, since the withdrawal of the stabilizing influence of Japanese occupation of Kiaochao and the railway to Tsinan, have gone from bad to worse, and continuous warfare, banditry, heavy taxation and intolerable conditions generally have reached the point where vast numbers of the population in desperation are leaving their homeland to seek peace and an opportunity to make a livelihood in the peaceful regions of Manchuria. Thus the emigration of Chinese from the two provinces mentioned, which in the past was largely a seasonal emigration of laborers, has during the past half-year became a mass movement. In former years from 300,000 to 450,000 Chinese came from Shantung and Chihli into Manchuria, these being mostly male laborers who went to work in the Manchurian farms, and of whom about one-half returned to their homes after the harvest. Last fall, however, conditions in Shantung became so unendurable that, in spite of the fact that it was the wrong season, a tremendous increase in immigration into Manchuria took place. The character of the immigrants has also changed and now one sees hordes of men, women and children, representing not only agriculturists but almost all classes of society, entering Manchuria in order to reside there permanently. They come by steamer, by junk, by train, or on foot and this fact makes it impossible to determine exactly the total of such arrivals. Still basing one's calculations on the arrivals in the ports and on the trains, it is possible to estimate with reasonable certainty that this year's total will be not less than 800,000 and possibly a million. (Further data on this subject may be obtained from an exhaustive and informative article "Chinese Labor Migration to Manchuria", by Mr. C. Walter Young, which appeared in the July number of the Chinese Economic Journal, issued by the Chinese Government Bureau of Economic Information, in Peking. Price 50 cents Mex.)

These immigrants present a most pathetic aspect. Most of them are virtually penniless and carry their entire belongings on their backs. The fact that the Japanese Leased Territory is fairly well settled (the Chinese population therein has multiplied by 14 during the past 20 years, whereas that in the rest of Manchuria has not quite doubled), while the regions along the S. M. R. lines in South Manchuria, are also well developed, makes it necessary for the newcomers to penetrate further inland, into the partly or entirely undeveloped regions along the newly opened Taonan -- Anganchi line, on the Manchuria Mongolia borderland generally along the Kirin-Tunhua and the Hulan-Heilun lines which are now building; and along the more remote sections of the C. E. R. The plight of many of these immigrants is pitiful. The railways give them the advantage of greatly reduced rates, and children and aged persons are carried free; and yet a number of them are so utterly destitute that they are compelled to walk, many of them making on foot the entire trek to points beyond Harbin, a distance of over 600 miles from Dairen. Charitable organizations, Chinese, Japanese, and foreign, private, official and semi-official, do

their best to assist the immigrants by providing food and shelter at the principal points alongthe line of march, but it is obvious that the poor farming population along the long stretches of ground which must be covered can do little to assist such vast hordes, and much suffering is endured by the travellers, this becoming naturally intensified the further they penetrate northwards, and the Harbin papers report a number of cases where aged people and children have been abandoned to die as they were unable to carry on with their people who must continue on their march.

It is quite evident that the restoration of Shantung to Chinese chaos has not proved an altogether unmixed blessing to its people. On the other hand, it has proved of considerable benefit to Manchuria. In the past it was necessary to attract immigrants into Manchuria from Shantung by recruiting campaigns, but today the distracted population is only too glad to escape and to seek peace in Manchuria, which gains through the fact that this influx of labor makes possible the rapid opening up and development of vast tracts of arable land. Various agencies assist the newcomers in establishing themselves, some of these being official, some semi-official and some entirely private enterprises. Usually a number of immigrants, generally coming from the same neighborhood are placed in some large tract of land, which is apportioned among them. They are furnished with seeds, tools, food and such scant material as is needed to establish them, but such assistance is frugal beyond all imagination and barely sufficient to keep body and soul together. As a matter of course, it is paid for by a considerable share of the crops when these are raised.

The influx of this army of toilers, who must work strenuously to keep alive is adding greatly to the production of Manchuria, and the fact that the crops this year will be marvelously good adds to the promise of the future. The C. E. R. officials, for instance, told me that they expected to carry a freight increase of 25,000,000 pood this year. It may be added parenthetically that one crop which has, unfortunately, increased considerably is that of opium, this being due to the fact that planting of the poppy is now being encouraged, and according to some reports even made a matter of compulsion by the authorities who find this an excellent source of tax revenue. Poppy cultivation has been engaged in in North Manchuria in the past, but it has heretofore been kept modestly in the back-ground and has been kept going mainly through an arrangement between soldiers in remote regions and farmers, the former promising protection in return for a share of the crop. Now, however, the poppy is seen all over Manchuria, except the Leased Territory, and old-timers tell me that this is the first time in many years that they have seen it in South Manchuria.

The above described condition, namely the opening of great areas of virgin soil by an influx of hundreds of thousands of industrious immigrants, and the potentialities for prosperity thus offered without effort on the part of the authorities causes the residents of Manchuria to harbor the wistful wish that Chang Tso-lin would abandon his chase of the will-o-the-wisp south of the Wall and devote his entire energies to Manchuria. At present, however, these energies have been devoted principally to draining the provinces of their wealth and to the building and enlarging of arsenals and providing of military equipment. The one exception is offered by the construction by the Chinese, through their own capital and with their own engineers, of some railways, namely one running from Mukden in a north-easterly direction to Hailungcheng, the center of a rich region; another from Takushan, a point on the Peking-Mukden line, to Changwu, a town in a northerly direction from Takushan; and still another running from Hulan on the Sungari near Harbin, northwards to Hailun.

General Conditions in Manchuria.

Railway building has during the past couple of years become almost an obsession on the part of the Chinese over-lords, who have found it very profitable. The modus operandi is simple. The governing officials buy up or secure control in other ways of the lands along the proposed railways, which are then built in such a manner that they come within only a mile or two of the towns, making the land between the towns and the railways increase immensily and immediately in value. The gain thus derived coupled with money furnished by the towns and villages touched by the lines, thus makes railway building cheap and profitable. The only drawback lies in the fact that the Chinese appear to have become somewhat over-enthusiastic, s that they show a tendency to build lines even more rapidly than it is possible for development to follow.

Another phase of the railway building referred to, which is of interest, lies in the fact that several of the proposed lines are in direct violation of the Sino Japanese agreement whereby China must build no lines competing with or paralleling the South Manchurian Railway. Where as in the past, the Japanese have encouraged and assisted the building of lines opening new territory and acting as feeders to the S. M. R., it is obvious that they must oppose the building of lines which will not only compete with the S. M. R. but which will draw traffic from lines built for the Chinese with Japanese assistance and which have not yet been paid for even. A case in point is the proposed building of a line from Changwu to Payantala, which, if built, must take a large volume of traffic from the Changchiatun-Saupingkai line built for the Chinese under a Japanese loan, which has not been paid. Another is the proposed line from Kirin to Hailungcheng, there to connect with the Mukden-Hailungcheng line, which would tend to divert traffic from Kirin-Changchun line. Building is in progress in the case of the former, while in the case of the latter preliminary arrangements have been made and bids for various materials have been called for.

Repeated protests have been made by Japan, pointing out that their construction clearly violates the Sino-Japanese agreements, but so far the Chinese appear to pay no attention to the protests. Foreign observers in Manchuria are showing some curiosity in the matter as to whether the somewhat more determined policy in regard to China announced by the Tanaka Government, will show any effect in the matter of these railway lines. Recently I asked Yang Yu-ting, at Mukden, as to what he thought on the point, but though Yang is known generally as the "brains" of the Mukden party and must be well posted, he declined to discuss the matter, saying that as he was a military man he had no knowledge of railway affairs. In this he was probably over-modest, as, as a matter of fact, it is likely that strategic considerations had not a little to do with the plans for building the lines mentioned as their completion will connect the three provincial capitals, Mukden, Kirin and Tsitsihar, by means of Chinese owned railways. The importance of this consideration was brought home to Mukden at the time of the revolt of Kuo Sun-ling, when Ivanoff, then manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway prevented the troops from Tsitsihar from traveling over the C. E. R. line, and thereby succeeded in creating a delay which almost disastrous for Chang Tso-lin, though, as it turned out, the Tsitsihar troops managed to get south by the Taonan line and to defeat the rebel troops in the very nick of time. The lesson thus learned seems likely in some measure, at least, to be explanatory of the Chinese railway building activities.

In the talk with Yang Yu-ting referred to above, Yang stated, in answer to a question as to his views on the subject of the despatch of Japanese troops to Shantung, that he was not at all opposed to the principle of Japan's sending troops to China where such action is

necessary for the protection of the lives and property of her nationals. But, added Yang Yu-ting, it seemed to him that Japan sent troops when it was unnecessary and refrained to send them in cases where they were plainly needed. Thus, he said, Japan had failed to send troops to Nanking and Hankow, in spite of the fact that it was very plain that the Nationalists could not and did not provide protection for foreign residents, whereas, on the other hand, Japan had sent troops to Shantung in spite of the fact that that province was held by Northern soldiery and it was well known that in not a single instance had violence against foreigners occurred in the territory held by the Northern armies. Furthermore, in this case the Northerners were being blamed for receiving aid from the presence of the Japanese troops in Shantung, which was not the case, as, on the contrary, they did not want them there at all.

The statement of Yang Yu-ting is illustrative of the view taken by Chang Tso-lin and his followers in respect to the attitude taken towards Mukden by the powers generally. They point to the fact -- which is beyond dispute -- that foreign lives and property has been given scrupulous protection in the entire territory in control of Mukden and her allies and also to the fact -- which is also beyond dispute -- that the Nationalists despite their vociferous enunciation of various highflown principles have committed arson, murder, and rape, and have ousted foreign missionaries and other residents from vast areas under their control. The Mukdenites point to the fact that order reigns in Manchuria and chaos south of the Yangtze, and they deplore the anomaly presented by the fact that public opinion abroad, especially in the United States, persists in sympathizing with the South and to dislike Mukden.

As was stated above, political conditions in Manchuria are quiescent at the moment. Even the long-standing dispute between the Chinese and the Russians as to control of the Chinese Eastern Railway rights seems dormant, this being due to the fact that both sides are too busily occupied with affairs in the south to wish to take up what is by comparison a minor issue. While the treatment of Russians and other nationals possessing no extraterritorial rights in Harbin seems to continue to be as bad/ever, the Chinese authorities who last year took over administration of the city, seem to take some pride in providing some improvements such as sidewalks and the streets are no worse than they were, possibly because they have never been much good. On the C. E. R. improvements are being made to both track and rolling stock. Owing to the increase in production, necessitating the carrying of more goods, the management is planning to purchase about 2,000 freight cars. This may tend to minimize one of the principal points in the dispute between the Chinese and the Russians, as the former have long been laying claim to their share of the railway surplus, said to be about twenty million dollars Mex. which is being held in the Dalbank by the Russians. The more of this money is spent on equipment, the less there will obviously be to fight over.

Since the above was written reports from Harbin state that the Chinese authorities there have appointed officials to examine the books of the Dalbank, where the surplus of the C. E. R. has been placed by the Russians. It is also reported that the Chinese President of the C. E. R. has resumed activities looking towards distribution of part of this fund to the Chinese side, thus reopening a question which has been a source of disagreement for a long time past. In view of the fact that Chang Tso-lin needs all the money which he can obtain from Manchuria, the large sum locked up in the Dalbank must seem quite tempting. Furthermore, the recent victories gained by the Shantung forces in their drive beyond Hsuchowfu lend strength to the reports mentioned, as the attitude of the Chinese in respect to the C. E. R. always closely follows the trend of developments in China proper. When the Chang Tso-lin side feels strong, the pressure brought to bear on the Russians always increases, while it de-

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creases whenever reverses demand the attention of the Chinese authorities elsewhere. "

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December 7, 1927

#7170

Subject: Report of Trip to Manchuria.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 12 1928

1. Herewith is transmitted a report of a trip of observation made by me to Mukden, Harbin and Dairen between November 16th and November 29, 1927.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1928
WAR DEPARTMENT

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2055-648

REPORT OF TRIP TO MUKDEN, HARBIN AND DAIREN.

When information of my contemplated trip to Manchuria reached the Chinese they took great pains to provide me with letters to all prominent officials in Mukden and Harbin. Both Yang Yu-ting and the Waichiaopu officials showed a genuine interest in my trip and seemed eager to facilitate observations in Manchuria by Americans. Yang Yu-ting notified all Manchurian officials of my coming and doubtless instructed them to try to impress me favorably. The Japanese Minister too, attributing an undue significance to my visit, provided letters to military, consular and railway officials and wired them in advance of my coming. Both the Chinese and Japanese were extraordinarily hospitable and courteous, which is mentioned only as an indication of the sensitiveness of the Manchurian situation in Chinese and Japanese eyes. As a result of the unusual attention of both groups, I had difficulty in finding time to visit other nationals resident in Manchuria but I did have excellent opportunities to converse at length with the important Chinese and Japanese in the area. Among others, I interviewed and was splendidly entertained by the following:

The Governor of the Administrative Zone of the C. E. R.
The President of the C. E. R.
The Japanese Consuls in Harbin and Mukden.
The Civil Governor of Fengtien.
The Commission of Foreign Affairs of Fengtien.
The Vice President of the S. M. R.

Leaving Peking November 16, 1927, I spent three days in Mukden and arrived at Harbin on the 20th. Here I spent four days and reached Dairen on November 25th. Due to a storm and the possibility of the Tientsin boat not sailing on schedule, I returned to Peking via Mukden, reaching Peking on November 29th. I was accompanied on the trip by Lieut. James M. McHugh, Marine Language Officer, who travelled under orders of the Naval Attache.

My observations of the Mukden arsenals and other military matters will be incorporated in Digest reports. General impressions of conditions observed which have no place in the Digest follow.

Peking-Mukden Railway.

This railway maintains a regular service and the trains are run on schedule time. The passenger equipment is very old for the reason that no foreign firm will extend credit with which to make needed replacements. A few British railway engineers and fiscal officers who remain to look after British investors' interests in the line make a brave show of technical supervision without which even the present decrepit conditions could not be maintained. The cars are filthy compared with American standards; the sleeping and dining accommodations are uncomfortable and unhygienic; and the service is slovenly. It may, however, be said to the credit of Chang Tso-lin that he has reserved one train per day on which military free-riders are forbidden, thus assuring for paying passengers a place in which all their senses do not revolt against the disgusting habits of Chinese soldiers. In most ways the Peking-Mukden must be considered a third-class railway. Its hasty degeneration to the condition of other Chinese-run railways is prevented partially due to its distance from the war zone and more to the persistency of British engineers and officialdom in trying to prevent loss to the British bondholders.

Mukden.

The atmosphere at Mukden has undergone a noticeable change since Chang Tso-lin has shifted his residence to Peking. Only second-rate individuals remain in official positions. The affairs of the government of the Three Eastern Provinces are largely directed from Peking, a method of handling so important an area that is generally regarded as unsatisfactory. All Chinese, Japanese and other foreigners

consulted expressed the need of a good official to coordinate the affairs of the Three Eastern Provinces in Mukden. General Wu Chun-sheng, Governor of Hailungkiang temporarily occupies this post but he lacks the power and vision for such an important post. Chang Hsueh-liang was most frequently mentioned as the best available man, in view of the prestige he enjoys as son of the Marshal. Mr. Matsuoka, Vice President of the S.M.R., unhesitatingly expressed it to be the Japanese wish that Chang-Tso-lin himself return to Mukden. Very significantly he said, "We do not like to assume theresponsibility for Chang Tso-lin in China proper".

Coming from the widespread pessimism among business men and officials in China proper, which increases progressively as one goes south, one is immediately struck with the optimism among business men, foreign and Chinese, in Mukden. As to the prosperous conditions in Manchuria I heard no dissenting voice. The atmosphere is infectious with high business adventure comparable to our own West. Even the Chinese masses on the streets look well nourished. Animals have replaced human transport, and the numerous cart animals are noticeably well fed. There is no unemployment in Manchuria. The senseless inflation of the fengpiao is well known and causes immense difficulties to trade. Everybody condemns the fengpiao, but business thrives and men are prosperous in spite of this stupid device for financing Chang Tso-lin's military venture south of the Wall. The wealth of Manchuria lies in rich and sufficient land and this fundamental soundness will permit much stupidity in government without incurring hardship.

From the more sensational business point of view Mukden is the Mukden Arsenal or, more properly, arsenals. Into the building and maintenance of these huge plants much of the Chinese wealth in Manchuria is poured and from them relatively small output finds its way to the Northern armies. The Mukden arsenals are an expensive luxury for Chang Tso-lin.

Upon them feed richly many foreign firms and numerous Chinese officials. The wasteful and cumbersome system of distributing wealth in China known as squeeze finds its supreme development here. The story of the arsenals is a disgusting commentary on Chinese character. Whereas the amounts of squeeze here are stupendous and concentrated in a relatively small group, the system employed is general throughout China and alone is sufficient an evil to prevent China for years from taking her place among strong nations. Here is a huge governmental industrial plant in which the principles of squeeze are employed by all heads of departments in the same sordid way that an avaricious number one boy exacts toll in a domestic establishment.

Yang Yu-ting, Director of the Arsenal, genuinely tries to reduce squeeze within reasonable limits but it is recognized as folly for him to attempt to eliminate the system so well grounded in Chinese nature. Directorships are farmed out among political favorites and likewise transferred as directors become too notoriously avaricious or as they accumulate what might be considered their share. A few examples will illustrate the evil. Yang Yu-ting himself has a private wheelwrights plant which supplies all wheels to the arsenal. Various other Fengtien officials manufacture auxiliaries which they sell to the arsenal at exorbitant prices. A semi-private coal company is being developed which will enjoy the monopoly of supplying coal to the arsenal. The biggest paying job is director of construction who, I am reliably informed, cleared $300,000 in one year after making the customary distributions to his associated beneficiaries. Useless new buildings are being constructed in order to collect the squeeze while suitable existing ones are abandoned. Likewise old and expensive machinery plants lie idle as new ones replace them. Once the squeeze is paid on buildings and machinery the interest lies only in newer projects on which squeeze is yet to be had. A fine

German electric furnace steel plant was constructed, the squeeze duly paid, and a German expert employed, but the steel contractors have thus far prevented its full operation. Raw materials are bought and paid for but only a fraction is actually delivered, in the same way that servants in Peking arrange for the delivery of short tons of coal, the balance representing their squeeze. The demand for falsification of invoice prices is a general practice.

The arsenal property now embraces about ~~ten~~ five square miles of ground, most of which is covered with plants, workmen's clubs, rows of handsome officials' and workmen's quarters, A palatial officials club has just been completed. The impulse to all this building is squeeze. The various arsenal shops are in an elongated rectangle one end of which is at the outskirts of Mukden itself. The new structures are prolonging the rectangle as the older plants are gradually falling into disuse. It gives one the impression of a grass fire burning with a fair breeze which flares brightly as it goes and leaves cinders in its wake. The only interest is in new plants, which alone are producing limited outputs and affording squeeze. Mukden arsenals are a tragic monument to the most unwholesome qualities of Chinese character. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Chang Tso-lin, or rather the Chinese people, pay three prices for all the munitions used in the senseless internecine wars.

The Chinese officials in Mukden try to belittle the part played by foreigners in the technical operation of the producing parts of the arsenal. My investigations showed that every vital activity of the arsenals was supervised by foreigners, including Japanese, Russians, Germans, Swedes, Americans. Naturally all the machinery is imported from abroad. The known details of the arsenals are fully shown in a Digest report.

South Manchurian Railway.

The contrast between Chinese railways and the Japanese operated South Manchuria has been remarked by every traveller. In all respects the South Manchuria Railway demonstrates the superiority of the Japanese

to the Chinese in organizational, technical and political skill. In a word, the South Manchurian physically compares favorably to America's best railways and furnishes almost perfect service. Certain administrative faults and lack of economies do exist in the operation of the railway and in the administration of the zone; but nevertheless the railway operates excellently and the zone is firmly governed. This cannot be said of any Chinese institution of like nature. Past events and present day security for development in and near the railway zone prove almost conclusively that the freedom from normal Chinese chaos in Manchuria has been insured by the Japanese control.

Harbin.

In the autumn of 1923, when the land dispute between Chang Tso-lin's military representative and the Chinese Eastern Railway officials acting for the Russo-Asiatic Bank was acute, I had occasion to visit Harbin with the American Minister. Conditions have greatly changed since that time. Red Russians have replaced White Russians on the directorate of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The complete civil administration of the railway zone, including the city of Harbin, has been restored to Chinese hands and is being administered by a civil official. The gross revenues of the railway, formerly deposited in a Russian Bank, have now been divided between the Dalbank and Chinese banks. The parity between Chinese and Russian employees on the railway is being approached. The President informed me that this parity is almost reached in the administrative and operating departments but that in the technical department the replacing of Russians by Chinese must be deferred, due to the limited number of Chinese with the requisite linguistic and technical qualifications. Soviet Russia's influence in the Chinese Eastern Railway is everywhere diminishing before aggressive Chinese tactics. The local Chinese officials, invigorated by the virile and foreign atmosphere of the North, are taking every advantage of a weak Russia and a Japanese

policy which temporarily enjoys Moscow's discomfiture.

Harbin is growing rapidly, especially in Chinese population. It is estimated that the net increase in population in all Manchuria caused by the influx of immigrants from Chihli and Shantung will reach 800,000. Of these perhaps a fourth reach Harbin and are distributed on lands to the east and west along the C.E.R. by the semi-governmental banks and guilds. Some of these are absorbed as laborers in Harbin. With the immigrants still arriving in winter one might expect there would be much suffering before they can be placed on land to produce their first crops. I found no evidence that the immigrants were not being fed and housed. This in China is quite unusual. Since both government and individuals seem willing to advance funds to maintain these immigrants and encourage their coming, it shows a foresight unique in China. The productivity of North Manchuria will tremendously increase. The increase in the value of land owned by semi-private banks and private large holders will fully repay present small expenditures, and in the background is the feeling that this colonization is China's strongest weapon against Japan's encroachment.

Business in Harbin is thriving, and the prospects for the future are bright. There are predictions that Harbin will become one of the foremost cities in China. One senses an atmosphere of boosting in Harbin which is impressive and foreign to China. With richest virgin land being populated with a rapidity perhaps not paralleled even in our West, the optimism for the future of Harbin is well-founded.

If China proper leaves one hopeless in viewing the future, if the local conditions in the arsenal atmosphere of Mukden disgust one with Chinese lack of ability and integrity, Harbin is the one spot where one may revive a degree of confidence in China's strength. The Chinese ability to trade successfully has been traditionally recognized; their ability to create political conditions permitting a reasonable opportunity

for the individual's talents has been markedly inferior. In North Manchuria today, and in South Manchuria to a slightly lesser degree, the Chinese can farm and trade with a freedom unknown elsewhere in China. Officialdom undeniably benefits from the farm and factory; capitalism is the motivating force back of all development, just as it is in the United States; but officials and capitalists, self-seeking as they are, have a conception which is as unique in China as it is simple and which may be expressed as an appreciation of a well-nourished laying goose instead of a dead one. Officials are permitting commerce and industry an unusual degree of freedom from the customary restrictions and obstructions. The result is that in Manchuria one sees the Chinese in rich fields and in a favorable atmosphere to express their most pronounced natural abilities. It is here rather than in the blatant, theory-ridden and imitative South where Chinese nationalism flourishes most. The Chinese of Manchuria are engaging in natural pursuits, are well fed, confident; they do not hate imperialism (they are imperialists to the core) but they resent any material advantage that Russia or Japan may enjoy in Manchuria, and they will go to considerable lengths to diminish that advantage. If the Southerners are patriotic academicians who in frantic movements would eliminate even the foreigners who feed them, the Manchurian Chinese tend to develop into healthy nationalists who will retain the old-fashioned Chinese sense of sufficiency and a practical sense to benefit even from foreigners and then eliminate them by gradual substitution. The Manchurian Chinese entertain a very marked appreciation for western organization and science; they seem to understand that it is more in keeping with Chinese nature to absorb even foreign created wealth than it is to destroy it and go through the dubious processes of creating it themselves. They proceeded more slowly with the recovery of rights on the Chinese Eastern than was necessary but the intact railway is

gradually passing into their hands. Military pressure will have to be employed before Russia's stake in the Chinese Eastern is ever recovered.

The reasons for the strength of the Chinese in Manchuria are complex. International accidents alone do not explain the situation. It is true Manchuria came to China as an incident in the conquest of China herself; Russian influence dwindled with a world war and a revolution; and international intervention prevented Japan from reaping the benefits. The rigorous climate excludes all but strong men and adventurous; the opportunities certainly favor men with vision. However, I believe that one must look for the principal causes of Chinese vigor in Manchuria in foreign influences. Russia built a railway and a small empire along the path of the Chinese Eastern. Japan took over a part of it and continues Russia's plan, probably better than Russia could have done. The Chinese were responsible for none of the grandiose scheme except the original disgraceful alienation of her soil and sovereignty. But the Chinese grew up alongside of an organization superior to any they had ever known and began to reap untold material advantages from law, order and modern communications. The advantages were not all material. Many Chinese absorbed some of the spirit of foreign civilizations and some considered it worth while to imitate them within limits. Russia's hold on the C.E.R. is becoming unsteady but Russia's civilizing influence will long persist in Manchuria. There is little originality in much of the Chinese development in the area of Russian and Japanese influence. The encouraging thing for China is that some Chinese by their acts, if not by their admissions, are manifesting an appreciation of methods more in keeping with the world requirements than they have been able to create for themselves.

One of the most capable appearing Chinese officials I have encountered is Chang Huang-hsiang, Governor of the C.E. R. Railway Zone. In 1923, as commander of the military forces in the zone, he executed

the demands for the transfer of the Land Office records from the railway to the Chinese authorities. This demand was only partially successful but since then he has steadily pushed his claims for the recovery of Chinese sovereignty in the zone with marked success. Regardless of the political views held, all observers agree that Governor Chang is an intelligent and determined executive who thinks of national interests. Of considerable personal wealth, he does not have to indulge in the petty and disgraceful forms of squeeze. Many irritations and costly administrative exactions do exist, particularly directed against Russians, but on the whole the zone is well and positively governed. Bandits continue to infest the Eastern Line, but this condition has always existed. It is an interesting fact that both White and Red Russians prefer life under Chinese jurisdiction to residence in Russia. Harbin is a safer place to live than ever before. The streets have been greatly improved since the Chinese took over its administration.

I could hear no fear expressed of radical activities in Manchuria. An excellent secret service superintended by White Russians having a personal as well as professional interest in keeping down communistic activities is operative everywhere. I was shown Russian-made plans for preventing a possible invasion by Soviet forces, but these were more academic than real. The higher Chinese authorities were fully conscious of Russian inability to take aggressive measures in Manchuria because of Russia's fear of attack from the West, her internal weakness, and the avoidance of any steps in the Far East which would arouse Japan's counter-measures. As Mr. Matsuoka expressed it, "The Russians would never submit to the Chinese aggression on the C.E.R. if they were not afraid of Japan's reaction to forceful resistance".

<u>The Crossover at Anganchi.</u>

When questioned as to the real reasons for the objection to permission being granted for the Taonan-Anganchi Railway to cross the C.E.R. at Anganchi, the President of the C.E.R. stated that it was purely

a technical matter which is now under consideration by the technical board. I appeared dissatisfied with the answer, whereupon the President admitted hesitatingly that certain other difficulties did exist. Not only, it appears, did the Russian directors object to the extensions of the Chinese railway (built with loans from the South Manchuria Railway) which would tap an area of North Manchuria formerly conceded to be in the Russian sphere of influence, but there were "other reasons" which the "government" had to consider. This opened a subject, seemingly unimportant, which was very typical of the international conflict existing in all Manchurian questions.

Later I asked Mr. Matsuoka about the matter and he enthusiastically defended the propriety of this particular crossover and crossovers in general. One gathered that the S.M.R. was eager to extend this railway over which it exercises credit control in the direction of Aigun. From various sources it was learned that some official Chinese object even to a Chinese railway built with Japanese money invading North Manchuria; others under Japanese influence or in Japanese pay favor the scheme; Russian officials wish to obstruct either Chinese or Japanese encroachments damaging to C.E.R. interests; and some Chinese favor maintaining a fiction of Russian interest in order to hinder Japan's moving northward. Adding a little squeeze here and intimidation there one finds that a railway crossover assumes huge proportions. There is little doubt but that in Chinese and Russian eyes the Anganchi crossover would establish a precedent favoring future Japanese encroachments in North Manchuria.

Dairen.

The principle value of my visit to Dairen was derived from two conversations with Mr. Matsuoka, Vice-President of the South Manchurian Railway. The President was absent in Japan. I talked with the Japanese consuls in Mukden and Harbin, both of whom conversed freely of local conditions and of Chinese generalities but imparted no important

information. They left no doubt in my mind that the Chinese were unanimous in obstructing Japanese political and commercial development except in those cases of individual Chinese who personally benefited from association with the Japanese. The Japanese officers in these two places, whom also I visited, were most affable and hospitable but told me nothing of value. Mr. Matsuoka, however, was very communicative. His long association with foreigners gives him a frankness of speech which seems natural but which is suspected of being studiously deceptive.

He wasted little time on the conventional explanation of Japan's position and objectives in Manchuria and quickly abandoned the altruistic smoke-screen of Japan's Manchurian projects which is so unconvincingly employed by Japanese publicists. He admitted frankly that Japan's needs dictated economic exploitation of Manchuria, and "certain resources of the Maritime Province", as well as a strategic zone on the mainland to protect her from Russia. The strategic aspects of Manchuria, he added, were never stressed in keeping with their importance. "We not only must protect Japan from Russia but protect China as well". I asked him, "Why China?", and he replied, "Japan by way of China". "For perfect security we should have outposts in Mongolia but that is a little too far". When asked about the probability of another war with Russia, he stated that there were many Japanese who thought that a war would come within five or ten years. He believed that the recrudescence of Russian strength would not come so soon but that within a period of twenty years Japan should expect to have to face a Russia aggressive in the Far East. He believed that in the future great compromises had to be effected between Japan and Russia or a war was inevitable.

He categorically denied all knowledge of the rumored political negotiations resulting from the visit of Chinese Eastern Railway officials to Dairen in September. No one with whom I talked in Manchuria believed that any serious conversations, such as have been reported, took place.

General Chang Hsueng-hsiang said that he believed the "leaks" regarding the Russo-Japanese rapprochement were permitted with a view to intimidating the Chinese.

In discussing the general railway situation, Mr. Matsuoka assumed a very unconcerned attitude toward independent Chinese railway construction. His criticism of the Chinese was not their actual building of the contested lines but rather their high-handed disregard of existing agreements. There is room in Manchuria for many more railroads, he said, and parallel lines are not harmful to the S.M.R., provided the area between lines allows normal exploitation. The S.M.R. is fast approaching maximum capacity as at present constructed. Both on this score and because of the fact that facilities at Dairen were not limitless he defended the construction of the Kirin-Kainei line and the harbor at Seishin. The Hulatao bugaboo did not disturb him. It is technically a difficult port for development. Even if the Chinese could manage to finance and construct it, which he seriously doubted, it would require ten years to develop facilities for handling three million tons a year. Dairen is now handling about ten million tons per year and its tonnage is increasing at the rate of about one and one-half million tons annually. He reiterated the idea of their being room for all in Manchuria. These confident statements are hardly consistent with known obstructions which the Japanese invariably put in the way of all Chinese attempts at independent railway and harbor exploitation.

The Vice-President made some interesting observations regarding creditor control over Chinese railway enterprises. By way of minimizing the extent of Japanese influence outside of the S.M.R. lines, he mentioned the Ssupingkai-Taonan Railway which was financed by the S.M.R. He said that on this line the S.M.R. had a few technical and fiscal representatives but that their supervision was ineffective both in the operation of the railway and in the control of revenues. The Chinese circumvented

all efforts to provide a surplus to apply to interest due on the bonds. Mr. Matsuoka admitted that the S.M.R. expected its financial returns from these feeder lines only from the handling of freights fed into the Japanese-owned railways. He naturally did not add that a mounting indebtedness to the S.M.R. was probably viewed with favor as constituting a fine argument for seizure in possible future political complications in the area.

As previously mentioned, Mr. Matsuoka expressed dissatisfaction with Chang Tso-lin's venture south of the Wall. When I mentioned a possible advantage of having a "covering detachment" intervening between militant Southern nationalism and Manchuria, suggesting that embarrassing arguments would be heard regarding Japan's position if nationalism broke against the Great Wall, he said that he was favorable to letting the Chinese do whatever they pleased south of the Wall but that the Japanese would fight and not argue if their Manchurian interests were menaced.

I was surprised to hear from several independent sources that communist propagandists were very active in the general sullen atmosphere of discontent prevailing in Korea. This sole weapon temporarily remaining to Russia, subversive propaganda, is being vigorously employed through Korean communists residing in Siberia. An American professor who has just completed a three-months investigation of social conditions in Korea told me that he everywhere encountered intense hatred of Japan and very definite evidences of Russian-inspired radical organizations. The situation he considered acute and the cause of great concern to Japanese officialdom. Mr. Matsuoka at first was inclined to deny the existence of unusual unrest in Korea but finally admitted that propagandists were causing considerable difficulty.

General Conclusions.

Manchuria is an area which because of its natural wealth and peculiar geographical position will continue to create political problems of vast importance not only for the three nations primarily affected but

for the statesmen of the world. Because of their material interest, in contradistinction to sentimental considerations, the Chinese in Manchuria have developed an intense desire for the recovery of alienated rights. This desire will be magnified as the Chinese colonization proceeds, as it does now at a stupendous rate. Genuine Chinese nationalism based on very practical ideas grows rapidly and is being fed by the enthusiasm with which the Russian position is being negatived, as well as by the deeply rooted resentment of Japanese aggression. Japanese policies were condemned by all Chinese officials and business men with whom I talked with a boldness unusual among Chinese.

The gradual and temporary elimination of Russian influence in North Manchuria is probably looked upon with satisfaction by Japan. This however is not without its immediate disadvantages to both China and Japan since the bitterness of a two party fight is intensified when not relieved by the usual Asiatic amelioration afforded by a three sided situation. The Chinese-Japanese struggle is on in earnest. The kinetic energy of Japan is pitted against the potential energy and mass of the Chinese. Japan militarily can take over Manchuria with little difficulty, and will if the Chinese create a crisis of sufficient magnitude to justify military action. I believe all Japanese interests in Manchuria would welcome such a crisis, since, with the huge influx of Chinese settlers and increase in Chinese independent development, time works for China. Meanwhile it is clear that Japan by credit control over railway construction and otherwise pursues a policy of extending hersphere of influence into Northern Manchuria.

The vigor of the Chinese in Mamchuria and their rapidly mounting wealth is undeniably the result of the creation of an atmosphere by Russia and Japan in which Chinese commercial talents could best assert themselves. The Chinese invariably succeed where others govern. It might properly be added that they succeed <u>only</u> where others govern.

There is no foundation for confidence as Russian influence in the Chinese Eastern Zone entirely disappears that traditional Chinese corrupt practices will not assert themselves and that gradually conditions so well known in China proper will not be approached. The same would be true if unforeseen international developments forced Japan to relinquish her position in South Manchuria.

Whereas the present situation in Manchuria has become an acute struggle between China and Japan, Russia is destined to re-emerge as her strength returns, and any consideration of the Manchurian problem must envisage a three-nation strife for rich stakes in which the position of each can be defended with certain sound political and economic arguments and from which sentiment were better eliminated.

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Sub Report

Japan (Economic)

Subject: Manchuria.

The following report on Manchuria may contain nothing new, but it should be of value for purposes of comparison, as it comes entirely from a French source.

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The expression Manchuria does not designate a purely natural region. The Amur, with its two tributaries, the Ussuri and the Argun, separates it from Siberia. The Tumen and the Yalu form its frontier with Korea. On the west the line which separates it from Mongolia is very straight.

An orographic map shows that Manchuria is divided into three distinct zones: To the west the massive mountains of the Great Hin-ngan which extend from north to south, and which with smaller mountain ranges stretches towards Peking; to the east the great mountains of Chang-pai (*) which divide the Ussuri and Sungari on one hand, the Yalu and the Liao on the other; in the center, between these two mountain ranges, there are vast plains where the rivers flow to the north, toward the Amur by the Sungari and the Nonni Rivers, and to the south toward the Gulf of Liao-tung by the Liao River.

The very slight line which separates the rivers of the plains serves for want of anything better, to distinguish Northern Manchuria from Southern Manchuria, at least in the vicinity of the railroad, but as soon as one leaves the railroad, it is quite impossible to differentiate between these two terms which have only recently come into use - Northern or Southern Manchuria. However, they have entered into diplomatic terminology - the

(*) Incorrectly called the Little Khingan in Schrader's Atlas. The Japanese Atlases, under the last name designate a chain of mountains located N.S. along the Amur to the west of Blagovestchensk.

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Sino-Japanese Treaty of December, 1905, and later documents made use of them. They are now in current use. Perhaps one might say approximately that Southern Manchuria designates the section which is south of the parallel of Changchun; or again that Northern Manchuria is the region served by the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and Southern Manchuria is the portion crossed by the South Manchuria Railroad.

The total area of Manchuria is estimated at 989,000 square kilometers (nearly twice that of France.)

I have already spoken above of the great waterways. To give an idea of their importance I would add that the Amur (Hei-long-Kiang) is navigable by large steamers for more than 3,000 kilometers, while the Sungari and the Nonni are navigable for more than 1,500 kilometers. The Yalu, on the contrary, a mountain river, is shallow and rapid and can scarcely be used except by junks. As for the Liao, a river of the plains, it has for a long time been the main artery for the transportation of the agricultural products of Manchuria which it crosses in the richest and most populous part of the country.

Always one must remember that all the water courses are frozen for part of each year - the Liao for more than three months, the Sungari for nearly six months and the Amur for more than half the year.

The indigenous population was made up of Manchus who belonged to the Tungus branch of the Ural-Altairs. But if the Manchus forced themselves on North China, the Chinese likewise forced themselves on the Manchus on several occasions, and this resulted in a mixture of races. One can hardly find pure Manchus save in the basin of the Ussuri and the Sungari Rivers. In our day, particularly in the agricultural regions, there is an annual influx of Chinese travelers who come principally from Shantung and Northern Chili and as part of these Chinese settle in Manchuria instead of returning to China, the mixture increases.

The distribution of the population is as follows:

Province of Mukden	255,000 Square kilometers	15½ millions
Province of Kirin	209,000 " "	6½ "
Province of the Amur	547,000 " "	3½ "
	989,000 square kilometers	25½ millions

These figures are approximate for Chinese statistics are extremely inaccurate. One may figure that there are about 200,000 Japanese in Manchuria, between 500 and 700,000 Koreans and 100,000 Russians. The greater part of the Japanese live in the territories which are subject to Japanese administration or jurisdiction.

From the point of view of administration, Manchuria is composed of the three provinces whose names I have already mentioned. This paper is not written for the purpose of exposing Chinese administration and everyone knows that for many years Marshal Chang-tso-Lin has governed the whole of Manchuria. As to the territories under the administration or jurisdiction of the Japanese, they will form the subject of the second half of this study.

AGRICULTURE

In a total area of nearly one million square kilometers the mountains cover about 250,000 square kilometers, that is to say one fourth. But only one-sixth of the land which might be sown is under cultivation. Yet Manchuria used to be called the granary of Asia. This is because that fraction of Manchurai under effective cultivation is equal to nearly three times the cultivated area of Japan proper, nearly four times that of Korea.

It is above all in Southern Manchuria that cultivation is highly developed - in the districts of Mukden, of Liaoyang, of Siminting, more than 95% of the arable land is effectively worked.

On the contrary in the valleys of Northern Manchuria three-quarters of the land which might be cultivated lies idle.

It is chiefly the Chinese who have improved the land of Manchuria, for the indigenous people were principally warriors, hunters and fishermen but poor farmers.

Actually there are nearly 3 million families of farmers in Manchuria of whom more than half are in the one province of Mukden. It is to be

noted that one-third of the farmers' families of that province own at least a part of the land they cultivate; the same fact is even more true in the province of Kirin (50% of the families), and above all in that of the Amur, where the proportion becomes 70% of the land owners or land owning tenants. The farms are of very different importance in Northern and Southern Manchuria. In the province of Mukden one-fifth of the farms are each only 40 acres; in that of the Amur there are farm properties of 198 acres; one of them has even 989 acres.

Farming methods are primitive, and yet the crops are scarcely inferior to those obtained by the Japanese farmers, and are better than those of the Korean farmers.

The number of indigenous workers is not sufficient (they are 30% deficient). Each spring brings 300,000 coolies to Dairen from Shantung and northern Chili. In the autumn they return, but not all, for a certain proportion of the immigrants (men and women) settle in the country. The workers are content with very low wages: an average of $8 Mex. for two months plus food and lodging. This is the reason why Manchuria is not an outlet for Japanese laborers who wish to emigrate. Manchuria is only able to receive Japanese who have capital, or who have technical knowledge, but not those who have only their hands. They cannot compete with the Chinese coolies.

The products of the country are in the order of their importance: soya beans, kaoliang, millet, corn, wheat, rye, rice, buckwheat, hemp, tobacco, cotton, beet root sugar, silk.

In 1923 Manchuria produced 2,385,000 tons of soya beans and 4,728,000 tons of kaoliang.

Kaoliang covers 27% of the cultivated land, soya beans nearly 20%, and millet a little more than 20%. There was a time when kaoliang alone covered 50%; but about 1908 a trial export of soya beans having been profitable, the cultivation of these beans has been developed more and more. In 1922 the M anchurian ports exported 675,000 tons of soya beans, 1,480,000 tons of soya bean cakes and 108,000 tons of soya bean oil, the total value being more than 100 million taels (Customs taels).

The soya bean owes its success to its multiple uses - the grain enters into the food of man in many different forms, the oil also, and besides it is serviceable to industry, while the bean cakes are used as fat. The Japanese are great consumers of beans in the form of soups, sauces, etc. The United States in 1918 bought nine-tenths of the oil of Manchuria, either directly or by way of Kobe, principally for use in making soap; it is necessary to add that questions of tariff have modified since that time the direction taken by this product.

The soya bean grows in numerous varieties which may be grouped under three colors, yellow, green and black. Its component parts average about as follows: Water, 11; Albumen, 37; Fat, 17; Hydrocarbonates, 25; Fibres, 5; Ashes, 5.

Kaoliang, a species of sorghum, having large crops is used by the inhabitants as food; they furthermore extract an alcohol from it (80 million hectolitres a year), the stalks are used in the construction of native houses, the leaves to make matting and the sacks which are used in exporting grain from Manchuria.

Millet is used for food, above all in the northern part of Manchuria where it grows better than kaoliang. The Koreans have also adopted it to partially replace rice. The straw is given to the animals, a part of the grain is used to make alcohol. The annual production is about 60 million hectolitres.

Corn occupies 8.6% of the fields of Manchuria. It is strong and successful where kaoliang and millet do poorly (S.E. of Manchuria, Kwantung). Its production is valued at 23 million hectolitres. In 1922 180,000 tons were exported.

Wheat is as yet little cultivated: 7.4% of the cultivated land. Its culture is, however, making rapid progress, although the Manchurian varieties make mediocre flour. Its export is of little importance. Japan, which is consuming an increasing amount of wheat flour, is nevertheless interested in developing this crop.

Rye is grown principally on the plains of the province of the Amur: 1,145,000 hectolitres. The province of Kirin gives about one quarter of this quantity and that of Mukden much less.

Rice is as yet little cultivated in Manchuria; 3 million and a half hectolitres a year. Buckwheat holds a rather important place in the native diet. Hemp is scattered a little everywhere, without exceeding 10,000 tons annually. Jute reaches 15,000 tons, but these two textile materials furnish nothing for export. Tobacco is not sufficient for local consumption. The cultivation of cotton is encouraged by Japan which produces none; the centers are Liaoyang and Kwantung; it appears that it does not develop very satisfactorily. Beet sugar is just beginning but will become perhaps a great source of wealth for the country.

The fruits which grow the best in Southern Manchuria are pears, grapes and apples.

ANIMALS

The Manchurian poney is of Mongol origin. It is known for its endurance : of a stature less than 1 meter 30 and weighing 250 kilograms, it can carry a load of 120 kilograms on a day's march of 40 to 50 kilometers. As a saddle horse he is easily able to exceed a journey of 50 to 75 kilometers a day. In Northern Manchuria it comes from the regions of N.O.: Tsitsihar, Hailar, Manchuli. Southern Manchuria is especially provided from inner Mongolia. Besides these, many are bred in the districts of Nangun and Changchun. Statistics, which differ greatly, fix the number of horses in Manchuria at approximately 2,500,000 or 3 million. There are besides 600,000 mules and as many asses.. Added to these are 60,000 camels in the province of the Amur.

The number of oxen (used for plowing and beasts of burden) is 2,200,000; that of hogs, 6,300,000.

The province of the Amur has many sheep - the total for Manchuria is placed at 2,600,000 head (sheep and goats) and the neighboring inner Mongolia is extremely rich. This is of great importance to Japan, who is practically destitute of wool and who must import a considerable amount each year, (235 millions of yen's worth of wool, of thread or of woolen cloth in 1925). The native sheep of Manchuria and Mongolia do not have rich fleece; cross breeding with merino sheep, with Southdowns and Shropshires is encouraged.

Furs are abundant in Manchuria, nevertheless their export is decreas-

ings they amount to several hundreds of millions of taels. Besides the furs of wild animals one must mention the furs of domestic dogs and goats, much used in China.

The wild silk worms (by this is meant those which are really cultivated on different kinds of oak leaves, but are not raised under shelter from inclement weather) produce (particularly near Antung) a great quantity of silk called raw or tussor which is exported almost entirely to Shantung and is made into Shantung pongee. (The value of the cocoons is estimated annually at 4 million gold dollars.)

FORESTS

The Chinese have destroyed the forests wherever it was possible; the great mounts of Hin-ngan and of Changpai have been spared aside from the valleys because they were difficult to penetrate. A quantitative evaluation of the wealth in forest lands in Manchuria is not easy - a figure which is only approximate but which appears reasonable enough is that of 150 billion cubic feet to 18 million hectares. The greater portion is in Northern Manchuria. The conifers (Korean pine, larch, etc.) account for 40%.

The Russians and Japanese were disputing the forests of the Yalu before the war of 1904-5. The woods have been generally very badly exploited by the Chinese. They begin to export, but there remain in the provinces of Kirin and the Amur immense tracts which have not been touched by the wood cutters.

MINERAL RICHES - GOLD

In other times Manchuria held an important place among the countries which produced gold. The output has greatly diminished during recent years. (A score of millions of yen a year?)

The gold mines are principally situated in the province of the Amur: in the region of Moho, of Huma and of Yuchingkou, of Taipingkou and of Kuan-yin-chan. The province of Kirin has two principal centers: Chiapikou and Honatien. The Province of Mukden has an equal amount of gold in a number of places, but generally speaking all of these mines are equally

poor. Nearly everywhere it is a question of gold mixed with alluvium.

COAL

The real mineral wealth of Manchuria is in the coal. The total deposit is valued at one billion and a half tons, of which two-thirds are in the one mine at Fushun. In 1926 the total production of Manchuria was in the neighborhood of six million and a half tons which were furnished principally by -

Fushun	5 and 3/4 million tons
Yentai	140,000 tons
Pen-hi-hu	Less than 400,000 tons
Zelainor	About 350,000 tons

Fushun and Yentai belong to the South Manchurian Company, of which more will be said below.

Fushun is very rich in bituminous coal which is easily mined. The soil contains a reserve of 930 millions of tons. Yentai gives a semi-anthracite. In the two mining districts in December 1924 there were 43,000 workers, (41,000 Chinese). The destination of the coal from these districts in 1924 was as follows:

In Manchuria (used by the South Manchurian Company and by local needs)		2,885,000 tons
Outside of Manchuria -		
Japan	1,171,000 tons	
South China	526,000 "	
North China	110,000 "	
Korea	351,000 "	
South Sea Islands	240,000 "	
Formosa	17,000 "	2,415,000 tons
		5,300,000 tons

The output of Fushun is steadily increasing. They hope the total amount mined in 1932 will reach 8,000,000 tons.

Pen-hi-hu, an old Chinese mine of which Baron Okura took possession after the Russo-Japanese War and which afterwards he divided in half with the Chinese, gives an anthracite coal used in part by the neighboring foundries belonging to the same company. The production is diminishing (it has reached 450,000 tons) for reasons which have nothing to do with the richness or the equipment of the mine.

The mine at Niou-sin-tai is worked by the Chinese using primitive

methods . This coal is a dusty anthracite.

Still further to the east (about 80 kilometers east of Pen-hi-hu) there is another little Chinese mine of the same kind, - Tai-pao-tsu.

A very good anthracite is found in the Chinese mine at Chan-song-kung, 50 kilometers southeast of Hailung, but the mine is in the hands of the Chinese and produces little.

Near Tung-hoa is found the mine of Ti-chang with good anthracite, but difficult of access.

The mines of Zolainor are nearly the only ones in Northern Manchuria They are worked by the Russians by contract with the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and produce about 300,000 tons a year, which is used by the railroad and by the needs of the region. The coal is mediocre (lignite).

IRON

The two principal mines are those of Anchan and Pen-hi-hu (beds of Miao-sulchan), the first belonging to the South Manchurian Company, the second to a Sino-Japanese company (Okura). There is considerable iron in the Anchan mines but it is of poor quality. There should be 300 million tons of hematite and magnetite, but in amounts of only 35 or 40%; the ore having 50% is not abundant.

In the beginning (1917) the intention was to produce a million tons of pig iron a year; or 800,000 tons of steel. The first blast furnace was finished in 1919 and a second in 1920. As a matter of fact, of the two only one actually functioned. The poor condition of metallurgic business in the Orient after the war was such that the South Manchurian Company which had put more than 35 million yen into the business after 1919, lost 16 million between 1919 and 1923.

Recently an economical process ought to have been invented for treating poor hemanite and they are making a new start toward their goal.

The deposits at Miao-sulchan, near Pen-hi-hu, are estimated at 80 million tons, a good proportion being made up of magnetite of 70%, the remainder being mediocre (30 to 40%). There should be also 120 million tons of poor mineral analogous to that of the Anchan mines. The necessary coal comes from the neighboring Pen-hi-hu mines which belong to the same

company. It is producing around 300 tons of pig-iron a day; they hope to reach 400 with a new installation.

The same Sino-Japanese company since 1915 has had the right to exploit 12 other iron mines in the same region. It has commenced at Tungyuanpao and Paibunlig (district of Fenchi).

The production of South Manchuria in 1924-5 was 198,759 tons of iron and 159,675 tons of pig-iron.

The capacity of production is estimated at 300,000 tons of pig-iron of which 180,000 is from Anchan and 115,000 from Pen-hi-hu. It is of course understood that this amount could be increased if an economical treatment of poor mineral were adopted.

COPPER

There are many copper mines in Kirin Province. The most important is that at Tienpaochan, worked by a Sino-Japanese company.

SLATE PETROL

Manchuria has no liquid petrol, but in Fushun there are enormous deposits of slate from which it can be produced. These deposits are valued at five and a half billion tons.

The treatment of 200,000 tons of slate a day (this is the amount of slate left over as a by-product by the extraction of the coal) would give 40,000 tons of petrol a year which would be a notable addition for the shortage in Japan. It is thought that by operating on a larger scale 400,000 tons a year could be obtained, which greatly exceeds the Japanese production. The entire question rests on the economy of the treatment adopted. Different processes - Scotch, American, etc., have been tried, but it seems that despite the news, always full of promises, that the public press is forever printing on the subject, the South Manchurian Company has not as yet emerged from the trial stage. One is permitted to think, nevertheless, that it will proceed to a definite installation; the Minister of the Navy, who takes a great interest in the subject will probably subsidize the enterprise and have its products reserved for his use. This question of the Fushun slate petrol is not regarded by the Japanese

solely from a commercial viewpoint, it has considerable military importance.

INDUSTRY.

We have seen above the importance of the soya bean both in cultivation and exportation, not only in the form of beans, but in the form of oil and cakes. The soya bean oil is indeed the most important export of all. The country-side of Manchuria is covered with oil mills (374 old style mills). Furthermore, Dairen and Harbin have great modern factories, both with hydraulic presses and with chemical treatment. There ought to be 138 of these new model factories.

The flour mills are equally numerous in all Manchuria. Harbin and Changchun are the great centers of the milling industry. South Manchuria has 14 large mills (with capital varying between 200,000 and 500,000 dollars), of which five are Chinese and four Sino-Japanese; they are at Mukden, Dairen, Tieling, Liaoyang, Kaiyuan, Fushun, Changchun. Northern Manchuria has 36 mills, nearly all in Harbin and Fuchatien: 24 are Chinese 8 are Russian, 2 Japanese and 2 Sino-Russian.

And, lastly, the third great industry is the distilling of alcohol for human consumption.

The manufacture of salt in the salt marshes of Kwantung is considerably developed: in 1919 200,000 tons were produced. This salt is partly consumed in Manchuria and in the territory of Jehol (Inner Mongolia) and partly exported to Japan.

The silk filatures are centralized in the province of Mukden (37 filatures employing nearly 5,000 workmen). The rest of the textile industry occupies 274 factories with 9,000 workers. At present Dairen is the center of the greatest number of factories in Manchuria and I shall return to this matter in the second part of this paper.

COMMERCE.

In 1925 the total commerce of Manchuria with China and other countries had increased to 557 millions of Haikuan taels of which 483 millions went through the three ports of South Manchuria. It will be seen that commerce by way of Siberia was within the neighborhood of 13% of the total.

The following table will show the respective importance of the articles imported; let us say that:

Figured cotton cloth amounted to	49,078,000	Haikuan	Taels
Cotton thread	16,090,000	"	"
Tobacco	8,765,000	"	"
Wheat flour	6,875,000	"	"
Steel and pig iron	5,450,000	"	"
Sugar	4,687,000	"	"
Paper	4,366,000	"	"

And for the articles exported:

Soya bean cakes	58,072,000	"	"
Soya beans	36,164,000	"	"
Kaoliang	23,664,000	"	"
Soya bean oil	14,367,000	"	"
Coal and coke	13,462,000	"	"
Silk	11,242,000	"	"
Millet	6,591,000	"	"
Wood and bamboo	5,462,000	"	"

It will be seen anew the place held by the soya bean in this list.

Who is the best customer of Manchuria? Japan. The United States comes long after Japan. It was not always so, and six or seven years ago the United States took nine-tenths of the bean oil, but a recent tariff has lowered the place of America in the list of buyers.

In 1926 the exports from Dairen were divided as follows:

Japan took	55%
China	31%
Korea	1 %
Europe	6.2%
America	1.5%

The same year the imports arriving in Dairen were divided as follows:

From Japan	46.9%
China	29 %
Europe and America	22 %
Korea	2.1%

One ought always to be able to recognize under Japanese etiquette the merchandise coming from or going to Europe and America which passes first through Japan.

In the chapter specially devoted to the Japanese territories, I shall speak in detail of Dairen, the big port of Manchuria, and in connection therewith, of the two other ports Yingkow and Antung. I shall speak here only of the total figures concerning the four great commercial centers of Northern Manchuria, Harbin, Manchuli, Suifenho (at the two extremities, east and west, of Eastern China) and Sansing. (Aigun has seen

its importance reduced to an insignificant level.)

In 1926 the exports from these four places had increased to 45,800,000 Haikwan taels, and the imports to 9,400,000.

Let us compare once more these totals with those of Southern Manchuria. The same year the three ports of the south had a total export of 157,100,000 taels and a total import of 112,800,000 taels.

Total for the North		55 millions
"	" South	270 millions

(The relation would have been as one to five, that is 20%; one has seen above, from another source, it is true, that the following year it would only have been 13%.)

RAILWAYS

The railroads of Manchuria have been the subject of several previous reports to which I can only refer (See No. 198 of the 16th of March, 1926 and 230 of the 1st of July, 1926, and then of the 29th of June, 1927). In them I have already portrayed the struggle between the Chinese Eastern Railroad to the hands of the Soviets, and the Japanese railways. I have pointed out the tendency, which has been showing itself for some little time, of the Chinese to construct, without any aid at all from the Japanese, railroads which are in competition with the South Manchurian: the Mukden-Hailung Railroad is already partially open to traffic and if the Chinese extend it to Kirin, they will have a trunk line to Kirin-Mukden-Peking, intersecting diagonally the South Manchurian Railroad. If on the other hand, they give preference to the plans which they have made for the Ta-hu-chan Pai-yin-ta-la Railroad which will eventually be continued to Taonan they would plan a trunk line Tsitsikhar Taonan Ta-hu-chan Peking Railroad parallel to the South Manchurian. It is these projects which the Japanese Government opposes, without great energy as yet, but also without apparent success.

EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA

Eastern Inner Mongolia often is found associated with Manchuria in negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese. It was, for example, the object of several articles in the Treaty of May 25, 1915.

By Eastern Inner Mongolia is meant the two eastern districts of Mongolia, that is to say, that of Jehol and that of Cha-ha-ul. The area of this region is a little less than that of the province of Kirin, the population is estimated at 4,356,000 inhabitants.

Aside from the mountainous sections, it is above all an agricultural region and one for breeding ponies and sheep, and it is because of this fact that Japan is interested.

MANCHURIAN TERRITORIES UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OR THE JURISDICTION OF THE JAPANESE.

The territories under Japanese administration in Manchuria have an area of 3,700 square kilometers. They are made up of two distinct parts:

1st - The leased territory of Kwantung (3,462 square kilometers)

2nd - The South Manchurian Railroads with the territory adjacent to either side of the tracks.

These territories were allotted to Japan in consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 5, 1915), the concession having been agreed to by the Chinese Government in the Treaty between China and Japan signed at Peking on December 22, 1905. In consequence of an additional agreement to the last Treaty, a certain number of cities of Manchuria were opened, strangers of all nationalities being able to reside there and to carry on business.

In January, 1915, the Japanese Government presented to the Peking Government what were called the 21 Demands, which the Chinese regard as a national humiliation. A certain number of these demands in a modified form became the subject of the treaty of May 25, 1915, which was signed under the threat of armed intervention, but against which the Chinese Government has not ceased to protest. This treaty extended to 99 years the lease pertaining to Kwantung and the South Manchurian Railroad. Furthermore, it must be understood that the Japanese can lease land in Southern Manchuria. The question of the extention of the lease (which expired in 1923) rests in abeyance, but that of the location of the territory is actually being taken up again by the Japanese Minister in Peking.

After the census of October 1, 1925, the different territories counted were as follows: 186,045 Japanese, 856,585 Chinese, 10850 Koreans, 2,796 foreigners, making a total of 1,055,976 individuals (about 766,000 in Kwantung, 290,000 for the Railroad.)

Furthermore, in the territory which is under Japanese Consular jurisdiction in the rest of Manchuria there are 6,109 Japanese and 56,303 Koreans.

A Governor-General working under the direct control of the Prime Minister, and dependent directly on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in any question which touches foreign relations, administers the territory of Kwantung, is in charge of the police along the Railroad and controls the affairs of the South Manchurian Company, which, it should be known, is not occupied alone with the Railroad but is engaged in a multitude of other enterprises which will be listed later. The Government-General has its headquarters at Ryojun.

Military occupation is assured by a detached division from the mother country, which is relieved every two years; by a detachment of garrison artillery and by 4 independent battalions assigned to guard the Railroad (see the report of the annual maneuvers). All these forces are under the command of a General who has his headquarters at Port Arthur and who has the title of Commander of the Kwantung Army; (one should add: and of South Manchuria, since the troops occupy not only the leased territory but also a certain number of important points on the Railroad. Port Arthur has been definitely struck off the list from the point of view of naval defense.)

Finally there is a civil police made up of (figures of February, 1925) 2,207 officers, agents, etc. and 421 Chinese agents.

The budget of Kwantung is divided into a national and local budget. The national budget is supplied by the revenues of the territory and an addition given by the State (3 millions in 1925). It amounted in 1925-26 to 13,841,746 yen.

The local budget is raised by local taxes from various places, etc. It is applied to the particular expenses of the villages.

Kwantung has two principal ports - Dairen (the old Russian Dalny)

and Ryojun (Port Arthur) which are always free of ice, in spite of the continental climate of the region which goes to great extremes. During the 20 years since they have occupied Kwantung, the Japanese have developed these cities considerably, they have equipped them as modern ports, installed electricity, gas, schools, hospitals, libraries, etc.

The South Manchurian Company.

The organ for all this work is the South Manchurian Railroad Company organized in 1906 just after the Russo-Japanese War. This Company, as I have said, is far from being concerned solely with the railroad; the latter is only one of the ways in which it displays its activities: - mines, steamship lines, electricity, ware-houses, the administration of the areas adjacent to the railroad and construction work on these lands, etc. Of a paid capital of 380,000,000 yen (the authorized capital is 440 millions) the Japanese Government possesses 220,000,000 shares. The President is named by the Government, which generally chooses him from among very noted men of affairs and also from amongst personal friends. Thus it was that Baron Tanaka has just named Mr. Yamamoto, one of the Chiefs of the Seiyukai party - the Government party. The Vice-President is also named by the Government. These choices are submitted for the approval of the Emperor. The four directors are also chosen by the Government from among the stockholders of the Company.

In March, 1923, the Company employed:

4719	Officers
4613	Clerks
26655	Other employes (12,041 Japanese, 14614 Chinese)
93	Others
36142	persons.

Without counting those whom it loaned to the other Companies of the railroad. (Chinese Companies helped by the South Manchurian Railroad.)

The total of the disbursements from 1906 to 1924 was divided as follows:

Railroad	211,457 Yen	37.0% of the total
Stores	11,[illegible]	2.1% " "
Boats	3,745	0.7% " "
Ports	43,480	7.6% " "
Mines	125,129	21.9% " "
Factories, foundries	39,504	6.9% " "
Electricity	18,745	3.2% " "
Gas	7,850	1.4% " "
Hotels	2,668	0.5% " "
Local Administration	60,062	10.5% " "
Miscellaneous	46,320	8.0% " "
	570,762 Yen	100%

The income of the Company in 1924 was 92,270,000 yen and the disbursements 35,788,000 yen.

In studying the various enterprises in Kwantung and Southern Manchuria we shall meet at every step the work of the Company.

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

In 1906 there were only 2 primary schools for Japanese in Kwantung. Today the Government maintains:

12 Primary schools for Japanese children
9 " " " Chinese "
4 Colleges
1 Commercial School
2 Higher schools for young girls
1 Industrial college for Japanese and Chinese.

Besides there there are:

107 Chinese elementary schools in the villages
1 Higher school for Japanese young girls
1 Commercial school in Dairen
2 Foreign language schools
1 Law college.
1 Industrial School in Dairen.

In all there are 40,000 students attending these schools.

In the Japanese territory belonging to the railroad there have been established schools attended by 22,000 students. The South Manchurian Company maintains professional schools for engineers, for foremen, and for specialists in railroads and mines.

In Mukden there has been established a School of Medicine.

Primary education has been made obligatory for the Chinese as it is for the Japanese; it goes without saying that that obligation is as yet eluded by many Chinese.

HYGIENE

Besides about 40 private hospitals, the territory administered by the Japanese contains:

(a) The hospitals of the Kwantung Government (Hospital at Port Arthur, contagious hospitals at Port Arthur and Dairen, hospitals for women at Port Arthur and Dairen.

(b) 13 Japanese Red Cross Hospitals in Northern and Southern Manchuria.

(c) 15 Hospitals of the South Manchurian Company(the largest of these is that at Dairen; 450 beds, 800 consultations daily.)

AGRICULTURE

The leased territory is rich from the point of view of agriculture: corn and kaoliang first of all, millet, beans. The Kwantung Government has created a model establishment at Chinchu (Kinjin); the South Manchurian Company has also established 2 - at Kung-chu-ling and Hing-yao-cheng.

The Japanese, who have not enough rice at home, have tried to plant it. There were in 1923, 740 hectares of rice lands which had produced 10,862 Hl. They have successfully tried fruit trees. Cotton,, of which there is none at all in Japan, is also in the experimental stage (they hope for 500 tons by 1935). Raw silk is also doing well (9 million yens worth of "tussor" exported in 1922.)

Soya beans occupy 50,000 hectares in the leased territories, which produced 438,800 Hl. in 1923. Millet on 17000 hectares gave 144,500 Hl.

DOMESTIC ANIMALS

	Kwantung	South Manchuria	Total
Cattle	30,670	2124	32,794
Horses	6,000	2030	8,030
Donkeys	27,700	1375	29,075
Mules	14,500	1350	15,850
Goats	7,530	260	7,790
Sheep	540	1060	1,600
Hogs	106,000	10000	116,000
Poultry	330,000	34000	364,000

FORESTS

Kwantung has been denuded by the Chinese; the Japanese have undertaken its reforestration.

SALT

The salt marshes of Kwantung have existed for centuries. The annual production is very variable. In 1923 it was as follows:

Japanese Salt Marshes	155,000 tons
Chinese " "	103,200 "
	258,200 tons

The salt is chiefly exported to Japan and Korea. In 1924 141,000 tons went to Japan and 40,800 tons to Korea.

FISHERIES

They are very rich on the shores of Kwantung. Their output is valued at 2 million yen a year.

COMMERCE

We have seen that by far the greatest amount of the commerce of Manchuria goes through the three ports: Dairen, Yingkow and Antung.

In 1924 the total commerce through these three ports had grown to 388,958,268 HK taels, of which 174 millions was imports and 206 millions was exports. (1 Haikuan tael - Custom House tael was valued in 1924 at 1.985 yen gold).

The share of Japan has been as follows: Kwantung sold to Japan in 1924 175,737,000 yen's worth and received 72,600,000 yen's worth of merchandise.

Imports consist chiefly of rice, sugar, tobacco, thread and cotton cloth, carriages, machinery, construction materials.

Exports - soya beans, bean oil and bean cakes, kaoliang, millet, wheat coal, silk. (The beans in the total of the three products mentioned herewith figured in 1924 - 114 millions of HK taels, millet 15 millions, kaoliang 5,500,000.)

There are Chambers of Commerce in all three ports; the Government has established five Exchanges of Commerce and there are two private Exchanges.

Since June 18, 1925 protective tariffs have been in force between Japan and Kwantung.

Banks: In the territory administered by the Japanese there are six branches of Japanese banks (Yokohama Specie Bank, Bank of Chosen, etc.); 13 banks having their headquarters in the territories. The Bank of Chosen is the principal bank. It has the privilege of issuing gold bank notes. The Yokohama Specie Bank can issue silver bank notes. The Oriental Development Company is a kind of real estate investment company.

The trust companies are the banks which lend to the merchants. In June, 1924 seventeen trust companies having a total capital of 3,535,850

yen loaned 5,000,000 yen. Financial unions for farmers were organised in 1925 under the control of the Government. Only the Japanese banks have been mentioned above. There are naturally large Chinese banks on the South Manchurian Railroad. The Bank of China and the Bank of Communications have branches and three Manchurian banks (Third Eastern Provincial Bank, Mukden Commercial Bank, Kungtsi Bank) have also the privilege of issuing bank notes.

PORTS

Dairen was founded by the Russians in 1898 where they spent 10 million roubles. The South Manchurian Company has developed the port, building one concrete breakwater of four kilometers and three bridges, which have a total span of 3,200 meters. A fourth is being built. Four thousand meters of wharfs have been built.

The port includes 74 warehouses, having a capacity of 340,000 tons, an area of open storehouses of 410,000 tons, 16 tug boats, 28 steel lighters (6,100 tons), 5 floating cranes, 21 wharf cranes, 5 reservoirs for bean oil, one dry dock of 129 meters in length and 7 meters 50 in width. It can accommodate 36 ships of 500 tons, that is 180,000 tons. The average is 19 ships of a total of 66,000 tons. In 1924 Dairen was the fourth port in the Far East for tonnage of merchandise, coming after Shanghai, Tientsin and Hongkong. Six thousand coolies work there in the summer, 14,000 in winter.

The other ports are more modest.

In 1923	Dairen	reported	3,005	ships	7,920,000 tons
	Port Arthur	"	54	"	113,000 "
	Yingkow	"	49	"	60,000 "
	Antung	"	?		8,000 "

In 1924 Dairen exported 141 million HK taels and imported 108 million's worth, a total movement of 249 million HK taels. Of the exports soya beans were 2,000,000 tons, bean cakes 2,700,000 tons and oil 810,000 tons.

Up to 1923 the South Manchurian Company had dispensed in public works:

In Dairen	39,211,000 yen
Port Arthur	187,000 "
Antung	627,000 "
	41,374,000 yen

Let us remember besides that the Company dispensed at the same time 487,000 yen in the port of Shanghai.

INDUSTRY

The great industries of Kwantung and the territories of the South Manchurian Company are the manufacture of oil and of bean cakes, cement and bricks.

I shall not mention here the figures which I have given in the first part of this report, and will limit myself to a few details concerning Kwantung.

In Dairen there are:

62 factories working with metals, representing a capital of 13,500,000 yen, employing 2,600 Japanese and 3,700 Chinese. Their annual production is estimated at 31 million yen.

77 oil mills, capital 4 million yen, annual production of bean cakes 82 million yen.

3 cement factories producing 1,745,000 yen.

4. factories for naval construction, capital 20 million yen.

10 printing establishments.

5 factories manufacturing paints and chemicals, capital 3,853,000 yen.

51 brick fields and tile works, capital 2,762,000 yen.

6 sawmills, capital 2 million yen.

5 soap factories, output 500,000 yen.

There is a total of 294 establishments having a capital of more than 66 million yen, employing 800,000 persons, having an annual output of 163 million yen.

MINES

The South Manchurian Company owns 5 coal mines at Fushan, Yentai (these alone are worked), Chasenyo, Chepeiling, Taochiatun.

The Okura family shares on equal terms with the Chinese (total capital 7 million dollars) the mine at Pen-hi-hu.

The details concerning these undertakings have already been given in the section of this report on Manchuria as a whole. One will return also to the chapter on iron: the mines of Anchan (worked by the South Manchurian Company) and of Penhihu (worked by a Sino-Japanese Company).

We have been able to note that the additional coal furnished by the mines of Manchuria which are worked by the Japanese, is considerable. The

production in Japan proper begins to be clearly insufficient at 30 million tons a year; in time of war it would be absolutely insufficient, but several years hence the Fushun mine alone will give 10 millions.

Concerning iron, of which Japan and Korea together only produce 300,000 tons annually, and are short one million, Manchuria can only furnish under actual conditions, an additional amount which is not very great 200,000 tons, but which it would be possible to increase if one treated the poor grade minerals.

RAILROADS

See earlier section.

ROADS

There are roads on the plains of Manchuria, roads which in reality are only footpaths, reduced by rainy weather to an extremely poor condition; the mountainous regions have nothing but footpaths. The Japanese have certainly given the large cities, such as Dairen, streets or paved roads, but outside the cities there are only about 75 kilometers of roads on which it is practical to use automobiles; these roads are those which radiate from Pitsuo.

GAS - ELECTRICITY.

The South Manchurian Company has established gas furnaces in Dairen, Anchan, Mukden and Changchun. It has put power houses in 15 villages; in 1923 their total production (in Kwantung and the territory of the railroad) was 48,385 kilowatts.

The Yalu near Igen, 160 kilometers above Antung, possesses rapids from which hydraulic power should be able to give 3500 CV in summer and 10,000 in winter; at eight kilometers below that point one could again have 20,000 CV. This power could be transmitted to Mukden (160 kilometers), but a power station installed at Fushun and using the coal from the mines would give cheaper electricity. On the other hand, it is necessary to economize with coal; no decision has yet been reached.

In Dairen the two power houses of Hamacho have a total capacity of 10,000 kw.; in the suburbs, the power house at Amanogawa is built for 30,000 kw., and the power houses of the railroad at Shakado (on the outskirts of Dairen) have also their electric works.

Without entering into all the details of the electrical installations of the South Manchurian Company, I nevertheless will mention the three power houses at Fushun, giving 30,500 Kw., that at Antung (8,500kw.), and that at Changchun (3,400 kw.).

The Chinese also have a certain number of power houses, at Mukden (5,300 kw.) with an American engineer at the head, Kirin (1,000 kw.), Harbin.

Generally the machinery is American or English, unless it comes from the Japanese factories at Shibara.

CONCLUSION

In times of peace Japan produces in the neighborhood of 30 million tons of coal, which is nearly enough for her, at least from the point of view of quantity, for this coal is rather mediocre for industrial use; in time of war there would be a large deficit, but Manchuria will soon give 10 million tons, and the principal mines are already in the hands of the Japanese.

Japan lacks iron; she must import three times as much mineral as can be produced in the territories of the Empire; she buys a third of the pig iron which is necessary and as much steel as she can produce. Manchuria, without possessing much mineral wealth, is nevertheless able to furnish a very appreciable additional amount.

Soya beans play a very important role in the Japanese diet. In a quantity corresponding to 60 million yen which Japan imported in 1924, 45 million came from Manchuria, 12 from China.

There is no wool in Japan, and she imports a considerable quantity; the wool of Manchuria and Mongolia is thus particularly important for Japan. Japan does not produce enough salt; she lacks one-sixth of the amount she needs, which she imports from Kwantung and Shantung. In case of war Japan would need a great deal of industrial salt. Although rich in wood Japan imports lumber and Kwantung furnishes a notable quantity which could be considerably increased in case of need. Fishery products and meat, which Kwantung would be able to send to Japan, would all be of importance in time of war. Soya bean oil and bean cakes for manure, already play, in

times of peace, the important role of which I have spoken.

In conclusion, Manchuria furnishes Japan with an additionalamount of produce which is most useful in peace times, which in war could be multiplied, and which the geographical situation of Japan would then render indispensible.

As much from the economic point of view as from the strategic or political point of view, the problem of Manchuria, for Japan, is one of the utmost importance, and one which she may have to handle with the greatest delicacy.

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1928 2055-66

September 8, 1928

WAR DEPARTMENT

#7317

Subject: Report of Trip to Manchuria by Lieut. T. D. White, A. C.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. OCT 17 1929

1. The following is an extract of a report by Lieut. T. D. White, A. C., Language Officer, rendered following a three months' visit to Manchuria (May 11th to August 8, 1928) at his own expense. Lieut. White maintained his language studies while in Manchuria.

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A report covering so broad a subject as "Manchuria" cannot attempt to encompass more than the salient points observed on a brief trip of this nature. Manchuria, as a subject for report, would require several years of study not only while on the ground itself, but its importance in past history, and therefore its bearing on future events would require an extensive knowledge of Sino-Japanese and Sino-Russian history together with considerable economic background. In Manchuria the aspirations of three great nations converge. My impressions of the progress and activities of each is detailed below.

JAPAN

The Japanese are in the ascendancy along the South Manchuria Railway which runs from Port Arthur to Ch'ang-ch'un. (The other "spheres of Japanese influence" which I did not visit are not reported on). Although the actual ownership of land by the Japanese extends only 33 feet on either side of the right of way and in the railway towns their influence seems much wider.

All South Manchuria trains carry a Japanese army train guard and at all bridgeheads, etc., blockhouses or small fortresses are manned by an army guard. The Japanese have their own postal, telegraph and telephone system along the railway zone.

The new town in Mukden, which lies within the Japanese railway zone, is entirely modern with wide paved streets and a street car system. Almost all buildings are of modern brick or stone construction. The outskirts of Mukden have the appearance of a rapidly growing suburb in an American real estate boom. There are dozens of stores and apartment houses in the process of construction as well as many as yet unoccupied, indicating an important influx of Japanese immigrants in the near future.

Although the Japanese special rights are only generally conceded as far north as Ch'ang-ch'un there is nevertheless a Japanese "military mission" in Harbin with a sub-post at Manchouli Station on the Siberian border. There are said to be 2,000 Japanese residents in Harbin. Following the assassination of Chang Tso-lin it was reported to the American Consul in Harbin by Amur and Sungari River steamboat captains that there were a remarkably greater number of Japanese passengers on their boats than usual, indicating a network of investigators for the Manchurian-Soviet border.

I observed an intense mistrust and hatred of the Japanese among all classes of Chinese from Chalantun to Port Arthur. Not less than ten Chinese told me that someday China and Japan were going to settle scores. On the other hand (and I made a special point of investigating) there was a surprising unanimity of opinion among American and other "foreign" businessmen as to the good for the benefit of all done by the Japanese in Manchuria. Nearly all stated they would hate to see the Japanese withdraw.

I particularly questioned a number of businessmen concerning the operation of the "open door" in Manchuria. In over a dozen persons so questioned no fault was found with Japanese business methods prevailing in Manchuria. As one man put it, it is certainly no more difficult for an American to transact business in Manchuria than it would be for a Japanese to do so in Nicaragua or other points within the American areas of "special rights". Among those questioned were the representative of Andersen Meyer Co. Ltd., Mukden (American), the Far Eastern Manager of the Dunlop Rubber Co. (British), a representative of the Compagnie International des Wagons Lits (Austrian), etc.

The militaristic attitude of the Japanese cannot be appreciated, however, without actually seeing the numerous groups of officers holding councils in the larger hotels along the line, wearing uniforms of Prussian pattern. Everywhere there seem to be Japanese troops.

At the Port Arthur naval base (which I recently read had been discontinued) during the week August 1-8, I saw one cruiser and four destroyers. There was also an Ankuochun (Chinese) cruiser undergoing repairs.

In coming into the Kwantung Leased Territory a marked change occurs, the towns, etc., being very Japanese in aspect.

The port of Dairen is a remarkably modern shipping and industrial city although the absence of other than Japanese activities is worthy of remark. That Japan has no intention of ever returning this territory to the Chinese is a foregone conclusion.

RUSSIA

The Russian influence, which is centered at Harbin, begins with the Chinese Eastern Railway at Ch'ang-ch'un; and just as the South Manchuria Railway is the backbone of Japanese influence in South Manchuria so is the Chinese Eastern the nucleus of Russian influence in north Manchuria.

Harbin is remarkable in that it has the largest white population of any city administered by natives in the Far East. It is here that the Red, the White and the Yellow actually meet in open competition, with the Yellow in political control. It is probably the only place in the world where a white race struggles economically on an equal or inferior basis with the yellow race. In spite of this the Russian farmer seems able to compete successfully with the Chinese, while in trade there is sufficient Russian population in Harbin to support a large Russian business community. The most successful businesses are owned by Russian Jews.

Politically the Chinese Eastern Railway is evenly divided between the Chinese and Soviet Governments. The railway flag consists of the two government flags combined. However, the important managerial posts of the line are at present, in general, held by Russians. There is a tendency, however, for the Chinese to take over more and more of the control as they feel politically stronger. An example of this I saw when visiting the C. E. R. Trade Musuem which was then in the process of inventory before being turned over to a Chinese curator.

Through the courtesy of the American Consul in Harbin I was able to meet many Russians and during the month of May lived in a Russian family. During June and July I lived entirely among Russians where no English was spoken and the Chinese appeared only as underlings. It is worthy of remark that almost no Russians know even a smattering of the Chinese language, while the Chinese about Harbin speak Russian exceptionally well.

I noted many instances of friendship among White and Red Russians, as though, in the Far East at least, there was a tendency toward rapprochement. Yet among the Russians as a whole I never met a group of people so filled with cliques and petty jealousies. There seems to be very little solidarity among them, as one would expect to find among the Whites at least, who all are underdogs together - but like real dogs in similar circumstances they seem to have turned to fighting among themselves. I gathered that nearly all White Russians wanted to return to Russia at the first opportunity.

An amusing paradox noticed in Harbin was that all the largest automobiles (generally railroad officials) flew the Soviet flag from the radiator cap.

There were rumors, one of which I recently read in a Shanghai paper, to the effect that in keeping with the Communistic efforts in Japan, the Soviet Government was sending military men as officers for the C.E.R. From inquiries among responsible foreigners it would appear a matter of coincidence, inasmuch as most Russians with Far Eastern experience have at some time been military commanders. It may be worth noting, however, that Lashevitch, the highest Soviet official of the C.E.R., was formerly commander of the Russian troops in Siberia, following the exit of Semenoff. Ismailoff, a close worker of Lashevitch, was also an officer in the Soviet army. (Lashevitch has since died under mysterious circumstances. Newspaper clipping attached.)

CHINA

Although Manchuria is considered Chinese territory the Chinese himself seems crowded into the background by the more progressive Japanese and Russians, in all phases of modern progress.

The real foundation of Manchurian prosperity depends, admittedly by both Russians and Japanese, on the Chinese farmer and laborer. In farming the Chinese reigns supreme, though there are many successful Russian farmers. In this respect it is said that the Japanese have completely failed. The Manchurian farmer, except along the two railroads, is oppressed by the many bandits which infest the country. It is considered dangerous to venture as much as five miles from the city of Harbin. A second great lack of the farmers is good dirt roads as feeders to the railroads.

It is variously estimated that over 1,000,000 immigrants have come to Manchuria during the past year from other provinces of China, largely from Shantung. This all means increased productiveness from the millions of acres of untilled land. The railroads, realizing this, have provided free transportation and lodging for them. The majority of immigrants have dispersed to lands along the S.M.R. and along the eastern branch of the C.E.R. Very few have gone into Heilungchiang Province, which has by far the least population of the Three Eastern Provinces. The reason given to me was that Wu, the since assassinated Tupan of the province, wished to develop the lands with his own people. This does not seem to be a very logical reason as Heilungchiang is the most backward of the three provinces. In view of the suspected pro-Bolshevik leanings of Wu, it might be possible that immigration was opposed by the Soviets who wished it to remain an unpopulated buffer for future development by themselves.

The actual governing of North Manchuria is in the hands of the Chinese, though except in a few instances, outward signs of progress by them is not noticeable. Some of the newer Chinese villages in the north are called "modern" and are modelled after the Russian pattern, with wide streets. The native part of Ch'ang-ch'un is an example; another is Fu-chia-tien, the Chinese part of Harbin.

The Taonan-Tsitsihar railroad which is being built by the Chinese is about completed, an agreement having been concluded with the C.E.R. concerning the crossing of the two lines. This line is now within some eight miles of the C.E.R. and will actually reach Tsitsihar, which is some 15 miles north of the C.E.R. line. Ultimately it is planned to continue the line to Aigun on the Amur River.

The Chinese, with characteristic methods, are worming into many corners and as a result the Russians, who are without treaty rights, suffer. It is now difficult, for instance, for any foreigner to transfer property in Harbin. Old titles are respected but when sales are made the deeds are not registered by the Chinese authorities

and there have been many cases, particularly among the Russians, in which they have found that deeds to recently acquired property were not recognized and the new owner forced to re-sell to Chinese at the buyer's price.

Another small instance of Chinese assertion is a recent order in Harbin to the effect that all stores must display Chinese signs.

In conclusion I can only say that this trip has been of the greatest interest and value. The future of Manchuria cannot be foretold except that it will play a tremendous part in Far Eastern affairs and its importance should justify a special study continuously made by one or more of our officers on duty in China. In my opinion every officer on duty in this office should have a first hand knowledge of this area. The expense involved is not great and the entirely new viewpoint on Chinese questions thus gained is far more than worth it.

A remark as to the courtesy and helpfulness of the American consuls at Harbin and Mukden is most certainly appropriate at this time.

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John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF MIL. INTEL. CIV

1929 2055-664

WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

China.

Subject: Impressions on my return to China.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. JAN 2 1929

1. Pre-conceived Ideas.

I must admit that my impressions have been startling to me. From the American Press I had assumed that conditions were better in China to-day than they had been in years ; that a government, however amateurish, was truly working for what it considered China's good; that the curse of banditry, if not a thing of the past, was at least rapidly disappearing. To expect to find such improvement in such a short space of time, was of course foolish,- for I knew then as I do now that China is anything but chameleon.

2. Views of Chinese friends and acquaintances.

Before leaving the "Grant", and since, I have been in constant conversation with Chinese. Some of them my old friends, others coolies scholars and shopkeepers, still others boatmen and stevedores on the Hai Ho, all have been butts for my curiosity. All to-gether I have probably questioned some fifty Chinese, and there is an unanimity in their opinions which is significant. Of course they may all be in the wrong, but their sincerity can not be doubted, nor can their singleness of idea fail to be remarked.

As is natural under the circumstances, most Pekingese deplore the change in government and its transfer to Nanking. They feel that while the old government was bad that this is even worse, and that in spite of many high sounding phrases, many wonderful promises, nothing more is being accomplished in Nanking than was in Peking. The Kuomintang had promised economy and now the Nationalist government is spending as much, and all my informants say more, than was expended by the old government. This Nationalist promise of economy was made too broad, for it costs money to run governments.

Mr. Wang, formerly Minister to Mexico, considers this government more extravagant than any of the former ones, and sees nothing but turmoil in the years ahead. He sees no stability in the existing regime.

From M/A, China. Report No. 7371 Nov. 19, 1928.

G-2 Report

China

Subject: Impressions on my return to China.

A friend of college days, Mr. Liu, a Tientsin engineer and merchant, while not having the natural animosity of the Pekingese to the present government, seems to feel as much hostility as any. He has but recently returned from Nanking, where as a friend of the heads of the government, and a Chinese he had an unusual opportunity to collect information. He sees in Nanking a close corporation, led by the "Three Sisters", busily engaged in erecting a screen of words and propaganda behind which they are enriching themselves. He named the ministers one by one, and said that he knew personally that they were grafting huge amounts. He said that the outcry against the Kuomintang was even greater in the South than it was here. That Chinese merchants, unless there was a politico in the firm, were all losing money, and that news to the contrary was all "Concession talk". He said that Yen hsi-shan was building additions to his arsenal that he had seen, and that there had never been any greater activity in munition making in Shansi than there was at present.

Mr. Liu thinks that the Christian General is playing a waiting game. As time goes on his popularity, and that of his soldiers is steadily growing. He is consolidating his arsenals. He is but waiting a false move by the Kuomintang.

My old teacher smiled when I mentioned the disbanding of the Chinese soldiery. He said that only the most worthless mercenaries were being discharged, and that recruiting is going on apace for each ambitious standard.

3. Personal Impressions.

My impressions are in the formative stage. Peking is not China, and what one hears in Peking is not the voice of China. But, Peking is a Chinese City, and the voice of Peking is still heard throughout China.

And from what I gather here, China is not such a pleasant domicile for John Chinaman as it was four years ago. There is no more Public Opinion behind the Kuomintang than there was behind the government of four years ago, but the Kuomintang does have stronger vocal chords.

Parker G. Tenney

Parker G. Tenney.
Capt. F.A.,D.O.L.
Asst. Military Attache.

#7371 1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - November 21, 1928 - To: A.C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

The impressions gained from conversation with the Chinese, not

in official position, are almost generally along the lines expressed by Captain Tenney. I do not fully concur in the final statement as to public opinion. However, there is no such degree of unanimity of public opinion behind the Kuomintang Party as is pictured in the American press.

John Magruder,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT
JAN 29 1929
2055-666
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
PEKING, CHINA.

4-1

December 19, 1928.

Subject: Impressions of General Conditions in Honan Received During Recent Trip Through that Province.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. JAN 21 1929

The following are my impressions of general conditions in Honan received during my recent trip through that province from Chengchow to Shanchow, on the Lung-Hai Railway. These impressions are the result of my personal experiences and observations, and of conversations with all of the foreigners in the places I visited, both business men and missionaries, and with many Chinese - local officials, business men, farmers, railroad employees, etc.

1. Itinerary.

I left Peking at 8:00 a.m. December 4th and arrived at Chengchow, Honan Province, at 11:00 a.m. December 5th. Left Chengchow at 5:00 p.m. December 7th and arrived at Loyang at 4:00 a.m., December 8th. Left Loyang at 7:30 a.m. December 11th and arrived at Shanchow at 6:00 p.m., December 11th. Left Shanchow at 8:00 a.m., December 13th and arrived at Loyang at 7:00 p.m. December 15th. Left Loyang at 7:30 a.m. December 14th and arrived at Chengchow at 4:30 p.m., same date. Left Chengchow at 9:30 p.m., December 14th and arrived Peking at 9:45 p.m. December 15th.

2. Political.

From the time of my arrival in Honan until my departure I was constantly impressed by the total absence of any Nanking or Central Government authority in the province. Evidences of Feng Yu-hsiang's authority were everywhere, but Nanking or the National Government were never mentioned. Many of the customary revolutionary slogans were in evidence on every hand, but the political horizon is dominated by the figure of Feng Yu-hsiang. I seized every opportunity to talk with both foreigners and Chinese on the political and other situations and found a complete indifference on the part of the Chinese to the Nanking Government, for whom it seems practically non-existent. Foreigners generally were interested in the new government, principally because of the anomalous situation now existing in Honan, with the Nanking Government claiming control over this province but actually exercising only such unimportant functions as Feng Yu-hsiang is pleased to delegate to it, or for which he receives a very substantial remuneration. In travelling through Honan one is never conscious of even a pretense of Central Government authority.

Foreigners almost unanimously feel that the political atmosphere is highly charged and that by spring there will be a resumption of factional warfare with various groups combined against Feng. The few Chinese who dare to express an opinion are generally of the same belief. There appears to be widespread dislike for Feng throughout the province, because of his oppressive measures and his restrictions on the ordinary rights of the people, which characterize his administration, and the people apparently would welcome a change of regime, preferably one that would place them under Yen Hsi-shan. The combine generally believed to be forming against Feng is composed of the Wuhan, Fengtien and Shansi groups, the alignment of the Chiang Kai-shek forces being not yet evident.

Signs are evident of Feng's preparations for any eventuality. He has made a pretense of reducing his military forces and reorganizing along the lines laid down by the Nanking Government, but people - both foreign and Chinese - believe this to be a gesture only and feel sure that no appreciable reduction of forces has been made, but that on the contrary it would seem that he is quietly but energetically strengthening his position. I heard from several unrelated sources that the forces claimed by Feng to have been disbanded have been sent into Shensi and Kansu to remain out of sight until called for. It was also reliably reported to me from several sources that in addition to working a full force at Kunghsien arsenal, Feng has a new arsenal under construction about 50 li beyond Tungkwan in Shensi Province which is intended to be as large as the one at Kunghsien, and for which some machinery has already been shipped from Shanghai.

3. <u>Administration of Honan</u>.

Relatively speaking, Honan is well administered. Taxes are excessive, but are regularized and the levying is fairly uniform.

A 100% military tax is imposed upon the freight rates on all goods, including foodstuffs, shipped over the Lung-Hai Railway in this province. I was informed by the Assistant Chief Accountant and the Acting Chief Engineer of the Lung-Hai that this tax collection averages $500,000 per month. The military tax on freight rates on that part of the Peking-Hankow Railway which crosses Honan Province ranges from 40% on foodstuffs to 100% on non-essential cargoes. This line is now operated by the Ministry of Railway Communications of the Nanking Government. The privilege of operating this line through Honan was virtually purchased from Feng Yu-hsiang, for which he is paid $500,000 per month from its proceeds. The military tax on this line was admittedly imposed to that end.

I was informed by a sufficient number of people in the province to establish the truth of the statement that land taxes have been collected in Honan as far as 5 years in advance.

As an indication of the effect of these exorbitant taxes upon business, the foreign manager of a large cotton packing plant at Chengchow, a great cotton center, told me that cotton from America could be delivered at Shanghai more cheaply than cotton from his mill; that it costs approximately 9 taels to deliver one picul (133 pounds) of cotton at Shanghai.

The police and military maintain a strict supervision over things in general, but for some obscure reason have done little to suppress labor agitation and less to suppress banditry, in spite of many promises to rid the country of this evil. At Chengchow, a great industrial center, labor conditions are generally said to be bad. Many agitators are at work in the city and according to the statement of the foreign manager of the Yu Feng Cotton Mills, a firm employing over 5,000 men, practically nothing has been done by the authorities to curb their activities. A number of arrests have been made, but in not one single instance did he know of any drastic measures having been taken. These statements were borne out by the statements of other foreigners employed in the city.

The feeling was prevalent among all classes of foreigners that considerable anti-foreign feeling still exists, toward which the authorities are apparently indifferent, and about which very little has been done. Conditions of a year ago, when most foreigners were forced to leave Honan, are still fresh in the minds of the Chinese and missionaries and business men all find that considerable feeling still remains. I was myself conscious of this, to a certain degree, during my short stay in the province.

Banditry was said to be rampant in all the districts through which I travelled. Statements to this effect from foreign business men, missionaries and Chinese of all classes, including local officials, agreed. At no place was it considered safe for me to venture into the country; when I broached the matter to district officials the reply was always to the effect that it was not safe, but that if my official duties made such a trip imperative an escort might be arranged for. Bands ranging in size from 5 or 6 to thousands, often including women, were reported within a short distance of the railway. Raids on the outskirts of large cities and on villages along the railway are not infrequent; such a raid on the outskirts of Loyang involving the taking of several prisoners was reported by a foreign missionary to have occurred a week before my arrival there. Conditions had improved somewhat along the railway during the latter part of November due to the presence at every station of disciplined troops on patrol duty, but nothing has been accomplished or even attempted away from the railway zone except the appointment of a bandit suppression commander, Gen. Han Fu-chu, with

headquarters at Loyang, whose only effort, so far, has been a big bandit suppression parade and demonstration at Loyang a week after his arrival. The following week he left on other business.

Considering the shortage of rolling stock existing on the Lung-Hai Railway it is operated very efficiently. Combined goods and passenger trains operate daily, but rarely on schedule, in both directions. These trains are little interfered with by the military; all soldiers are required to have passes in order to board the trains and do not attempt to dictate to or to interfere with the train officials. The conduct of the troops in this respect is an example of the excellent discipline maintained in Feng's army, other evidences of which were numerous. In this connection, I found that people generally liked Feng's soldiers because they are well disciplined, but that they heartily disliked his officers for their arrogance and oppressive measures.

The much heralded reforms instituted by Marshal Feng, aside from regularizing taxes and permitting the efficient operation of the Lung-Hai Railway, consist mainly in superficial "moral reforms" such as prohibiting the use of cigarettes and wines by his troops and by all officials under him, encouraging the drinking of hot water in place of tea, the deportation of prostitutes, and a perfunctory campaign against opium smoking. Although it is difficult to get Chinese in Honan to commit themselves because fear plays so large a part, I found nowhere, even among the missionaries, any feeling that Feng has done anything of value for the people of the province. Chinese invariably hesitated to express their opinions unless well out of earshot of others, and some frankly admitted that they did not dare to talk.

4. <u>Famine Conditions and Military Data</u>.

These subjects will be covered in special reports.

Helmer W. Lystad.
HELMER W. LYSTAD,
1st Lieutenant, Infantry.

#7395 1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - December 19, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Forwarded. The experience of Lieutenant Lystad is similar to that of all observers who spend any time in Honan; namely, that the actual conditions are notably different from the pictures painted by Feng's active propagandists.

John Magruder,
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Y.1 1929 205-5-66
MIS

January 25, 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 7429

Subject: Report on Trip to Shanghai and Nanking.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D MAR 7 1929

On January 4, 1929, I left Peking and proceeded by rail directly to Shanghai where I arrived on the morning of the 7th. Remaining in Shanghai a week, I reached Nanking on the 15th. I returned to Peking January 23rd, via the bi-weekly express leaving Nanking January 21st. The principal objective of my trip was to get into the atmosphere of the new capital with a view to correcting or modifying opinions and impressions of the National Government currently held in Peking if such were erroneous. While I obtained no highly important information not known in Peking, observations made on the groups did modify certain of my opinions, especially those affecting the earnestness of the efforts of the government personnel. It was pleasing to find that the irritating pretentiousness so often evident in the official statements of nationalist officials is absent from their private conversation. The officials were always friendly and reasonable and generally frank. My observations are reported under the following headings:

1. General Impressions in Shanghai.
2. General Impressions in Nanking.
3. Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government.
4. The Government as now Organized.
5. Conference on Disbandment.
6. Considerations Affecting the National Kuomintang Congress.
7. Irregularities, Squeeze, etc.
8. Military Notes.
9. The Question of the Future Capital.

1. General Impressions in Shanghai.

With the exception of certain individuals who see much of the Chinese, people in Shanghai know little more, if any, of the National Government than is known in Peking. Much less is known in official circles in Shanghai of China as a whole than is known to officials in Peking. In general, Shanghai is engrossed in matters of finance and business. This is true of Chinese as well as foreigners. The whole political aspect of the National Government is gauged in terms of money deals. Of the sociological side of the revolution little is heard. The week-end visits of officials from Nanking produce flocks of rumors rather than substantial information. These rumors deal largely with involved financial manipulations and social peccadillos of the

leaders. Due to the eagerness and irresponsibility with which the Chinese mouth gossip and scandal and to the dependence of foreigners upon turns in Chinese situations, rumors in Shanghai fly like wildfire. Unimportant bits of information are so often repeated that they assume a weight wholly disproportionate to their value.

After speaking with a great number of people I left Shanghai with no clearer idea of Nanking than that with which I left Peking. I heard principally of reaction, of taxes, graft and squeeze; of undignified and petty borrowings to maintain the finances of the government and of shamelessness in raids on revenues obtained. I heard little suggestion that Nanking might have a different side.

Whereas a large factor of exaggeration must be applied to Shanghai opinion to account for the "Shanghai mind", nevertheless Nanking cannot be fully understood if one refuses to accept some of the sordid facts known in Shanghai financial circles which brand the Nanking regime at best as an oriental revolutionary organization rather than such as the western political mind would conceive as an ideal attempt at government.

2. General Impressions in Nanking.

Arriving in Nanking one is depressed by the physical appearance of the capital. It rains so frequently that mud is associated with Nanking. The real city where the capital is located is six miles from Hsia Kuan where one arrives by railway or steamer. Between the two at the present time is a single muddy and congested road which runs through a series of squalid villages all within an area enclosed by a wall 22 miles long. "The City" consists of a combination of very congested areas interspersed with open marshy fields and ponds. The various government offices are scattered widely over the city and the circulation between makes motor travel through the narrow, muddy streets hazardous, noisy and exciting. One has the impression of being in a booming Oklahoma

oil town on a wet day - without the wide open spaces. Except for the fifteen mile Chung Shan road, as yet uncompleted, from the river to the tomb of Sun Yat-sen, few of the roads are improved.

The housing facilities of Nanking are very inadequate both as regards offices and living quarters. "Every house is a hotel" the Chinese say. Many ruined missionary structures are evident. Many others are being occupied by the government the rent for which I believe is at present being paid. Without former missionary property and other foreign property it is difficult to see how the government could operate. As yet there is no new building in progress. All say they must await the new city plan for fear of wasting their efforts and money. Sufficient confidence does not exist in the permanency of the government to warrant large commitments.

The old Kiangsu provincial yamens are crowded with the government establishments. All the available space is employed and most of the offices of the lower officials are entirely unheated even in freezing weather. In spite of the evident discomfort there was no indication of dissatisfaction. There is a business like air about the offices quite different from anything observed in Peking. Some offices begin work at 8:00 a.m., others at 9:00. One hour is allowed for lunch and work continues until 4:30 p.m. It is said that officials can always be found at their offices when not absent at the too frequent conferences and committee meetings. In many offices, especially military ones, no smoking is permitted. It is admitted that at present there is much inefficiency and wasted effort in all departments of the government but all boast of an expenditure of energy which is new in China.

Among officials I had known before I observed signs of strain, even nervousness, from hard work. They were eager to be getting things done but due to the rivalry among the factions so little could be accomplished. The best of their time was spent at the endless round of committee meetings where much of the talk was admittedly futile. The

government as contemplated in the Organic Law is still incompletely organized. Many organs exist only in name. This is due somewhat to inexperience, somewhat to lack of funds but mostly to the fundamental weakness in the whole political structure, namely, that the real power still resides in military leaders. No constructive measure can yet be enforced which has in it elements embarrassing to the position or face of the big militarists. The conference on disbandment which was in session during my visit will be discussed later. It is hoped that this conference may remove some of the obstacles to the proper organization of the government organs.

Despite the almost infantile enthusiasm of older officials, despite an incredible expenditure of energy, over Nanking hangs a pall of uncertainty, of fear. No individual has burnt his bridges and set his eyes confidently to the future; one everywhere senses half measures. All express a fervent hope for the future but no man has staked his all on the success of the National Government. I asked many people, "What is it exactly that you fear?" Some whisper, "Feng", others say they fear the left wing, and some fear reactionary tendencies of those in power. Those government officials who have grown conservative in power are afraid of "The Party" but I could never disclose what it was exactly they meant unless perhaps they feared the growing opposition throughout the party to the closed corporation constituting the party central. All fear further fighting. They feel that another civil war would destroy the government, and the most wholesome sign in Nanking is the general tendency to make any compromise rather than precipitate further fighting.

The public announcements of Nanking, intended for foreign consumption, are bold and challenging. The atmosphere of Nanking is quite different. The optimism is bred of hope rather than confidence, of possibilities rather than accomplishments. One senses more of old China

in the capital than appears in press releases. The Chinese nature has not changed. In moments of optimism one encounters among the officials the same old racial conceit and self-sufficiency; when fear returns the same lack of confidence which grasps at straws. Underneath all of the revolutionary bluster and beneath the smug self-satisfaction of centuries it is evident that there lurks constantly a sense of inferiority in facing modernization; a feeling of inferiority which increases as the immensity of the task is beginning to be grasped.

3. Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government.

Whereas the Central Political Council is the power in Nanking and the government the mechanism for administration, Chiang Kai-shek occupies the strategic positions in both party and government. His own troops surround Nanking and occupy the city in great strength. He is head of the Central Military Academy where there are 6,000 or 7,000 cadets who would obey his orders. As commander-in-chief, in theory he commands all armed forces in China; actually the only operative military organ of the central government, the Training Department under Ho Yin-ching, is in effect Chiang Kai-shek's own staff. The only immediate check on Chiang's power is the influential group in the party central headed by the party elders, Chang Chih-chiang, Wu Chih-hui, Li Shih-tseng and Tsai Yuan-pei. To these Chiang must defer; the other militarists he must play one against the other. It is not far wrong to say that so long as Chiang Kai-shek can remain as nimble in passing from right to left and back again, as he has been in the past, and can continue his role as the Great Harmonizer, his group is the National Government. In the Yangtze provinces his powers are almost dictatorial, even if he does use soft gloves in keeping harmony among the other nationalist leaders in Nanking.

At the present time the Minister of Finance collects the revenues of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Chekiang, and partial revenues

in a few others. He controls customs surpluses and makes loans for the central government. Nearly all funds so collected are disbursed directly through or under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang's whole military establishment is paid from central government funds through his own fiscal agents; other militarists except for occasional doles pay their own armies. Most of the money remitted for party expenses and administrative expenses passes through Chiang's agents. This financial control as at present exercised greatly increases Chiang's power. The central government as yet exerts little check over the Chiang-Soong combination. The most effective check upon government finances is exerted by Shanghai bankers who are supporting the Ministry of Finance in return for assurances that the internal loans held in great quantities by the Chinese banks will be amply secured as the process of centralization of finances proceeds.

At the time I visited Nanking the National Military Reorganization and Disbandment Conference was in progress. The conference was made possible only by a very nimble shifting of position by Chiang Kai-shek. In brief, he gave assurances to the Kwangsi faction that the principle of proportionate disbandment would be adhered to rather than selective disbandment as demanded by Feng Yu-hsiang and thus secured the presence at the conference of the Kwangsi leaders. His present problem is to appease Feng Yu-hsiang who is believed to be disaffected. Previous to the conference great fear had been entertained in Nanking that Chiang was playing too closely with Feng and the left wing, and would precipitate a break with the Kwangsi faction and other anti-Feng militarists. For the time being there is a general feeling that Chiang has strengthened his own position and the security of the government by his alignment with the Kwangsi faction rather than with Feng Yu-hsiang. Always there is the fear that situation may arise where Feng may openly declare himself champion of the left wing and be urged to declare a holy war on the

reactionary regime at Nanking. For the moment, however, it is confidently believed there that Feng is too isolated to risk a war. Reaction is certainly in the air at Nanking and Chiang Kai-shek is preeminently the leader of what is popular.

4. The Government as Now Organized.

The government prescribed in the New Organic Law is only partially completed. Those organs which existed in former Peking governments are to a large extent grouped under the Executive Yuan. There is little political controversy over these organs; consequently this yuan is most nearly completed and is operating more smoothly than the others. For the same reason the Judicial Yuan is beginning to function with relatively little friction. The Legislative Yuan is holding daily meetings and the members boast of some accomplishment while admitting considerable lost motion due to the absence of centralized authority. The Examination Yuan is still unorganized. In view of the existence of a special committee in the Judicial Yuan for the punishment of deficient civil officials, the Control Yuan would seem to be superfluous. This yuan included out of sentiment for Dr. Sun's five yuan scheme may be permitted to exist in name only. In general throughout the government one finds upon inquiring about specific organs that many of the subordinate ones have not been organized and exist only on paper.

The military departments of the government are by far the most nebulous and when existent are functioning with the least efficacy. The actual conditions in China cannot be obscured by a facade of central military administration in Nanking. The real authority in China undeniably still resides in the persons of the military leaders who control military regions. So long as this is true Nanking cannot boast of an authoritative central military administration any more than could Peking in her later days. What actually exists in Nanking by way of military

administration is several water-tight compartments each representing the organ of the more important military groups. Each exists to satisfy the vanity or face of the larger militarists and constitutes no part of a real operating ministry of military affairs. In this I am stating the conditions as expressed to me frankly by numerous civil and military officials in Nanking.

Thus the Ministry of Military Affairs is Feng Yu-hsiang's compartment; the General Staff is the organ of the Kwangsi faction; the Department of Military Training is Chiang Kai-shek's. With the notable exception of the latter, the functions and authority of these organs are undefined, and there is no cooperation among them. On the contrary, each looks with undisguised suspicion upon the activities of the other. Feng Yu-hsiang's real authority resides at his own headquarters at Kaifeng as the authority of the Kwangsi faction does at Wuhan and Canton. In the case of Chiang Kai-shek, his activities as an individual militarist and as head of the National Government both center in Nanking. Therefore the Department of Military Training has the dual capacity of organ of the central government, and what is more important, of Chiang Kai-shek's personal military headquarters. In the capacity of the latter, the Training Department is the real operating military organ in Nanking. In this Department are published such training, instructional and organizational pamphlets as exist; studies of foreign armies are made; through it the Central Military Academy is run. It is within this Department that Colonel Bauer and his officers are believed to work for Chiang Kai-shek. It is quite understandable therefore that while Chiang Kai-shek would have this Department appear to be an organ of the central government, the other militarists consider it a part of Chiang Kai-shek's more or less personal military establishment. I could trace practically no authority and no functions in the elaborate organization known as the Ministry of Military Affairs.

Such a situation as just described could exist only in China. So far it continues to exist under the Nationalist regime despite publicly announced impressions to the contrary. It remains to be seen if any of the conditions rendering impossible a centralized military administration will be removed by the Disbandment Conference which is still in progress. It is evident however that centralized military administration cannot exist in Nanking so long as actual military authority remains in the persons of the big militarists themselves. That this decentralization of authority will continue to exist long after the present conference is the belief confidentially expressed by practically all of my Chinese contacts in Nanking.

5. Conference on Disbandment.

The details of this conference will be covered in a special report as the facts become known. A generalization gathered during my visit to Shanghai and Nanking will here be mentioned.

The published agenda for the conference included business which if passed and made effective would effect the regeneration of China. The participants well know that no such sweeping reforms are immediately possible. For example, large scale disbandment, employment of disbanded soldiers, centralization of military authority and centralization of revenues in Nanking - these things under the best possible circumstances will be of gradual and long drawn out accomplishment. As nearly as could be gathered from conversations with many Chinese the conference was called essentially to arrange a redistribution of areas and revenues among the larger militarists in order to avoid a recrudescence of civil war, and incidentally to effect some relief from the cost of the present swollen forces. The last two years of war have left the militarists in a confused state as regards spheres of influence, distribution of available revenues, location of troops, etc. The stresses set up by

this unstable crystallization following military operations if not relieved might easily cause another civil war. One thing about which all responsible Chinese agree is that further fighting must be avoided. They know that all that has been accomplished in the revolution might be lost if there is further fighting. They also know that drastic internal reforms can wait if only the remarkable Chinese capacity for revival of means of livelihood be permitted a respite from civil strife. With a few years of peace, reopening of railways and trade routes, and relaxation from excessive taxation necessitated by munitions expenditures, China's simple economic structure, so immediately dependent upon the soil, can be reasonably restored by a few good crops.

The real objectives of the conference are, I believe, the elimination of the causes of suspicion and friction among the various militarists, thus permitting a measure of proportionate disbandment; and the maintenance of peace. If a partial flow of the revenues customarily collected and disbursed by regional commanders can be started into the central treasury, I gathered the impression that the civil leaders would consider the conference to exceed their expectations. Mr. T. V. Soong's magnificent proposals were "accepted in principle" as unassailable economic truths, but to the militarists they were probably classed as abstractions to be considered at a later date.

To show how delicate the situation was before the convening of the conference, it appears that the Kwangsi faction refused to attend even at the last moment until Chiang Kai-shek made one of his dexterous shifts from an alignment with Feng Yu-hsiang and gave assurances that he would support the Kwangsi plan of proportionate disbandment rather than Feng's plan. The latter had insisted upon a scheme for retaining for the national army only those divisions which were selected for their efficiency. This struggle over plans for disbandment demonstrates

that the militarists were and are still animated less by the desire to disband than that they be able to retain their personal influence over such divisions as are to constitute the national army.

In the midst of the doubts and fears expressed by members of the government, everywhere except in Feng's camp satisfaction was voiced at the new harmony which has developed between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi faction. Feng is isolated for the time being and breathing is freer in Nanking as a consequence. Feng not only is a Lone Wolf but he is a Northerner; for two reasons he seems out of place in Nanking. The conference, once Chiang Kai-shek, Yen Hsi-shan and Li Tsung-jen joined forces, seems to have been stacked against Feng. Everything was decided in committee before the plenary sessions and Feng, without throwing down the gauntlet, had to agree to all motions. These were carried "unanimously". Feng is certainly eclipsed at this time, and is plainly disaffected.

6. <u>Considerations Affecting the National Kuomintang Congress.</u>

The accomplishments of the conference on disbandment are yet in the stage of plans and projects. The future must prove how successful will be the application of the resolutions adopted. The holding of the conference with no outward disagreement indicates the moral strength of the Kuomintang organization. This accomplishment of the party will increase the probability of success in the next test, which is the National Kuomintang Congress scheduled to be convened March 15th. Next to civil war, nothing is so menacing to the immature government as the possibility of a party congress dominated by youthful radicals and delegates with little political experience. A congress so composed, if not ending in disorders, would be disposed to replace the present relatively conservative and experienced personnel of the Central Executive Committee, the Central Political Council and the government. The unstable structure at Nanking is in no condition to support drastic

changes. These dangers are frankly discussed in the capital and several high officials admitted that the present party leaders felt justified in taking arbitrary measures to prevent the seating of too many delegates from the left wing radicals. In brief, the present party leaders intend to continue themselves in office and defend their action as essential to the safety of the government.

Many conflicting details have been published as to the method of procedure in the elections now in progress. The party central's devices for assuring a composition of the congress suitable to its desires have aroused considerable criticism in the party locals and consequently the manipulations are probably given as little publicity as possible. Dr. Wang Chung-wei, President of the Judicial Yuan, told me that each delegate elected would have to be approved by a sub-committee of the Central Executive Committee before being declared eligible. A duplicate panel of delegates, he said, was to be elected from which the members would be chosen by the C.E.C. Certain provincial chapters are considered incompletely organized and the delegates from these are to be appointed by the C.E.C.

I asked Dr. Wang why the Peking and Tientsin party locals were considered so troublesome and radical. He said it naturally seemed anomalous that the most radical party organizations were those in the reactionary North. This, he explained, is a temporary state of affairs and is a phenomenon which has been observed during the whole movement since the revolution spread from Kwangtung. Those party locals last included in Nationalist territory were always assertive and insistent upon trying out their newly acquired authority. He mentioned the insubordination of the Shanghai chapter and that in Nanking against central authority, and added that they gradually subsided, as will those in the North. He said, "The party locals fill the vacuum which exists between the military occupation and complete organization of the new administration". They take upon themselves authority and responsibility which

under normal circumstances do not belong to the local party organizations. This is the first explanation I had heard of these unusual activities of the party locals which have created so much ill feeling against the nationalist regime.

7. Irregularities, Squeeze, etc.

A resident in China would be in a difficult position if called upon to present legal evidence as proof that his number one boy daily takes his squeeze, and yet no resident entertains the slightest doubt of the fact. It may be said of Nanking that no Chinese doubts that the time-honored custom of grafting on public funds has been wiped out by the revolution. I have been assured by many Chinese and foreigners in position to know that grafting among the higher officials is as prevalent as it was in Peking. Some say it is worse and that the only difference is in the technique. An acquaintance in the foreign office who is remarkable for his cautious statements tells me that he believes there is less corruption among the smaller officials, of which he is one. There are apparently more checks on expenditures, he said, and administrative funds are limited. There seems to be no doubt that millions of dollars of the war funds were unaccounted for by authorized expenditures.

It is well known that Feng Yu-hsiang embarrassed Chiang Kai-shek over a long period by insistence on having the accounts of Chiang's campaign expenditures for the files of the Ministry of Military Affairs. Large sums could not be accounted for. In the published statements it was observed that Chiang mentions certain amounts for the First Army Group and for the East Route Army which were the same organization. One item of $3,000,000 was mentioned for "fixtures", which item has never been explained. Both Chiang Kai-shek and the Soong family have accumulated large and valuable properties in Shanghai, I am informed, by a contact believed to be reliable.

A secretary of Feng Yu-hsiang's told me the following story of the opium scandal which he assured me is substantially correct. The story seems to be in keeping with the known facts. Briefly it is as follows: Chiang Kai-shek controlled the opium market of Shanghai which he supplied with shipments from Yunnan and Szechwan. Feng originated the Opium Conference and had his very consciencious subordinate, Chang Chih-chiang, a devout Christian, appointed head of the suppression bureau. In view of the high prices which would be created by temporary suppression he built up large stocks of Shensi and Kansu opium in Shanghai. He had the police informed about the shipment of 20,000 ounces belonging to Chiang Kai-shek which created the scandal. Chang Chih-chiang investigated the case seriously and discovered not only that Chiang Kai-shek was involved but also that Feng was involved. He issued an innocuous report, resigned as Suppression Commissioner and in disgust went to Peking, where he insists on living in retirement.

9. Military Notes.

I was surprised to find the military thought in Nanking dominated by the J apanese school. The Superintendent of the Central Military Academy told me that the instruction, drill and methods employed were almost entirely Japanese. At the present time all the drill manuals and instruction pamphlets are practically copies from the Japanese. The reason seems to be that the majority of the higher military officials are either graduates of Japanese military schools or of the old Paotingfu Academy which followed Japanese methods. The officers who studied in Japan form a ring which is closed to western educated students. The latter are found in subordinate positions and almost generally are relegated to staff rather than to command positions. Little is heard today of the Russian military drench.

Feng Yu-hsiang has thirty of his officers in Nanking being coached in language prior to their departure to study abroad. Their destination has not yet been fixed. Feng's secretary told me that

Yang had at present thirty officers studying in Japan and thirty in Germany. Fifteen have just returned from several years' study in Russia "and are now undergoing political purification. Six of them are in jail".

8. The Question of the Future Capital.

I asked many Chinese in Nanking about the question of returning the capital to Peking. In almost every instance they expressed a personal desire to see the capital moved back. The prevalent idea was that nearly everybody would like to return to Peking but that no one dared at this time to suggest it. The regime they all admit is too unstable at present to attempt any change. Until real centralization of authority is attained the present government would not be safe away from the troops of Chiang Kai-shek. The Minister of Foreign Affairs said to a friend of mine, "This is a southern government and it would not be safe in Peking without our own troops. It is too expensive to maintain rice-eating southern troops in the North".

Some Chinese said they were afraid of the imperial traditions and degenerating influence of the luxury of Peking. A number when asked for the fundamental reason for not coming to Peking promptly mentioned the peculiar status of the Legation Quarter as being the most face-destroying feature of the old capital. Despite the general assurance that once they adopt a city plan they will proceed with building the new capital, one cannot but note the complete absence of any building today. I frequently heard the idea expressed that if all goes well, the capital will be in Peking in about two years.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 12 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT

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2055-670

Peking, May 2, 1929

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR MAGRUDER:

Subject: Visit to Nanking, Hankow and Shanghai.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. JUN 11 1929

According to your orders I left Peking on April 5th and visited in turn Nanking, Hankow and Shanghai, returning to Peking on May 1st. Separate reports have been submitted giving in detail the composition of the First and Second Armies and an account of the Hankow air field. The following report is submitted under the following heads:

1. Chiang Kai-shek's Army.
2. Chiang Kai-shek vis-a-vis the Government and People.
3. The Wuhan Incident.
4. Conclusion.

1. Chiang Kai-shek's Army.

Discipline. Chiang's army, down to the rank and file, is showing the result of German tutelage. The men are well dressed, their set-up has improved, and they are apparently well disciplined. On the recent Wuhan expedition the main body disembarked at Kiukiang. They were marched quietly ashore and bivouacked on the beach. It was nota ble that none of them left their bivouac area and that foreigners—male and female—passed through their lines without drawing a remark of any kind. Again on the disembarkation at Hankow it was remarkable that the army was marched from the ships in companies of about 100 men each, each unit having orders as to its exact destination in the city, and each unit marching directly to its area with no straggling and no loss of time. Furthermore, upon reaching their respective areas the men were not allowed to leave them, and were not seen walking the streets.

The Staff. Of as great interest as the discipline in the army is the improvement in the staff work. I had an opportunity to watch a part of the staff function while Chiang Kai-shek was making speeches away from headquarters. The Chief of Staff, Major General Ho Kuo-kuang,

a Japanese returned student, was working in the most approved manner. A large map was in his office on which were posted troop positions, and he knew where all his troops were, where they were going and what they were doing. His staff was all carrying on and was divided into the conventional G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4. The staff had been German trained, and was composed of men capable of training, men for the most part under 35, bright, quick, intelligent and eager to learn anything of foreign armies and foreign methods of war.

General Ho was very anxious for any information on military subjects. He spoke of the plans for the army, and is deeply impressed with the value of tanks, of gas, and of an air force. Speaking of the latter he said that the Chinese would not spend the millions necessary to build a navy, but instead would build up a modern air force, which he thought would cost less and be far more effective. He also stated that a 20 mm rifle was to be used in anti-tank and anti-airplane attacks.

It is safe to state that Chiang Kai-shek is much more interested in the organization and the training of his army than he is in the carrying on of the other duties of his office, and that if the German influence is allowed to remain at work for two or three years more, backed up financially by an open hand, Chiang's army will be well the best in China, as it now is the largest.

Transport. Of interest is the manner in which the army on the march takes advantage of the native transportation. To each unit is attached its own transportation train, and in one such train I saw rickshaws, pack mules, pack oxen, wheelbarrows, t'iao t'iaozetis (men bearing burdens on their shoulders suspended from either end of a pole), carts and pack ponies. The advantages of this means of transportation are obvious; in the first place any district can provide it and maintain it; it keeps up with the troops, and occupies little road space.

From what I could gather, there does not seem to be any deep attachment on the part of the officers to Chiang Kai-shek or love of any cause. Their interest seemed to me to be academic only.

2. Chiang Kai-shek vis-a-vis the Government and the People.

China is no country for the "Strong Man". Mussolini might here gain power but it would quickly be taken away from him. The wings of the eagle are clipped with the object of making his resemble the barnyard fowl. A strong man is suspected, his every move maligned, his every motive mistrusted, his friends turn from him and deceive him and his enemies multiply and flourish as the green bay tree.

Chiang Kai-shek is a strong man. He has not the over-developed sub-maxillary process of a Mussolini, the piercing eye of a Napoleon nor the bulging forehead of a Caesar. In fact, with only a change of a garment he could pass equally well as a rickshaw coolie, a merchant, or a dockhand. He does not exude power, and for this reason has I think been allowed to gain power. People have underestimated his qualities. Below the surface I believe there hides one of the cleverest Chinamen that ever lived——supple of mind, quick of thought and of action, without a scruple, logical, Machiavelian in thought and action, and with a thorough respect for the lessons in propaganda learned from the Russians. The influence of Madame Chiang on his actions is great. Even while recently in Hankow he sent for her. And she, popular opinion has it, desires to be called the Empress of China.

Chiang is becoming too big for the party, too big for the Chinese people. Men high up in the Kuomintang say that they are watching him, and that at the first overt move, off will come his head. They are, I think, optimistic——the tables might be turned.

His interest is not the interest of the government and certainly not that of the people. From where did the millions come for his recent expedition? Did he see that they were used to alleviate the really pitiable conditions brought about by famine, or for the future development of the country in roads and railroads? Nanking and propaganda to the contrary, the authorities there obeyed his every command

and did everything in their power to avoid a conflict. And absolutely inexplicable to the Chinese mind, why does he send his armies toward Kwangsi to punish these "rebels" after having driven them from power—a sufficient punishment in the Chinese eye. In no area under his control have taxes been lessened—and it must be remembered that much was promised. In no area has there been a reduction in the number of soldiers. The people are certainly not behind him, and even in Nanking and Shanghai he has no popular following. In no place in the present age does public opinion count for so little as it does in China, and so the lack of this following may not militate against him for a long time, but eventually it will count.

Chiang is bigger than the government. The government, or the leaders of the Kuomintang, were opposed to the Wuhan expedition—opposed very decidedly, though since Chiang wanted it they acquiesced. From all I could gather, the present government of China, in spite of the elaborate precautions taken in the constitution by Sun Yat-sen, is being dominated by one man, and is subservient to one man.

Is such a form of government feasible in China?

3. <u>The Wuhan Incident</u>.

The Wuhan incident is practically completed. In its inception the motivation was obscure, and only recently was I able to evaluate it. The war against the Wuhan clique was waged in the hope that it would draw Feng from the mountain top and defeat him, and for the financial benefits to be derived from the Hankow area and the Upper Yangtze. From reliable sources at Hankow I gathered that there was certainly no truth in the Nationalist reports that the Wuhan troops were attacking the Nationalists. There is no gainsaying the fact that the Provincial Committee at Hankow actually dissolved itself and that Hu Tsung-to resigned. There was no excuse for the war except in Chiang's ambition. It may be

that the decision to fight Feng came early in the Nationalist programme, or that it came later, or as so often happens here, it came into being during the expedition itself. But for the following reasons I believe it formed a part of the general scheme:

1. Chiang's strategy is no longer Chinese but German. Colonel Bauer undoubtedly planned the whole expedition, and it would be impossible for the German mind to accept Feng in his present position.

2. As Feng's troops were advancing ostensibly to assist Chiang in the occupation of Hankow they were fired upon and engaged in battle with Hsia Wei's division which had been bought over by Chiang. This fact was never reported in Peking, but there certainly was a battle, and reports in Hankow were practically unanimous that it was of about four hours' duration.

3. Now, the leaders of the Kuomintang quite frankly state that Feng must be eliminated, and Feng's representative told Consul Stanton, in Tsinanfu, on April 29th, that war between Chiang and Feng was inevitable.

The expedition was a great success in every way. Staff work was good; troops were well handled; few lives were lost; the objective was obtained. The tobacco tax alone in the Hankow area is worth 500,000 Mexican dollars per month, and what additional revenues will be added to Chiang's coffers is open to conjecture, though of course they will be equal to several times this 500,000.

4. Conclusion.

Chiang Kai-shek is growing larger than the party, and the party is beginning to realize it, though the government as opposed to the party is now under Chiang's control. No present alignment of interests can shake Chiang from the position he holds which has been greatly

strengthened by the Hankow expedition. Every day sees more strength added to Chiang's army——strength not in men alone but in finances and in German training.

The future will undoubtedly see new alignments of forces directed against Chiang, for fundamentally, the "Strong Man" idea is un-Chinese.

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache.

elh

7516 1st Ind. JM:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - May 10, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

MIS INTEL. DIV.
AUG 5 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 6009. COPY

4-1 2055-671

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, June 13, 1929.

Subject: MEMORANDUM ON CHINA - February, 1929.
NEWS BULLETINS.

The Honorable
J. V. A. MacMurray,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of MEMORANDUM ON CHINA, dated February 1929, issued by Mr. R. Huntley Davidson, A. C. A., believing it will be of interest to the Legation.

The Legation's particular attention is invited to the new problems facing the Settlement which are discussed at the beginning of page 8 of this Memorandum. Mr. Davidson's statement of these problems is regarded as fair and as ultimately alarming. These problems are really more alarming today than they were in February, and will continue to be of increasing consequence to the International Settlement and French Concession. The questions dealt with under the heading, "Defence of Shanghai", on page 9, give great concern to the Settlement authorities. Section I (d) contains a statement which is limited to very few American concerns. There is an intimation, particularly among American firms, that the American naval authorities, being here to protect American lives and property, should do so completely, except for a limited period of emergency when the volunteers may be called upon; otherwise the services of the volunteers will limit the business activities of American concerns. The question of the defence of the International Settlement is very serious and it is believed that the lives of foreigners would be in very grave danger should the foreign emergency forces be materially reduced at the present time.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
1/ - Copy of MEMORANDUM ON CHINA

ESC MB
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In Duplicate.

Enclosure to Department in Quintuplicate.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM ON CHINA

February, 1929.

R. HUNTLEY DAVIDSON, A. C. A.

- - -

INTRODUCTION.

GENERAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN CHINA.

Military Spheres of Influence.

Political Activities.

Communist Revival.

Chinese Foreign Policy.

The Third International in China.

THE PROBLEM O F SHANGHAI.

General Survey.

Constitution of Municipal Council of Foreign Settlement.

Taxation.

Finance.

New Problems facing the Foreign Settlement and Forces undermining Authority of Municipal Council.

Defence of Shanghai.

1. Shanghai Volunteer Corps.

2. Cost of Local Defence.

CHINA'S NEW TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

THE FUTURE OF SHANGHAI.

MEMORANDUM ON CHINA, FEBRUARY, 1929

Introduction

It is necessary to emphasise at the commencement that this memorandum is taking for granted the manifestation in China——as elsewhere in Asia——of indigenous "nationalism", which should be welcomed and helped in its struggle to survive and grow. This indigenous nationalist movement is evident throughout the whole of the Far East and constitutes an entirely new factor in the modern situation as compared with the 19th Century. China during the past five years has witnessed the rapid development among her people of a nationalist movement, resulting in the establishment at Nanking of a Nationalist Government composed on the civilian side of many men either educated in America or Europe or with some experience of Western countries. For the first time since the Revolution of 1911 we have now a Government in China with a definite constructive programme both as regards internal and foreign affairs, but faced with the colossal task of attempting to exert its authority and carry out its programme in a country of the size and proportions of China. Left with a legacy of anarchy and chaos, disruption and provincial independence, financial bankruptcy and military intimidation, it is evident the task to which the Nationalist Government have set their hands is of enormous magnitude and difficulty.

The purpose of this memorandum is a limited and definite one, to summarise the dangers and difficulties which beset both Chinese and foreign commercial interests in China. That no mention is made of other, possibly more hopeful, aspects of the China problem does not imply their denial or that their presence is not acknowledged or welcomed, as they certainly are by responsible British residents in China. Certain fundamental difficulties and unpleasant facts must be faced if genuine Chinese nationalism is to survive, and fear lest it should fail through lack of true discernment of the actualities of the situation at Home is one of the chief concerns of British residents here who wish China well.

British interests in China ask for no imperialistic policy; they welcome any changes which will lead to closer co-operation and understanding with the Chinese, but ask from their Government such firmness of action and direction of policy as will secure for British residents and traders in China that respect, security and freedom which are their legitimate rights. The entrance of China to a position of equality among the nations of the world must surely carry with it the responsibilities and duties of such equality. To grant the former without insisting upon the execution of the latter constitutes one of the greatest dangers in Sino-British relations. No solution is possible without earnest goodwill and sincerity from China.

That the present position of British interests in China calls for adjustment, in the attainment of which sacrifices must be made, is fully acknowledged and sacrifices will be readily borne if the policy resulting therefrom justifies some confidence in a solution being definitely reached of the problems which now make such adjustments necessary. Any concessions granted by us to satisfy the demands of present-day Chinese politicians must prove futile if we ignore the fact that the fundamental characteristics of the Chinese race cannot have changed appreciably during the short space of half a century. Therefore a reversion, a mere drifting back, to the state of affairs which gave rise to the so-called "unequal treaties" will indicate no progress in the permanent establishment of better Sino-British relations nor hold out any hope for the future of Sino-British trade and commerce which have always been the main concern of the British Government in formulating its China policy.

There is nothing more misleading than to arg us Chinese questions from European premises. What may seem obvious in the West, is likely to be quite preposterous in the East, particularly in China, and it would be easy to draw up a list of blunders committed by foreign statesmen in their dealings with the Chinese simply because they assumed what was logic in the West would also be logic in China. Predictions as to the probable result of certain actions in China have again and again proved wrong because such foreign prophets have ignored the most important link in their argument, namely, a correct knowledge of Chinese character and psychology, and this one unknown quantity has upset all calculations.

Writing in 1859 Sir Harry Parkes said: "These Chinese questions instead of reaching a settlement have only attained a greater growth, and now give promise of greater trouble than ever. Our mild undecided policy has had much to do with this.... The Government at home appear ready to do anything almost to get the matter off their hands, but the evil that they have to take in hand is not one that can be dealt with rapidly. It is not sufficient to make engagements with the Chinese: we must also see them executed, and this latter is a slow process."

This Memorandum urges that failure to acknowledge and to deal firmly and resolutely with the difficulties now threatening British interests in China is only to court far more serious trouble at a later date, the dangerous consequences of which it is hardly possible to estimate. The mere signing of new Treaties with China without firm insistence that they are carried out in both letter and spirit, will no more solve our China problems today than in the days of Sir Harry Parkes.

During the crisis of 1898 when other Powers were united in a policy for the dismemberment of China, Great Britain alone directed the whole of her diplomacy and efforts to preserving the integrity of the Chinese State. During that important period of modern Chinese history British statesmen felt it their imperative duty to safeguard the great commerce which their nationals had developed in China, in the growth of which Chinese, no less than British, interests have been mutually served. Do we ask too much today when we ask for our trade and interests to be similarly safeguarded now as thirty years ago?

A correct analysis of the events of the last decade of the 19th Century does not indicate any fundamental change in Great Britain's China policy to be necessary, for the mutual trade and political interests of China and Great Britain are now, as then, identical. Britain has always been pro-Chinese for no other reason than that it serves her own commercial interests to be so. Chinese statesmen both in the 19th Century and today have failed to recognise this basic characteristic of British China diplomacy, hence, as in 1895/8 so again in 1925/8 China turned to Russia for help rather than to Great Britain. Other nations, particularly Russia, have only been too eager to misrepresent Great Britain to the Chinese and the world at large. But that is no reason why we should encourage any acceptance of this misrepresentation of Great Britain's China policy by adopting an apologetic attitude. The countries who, during the past few years, have most welcomed this misrepresentation of Great Britain are those, who, but for England, would have dismembered China thirty years ago, for their own selfish political ends. Our sole interests in China are, and always have been, commercial and not imperialistic. But unequal civilisations, the difference between Occidental and Oriental conceptions of morality, ethics and legal justice called for some adjustment by means of Treaties and agreements which have given rise to what has so easily

been proclaimed as the "injustice of unequal treaties". For foreign commerce with China to survive, certain conditions of security and confidence are absolutely essential. To sacrifice these can neither benefit China nor help us to esca pe the dangers or solve the complex problems which so seriously threaten and encompass the future of Sino-British political and commercial relations.

In approaching a study of our China problems it is therefore obviously impossible to divorce them from the historical past out of which they have arisen. Chinese and British commercial institutions have been created in the confidence that security and stability of trade will be maintained. To adjust and revise such conditions of trade and of foreign residence in China, with no insistence that new agreements will be held inviolate, is to undermine the very foundations upon which foreign relations with China rest. To drift across such shifting quick-sands of insecurity in the blind hope that Chinese Nationalism or British commerce with China will either survive or eventually find stability is to court disaster endangering the future peace and prosperity of the Far East.

There is as yet little evidence whatsoever that the time has yet arrived when the Chinese can, or intend to, meet the obligations of a position of international equality which they so insistently claim for themselves and which Great Britain is no less ready to welcome.

With these various aspects of Sino-British relations this Memorandum largely deals.

GENERAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN CHINA

There are strong evidences that there is increasing opposition to the Nanking Government, as dissension is still rife between the main military and political factions that exist in China today. There are three main lines of demarcation which again can be sub-divided:

1. Military
2. Political
3. Communist

1. The military spheres of interest are roughly as follows:

(a) Chiang Kai-shek controlling the Provinces of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Chekiang and Anhui, also two railways,
Shanghai/Nanking,
Hangchow/Ningpo.

(b) Feng Yu-hsiang controlling Shantung, Honan, Shensi, Kansu and three railways,
Tientsin/P ukow
Lunghai,
Peking/Hankow.

(c) Kuangsi faction controlling the Provinces of Kuangtung and Kuansi, Hupeh and Hunan; Pei Chung-hsi in Northern Chili and Tientsin.

In the North this group controls part of Tientsin-Pukow, Peking-Mukden Railways and in Central China part of the Peking-Hankow line.

Their centres of activity are Hankow and Canton.

(d) Yen Hsi-shan who controls the Provinces of Shansi and also the Peking area, as well as the Peking-Suiyuan Railway.

(e) Chang Hsueh-liang who controls Manchuria and Jehol.

(f) Western China——the Provinces of Yunnan, Kwei-chow and Szechuen are each acting in complete independence, giving nominal allegiance to Nanking.

On the borderland of these areas control becomes indistinct and in fact within the areas themselves there are more or less constant fluctuations in the balance of power.

2. Political Activities. Officially in China today there is only one party, namely, the Kuomintang which, in an attempt to establish itself, with the Nanking Government as its executive, has supplanted the dictatorship by military war-lords with dictatorship by the Party, which is proving extremely difficult as the Kuomintang has never really been homogeneous in its theories or practice, for example:

(a) The Western Hills Conference Group (Hu Han-min and others) was driven from the party by Borodin.

(b) Communist members expelled after the break-up at Hankow.

(c) The Kuangsi members in open defiance at Wu-Han.

The entire history of the Kuomintang relates a conflict between internal cliques. Thus the dictatorship is not really of the Party, but by some clique, except when all cliques were under the powerful domination of Borodin.

Dictatorship by the clique has resulted in the movement for party purification. This terrorism which justified the killing of thousands suspected of being "communists" or "reactionaries" is bringing rapidly its own reaction. The communist movement has been driven underground; the Chinese press has become merely an echo of the clique in power; capable men are either driven from office or become mere opportunist politicians, fearful lest they involve themselves in "purifiable" complications.

The most recent development has been the revival of the old Revolutionary Secret Society of pre-revolution days known as the Tung Men Whei (Elder Brother Society) under the name of the San Ming Tsu I Ta Tung Men (The Three Principles Great Brotherhood) which is attracting to it many disgruntled and discarded political and military leaders. The Nanking Government to exert its authority recently made an attempt to suppress or control the activities of the local or District Kuomintang Committees, but this was so greatly resented that action has had to be deferred and the third Party Congress postponed from January to March. The Sectional or District Committees of the Kuomintang openly voiced their opposition to Nanking and now show indications of joining forces with the San Ming Tsu I Ta Tung Men, in an attempt to overthrow the clique now in control of Nanking and the Central Executive Committees. This movement is watched with grave concern by Nanking officials and it is asserted in many quarters that unless Nanking can control this movement, startling developments may

occur before or at the coming Third Party Congress to be held in March. The Kuomintang dominates the Nationalist Government in a manner similar to the Third International domination of the Government in Moscow. The Kuomintang is torn between conflicting factions—Leftist, Kuangsi-ites, Rightist, Western Hill Conference Confederates and Communists. All are represented on the Central Executive Committee, in addition to whom we must add General Feng Yu-hsiang with his North Western Army, Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Hsueh-liang of Mukden. The general revolt against Party-clique dictatorship is giving the Communist movement in China another opportunity to enter the field openly. The disappointed are retiring from positions of responsibility or being attracted to communism in the hope that they can revive the enthusiasms once stirred by the leadership of Borodin and the propaganda of Eugene Chen.

3. The Communist Revival. The revival of the Communist movement is one of the most serious factors in China, especially in view of the situation described above. After the communists were expelled from the Kuomintang they decided their only hope of success lay in developing their party independently of the Kuomintang or other political associations. In its revival it is only natural that the Third International should take considerable interest and there are evidences of Moscow direction and attempts once again to control the whole movement. "Down with the Kuomintang" and "World revolution throughout the East" are their slogans. To further these ends the Chinese Communist Party is developing a political organisation with clearly defined party tactics. The new movement is being concentrated up-country among the peasants whose distressed condition and sufferings after years of civil war make them the most fertile field, as some 60,000,000 of them live on the verge of starvation. While Nanking and the militarists squander money, nothing is being done to relieve the lot of the long-suffering peasants who are the only truly oppressed class in China.

In many Provinces the peasants have already armed themselves in self-defence against the ravages of soldiery. Local Min Tuan (village militia) form armed villages, to which must be added such organisations as the Big Sword Society and the Red Spears and the Min Chün—People's Army—organised in the course of the Northern Expedition. The peasant village autonomy movement is spreading throughout China. This process of disintegration constitutes one of the most important developments; and only the Communist Party appear to be making definite efforts to capture and lead the Peasants' Movement.

The weakness of the Chinese Communist Party is its inability to prevent sporadic outbursts, such as were seen in Hunan, Canton and Swatow during 1927/1928, and more recently near Shanghai. The policy of the Third International is to delay active operations until the whole peasant revolt has been thoroughly organised and the forces co-ordinated. As the present movement is being concentrated on the peasantry, there is probably little likelihood of serious disturbances in large industrial centres until the agrarian revolt is mature. The Communist Party cannot afford to run the risk of powerful labor unions in large cities getting out of control, as was the fatal error during 1926/27, which error Borodin did his utmost to avert.

The seriousness of this movement in China today cannot be minimised as there is no indication that the Nationalist Government or the Kuomintang are attempting to do anything materially to improve the lot of the masses. The real difficulty of the Nanking Government is the Left-Wing Movement, a difficulty manifesting itself throughout China. The fact is the country is in a bad way economically and the poor feel the Government has done nothing for them. In other words, the establishment of a Nationalist Government has brought nothing approaching the millenium, as the people thought it would. The Communists are naturally making the most of this.

Foreign Policy. The only point of agreement between all parties and factions is their unanimous demand for the abolition of so-called Unequal Treaties and the recovery of China's sovereign rights. The existence of the former and the loss of the latter, one and all proclaim to be legacies of their one common enemy "imperialism". Were the sole purpose of this aim genuine and sincere, the meeting of it by the Powers would give grounds for hope of better Sino-Foreign relations. But the situation is by no means so simple. Any student of the history of the 19th Century must be aware that the "Unequal Treaties" were the definite outcome of the efforts of foreign nations to secure recognition of their equality of status by the Chinese and such conditions for trading and living in China as would mitigate the friction and impossible conditions experienced in the days of the East India Company. Two civilisations, East and West, fundamentally different—in many respects directly opposed—in every important characteristic, made it necessary to regulate their intercourse upon a system of Treaties which made up for the lack of a common ground upon which to meet. Whether the adoption by China of certain Western conceptions of civilisation yet justifies the extensive abrogation of these Treaty conditions is still open to question. But it is significant to note the Chinese today do not really demand equality, but inequality in their favour, a reversion to the pre-Treaty state of affairs. Furthermore it must be now obvious to all concerned that mere Treaty revision cannot solve the difficulties by which China is still encompassed. If and when all the "unequal Treaties" have been revised the fundamental problems, above indicated, will still remain. It will then be no longer possible for Chinese politicians and propagandists to continue deceiving their long-suffering people by assuring them that all their ills are due to "foreign imperialism" and the "Unequal Treaties." But this mere awakening to the realities of the situation would, in itself, hardly justify the sacrifices now being made to meet the demands of Chinese Nationalism.

The Third International. Russian attempts to injure British trade and discredit Great Britain in the Far East are nothing new to the student of Sino-Foreign diplomacy during the years 1894-1900. Russian desire to dominate Chinese political affairs is as evident today as during the last decade of the 19th Century.

The activities of the Third International in China are of no mere local significance to Great Britain, for the British Empire is receiving their concentrated attack along the whole of our Far Eastern "frontier" from Afghanistan to China. If the British Empire can be undermined and British statesmanship discredited in the Far East, the main bulwark against world revolution will have given way. The Russians have learnt that a war of propaganda is both more effective and cheaper than a war of bullets. The Chinese, to their own cost, are fast learning the power of propaganda. Propaganda has carried them a long way during the past three years but threatens the life of any Chinese Government which is thus attacked. Russian propaganda methods helped the Kuomintang from 1924 to 1927, but threatens the latter's own existence today.

Finance. In a statement issued recently, Mr. T. V. Soong, the Minister of Finance, shows that Nanking also must face the menace of National Bankruptcy. Providing the disarmament proposals recently adopted at Nanking are carried out—which is as yet very problematical—T. V. Soong estimates a deficit of 50 million dollars a year, limiting military expenditure to 192 million dollars. But in fact the military expenditure for 1929 can hardly be less than 280 millions which will involve a deficit of 140 millions. The Minister of Finance further complains that only four Provinces furnish any figures or remit any revenue to the Central Exchequer, namely, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhui and Kiangsi. It is no wonder he claims that unless the country can be unified "the future is dark indeed."

These are in general outline——as far as it is possible to gauge them——the main political features of the present China situation in the light of which we now proceed to consider the problem of Shanghai.

SHANGHAI

So far as foreign interests——and British particularly——are concerned, Shanghai is the central factor. If Shanghai should be lost it would spell ruination to British trade as well as Chinese/Foreign commerce itself. Chinese "anti-imperialism" today is in reality fundamentally a revival of the anti-foreignism of 1842/65 skilfully fostered and encouraged by the Third International for its own aims: clothed in their language and armed with their slogans. No foreign power, much less Great Britain, entertains any real imperialistic designs upon China. The only power actively interfering in China is the Third International.

Until recently, foreign administered areas have kept free of the disruptive influences so manifest in China of recent years, hence in large measure their commercial prosperity and security. But now these areas are threatened and if once permeated must result in the ruination of China's foreign trade and commerce. China is one of the great potential markets for British products and all that such trade means for British employment and labour. To retain any influence for stability and moderation in China, Britain cannot afford to lose her position in Shanghai, the greatest commercial and shipping port in China (fifth in the world), for China's sake as much as for her own. Hence the urgency of a positive and practical programme to save the situation from drifting past redemption in our day and generation. For Great Britain to fail in China must mean loss of her leadership in the Far East and in time may threaten the existence of our Eastern Empire——which is the fond dream of the Third International.

It has been pointed out that there is unity among all Chinese parties on the question of abrogation of Treaties and the retrocession of Settlements and Foreign Concessions. The methods adopted for securing these ends have been demonstrated clearly at Hankow and elsewhere. There still remains for solution the problem of Shanghai to which the Nationalists are giving more and more attention. Economic, political and judicial forces, aided by constant propaganda in China and abroad, are being brought into action and skilfully marshalled against us. Communism is not the immediate danger as already indicated. Pressure from the Chinese is incessant and unless the solution of the Shanghai problem can pass into foreign initiative, we must prepare to accept the entire Chinese programme without regard to the Chinese and foreign commercial interests jeopardised thereby. Should the Shanghai Defence Force be withdrawn or reduced beyond safe limits, we shall witness the present incessant undermining of the authority and status of the International Settlement immediately intensified. Such a situation must inevitably involve grave risks of incidents arising at least as serious as those which preceded the loss of the British Concession in Hankow.

Constitution of Shanghai Municipal Council. The foreign Settlement of Shanghai derives its authority and status from the Land Regulations of 1854. The limits of the Settlement were extended by agreement with the Chinese authorities in 1898. It is important to note that the Settlement does not depend exclusively upon Treaty provision, but rests upon a tripartite agreement between:

1. The Chinese Government
2. The Treaty Powers
3. The Ratepayers.

Any constitutional change in its status or Regulations must have the sanction or approval of all three parties involved. The Land Regulations do not provide for Chinese Representation upon the Municipal Council, for the Foreign Settlement was originally set apart for residence of foreigners only. However, to meet modern circumstances, Chinese representation was finally introduced in 1928, though in 1860 and again in 1898, when it was proposed by the foreign Councillors and Powers, the Chinese showed no interest in the proposal whatsoever. Chinese representation on the Council was adopted in 1926, but owing to Chinese political reasons was not accepted by them until last year.

At present the Shanghai Municipal Council consists of the following Councillors appointed annually:

5 British
2 American
2 Japanese
3 Chinese

Six Chinese have also been added to the Advisory Committees.

While on the question of Chinese representation on the Shanghai Municipal Council, it must be noted that there is no popular representation on any Chinese Municipal or Provincial Assembly, not even for the Municipality of Greater Shanghai (Chinese area) though the Chinese are insistent upon no taxation without representation in foreign or Sino-foreign controlled areas, which now are the only areas in China enjoying representation for Chinese civilian interests.

Taxation. It is true Chinese residents contribute 55 per cent. of the Revenue collected in the Shanghai Foreign Settlement but on a per capita basis each foreigner pays about Tls. 145 annually as compared with Tls. 6.6 paid by each Chinese. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that 84.2 per cent. of Capital Expenditure is contributed by foreign investors in Municipal Debentures, while only 15.8 per cent. are held by Chinese.

Much Chinese-owned land in the Settlement is held by them under "fangtan" deeds which, not being registered, are not subject to Municipal Land Tax. This results in Chinese not contributing their full proportion of Municipal Revenue, though if unregistered land is surrendered to the Council in connection with public improvements, owners are fully compensated on the usual basis. In this connection it is interesting to note the Nanking Government pay no compensation whatsoever to owners of land and buildings taken over in Nanking by the Chinese Authorities in connection with the construction of the great boulevard now being made there, costing, it is said, Tls. 5,000,000—over which the remains of Dr. Sun Yat-sen are to be conveyed on the occasion of his ceremonial burial in the new mausoleum at Tiger Hill on 12th March next.

Finance. The latest Municipal Balance Sheet shows Debentures issued and outstanding as amounting to Tls. 50 million; total assets to just under Tls. 100 million. The Budget for 1928 provided for an ordinary expenditure of over Tls. 12 million.

New Problems Facing Settlement. It has been pointed out that the Nationalist programme insists upon the immediate retrocession of all foreign controlled areas, but it is significant that up to the present no demands are being made for the modification of foreign control in areas held by the French, though the demand for the return of areas in which British interests predominate or have been under British control, grows more and more insistent.

In Shanghai the problem presents itself in an unique manner. Its solution by negotiation on terms safeguarding mutual Chinese and foreign civilian right and interests is already being prejudiced by subversive propaganda and interference with the existing administration. The manner in which these activities manifest themselves may be summarised as follows:

1. Despite the quiet of 1928 and the relegation of communist activity to a secondary position, nevertheless such activity continues "underground" waiting for any incident which may serve as a pretext for creating trouble on a large scale.

2. Should the fall of the Nanking Government materialise at any time, the result would bring about chaos not only in China, but a repetition of previous dangers locally.

3. All classes of Chinese, except possibly the mercantile community, are united upon a policy of gaining control of the Municipal Administration of Shanghai irrespective of the greater issues involved in the abrogation of existing Treaties. To further this end a consistent policy of undermining the foreign control and administration of the Settlement is in active operation.

(a) The Shanghai Provisional Court, the only Court of Appeal for the execution of Chinese legal jurisdiction in the Foreign Settlement (for both the Municipal Council and the Public) acts in the dual capacity of a public judicial tribunal and a political instrument of the Nationalist Government and the Kuomintang. This is seriously interfering with the work of the Municipal Police in maintaining law and order.

(b) The Social Bureau for Labour established outside the Settlement, together with the Sectional Committees of the Kuomintang for this area, are persistently interfering with, when not instigating, Labour disputes within the Settlement area for purely political purposes. The attitude of these organisations is both domineering and provocative towards foreigners as well as towards Chinese and foreign employers of Labour. Nanking's ineffective control over the activities of the Social Bureau and the Sectional Committees is very evident.

(c) Foodstuffs entering the Settlement are being illegally taxed and the removal of refuse from the Settlement is being interfered with.

(d) The Public Health Bureau of Greater Shanghai (Chinese territory) while seeking co-operation with the Municipal Health Department, resents the insistence of foreign standards of health administration as a conditio sine qua non to reciprocity. While taking exception to Municipal inspection outside the settlement, the Chinese Health Bureau is continually interfering with the work of the Municipal Health Department inside the Settlement.

(e) Attempts are already being made to assume jurisdiction and control over Municipal roads outside the Settlement before the question can be settled by negotiation.

(f) The Settlement is being hemmed in by a military road adjacent to the Western Boundary, which road will cut right across all Municipal roads leading out from the Settlement, and places the Municipal Sewage Works beyond Settlement protection should serious trouble arise.

(g) In view of the political atmosphere existing in China generally, free and frank discussion, in Council meetings, of many matters relating to the conflicting political interests of Chinese and foreign communities is often impossible. To attempt to avoid individual politico-military dictatorship, the Kuomintang, as already explained, have adopted the Committee or Soviet system of Government. This frequently results in resolutions being passed without anyone having the power to make such resolutions effective. Each member of the Committee is a spy on the others for the party each represents. Individual and party jealousies have been intensified. As with all committee work, unless there is individual executive power and authority, resolutions and decisions never get further than the paper they are written upon. Chinese control of the Shanghai Municipal Council under these conditions would raise very serious and far-reaching dangers. These difficulties are gradually manifesting themselves in the Shanghai Municipal Council through its Chinese Councillors and Committee Members——very able and excellent men——but themselves against the intimidation resulting from the disruptive party strife so manifest in Chinese political life today, of which they are the accredited representatives.

These constitute some of the major dangers with which Shanghai is faced at the present time.

In view of the dangers and magnitude of the problems as set forth above, the importance of retaining an adequate Shanghai Defence Force is of the utmost urgency. Its departure <u>prior to a settlement of outstanding issues</u> would expose Shanghai to very grave risks and involve not only the withdrawal of effective military defence, but what is even more important, the withdrawal, in Chinese minds, of the moral support of the Powers, which is so essential if adjustments are to be made by constitutional and evolutionary processes.

1. Difficulties of increasing the Shanghai Volunteer Corps:

(a) In 1926 only by dint of personal appeals to commercial organisations and utmost sacrifices was the Shanghai Volunteer Corps increased to 2,000. This number included a considerable percentage of special constables, professional and single-handed commercial men who had to abandon their occupations, while staffs of the large firms were reduced to thinnest skeletons.

(b) Refusals by consuls of countries not enjoying extra-territorial rights to permit their nationals to join the Shanghai Volunteer Corps for fear of Chinese retaliation.

(c) Inability of indigent Russian refugees to volunteer except in paid units.

(d) Refusal of certain American firms to allow their staffs to join based upon the doubtful assumption that the foreign powers could be relied upon to defend Shanghai.

(e) Refusal of the Japanese to volunteer in large numbers owing to Japan being able to land regular forces here within 48 hours. Owing to conscription in Japan, volunteer service is not in vogue.

(f) The comparatively small population contribute practically the whole technical and indispensable staff to large public utility bodies, essential land and shipping services.

(g) Whilst practically all nationalities contribute, the result of the above means that the greater part of the burden falls upon the community, though, of course, British interests predominate.

(h) For long periods the greater part of the staff of British organisations have done continuous military duty to the detriment of their business and to the advantage of their competitors of other nationalities. This has been most discouraging to British merchants.

(i) Any additional service would necessitate increasing staffs quite unsoundly from the view point of business policy.

2. A partial palliative would be to augment the Shanghai Municipal Council Police Force, which is semi-military, by increasing the present White Russian contingent.

(a) At best this expedient would be of doubtful permanent value.

(b) The Chinese pay more than half the rates and are opposed in principle to an armed defence force upon political and patriotic grounds.

(c) Special precautions are necessary to avoid including Russians inoculated with Bolshevik doctrines.

3. Shanghai is criticised for relying too much for defence upon Foreign Power and too little on its own resources. It must, however, be pointed out that:

(a) Out of an ordinary income of Tls. 12,000,000 three and a half million (29 per cent.) is devoted to defence in the upkeep of Police and Volunteer Forces, to which must be added cost of any increase in the White Russian units.

(b) The foreign adult male population, according to the census of 1925, is approximately 10,000. Of this number 3,600 (36 per cent.) are serving in the Shanghai Volunteer Corps or Police units.

(c) A considerable proportion of the remainder of the personnel is engaged in indispensable services—mercantile and public utilities—while there are others engaged in one-man business concerns.

(d) It is doubtful if any Municipality anywhere else is so heavily taxed for purely defence or where so large a percentage of its adult male population is serving in its defence.

For the Shanghai British community, responsible for investments considerably exceeding £100,000,000, and all that this trade means for employment of British labour in England, to live under the constant danger of having to resort to arms in self-defence is certainly not conducive to a sense of security. The issues and problems thus presented, involving as they do, serious international complications, a re a responsibility which should be shared by Home Governments both as regards their defence and solution.

CHINA'S TREATY OBLIGATIONS

Recent developments in Hankow revealing the violation of the Chen-O'Malley Agreement by the Chinese Government and the disregard, a lready manifest, by the imposition of taxes contrary to Annex III. of the New Sino-British Commercial Treaty indicate the serious problem of enforcing any new treaties or agreements made with China. It would appear very evident that Treaties made today with any Chinese authority, just as Sir Harry Parkes found during the years 1842/65, are valueless unless the Chinese are made to realise that such Treaties can and will be enforced after they have been accepted by the Parties thereto. Agreements made between Chinese themselves are only kept when the parties thereto are in a position to enforce them. It took British statesmen many years last century before they realised what Russia knew all the time, that to the Chinese political agreements are not made with the prime object of being kept, but only as a move for position in an endless game of bluff. Any student of Chinese politics today can see this is true of all Chinese internal political strife. It is only natural that the same conception should be held by them regarding Sino-Foreign political relations.

Presented with the difficulties and issues which have been set forth in this memorandum, the urgency of some solution to the Shanghai problem becomes apparent. The situation if left to drift in its present direction must lead sooner or later to a crisis of first class magnitude. The question therefore arises as to what effective measures are practicable to avert such a crisis?

In the first place there seems nothing to be gained from making any further concessions to China or any new Agreements if the Chinese on their part refuse to abide by the terms of the new treaties which have already been made during the last two years. It is therefore urged that the time has come when Great Britain should indicate in no uncertain language that she is not prepared to consider any further negotiations pending the carrying out, in letter and in spirit, by the Chinese of the new Treaties already granted in Hankow and Nanking.

The purpose of general Treaty revision and adjustment of the existing status of Concessions or Settlements is to remove causes for friction existing between China and Great Britain and place Sino-British relations upon a friendly and stable basis. The treaties already signed demonstrate Great Britain's readiness to meet Chinese national aspirations. B ut if revised Treaties are to be binding for one part thereto only, and disregarded by the other, the resulting consequences entirely defeat the main purpose in view. Instead of placing Sino-British relations upon a more permanent and friendly footing, these relations will revert to those existing prior to the enforcement upon China of the so-called "Unequal Treaties."

A stand will have to be made sooner or later, if catastrophe is to be avoided. We must be fair and just to the Chinese, but unless we are firm also, a policy of conciliation must fail. This application of justice tempered with firmness in dealing with China constitutes the great task of modern statesmanship. The difficulties of this task are perhaps hardly realised by those who do not know China intimately, and who are apt to judge things and minds Chinese from standards of Western civilisation. Chinese constructive leaders find it impossible to withstand the power of disruptive intimidation so powerful in China today, and their task is made more hopless because the foreign Powers also appear helpless when confronted by these disruptive forces. Rather than acknowledge or

face the difficulties this situation reveals, it would appear we yield when we should remain firm, drift when the situation demands positive action, thus involving us in an eleventh-hour evacuation because we have permitted developments to pass beyond our control. To recover, therefore, the initiative in dealing with China, and particularly with the Shanghai problem, before it is too late, is of utmost urgency.

FUTURE OF SHANGHAI

The present unsatisfactory state of animated suspension is likely to continue indefinitely.

The Chinese will press for a change in status of the Settlement and work to this end through attempting to secure larger representation on the Council.

In view of Hankow experiments as well as the general political situation in China, it is evident the Chinese will endeavour to present the Powers with a fait accompli in Shanghai as at Hankow.

Insistence upon the status quo being maintained is unlikely to receive sympathetic consideration in London and Washington. Any further accommodation of Chinese present demands will only create a worse situation, as these demands cannot be satisfied except by immediate total surrender, which would spell ruination to Shanghai. The difficulty of persuading Home Governments to retain an international garrison here indefinitely under the existing constitution of the Settlement, makes some further adjustment of the present position necessary.

The prosperity of Shanghai is dependent upon the maintenance of three institutions in a state of efficiency and security:

1. Municipal Council.
2. A River Conservancy.
3. The Maritime Customs.

If any of these institutions should pass into corrupt or inexperienced Chinese control, and be subject to Chinese political intrigue or intimidation the stability and credit of Shanghai would be seriously jeopardised.

It should also be pointed out that though this Memorandum deals with the problems of the International Settlement, any solution of the Shanghai problem must recognise the mutual interests and interdependence of the International Settlement and the French Concession adjacent thereto. The issues at stake in Shanghai are those of foreign interests as a whole. As already pointed out the pressure from Chinese in favour of changes in the status of Shanghai is practically entirely concentrated upon the International Settlement where British interests predominate and British responsibilities are greatest.

1. It is suggested that an alternative is to propose positive action in requesting the establishment here of a Special International Area—The Free Port of Shanghai.

   (a) With equitable Chinese representation on the Governing Council;

   (b) Guaranteed by International Garrison, pending such time as the Chinese Government have demonstrated their intention and ability to fulfil Treaty obligations, and provide the security and confidence which have hitherto been given in foreign administered areas.

2. Unless some positive construction action is proposed by foreign interests, the initiative remains with the Chinese who have proved themselves past masters in securing their aims by means which it is most difficult or impossible to resist through diplomatic channels.

3. It is further suggested that the temporary removal of the whole Shanghai area from Chinese political contention would:

(a) Assist in stabilising the general China situation and strengthen the hands of the moderate constructive elements.

(b) Make the question of future concessions to Chinese legitimate national aspirations dependent upon China effectively assuming the obligations of International equality, and would be a most effective way of bringing pressure to bear upon the Chinese to fulfil Treaty obligations.

4. It is further submitted that this proposal is in accordance with the defined policy of Great Britain and America towards China, inasmuch as it merely postpones the carrying out of their declared programme pending evidence of Chinese good faith and ability to assume the responsibilities of the position she demands. Meanwhile the Shanghai area would thus be removed from the maelstrom of Chinese political strife and would be an excellent training ground for Chinese to obtain municipal administrative experience with foreign co-operation by utilising the present municipal organisation or such modification thereof as experience may justify. When the defined programme of further concession to China could be proceeded with would then entirely depend upon Chinese demonstrating their ability to assume their responsibilities and giving evidence of their good faith.

5. The alternative to some such proposal as the above seems to place the Shanghai Municipal Council in the false position of unreasonably maintaining a "die-hard" position which as time passes must inevitably embitter existing relations between Chinese and foreign interests in Shanghai, which can only lead sooner or later to a crisis jeopardising the whole credit and prosperity of this Port. The responsibility for dealing with such a situation without adequate support from the Powers is manifestly unfair to Shanghai. A continued resistance by the Shanghai Municipal Council alone to further Chinese demands must have most serious and dangerous consequences. There is as yet no evidence whatsoever that Chinese insistence upon the immediate abolition of Concessions and Settlements will moderate. In fact, there is every indication of this insistence becoming greatly intensified in the near future.

NOTE: Representation of Army Expenditure in proportion to Gross Expenditure:

China 36 per cent., Japan 9 per cent., England 5 per cent., America 8 per cent., France 14 per cent.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 7553 1st Ind. PGT:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - June 29, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

For the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 5 1929
2055-672
WAR DEPARTMENT

June 29, 1929

Subject: Report on Travel in North China.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China.

1. This trip was taken with the following ideas in view: To gain some knowledge and experience of means of travel in China; to obtain general knowledge of the geography, topography, and conditions in North China, and to practice myself in the use of the language.

2. The route covered was as follows:

Peking-Tientsin-Pukow by rail.
Pukow -Nanking by river ferry.
Nanking-Shanghai by rail.
Shanghai-Chungking, return to Hankow, by water.
Hankow-Peking by rail.

This routing took me over the principal railroads of North China, and fourteen hundred miles up the Yangtze River; a total distance of approximately thirty-eight hundred miles. The elapsed time on the trip was one month.

3. Military. Generally, troops observed were not well equipped. The best equipped were those at Nanking, acting as guards in the vicinity of Sun Yat-sen's tomb. Their uniforms were well fitting and clean, and the rifles and bayonets were well kept. They were very courteous, apparently so instructed in view of the coming arrival of diplomats to attend the burial ceremonies of Sun Yat-sen.

Other troops observed were Wei I San's division, en route to Tsining. This division was composed largely of boys between seventeen and twenty. I estimate 70% had rifles and red paper umbrellas, the remaining carried beheading knives and umbrellas. About half had entrenching tools. All equipment appeared old and dirty.

At Chungking, I saw troops of Liu Shan on guard duty in the streets. Their equipment generally was similar to that of Wei I-san's division, mentioned above.

At Hankow, I heard that two German officers were supervising all instruction of troops. These officers were daily visiting outlying garrisons, supervising drills and conducting officers' schools, and were usually absent from Hankow headquarters eight or ten days on each trip. At Hankow, I talked to a young Chinese officer who is attending a physical culture school at Wuchang. Although in uniform, and classed as an army officer, he stated that on graduation, his only duties would be those of athletic instructor and physical director. He showed me his textbooks, which were illustrated. These books outlined exercises, with and without rifles and swords, roughly corresponding to our Butts Manual.

At Hankow, I visited the aviation field where a large brick hangar, capable of accommodating twelve planes, was nearing completion. Here I saw a Ryan (U.S .) monoplane, motored with Wright Whirlwind Engine. Originally there were five of these planes; two have crashed, two have been flown south during the recent Kwangsi trouble, and only this one remains. I also saw and rode in a Gypsy Moth training ship (De Haviland). Four of these ships had been ordered by the Hankow Chinese Chamber of Commerce for mail, and passenger service. The local military had requested the "loan" of these planes for use in threatened campaign to eliminate Feng Yu-hsiang. As the planes had been only half paid for at time of order, only half the number (two) have been delivered. I flew with Captain W. E. F. Jones, formerly an English army pilot, on one of the test flights prior to delivery of these two planes. Captain Jones is now airplane salesman for a large Shanghai firm. He is assembling the other two planes now on the premises of his firm's Hankow agency, which is in the concession area of Hankow, and will require payment of balance due before delivery. The Chamber of Commerce has refused to pay, due to the "loan" of ships to the government, but Capt. Jones has been in telegraphic communication with Nanking authorities, who promise prompt and complete payment.

Captain Jones further informed me that thirty-two Junkers all metal monoplanes had been delivered to Nationalist troops at Nanking, on or about May 25th, and that these were now being assembled, tested and delivered at Nanking by three German pilots and mechanics. Later in my trip, I saw two of these planes in a field at Chengchow, Honan. These had arrived from Nanking the first part of June. The planes were standing in the open, the engines, cockpits and propellers being protected from weather by heavy grass matting tied in place.

At Chengchow, I saw a mixed brigade of Han Fu-chu's division, entraining for departure to Kaifeng. These troops, formerly of Feng Yu-hsiang's First Army, were all equipped with rifles, with the exception of a 3" trench mortar battalion, which carried only pistols. These seemed to be the best disciplined of all troops observed. They remained

in ranks more than an hour while awaiting arrival of their trains. Apparently no straggling is permitted, for these troops were not even approached by the food peddlers, so numerous at railroad stations. The horses of this brigade were well groomed, appeared to be fit, and the leather was clean. The "boy soldier" was conspicuous by his absence, these troops all being men.

In my wanderings around Chengchow, I saw considerable drilling. In no case was instruction being given with rifles. Large beheading swords, similar to but larger than machetes, were being used, and the drill consisting of movements with these swords, which are designed for a cutting stroke rather than a thrust. I was impressed with the fact that these movements closely resembled those of actors in the battle scenes of the military plays of the Chinese theatres. This apparently was only recruit instruction, as many were not yet in uniform, and primarily for disciplinary purposes. Local missionaries informed me that there was considerable recruiting going on in central Honan. These missionaries further stated that although Han Fu-chu and Ma Hung-kuei claimed to have left Feng and acknowledged the authority of Nanking, nevertheless they insisted that they be given control of Honan and refused the offers of Nanking to send other troops into Honan.

4. Economic. Irrespective of present military uncertainty, "business as usual" goes on. All complain of high taxes and resulting increase in living expenses. As near as I discovered, likin is still in effect throughout the areas in which I travelled.

The area traversed by the Tientsin-Pukow line, in western Shantung and Kiangsu, showed promise of excellent crops. Other places generally expected normal yields, with the exception of Honan where the country appeared very dry and the crops poor. From Chengchow north, our train carried three cars, crowded with famine sufferers from western Honan and Shensi, who were being forwarded to Manchuria to settle newly opened lands along railroads recently built in that province.

5. Political. The outstanding impression I obtained relative to the political situation—the outstanding impression of the entire trip, in fact—was the prevailing indifference among all classes towards Nanking. Each local official was interested only in the affairs of his bailiwick. The local tupan was the man to patronize, he was the man to be looked to for appointment to official position and promotion, which is the height of Chinese personal ambition. And although the local tupans for the most part pretend allegiance to Nanking, it is apparently little beyond a "lip service". From what I could learn, very little of the revenues collected by local Chinese governmental agencies was despatched to Nanking. I was unable to get any accurate information,

as no one seemed willing to make any definite statements. It was apparently well known, and admitted as most probable, but nevertheless a matter to be avoided in conversation.

6. Bolshevism and Anti-Foreignism. Hankow, according to foreigners stationed there, is still under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda, although at present there is not much agitation. The general attitude of the ricksha boy and coolie type toward the foreigner is unfriendly, more so than any other place I visited. There is an atmosphere of tenseness in the relations between foreigners and Chinese, and one feels that with leadership, the Chinese could be easily inflamed to the point where trouble, similar to that experienced in 1927, would break forth.

7. Result of Trip. I feel that the purpose outlined in the first paragraph has been accomplished. A map of North China now brings to mind a picture of the topography and of the people. It is no longer merely a shoreline and inland area intersected by meridians and parallels. As to the language, I was easily able to make myself understood everywhere except in Shanghai, where the dialect is radically different from Peking. All along the Yangtze I found local differences of dialect, but they were slight. I feel that after a short residence in any of those places, I could understand and be understood as well as in Peking.

C. J. Kanaga

C. J. Kanaga
First Lieutenant, Field Artillery (DOL)

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

September 27, 1929

WAR DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 7602

Subject: Miscellaneous Notes from Nanking.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 28 1929

1. Reference our No. 7592, on the above subject, herewith is further material from the same source. In further identification of the source of this information, the writer is a protege of Foreign Minister C. T. Wang himself and is believed to be on intimate terms with him.

"Nanking, September 18. There is no hope of an immediate settlement of the Sino-Russian dispute. China is now forced to either declare war against Russia or to give in. Russia expressed the opinion in recent negotiations that she is unwilling to discuss the matter with a "Chiang Kai-shek government", that is unless Chiang goes she will not agree to any settlement. So Kai-shek will either declare war and force settlement or retire. Of course, if Kai-shek declares war against Russia he will have no chance at all. He will have to retire either way. Kai-shek is now trying to get round it, thinking that by replacing Dr. C. T. Wang Russia may agree to discuss the matter. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang has sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek recommending Dr. Wellington Koo for the post. I don't think Koo can get the job, but it is quite possible that Wang will be replaced. There is, of course, the possibility that Kai-shek will retire himself. Mr. Shao Li-tze, Chiang's personal secretary, has been talking about going abroad during the last few days. C. T. Wang's moves in the Sino-Russian case were quite good, trying to imitate the moves made by Turkey. Unfortunately, things did not come out to his expectations. At first, he hoped that MacDonald and Hoover would intervene. Then he fully expected Japan to rush troops into Manchuria, thus arousing the interest of the powers in the situation in Manchuria. But both London and Washington watched from the side-lines and did not take any action and Japan pretended to stay neutral in the dispute. C. T. Wang also made certain moves without consulting

the matter with Kai-shek. That also got Kai-shek's goat. However, I don't think anybody could have done better than what C. T. has accomplished."

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

4-1 2055-623 OCT 12 1929

September 14, 1929.

WAR DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 7592

Subject: Miscellaneous Notes From Nanking.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 12 1929

1. Following are some notes which were furnished me by a reliable foreign journalist with the remark, "Thought these rather piquant items from a Nanking source with which you are already acquainted might entertain you". The Nanking source is a well-known Chinese journalist who sends such confidential notes to his friend not to be published, but to be used as background. Obviously some of the items have not been verified, but the writer has intimate sources of information and generally gives sound indications of events.

"Nanking, August 31. It is now confirmed that the Kuominchun troops are coming out from the North-West. Recently they sent a telegram to General Lu Chung-lin, Mr. Y. L. Tong and General Hsiung Pin—the three are Kuominchun men—asking them to return at once to the North-West. In this telegram the Kuominchun leaders in the North-West declared that the Kuominchun troops were starving, having no food supplies. These Kuominchun leaders stated that they were willing to die fighting rather than to die starving. So they are coming out for war.

"The 'reorganization clique' is gaining force. Political atmosphere here very pessimistic. The new clique aims to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and to ask Wang Ching-wei to come back.

"In connection with the above it is interesting to note that Mr. Tong and General Hsiung are already in Shansi, while tonight's (Sept. 1) despatches state that General Lu has finally been given permission to proceed to the North-West.

"Nanking, September 5. By telegraphic instructions from Chiang Kai-shek, two German advisers left Nanking on the afternoon of September 4 for Hankow. One is adviser to artillery corps, and another to engineering corps. It is understood here that Sun Liang-cheng's troops have already passed Loyang.

"Nanking, September 6. Reported from various sources Madame Chiang Kai-shek has started divorce proceedings. Trouble started when Chiang Kai-shek wanted to examine her correspondence, especially her letters to Madame Sun Yat-sen, who is at present in Tsingtao. Madame Sun is dead against Chiang Kai-shek. It is said that in her letters to Madame Sun Madame Chiang made unpleasant statements about Chiang and gave out some valuable information. Madame Chiang went to Shanghai and refused to come back. When Chiang Kai-shek was in Shanghai, the two quarrelled and Chiang in one or two instances threatened to kill his wife. She is now said to be asking for $20,000,000.

"Mr. and Mrs. Kao Ying will probably be sentenced to from 2 to 3 years' hard labor."

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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2055-674

Peiping, China
December 11, 1930

WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: Conditions in North Shansi and Suiyuan

To : The Military Attache, Peiping, China

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 16 1931

The following observations relative to military conditions in Suiyuan Province were made during a recent trip to that province to assist in effecting the rescue of two lady missionaries, one British and one American, who had been attacked and robbed by bandits at a point about twenty miles west of Paotowchen, the western terminus of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway.

Upon the receipt of information relative to the robbery, Mr. Findlay Andrew, a member of the China Inland Mission, now working with a famine relief organization, went to the British and American Legations, volunteering to go after the ladies providing the Legations would detail one representative from each to accompany him, thus putting the negotiations on an official basis. Lacking such basis, Mr. Andrew was highly skeptical of the willingness of the Chinese officials to exert themselves to effect such a rescue. The Legations promptly agreed, asked Mr. Andrew to go, and appointed Captain Stables, British Language Officer, and myself from the American Legation. Our mission primarily was to bring about the rescue of the ladies and to take them to safety. Captain Stables and I were being sent on Legation business first, but each of us received from our immediate superiors, the respective Military Attaches, instructions to make such study of local conditions, troop dispositions, military organization, et cetera, as we could accomplish in addition.

My itinerary was as follows:

Left Peiping	12:00 noon	November 30
Arr. Tatungfu	4:50 a.m.	December 1
Left Tatungfu	4:50 a.m.	December 2
Arr. Kweihua	5:30 p.m.	December 2
Left Kweihua	2:30 p.m.	December 5
Arr. Peiping	4:10 p.m.	December 6

Captain Stables and Mr. Andrew, accompanied by Dr. Kao Chin-cheng, a Chinese member of the China Inland Mission staff, left Peiping on the same train with me, proceeding directly to Paotowchen, arriving there about 7:00 p.m. December 1, leaving there in company with the rescued ladies at 7:00 a.m. December 5, and reaching Peiping at 4:10 p.m. December 6, on the same train on which I returned.

Due to receipt of telegraphic instructions en route, I stopped first at Tatung, in north Shansi, and then at Kweihua, the capital of the province of Suiyuan, to gain contact with the provincial, civil and military officials and work with them at that point, while Captain Stables and Mr. Andrew were cooperating with the local authorities at Paotowchen. I was constantly in telegraphic communication with Captain Stables at Paotowchen and with the American Legation at Peiping.

On Wednesday, December 3, the ladies were brought into Paotowchen by a Chinese escort which had left early that morning, as a result of the joint representations of the British and American Legations. Consequently, there was no need for me to proceed to Paotowchen, and I instead busied myself with making arrangements with the railroad headquarters at Kweihua for the dispatch of a first-class car to Paotowchen to bring the ladies back on Friday, December 5. This was necessary in view of the illness of one of the ladies, and in view of the fact that ordinarily no first-class cars were provided to the west of Kweihua.

7900

Consequently, I did not get to Paotowchen, and was not able to observe personally the conditions existing there. From conversations with Captain Stables, while en route returning to Peiping, and subsequently, I perceive that conditions at Paotowchen differed to a considerable extent from those pertaining at Kweihua and in northern Shansi. For this reason I am attaching to this report certain selected paragraphs from his report to his Legation, which he has kindly furnished me and authorized my using.

My first stop was at Tatung, the principal city north of the important Yen Men Kuan Pass in northern Shansi. I had been instructed to get in touch with Ch'u Hsi-ch'un, the Shansi general in command of that area, with the view to requesting his assistance. On arriving at the depot, I first inquired of the station master whether or not Ch'u Hsi-ch'un was still at Tatungfu, and was informed that he was there. At daylight I proceeded to the city, a mile and a half from the station, and at about nine o'clock went to the military headquarters to call on General Ch'u. I was informed that he had left about thirty-six hours earlier by motor for Taiyuan, en route to Niangtzekuan, the pass in central Shansi, through which the Shihchiachuang - Taiyuan (Cheng - Tai) Railway runs. The district magistrate of Tatung, who gave me this information, reported further that the troops making up his command had already preceeded him there. The magistrate was unable to give me the numerical designations of the divisions, brigades, regiments, etc., and claimed that all such designations were now undergoing change due to the reorganization of the Shansi troops. Tatungfu, he further reported, was to be occupied by General Fu Tso-yi, whose advance detachment consisting of two regiments of infantry was then arriving, by marching from the south. General Fu himself was expected within three or four days.

Conversations with local Chinese merchants and with other Chinese in the city and at railroad station confirmed the above, but no further details as to number of troops expected, their designations, character or composition were available.

Among the people here there was noticeable a marked change in attitude towards Yen Hsi-shan. A year ago, on my previous visit, he was immensely popular -- now all are glad to see him go. This is partly due to his defeat, but also to two other factors, namely, his alliance with Feng Yu-hsiang and his imposition of the heavy taxes necessary to carry on the recent rebellion against Nanking. There seems to be no active hatred against the Shansi soldier, who normally is a pleasant, soft-mannered type of individual, but rather has Yen himself become the butt of all the dislike.

Leaving Tatungfu on the first available train I proceeded to Kweihua, the capital of Suiyuan province, to get in touch with Li P'ei-chi, the chairman of the provincial government. The troops in Suiyuan are commanded by General Chao Ch'eng-hsiu, who was formerly Yen Hsi-shan's cavalry commander. Rumors to the effect that Fu Tso-yi would come along from Tatung into the province of Suiyuan existed.

At the time of my arrival, Kweihua was garrisoned by the so-called tenth cavalry division under a General Li, given name not known. This division was reported as composed of five cavalry regiments, the 3rd, 9th, 13th, 14th and 15th. This division was expecting relief to enable it to be sent west along the railroad to do bandit suppression work, for which cavalry is more suitable than infantry. The following morning, December 3, two regiments of infantry arrived, and were garrisoned in several of the seventy-two lama temples of Kweihua. Along with them came a large part of the staff of the 28th Infantry Division, which moved into the hotel where I was staying. All other guests at this hotel were

ousted to make room for General Miao, the division commander, and his staff, but I was allowed to remain. On the 4th, General Miao himself arrived and went directly to report to Li P'ei-chi, the provincial commander, not returning to the hotel during my stay. One of his staff officers told me that the division consisted of six infantry regiments, but as the division was undergoing the process of reorganization, no numerical designations had yet been assigned the regiments, all of which were made up from parts of other regiments. Such troops as I saw were warmly dressed in the heavy cotton quilted grey uniforms and were wearing fur caps. Few appeared on the streets either in Tatung or Kweihua, and in neither place did the merchants or people evince a violent dislike to the soldier. However, in Kweihua, I was "protected" by two officers of the military police, who were with me from morning until night, who accompanied me everywhere and could only be persuaded to leave by my giving them theater tickets, etc., and notifying them of my desire to turn in. I do not believe they were particularly intent on keeping track of my movements so much as that they had a natural curiosity to see how a foreigner behaved. These men were perfectly willing to talk about any military subject and did so without reserve, but were woefully ignorant of their own organization and dispositions.

Throughout Suiyuan, banditry is rife. The bandits are largely deserted soldiers, but many are local bullies who have obtained arms and turned to robbing as a means of livelihood. Kweihua and Tatung were not much bothered, although it was reported that about six months before a force numbering several thousands had appeared south of Kweihua and moved near enough to cause alarm among the inhabitants. Outside of these larger walled cities, however, the bandits have things pretty much their own way and so far have met little opposition. Troops must be detailed to protect all goods shipments, and these troops must be fed and paid, so trade is considerably hampered. A large share of the food supply comes in by the railroad from the east, some from as far as Peiping, but this is expensive, too, due to the fact that five taxes are collected, the first at Kalgan, again at Tatung, and three taxes at Kweihua itself. Food and other necessaries are very expensive, which in conjunction with the depreciation of Shansi currency, is causing some distress. However, crops were reported fair, and so with the putting down of banditry, enabling the goods to move within the province, conditions will improve.

Kweihua is an important center of the opium industry in North China. Opium pipes and lamps were on sale everywhere, and opium is bought openly and cheaply. It was almost cheaper to smoke opium than imported cigarettes, subject to heavy taxation.

In this area railroad trains, whether freight or passenger, never move without an armed guard of from forty to a hundred troops. Almost daily bandit groups appear at one station or another. Immediately after the arrival of my train at Sanchakou, bandits appeared on the crest of a hill not more than two hundred yards from the station. Our guards spotted them at once, and jumping from the train took up a formation along the side preparatory to resisting an attack. This seemed to be all the bandits wanted to know, so they stood peaceably on the hill top and waited until the goods on the train were unloaded, after which our soldiers got back on their cars, and the train moved out. Not a shot was fired. The next day bandits appeared at another station, and on the return trip the train was delayed two hours at a small village between Paotowchen and Kweihua to allow investigation of reports that a large body of bandits was near the next station.

According to Dr. Kao Chin-cheng, a member of our party, and one well-informed on the conditions and politics of that particular locality, the seriousness of the banditry is increasing. This disturbed condition he claims is a protest against Shansi control and an attempt to discredit

the Shansi administration. The change to Fengtien control seems to be greatly desired. At Paotowchen, where banditry is most serious, he states all will become quiet at once if one Wang Ying, former local bandit chief, is brought back from Mukden and given an official position.

In summary, Shansi and Suiyuan are under the control of the old Shansi group who are daily becoming more unpopular, and there is widespread demand for Fengtien to take over the area; banditry is rife, and will be difficult to suppress, even along the railroad where troops are most easily moved. Fengtien, however, is holding to its original agreement with Yen Hsi-shan and has dispatched no troops beyond the Chihli (Hopei) border, and so far has indicated no desire to extend its control to those provinces. Whether or not the seriousness of the bandit situation and the demand for Fengtien intervention will move Mukden to occupy this area is yet uncertain, but the situation probably will eventually result in such a move. This occupation may meet the resistance of the remaining Shansi military group, but their strength to cope with it is not believed sufficient to block a determined effort on the part of Mukden.

Clarence J. Kanaga

CJK/edb

Clarence J. Kanaga
First Lieutenant, Field Artillery, D. O. L.

No. 7900. 1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, December 12, 1930. To: The A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded. Lieutenant Kanaga is to be highly commended for handling a delicate situation with tact and good judgment, as indicated by the success of his mission.

N E Margetts

NEM/edb

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY I.D.
1931
JAN 17
2055-674
WAR DEPARTMENT

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[redacted]

[redacted]

An expedition composed of Captain Stahlec of the British Legation, Peiping, Lieutenant Kanaga of the American Legation, Peiping, Captain Stahlec's orderly, and G. Findlay Andrew of the Chinese Maritime Customs left Peiping on the same train on Monday, November 30, using orders for Fengtai, Hopeh, to escape all possible curiosity on the part of [redacted] who had been reported as having been robbed and taken by bandits, some twenty miles west of Fengtai, which is reached and taken by train from Lungkuo, Hopeh. Mrs. Hayward was travelling to Peiping for the purpose of obtaining surgical aid, Miss Swarzell, a trained nurse, accompanying her.

On arrival at Kalgan on Sunday morning, a wire from the American Legation, Peiping, reached the expedition advising Lieutenant Kanaga to visit General Ch'ih Hsi Ch'uan ( ) at Tatungfu, to which aid in the rescue of the two ladies. Consequently, Lieutenant Kanaga left the train at Tatungfu during the early hours of the 1st inst. and Captain Stahlec with G. Findlay Andrew proceeded to Fengtai where they arrived at 8:30 on the morning of the same day. At Kueihua, the provincial capital of Suiyuan, two orderlies, who had been specially detailed for the service by Chairman Li Peh Ch'i of the Suiyuan Province, joined them.

From the railway station at Fengtai to the city is a distance of approximately three miles, and, owing to the acute state of the brigand menace, after dark it is only possible to accomplish this short journey with considerable military escort. Hence the expedition found a military and police armed guard awaiting them at the station, which guard escorted them into the city. On arrival there the expedition met Mr. T. Oberg, a Swedish national, who had come in from Saratsi the previous day to ponder what assistance was possible to the distressed ladies. From him they learned that the ladies had been robbed within twelve miles of Fengtai on the 25th of November by a large band of so-called brigands, after which they had managed to get in touch again with their Mongol escort who had been accompanying them at the time of the robbery, and that the said Mongol escort, after repulsing a second attack of the brigands, was still holding the ladies in a village some twenty miles west of Fengtai. In the meantime a large band of brigands (reported as many as four thousand and certainly numbering thousands) was gathering seven miles west of Fengtai, between the ladies and the city, with the avowed intent of capturing them. On the representations of Mr. T. Oberg, who proved indefatigable in his efforts, backed by the machinery set in motion as a result of the British and American Legation wires sent out on November 29th, a body of cavalry numbering 250 was sent out on the morning of the 1st inst. with orders to get in touch with the ladies and if possible to bring them into the city. These troops were the celebrated "Black Cavalry", composed almost entirely of local men who know the district well and have the reputation of being the only troops in the district who are able to cope the brigands.

Captain Stahlec and G. Findlay Andrew took the first opportunity on the morning of Tuesday, the 2nd inst., to call on the Garrison Commander, General P'eng Ti Pin ( ) requesting instant and effective action. The General deputed his Chief of Staff to negotiate with the expedition and through him expressed his inability to do anything further. On the afternoon of the 2nd inst. Lieutenant Kanaga arrived in Kueihua from Tatungfu and his energetic representations to Chairman Li Peh Ch'i evidently brought extra pressure to bear on the situation

[illegible] for on the afternoon of that same day a distinct change was [illegible] the attitude of General P'eng toward the whole question. [illegible] to deal with the matter became more marked. To [illegible] Mr. [illegible] the Mission, who had [illegible] mainly through the officers of [illegible] unit in [illegible] Chang Chin Ch'uan, the expedition from Peiping, [illegible] the [illegible] Regiment of the [illegible] ( ) commanded [illegible] of the Third Army. Major Chang, who volunteered to render all possible assistance, was detailed by General P'eng to deal with the situation and immediately evolved a plan of campaign in consultation with the members of the expedition. Major Chang's interest and willingness to aid stood out in strong contrast to General P'eng's apathy.

The main problem to be solved was in connection with the large band of brigands holding a village seven miles west of the city, right on the main road, with the intention of blocking the "Black Cavalry" when they endeavored to bring the ladies into the city. The local officials insisted on their inability to furnish any motor transport, the expedition was forced to negotiate the hire of four motors, and it was only after considerable trouble that the necessary number was procured. On the morning of the 3rd inst., however, the drivers wished a complaint to the expedition that the General's headquarters had levied five dollars from the agreed payment of fifty dollars for each car. Finally, at 7:30 a.m. on the 3rd inst., one hundred cavalry of Major Chang's command left the city for the west, followed an hour later by the four motors packed with forty armed soldiers and accompanied by Major Chang and Dr. Millington Mao, both of whom expressed their determination not to return to the city without the ladies. In deference to the insistent demands of the Chinese officials, neither Captain Stables, G. Finlay Andrew nor T. Oberg accompanied the outgoing troops, though the expedition made it clear to the authorities that they reserved the right of whatever future action they felt advisable should the official plan fail.

The cavalry accompanying the motors had orders to clear the seven mile village and then to hold it against any possible counter attacks of the brigands, whilst the motors made a dash through with the object of getting the ladies and bringing them in. On the approach of the cavalry and motors the bandits who were holding the seven mile village evacuated after firing a few shots and took to the hills, where they remained for the rest of the day, watching developments. In the meanwhile the body of "Black Cavalry" sent out on the 1st inst. had got through to the village of Yang Chia T'ai and had there got in touch with the Mongols who were holding the ladies. These Mongols were suspicious of the "Black Cavalry" who requested the ladies be handed over to them, and refused to comply with the request, finally agreeing to accompany the cavalry to the city, bringing the ladies with them. Consequently the ladies were mounted on camels and accompanied by their Mongol guards and the "Black Cavalry" sent out to effect their release, set out for the city. The motors met them at the exact spot where they had been robbed by the bandits on the 25th of November. The ladies were taken into the motors and brought into the city, arriving at the Mission Compound at 11:30 on the morning of the 3rd inst. The measures taken for the ladies' release also enabled about one thousand Chinese travellers or merchants, who had been either robbed and held by the brigands or prevented from continuing their journey, to gain the safety of the city.

The ladies both showed signs of having undergone very considerable strain and hardship, having been robbed of even the clothes they were wearing, and been forced to subsist on insufficient food; yet, nevertheless, they were in good spirits. They reported having been held by the Mongol escort in various places since the time of the robbery, ever in constant dread of capture by the increasing number of brigands intent on taking them. Had the assistance which came as a result of the prompt

[illegible] unless they were delayed, either their orders by the brigade [illegible] or they would have been taken by their longer [illegible] the value of respects for their greater seniority, in either of which events the work of my rather party would have been very much more complicated and lengthy.

For purposes of future reference the expedition desires to place on record that in spite of [illegible] the president any were any financial obligations left unliquidated.

Recommendations.

The expedition requests the Legation to bring to the notice of the Chinese Minister in China the services of Mr. T. Chang, whose willing and energetic work did much toward the successful issue. The expedition also requests the Legation to bring to the notice of his superiors (Chairman Chang Chun of Shensi, Chairman Li Yuh Ch'i of Kalgan, and General Chao Ch'eng Shou of Suiyuan) the exceptional assistance rendered by Major Chang Ching Ch'uan ( ). The expedition would also appreciate any action the Legation could take in recommending Dr. J. Billington Lee to the authorities of the Peiping Union Medical College, where he is just entering on a six months fellowship, hoping that such a recommendation will result in him being accorded some preferential privileges in view of his wholehearted assistance in connection with the above mission.

Respectfully submitted,

C. Finlay Andrew
China Inland Mission

F. H. A. Stables
Captain, British Army

C. J. Kanga
1st Lieutenant, U. S. Army

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 23 1930
2055-674
WAR DEPARTMENT

Peiping, China
March 20, 1930

Subject: Observations at Nanking.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 22 1930

While in Nanking, awaiting authority to return to Hsüchowfu as military observer, I heard the following items of interest:

1. Relative to Mr. Bert Hall, Air Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. Hall, an American citizen by birth but now a naturalized citizen of France, has been serving for several months as air adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. He was a member of the Lafayette Escadrille during the World War, and since then has been the typical "soldier of fortune", always as an airplane pilot. He was in Southern Europe in the Balkan countries just prior to his coming to China, I was informed.

His salary is $750.00 Mex. a month, but his income is believed to be considerably larger due to the assistance he renders the Nanking government in negotiations for the purchase of planes and supplies for same. He has the rank of a general officer, but is not directly in command of any troops or air units. He assists in drawing up training schedules for the flying schools, and is to give instruction personally in bombing, aerial gunnery and acrobatics. It was reported to me by his personal acquaintances that undoubtedly he would fly himself and do bombing in the forthcoming campaign, especially so since so far he had been too busy in other lines of work to have trained anyone else to do the bombing. In this connection, he is also to be given a bonus for combat flying. It is rumored that prior to the commencing of this campaign, Feng Yu-hsiang wired him an offer of a thousand dollars Mex. a day for such combat flying, but that Feng was outbid by the Nanking group, who desired to retain his services.

Although Mr. Hall was originally an American citizen, he apparently is antagonistic to the efforts of American airplane salesmen to close deals with the Nanking government. Prior to the closing of the contract between Mr. L. E. Gale, the representative of the Vought-Corsair Airplane Co., and the Nanking government, at a price of thirty thousand U.S. dollars per plane, Mr. Hall is reported to have notified Nanking that he could get them the same plane at eighteen thousand each. As Mr. L. E. Gale is the sole agent, Mr. Hall's alleged claims were impossible of fulfilment. My informers say it was only a scheme to block the purchase of the American planes, in the hope that he and some members of the purchasing bureau could place another order with another company, most likely not American, from which transaction Hall and the others would benefit financially.

2. Attitude of German Advisers.

I talked with Colonel Wentz, formerly of the German army, and now one of the group of advisers and drill masters in the employ of the Central Government. He says there are approximately eighty former German officers now with Nanking, about ten of this number functioning as staff officers, the remainder attached to various divisions as drill masters,

and as instructors in schools for officers. He says on the whole they are very much dissatisfied with their work and the results. They draw up training schedules and plans and no sooner is the training started than it meets interference. For instance, he and several other artillerymen among the group had spent considerable time and effort on the organization and equipment of an artillery regiment, the men had been more or less hand-picked, and it had been promised that they could carry out the training program to completion. However, after less than a week of drill, the regiment was taken out of their hands and sent up towards Hsüchowfu . Colonel Wentz and the other instructors were left behind in Nanking with nothing to do. He says this is not an isolated instance, and that many are discouraged and feel quite hopeless about the possibility of accomplishing anything. If there should come a long period of peace, some training schedules might be carried out, but none of them feel that they can hope for such in the near future. He said he was seriously considering resigning.

C. J. Kanaga
C. J. Kanaga,
1st Lieutenant, F.A.

No. 7703 1st Ind. NEM/elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China - April 14, 1930 - To: The A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Forwarded.

J. Mac McGregor,
for Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 23 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

Peiping, China, March 20, 1930

Subject: Report of Trip to Hsüchowfu.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 22 1930

1. The following report on my trip to Hsüchowfu, Kiangsu, is herewith submitted.

2. My instructions were to proceed to Hsüchowfu, the junction point of the Tientsin-Pukow and Lunghai railroads. Here I was to observe military activities in connection with suppressing the revolt of Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. These instructions allowed me freedom of action to move with or behind Chiang Kai-shek's troops in their threatened drive north towards Tientsin or west towards Chengchow. In case I was refused permission to observe troops in the field, I was to remain at the rear and make such observations as I could relative to staff functioning, the supply system, the communications, hospitalization, air organization, troop training and morale.

3. On arriving at Hsüchowfu, I learned that the city was being occupied by the 52nd Division under Yeh Kai-hsing, which was then in the process of arriving. Several divisions had already moved west along the Lunghai towards Kweitehfu and Mamutsi, the number of troops in that area being estimated at about ninety thousand, and made up of infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade and about six regiments of light field artillery. The headquarters of Liu Chih, in command of the Second Route Army, had been already installed, and was occupying offices in the local barracks.

4. Although troops were stationed along the Lunghai, it was not known whether the main effort would develop to the north in a move on Tientsin, or to the west against the Yen Hsi-shan—Feng Yu-hsiang combination, then being concentrated along the Peking-Hankow railroad.

5. I arrived at Hsüchowfu February 25, about midnight. On the way south, I had encountered no troop movements of any kind, although before my departure from Peiping, there had been rumors of troop movements from eastern Shantung towards Tsinan, and from there to the south.

6. The next day I spent in moving from the little hotel outside the city walls to the larger hotel in the center of the city, and in calling on the local agents (Chinese) of the British-American Tobacco Company and the Standard Oil Company of New York to make contacts and arrange for funds and telegraphic facilities and to find out local conditions. I also rode through a large part of the city to observe billeting areas and to get general impressions of troops. At this time I noted locations of military hospitals, wireless stations, barracks, buildings used as headquarters by ordnance, quartermaster, staff and military police. Later on I called at General Headquarters to pay my respects to Liu Chih, the commanding officer of the Second Route Army—that responsible for the defense of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway area. I was notified that I must call the next day at noon. The evening I spent in conversation with Chinese officers around the restaurant and at the railroad station watching the arrival and debarkation of remaining units of the 52nd Division.

7. The following morning, the 27th, I went to call on the missionaries of the Presbyterian Mission to discuss with them the local situation, and from there to General Headquarters to pay respects to General Liu Chih, as per instructions of previous day. I presented my credentials to Col. Han, Deputy Chief of Staff, by whom I was questioned most thoroughly as to my plans and desires. He then delivered the information to General Liu Chih, and returned after about half an hour with the following information. General Liu Chih could not grant authority for me to remain in Hsüchowfu, due to great danger to which I would be exposed in fighting which they anticipated would begin within a week or ten days or maybe sooner. However, I could go to Nanking or telegraph there for such authority. They strongly recommended that I go, believing in that way that such authorization could be expedited. As Nanking was just ten hours away by train and our Minister, Mr. Johnson, was there, I decided to go rather than telegraph, expecting to be able to return to Hsüchowfu in three or four days at the latest, and notified Colonel Han accordingly. I then returned to my hotel where I wrote up report to date, and prepared for departure for Nanking. About six p.m. I was called on by Colonel Han and Colonel Peng, the local commandant of Military Police. They invited me to dinner with twelve other officers of Liu Chih's staff, at which dinner I remained until train time.

8. On arrival at Nanking I reported immediately to Mr. Johnson, and negotiations were started immediately through the Foreign Office, Apparently matters were moving smoothly and I was informed that authority for my return would be granted and that papers to that effect were being prepared. After I had waited four days, Mr. Johnson departed for Shanghai. The following day, I went to Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters to request information as to date when papers would be ready. I was informed that authority could not be granted at present, and that letter to that effect was in the mail to our Minister, by way of Foreign Office. Within a week or two I <u>might</u> be permitted to go, according to Colonel Wu, officer on Chiang Kai-shek's staff. I telegraphed Peking this news, and was ordered to Peking at once.

9. I was in Hsüchowfu forty-eight hours, during which time it rained constantly. The soil is clay and the mud was too deep for troops to drill or for newly arrived troops to go into camp. For same reason, the air field outside the city several miles could not be visited. Rickshas could not make the trip and roads were not even navigable for such automobiles as could be obtained. Hence my observations were limited, but such information as was obtained is as follows:

<u>Staff Work:</u> The staff of the 52nd Division moved into my hotel within a few hours of my arrival. All unoccupied rooms were taken, and tables were set up in the halls for laying out of maps. Field telephone lines were at once installed connecting Division Headquarters with General Liu Chih's headquarters; with other units of the Division, and with nearby radio station. Orderlies spread their bedding and slept in the hall, and added greatly to the noise and confusion. One room was occupied by a Col. Reibel, a German adviser. The courtyard was the scene of the continued coming and going of cars carrying staff officers, and of mounted orderlies. I talked to hotel boys, who told me the rooms were not being used as offices, but only as sleeping quarters. This was borne out by the fact that "sing song" girls were on hand in abundance. There was more the atmosphere of a drummers' convention than that of a military headquarters. This may have been due to the reported fact that this division was here only temporarily, and was expecting orders to move west towards Mamutsi at any time. Apparently no attempt was made to organize the staff here.

Supply: Troop trains were mostly the coal car type—high walls, but no roofs. Each train of thirty or forty cars had about three roofed cars in which the flour and ammunition was stored. Apparently no other food supplies were being carried, and such other articles as were necessary were to be obtained locally. No forage for the animals was brought; it also was to be found locally. When a train arrived, a sufficient number of the ever present two-wheeled carts and pack mules were loaded by details of troops, and supplies were immediately moved off to cover in area in which troops were to be billeted. Each train load that I saw arrive carried all food and ammunition in these two or three cars. During the time I was at Hsüchowfu, no trains arrived carrying supplies only. Apparently the distribution of supplies for a short period had been made prior to departure north. Although I passed the houses marked "Quartermaster Supply Depot" and "Ordnance Department" several times, at no time did I see supplies entering or leaving those places. Company officers with whom I talked said they had brought enough flour for the present, and seemed unconcerned about the future. They said they didn't know where the warehouses or depots were, and didn't know whether supplies were already here in storage or would come later.

Hospitalization: There were about twelve buildings—inns or hotels, that were labelled hospitals. About half of these bore the Chinese characters reading "606" and were especially used for treating venereal disease. The doctors at the mission had visited some of the hospitals and said they were dirty and poorly equipped, and would be woefully inadequate to handle even a limited number of casualties. These doctors also stated that venereal disease was very prevalent among the troops, and that the "606" hospitals were for treating active cases and were not prophylaxis stations.

Communications: The principal streets were strung with many lines belonging to the occupying troops. In some cases eighteen or twenty lines paralleled each other. All were insulated, but cloth insulation was all of the same color. The lines were not tagged and in case of break of several lines at the same point, great difficulty would have been experienced in rejoining them properly. The lines were knotted at intervals of twenty feet, nails being inserted in the knots to allow affixing to poles, walls of adjacent buildings, or other supports. All lines were strung about twelve feet off the ground and were stretched fairly tight. I saw no switchboards in the hotel, nor in other buildings visited, but was told that regimental headquarters were supplied with them. The net was said to include battalion headquarters, but not to go to the companies.

Air Organization: From conversation with staff officers of Liu Chih, and with Major Wong, in command of the local field, I learned that east of Hsüchowfu about two miles there was a large landing field, where temporary hangars had been erected. At present only five planes were there—two Junkers four passenger all-metal monoplanes, and three sport type two passenger Moth (De Haviland) biplanes. All were equipped with bomb-racks. Up to the time the heavy rains set in these planes had been flying west along the Lunghai Railway in observation, and back and forth between Hsüchowfu and Nanking carrying messages. All were flown by Chinese pilots, but every two or three days, Mr. Bert Hall, the American, now naturalized French, flew from Nanking to Hsüchowfu to direct the organization of the field. Mr. Hall is the air adviser on Chiang Kai-shek's staff, and was formerly a member of the Lafayette Escadrille. Before I left Hsüchowfu I was informed that one of the Junkers had been wrecked near Mamutsi, while trying to take off to return to Hsüchowfu.

The wheels had begged down in the mud, and the plane had just nosed over. The Central Government claimed to have sixty planes at Nanking which could be sent up on demand. This number is believed to be excessive. Report on Mr. Bert Hall's activities and of visit to Nanking air field will be submitted separately. Major Wong, who talked to me, had never done any bombing or fighting in the air, although he had been flying with various Chinese armies for nearly eight years. All his work had been observation. Of the pilots under his control, none had had more than a year or two of flying experience, all of which was observation only. He reported that Mr. Hall was going to come up as soon as the weather cleared, and start training in bombing and attack, and that machine guns would be mounted on the planes for the latter.

Troop Training: In my rides and walks through the town, I saw small groups of recruits at drill—mostly marching (the goose step); doing saber exercises, performed with the large knives so commonly found in the equipment of Chinese troops, and some callisthenics. No artillery or cavalry drill was observed, none of such troops having been detrained at Hsüchowfu. I saw about two platoons of Yeh Kai-hsing's bodyguard doing the manual of arms in the courtyard of the hotel during the interval between the rains. This drill was well conducted and showed evidences of fairly good training. These, however, were bodyguard troops, the drill was being conducted almost under the eye of the Division commander, and cannot be considered an average example. Although recruit training was proceeding during the rain, none of the older troops were being given training, as far as I could learn.

Callisthenics: Callisthenics has become quite a hobby with the Central Government troops. At the dinner party I attended with the staff officers, I was told that they themselves would have to turn out the next morning, rain or shine, at four o'clock for a half hour of such work. I did see the bodyguard troops being given callisthenics before daylight in the hotel courtyard, but am somewhat skeptical about the participation of the staff officers. At this party, all were taking their turns with the opium pipe, and although apparently in moderation, I nevertheless doubt their willingness to arise at four, or any discipline of sufficient severity to bring them out against their will.

Equipment: The 52nd Division was better and more uniformly equipped than any other Chinese troops I have seen. About forty per cent were equipped with Thompson automatics of 6.5 mm caliber, air cooled; the remaining troops with Mausers 7.9 mm caliber. They carried a square pack with a grey blanket folded around it. The pack was slung high on the back by a harness attachment which also supported the cartridge belt. The uniforms were of heavily padded quilted cotton, the caps had oil cloth cap covers, and all were wearing thin rubber overshoes. The Thompson automatics were equipped with brass muzzle caps to keep the rain out of the barrels, but a wad of oiled cloth inserted in the muzzle was the only protection for the Mausers of the bodyguard troops which I saw stacked in the courtyard of my hotel. These rifles were left in the rain while the troops took shelter in the adjacent sheds. There were few signs of the red paper umbrellas, tea pots, lanterns, etc., with which I have seen Chinese troops laden on previous occasions.

Morale: My limited time in Hsüchowfu gave me little time to talk to the individual soldier, hence my impressions as to morale were from contact with captains, major and colonels in command of troops, and from talking with staff officers. In every case, they were confident of

success. However, so far there had been no fighting or discomfort except that brought about by the bad weather. The day before my arrival, General Liu Chih had assembled all the officers and delivered a speech telling them why they were fighting, and apparently had succeeded in imbuing a spirit of indignation towards the defection of Yen and Feng from allegiance to the Nanking government. At the time of my talk with them, this made up the burden of their conversation.

As a result of this trip, the following general impressions are recorded:

Certain troops are better equipped now than in the past; military communications have developed somewhat but not to the point where they are efficient or dependable; hospitalization and care of wounded are far from satisfactory; the different uses and employment of aircraft are not properly appreciated; and there is as yet no aroused public feeling of patriotism or devotion to a cause. It is to be a war of personal ambitions; each general leading his personal following, and aligning himself with the group from whom he can expect the greatest rewards.

C. J. Kanaga

C. J. Kanaga,
1st Lieutenant, F.A. (DOL)

elh

No. 7702 1st Ind. NEM/elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China - April 14, 1930 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 25 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 7613 1st Ind. JM:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, October 26, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Forwa rded.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 23 1929

John Magruder
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 25 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

4-1 2055-2-674

October 25, 1929

Subject: Trip to Shansi.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China.

Between October 1 and 17, 1929, I made a trip to Shansi and Suiyuan, during which I visited the following places: Taiyuanfu, the capital of the province, Fenchoufu, Wutaishan, Tatungfu and Kalgan. Herewith are submitted some general observations resulting from my rather hurried travels.

Shansi, the province of Yen Hsi-shan, is undoubtedly the best governed and most stable of China. For eighteen years——ever since the overthrow of the Ch'ing Dynasty——it has escaped the turmoil and devastation of civil war and has developed into a conservatively progressive community. The revolution which China is undergoing has not missed Shansi. It is not a secluded section which has been uninfluenced by the ideas which have spread through the Middle Kingdom. It however has avoided the violent radicalism, and its revolution has been one of constructive development.

This condition, most unusual in the history of revolutions, is due largely to the personality of the leader. Yen Hsi-shan has never been inordinately ambitious. He has been content to govern one province and has done that work exceptionally well. At present it might appear that his policy is changing, that he is branching out and becoming too much interested in national politics. I believe, however, that this is more due to his realization of the shortcomings of those in control of national affairs than a desire to find himself a place in the sun. Whether he is big enough for the work is a matter yet to be demonstrated, but his province has confidence in him, and will support him——at the start at least.

Shansi differs from the other provinces in two very important respects. These are the steady construction and maintenance of its communications, and the lack of banditry. These conditions are particularly notable in that geographically neither is to be expected. The province is mountainous, so roads are difficult and expensive to build. As to banditry, mountainous areas usually encourage it by offering hiding places, and because such land, being difficult to farm, opens the temptation to a quicker and less burdensome way of getting one's livelihood.

The road net of Shansi is composed of one main highway from north to south, with a few important branch roads to the east and west. And in speaking of the road net, one designed for and capable of supporting automobile and light truck traffic is meant. For at least half of its length, it is only a smooth dirt road, but crushed rock is being added to give a better all-weather surface, and it is just a matter of time until it will compare with roads of the same type in America. It is continually being maintained and improved. In travelling over more than four hundred miles of the main north and south highway, many large groups of laborers were seen at work. Another aid to maintenance is the fact that only pneumatic tired vehicles are permitted to use these roads. In four days of travel, never once did I see anything but private cars, automobile busses or bicycles on these roads. At each of the state owned and operated garages, spaced at about twenty-five mile intervals, there are road police, who when it rains put out signs forbidding the use of the road to all cars——and enforce the ruling, keeping cars off until the road is again sufficiently dry so that traffic will not cut it up. To the American who demands his rights and who is always in a hurry to get somewhere, this would be an intolerable curtailment of liberty and freedom of action. However, the Shansi people apparently do not resent it, and the roads are maintained.

Banditry, practically universal throughout the rest of China, is conspicuous by its absence in Shansi. In a recent journey through that province, in which we were away from the motor roads for a week, travelling by mule and mule-chairs through very rough country, no mention was heard of any bandit activities. We were always furnished with a police escort, but never were there more than two, and they were unarmed, except for small clubs. This escort was more honorary than protective. Protection was not needed, but good guides were, so their services were appreciated. They were also a great help in driving away the crowd of the curious, out to gaze upon the foreign devils. A word was sufficient, and the words were not harsh either——an interesting sidelight on the inherent discipline of the people. It was rather a willingness to obey than a fear of punishment. A people of such characteristics will never conquer the world, but neither will it produce bandits.

The people are friendly. They spoke of us as foreign devils, but with a smile in their voices. They probably had never heard a foreigner referred to in any other terms——a condition similar to the use of the word "damyankee" in our South. Also the people are cleaner and healthier than those encountered in the cities. Primarily they are a rural people. They have never tasted of the flesh pots, they work hard every day of the year to get their rice, and mountain sides that an American goat would disdain to inhabit have been cultivated and furnish a large percentage of the tilled area.

Shansi is not in decay. As far as public buildings, parks and temples are concerned, most of China is a land of magnificent ruins. This is largely due, no doubt, to the fact that the wars, to which all the rest of China have been subjected, have left very little to be expended on maintenance and repair. The struggle for existence has been so severe that the luxuries have ceased. However, after gazing with regret in Peking at the disintegration of so many wonderful monuments of a glorious past, it is a joy to find temples clean and freshly painted in Shansi.

Shansi is progressive and public spirited. The cities have telephones and electric lights. The state owns and operates its own telegraph and long distance telephones. Taiyuanfu, the capital and business center, has some fifteen auto bus companies, operating on daily schedules to points as far as two hundred and fifty miles away. The military also have many of these busses in daily use. Two that I looked over carefully, although they showed over fifteen thousand miles apiece, were in excellent mechanical condition. On opening the hood, the brass was found to be polished as well as for our army post motor shows. The drivers drove well, and examined their cars at each stop.

Another evidence of progressiveness is the constant striving to increase and improve agricultural products. This year Yen Hsi-shan expended a large sum for the importation of seeds of grains, especially adapted to growth in a dry soil. Shansi is dry——sufficient rainfall for her crops is the exception.

Politically Shansi is in good shape. Lack of wars, with its resultant constant change in the personnel of the official family, has tended to keep down the amount of graft. An official in Shansi does not need to make his fortune before the next campaign. Consequently the money appropriated accomplishes more, and with tenure of office comes experience and still greater efficiency. It may seem unusual to dwell upon such facts, but it is done merely because the contrary is the normal state of affairs elsewhere in China.

For instance, on the trip mentioned above, it was necessary to return to Peking by passing through Kalgan. A short stop was made at Kalgan, the frontier town of Inner Mongolia. As this is an important fur market, I went to several fur shops to examine their stocks. In every store visited, if I asked to see a particularly fine or expensive type of fur, the dealer had to send to a warehouse and have it brought. Without exception, they stated that they were afraid to have valuable goods on hand in their shops for fear of bandits. Also, an attempt was made to drive to a point fifteen miles north to a mountain pass overlooking the Gobi Desert. This authority was also denied, due to the fear of the local authorities that our car would be attacked by bandits. The

head of the Salt Gabelle showed me many telegrams reporting bandit activities all over Suiyuan, and the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs explained to me how parallel telegraph lines were being laid, and duplicate nets being established, so that bandits tearing out one line would not completely wipe out communications in that district. Although this area is particularly infested, it much more nearly approaches the average condition than does Shansi, where banditry is practically non-existent.

Shansi has acquired the ideal of peace and work. It has one of the best arsenals in China, its troops are well equipped and well disciplined, but it neither thinks nor talks in terms of military expedience. Although the last few weeks have brought Yen Hsi- shan very much into the lime-light, as the possible head of the anti-Chiang Kai-shek group, Shansi was not talking war. I saw no signs of increased military activity, no tenseness, no recruiting, no shouting of slogans. Instead Shansi is keeping her shoulder to the wheel, and trusting in Yen Hsi-shan.

C. J. Kanaga
First Lieutenant, Field Artillery

elh

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
OCT 29 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT
JM

No. 7600

1st Ind.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 28 1929

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, September 27, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

1. Forwarded. I consider these observations extremely informing and in keeping with the general political impressions gained from other sources.

The growing appreciation of Yen Hsi-shan in all circles as a very sincere revolutionary is notable. He aims less at untried political and social experiments than at practical, modern reconstruction, and peaceful conditions in which to permit the natural industry of the Chinese people full play. Yen Hsi-shan speaks little of the "livelihood of the people" but he has consistently provided for it.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
OCT 29 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

4.1

2055-674

September 26, 1929

Subject: Impressions of Taiyuanfu, Shansi.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China.

1. To a certain extent, Taiyuanfu, the capital of Shansi, has become the capital of North China. Due to the fact that Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang are there, this city has taken on added political importance and is under careful observation as the scene of activities, the significance of which must be carefully considered.

2. As Shansi has suffered no invasion during the civil wars of the last fifteen or twenty years, it is economically in much better condition than the average province. This condition is particularly noticeable in the capital. One is impressed by the large number of schools, with large dormitories, and many basket-ball and tennis courts. Many new buildings, especially large three or four-story shops and official buildings, are under construction, both in the center of the business district and in the areas further away. Although none of the streets are paved, they are for the most part in a good state of repair. Beggars are conspicuous by their absence, unusual indeed in China, and a general atmosphere of activity and prosperity pervades the region.

3. Probably this is only as should be expected. The people of Shansi are the Jews of China. Even with invasion, it might have maintained a status of "business as usual". However, the people feel differently. All give the credit to Yen Hsi-shan, as the man who has been able to ward off the ills to which they well know the other provinces have been subjected. He is respected and loved, rather than feared. This is in marked contrast to the usual attitude toward the militarist. Even Feng Yu-hsiang, who formerly enjoyed a large measure of the people's confidence, has lost his popularity because of the harsh and oppressive measures employed in recent years.

4. One large factor contributing to the prosperity is the location of the arsenal just north of the city. It is a thoroughly modern plant, operated by electric power and employing about six thousand laborers and machinists, at a wage scale higher than usual

in China. This arsenal is independent of outside sources of supply, except for better grades of steel and copper which for the most part come from Germany. The machinery is modern and the factories are well lighted. Apprentice schools are maintained for the instruction of newly hired employees. Its output includes powder and other explosives, three-inch field guns and four-inch mountain howitzers, rifles, automatic rifles and machine guns; trench mortars, hand grenades, aerial bombs, and ammunition for all arms mentioned herein. In connection with the aviation school, about three miles north of the arsenal, an airplane factory is planned which will produce the plane complete, except for the power plant. This airplane factory will also be operated by electric power, delivered over power lines from the arsenal, and will be built on land adjoining the fine large flying field, now in operation. Detailed reports are being submitted separately covering this arsenal and the aviation field and school.

5. Another factor which contributes to the prosperity of Shansi is the presence of fairly large numbers of troops, who spend their pay there. Usually in China, the presence of troops is a heavy economic drain, but in Shansi, the troops are paid monthly and help rather than hurt business.

6. Taiyuanfu is the Rome to which all roads, and good roads too, lead in Shansi. As such, it is well supplied with motor garages which operate bus lines on daily schedules to the north, south, east and west. F or instance, there is daily service to Tatungfu, nearly five hundred li (170 miles) to the north, and at a cost of twelve dollars per passenger. This is a one day trip, mostly through a mountainous country; this fact attesting to the quality of the busses and the condition of the roads.

7. The foreign colony is small——estimated at about one hundred. There are few Americans, mostly missionaries and teachers in the colleges. The remainder are mostly the French who operate the railroad, and Germans, Danes, Norwegians and Swedes who are connected with the arsenal, the Germans in the majority. Of these latter, some are heads of departments or technical advisers, others are salesmen for firms supplying the armory with metals, chemicals and machinery. The Germans are the most influential group, probably due to their technical skill. Although well treated, they resent their loss of the right of extraterritoriality and hope for rather than expect their restoration to that status. The relations between these groups and the Chinese seem to be most friendly—even among the young student group there appears to be no anti-foreignism. Although the walls are painted with the usual "Down with Imperialism" Kuomintang slogans, the underlying idea is "build up" rather than "tear down". The revolution in Shansi is a constructive and practical movement.

This is undoubtedly a reflection of Yen Hsi-shan's wisdom and foresight. He has realized the necessity of foreign aid and advice, has encouraged it, and has used his influence to overcome the spread of anti-foreignism. Consequently the people from ricksha coolie to shopkeeper, from private soldier to staff officer, are friendly and courteous.

8. Among the Chinese in high position, especially in the arsenal, the foreign educated are in the majority. Most of those with whom I came in contact were educated in America; Germany supplied the next largest number, and several had studied in France. In the employ of the railroad, those with French training predominated. These are mostly young men, from thirty to forty, all wear foreign clothes, and their attitude is strictly business-like. The head of the purchasing department of the arsenal has an office organized very much as that of a large accountant's office in America, using adding machines, steel filing cabinets, etc.

9. Politically, Shansi is very important at present. Yen Hsi-shan, by appointment of Nanking, is responsible for the organization of all military activity in North China. Whether for this or other reasons more obscure, he is constantly being visited by delegations from Thibet, Kansu, Shensi and Mongolia. Yen's close relations with Feng, who is living in a temple about twenty miles away, add to his importance in the present scheme of things.

10. A rumor at present being circulated prophesies an early break with Nanking. According to this rumor, the entire northern area will sever relations with Nanking and set up a northern government in Peking. However, no attempt will be made to obtain control of any area south of the Yangtse, and in certain circles it is believed the Yellow River may be the southern boundary. As to the time of this step, all said it would take place within a year——I heard no one say it would develop before the spring. The North will simply declare its independence and attempt a defense against any invasion launched by the South to force its return to Nanking control.

11. These rumors are interesting in view of the following facts: No one mentioned Yen Hsi-shan's impending departure on a world tour with Feng Yu-hsiang. From this I deduce that his departure is not expected. The arsenal is being enlarged, although at present it is believed large enough to supply all local needs. However, any shipment of military supplies to other provinces was denied by all with whom I discussed the matter. This, however, may be purely a precaution until the various elements of the North are definitely in line. Another fact,

the delegations from other northern provinces, mentioned previously, are military rather than political in personnel. This however might be partly accounted for by Yen's position as organizer and director of activities for defense in the North.

12. The sources of such rumors were invariably Chinese. Some statements were made by flying cadets at the airdrome, others by Chinese not connected with government or arsenal, but in railroad or commercial work. The foreigners hesitated to talk of this matter, the Germans at the arsenal particularly avoiding an expression of opinion. This rumor is not one which is encountered immediately; the prophesies are not dinner party conversation. Rather there is an air of secrecy——of a definite refusal to tell what one knows or suspects. And in the meantime there is no particular air of expectancy or foreboding, but confidence in Yen Hsi-shan and business as usual!

C. J. Kanaga,
1st Lieutenant, F. A.

clh

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 8 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Population &
Social Conditions)

Subject: Linguistic Survey of Modern Chinese.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 8 - 1930

1. The following article, prepared for the Manchester Guardian by Mr. H. J. Timperley, a British journalist, is considered so informative and accurate that it is quoted in full.

2. Attention is invited to our Letter No. 7433, in which the opinions of Messrs. Hu Shih and V. K. Ting were quoted as showing the relative importance of Mandarin over all other Chinese dialects. These opinions are confirmed by Dr. Chao in the following article:

"A linguistic survey of modern China is the ambitious task which the national research institute of history and philology recently established in Peiping by the Nanking government is attempting under the direction of Dr. Y. R. Chao, a graduate of Cornell and Harvard universities who also studied for a short time in the department of phonetics at University College, London.

'Old-time Chinese philologists felt it beneath their dignity to study the current language', Dr. Chao explained in a special interview with the 'Guardian' correspondent, 'but we now pay attention to all aspects of it. The work of the language section of our institute has to do with the study of the Chinese language both in its ancient and present forms. We feel that unless we study the different dialects in the country we cannot have any clear idea of what the ancient sounds really were. We hope to make a linguistic survey of the language in various parts of the country, so far as conditions allow, in order to secure a sort of base-line from which we can triangulate, as it were, back into the past.'

"Already some progress has been made. Preliminary surveys of the Kwangtung and Kwangsi dialects have been carried out, and a survey is also being made of non-Chinese dialects which probably are related to Chinese such as the Miao and Yao aboriginal dialects found in Yunnan, Szechuan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi and in Hainan Island. Present-day Tibetan is being studied in Peking by modern phonetic methods; Tibetan folk songs as spoken by a native of Lhasa are being recorded into a dictaphone. 'We find', said Dr. Chao, 'that the dictaphone gets the intonation, the vowels and some aspects of the consonants. Next year we plan to make permanent records for a Sound Library such as they have in France and Germany. By this method we shall be able to collect material faster than it can be studied and we shall be able to study it under suitable conditions with the proper instruments of experimental phonetics. We are investigating the pronunciation, vocabulary and grammar of the various modern dialects. This is a big task, for the difference between Mandarin and the Kwangtung dialect, for instance, is as great as the difference between modern Italian and Spanish.'

"The results of the institute's researches are made available, incidentally, to the Society for the Unification of the National Language, which, under the direction of the Ministry of Education, is making use of them in connection with pedagogical experiments. 'The Society now has virtually taken the view that Mandarin must be the standard', Dr. Chao said, 'and its work is based on that idea. There are many indications which show that the prestige of Mandarin is gradually growing. Even people from Canton speak it when visiting Fukien province, though both Fukien and Kwangtung are southern

CHINA (Population &
Social Conditions)

Subject: Linguistic Survey of Modern Chinese.

provinces. It is also making great headway in Shanghai—not that the Shanghai dialect is dying out, but more people understand Mandarin and you can get along very well with that dialect in Shanghai now. In the big Cantonese department stores there the employees now must have a working knowledge of three dialects—their own, the Shanghai dialect and Mandarin. Mandarin is also being used now in the higher institutions of learning everywhere, even including Canton. At the Sun Yat-sen University in Canton lecturing in Cantonese or Mandarin is optional but even some of the native-born teachers prefer to use the latter."

'How many dialects are there in China at the present moment?' Dr. Chao was asked. He answered that it was rather like being invited to say how many colours there were, since the dialects shaded very much into one another. However, he thought perhaps they might be grouped roughly into Mandarin, the dialects of Kiangsu and Chekiang, the Fukien dialect, the South Fukien-East Kwangtung dialect, the Kwangtung dialect and nondescript dialects which do not form a group but are nevertheless very different from anything else.

"In reply to a question as to whether modern Chinese was changing in any particular direction, Dr. Chao replied that, apart from local fashions, the language was changing through the introduction of foreign abstract terms. 'Often', he explained, 'an abstract term is used instead of re-shaping a sentence, though the latter procedure would be more natural to Chinese. This leads to a certain rawness and consequently is not a literary advantage. Some of these terms have been imported indirectly through Japanese translations in Chinese characters. But owing to the ideographic nature of the language there has been very little direct borrowing of actual words, though this is sometimes done in the case of abstract terms for which the borrower feels that there is no exact equivalent in Chinese. Two examples of this kind of thing are "democracy", which is sometimes rendered into five separate characters as "te mo ku la hsi", and "inspiration", also rendered into five characters as "yen shih pi li shun."' Another borrowed term which is very common is 'lo chi', a direct rendering of 'logic'.

"Another side of the institute's work has to do with the historical aspect of the language and is in charge of Mr. Lo Ch'ang-pei, who is a specialist in Chinese phonology. 'The richest material we have in connection with the study of ancient philology', Dr. Chao said, 'consists of the dictionaries or rhyme books of the Sui, Tang and Sung dynasties, which represents a very important period. We are devoting a good deal of attention to re-editing and comparing the books of that time. The most important book in connection with these ancient researches is the "Kuang Yun", which is a Sung edition of the "Chieh Yun" and represents the language of about 600 A.D. It is a pronouncing dictionary which gives the pronunciation and meaning in terms of that time. The material gathered in this way throws light upon modern dialects. What is dead in one dialect may be alive in another, and often there is a historical basis for the fact. In ancient times there were many different dialects, just as now, but the dialects have not always descended directly—some produced more descendants than others.

'We shall specially study the collection of Hsi Hsia works recently acquired by the National Library of Peking. This is a Sinitic language and in the case of part of the hundred volumes now in the library we have parallel texts in Chinese and Tibetan elsewhere. Though written in characters which look like Chinese strokes, its nature is not Chinese. It is a little understood dead language and with the extensive parallel texts we hope to be able to study it thoroughly, since it is likely to prove of the greatest value in the reconstruction of archaic Chinese.'"

N E Margetts

Nelson E. Margetts,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery,
Military Attache

JM

OFFICE CHIEF OF ST. MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 2 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

6940

G-2 Report.

SWEDEN (Combat).

Subject: Swedish Report on Conditions in China. Military Mission.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 29 1930

The known Chinese-Swede Colonel Baron Taube has just returned to Sweden from China where he has been engaged since 1914. That year Baron Taube went to Peking as instructor in a gendarmeri which was there organized by the Norwegian General Munthe, a very confidential man with Yuan Shih-kai. After the death of Yuan Shih-kai and Munthe's failure to succeed him, the gendarmeri was dissolved. In 1922 Baron Taube applied for permission to assist in the work looking to the return of the Shantung territory to China, when he was responsible for the preservation of order during the Japanese withdrawal. During the last five to six years Baron Taube has served as controller in one of the arsenals in Mukden as well as instructor in various artillery firing schools.

It is natural that during the many years he has been engaged in China he has had splendid opportunity to follow the development in its particularly important phases.

Translation.

"The development which the old country has gone through during these years I have visited there is quite singularly enormous, he emphasized during an interview with 'Svenska Dagbladet'. China has during these years tried to blot out the 'children's tracks' and take on an entirely independent position among the world's civilized nations. This has certainly still not been successful, but one cannot but recognize the extraordinary difference between the position of 1914 and 1930. The later years' great and difficult problem has, as known, been the question of national unity. Last year it appeared as if the national government in Nanking really had been successful in effecting China's unity. It seems to be absolutely contrary to the half self-supporting province governors to entirely submit themselves to a strong central government, and during the summer of the previous year there was commenced a still stronger opposition against it among some of the less important generals in Honan and Anhui. This opposition has been suppressed at least for the time being through various compromises, but the situation was worse the last winter when the opposition came from

FROM: M. A. SWEDEN. REPORT NO. 897. MAY 14, 1930.

the two powerful Generals Yen Hsi-shan and Fend Yu-hsiang. It has long been known that these two old companions considered themselves slighted by the young 'upstart' Chiang Kaishik who really effected what they so long sought to bring about: China's unity. But naturally this was brought about in that he made himself head of the state and the two old generals were reduced to inferior commands. In the beginning of this year the tenseness between the central government and the two old generals has all the more increased and taken on the impressions of the usual 'telegram war', where both parties exercise their literary style in accusations against one another, with never any apologies. That open war has not yet broken out has depended very much on Manchuria's position. Both parties did all possible to insure themselves of Manchuria's support in a probable war, but then there had already been quite enough war, and the young Marshall in Mukden answered all telegrams with an exhortation for peace and compromise. I believe I can even point out that he personally has greater sympathies for a strong central government in Nanking than for a government lead in particular by Feng-Yu-Hsiang who was his father's arch enemy. After my departure from Mukden I have seen a few telegrams indicating that the tension has further increased, but during the last week the situation has been quieter.

With a Strong Government in China, Special Privileges Would Disappear of Themselves.

The new Nanking Government's foremost ambition has, however, been the abolition of all special privileges which are enjoyed by a part of foreigners in China as extra-territorial rights, concessions, etc. The Foreign Minister, Dr. C. T. Wang, has in this matter been right successful since a part of the smaller powers have relinquished their claims to these privileges and have written new treaties accordingly on this basis. The great powers have also in principle supported China's demand in this respect, but demand as guarantees that China's department of justice, courts, prisons, etc., first be organized in an entirely modern way. This is now a long way from completion, and the problem is, therefore, intimately bound together with that of the country's unity. It appears to me as if it would be better if the Chinese first commenced to organize their country instead of crying so much of foreign 'oppression'. At the same time, if the country had a strong government and good administration, all the special privileges to foreigners would disappear of themselves.

In the question of the Russian-Chinese crisis of the East Chinese Railway in Manchuria, Baron Taube recalled that the railway was originally built as a Russian concession by Russian state funds, borrowed principally from France. In a few treaties between

Soviet Russia and China it is declared that half is owned by each country. The Russians, in the meantime, had the right to appoint the director of the railway and the higher employees of Russian nationality. The Chinese in the summer found that the director seriously over-stepped his authority and that the Russian employees used their official position for communistic propaganda. The quite serious and bloody difficulties along the frontier were concluded with a victory for the Russians, as the Chinest had to appeal for peace. A preliminary treaty was signed in Habarovsk to be followed by a conference in Moscow, which in the meantime still has not assembled, really because the Nanking government and Manchuria could not agree on what may be decided by this conference.

Strong Economic Development in Spite of All Strife and Trouble.

In spite of the many civil wars, the country economically has developed remarkably during the recent years, concluded Baron Taube. A part of the provinces where civil war has steadily raged, such as Chihli, Honan and Shantung, have naturally gone backwards and suffered terribly by the wars and the resulting hunger, but on the other hand those provinces where there has been relative quiet, in particular Manchuria, have developed remarkably. Immigration to Manchuria has been enormous during the recent years - one to two million people yearly - and this invites no difficulties in securing the maintenance of life for these. During the previous year, however, the great fall in the value of silver has in a high degree disturbed business life, in particular naturally imports into China."

E. P. Pierson

E. P. PIERSON,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attaché.

FROM: M. A. SWEDEN. REPORT NO. 897. MAY 14, 1930.

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 22 1930
2055-679
WAR DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL October 22, 1930

No. 7854

Subject : Removal of Office of Military Attache

To : A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 20 1930

1. Your No. 192 instructions complied with. Attached hereto is an estimate in detail, in so far as it is possible to prepare such estimate, showing cost incidental to removal of this office from Peiping to Shanghai, in case the Legation is moved to that city.

2055-679 (5)

2. During a conference with the Minister the question of the possible removal of the Legation to the vicinity of the seat of government was discussed in detail, and what follows was given to me in strictest confidence; it is requested that it be received by G-2 in the same manner. The Minister stated that before leaving Washington to take up his duties in Peiping, while receiving his final instructions from the President, the question of possible removal of the Legation to the vicinity of the recognized government was considered, and he was directed to keep the Department informed of the results of his investigations, with recommendations. Soon after arrival in China, taking advantage of the occasion when he presented his credentials at Nanking, he took up the question of the probable necessity for establishing the Legation in that city. Possible sites for building were inspected (as there are no suitable buildings available in Nanking) and he was satisfied this idea should be abandoned because of the great expense and the uncertainty of Nanking's remaining the site of the capitol.

3. The Minister made a careful study of Shanghai with a view to finding suitable quarters for housing the Legation staff, but results have been disappointing and discouraging. Since the Minister deems Nanking impracticable and is in favor of locating at Shanghai because of its strategic location with reference to the rest of China, he believes the best solution will be the construction of a Legation building there. Plans are completed for beginning the construction of the new Consulate General Building at Shanghai, but the Department does not look with favor upon the Legation and Consulate General building being one and the same. At present eight rooms in the temporary Consulate General building have been put aside for the Minister's use while he is in Shanghai. He further stated that he would continue to look for suitable quarters to house the entire Legation staff including the Military and Naval Attaches, and would continue to keep the Department informed of his actions. In the event the Legation moves, it is contemplated to leave one of the secretaries in Peiping to act as diplomatic agent and also to supervise the consular language students who will be left here, and in this event the office of the Military

Attache will close in Peiping to join the Minister and Legation wherever the latter locates.

4. In case our Legation moves to Shanghai and the Legations of the other important powers do not move, it is recommended that the Assistant Military Attache remain in Peiping to keep in touch with the other Legations, the situation in the north, and to take charge of the Language Officers and their work.

5. a. In the event the Legation moves from Peiping, it is recommended that the Language Officers now attached to the office of the Military Attache remain in Peiping to continue their study for three years, the fourth year to be attached to the office of Military Attache, as at present, arrangements to be made with the Legation that our Language Students be placed under the supervision of the secretary who will be left in Peiping, in the event that the Assistant Military Attache does not remain.

best

b. As an alternative, it is recommended that our Language Students be transferred to Tientsin and placed under the supervision of the Commanding Officer of the Army Forces in China for the period of three years, the fourth year to be attached to the office of the Military Attache. Tientsin as a place for language study is less desirable because of the lack of teaching staff and facilities, the colloquial form of Chinese used, and more expensive living conditions.

do not concur

NEM/edb

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

noted & studied in MA 7PL Sec 12 Jan 1930

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2055-679
1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

Estimates for Move to Shanghai -- Military Attache's Office, Peiping

Crating property amounts to $0.95¢ per cubic foot.
Freight, Tientsin to Shanghai, $12.50 per cubic ton.
Twenty-ton car, Peking to Tientsin, $150.00 (car holding Approx. 1600 cu. ft.)
Cartage: Peking, 10¢ per case, Tientsin, 25¢ per case; Shanghai, 25¢ per case.
Handling fee at three points above, $1.50 per case.
Steamer and rail fare, $98.30 per person.
Uncrating in Shanghai, $1.00 per case.

	No. Cu. Ft.		
Col. Margetts	2,800		
Capt. Tenney	2,400		
Stenographer	700		
Sergeant	700		
Office	2,500		
1 Language Officer, Captain	2,000		
2 " " Lieutenants	3,800		
	14,900	cu. ft. @ 95¢	$14,155.00

	No. Crates		
Col. Margetts	120		
Capt. Tenney	100		
2. Language Officers, Lieutenants	180		
1 Language Officer, Captain	95		
Sergeant	10		
Stenographer	15		
Office	130		
	650	crates @ $2.10 (Handling & Cartage)	1,365.00

Uncrating in Shanghai	650.00
Freight, Tientsin to Shanghai, 372.5 cu. tons .	4,656.25
Freight, Peiping to Tientsin, 9 cars	1,350.00
Fares, Peiping to Shanghai (7 tickets)	699.10
	$22,875.35

In case Chinese employees are taken, fares would be increased from $200 to $300. Chinese employees in Shanghai receive 20 to 50% more per month than in Peiping.

Since rentals in Shanghai are approximately the same as in Tokyo, an amount equal to the rental allowance given the Military Attache in Tokyo should be allowed for office rent.

This estimate is prepared in local currency and is based upon estimates obtained by the Legation. The present rate of exchange is $1.00 U.S.C. equals $3.475 local currency.

PGT/edb

Roughly $7,000 gold to 10,000 depending upon exchange

G-2 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MAR MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 2055-679 1930
5
WAR DEPARTMENT

OCT 16 1930

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Cablegram.

The Secretary of War directs that a cablegram substantially as follows be sent in War Department code to the Military Attache, Peiping, China:

No. 192

Sent 10-16-30

Paragraph____

2055-679/2

Your 254 June 7 and remarks in letter 7809 August 27 fully appreciated. Without reference to decision in matter, of which there are no indications whatever, please prepare plans for removal your office and relocation at possible places for establishment of Legation; submit them by early letter with your recommendations and estimates as to cost in all details. If Legation plans to leave part of personnel and office at Peiping, you should consider as regards similar action by your office desirability of military attache in person relocating with headquarters of Legation and Minister.

Submit also separate recommendations concerning place of residence and study for language officers in case your office leaves Peiping.

Purpose of these recommendations at this time solely for convenience of this office when and if the State Department broaches subject to War Department. Please limit discussions concerning this matter to Minister and your immediate official assistants. Cable acknowledgment receipt these instructions.

OCT 16 1930

bap

R. C. Foy,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
In replying refer to

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

NOV 3 1930
2055-679
4

October 14, 1930 WAR DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM of conversation between Major Kroner and Mr. Peck, Assistant Chief, Far Eastern Division, State Department.

Subject: Removal of American Legation from Peiping, China.

Mr. Peck informed me today that the State Department had on October 7 dispatched a cablegram to the American Minister in Peiping, in substance as follows:

> That it does not appear immediately necessary to move the Legation from Peiping to Shanghai; that circumstances which might affect such a move should be constantly borne in mind, particularly in view of the American Minister's cable recommendation in May, 1930, to the effect that the Legation, less one secretary and a clerk, move from Peiping to Shanghai; that it was desired to call the Minister's attention to the fact that, on the recommendation above referred to, the State Department had gone to Congress and secured funds to cover the cost of moving the Legation and for temporary establishment in Shanghai; and further that it was desired for the Minister to investigate, on his next trip to Shanghai, the local situation with reference to securing the proper buildings for accommodating the Legation staff.

Mr. Peck stated that the recent victories of the Nanking government and attempts to consolidate the government power in Nanking, while appearing to strengthen that government more than at any time in the past, did not cause the State Department to feel that there was any necessity thereby for immediately removing the Legation from Peiping to a place closer to the seat of the Chinese government. He stated further that the purpose of the cablegram above referred to of October 7 was purely to remind the Minister that the State Department had not overlooked his recommendations of last May and to insure that timely preparations are made for removing the Legation when and in case such might appear desirable.

Mr. Peck informed me that, whatever steps are taken in this matter, it was his belief that the State Department would take no definite action without notifying the War Department with a view to coordinating the removal of the M/A's office at the same time as the Legation office (if it appeared to all concerned wholly desirable that the M/A's office accompany the Legation).

Mr. Peck stated further that he was not unaware of the importance to the M/A of a centralized establishment for securing information as is readily available in a place where all of the foreign M/A's reside. He said that he had been told as much by the recently returned M/A from Peiping and that the officers of the State Department, in the Far Eastern Division, felt that that much was true, and for this reason it might appear not wholly necessary, should the Legation leave Peiping, that the M/A should be as prompt about leaving Peiping as the rest of the Legation. However, Mr. Peck stated in effect that he was cognizant of the rules which assigned the M/A to the Legation under instructions to report to the Minister. In explanation of this attitude, Mr. Peck made it very plain that it would undoubtedly be most desirable that no precedent be established regarding the definite separation of the M/A from the Embassy. He said further that it might develop on account of the somewhat temporary nature in the beginning of the removal of the Legation that it might not not be necessary for the M/A to move all of his office from Peiping. Mr. Peck's conversation then dwelt at some length on the fact that the stability of the Chinese government is by no means definitely established; that the removal of the Legation from Peiping to or near the seat of the present Chinese government might become a wise thing to do, and yet the Department of State was not prepared to surrender its diplomatic control over its holdings in the Legation quarters at Peiping. For the latter reason, said Mr. Peck, it might result in some years of a dual establishment of the Legation.

Mr. Peck stated that he felt certain that, in considering the cost of moving the Legation from Peiping and the securing of suitable quarters elsewhere, accommodations for the M/A and his office were not a subject to which the Department of State had given thought; and finally, in order that the War Department might be assured of timely notice of the State Department's plans in this matter, he, Mr. Peck, would prepare for Dr. Hornbeck, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, a memorandum of this conversation with me, with the suggestion that he keep G-2 informed.

Hayes A. Kroner,
Major, Infantry, DOL,
Military Attache Section.

bap

2

THE SECRETARY DIRECTS ANSWERS TO THIS CABLE AS FOLLOWS:

ADVISE WITHIN 12 HOURS if answer is unnecessary.

If answer is NOT SENT WITHIN 7 DAYS REASON MUST BE STATED.

C. H. BRIDGES,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Copies furnished as noted:

G-2 X
The Adj Gen √

FORM NO. O 635-3--A. G. O.
ED. MAY 15, 1922.

2055-679

Code ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ Radio LMB

CABLEGRAM.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

Received at the War Department. June 7, 1930

NOV 3 1930

2055-679

WAR DEPARTMENT

Peiping M.

20 NVFrom The Adjutant General

To

Number 234 June 7th.

SECRET

~~Reference Legation 384. It is my opinion~~ and that of best informed observers that Shanghai not comparable Peking as information center for all China. Minister's argument as to advantages geographical location does not apply to collection military information. Outstanding value Peking depends upon existing established centers of foreign official information which will continue so as long as majority of legations large countries remain here. This fact independent outcome of present or future disturbances. In view of above should legation move I recommend plan whereby representative of this office only accompany chancery until situation more clearly demonstrates value to War Department of suggested move.

Margetts

X INDICATES CABLE ROUTED FOR ACTION; √ FOR INFORMATION

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.
2055-6798
1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

August 27, 1930

No. 7809

Subject: Reply to Evaluation Report of July 11, 1930

To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 25 1930

Replying to your request for further information in the Evaluation Report of July 11, the following comments are added in hope of making my report more clear:

1. Permanent Government Buildings. During my visit to Nanking in May from the 1st-7th and the 18th-25th, I observed considerable building activity going on. The Railroad Administration Building was completed, this is a magnificent work of Chinese architecture and is the only new government building now erected that is considered permanent.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs occupies an old temporary building. The Minister of Finance has just added to his office building a new wing for his occupancy as office and residence.

There are two large buildings nearing completion said to be for the Legislative and Executive Yuans, these buildings are of two-story type and will be turned over for office buildings when the plan for construction of new buildings for the modern capital on a selected site near the Sun Yat-sen Memorial, is completed. At the time of my visit no work had been commenced on this selected permanent site.

2. Shanghai as an Information Center. It was not intended to convey the impression that information of value could not be obtained in Shanghai, but to make clear that where the Foreign Legations are located there is the best source of information, because the Military and Naval Attaches receive information from all sources and exchange with each other, also reports arrive at the Legations from Consulates and Commercial Attaches regarding conditions in their districts which as a rule are made available. Newspaper representatives or war correspondents are also present and are a source for comparison of the information received.

To be stationed at a place other than where the majority of diplomatic representatives are located is to reduce the source of information. Shanghai at present is not believed to be a better source of information regarding the military, political and economic situation than San Francisco. The influential population are interested and occupied with their business and have little time for affairs going on outside the city.

3. Dr. C. T. Wang. The statement with reference to Dr. C. T. Wang's not fitting his position, was the result of observations and remarks heard while I was in Nanking.

During the dinner at Chiang Kai-shek's home, Dr. Wang did not appear to receive much attention from the other heads of the government, he was the only Chinese present in foreign dress. Then later his action concerning the Japanese tariff treaty was refused and he was accused of usurping the functions of the Legislative Yuan and called to account by that department. Incidents of this nature dictated my remark that he did not fit in, although nothing has since come to my attention to confirm that statement, as Dr. Wang continues to function as Foreign Minister and seems to have the confidence of his colleagues.

4. Refusal to Visit the Battle Areas. The Chinese military authorities for unknown reasons dislike to have foreign military observers accompany their armies in the field and always find some excuse to prevent visiting the battle fronts. The excuses given in reply to my request were in each case:-

a. Transportation is very poor and no facilities for foreign observers available.

b. In case of injury or accident to accredited observers, loss of face would result.

c. In case authority was granted to one official observer it would be necessary to accept others and they have no facilities for caring for foreign missions.

I am under the impression that they do not want their inefficiency disclosed by experienced observers. Again they may not know how to receive and conduct a foreign mission at the front and have no means of caring for them.

On the northern side, Feng appears to have no objection to Americans visiting points near the front, but he will make no arrangements for necessary transportation and living conditions. He merely authorizes a visit, sends an officer with you and then you are on your own. This was what actually happened during my visit to Chengchow and Kaifeng.

N E Margetts

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUL 2055-679 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

REPORT OF TRIP TO NANKING AND HANKOW

April 22—May 27, 1930.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 3 1930

Peiping to Nanking.

From the date of arrival in Peiping (March 17) until my departure for the Yangtse Valley (April 22), I found myself in an atmosphere wholly anti-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Government. The sympathy of North China is unanimously with Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang, and this sympathy is encouraged daily by propaganda that appears in the local press. Due to a close censorship little appears in the local papers favorable to the Government's cause.

In attempting to maintain a neutral attitude, in order that I may report conditions as they actually exist, I have made inquiries among not only resident foreigners but many Chinese residents of Peiping of all classes, and am satisfied that if Chiang Kai-shek or any other person will bring the capital back to Peiping the population will receive them with open arms and loyal support (so far as the Chinese can support anyone loyally). The return of the capital with its attending activities would mean money, and money is the god these people worship.

An opportunity was afforded to observe the situation from the other side and, in company with the Minister, I left Peiping on April 22, and arrived in Shanghai on April 27. We remained in Shanghai until May 1, during which time I called on many influential Americans, British, etc., and visited many Chinese bankers. I was disappointed with the apparent lack of information possessed by these persons concerning conditions outside of Shanghai. In answer to queries regarding the stability of the present government, the usual reply was that it was probably as good as any that could be organized and they were satisfied that it should continue, but had no idea how long this would be. After three days in Shanghai, I learned very little of value with reference to the government and its activities, and felt that one could get as much information regarding the situation in China in San Francisco as in Shanghai.

En route to Nanking April 30, we detrained at Soochow in order to observe conditions in this old and interesting city. A three hours' visit here convinced me that the people were not interested in the war. We left on the 4:00 p.m. train and arrived at Nanking at 9:30 p.m. The country between Shanghai and Nanking is a huge garden, every inch cultivated and indications favorable that there will be a bumper crop. An interesting feature of this part of the country is the entire absence of roads; the principal method of transportation is water. A network of canals covers this entire region, and the railroad is the only other method of transportation.

Nanking.

Arrived in Nanking at 9:30 p.m. on May 1, and proceeded at once to the United States Consulate where we were to stop during our visit. The Minister very kindly arranged for visits to the heads of the government, important officials in the Ministry of War and headquarters of Chiang Kai-shek, as well as the head of the Aviation Bureau.

During the week May 1-7 spent in Nanking, there was nothing observed to indicate other than absolute confidence in the ability of the government to handle successfully the rebellion in the North. However, there was a feeling of anxiety regarding the communist and bandit activities

south of the river, this being due to the necessity for withdrawing the bulk of the troops from these areas, thus leaving the villages with little protection.

During this period the Model Division had completed its training and was completely equipped with new uniforms, arms, machine guns, rifles, 37 mm's, 3" Stokes Mortars, mountain guns and 75 mm artillery; in fact, the Germans had completely outfitted this division with new equipment and material, mostly from Germany and Mukden. We watched a review for Chiang Kai-shek with more than half the division (15,000 men) present, and it was very well executed; after which Chiang mounted a stand, the troops were formed around him and he made a farewell address to these troops who were due to leave the next day for Süchow.

We saw Mr. Bert Hall and Major Shumaker, aviation advisers to the government. These men were both of the opinion that little could be accomplished with aviation because of indifference and lack of support afforded them by the responsible heads. At this time they had very few qualified pilots and none that had had any instruction in bombing and use of machine guns on planes. However, these men, like all other foreign advisers, are looking out for themselves and so long as they draw their pay in advance they will stick, but if pay fails or if things look bad, they will slip out. During the time of our visit, however, they were very confident that the government would win, and were expecting 10 Douglas bombers to arrive at Nanking by the end of May, when plans were to be made for sending a squadron to destroy Yen's arsenal at Taiyuanfu. There is a very good airdrome at Nanking equipped with ten hangars, used in common by the Minister of Communications and the military.

A visit was made to the Nanking arsenal which is very active in turning out small arms ammunition, machine guns, aerial bombs, Stokes mortar bombs, etc. (see report on arsenals).

Authority was granted to visit the Central Military Academy. This Academy has replaced the Whampoa Military Academy near Canton and is now the Central Military Academy which prepares schedules of training and instruction for the Wuhan Military Academy (at Wuchang) and the Whampoa Military Academy near Canton.

The Academy is located at the base of Purple Hill on which stands the tomb of Sun Yat-sen, and adjacent to the tomb of the first Ming Emperor. The plant is very complete in buildings and equipment and can accommodate 3,000 cadets. At present, 1800 are under training. There are no foreign instructors, but the German advisers have drawn up the schedule of instruction.

General Chiang Kai-shek lives in the house of the Commandant within the grounds (see report for digest).

There are a number of military hospitals in Nanking, but at this time the patients consisted of local garrison cases and some cases of severe wounds as a result of last year's war. The accommodations are crude, although the German's have installed much up-to-date medical equipment, such as X-Ray machines, etc. No foreign medical men are employed in these hospitals. The doctors are mostly graduates of the medical colleges in Peiping and Tientsin. Sanitary conditions were good and the dispensary was well supplied with medicines. I was informed that they were not making preparations to receive wounded from the front as it was the custom to treat all cases in towns along the railroad. The capacity of these hospitals average from 500 to 700 beds.

An opportunity to observe most of the heads of the government was afforded during dinner at Dr. C. T. Wang's, Mr. T. V. Soong's and at the house of General Chiang Kai-shek. I was particularly impressed with Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong and Tan Yen-kai. These men appear to be the strong men of the present government. Hu Han-ming is slight of figure, very active in speech and manner, demanding attention when speaking. He impressed me as an unknown quantity. I rather got the impression that Dr. C. T. Wang did not fit in with these others.

There appeared to be an air of confidence about these men who were familiar with the situation, and who stated that the government had the situation well in hand and that Feng and Yen could not make serious progress against them.

There is great building activity going on in all parts of the city, mostly government buildings of brick construction for temporary use.

Several good roads have been constructed but through lack of care are rapidly going to pieces. Transportation is confined to old taxis and rickshas, both very expensive; in fact, living here is very expensive, with hotel accommodations limited.

Up the River.

We left Nanking at 1:00 p.m. on May 7th aboard a Butterfield & Swire boat. The river was up about 35 ft. and still rising. A flood is predicted in August. The river boats are very comfortable. All passenger boats have armor plate around the upper decks to protect passengers from shots fired from the shore. Stops are made at Wuhu, Anking, Kiukiang and Hankow.

An agreement arrived at between the commanders of the foreign fleets provides for one or more gunboats being stationed at all the important cities up the river. The country on both sides of the river and extending as far as the eye can see is cultivated and the crops appeared to be in fine condition. One wonders that famine can exist in a country so widely cultivated.

During stops of several hours at Kiukiang, a call was made on the Standard Oil agent, who informed us that the country to the south in the direction of Nanchang was infested with bandits and communists, and that it was unsafe to even go outside the city very far. Most of the government troops had been withdrawn from this area to be used at the front, and there was a fear that Kiukiang would be attacked by communists. Kuling, the summer resort in the mountains about nine miles back of Kiukiang, has been placed out of bounds by the foreign consuls and their nationals advised not to go there at this time.

Hankow.

We arrived in Hankow at 11:00 a.m. May 10th. For anyone who has never visited this city it will be of interest to know that it impresses one as being as large as Shanghai. There is the Bund, and the foreign concessions (only French and Japanese now) and business activity everywhere.

A visit was made to the Consulate and appointments made to call on the area commander, Ho Ying-ching, to visit the Hanyang arsenal and the Wuhan Military Academy.

Accompanied by Admiral Gravens, Commander of the Yangtse Patrol, we called at the headquarters of General Ho. Here we learned of the capture of Pochow on May 11, and other successes of government troops along the Lunghai. He told us things were quiet up the Peking-Hankow line, that General Ho Chen-chun, the Third Army Group Commander, with his staff had left the day before (May 9) for Sinyang, where he would establish his headquarters. He informed us that they had ample troops to meet any move that Feng made, and that it was the plan of the government to move slowly up the railroad with a view of co-operating with the advance along the Lunghai in the capture of Chengchow. He said that there would be no action in the Han River Valley; that Feng was having difficulty in mobilizing his troops and was short of arms, ammunition and supplies. He refused permission for me to visit the front.

At this time one would never believe the war zone was near. The city is peaceful, calm and busy, no one seems to think the war will come here and are satisfied to continue the present government.

We visited the Hanyang arsenal, which is very active in making rifles, carbines, small arms ammunition, bombs for airplanes, and Stokes mortars and machine guns (see arsenal report).

We crossed the river to Wuchang where the Wuhan Military Academy is located. We were particularly impressed with the efficient manner in which instruction was carried on here; although lacking many facilities in buildings and equipment, it was my impression that this Academy is far more efficiently administered than the Central Military Academy, under the eyes of Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking (see report for digest).

There was considerable discussion regarding bandit and communist activities in the areas to the south and west of the river, but there seemed to be no fear that Hankow would be affected. It is astonishing how indifferent these people are to the conditions of war and seem to care little who wins; as they say, it matters not who controls the government as they suffer as much under one as under another.

As conditions were peaceful here and General Ho Ying-ching assured me there would be no movements for a week or two, I left on May 15th for Nanking, where we arrived on May 17th after an uneventful trip down river. I am told boats are not fired on below Hankow. We remained in Nanking three days during which time it rained continuously. I called on the Acting Minister of War, Chen I, and General Chu Pei-teh (Chief of Staff to Chiang). Although received very cordially we learned nothing that had not been published in the papers to date. At this time the government troops were successful and were moving westward along the Lunghai. We were informed that they were expecting word of the fall of Lanfeng, and that it was expected that Chengchow would be captured before the 25th, after which the troops would move up the Tientsin-Pukow line with Tientsin as their objective. With the capture of Tientsin, Yen would be cut off from his main line of supply and the government could sit back and wait for submission, or disintegration of the Northern troops.

We returned to Shanghai on the 20th and learned that because of no rail communication between Shanghai and Tientsin all boat accommodations were reserved days in advance. While in Shanghai we spent two days visiting the Shanghai arsenal and ammunition plant; here great activity was observed. This appears to be the most important arsenal controlled by the government (see arsenal report).

Called on Sokolsky, of the Far Eastern Review, and Powell of the China Weekly Review. They both spoke confidently of the ability of the government to maintain itself. Other calls during these last days to include May 22, further confirmed the feeling that the government would stand. We left on May 23rd for Tsingtao with a feeling that the government had the situation well in hand. We arrived in Tsingtao on May 25th and found everything quiet and far removed from war worry. Our Consul informed me that they received little news here regarding the war and that they were not disturbed by bandits or communists.

We returned to Peiping on the 27th, and the following morning the Peking Leader carried the news of an overwhelming victory for the Northern Armies on the Lunghai front, and that the government armies had been crushed and were in full retreat. I was back in the anti-government atmosphere again, and although it was evident that the government forces had met with a reverse, I was satisfied the reports were grossly exaggerated, which proved to be so.

The following is a summary of miscellaneous information obtained during my trip:

1. Chiang Kai-shek declared he would not buy off any more doubtful generals.

2. The German advisers with the Central Government enjoy unusual influence over Chiang. There is evidence that enormous quantities of war supplies are purchased upon their recommendation.

3. The German advisers attempted to persuade Chiang to organize a chemical warfare service and to employ gas against his opponents, but without success.

4. Although the Central Government has a number of small Whippet tanks they do not expect to use them in the field, due to difficulty of operation and lack of repair shops.

5. The supply system is organized as follows:

A large depot is established at Nanking and at Hankow. Sub-depots are established along the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad to supply designated divisions within each area. Sub-depots are established along the Peking-Hankow Railroad and supply divisions within designated areas. Supplies are pushed up from the main depots to sub-depots, and divisions are supplied from sub-depots by wheeled vehicle where roads permit, or by coolie labor.

6. All war material manufactured at government arsenals is sent to Nanking for distribution. This is done as Nanking fears shipment of arms, ammunition, etc., might reach organizations for which it was not intended.

7. (a) The present class at the Central Military Academy is being trained as a nucleus on which to organize the second Model Division.
(b) The class at the Wuhan Military Academy is to form the third Model Division.

8. Each arsenal has attached a small powder plant where powder in small quantity is manufactured. It is not satisfactory and will be done away with after the present emergency and all powders will be purchased from abroad. All appear to favor DuPont powder. I was informed that the

government had just bought from DuPont 160 tons of smokeless powder and 100 tons of T.N.T.

9. In conclusion, the strategical position of the government at the time of this visit appeared to insure them a big advantage in the coming conflict, other things being equal, viz:

a) Their forces are well equipped, well fed and better trained than their opponents.

b) Their forces are distributed along lines of communication which will permit rapid receipt of supplies and reinforcements—on the East, the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad and Grand Canal; on the West, the Peking-Hankow Railroad. Large number of passenger boats are available on the Yangtse River for moving rapidly troops or supplies from one front to the other. Possession of the Lunghai Railroad will add another valuable line of communication.

c) The money market of China is located at Shanghai.

d) The Central Government has the benefit of German military advisers, most of whom it is reported saw service in the World War.

e) The Central Government has control of the air and are organizing an air force, having two expert American advisers as instructors.

10. Opposed to this formidable array, the Northern leaders have an equal number of men. It is reported they are not well fed, clothed or equipped, and that their source of supplies is limited; but those who have lived long in China and observed and studied the Chinese, state that the government has all the advantage but some unforeseen element may appear.

At this writing (June 4, 1930) the Central Government is struggling for its very existence and the outcome does not appear too favorable.

I have written this report in a narrative form in order to give my impressions as a result of my first trip in China.

N E Margetts

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILANTEL DIV
SEP 6
20SS-68/1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

G-2 Report.

VISIT TO TAIYUANFU, CHENGCHOW
AND KAIFENG,
WITH COMMENTS.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 3 1930

The offensive launched by Chiang Kai-shek June 18, south of the Lung-hai railroad and in a northwesterly direction with Kaifeng as the main objective burned itself out about June 27 and 28 when Chiang had arrived within fifteen miles of Kaifeng. A counter-attack by several of Feng's divisions between Kaifeng and Lanfeng beat back Chiang's right, thus exposing his left and caused a withdrawal to almost the line of departure on June 18. From this time until the first week in July contradictory reports were received daily until it was impossible to arrive at any conclusion as to the existing situation on the Lung-hai front.

On July 8, accompanied by Captain De Pass, fourth-year language student, I left Peiping for Taiyuanfu with the hope of seeing Marshal Yen Hsi-shan and learning something definite as to the situation in the west.

We arrived at Taiyuan July 9, at 4 p. m.; found all hotel accomodations occupied by politicians, office seekers and visiting army officers. However, we were cared for when it was learned our mission was to call on Marshal Yen. The following morning representatives from Yen's Headquarters called upon us extending a welcome from Yen himself, it was arranged that we should call on Yen at 11 a. m. to pay our respects. A car arrived at the hotel and we were conducted to the Marshal's yamen where he greeted us cordially and our interview lasted nearly an hour.

Yen appears to be carrying a burden of worry, he sighed deeply at intervals and his smiles and laughing replies seemed forced, he appeared to be in good health, answered questions readily; and granted requests promptly when asked if I could visit his arsenal, if I could go to Chengchow and if he would give me a letter that would admit me to an interview with Marshal Feng.

In reply to my question as to the situation at the front, he stated he was optomistic and felt they had the situation well in hand; asked if he intended going to Peiping and if a government would be formed he stated he was occupied with the military situation now and until a decisive victory was gained or the military situation cleared, he would have not time for political considerations, he said the supply problem was difficult but they were able to solve it.

Marshal Yen does not impress one as a military man, he is forty-eight years old and a delightful Chinese gentleman of the higher class, he is very gentle in act and conversation and fits in better as an administrator or diplomat. Our interview ended and we returned to the hotel to prepare for our visit to the arsenal during the afternoon when we were escorted to it by a member of Yen's staff-received by the Director and shown over the entire plant. All information asked for was freely given. (See Arsenal Report No. 7784).

Upon our return to the hotel we found an invitation to dine with the Marshal at 6 p. m. At 5.30 a car called for us with a member of Yen's official family. En route to the yamen while driving through a narrow crowded street the car struck and knocked down an elderly Chinese. This caused considerable excitement, a large crowd gathered, the police took charge and although the man was not badly hurt, the police stated the driver and car must be taken to the police station and we would have to

From M/A

proceed by ricksha to the yamen. I mention this to show that even Yen's car and guests are subject to the laws of Taiyuan. At dinner we met Yen's official family, consisting of twelve civilian and military members. The Marshal begged to be excused as important matters had come up that must be attended to at once.

The dinner was very pleasant, questions were asked and answered. It was confirmed that there would be no government formed by Yen until a decisive military victory was gained. They stated this victory would be the capture of Hsuchow on the Sin-pu railroad. Before our departure a letter signed by Marshal Yen was handed me to present to Marshal Feng.

The following day July 11, we called on General Shan Chen, now Governor or Chairman of Shansi, he is the General who commanded in Peiping sometime ago, it seems that he had been charged with arresting Chiang Kai-shek when he visited Peiping but failed to carry out the order, that this aroused suspicion in Yen's mind and he transferred General Shan to Taiyuan as Chairman of Shansi Province with station in Taiyuan under Yen's eye.

I found him a charming gentleman, who received us warmly and stated that anything he could do for us would make him very happy. He said that in his opinion that in case the present government is disposed of and Yen establishes a government at Nanking, that the important posts would have to be shared with: Feng Yu-hsiang, Li Sung-jen, Wang Ching-wei, General Hsu Chung-chih, Tang Shao-yi and Chang Hsueh-liang, (the Young Marshal) provided he would join; but if the present government is not disposed of and he decides to form a government in the north, then Yen's own men will be in the majority.

We left Taiyuan at 12.09 p. m. July 11, arrived at Shih Shia-chuang at 8 p. m. where we spent the night,--left at 7 a. m. July 12, for Chengchow where we arrived at 11.30 p. m. on the same day, to find the city dark. Feng has closed all power plants as spies utilized his electric power to radio his movements and they stated his train had been bombed by enemy planes. There are no foreign hotel accomodations in Chengchow. The following day July 13, we presented our letter at the Social Bureau and were put in touch with Mr. Tang, brother-in-law of Feng, who is in charge of Feng's Foreign Affairs Office. He received us cordially and suggested that we go to Feng's Headquarters and take a chance on seeing him without a previous appointment. This proved to be a very interesting part of our visit; we took rickshas and after a time came to the railroad station. Here was noticed a train made up of twenty-two dilapitated box cars, a portable radio station was erected nearby. Mr. Tang informed me that this was Feng's special train, that his staff and Headquarters Personnel lived on the train and it was available to move at a moment's warning.

Our rickshas stopped at the entrance of a mud godown some hundred yards from the train, we entered and were ushered into a small room that had been arranged as an office. Mr. Tang left us to see if Feng would receive us, but soon returned with the information that Feng had been on the phone for hours receiving information from and giving instructions to, his field commanders and was now sleeping. He suggested that we wait as he slept very little. In a short time an officer came to conduct us to Feng. We passed through an open court surrounded by a mud wall, passed a detachment of several men on guard and entered another open court. My attention was at once attracted to a bomb-proof dug-out as the only habitation in view. They informed me this was where Feng lived when not in the field. On the opposite side I saw a huge man in a plain denim gown pacing back and forth, as we approached he came toward us with a pleasant smile and welcomed us warmly. This was Feng--the fighting man--and this is the impression he gives you at once. We sat down, were served tea and began an interview which lasted about an hour.

Feng is certainly in good health, does not appear worried and in reply to questions, stated he was satisfied with the situation, that at this time the Government troops were on the defensive on the Lung-hai awaiting re-inforcements, that in the last offensive Chiang had arrived within fifteen miles of Kaifeng before he was stopped, and that his (Feng's) counter-attacks had forced him back to where he had started.

We learned that there had been no enemy planes over Kaifeng or Chengchow for over two weeks, that when they did come they usually attacked the railroad stations and military objectives.

In reply to my request to visit Kaifeng, Lanfeng and to go down the Peking-Hankow line, he stated he would be very glad to grant any request I made, that he felt very kindly toward Americans, but he would not permit either the Japanese or English to visit his front. Feng would not discuss politics, he said he had more important matters on his mind. Our interview terminated in a friendly manner and we left much impressed with the simplicity of this big fellow who has exercised great influence in political and military affairs in China for many years.

He lives the life of the common soldier, eating the same food. He never drinks alcohol, nor smokes, nor does he permit his officers or men to do so, he is more lenient with his civilian staff, but they never smoke in his presence. He contents himself with one wife and no concubines

We left Chengchow at 7 a. m. July 14, arrived at Kaifeng at 12.30 p. m. on the same day. The railroad station is about three miles from the town and one must walk or ride in ricksha, there are no foreign hotel accomodations here. Feng sent a Colonel of his staff with us and a member of the Social Bureau who speaks English.

Soon after arrival we visited the Headquarters of General Lu Chun-lin, Feng's Field Commander, he had left for the front the day previous, his Chief of Staff received us cordially and gave us an idea of the situation on this front. Although Kaifeng is well in the zone of operations, there was no sound of guns and no outward evidences that a war was going on nearby. I was surprised to find practically no troops in this vicinity. There are no large reserves in this area, the front line at this time runs about 100 li or 33 miles east of Lanfeng, thence south and west through: Suichow--Taikang--Sihwa, all to Feng and to the Pin-Han railway just north of Yencheng, the latter to Chiang. It was along this front that Chiang launched his offensive on June 18, and where both sides are facing each other in an exhausted condition.

After leaving Headquarters we were taken to visit a military hospital. The one visited is located in a group of mission buildings and is in charge of a Chinese doctor who is a graduate of Harvard Medical School. He has a model hospital with a capacity of 250 beds, everyone occupied by a serious case, the medical personnel is limited and the doctor informed me they perform major operations during the day and night.

A visit through the wards disclosed the fact that a majority of wounds were from machine guns, artillery and rifles, a few bayonet or knife wounds were seen. Medical supplies are insufficient, they have to improvise in many ways to meet the ever-growing emergency. There are no foreign medical personnel here. I was informed there were nine other hospitals in Kaifeng, all filled, that the hospitals in Chengchow were too, and they are distributing the overflow of wounded up the Pin-Han line. From figures given us, I estimate there are at least twenty-five thousand wounded in this area, and a tragic shortage of medical personnel, supplies and hospital facilities.

G-2 Report.

We spent the day in Kaifeng and decided not to go on to Lanfeng which is only eighteen miles further east, all was quiet and railroad travel is very difficult. We left at 2 a. m. on July 15 to return to Cheng chow. The train we left on brought in from Lanfeng 200 wounded, the majority severely so, there was a small detail of medical personnel at the station, but no officer present, these men did not seem to know anything about handling the wounded and much time and delay resulted in unloading the wounded who were scattered about on the floor of dirty box cars and flat cars, these wounded were taken from the cars and laid about on the station platform, most of them had some evidence of first aid bandages, there were no moans or groans, many were unconscious and nine were dead when unloaded from the cars. When the train pulled out two hours later most of the wounded were still on the ground.

This apparent indifference to the care of the wounded, not alone on the part of the military, but by the population is one of the sad things about this war. The civil population offer no assistance to the wounded soldier, it may be that they have suffered so much at the hands of the military that their hearts are hardened against anyone who wears a uniform.

We returned to Chengchow arriving at 6 a. m. on July 15. Only two trains a week leave Chengchow for Peiping, it was necessary for us to remain in this area from July 12 to the 17. During this period we visited around a great deal and had an opportunity of observing conditions first hand.

From the time of our arrival until our departure, the heat was intense, averaging about 105 degrees, the countryside is dry and burned, the crops in this area look very badly because of great shortage of water. The farmers work their wells day and night to keep the crops from failing. The dust and dirt in the city streets is unbelievable, there seems to be sufficient food for the people, we saw no indication of famine. In all the towns in this area they have dug bomb-proof shelters along the streets at intervals of about 100 yards.

We left Chengchow at 8 a. m. on July 17, arrived at Shih Chiachuang at 1 a. m. on July 18 and at Taiyuan at 4 p. m. the same day. I returned to Taiyuan for the purpose of going by auto to Tatungfu, we left Taiyuan at 7 a. m. on July 19 and arrived at Tatungfu at 6 p. m. the same day.

This distance is about 200 miles traversed by a good auto road. Ten large busses leave Taiyuan daily for Tatung and ten leave the latter place daily for Taiyuan, the country traversed is rich and prosperous, the crops are abundant and about ready to harvest. The trip over the mountains through the Yen Men pass is intensely interesting and a fine piece of engineering was done when this road was completed. Tatung is on the Peking-Suiyuan railway. We were cordially received by the magistrate who had been advised of our coming by the Governor and the Governor's yamen was opened for us to stay over night. In the morning of July 20, escorted by an armed detail of 30 men (bandits were peported about) we were taken to the Caves of the Clouds about ten miles distance, where a group of caves with carved Buddhas sisty feet high are located, the figures being in a remarkable state of preservation after 1600 years. We returned to Tatung and left at midnight for Peiping where we arrived at 5 p. m. July 21, after a very interesting and instructive trip, but a most uncomfortable one.

COMMENTS.

1. Military.

Very little military activity was observed until we left Shih Chia-chuang for Chengchow. Along the Pin-Han, south of this point, there was observed many supply trains carrying flour, grain and ammunition. Some few units--none large than a battalion--were moving south.

In the Chengchow and Kaifeng area there were surprisingly few troops in spite of the fact that this is the critical area within which Feng's troops are mobilized and where important military decisions are to be arrived at.

These troops observed were well equipped, all wore good looking uniforms and appeared to be amply supplied with food; most of the men were of mature age, very few boys in uniform were in evidence. It was learned in view of the difficulty in getting sufficient war material that Feng's men have been taught to conserve their ammunition, especially small ammunition.

A company of Feng's famous Big Sword men were observed at drill near Chengchow. There were about 100, the gymnastics employed in the drill bordered on the ridiculous, I endeavored to learn something of the effectiveness of these units at the front, but little information was available here. I am inclined to believe that they are given wide publicity with a view of affecting the morale of the enemy and that very little use is made of them at the front. Most of the station guards along the railroad consisted of soldiers equipped with the big sword worn across the back.

One is impressed with the apparent lack of interest of the people concerning the war. The fact is the masses in their daily struggle for existence, in the effort to find food enough to keep alive, have no time or thought for other matters.

I was informed that machine guns and artillery are playing the important part in the present operations on the Lung-hai, that both sides employ many trench mortars of 3 inch caliber.

The Chinese private soldier is a poor marksman with a rifle, the reason for this is that because of shortage of ammunition, target practice is rarely, if ever, engaged in, neither does he give much time to the care and cleaning of his weapons. Rifles were observed dirty and rusty, and there were great numbers of machine guns, artillery material and rifles noticed in the Taiyuan arsenal returned from the front for repair and overhaul and much of this had become unserviceable from lack of care.

One gets the impression that the war is a long way from Kaifeng and Chengchow, as a matter of fact the front lines are not distant more than twenty-five or thirty miles.

At this time both sides have fought until exhausted and the situation on this, the Lung-hai front, can be said to be stabilized and will remain so until one or the other is reinforced to the point where there is a chance of a successful offensive. In the meantime, operations on the Sin-pu are becoming active and failure on the part of Chiang Kai-shek to stop the advance south to Hsuchow, of the Shansi forces, would mean abandonment of the Lung-hai front followed by evacuation of the Wuhan area. Success for Chiang on the Sin-pu to the extent of driving the Shansi forces north of the Yellow river and re-occupation of Tsinan would be a moral rather than physical victory, because it would further extend his now weakened lines. Chiang's most serious problem is the

elimination of Feng, if he can succeed in this the war is won for him. Where ever Feng is fighting there the final decision will be made and as he is mobilized on the Lung-hai, Chiang must concentrate his strenghh there.

Time is an important factor that will favor the Government armies, because Chiang has money and can get ample supplies for his troops, his communications by rail and water will admit of supply or transfer of troops from one front to another, although the Government air service was badly crippled by cavalry raids and other losses. Airplanes are reported to be arriving in large numbers at Nanking and bombing will be renewed soon. On the other hand Yen has little money and those powers that could supply him with supplies of all kinds will not grant the necessary credit.

Yen's only resources from the outside must come through the one port of Tientsin, his one Arsenal at Taiyuanfu cannot meet the demands of the troops on both fronts, and the people are being stripped of their possessions by increased taxes and requisitions.

As an example of supplies received by Nanking from outside sources, it was confirmed through the Consul-General at Shanghai on July 26, that the following war material was unloaded from the Japanese steamer "Taian Maru" at Woosung on July 16, 1930 and transported to Nanking the same day: 100 field guns, 20 stokes motors, 300 tons of powder, 2 1/2 million rounds of ammunition, 60 motor boats.
It is not clear why Chiang does not destroy the railroad bridge over the Yellow River north of Chengchow. The destruction of this bridge, which bombing easily could accomplish, would mean the economic defeat of Feng, Over 75 percent of his supplies comes from the north and crosses this bridge, there is no other means of getting supplies to his army except by improvising ferries and they could not begin to maintain the necessary supply to his armies. The only evidence of protection for the bridge observed is two field guns among some trees which would mate zero against airplanes. The only answer I can find for Chiang's failure to take advantage of this opportunity is that he fears the destruction of the bridge will bring hardship to the civilian population south of the river and thus turn them against his government.

2. Economic.

a. Railroads:

The Peking-Hankow railroad runs a passenger train with sleeping cars and diner as far as Chengchow twice each week. The rolling stock is in very poor condition, I did not see an engine that was not leaking badly, both water and steam.

Trains are usually crowded both ways. The road bed is in good condition but all sleepers are badly decayed and spikes can be drawn out by hand, the normal running speed is about 15 miles per hour and trains make no pretense of running on schedule time, four to six hours late is the usual thing.

From Chengchow supply trains run east to Lanfeng, south to Hsuchang and West to the end of the Lunghai line, this stretch of railroad is in very poor condition, passenger trains are not run but all supply trains are crowded whereever space can be found. The railroad from the junction of the Pin-Han at Shih Chia-chuang to Taiyuanfu is in excellent condition with regard to rolling stock and road equipment. Trains leave on scheduled time and arrive on scheduled time, this run is managed by French and Belgian engineers.

G-2 Report.

The Peking-Suiyuan Railroad from Tatung to Peiping is in fair condition. No first class accomodations or dining car is provided, the rolling stock is in bad repair and the road-bed requires much attention, trains on this line run on scheduled time.

b. Roads:

There are no roads suitable for motor transport outside the towns and only the military personnel are using motor cars in this area. There are, however, good motor roads in Shansi. One runs from Taiyuanfu to Tatung, a distance of 200 miles over which daily bus service is run. Another runs south from Taiyuan, also served by passenger busses.

c. Crops.

Through the province of Shansi the crops appear to be excellent. In southern Hopei and northern Honan conditions are very bad, lack of water and burning sun has caused much damage and crops are in very poor condition.

3. Political.

Yen and Feng were definite in stating that until a decisive military victory has been gained or until the military situation became more favorable, that they would take no steps toward the formation of a separate government in Peiping.

Wang Ching Wei has finally left his retreat in Hongkong and arrived in Peiping, where he has been met by the out politicians and there is great publicity and propoganda being spread around stating the great things they are going to do to save the country. It is difficult to understand just what these gentlemen expect to accomplish, of course they can get together, draw up a tentative form of government and there it must end awaiting a favorable military outcome for the north.

Whatever these politicians agree to they will have no power to act until the stamp of approval is given by Yen and Feng. In addition, funds will be necessary to carry on with, it is hardly conceivable that Yen will permit the diversion of public funds from his military campaign when he and Feng are fighting for their very existence and money is their life blood. In the last analysis the whole show savors of the burlesque and I do not believe anything of a practical nature will be accomplished until Yen and Feng have brought the present war to a successful conclusion.

NOTE:

During my visit to the western front I was accompanied by Captain Morris De Pass who is entering upon his fourth year as language student. His services were invaluable, his broad knowledge of the Chinese language which he speaks fluently saved many embarrassing situations and his observations of things military and otherwise were of great assistance. I feel that this is the sort of experience our language students are trained for and the practical application they are given in the opportunity to apply the three years of theoretical study, is of greatest value to them. I have utilized Lieutenant Kanaga in the Yangtze valley, Captain De Pass on the western front and hope to use Lieutenant White in Manchuria before his time is up next year.

N E Margetts

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Distribution:

4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

UNITED STATES NATIONAL MUSEUM
BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY
ASTROPHYSICAL OBSERVATORY
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ALL CORRESPONDENCE
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
Washington, U.S.A.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
APR 26 1931
2055-682
NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART
FREER GALLERY OF ART
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGES
INTERNATIONAL CATALOGUE OF
SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE
WAR DEPARTMENT

April 7, 1931

File

Dear Sir:

Receipt is acknowledged of your communication of the first instant (G-2/2055-682) and of accompanying enclosures, one describing the 1930 Central Asiatic Expedition under Roy Chapman Andrews and the other being a series of six maps made by Lieut. Willard G. Wyman, who accompanied the Expedition.

Your thoughtful interest in forwarding this material is very greatly appreciated and I would assure you of our appreciation of your cooperation. It is understood that the matter forwarded is not for publication.

Very truly yours,

C G Abbot

Secretary.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 8 - 1931

Col. William H. Wilson, U.S.Army,
Acting Executive Officer, G-2,
Military Intelligence Division,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

DE

WDC/IAV

G-2/2055-482

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 26 1931
2055-68
3
WAR DEPARTMENT

April 1, 1931.

Mr. C. G. Abbott,
Secretary of Smithsonian Institution,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I am enclosing copies of two reports from our Military Attache at Peiping, China, one describing the 1930 Central Asiatic Expedition under Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews, and the second transmitting a series of six maps made by Lieutenant Willard G. Wyman, attached to the Military Attache's Office, who accompanied the expedition. A set of the maps is forwarded to you under separate cover. It is believed these reports and maps will be of interest to some branch of the Smithsonian Institution. It is understood, of course, that they are not for publication.

For the A. C. of S., G-2.

WM. H. WILSON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Executive Officer, G-2.

2 encl.

MAILED G/2 W. D. APR 2 1931

clt

Set of maps referred to not mailed from mail Room
copy.

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
PEKING, CHINA.

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 5 1931
WAR DEPARTMENT

9 Enc

205-5-682

November 22, 1930

Subject: Sketches to Accompany Report No. 7789

To : The Military Attache, Peiping, China

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 3 1931

205-5-682/1

1. In accordance with the last paragraph of Report No. 7789, "Report of Travel with the Central Asiatic Expedition, Summer of 1930", the following sketches are submitted:

Sketches	Area	
Vicinity of Hatt-in-Sumu (1 sheet)	2 miles by 6 miles	R.F. 1/20,000
Vicinity of Wolf Camp (2 sheets)	3 miles by 11 miles	R.F. 1/20,000

Route Sketches

Vicinity of Tairum Nor Basin (1 sheet)	95 miles	R.F. 1/200,000

Wolf Camp to:

Northeast	32 miles	)	
North	20 "	) All on	
Northwest	15 "	) one	
Telegraph road	20 "	) sheet	R.F. 1/200,000
Southeast	32 "	)	

An area sketch covering terrain of route sketches on one sheet		R.F. 1/200,000
A very rough sketch of route covered by camel caravan made from data given by a Chinese boy accompanying camels. (1 sheet)	120 miles	R.F. 1/200,000

2. A memorandum to Dr. Andrews is submitted showing an error in the large area sketch. The sketch remade at the American Museum should be corrected for this error.

Willard G. Wyman
Willard G. Wyman
First Lieutenant, Cavalry, D. O. L.

WGW/edb

1 encl

1st Ind.

No. 7893.

From: Office of the Military Attache, Peiping, China, December 2, 1930;
To: The A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

The attached sketches complete the report No. 7789, submitted by Lieutenant Wyman. This information is valuable in that the work covers an area of which, heretofore, little was known. Lieutenant Wyman deserves commendation for the successful result of his efforts.

NEM/edb

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Mongolia

P. 3-20-20/200

1-/

JAN 5

205-5-2

Memo. to Dr. Andrews.

Subject:- Notes relative to sketches drawn in June-July, 1930.

Equipment: Plane table, with compass attachment.
Alidade, non telescopic.
Prismatic compass.
Abney level.
2 aneroid barometers. (Keuffel&Esser, #5291, obtained from U.S.Military Attache's office in Peking. Tycos, obtained from Dr. Andrews.)

Checking of barometers.

At known points on the route into Mongolia elevations were computed by adding the altimeter's difference of elevation between Peking and the known point to the known elevation of Peking. The average of the elevations as found by the two barometers was compared with the known elevation. The error in any case was less than 20 feet.

Elevations.

Initial elevations of unknown points for all sketches were found by the method described in the paragraph above. However, more care was taken in the use of barometric readings, ie. only those readings were used which were obtained over a period of normal fair weather days.

Declination.

Declination was determined by taking azimuths of the sun morning and evening when it was at zero elevation.

Error in large sketch.

The sketch of the Wolf Camp - Tairum Nor Basin area was made from route sketches drawn in those two areas. The only point in common to the Tairum Nor Basin route sketch sheet and the Wolf Camp route sketch sheet is the well at Mingan Japchir. On the Wolf Camp sheet this point was very roughly located due to poor visibility from Bomban Obo on the day of that prospect. Consequently in putting the two sheets together there is a possibility of a considerable relative error. This error can be corrected if you have sketches at home locating Gurdong Ho Usu and Mingan Japchir Usu with respect to each other.

Willard G. Wyman,
1st Lieut., Cav., D.O.L.

Note by FE,G-2: Sketches were distributed to
Geog. Br., G-2
AWC, State Dept.,
Commerce Dept., Nat. Museum

(2055-682/2 Jan 5, 1931)

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Willard G. Wyman
1st Lieut., Cav., D.O.L.

Mongolia
P3-30-20/200

COPY

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
SEP 15 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

G-2 Report.

Report of Travel with the CENTRAL ASIATIC EXPEDITION

Summer of 1930

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 12 1930

Members of the Party

Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews, Leader.
Mr. Walter Granger, Paleantologist and Second in command.
Pere Teillard de Chardin, Geologist.
Mr. William Thompson, Preparator.
Dr. Chang, Paleantologist, China Geological Survey, nominally Co-Director of the Expedition.
Dr. Yang, Geologist, China Geological Survey.
Dr. A. Garber, Medical.
Lieutenant W. G. Wyman, Topographer.
5 Chinese Technicians
2 Chinese Cooks.
1 Chinese Chaufferu.
2 Chinese Boys for personal service.
2 Mongol Interpreters.
5 Mongol Camel boys.

Transport.

3 light Dodge Trucks (half-ton)
1 Dodge Touring Car.
50 Camels.

Purpose of the Expedition of this Season.

The purpose of the Expedition was:

1. To make a more complete collection of fossil specimens for the American Museum of Natural History, New York.

2. To make a six weeks exploration by camel of a sand region 100 miles northeast of Hatt-in-Sumu from which place reports had come indicating a region of particular interest to the Expedition.

I accompanied the Expedition as topographer for the purpose of making route sketches of territory covered in the second project. At Hatt-in-Sumu a two day reconnaisance by motor was made to the borders of the region to be explored. Here it was found that conditions had been greatly exaggerated in the native reports and the leader abandoned the second project. He consequently devoted his principal effort to obtaining fossils from areas in which he had worked in previous years. The geologist was able to make additional studies of these regions. The topographer made several route maps of short exploration trips as well as several contour sketches of small areas which will be used to augment the mapping done in previous years.

Itinerary.

The personnel of the Expedition was assembled in Peking and moved to Kalgan via the Peking-Suiyuan railroad on May 26, 1930. Motor transport with camp and personal equipment was assembled in Kalgan. Gas and commissaries with working supplies had been shipped ten days previously by cart to Hatt-in-Sumu where the camel caravan was to assemble.

From M/A Report No. 7789 August 8, 1930

Report.

On May 27 the Expedition moved by motor to Chang Pei Hsien via the Wan Ch'uan pass a distance of thirty-five miles. On May 28 it moved to Hatt-in-Sumu via the Kalgan-Urga Telegraph Road a distance of 97 miles. Here the Expedition remained in the camp for ten days. Four days were used in reconnaisance to determine the feasibility of carrying out Phase Two of the Summer project. Three bearings were burned out requiring two days work on the motor and the remaining time was spent in assembling camels, preparing packs and hiring native help.

On June 6, the camel caravan left for the next camp. June 7 the Expedition moved by motor northwest up the Telegraph Road on Iren Dabasu. A few miles south of that place it left the road and moved northeastward to Bolok-in-Sumu, a distance of 129 miles.

June 8, we moved thirty miles east to a camp of a previous year. (Elephant Camp.)

June 9, a very successful prospect for fossils was made and on June 10, we moved fifteen miles southwest to Wolf Camp.

June 12 the camels came in, they had taken a shorter route than the motors, having done 120 miles in seven days, Dr. Andrews thought this to be a day too slow in spite of the fact that the camels were soft when they started.

Several short exploration trips were made from Wolf Camp, route maps of which were made and area contoured sketches were drawn as directed by the Leader. June 30, Dr. Andrews left for Peking with two truck-loads of fossils and returned July 14 with supplies.

On July 22, two more truck-loads of fossils started for Peking taking also Pere Teillard, Dr. Yang and myself, as our work was finished. Trucks left camp at 6.15 a. m. arriving at Chang Pei Hsien at 9 p. m., a distance of 212 miles, this is a record run for any of the expedition's motor transport in Mongolia. We arrived in Kalgan on July 23 and on July 24 went by rail to Peking.

General Topography of Area Covered.

The Peking-Suiyuan Railroad climbs steeply through the Nan Kou pass to an altitude of 2,437 feet at Kalgan.

There are two passes from Kalgan northward to the Mongolian plateau. The Wan Ch'uan pass which can be used by motor transport is 5,000 feet at its summit, 17 miles north of Kalgan. The other pass, a few miles to the east of Wan Ch'uan is used only by animal drawn and pack transport.

The Mongolian plateau is in reality a great basin, part of its southern rim being the range just north of Kalgan. The terrain of the plateau traveled over by the party is of two quite different types--the Grasslands and the Gobi Desert.

The Grasslands go inward from the rim toward the center of the basin for over a hundred miles. On the Telegraph Road they extend to a point about twenty miles northwest of Hatt-in-Sumu. The region, as its name implies, is quite fertile and where there is no cultivation, furnishes splendid grazing for stock. It is a steeply rolling country and the road winds through hills, many of which are 300 feet high. As one goes on into the Gobi, the hills become flatter, the soil becomes gravelly and the grass is sparce, though to my surprise the Gobi does furnish grass in many places capable of giving much Mongol stock good grazing. The Gobi is cut through

with many smaller basins and between them spreads a vast area of plain, in some places gently rolling and in others as flat and hard as a great man-made floor. On the rims of the basins where the weathering has been most severe are found steep and ragged escarpments. In such regions basins drop down to 300 feet below the level of the plain.

North of Pan Chung there extends east and west across the width of Mongolia a broad belt of sand which often gives difficulty in dry weather to motor transportation. There is no way of avoiding it, so the roads generally find the narrowest places for crossing.

There are few stream beds on the plateau. Only one was encountered with running water, a small river five miles northwest of Chang Pei Hsien, named Pei Tao Chiao. This stream gave no difficulty in crossing with our transport. The bridge across it had been destroyed some years ago and it was necessary to pass through the stream. The bottom was soft, so each motor chose a crossing of its own and ran for it. Motors crossing in columns would have become mired. There are no bridge building materials in the vicinity.

Other water courses encountered were all dry and had hard bottoms except in rainy weather.

Climate.

The climate is a severe one. Members of the Expedition wore sheepskin coats up to the 26th of June. Goatskin sleeping bags were also comfortable up to that date. The cold weather commences about the middle of August, but in July the shade temperature did not go over 94 degrees. Early in July the thermometer dropped from 93 degrees to 40 in six hours. The older members in speaking of previous experiences indicated an unreliable and severe climate. The winds are extremely violent and bring bad weather from all points of the compass.

Mongol tents seem to be the most desirable type for use on the plateau. They present a minimum of resisting surface to the wind. The only tent in our service practicable for use in Mongolia is the shelter half. Our wallstents or pyramidals would be blown down too frequently to be useful.

Roads.

The road from Kalgan up through the Wan Ch'uan Pass is narrow and rough though quite good when compared to other roads of this country. Five miles north of Kalgan the road passes over some loess hills which in wet weather become very difficult due to the muddy and slippery surface. The road then follows a dry gravel-bottomed river bed which is reported to be passable in all weather. In the last five miles as the road approaches the summit the gradient becomes very steep. The road through the eastern pass is too rough and steep for motor transport. Generally north and south roads,-north of the pass-are routes between Urga and Kalgan, many of them coming into the Telegraph Road as it approaches the rim of the great basin. These roads, better called trails, are usually very rough due to the cart traffic over them in wet weather. Because of the nature of the terrain a vehicle is not confined to the use of the trail. This results often times in a band of cart tracks half a mile wide where travelers have sought smooth going. Sandy patches and mud in wet weather may be expected nearly anywhere along these routes.

Transportation.

Local transport is principally pack and animal drawn: camels, horses, mules and oxen being utilized as draft animals, and with the exception of the latter, also as pack animals.

Prior to the taking over of Outer Mongolia by the Russians, a bus line service existed between Urga and Kalgan. At present there is one bus line running between Kalgan via the Lamasery of Arshanto (Arshanto-in-Sumu) to a temple further to the north in Inner Mongolia.

Air transport would be quite practical in this country. Naturally smooth and hard ground can be found almost at will for landing fields. The Central Asiatic Expedition finds its motor transport to be entirely efficient. It goes anywhere on or off trails. However, it would have used airplanes for prospecting if permission could have been obtained from the Chinese government.

Communication.

The Urga-Kalgan Telegraph line is in good working order. There is a station every fifty miles. Two Chinese linesmen were seen working on the line in the Gobi Desert. A telegram was delivered to a missionary forty miles from the nearest station to my knowledge.

The postal service is poor. Telegraph stations and missions, which are few, are centers of distribution. Mails are carried mostly by dependable travelers.

Trade.

Considerable trade is carried on between Chinese merchants and the Mongols. The Chinese travel from the northern provinces of China to the Outer Mongolia borders in ox carts. They trade cloth and bad liquor for hides and wool.

Water.

Wells are found at frequent intervals usually not over twenty miles apart and often much closer. The wells are small and generally dirty. Missionaries report, however, that diseases communicated by drinking water do not frequently occur.

It is reported that water exists everywhere under the surface in this region and at a high level. It is believed that artesian wells could be sunk quickly and furnish a plentiful supply. An indication of the capacity of a well might be given in an instance, where we saw the average well supplying a herd of 500 horses, 100 camels and a family of Mongols.

Rainfall in the summer seems to be sufficient normally. Even in the Gobi Desert, this season, during my stay the rainfall was considerable, certainly more than an inch.

Fuel.

There is no wood in this region. The fuel used, which is only for cooking, is dry camel dung.

Ponies.

Few ponies were seen on the way into the Gobi, due probably to the scarcity of grass. On the return trip the grass was more in evidence and consequently larger herds were observed, the largest being one of 500 head which belonged to a near-by Lamasary. (Artung Gurrel-in-Sumu) It was stated by Mr. Larsen, a dependable authority in Kalgan, that the largest ponies were found in Outer Mongolia, that it would take him two months to collect a herd of sixty ponies in Inner Mongolia which would stand 13-2hands or better. He said also that the smaller well-built pony was quite as capable and strong as the larger one. It is believed that this pony would prove to be useful in the event of military operations in Asia. Much can be said for him, a study of his capabilities and limitations would be of military value.

General.

The Mongols of Inner Mongolia are a quiet, friendly race governed entirely by their tribal organization. They are nomadic, living off the products of sheep and goats with horses and camels their means of transportation. They till no fields, do a little trading with their wool and skins and want no money. If they receive money, (Chinese silver) they immediately turn it into live stock. They are dirty and poor and ninety percent of the population is syphilitic. The population which is very sparse is being pushed further and further north by the incoming Chinese.

The Chinese farmer is in Mongolia to stay. All along the Mongolian border he forms a wide belt and the grass lands will soon become the farm lands. On the Urga trail he is within ten miles of Hatt-in-Sumu. From there to the south are thickly spread fields of growing grain.

Going north in the spring the Chinese police force was seen in small numbers. Small mounted patrols were stationed at all the larger villages. Returning in the summer, from Chap Ser to Kalgan, these villages were garrisoned with much larger forces, wearing the yellow police uniform, but actually real soldiery.

There have been recent instances of bandit depradations in this region. Actual clashes between the police and bandits with casualties on both sides have occured.

The Mongols do not seem in any way to resist the inroads of the Chinese, but merely move away from them. The tribes are reported to be very weak in soldiery with possibly the exception of the west Sunits. Mr. Larsen reported that the Prince of this tribe sold Chang Hsueh-liang a large number of horses in the spring and was paid for them with several thousand rifles, although the actual numbers involved in the trade is unknown. A squad of this tribe's soldiers was seen in the srping at Hatt-in-Sumu when they were acting as an escort to an official. They were dressed in the Chinese military uniform, were mounted and armed with rifles. Dr. Andrews said it was the first time he had seen Mongol soldiers dressed in this way.

Business in Kalgan is very poor. Though prior to the Bolshevik control of Urga, Kalgan had a tremendous trade with Outer Mongolia and it is believed that, but for the taxes, an equally valuable trade could be stimulated in Inner Mongolia.

The agent for the British-American Tobacco Company reported that shipment of three million ounces of opium was being made on the Peking-

Suiyuan railroad from the interior, that the people of the famine areas were being forced to grow opium rather than being permitted the opportunity to grow the grain they need.

It was interesting to observe the two Chinese scientists throughout the expedition. Their re-actions and demonstration of scientific ability would be enlightening to one interested in making a study of Chinese character. These two men were forced on the expedition by the Chinese government. They were carefully selected for their education and ability. They are supposedly the best that can be found in China. In the field they were helpless, their scientific knowledge was pitiful in comparison with that of their foreign colleagues. What they had learned parrot-like they were entirely unable to apply practically. One of them was particularly egotistical, he endeavored to impress us with his knowledge and in trying to do so, exposed his ignorance continually. They were not enthusiastic over the work as one would have expected to find them and were utterly afraid of "losing face" in doing anything that the servants could do. In uncomfortable circumstances they became childlishly petulant, they could not be helpful in anything, but were out on a holiday and above everything else preferred riding in the touring car. Their education was merely a very thin veneer under which the Chinese weaknesses of all time lay unaffected.

Sketches.

	Area		Sketch
Vicinity of Hatt-in-Sumu	2 miles by 6 miles	R. F.	$\frac{1}{20,000}$
			1 sheet
Vicinity of Wolf Camp	3 miles by 11 miles	R. F.	$\frac{1}{20,000}$ Y
			2 sheets

Route Sketches

Vicinity of Tairum Noi Basin	95 miles	R. F.	$\frac{1}{200,000}$
			1 sheet

Wolf Camp to:

Northeast	32 miles
North	20 "
Northwest	15 "
Telegraph Road	20 "
Southeast	32 "

All on one sheet
R. F. $\frac{1}{200,000}$

An area sketch covering terrain of route sketches on one sheet
R. F. $\frac{1}{200,000}$

G-2 Report.

A very rough sketch of route covered by camel caravan made from data given by a Chinese boy accompanying camels. 120 miles

R. F. 200,000

1 sheet

The sketches are not accurate, but are only indications of terrain formations. Instruments used were the prismatic compass, the aneroid barometer and the automobile speedometer for distances.

Elevation on the original sketches will be corrected at the American Museum to correspond with maps drawn in previous years. Copies of all sketches will be submitted on completion.

Distribution:

4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

Willard G. Wyman
First Lieutenant, Infantry, D. O. L.

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, August 8, 1930. To: The A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Forwarded.

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

APR 22 1937
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
6-1 2055-685
WAR DEPARTMENT
2010

RESTRICTED

CHINA (Population & Social Con.)

Subject: Population

The Population of China

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 20 1937

China's total population reached the figure of 465,882,566 for the year 1936, according to statistics compiled by the Ministry of the Interior, reports the Central News Agency.

The total area of the country, these data show, is 11,573,583 square kilometres.

Szechwan, according to these figures, had the largest population, the total being 52,963,269. Shantung comes second with 38,029,294; Kiangsu third with 36,469,321; Honan fourth with 34,289,848; and Kwangtung fifth with 32,385,215.

Five provinces have a population between 20,000,000 and 30,000,000, namely, Chekiang, Anhwei, Hupeh, Hunan and Hopei.

Sikong province, with an area of 371,599 square kilometres, has the smallest population - 968,187, or a little less than three persons per square kilometre.

The following is the detailed estimate of population and area for the various provinces and municipalities:

Province	Area (sq. km.)	Population
Kiangsu	108,339	36,469,321
Chekiang	103,058	21,230,749
Anhwei	134,426	23,265,368
Kiangsi	200,209	15,820,403
Hupeh	207,692	25,541,636
Hunan	237,231	28,293,735
Szechwan	431,309	52,963,269
Sikong	371,599	968,187
Hopei	153,682	28,644,737
Shantung	179,269	38,029,294
Shansi	155,935	11,601,026
Honan	172,736	34,289,848
Shensi	187,394	7,717,881
Kansu	378,059	6,705,446
Chinghai	697,194	1,196,054
Fukien	158,702	11,755,625
Kwangtung	217,404	32,385,215
Kwangsi	217,578	13,385,215
Yunnan	320,051	11,994,549
Kweichow	179,478	9,043,207
Chahar	278,957	2,035,957
Suiyuan	291,432	2,083,693
Ninghsia	274,910	1,023,143

From M/A, China Report No. 9533 March 25, 1937

RESTRICTED

CHINA (Population & Social Con.)

Subject: Population

The Population of China

Province	Area (sq.km.)	Population
Sinkiang	1,828,418	4,360,020
Liaoning	321,823	16,465,303
Kirin	283,380	7,666,648
Heilungkiang	449,623	3,822,344
Jehol	192,430	3,054,305
Mongolia	1,621,201	2,077,669
Tibet	1,215,788	3,722,011
City		
Nanking	597	1,019,148
Shanghai	893	3,485,998
Peiping	708	1,556,364
Tientsin	50	1,292,025
Tsingtao	552	514,769
Sian	738	188,291
Weihaiwei	738	214,113
	11,573,583	465,882,566

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

David D. Barrett
David D. Barrett
Captain, Infantry
Assistant Military Attache

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No. 9533

G-2 Report

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2010
Population

CHINA (Population & Social Cond.)

Subject: Peasant Population and Agricultural Area

DEC 5 1933
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 4 1933

	Peasant Households	Total Households	Peasant percentage of total	Low Land (1,000 mow)	High Land (1,000 mow)	Average holding of each peasant household (mow)
Heilungkiang	489,927	624,468	78.5	382	50,093	103
Kirin	141,454	1,860,907	74.7	1,426	64,778	70
Liaoning	1,775,150	2,157,705	82.3	878	11,083	61
Jehol	437,232	547,473	79.9	240	17,306	40
Chahar	309,109	394,067	78.4	1,855	14,984	54
Suiyuan	247,227	367,452	68.0	1,400	17,239	75
Ninghsia	54,159	76,059	71.3	1,426	578	37
Sinkiang	344,111	512,316	67.2	---	13,629	40
Kansu	793,160	1,075,880	73.7	3,801	13,649	20
Shensi	1,364,579	1,896,926	73.0	3,111	30,385	24
Shansi	1,874,082	2,262,408	82.8	2,629	56,931	32
Hopei	4,223,704	4,938,659	85.5	8,647	94,965	24
Shantung	5,918,280	6,659,858	88.9	2,395	108,267	19
Kiangsu	5,056,536	6,438,036	78.5	35,574	56,095	18
Anhwei	2,682,244	3,788,764	70.8	20,830	32,681	20
Honan	5,061,700	6,029,066	84.0	7,182	105,179	22
Hupeh	3,959,690	5,771,371	68.6	26,274	34,736	15
Szechwan	4,975,252	7,263,538	68.5	24,222	54,050	19
Yunnan	1,363,924	1,947,021	71.1	12,036	15,089	20
Kweichow	1,193,488	1,769,023	67.5	9,513	13,487	19
Hunan	3,899,715	5,537,680	70.4	28,844	16,768	12
Kiangsi	3,292,310	4,942,249	66.6	23,666	17,970	13
Chekiang	3,164,857	4,559,540	69.4	29,800	11,430	13
Fukien	1,625,684	2,287,645	71.1	11,986	11,302	14
Kwangtung	3,479,103	5,459,096	63.7	24,690	17,762	12
TOTAL -	57,726,677	73,029,527	--	282,837	880,436	--

Source: Ministry of Industry, Chinese Government.

COMMENTS: 1 mow = 1/6 English acre.

The above table does not include Kwangsi, Sikang and Chinghai as no figures are given for these provinces. Reports from ten districts in Sinkiang, four in Yunnan, one in Kweichow and one in Heilungkiang are not available and hence the figures for these provinces are incomplete.

It will be noted that the "lost provinces" of Manchuria are included.

The Chinese officials are quite methodical in tabulating statistics of this nature and the information given is the most accurate available.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

S. V. Constant
Major, Cavalry
Assistant Military Attache

From M/A, China Report No.8682 November 6, 1933

Intel Report

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.

OCT 25 1932

205-685

4

WAR DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 24 1932

CHINA (Population, etc.)

Subject: Population of China

According to figures released by the Ministry of the Interior, the following statistics are furnished showing, province by province, the population of China. The figures given below include the special areas of Shanghai, Peiping and Nanking. It may be noted that the figures totaled do not correspond with the total given. This is probably due to errors in figures when printed. The figures followed by the letter "A" are supposed to be only approximate, while those marked "C" were derived from an actual census.

The list is as follows:

Anhwei	21,715,396	C
Chahar	1,997,015	C
Chekiang	20,642,701	C
Fengtien	15,233,123	C
Fukien	10,071,236	A
Heilungkiang	3,724,738	C
Honan	30,565,651	A
Hopei	31,232,131	C
Hunan	31,501,212	C
Hupeh	26,699,126	C
Jehol	6,593,440	A
Kansu	6,281,286	A
Kiangsi	20,322,837	A
Kiangsu	34,125,857	C
Kirin	7,634,671	C
Kwangsi	13,648,200	A
Kwangtung	32,427,626	A
Kweichow	14,745,722	A
Mongolia	616,010	A
Ninghsia	1,449,869	A
Shansi	12,228,155	C
Shantung	28,672,417	A
Shensi	11,802,446	C
Sikang	8,906,430	A
Sinkiang	2,551,741	C
Suiyuan	2,123,768	C
Szechuan	44,992,282	A
Tibet	3,722,011	A
Tsinghai	6,195,057	A
Yunnan	13,821,234	A
Total -	474,787,386	

Population of Nanking in July 1932

According to a census taken by the Bureau of Public Safety in Nanking and published in the Chinese Economic Bulletin, the population of the Municipality in July was as follows:

Households	Inhabitants	Male Inhabitants	Female Inhabitants
121,275	619,745	375,929	243,816

From M/A, China Report No. 8394 September 28, 1932

CHINA (Population, etc.)

Subject: Population of China

The foreign population was 561, including 118 Americans, 44 British, 93 Germans, 11 Russians, 15 French, 26 Indians and 42 Japanese.

Population of Shanghai in July 1932

According to the latest census returns taken by the Bureau of Public Safety of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, the total number of people residing within the Municipality during the month of July, 1932, was 1,544,230, showing an increase of 47,996 as compared with the figures of the previous month. This total added to the 1,007,868 residents of the International Settlement, and the 434,817 residents of the French Concession, makes a grand total of 2,986,915 as the population of Shanghai.

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

RHS

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2610
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JUL 22 1931
2055-685
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 22 1931

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Population of China

The following information was published by Kuo Min New Agency at Nanking on June 12:

According to statistics compiled by the Ministry of Interior, the total population of China is 474,487,000. The figures are based upon the census reports submitted by the various provinces and municipalities.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

From M/A, China Report No. 8045 June 22, 1931

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 15 1931
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G-2 Report

CHINA (Population &
Social Conditions)

Subject: Population of Hankow

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 1 1931

Hankow, March 31: The latest census report compiled by the local Municipal Bureau of Public Safety states that the total population of Hankow in February, 1931, was 738,169; of whom 453,574 are males and 284,595 females. The number of households is 143,967. ....KUO MIN.

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

PGT

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From M/A, China Report No. 7994 April 14, 1931

Report

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 21 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

POPULATION AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Population of China

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 20 1930

The following statistics are furnished showing province by province the population of China. In this report Manchuria was given as one province, although it is now divided into the three provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Fengtien (Liaoning). In addition to the provinces, the population of Hongkong, a British colony, is included. The Chinese territories of Mongolia and Tibet are not included but are listed separately at the end of this report.

The list is as follows:

Anhwei	20,000,000	
Chahar	2,988,684	
Chekiang	24,000,000	
Fukien	14,000,000	
Hongkong	681,000	
Honan	35,000,000	
Hopeh	39,000,000	
Hunan	40,000,000	
Hupeh	28,600,000	
Jehol	650,000	
Kansu	6,000,000	
Kiangsi	27,000,000	
Kiangsu	34,600,000	
Kwangsi	12,250,000	
Kwangtung	37,000,000	
Kweichow	11,000,000	
Manchuria	27,512,800	(3 provinces)
Ninghsia	1,000,000	
Shansi	12,100,000	
Shantung	34,000,000	
Shensi	17,220,000	
Sikang	6,000,000	
Sinkiang	2,500,000	
Suiyuan	1,800,000	
Szechuan	52,000,000	
Tsinghai	1,000,000	
Yunnan	11,000,000	
Total	498,902,484	

This total compares quite closely with the 1926 Postal Estimates which listed a total population of 485,508,338.

The population of Mongolia is given as 676,000, of which 579,000 are Mongols, 7,000 Chinese and 90,000 Russian. Tibet has a population of 2,500,000.

The above figures are obtained from an American Department of Commerce report, published by the Office of the Commercial Attache, Shanghai.

CJK/edb

Nelson T. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

Report No. 7846

Oct. 17, 1930

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 21 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN EMBASSY

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
TOKYO, JAPAN

No. 5532. October 31, 1930.

Subject: Observations of Conditions in Northern China and Korea.

To: A.C.of S., G-2, War Dept., Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 20 1930

Last evening I returned from a four weeks' trip through Korea, Manchuria, and Chihli provinces. The following report is based upon my personal observations, conversations, and conferences with persons in all walks of life with whom I was able to make contact. This report will be very general in nature. Any part of it which appears to justify it will be reported on in more detail later. During this trip I made many contacts which I hope will be the source of more accurate information about certain matters concerning which this office was not fully informed.

KOREA.

I well remember my impressions gained from visits to Korea in 1910. Even then it seemed to me that the only people doing anything in that country were the Japanese. At that time all constructive work appeared to employ Japanese labor, while the Korean coolie stood aside looking on. Of course, much had been done by the Japanese during the intervening years in modernizing Korea, establishing schools, widening streets, construction of modern buildings, improving sanitation, opening mines, etc. Today, all important positions of whatever kind, either in the government or in civil life, appear to be held by Japanese. However, the Korean coolie is being employed in labor, always, however, with a Japanese overseer.

The average Korean appears miserably poor. He is mainly interested in finding some way to secure enough to eat. There are some wealthy Koreans, but it is understood they fear to let anyone know that they have money.

The Korean laboring class is pouring back into Korea from Japan. I have been told that the Japanese Government gives them free transportation; this because of the unemployment situation in Japan. Many Koreans have moved to Manchuria with the hope of finding better economic conditions there, The communistically inclined Koreans are guided by the Soviet representatives into sections in Manchuria, which have been selected for that purpose. The pro-Japanese or anti-Red Koreans are encouraged to settle in regions selected by the Japanese to help develop Japanese enterprises.

The Japanese Oriental Development Company is gradually buying up the best of the Korean lands. In northern Korea there is still much undeveloped excellent forest lands with no undergrowth. This sells at Yen 400. per thousand acres.

One prominent American explained to me that he found it difficult to compete with Japanese firms in laying down in Korea certain American-made products. He stated that Japanese bids were so low that they could not possible furnish them products at the prices quoted, unless they were able to import them free of duty.

There is no doubt that a great many Koreans are turning pro-Japanese. They see no hope of independence, and consider it the best policy to work with their captors. One Korean told me that the best minds in Korea today were turning their attention to pushing the education of all classes of Koreans, and their only hope for the future, as expressed by them, was that China might some day become strong enough to force Japan back to her islands and leave Korea in a position similar to that enjoyed by Belgium.

There still exists outside Korea an Independence Party. Well to do Koreans are often forced to subscribe much money to this party, even though they do not approve of it.

MANCHURIA.

Manchuria, under the control of Marshal Chang Hsieh-liang, backed up by the Japanese, is going ahead by leaps and bounds. Chinese from the southern provinces have been pushing in great numbers for some years into western and northern Manchuria and eastern Mongolia. There is still much rich land in the north to be colonized.

The former plan of Japan to colonize certain parts of Manchuria with Japanese, has failed utterly insofar as any numbers are concerned. A few Japanese have gone and have been placed in strategic positions. Koreans favorable to the Japanese are also being encouraged to go into these sections into which the Japanese desire a foothold. The Japanese banks in Manchuria do everything possible to encourage their own people in this colonizing.

The railroad between Mukden and Chanchung is being rapidly double-tracked. It will probably be completed with much additional trackage for switching inside one year. From several sections I learn that the Japanese have materiel sufficient along the railroad running northwest from Gensan in Korea, to complete the Kirin-Gensan railroad whenever they get the opportunity. The strategic importance of such a railroad is very evident. Incidentally there is now being completed a high class highway between Kirin and Harbin. With this completed, and the mountain link of the Kirin-Gensan railroad completed, the Japanese would have a second line of approach to Harbin, which would be very useful in case of the destruction of the bridges over the Sungari River on the Chanchung-Harbin line.

The Japanese have many concessions in cities along the railroad which they control. Their concession is especially large in Mukden, where they have constructed a very creditable modern city adjoining the old Chinese city. For all their concessions, they have their own police system.

I had the pleasure of meeting General Chang Hsieh-liang and a number of his friends and advisers. There is no doubt but that he has a very strong hatred for the Japanese. It is thought that the Japanese do not bother him very much in carrying on his government, but the Marshal knows very well what the Japanese attitude is. He cannot forget what happened to his father when he failed to carry out the wishes of the Japanese. When he states that he has no intention of going further south of the Great Wall, and no intention of ever fighting to hold Chihli province, I believe he is telling the truth.

The Marshal's Secretary told me that there were over 200,000 Manchurian troops south of the Great Wall. This may be an exaggeration, for both the Military Attache in Peking and the S-2, 15th Infantry in Tientsin, do not believe it. He may have meant that his plans call for a total of 200,000 troops south of the Great Wall. The fact remains that there is a comparatively small force at present at Peking, perhaps 25,000, and an equal number in the vicinity of Tientsin.

En route from Mukden to Peking on the 15th to 17th of October, I saw no movement of Chinese troops. However, although Marshal Chang at present may not have any intention of being aggressive concerning the molding of Peking and Tientsin, it may be very different a year or two from now. They are even now pushing their relatives and supporters into important positions throughout the territory occupied by their armies. After they have enjoyed the usual privileges that go with such jobs in China for a year or two, it will not be easy for anyone, either Nanking or Marshal Chang, to persuade them to give up such golden opportunities and retire north of the Great Wall peacefully.

The Chinese troops I saw in Manchuria and Chihli province seemed to be well equipped and showed evidences of much disciplinary drill.

In comparison to the way affairs are conducted in Tokyo, there is quite a democratic atmosphere around the official functions at which Marshal Chang is present. His Social Secretary is a Yale and Columbia man known as Tommy Lee. At a big review of Manchurian troops which I attended in Mukden on the Anniversary of the downfall of the Manchu Dynasty, I stood on the platform a short distance to the left of Marshal Chang. Between the Marshal and me were the Consul Generals of the various nations. In front of us all, except the Marshal, crowded two or three rows of modern Chinese women with their children, almost cutting off our view, quite different in their attitude from that of Japanese women. All around were many Manchurian Generals. Facing us was a rather good military band. One amusing part of the review was the fact that noneof the troops seemed to have any idea of keeping step with the band as they passed in review. Their step was perfect, and their lines excellent, but never in step with the band except by accident. In the midst of all this show of force and general excitement I smiled inwardly when I looked onthe quiet, condident, and clever features of the Japanese Consul General Hayashi, and, standing beside him, Brigadier General Suzuki, the representative of the Kwantung Army in Mukden. To me they represented the real power in Mukden. I would liketo have known their thoughts.

I asked the Social Secretary of the Marshal whether there was any message I might take to the American Minister in Peking from the Marshal. He replied, "You can tell him that Marshal Chang has no intention of fighting south of the Wall; that he will retreat to Mukden if compelled to fight in order to remain south of the Wall."

There is no doubt that Marshal Chang desires a more or less united China to support him in his efforts to restrain the Japanese. Any recent stories about Marshal Chang being a weakling are believed to be false.

JAPANESE ARMY ON THE CONTINENT.

The following discussion is made without the full details which I am hopeful of securing in the near future. These are my present impressions.

Officially, Japan has in Korea, two divisions at peace strength; in Manchuria and the Kwantung Leased Territory, one peace strength division and six battalions of railway guards. In North China, betweenPeking and Shanghaikwan, a force of about 800. In addition to these soldiers in active service there are many reserves, the number of which I cannot even approximate. Not only are these reserves found in the Japanese concessions and along the South Manchuria Railway, but there are perhaps over 2000 of them in Harbin and the four concession to the east of Harbin. In some cases there reserves are foresters; in other places they are

working in factories and storehouses. For instance, it appears that there is a leather factory employing 150 able bodied Japanese southwest of Harbin close to the Chinese EasternRailway line.

An unconfirmed report states that the Japanese have sixteen 75 mm. guns in hiding in strategic positions in Harbin.

A Japanese,Colonel Sawada, appears to be in control in Harbin of all military and semi-military commercial operations in northern Manchuria. It is said that he supervises the buying of property in that region, especially in Harbin, so that strategic positions will be secured.

A very reliable and informed contact who has served five years in the American Army informed me that he had been in a number of big Japanese warehouses in Manchuria in which were stored uniforms and rifles and other equipment. It appears, where deemed advisable, Japanese reserve soldiers have their rifles and equipment, and evenammunition, in their own homes with them.

An interesting study for me was the system of block houses which extend over all Japanese controlled railways of Manchuria.

All information tends to indicate that the centerof gravity of the Japanese forces in Manchuria is moving northward. There is no,doubt but that the Japanese are seriously considering moving northward the Division Headquarters and the Kwantung Army Headquarters. There is much information concerning the increase in size of the units north of Manchuria and additional units at Chanchung, and between Chanchung and Mukden which are not officially reported there. These additional forces appear to have come from northern Korea. Of course,this may be only a temporary arrangement intended to impress Marshal Chang with the dertmined attitude of Japan. A close foreign friend of the Marshal stated he knew of a recent large shipment of rifles by the Japanese through Mukden,going north. Officially, there have been maneuvers held north of Mukden by the Japanese. These maneuvers appear to havetaken place not only before, but also after the big maneuvers around the capital of Korean, which took place about the 7th to 12th of October.

The question naturally arises, in case of a big emergency in northern China, how many troops would Japanhave on the scene of action without waiting for additional ones from Japan. One foreignskilled observer believes that in Korea the two peace divisions would be four war strength divisions; that the Kwantung division would become two war strength divisions; and that the six battalions of railroad guards would become one full war strength division. Another skilled observer in the Secret Service of the Chinese forces agree with this, except that he thinks the six battalions ofrailroad guards would become 18 battalions of railroad guards. At present I am inclined to agree with the latter plan. The Commanding General of the Japanese Forces inTientsin claims that he can have in Tientsin one division of Japanese troops within 48 hours. Dairen and Mukden are the only places from which troops couldbe brought in that length of time. In that case, no doubt one division of troops in Korea would be movedto Manchuria to take the placeof the division going to Tientsin. One can see from the above what a thorough grasp of northern China Japan has. Her power can beasserted there very quickly in any locality.

Her military policy in the Shanghaikwan-Peking area is still aggressive. Her attitude in the International Military Conferences in Tientsin is always one of aggression. They desire to occupy the entire line from Peking to Shanghaikwan with actual troops, to run the International train, and enforce the old proctocol to the letter. It appears they would be supported in this by England, France, and evenItaly, were it not for the positive contrary policy of America.

3

FISHERY DISPUTE.

In Harbin several contacts told me that the real cause of the recent fishery dispute between Japan and Russia in the vicinity of the Saghalien Island, was the fact that the Japanese have been importing into the adjacent Siberian region, arms and ammunition for the use of the anti-Red elements there.

WHITE RUSSIANS.

The following statements were made to me by a White Russian in an important position in the Chinese Government:

"Harbin is the center of all communistic activities in China, Korea, Japan, and the Philippine Islands.

There are the following White organizations:

(1) The Russian Union, with Headquarters in Paris, and the Far Eastern Headquarters in Shanghai. This organization works entirely outside of Russia.
(2) The Military Organization. This is inside Russia, made up larhely of peasants who are supposed to carry on a gorilla warfare. There is an army of about 11000 partly armed and equipped men.
(3) A Civil Organization, which works inside Russia.
(4) The Seminov Organization, which works incommection with the Japanese. It hires bandits for various purposes, especially along the C.E.R."

This man also made this statement which I give for what it may be worth:

"The Japanese have offered arms and money to Nos. 1 and 2 organizations if placed under the control of the Japanese. The Japanese made a special effort to get control of the peasant military organization inside Russia."

GENERAL.

This has been a very worthwhile trip, both officially and personally. Every Military Attache should make it at least once during his tour. The Manchurian and Chinese peasants appear muchmore prosperous than the Koreans. Travel on Chinese railways is not a pleasure at present. The inefficiency of the Chinese railways is most disappointing after seeing the efficiency of the Manchurian and Russian railways. The railway sleepers between Chanchung and Harbin are the most luxurious I have ever ridden in. Travel over the Siberian railway is very comfortable, and the food very plain but generally good. However, travellers in taking the trip should provide themselves with a variety of canned goods to break the monotony of the dining room food. Especially a substitute of black bread may be needed.

Everywhere on the surface the Japanese seemed to get along nicely with both Koreans and Chinese; of course, underneath there is a very strong feeling against the Japanese. There is every indication that Japan's considers Manchuria her own. I think, however, she would be sorry to see the Russians entirely eliminated from north Manchuria, for thenthe Chinese could then devote themselves to the Japanese andmake the Japanese position quite unpleasant and difficult, perhaps.

I was astonished by the manner in which alldiplomatic and military officers in Peking and Tientsin live. I estimate that in China foreign food is one-third, foreign clothes one-half, and rent of houses one-seventh of that in Japan. Officers coming to Japan have a harder time meeting their expenses, and those going to China have their pay at least trebled upon arriving in Tientsin or Peking.

Before closing, I wish to add a remark concerning the 15th Infantry at Tientsin. After witnessing a review and inspection of that regiment by General King, I decided that I had never seen a better drilled or finer appearing regiment during my thirty years of service.

J.G. McIlroy

J.G. McIlroy
Lieut. Colonel, G.S.,
Military Attache.

OPERATIONS BRANCH
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT
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REPORT OF TRIP AND VISIT TO TUNGKWAN, SHENSI

November 9 - 20, 1930

After the defeat of Feng and the Shansi troops and the evacuation of the Chengchow area on October 6, resulting in the disintegration of the Kuominchun, the situation in the country west of Chengchow has been covered with a veil of uncertainty, and little information of a reliable nature has come out. With a view of ascertaining the conditions existing thereabouts and of informing myself by personal observation of the nature of the terrain and country traversed by the Lunghai Railroad, I determined to make an effort to reach Tungkwan, Shensi, and see matters for myself. The plan drawn up for the trip was as follows: To go via Tientsin to Hsuchowfu by the Tsinpu Railroad; at Hsuchowfu, eastern junction of the Lunghai, to take the latter railroad for the purpose of observing the country around Kweiteh, Liuho, Lanfeng and Chengchow for evidences of reported heavy fighting during the past eight months; from Chengchow, if possible, to continue on via Loyang to the end of the Lunghai line at Lingpao, and to procure some type of transportation to complete the remaining forty miles to Tungkwan; from this point to cross the Yellow River and proceed by bus northward through Shansi to Taiyuanfu, thence to Shihchiachuang, and return to Peiping via the Kinhan line; if possible, while traversing southern Shansi to locate Feng and obtain a conference with him. This plan was carried out in detail as far as Tungkwan, but as a state of war still exists along the southern boundary of Shansi, and as there is no communication permitted across the river in this area, it was impossible to cross to the north at Tungkwan, which necessitated a return to Chengchow and thence return to Peiping via the Kinhan line.

On November 9, accompanied by Captain De Pass, I proceeded to Tientsin where it was found the Young Marshal's special train had arrived from Mukden that same day. There was much speculation as to his next move. Rumors had him going in all directions except the one he finally took to Nanking. We left Tientsin on the Blue Express, which has been placed in operation again, and aside from the dilapidated condition of the cars as a result of military use during the past months the train is very comfortable and efficiently serviced.

We arrived at Hsuchowfu at 11 p.m. November 10 without incident but were rather surprised to find that all stations leading south were decorated with arches and banners of welcome to the Young Marshal, who, we were told, would pass through the following day en route to Nanking where he was to meet General Chiang Kai-shek and attend the Fourth Plenary Session.

We left Hsuchowfu in the early morning of November 11 and arrived at Kweiteh at 2 p.m. the same day, detrained at this station and proceeded to the town of Kweiteh, which is about four miles south of the railroad station. The road from the station to the town is a well-kept macadam road, the only means of transportation being by rickshaw or wheelbarrow.

Kweiteh at this time is occupied by the forces of General Liang Kuan-ying, formerly a Kuominchun leader who has turned over to the Nanking government with his troops. At the time of our visit General Liang was absent in Nanking attending the conference, but his Chief of Staff received us cordially, had us shown over the city, and informed us that the troops under General Liang's command would soon be moved to Kiangsu to

participate in bandit suppression work. The troops of this command were all wearing new winter uniforms and the morale appeared to be good.

A visit through Kweiteh and environs disclosed no evidences of wreckage due to warfare, although this area saw considerable fighting by the government troops and troops under the "gray generals" in the early stages of this last war. It was confirmed, however, that three government airplanes were burned during a raid by a detachment of Feng's cavalry. The wreckage of these planes still remains in a field near the town. It was also learned that during the fighting on the Lunghai Feng on two different occasions arrived within eight miles of Kweiteh but was forced to halt and finally withdrew because of the flooded condition of the surrounding country, evidences of which still remained when we passed through.

We left Kweiteh at 2 p.m. on November 12 and continued westward, between Hsuchow and Liuho, which latter place was the field headquarters of Chiang Kai-shek during the whole campaign. Very few trenches were observed. Beyond Liuho westward trench systems were seen on both sides of the railroad, and as we approached Lanfeng these grew in importance. They were very well laid out and very well constructed, comparing favorably with many of the elaborate trench systems used in France during the World War, the principal difference being that in this area where the country is very flat, because of heavy rains during the period of active operations the trenches were constructed on the surface, the wide ditches resulting from the removal of dirt becoming small moats. Water was still standing in many of the trenches as we passed through. Wire entanglement and other obstacles were not used in the defense of any of the trenches observed.

Continuing westward, we arrived at Chengchow at 11:30 p.m. November 12. The country between Hsuchowfu and Chengchow as far as the eye can see on either side of the railroad is painfully flat and dotted with clumps of trees and villages. The roadbed of the Lunghai Railroad between Hsuchowfu and Chengchow is in a surprisingly good condition. The rolling stock, however, is worn out and dilapidated and in very poor shape. At this time only third class accommodations were available, and such trains as were running on a very irregular schedule were packed to the last inch of space by people returning to their homes. The country, due to continuous occupation by hostile armies, has suffered for want of cultivation, and although there is little evidence visible in the way of destroyed villages due to warfare, there is a distinct appearance of desolation, and the inhabitants are undoubtedly faced with great suffering during the coming winter for want of food supplies, the great majority of which will have to be brought in to relieve a very serious situation.

On the morning of November 12 a visit was made to the headquarters of General Ho Ying-ch'ing, who is in command of this entire area. It was learned that General Ho was also absent in Nanking, but his Adjutant General, Colonel T'an, whom I had met during my visit to Hankow in May, received me very cordially and expressed a desire to assist in anything we might request. We were presented to the Chief of Staff, General Ho Kuo-kuang, and our requests to proceed westward over the Lunghai to the end of the line at Lingpao and on to Tungkwan were granted. We were told that telegrams would be sent to the commanding officers along the line to notify them of our arrival and to see we were properly cared for. All arrangements were very satisfactory, and upon leaving the headquarters I was very happy in the feeling that our plans were maturing so easily. We returned to our quarters preparatory to leaving Chengchow the following morning on another leg of our trip. However, in the afternoon of this same day Colonel T'an called at my quarters and when asked if arrangements for our leaving the following day were completed he informed me that a

telegram had just been received from Nanking to the effect that General Chiang Kai-shek would be very happy to have us visit Kweiteh, Lanfang, Kaifeng and Chengchow, but that he would not officially approve of our going west of Chengchow, and asked that our contemplated visit be deferred until the situation in that area had become more stabilized and secure from bandit activities.

This information was extremely disappointing as the particular part of the country which I had come so far to see was now to be denied me. I asked Colonel T'an if there would be any objection to our continuing the trip unofficially. He stated that they had no authority to prevent our going if I insisted, but the visit could not be authorized officially, and he repeated that General Chiang Kai-shek would like to have the visit deferred until a later date. The matter was left for the decision of the Chief of Staff with whom we dined that night. He placed no obstacle in the way of our proceeding, in fact stated he would send a private message to the commanding general of that region at Shanchow, General Liu Mao-en, notifying him of our coming and requesting him, if possible, to furnish automobile transportation from the end of the line to Tungkwan. In addition, he was good enough to have an old car attached to the train for our exclusive use.

We left Chengchow at 2:30 p.m. November 14. The train on which we traveled was a very long one, made up of old, dilapidated, broken-down cars of every description and literally packed with humanity. It required two engines to move us, one in front and one in the rear. All rolling stock observed on this line is in a very sad condition.

The country traversed until we arrived in the vicinity of Kunghsien is similar to the terrain east of Chengchow, very flat and very poor looking. From this point we struck the foothills and from there on to the vicinity of Kwanyintang we climbed steadily, the old engines finding great difficulty in making the grade, and on several occasions could not negotiate curves on the road, which necessitated backing for several miles and delay of hours while building up more power in order to make a second attempt. We eventually reached the summit of this range in the neighborhood of Kwanyintang, where the rear engine left us and we coasted down grade, arriving at Shanchow,the next to the last station on the Lunghai at 5:30 p.m. November 15. We were met by the Chief of Staff of General Liu Mao-en and a Colonel Liu, Chief of the Political Branch of General Liu's headquarters. We were cordially received, and informed that General Liu, as soon as he had completed some important work he was then engaged on, would call upon us.

Our trip to Shanchow was without incident. At all stations en route there were swarms of soldiers. All seemed to be warmly dressed in heavily padded winter clothing. The roadbed west of Chengchow is in a condition similar to that to the east, and the same applies to the rolling stock. It all shows the results of very hard usage by the military during the past eight months.

General Liu Mao-en called upon us at the railroad station about 6 p.m., welcomed us to his area, offered the usual apologies that he had no facilities for extending proper reception and stated that it was due to the great number of troops present so that he had nothing suitable to offer in the way of quarters for us. We expressed a desire to remain in our car, which was put on a siding and a guard of six heavily armed men were assigned to look after us while we were in this area. General Liu directed his Chief of Staff to have two Dodge trucks made available to carry us with the guard and baggage to Tungkwan, and Colonel Liu, who spoke a little English, was to accompany us.

The following morning, November 16, we left Shanchow by motor for Tungkwan, carrying with us two missionaries who were en route to

Sianfu to join their mission. The trip from Shanchow to Tungkwan, a distance of approximately 60 miles, is over a broad road which was built by Feng during the past years of his occupancy of this area. Except for certain sections which are rather deep with sand, the road is in good condition and easy to navigate by any type of transportation during the dry season. Upon leaving Lingpao, which is the western terminal of the Lunghai Railroad, a stream is crossed and passage of the Han Fu Kuan, a very formidable pass, is commenced. This pass constitutes a strong defensive position. The northern part rests on the Yellow River; the southern part is defended by a high range of hills, easily protected by a small force. After traversing this pass we came into flat country until arriving at Tunghwan, which pass looms up suddenly and is entered through a large gate which covers the road into the pass. On going through this gateway one is confronted by the walled town of Tungkwan itself. This position can well be termed the gateway leading from Shensi and Kansu into China. It is said to be the only route available.

Tungkwan is packed with government troops. There is little extra space for visitors or even for the populace. General Ku Chu-t'ung commands this area, but he also was absent in Nanking. His Chief of Staff received us very cordially and placed a small room in his headquarters at our disposal during our visit. We had arrived at our main objective, but upon inquiring from the headquarters as to whether it would be possible to cross the river and continue our trip through Shansi, we were told very frankly that this would be impossible, that a state of war existed along both sides of the river, that the government troops had orders to stop or fire on anyone attempting to cross from one side to the other, and that patrols on the northern side were acting under similar orders. The river at this time of the year is very low; in fact, in the vicinity of Tungkwan, the river, which at its narrowest point is about a mile wide and opens up into a veritable lake further west, is now nothing but a mud flat with small streams running through it. There were no evidences of any river traffic visible between Tungkwan and Shanchow. A reconnaissance around Tungkwan disclosed the fact that Feng has left very little to the inhabitants of the town or the population of the surrounding country; in fact, the appearance of this country between the end of the line and Tungkwan is tragic in its poverty-stricken appearance. It has been stripped and left bare. There is no visible evidence of anything to eat nor of anything to burn. The great majority of the people in this area live in caves dug into the clay cliffs. It is hard to understand how these people are to exist through the coming winter. The difficulty of transportation from the end of the line from Lingpao westward will be understood when it is explained that the forty miles between the end of the line and Tungkwan is covered with a continuous stream of every type of transportation available, including ox carts, horse and mule pack trains, rickshaws, wheel barrows, camels, and coolies with packs on their backs, all moving like a string of ants from the supply base at Lingpao, carrying necessities to the troops at Tungkwan and then on, the additional ninety miles to the troops located at Sianfu. This steady stream of transport is moving westward loaded, while another steady stream is returning eastward for another load. All transportation of every description in this area has been requisitioned by the military, and that part of the population which does not participate in this movement is going to find it difficult to exist during the coming winter.

Finding it impossible to carry out that part of the program which contemplated crossing the river at Tungkwan and returning to Peiping via Taiyuanfu, we left Tungkwan on the morning of November 17 and returned over the same route to Shanchow, where we arrived at 2 p.m. the same day. As it was found that the train did not leave for Chengchow until the following day, we had an opportunity of visiting and looking over this area in some detail, and of gathering information regarding the military

occupation, confirming the organizations stationed between Chengchow and Tungkwan and including Sianfu, as well as getting some information of the economic situation in this area. Details of this will be included in the Situation Report.

We left Shanchow in the afternoon on November 18 and arrived without incident at Chengchow at 10 a.m. on November 19, during a very heavy dust storm. We were agreeably surprised to learn that a train would be leaving in a short time for Peiping over the Kinhan on which we were able to secure transportation. We left Chengchow at 12:30 p.m. on November 19 and arrived at Peiping at 4 p.m. November 20.

Comments on the Trip

1. Transportation

This trip developed the information that it is possible to travel by railroad from Peiping via Tientsin to Shanchow; that the Tsinpu Line is now open to practically normal traffic to Shanghai, that traffic is open on the Lunghai Railroad throughout its full extent, from Hsuchowfu on the Tsinpu Line through Chengchow to Lingpao, the western terminal; that from Lingpao to Tungkwan the Lunghai Railroad extension is completed as follows: The roadbed is completed, ready for the laying of the sleepers and the rails. At a number of river crossings en route the concrete piles are finished. Aside from the construction of the necessary bridges, very little work would be required to complete the extension of this line from Lingpao to Tungkwan. At the present time there is a very good dirt road through the mountains from Loyang to Tungkwan and truck and bus transportation is available, but at irregular intervals. As the country stabilizes, this bus transportation, we were told, would assume regular trips at stated times. The Kinhan Line is open from Peiping to Hankow and normal traffic has been resumed.

Considerable repair work has been done to the road beds on these lines since the cessation of hostilities. The condition of the rolling stock, due to hard usage and lack of care or upkeep by the military during the past campaign, has been left in a deplorable condition. The engines have suffered considerably. Without exception all the engines observed on the Lunghai and the Kinhan Lines leaked water and steam very badly. We were informed that due to shortage of engines they could not be laid up for repair, and only temporary repairs could be effected. The result is that all trains on these lines do not attempt to run on a regular schedule, or even to maintain one. Passenger traffic is overwhelming. Freight traffic has not yet been resumed. Unless new engines are obtained or the present engines laid up for overhauling and repair, it will only be a question of time before traffic on the Lunghai and Kinhan Railroads will diminish or have to cease entirely.

2. Economic

During the trip through Shantung, particularly south of the Yellow River, the country on either side of the railroad showed evidences of prosperity even during this, the fall of the year. The winter wheat crop appears healthy. The harvesting of the large peanut crop is completed and the great number of hogs raised in this area are fattening on the peanuts remaining in the ground. From Hsuchowfu to Kweiteh in eastern Honan this large peanut producing country continues to show signs of prosperity. From Kweiteh westward there has apparently been a large crop of cotton which was not destroyed by the hostile armies. There is little evidence of any other agriculture or crop having been successfully harvested. In western Honan particularly there are visible evidences of approaching famine.

3. Military

From Tientsin to the Shantung border Mukden troops are in control. Beginning at Tehchow on the north Shantung border, continuing south through Tsinan to just north of Taian the troops of Han Fu-chu were observed in control. Beginning at Taian and continuing south to Hsuchowfu, one finds the troops of Ma Hung-kuei. West of Hsuchowfu to include Kweiteh are the troops of Liang Kuan-ying, and from Kweiteh westward including Chengchow and further westward to include Tungkwan and on to Sianfu in Shensi are found government troops under the command of General Ho Ying-ch'ing, with headquarters at Chengchow. North of the Yellow River on the Kinhan, exclusive of Sinsiang, we find the troops under the command of Sun Lien-chung. These troops were formerly Kuominchun and have turned over to the government. There is considerable discussion as to the disposition of this large body of ex-Kuominchun, which numbers about 80,000 men. At the headquarters of General Ho Ying-ch'ing it seems that several proposals are under consideration, one that these troops be moved south to be replaced by troops moved from the south. It is understood that the southern troops welcome the transfer to the north but the northern troops refuse to move south. Another proposition under consideration is to move these troops into Kansu. There is some hesitation about carrying out this proposition, as moving this strong ex-Kuominchun force back into the territory formerly occupied and controlled by Feng might in the future develop difficulties that would be hard to overcome by the government. At present these troops remain on this portion of the Kinhan, awaiting the decision of Nanking for their disposal.

From Sinsiang northward to Shunte one finds the troops of Shih Yu-san, and from Shunte northward, the Fengtien troops again.

We were informed by the various headquarters from Chengchow westward to include Tungkwan, that a state of war still continued between the government and Shansi; that it was pretty accurately established that Feng was still in the south of Shansi and had available about 50,000 loyal, well-equipped and well-supplied troops; that they did not know where Feng was located and that government airplanes continually reconnoitered the area attempting to locate him; that it was understood that Feng moved from place to place during the night; and that the government has eight divisions distributed between Chengchow and Tungkwan prepared to move into Shansi upon orders from Nanking, but that the belief is that the problem of the occupation of Shansi and the re-organization of the troops therein will be left for the Young Marshal to accomplish.

In conclusion, the result of the trip has been to clear up information regarding the situation existing in that area, to give me a good clear picture of the nature of the terrain and the economic conditions therein, and it has established the fact that the country traversed is now peaceful, with desperate efforts being made on the part of the population to meet the hardships and sufferings that will come with the approaching winter.

NEM/edb

Nelson E. Margetts
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Distribution:

4 MID
1 File

Peiping, March 3, 1931

Subject: Trip to Suiyuan.

To: The Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping.

1. On February 12, 1931, together with Mr. Owen Lattimore, Dr. James Cash and Lieutenant C. C. Brown, U.S.M.C., I made a hunting trip to Suiyuan. We left from Chang I Men station in order to avoid the crowd at the Hsi Chih Men station, and got ourselves comfortably spread in the only first class compartment in anticipation of the thirty-hour or more train ride in front of us. The first class compartment on these trains occupies one fourth of a car and has soft seats; the second class compartment occupies half the remainder, and the rest of the car is third class. The rest of the train is all third class passenger cars and several freight cars for baggage and over-flow passengers. As we had anticipated, the crowd at Hsi Chih Men filled the train to capacity and we were very fortunate in having secured our seats. The trip was uneventful except for a delay at Kang Chuang, just outside of the Nankow Pass where we waited several hours for a locomotive. During the trip we were bothered very little by requests for huchaos or other identification until we had passed out of the sphere of Fengtien troops—this despite the fact that we carried two rifles in plain sight. At Ta Tung the Shansi troops took over and the difference in discipline and appearance between them and the Fengtien troops was quite striking. At Feng Chen a detachment of soldiers came aboard ostensibly to guard the train, one of the trains having been fired on by bandits a few days previously. These soldiers were more of an annoyance than a guard and in case of trouble would have been of very little use. The officers slept and spat all over the first class compartment in truly characteristic fashion. We arrived at Saratsi about ten p.m. the 13th, having been on the train thirty-five hours. There we were met by Mr. Oberg, who had invited us up for the hunting trip. He put us up at the Swedish Mission there. Mr. Oberg while not a missionary himself is the son of missionaries and having been born in that vicinity his knowledge of the country and the local dialect is excellent. His parents made the trek across Mongolia to Siberia in the Boxer year, barely escaping with their lives. He himself is in business at Saratsi, owning a carting business, doing part time work for the Famine Relief Association, and also interested in a colonization project in that vicinity sponsored by some Peking Chinese. Having the carting business, he was able to furnish us with riding horses and a cart for our baggage at nominal prices.

The next morning was spent re-arranging our equipment and we left Saratsi about noon, heading west. Just as we passed out of the west gate, there on a pile of stones, covered with dust and looking for all the world like a snow man, was the severed head of a bandit. Some wag had placed a cap on the head and had hung a pair of Chinese women's tiny shoes on the ears—just a grim reminder that everything was not entirely peaceful yet. Before leaving Saratsi we were informed that all the large groups of bandits had been pushed west and south of Pao Tou toward Ninghsia, but that small groups of from five to thirty might be encountered any time. We were also furnished an escort of four soldiers, for whom Mr. Oberg had to provide horses. The soldiers were with us the entire time until we returnedto Saratsi. Two of them were always sent out ahead as a point and to get information of any bandits in the vicinity. All of us carried loaded rifles all the time, with enough ammunition on our person for an ordinary skirmish. Even when we slept, the rifles were loaded and handy. We were

told a story of a Catholic Father who was coming down from Mongolia with only a servant and had stopped at a Chinese inn for lunch. As he was eating, the innkeeper rushed in in an agony of fear and told him that about thirty bandits were riding down on the inn. Sure enough, the bandits arrived in a few minutes, galloping around the enclosure wall and firing their rifles to intimidate people in the inn. The Padre stopped eating, calmly picked up a 22 hipower he had been carrying, poked it through the paper windows of the room he was in, and as the bandits started through the enclosure gate he picked off the first five and dropped them in their tracks. The rest of the bandits turned tail and fled—the Padre calmly went on with his lunch.

The first night we stopped in Sarching at a mission with only Chinese in charge, having covered fifty-five li. We had a little trouble getting in the gate of the village. The officer in charge of the guard, after he had asked for a huchao, discovered he couldn't read it; but when he found that I had a personal card also, the gates were immediately opened. This was also our first experience sleeping on a heated kang. This, like so many other things in China, is probably all right when you get used to it. Saching is situated just where the mountains rise abruptly north of the Saratsi plain. When we left it the next morning, we immediately entered a narrow valley between high mountains. The floor of the valley was a frozen stream. The horses were sharp shod all around (except for a couple too wild to be shod behind) so we made good progress up the valley. Our objective was Wu Tang Chiao, a Lamasery about seventy-five li N.N.E. of Sarching. We reached there just before sunset. We came around a fold in the hills and there, illuminated by the rays of the setting sun, was the Lamasery - tier after tier of white-washed buildings with red roofs and windows against the dark mountainside. A truly imposing sight. We had hoped to stay at the Lamasery over night, but the discourtesy of one of our soldiers in bringing his rifle into the forbidden precincts of the building brought us a chilly welcome, so we had to stay at an inn about half a mile away. Unfortunately the next day's march was quite long and we could not stay and make friends and so get to see the temple. Very early the next day we got under way headed for Ku Yang Hsien, about ninety li distant. About half way there we debouched from our original valley into a very wide valley running east to west, the far mountains of which were the mountain barriers of the Mongolian plateau. We turned west along that valley and just before sundown reached our destination near the western end of the wide valley. There is a Catholic mission at Ku Yang Hsien in charge of a solitary young Belgian Father, Jules Desmet by name. He gave us a warm welcome. His English was excellent considering the little use he had of it, but he was very much more at home in French and the local Chinese dialect. We stayed with him over night and he told us about conditions in the vicinity. We had passed several abandoned villages in the valley and found out that drought and incessant banditry had driven the people away. In fact, the Hsien Magistrate and other officials had taken refuge within the mission. The mission is in a walled compound outside the city, which though walled is poorly placed for defence. Father Desmet showed me his arsenal, about thirty rifles of assorted makes—French, German, Russian, Mexican—and separate ammunition for each. These rifles are for use in case of attack by bandits. He himself when traveling carries a long barrelled Luger automatic with a drum magazine which carries thirty-two rounds. The fame of the so-called machine gun has travelled all over the locality and the bandits leave him severely alone.

The next day, the 17th, we left for Ah Kuei Kou, about thirty-five li away, and stayed at a farm house in the mountains. This place we made our headquarters during the three shooting days. Game was plentiful and there was not a day that we did not see ten or twelve Big Horn,

usually too far away to shoot. The country was exceedingly rough but it was most interesting hunting. The party succeeded in getting three big horn, missing some very fine shots too. The third day we returned to the Padre at Ku Yang Hsien and the next day began the homeward march.

On the 21st, after riding ninety-five li, we stayed at Shih Kuei at an inn in the valley we came through northward. At all the inns we stayed at during the trip opium could be freely bought, and this place was no exception. Our soldier guards managed to get their pipeful almost every night. They usually showed signs of it the next day. We were told that it was being grown freely all over Suiyuan. Certainly the opium pipes and lamps were plainly visible in all the inns where we stopped.

We had hoped to reach Saratsi on the night of the 22nd, but some cameleers coming up the valley told us about some Big Horn nearby, so we went after them and got one. By the time we had gotten the sheep to the cart and loaded it, we were so delayed that we were compelled to stop at a small village (Hei Mow Er Ban Sheng) about twenty-five li west of Saratsi. We left there before dawn and got to Saratsi about 6:30 a.m. There I left the party for I wanted to stop over at Kweihua. I waited at the Saratsi station six hours for a train and finally got to Kueihua about 7:00 p.m. The commanding officers of the 8th and 7th Divisions, stationed at Pao Tou and Saratsi, were on the train on the way to Suiyuan. On the way down the C. O. of the 7th Division inspected troops along the line and went over organization lists with the local commanders, thus indicating that a reorganization is really going on, if only on paper. These division commanders were not very talkative, at least not with me. The discipline of the subordinate officers and soldiers on the train, even with all this rank about, was not very high. I probably was the only man in the compartment who had paid for a ticket yet I had to content myself with what little space could be found in the second class compartment.

Kueihua, once called the camel gate of the world, is an interesting place. There are excellent roads in the region, built during Feng Yu-hsiang's stay. Except for two official cars, however, the only automobiles there are three busses used to haul the opium from Pei Li Miao, brought there by camel caravan from Kansu. Kueihua is still a terminus of the caravan routes to Turkestan and Mongolia, so at times the place is crowded with camels and cameleers. There were many Shansi troops in Kueihua, as Suiyuan, a mile away, is the capital of the province. My clothes were in such condition at this time that I did not like to call on the Governor of the Province. I called on Mr. Almquist, a Swedish missionary, and Pere Ange Verstaden, the Director General of the Catholic Hospital. Both were very cordial and strange to say, longed for Feng Yu-hsiang to take over again. They missed his stern discipline. They said that the Shansi troops were practically worthless, having no discipline and little courage in fighting either an organized enemy or bandits. This merely confirmed what foreigners I met all along the line told me. In fact, several Chinese said practically the same thing. While in Kueihua quite a number of people called out "Yang Kuei Tzu" (foreign devil) as I passed and on the train some of the inspecting soldiers sometimes made slurring remarks. After getting into territory controlled by Fengtien troops, there is an entirely different feeling. The troops are more disciplined and there is less tension in the air.

I left Kueihua on the 26th and arrived in Peiping on the 27th, after an uneventful trip.

For the benefit of others who might like to take this trip I will touch on the finances and a few other points. The entire trip, including railroad fare for the four of us, cost about $800.00 Mex. or $200 apiece.

First class railway fare to Saratai one way is about $39.00. We had with us thirteen horses. Five foreigners (including Oberg), four soldiers and two Chinese were mounted. Two horses hauled the cart. Three cart horses would have been better. We were out nine days mounted. It was very fortunate having Mr. Oberg furnish the horses, we paying only the cost of feeding. Unless arrangements are made with some local man, preferably a foreigner, to get ponies hired in advance, it will be necessary to spend a day or two at the railhead bargaining. Mr. Oberg told us that he would be glad to furnish to foreigners ponies and feed at one to two dollars Mex. per day, depending on the value of the Suiyuan dollar. Suiyuan money can be bought at about two for one now. Unless one is inured to living on a very poor grade of Chinese food, all food supplies must be carried. In this connection foreigners all along the line are very hospitable, but they have great trouble getting foreign foodstuffs in so it is advisable to carry a little extra to leave in return for hospitality. Coffee makes a very acceptable gift.

William Mayer
Captain, Field Artillery

clh

Peiping, June 25, 1931.

Y-1 JUL 23 1931 2055-6189

Subject: Report on Trip to Kansu.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping.

WAR DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 22 1931

1. On April 22, I left Tientsin for Lanchow, Kansu. I was accompanying a party consisting of Mr. N. Grishkoff, a Russian naturalized French, Mr. LaPage, a Belgian automobile mechanic who was to accompany us only as far as Sian, three Chinese chauffeurs, Mr. Grishkoff's personal servant, and I took with me one personal servant. We started from Tientsin with four cars, two 1½ ton trucks (1 Renault and 1 Citroen), and two sedans (Citroen). All were heavily loaded, carrying gasoline and oil, motor spare parts and three wireless transmitting sets, the truck loads averaging two tons each. Three of these cars, the Citroens, belonged to the Sino-French Scientific Expedition of which one division was leaving Beruit coming east, the other was to leave Tientsin, going west. They expected to meet in Kashgar in midsummer and all return to Tientsin. The Renault truck was Mr. Grishkoff's personal property.

2. The part of the Expedition leaving Tientsin consisted of a main column carrying the party of French and Chinese scientists, altogether about forty people of whom about half were Chinese, and the smaller group with whom I traveled. In the main body the French personnel included about ten tractor drivers and mechanics, a moving picture camera operator, two radio operators, a mechanical engineer from the Citroen factory, a doctor, and the scientific party proper. Their transport consisted of seven tractors, each with a trailer, and some light cars and trucks. These tractors were of a semi-tractor type with regular automobile wheels in front and the moving track mounted under the rear half of the machine, the track surface being about five feet in length. Mr. M. C. Brull, the head of the Citroen laboratories, had been experimenting with such tractors for nearly ten years, had accompanied other expeditions, mainly in Africa, and apparently had designed a strong and efficient vehicle for such work. He showed me his tractors as they were being assembled at Tientsin and pointed out the many unusual features incorporated, due to their peculiar mission. A complete description of this equipment with photographs appears in the June 1931 copy of the National Geographic Magazine.

This main Expedition started about April 12th from Tientsin and, as far as I can learn, without informing the press or Chinese officials. They proceeded towards Nankow Pass, some thirty or forty miles northwest of Peiping (Peking). En route some difficulties were encountered when one of the small trucks broke through a bridge over which the much heavier tractors had passed safely. The Chinese press learned of the unannounced departure and in collaboration with the "Society for the Preservation of Cultural Objects" began to protest most violently against this action. The result was that the Expedition was directed to halt and the Expedition heads, through the French Legation, entered into negotiations with the Chinese Government. As a result, Dr. Chu Min-yi, the head of the Chinese section, was made a co-director with

Lieutenant Commander Victor Point. Among other concessions made to the Chinese side as a result of the negotiations, it was agreed that the Chinese and French flags were to fly side by side on the cars and that all movies and photographs were subject to censorship by the Chinese to prevent such as were discreditable to China from being put into circulation. Protest had been raised to the Expedition's carrying arms, but I understand it was permitted to retain three machine guns and also pistols.

After this agreement had been reached, the column was permitted to depart for Kalgan where it was to await the return of Dr. Chu Min-yi, who must first attend the People's Conference due to convene in Nanking on May 5.

My connection with the Expedition was absolutely unofficial. I had been planning and discussing with friends in Peiping for a considerable period my plans for a visit to Lanchow after my duty as language officer was completed. I had expected that a large portion of the trip would necessarily be made by cart and had intended to leave early in March, - in fact the date on which my duty at the Military Attache's office terminated, March 8. In February I received a note from Mr. M. W. Petro, assistant to Lieutenant Commander Point, inviting me to accompany the smaller party of the Expedition whose itinerary, as he outlined it to me, practically coincided with the one I had planned. He stated that the trucks and cars would leave not later than April 1. Since the trip would be made by automobile much greater speed could be made than by cart, and I would get to Lanchow just as soon - not later than April 25. He wished me to go as interpreter and unofficial assistant to Mr. Grishkoff. After some consideration I agreed to the proposal and utilized the intervening time to visit Nanch'ang, Kiangsi and Ch'angsha, Hunan, which trip I reported upon prior to my departure for the west.

After my return from the short trip south mentioned above, I was informed that the trip west could not start before April 6, - the tractors, etc., had arrived late and the customs insisted on a thorough inspection which was the chief cause of delay. Later, another and another postponement was announced, and it was not until April 22 that we actually got under way. These delays made it very doubtful as to whether I could cover the entire route planned, but since a return to my original plans to go by cart was inadvisable, I started with the truck column, advising them that I retained the privilege of dropping out and returning whenever I believed it necessary to do so in order to reach the coast in time for the sailing of the June transport, on which I was under orders to return to the States.

The cars we took were standard cars and trucks, not especially designed to meet the difficult conditions under which automobiles must operate in China. The clearance was low, the trucks were of long wheel-base, the power plant was not of sufficient power, and the frames and springs were not sufficiently strong. In addition, all the cars were loaded in excess of the designed carrying capacity. Consequently from the first difficulties were encountered. The first leg of the journey, which it was anticipated would require two days, required four. Due to a series of heavy dust storms, the road which parallels the embankment of uncompleted railroad from Tsangchow to Shihkiachwang was blown full of dry sand which in some stretches reached a depth of a foot. Here the trucks encountered great difficulty and were required to proceed in low speed for ten or fifteen

miles at a time. The last two days of the four we drove through a dust storm of such severity that we could not see more than a hundred yards ahead or behind. By the time Shihkiachwang was reached the cars were in need of overhaul. This fine Gobi dust sifts through almost any opening. An examination of our oil showed that it contained much dust which the air and oil cleaners had been unable to keep out or to remove.

The day after we arrived the automobiles were loaded on flat cars for shipment to Taiyuan, from which point they would proceed under their own power. After unloading, three days of cleaning and overhaul were necessary and it was May 1 before a start could be made from Taiyuan. The trip to Fenglingtu, the small village on the north bank of the Yellow River opposite T'ungkuan, Honan, also required four days although it was originally scheduled as a two day run. Shansi roads had long been considered among the best in China, but we found them full of holes and deep ruts. We were at no time able to move more rapidly than 30 kilometers an hour because of the danger to the springs over these rough roads.

The crossing at Fenglingtu was delayed one day by a heavy rain and strong wind in which the river ferry-boats were afraid to attempt a crossing. The next day was clear and the crossing was made. The boats were small, - barely large enough to permit the trucks to be loaded. The rear of the truck bodies projected over a foot beyond one side of the boat and the bumper projected beyond the other. No loading ramps or platforms were available; we used planks that we carried and were required to exercise the greatest care to prevent the cars dropping into the river. This crossing of the four cars occupied the entire day as it was necessary to go two miles down stream to find a channel through the sand banks of sufficient depth to cross. As we approached the north bank, our crew jumped into the shallow water, waded ashore, and towed us the two miles up stream to the landing point.

Here the local military demanded that we submit our cargo and baggage for inspection. As this would consume considerable time we went to the headquarters of the local commander where I presented our passports, explained who we were and what we wanted. As a result we were permitted to proceed to the inn within the city walls without further delay, and suffered no further inconvenience.

The next day we drove to Sian, the capital of the province of Shensi. For almost the entire distance the road was flanked by poppy fields in full bloom. In this district I estimate that from 15% to 20% of the arable land is given over to the raising of the opium poppy, the balance being used to grow wheat. Rainfall has been plentiful in this area, the wheat is tall, and the heads are full-grained. This part of Shensi will suffer no famine during the coming year unless other causes intervene.

In Honan, the military are everywhere in evidence. Ku Chu-jen, appointed by Nanking as Military Governor of Shensi, Kansu, Ch'inghai and Sinkiang, is still at T'ungkuan. There were no reports or other indications of his moving on into the territory nominally under his jurisdiction. Further on, in later conversations with various staff officers, etc., I learned that General Ku was not wanted - he and his troops are from the south and the age old prejudice still exists. Northerners do not want to be ruled by southerners. Undoubtedly Ku feels this antagonism and is making approaches to the various local tupans to insure their cooperation before he

attempts to proceed. Another factor is the threat of Feng Yu-hsiang, who with twenty or thirty thousand troops is just north of him in southern Shansi. Ku's uneasiness and apprehension in that direction are evidenced by the trenches along the river bank below T'ungkuan, and by the numerous sentry groups posted along the main approaches for fifteen or twenty miles to both the east and west to warn of a river crossing in their vicinity.

In Sian, General Yang Hu-ch'en occupies the two posts of Military and Civil Governor concurrently. The missionaries report him most fair and considerate. He is nominally a Nanking man, that is, a subordinate of Ku Chu-jen. Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays he is at the offices of the Civil Government; Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays he spends at the military headquarters. Conditions seem most peaceable, this year's crops are good, business is flourishing, there are few beggars, and all denotes normalcy. Sian has several wide smooth streets, many automobiles, five or six large bus companies operating on more or less regular schedules both east and west. A street cleaning and road repairing organization functions, and within twenty-four hours after a rain the streets are smooth again and in good condition for motor transportation. Opium, however, is in evidence everywhere, is openly raised and sold - and taxed - there being no pretense of a prohibition against it in any form whatsoever.

Our convoy waited here eight days. The repairs were completed and gasoline for the remaining distance was loaded by the sixth day, but it rained that day. Mr. Grishkoff decided to wait for the roads to dry, so we started again towards P'ingliang in Kansu on the 15th of May. Although these delays since the start had made it practically hopeless to expect that I could have time to reach Lanchow, nevertheless I continued on with the party.

The run from Sian to P'ingliang is a two day run for the buses that operate over this route. The half-way stop is made at Pinchow, not far from the Shensi-Kansu border. The road is good for fairly long stretches but nearly all the bridges are damaged or completely destroyed, so that in almost all cases we were compelled to ford the streams. This, however, was not particularly difficult as there was very little water in the streams crossed during this stage of the journey. Although the T'ungkuan-Sian general area has had a plentiful supply of rain, the area in central and central-western Shensi and eastern Kansu is very dry. Missionaries told me that only one rain had fallen this calendar year, and that at that time the fall was not sufficient to moisten the ground beyond a depth of two inches - by no means a rainfall of two inches. Famine and suffering are inevitable again this year; already grain prices are fifty per cent. higher than last year.

Some very long and very steep grades exist on this Sian-P'ingliang road. At the bases of these hills villages have grown up whose main industry is supplying additional draft animals to be hitched to the carts about to make the climb. Our trucks were required to adopt this method and six mule and ox teams finally got us over. All this time our engines were running in low gear to assist the animals. Even then a move forward of more than a few feet at a time was impossible. The engine would be raced, the clutch let in, the mules and oxen whipped, and a forward movement of a yard or two accomplished. When the engine died down, and the animals could move the trucks no further, blocks were thrown

behind the wheels to prevent them from rolling back. Then the animals rested, the engine was raced again, and another short stretch was accomplished. It was a most laborious and time consuming process. The regular bus companies here use American cars - the Dodge, Federal, International, Ford, and Chevrolet are the most popular. These under normal conditions accomplish the climbs without animal assistance; hence, there has been no pronounced agitation for the reduction of the grades. However, the French cars we were using could not do the work. Undoubtedly we were loaded too heavily; also, the Chinese chauffeurs were afraid of these hills and drove too timidly. However, after all is said, these cars have not the power or strength of design to operate successfully under the conditions one must meet in the interior of China.

Mr. Grishkoff stated to me at one time that this particular model had failed in France, that the cars had been re-designed before being put on the market in France, and that the inefficient, unsatisfactory models already constructed were being sent to China for sale. Outside of his statement to that effect I know nothing, but from what I saw of their performance I am inclined to believe that this statement is not entirely erroneous. These Citroen cars, however, were not being driven in to be sold, I understood, but were to be presented to the Governor of Sinkiang in recognition of his services to the Expedition -mainly the granting of permission to cross his territory.

In this connection, I heard that the Governor of Sinkiang objected strenuously to the inclusion of Dr. Chu Min-yi, and other Chinese "scientists", in the Expedition, and that he had said he would not permit the Chinese members to enter his territory. He suspected the Chinese members of political designs, said he would have no propaganda spread in Sinkiang, and that he would permit the formation of no Kuomintang groups. It will be interesting to see what happens when the party arrives at the borders.

To continue - we accomplished the Sian-P'ingliang stage in four days of very difficult going. On the third day one of the Chinese chauffeurs suffered a severe cut on the shin-bone. A large stone used to block the rear wheel of a truck was thrown forcibly against his leg by the spinning of the wheel as he was pushing from behind. I dressed the wound but the chauffeur was suffering. He lost considerable blood and was unable to drive his car (one of the sedans). I took over that work and drove that car up to the time I left for my return trip.

Reports of strained relations between Shensi and Kansu authorities increased as we neared the border, and here we found the garrisons most concerned about our mission and about the nature of our cargo. However, the Expedition passports, the letters from the French Legation to the various local officials, and the presence of foreigners seemed to reassure them for we were allowed to proceed after the routine questioning.

Previous reports had indicated the presence of bandit groups beyond P'ingliang, so we called on the garrison commander at that city to ascertain the advisibility of carrying a guard of Chinese soldiery. General Ch'en Kueichiang assured us that we would be safe as far as Kuyuan, but that he was not informed as to conditions beyond. He would, however, telegraph to the general there, and on arrival we could learn the conditions and call on that official for guard, if necessary.

After the day's delay necessary to make the above noted arrangements we proceeded and accomplished the sixty miles in two days. At Kuyuan we found the military commander unwilling to furnish us a guard for the next stage, the trip to Tsingning, but he consented to send a staff officer to a city some twenty miles along the road. This staff officer was to carry a letter to that city's military official, requesting for us safe conduct ahead.

The following day we started again and had accomplished some fifteen miles when another chauffeur was injured. This time it was a finger. The finger nail and the whole end of the finger was pulled off when caught between the tire and a block of wood which the driver was setting behind the wheel to prevent the truck from rolling down hill. This second accident left us with four cars and three drivers, including me, so it was impossible to proceed in one column. Due to banditry, bad roads, etc., Mr. Grishkoff considered it inadvisable to proceed; we turned back to Kuyuan, arriving there the evening of the same day.

The next day telegrams were dispatched to Sianfu asking that two chauffeurs be hired and sent immediately to Kuyuan. As this delay awaiting their arrival would amount to at least a week, I decided to return. Lanchow was now out of the question for me as I was due to return to America on the June transport.

I remained two days more with Mr. Grishkoff, helping him send telegrams, draft reports, etc., and closing my accounts with him. On the morning of the 24th I started my return trip by cart, taking with me at Mr. Grishkoff's request, the most seriously injured of the chauffeurs. The two day trip by cart to P'ingliang was accomplished without incident. Although a convoy of some twelve carts, an hour ahead of us on the road, were robbed at San Kuan K'ou, we passed through in our single cart without molestation. This point is a very narrow defile lined on either side with overhanging cliffs upon which are built Buddhist temples. As we passed through - about 8:30 p.m. - services were being held in these temples, "praying for rain". The beating of the gongs, the chanting, the lights from the incense being burnt before the altars, evidently had attracted the bandit groups from their labors; or maybe they had found opium among the cargo and were indulging in their pipes in the cool of the evening -anyway all was quiet as we passed and not until our arrival at the inn in the village ahead did we learn of the disaster that had overtaken the convoy which had preceded us.

Arriving at P'ingliang we found the buses all in the possession and use of the local military, who were busily engaged in "bandit suppression" -- the bandits concerned being the garrison of the next city ahead on our return route. The bus station master assured us that the situation was well in hand and that without any doubt all the cars would be returned to them the next day and normal service restored. However, when during the next two days no cars had been returned, I demanded the refund of my ticket money, hired two small carts and started for Sian. Normally this is an eight day journey but I pointed out to the driver the lightness of our baggage, the size and strength of his mules, and promised a slight bonus over the usual rates provided we accomplished the distance more quickly. He agreed and we left, starting each day between two and three o'clock in the morning and

continuing on until dark. Increased distance with our carters was a matter of only one possible solution - an earlier start and a later stop. Apparently Chinese history contains no record of a mule cart moving at a pace more rapid than a sleepy, leisurely walk. Increasing the speed to increase the distance to be covered was an idea that couldn't penetrate. Time on the road was a variable that could be introduced into their mathematics, but rate or speed was fixed and unalterable. However, by the expedient of lengthening our travel day we cut the time from eight to six days, arriving in Sian on the 2nd of June. En route we had passed through the "bandit suppression" campaign and two other bandit infested areas, but again without the least trouble, although on different occasions we heard of the difficulties of other convoys. Dead bodies along the side of the road proved the activities of bandit groups. Near T'ing K'ou, close to the Shensi-Kansu border, we saw the dead bodies of one of General Ch'en Kuei-chiang's division commanders and his orderly. Arriving at the city gates, we learned that this general had started home to attend the funeral of his concubine, carrying some four thousand silver dollars to defray the funeral expenses, and that he had been set upon by four soldiers of his command. He offered resistance to their demands and both he and the orderly were killed within a mile of the town, less than three hours before our passing the point. The robbers had escaped to the neighboring hills.

Arriving in Sian, I immediately investigated the chauffeur situation in compliance with a request made by Mr. Grishkoff prior to my return from Kuyuan. Although the telegrams had been dispatched some two weeks before, the chauffeurs had not yet departed for Kuyuan, but were in Sian unconcernedly awaiting the re-opening of bus service to P'ingliang. The border "bandit suppression" was apparently still being carried on. None of the buses had returned from P'ingliang, hence the local garages refused to dispatch more from Sian to that district. I called on the garage to whom the request had been sent and impressed upon them as forcibly as I could the necessity of starting these chauffeurs off to Mr. Grishkoff's assistance at once. I pointed out to them the urgency of the matter, the long delay already forced on this section of the Expedition, and the uncertainty of an early re-opening of bus service to the northwest. They agreed to start the men off the next day by cart, under which circumstances they could have reached Kuyuan by June 12.

Early the next morning my boy, the injured chauffeur, and I boarded a bus for Ling Pao, the western terminus of the Lunghai Railway, and continued our journey east. Our bus, a truck with an ordinary cargo body, was packed with passengers and cargo well beyond the limits of either safety or comfort. It broke down completely ten miles from Ling Pao, and only a bribe to the driver of a passing military truck enabled us to make our destination that day. The drivers of our truck were unable to get any help from other buses passing - the Good Samaritan of the highways, like the philanthropist generally, being a specimen rare almost to the degree of extinction in this land of face and futility.

Arriving at Ling Pao, we boarded the train east. It carried us to Shanchow that night and started on again at ten the next morning for Loyang, where we changed trains to Chengchow. Rumors of interrupted service on the northern half of the Peking-Hankow line, due to mutiny of Shih Yu-san's

troops, were found to be without foundation of fact, and we arrived in Peking June 6.

3. The itinerary of the trip was as follows:

April	22	Tientsin - Tsangchow	Chihli Province
	23	Tsangchow - Wukiang	"
	24	Wukiang - Sintsi	"
	25	Sintsi - Shihkiachwang	"
	26	Shihkiachwang - Taiyuan (cars shipped by rail)	
May	1	Taiyuan - Hwochow	Shansi Province
	2	Hwochow - Wenhsi	"
	3	Wenhsi - Yünch'eng	"
	4	Yünch'eng - Fenglingtu	"
	6	Fenglingtu - T'ungkuan (Honan) (crossing of Yellow River)	
	7	T'ungkuan (Honan) - Sian	Shensi Province
			"
	15	Sian - Kienchow	
	16	Kienchow - Tingk'ou	"
	17	Tingk'ou - Kingchow (Kansu)	Kansu Province
	18	Kingchow - P'ingliang	"
	20	P'ingliang - K'aich'eng	"
	21	K'aich'eng - Kuyuan	"
	22	Kuyuan - returned to Kuyuan	"
	24	Kuyuan - Haotien	"
	25	Haotien - P'ingliang	"
	28	P'ingliang - Peishui	"
	29	Peishui - Kao Chia Niao	"
	30	Kao Chia Niao - Pinchow (Shensi)	
	31	Pinchow - Chienchunchen	Shensi Province
June	1	Chienchunchen - T'ien Chang I	"
	2	T'ien Chang I - Sian	"
	3	Sian - Shanchow (Honan - via Lingpaohsien)	
	4	Shanchow - Loyang	Honan Province
	5	Loyang - Chengchow (arrived Chengchow early in morning of 5th, took train for Peiping)	
	6	Arrived Peiping	

4. In connection with the story of the trip above, some comments have been made on political or economic phases of the country traversed. However, several features were omitted and will be commented on separately below.

5. In Honan and particularly in Shensi and Kansu, poppy fields were plentiful. At the time of my going west the fields were in blossom. The white blossoms stood out brightly against the green of the adjacent grain fields so that even from the road a fair estimate could be made of the proportionate acreage given over to grain and to opium. I believe more than fifteen per cent. of the acreage in the areas visited was in opium; in the remainder, wheat was the principal crop. As mentioned previously, the area from T'ungkuan to Sian showed excellent crops. However, after crossing the Wei River on the stage toward P'ingliang, conditions were found to be very different. North of the Wei River, a high plateau cut by deep valleys and gulches is the outstanding feature of the geological formation. On this

plateau rainfall has been very scarce. The wheat is low and not well headed, but the crop is not an entire loss. The opium looked much poorer than the wheat. Beyond Pinchow, however, and to the west, there was indication of real drought. This observation was borne out by the testimony of missionaries to whom I talked. Unless conditions change very soon, a scarcity as great or even greater than last year and the year before is predicted. In both Shensi and Kansu farm labor was performed almost entirely by hand. Very few animals were seen, even the ploughs were pulled by human beings. Poverty beyond anything I had seen in previous travel in China is the rule in the rural areas. Except in fairly large cities it is impossible to obtain proper food. Our Chinese chauffeurs were constantly complaining not only of the high prices but also of the coarseness of the only food obtainable.

This famine has certainly affected the people physically. Normally the northerner, in China as elsewhere, is a man of energy, and in a mountain country we expect to find this characteristic even more marked. However, these people are slow of wit and movement, they work listlessly and apparently hopelessly; the porter class - the wheelbarrow, coolie, etc., - although often in groups, just plodded silently along. To one who is accustomed to seeing the coolie laughing and chattering interminably at his work this silent, plodding coolie immediately becomes noticeable. The average Chinese is happy, no matter how poor. In this case, it is undoubtedly years of improper nourishment that have caused the development of this type. These coolies are not sullen or morose, no active bitterness is in evidence; they have just resigned themselves to their fate because they lack the energy to combat their condition. No matter how corrupt or vicious the officialdom that preys upon them, these famine people won't resist. They are incapable of even an attitude of passive resistance because resistance implies at least mental activity and determination, and of such I saw no sign. Opium is their only solace. I heard that during the most severe periods of the famine, a small amount of opium dissolved in a cup of hot water was the main diet of thousands who found this would keep them alive for three days. Then another dose was taken if it could be obtained. Opium, primarily, was the money crop of the farmer in this area, the same as cotton in our own South, but during the famine it also has become the subsistence of thousands.

6. Politically, Northwestern China is a collection of little kingdoms ruled by bandit chiefs whose tenure of office endures only while their troops are kept happy and while no stronger or cleverer man appears to contest their right to rule. Some of these men are nominally recognized by Nanking, but when so, they are seldom in actual control of the total amount of territory allotted to them. There is an endless round of intrigue which concerns only the soldiers-bandits themselves. The ordinary citizen or merchant carries on while he can and then when upheaval comes he closes his shop, avoids in every way he can being implicated in the struggle, and like the ground-hog, only comes out occasionally to see if the sun has appeared from behind the clouds. If he finds impossible taxes have been imposed by the new authorities, the shutters on his shop remain in place and he waits for the next change, hoping that it will then be possible for him to do business.

At the time I left Tientsin the present Kwangtung revolt was just coming to light. All English newspapers I saw on this trip were several weeks old, for the mail service is slow, so it was very difficult to keep informed. The Chinese papers carried practically no references to it, partly due to strict censorship and partly to the interrupted telegraph service, - the lines had been cut by the bandits. Nearly all the Chinese papers were one or two sheet affairs, the organ of the local tupan, the news was mainly local or that copied from the larger papers which came by mail; consequently, such news as I obtained relative to the People's Convention in Nanking and the Kwangtung rebellion was very sketchy and often contradictory. The general consensus of opinion was that neither would affect conditions very much here. It was predicted that Nanking's appointee, Ku Chu-jen, then stationed at T'ungkuan, would be sent down the Lunghai Railway to occupy Chengchow and neutralize any anti-Nanking threats of Shih Yu-san. As his actual control had never extended far beyond T'ungkuan, this would have little effect on the situation as a whole. It was denied that any others would become implicated. Feng in south Shansi was always to be considered but it was expected that Ku Chu-jen would leave behind at T'ungkuan enough troops to prevent Feng's crossing the Yellow River into Honan.

7. An interesting observation concerns the attitude of the missionaries toward extrality. I met many, nearly all Americans but a sprinkling of French, Italian, Spanish, German, Scandinavian, and some English. All were most emphatically opposed to the abolition of extrality. Even though Nanking has no real control in this area and could not effectively protect foreigners here, nevertheless the Chinese now feel to a certain extent the restraint imposed by the present system. If extrality is removed the missionaries say all sorts of charges will be laid at their doors, they will be eternally at law, the Chinese will consider them and mission property a sure and safe source of revenue. Anyone wanting to divert attention from his own misdeeds will use an attack on their work to screen it. The all pervading reports and superstitions regarding foreign medicine, the alleged terrible practices of foreign hospitals, etc., are always at hand for him who lacks other methods of attack. Even in Peking, the home of the Rockefeller Foundation Hospital and Medical College, the Chinese press is constantly carrying editorials and news items derogatory to this institution. If in Peking, a city of some real knowledge of the foreigner and long acquaintance with western medicine, such attacks can be made and accepted, as they are, what then of the interior where ignorance and superstition are the normal condition.

These missionaries suggested that our Minister, Mr. Nelson T. Johnson, send out a "Literary Digest" type of questionnaire on this subject of extrality. These missionaries are not in a position to broadcast their feelings - - they wouldn't want the home missionary bodies to know of their attitude because many of them several years ago signed the recommendations that foreign powers abolish extrality. However, they now realize the error of their earlier statements, are appalled at the effect of their statements on public opinion abroad, and would do almost anything to insure the maintenance of the status quo - anything except

individually to break into print disclosing their true feelings in a signed statement. Their work is their source of livelihood and it is only human nature that they want to safeguard it. They are idealists and emotionalists and have been carried away by theories. In their sober moments they realize the results of these impractical statements, they see that China has not been changed overnight by the issuance of Nanking's proclamations, and they regret their rash and hysterical actions.

One missionary told me that right now servants and even native pastors were claiming they had received no pay for five years, and were demanding this back pay, even to the point of threatening lawsuits in the Chinese courts. Another told me that mission property in a fairly large city nearby had been continuously in the hands of the legal governing body of this city ever since the spring of 1927 in spite of oft repeated protests and requests for its return. These requests had been made through the proper channels - the mission to the American consul who transmitted it to proper Chinese authorities. These Chinese authorities have reported to our consuls that necessary orders have been issued, such information has been transmitted to the mission, and they have promptly acted to recover the property. On arriving at the locality in question, the persons concerned found each time that the local authorities denied the receipt of instructions from their provincial governments and refused to return the property to mission control. And this particular instance is in Honan, not in one of the northwest provinces.

I found these missionaries exceptionally fine people, doing a good work, and living under conditions that were far from the luxury sometimes laid to their charge. They are not a group of fanatics but are good every-day people, at times stirred to ill-considered action by their emotions and idealism but then as surely realizing their error when this phase has passed. The unfortunate part is that their idealistic and emotionally inspired outbursts have carried far, and public opinion has succumbed to the display of sentiment. Now they are reaping the harvest and are very ill at ease to see how disastrous the results promise to become.

8. Chinese roads are still difficult. Even where the political situation is such that petty warfare or banditry do not interfere, communication is still a real problem. I am firmly convinced that China's chief need is the opening and maintenance of motor roads and railroads. I feel that the automobile salesman will do more for the advance of China to a position of responsibility among the world powers than any other one factor. Car owners will demand roads, cars and roads will make control and administration possible, and China may become unified and capable of government. The petty local bandit chief will not feel so secure if he knows that ready avenues of approach exist through which government police forces may be dispatched to punish his derelictions. It will broaden the Chinese mind and outlook. John Chinaman will no longer be a Peking man or a Hunanese, but will be a Chinese. Now he is too provincial, patriotism as we know it is meaningless to him and will remain so until he learns more of his countryman and gets the community idea. This will never happen while he is held forever to his own district by the restrictions imposed by lack of communications.

9. In summary, although China has made tremendous strides toward unity along her seacoasts, further inland we discover that the old China of decentralized control is still existent. Ideas and ideals have been accepted and swallowed but not digested, and the process of digestion is slow and productive of pain. Nanking oratory and propaganda should not blind one to the true conditions. Sympathy in our attitude toward China is an admirable quality, but harmful when it degenerates to sentimentality or is applied without knowledge and judgment. China has not yet set her house in order, and can not be classed as capable of responsible government. Her pages in the World's Ledger must still be written in red ink.

C. J. Kanaga
C. J. Kanaga
First Lieutenant, F. A.
U. S. Army

No. 8049 1st Ind. PGT:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, June 25, 1931 - To: The A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 13 1931
WAR DEPARTMENT

REPORT OF TOUR OF INSPECTION OF FLOOD AREA

Shanghai to Chungking, Szechwan

September 14 - October 10, 1931

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 11 1931

Acting on the suggestion of the Minister that it would be desirable to have a report on flood conditions in the Yangtze Valley from personal observation, I took advantage of an invitation to sail on a Standard Oil ship that was scheduled to go to Chungking and return to Hankow. According to schedule, we sailed from Shanghai at daybreak on September 14, and arrived at Hankow on September 19.

The real tragedy of the flood begins to develop shortly after leaving Nanking and continues until Kiukiang is reached. It is difficult to find words which suitably describe the frightful ruin that extends to the horizon on either side of the river. The banks and dykes have disappeared, the Yangtze River has become an inland sea, and destruction of homes, crops and other evidences of human effort is complete. Aside from sections of the larger towns of Wuhu, Anting and Kiukiang built on high ground, all signs of life in this vast area have disappeared except the movement of steamers and river junks. At Wuhu the Chinese city is under water. At Kiukiang the water is over the bund and into the Chinese city. The rise has reached to the first floor of the foreign buildings and offices along the bund. Business, except from the river, is at a standstill and much suffering is reported in the Chinese city. At Hankow two to four feet of water is in the streets and sampans are the only mode of transportation.

Refugees line the railroad banks and large camps have been organized at Wuchang and Hanyang, where food is scarce and terrible conditions obtain. Streams of refugees are pouring into Hankow and are being distributed to refugee camps, into godowns, or any place where there is ground to camp on. The efforts of the relief commission to aid this vast horde of starving humanity appear so futile and can reach so few. Members of the commission with whom I talked seemed discouraged and felt that before organization could be completed and put on a working basis the number of deaths would be appalling. Already the deaths reported daily from the Wuchang and Hanyang camps number 60 or 70 from each camp, mostly from dysentery. Great efforts are being made to prevent a cholera epidemic. All foreign women and children have left and business men who can not leave their property remain, but no business is being done.

Hankow is truly a stricken city and will require a long time to recover.

Early reports that great numbers of people were drowned when dykes gave way are not confirmed. The loss in and around Hankow is reported to be small.

Soon after arrival at Hankow we were informed that the Cantonese troops were moving into Hunan and had reached Hengchow; that government troops were moving across country from southern Kiangsi, and others were coming by boat from Kiukiang. This report appeared to be confirmed as we passed several large passenger ships loaded with soldiers en route to Changsha, also barges on which I counted 130 new auto trucks, and while at the Standard Oil installation I saw 50,000 gallons of aviation gasoline transferred to another Standard Oil boat, which left at once for Changsha, for delivery to government troops. I learned later on the down trip that due to the Japanese trouble the Cantonese troops withdrew from Hunan, and the trucks and gasoline were not unloaded at Changsha.

We left Hankow at daybreak September 20th for up river. The first day out we ran into conditions similar to those existing between Nanking and Kiukiang. This flooded condition extends from Hankow to the vicinity of Shasi. There was evidence of falling water in this area and where ground is beginning to appear above the water refugees are returning, building little grass huts, and will wait for land to appear to begin to cultivate. In the meantime we wonder how and on what they will exist.

From Shasi to Ichang conditions begin to improve due to higher ground and falling water. People are returning to their homes and cultivation is beginning on a large scale. We arrived at Ichang on September 22. From this point through the Gorges to Chungking the effects of the flood have not been felt. Ichang's principal reason for existence is that this is a point where all up river cargo going into Szechwan must suffer a transfer or pay the coolie unions the equivalent transfer charges. It is also the center of distribution of opium coming out of Szechwan, Kweichow and even Yunnan. Foreign shipping suffers long delays incurring financial losses as a result of continuous strikes which hold up transhipment of cargoes.

It was while in Ichang that I received the first information of Japanese occupation of Mukden. I called on the Commissioner of Customs, who is a Japanese, and the manager of the N.K.K. steamship line. Neither had any detailed information of the Manchurian incident but precautions were taken by having all Japanese residents report at the godown of the N.K.K. Company. Japanese commercial boats were ordered off the upper river with the exception of one at Chungking and one at Ichang, which were held in readiness to take off Japanese nationals in case of necessity. No Japanese cargo is carried on steamers on the upper river (between Ichang and Chungking). Further calls were made on the British Consul and on the manager of the Yangtze Rapid Steamship Company (American). They had no news of the outside except fragments picked up by wireless on foreign gunboats in port. They stated there had been no demonstration on the part of the Chinese against the Japanese; that conditions in Ichang continued peaceful.

We left Ichang on September 23, passed through the Gorges to Wanhsien, where we arrived on September 25. Many pages could be devoted to a description of the wonders of the Gorges, with mountains on either side running almost straight up to heights in many places reaching 3700 feet. At this time the water was 50 feet above normal and only the specially built steamers could successfully combat the many rapids encountered. It is a strange sight to see cultivated spots on the sides of these mountains where it appears only a goat could get a foothold.

The great value of this the only channel of communications with Szechwan (unless by the roundabout way of Kansu or Yunnan) is that the warlord who holds Wanhsien and Chungking controls Szechwan. At present Marshal Liu Hsiang at Chungking is No. 1, with his right hand man, General Wang Fangchow, at Wanhsien. We left Wanhsien at daybreak on September 26, arriving at Chungking at 5:00 p.m. on September 27.

The mountains between Wanhsien and Chungking become more rolling, are highly cultivated and present a very prosperous appearance. One has an opportunity to observe this entire distance as river boats are not allowed to run during hours of darkness. I was told this time was dangerous for the loaded junks because of high water, but many were observed being towed up stream and sailing down.

Chungking is the most important city on the river west of Hankow. It is a beehive of activity. Foreign shipping is not permitted to carry cargo further west from here.

An interview had been arranged for me with Marshal Liu Hsiang, and accompanied by Captain Dyer of the gunboat Panay, we called at his official residence on September 29. He received us cordially and immediately asked if we had any news of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and what action the United States would take. It is strange that this is usually the first question asked by high officials. They seem to rest content in the belief that the United States will get them out of trouble.

Marshal Liu was very bitter in his expressions regarding the Japanese and stated that this violation of China's sovereignty would have a great influence in unifying China; that the various factions would forget their local quarrels and join in a common front against the common enemy. He said he had sent circular letters to all generals in Szechwan asking them to join him in a general boycott against the Japanese. He designated September 28th as a day of humiliation for China and ordered all stores closed, all citizens to wear a badge of mourning on the left arm, all flags at half-mast, and mass meetings to declare against the Japanese. I visited Chungking on the 28th and found little evidence of the general observance of Marshal Liu's order. It is difficult to understand how interest can be aroused in a people who for years have been independent of the Central Government, who are located thousands of miles from the scene of the incident and who, suffering under the burden of extortionate taxes, have to struggle for a daily existence. The people may be forced to observe a boycott but they will observe it indifferently. This was the general attitude of the people observed in the large towns visited west of Hankow.

Peace reigns throughout Szechwan. This is a province which suffers little from communist or bandit activities. It is true there are at present four important warlords who control a certain area and an army. At Chengtu three of these generals have their headquarters, i.e.,

1. General Liu Wen-hui, Nanking's appointee as Provincial Chairman and uncle of Liu Hsiang. His army is said to be 100,000 strong and at present he controls the area to the west of Chungking and south of Chengtu. He is hostile to Liu Hsiang at present because of the failure of the latter to make delivery of a large supply of war materials bought and paid for and confiscated by Liu's No. 1 at Wanhsien.

2. General Teng Hsi-hou. His army is said to number 25,000 men and he controls the area northwest of Chengtu. His army is reported to be poorly equipped and undisciplined.

3. General Tien Sung-yao, said to have an army of 35,000 men and controlling the area northeast of Chengtu.

Marshal Liu laughingly stated that these three generals were classmates at Paotingfu. This was the reason for all having headquarters in Chengtu but each regards the other with suspicion. He fears them not because he controls the channel of communication through which they must obtain war supplies.

General Yang Sen controls a small area between Liu Hsiang and Tien Sung-yao. His army is said to number 30,000 men. Yang controlled Wanhsien until a year ago and was very popular with the people. He did much for civil improvement in the city, constructing good roads and keeping taxes down.

There are numerous other unimportant officers who control small areas but acknowledge allegiance to one of the more important generals.

Marshal Liu is the No. 1 in this province. His army is 125,000 strong and he controls the richest and most important areas. His troops are stationed down the river as far as Shasi. They are equipped with modern arms consisting of Lewis machine guns, Thompson automatics, trench mortars and field artillery. He has an air corps, with a captain of the French air service in command, and a field at Chungking, Wanhsien and Ichang (separate reports on these air fields will be submitted in the next pouch).

Two small gunboats are now ready for delivery, for use on the upper river. Marshal Liu is building roads through the city of Chungking and new modern buildings are going up along both sides of these wide streets. He has 60 automobiles now running over the roads completed and with the completion of the road to Chengtu, automobiles will make the trip in one day and a half. He is just completing a modern reservoir which will supply the city with good water. At present the water system of Chungking consists of 30,000 coolies who carry and deliver dirty water from the river to the inhabitants.

Those who know Liu, however, say he is unscrupulous in the imposition of taxes; that he is killing local business and preventing foreign business development because of impossible, high taxes. There is a considerable foreign population in Chungking with British, French, Japanese and German consulates.

During the four days I was forced to remain in Chungking I was impressed with the apparent prosperity. There were certainly no indications of hostilities in the immediate future; in fact, in conversation with Chinese officials and foreigners the subjects of war, communists and bandits are not often mentioned. Marshal Liu, in returning my visit, stated he was receiving instructions from Nanking, but certainly he is not carrying out any that are not to his benefit. It is to his advantage to declare loyalty to Nanking as this insures his receiving war supplies as tribute.

We left Chungking on October 2nd. The down trip is made in just half the time required for the up trip. We arrived at Ichang in the afternoon of October 3rd. This being Saturday, the Customs closed at noon and we were forced to remain over until noon on the 5th before the ship could be cleared. Taking advantage of this interval, I called on General Yuen Chen-wu, bandit suppression commander of this area including Ichang, Itu and Shasi. He has 20,000 of Liu's 21st Army distributed along this line and stated he has had very little trouble with Red-bandits. This is confirmed as ships have not been fired on for a long time.

There was no change in the attitude of the people toward the Japanese from the time I passed through going up river; in fact, the Japanese residents had returned to their homes. I called on General Chang Hua-feng the same day. He commands the local garrison of 7500 men, who appear to be well equipped and well disciplined. He stated conditions in his area were quiet and peaceful.

We left Ichang on October 5th, arriving at Hankow on October 6th. From Ichang to Hankow there is evidence of the river falling in the appearance of parts of dykes and other high ground, but the back country shows no change, being still flooded to the horizon. It will be months before the people will be able to begin cultivation. In the meantime some will receive assistance but many will die of exposure and starvation.

Upon arrival in Hankow on October 6, we found the water out of the town and well within its banks. The city is being cleaned and is making a rapid recovery. Autos and rickshaws are in all the streets and stores are opening for business. Quite a different air grips the people from that found six days before.

While here I learned from our Consul General and the Standard Oil agent that 30 trains were being made up to transport troops up the Peking-Hankow Railroad to Chengchow, at the junction of the Lung-Hai Railroad. The Standard Oil Company was preparing to ship 25,000 gallons of gasoline. No one seemed to have a good reason for the movement.

I learned here from reliable sources that all Cantonese troops had withdrawn from Hunan and reports from southern Kiangsi were to the effect that communistic activities had practically ceased. The Japanese situation had not unduly excited the people, - perhaps they were too busy re-establishing themselves after the flood.

I learned from members of the flood relief commission that conditions in the refugee camps, particularly at Wuchang and Hanyang, were still in a terrible state. 50 to 60 were dying in each camp daily and there were evidences of cholera in the camps. The distribution of relief was very difficult. Some 30,000 were still in the godowns and factories and refused to get out. They expected to have trouble in ejecting them.

I left Hankow at 9:30 p.m., October 6, on the first commercial boat down river, and arrived at Nanking the afternoon of October 8.

Very little change was observed in the flooded area, although the water is falling. This area extends to such distances that it will require months for the back country to clear. The cities of Kiukiang and Wuhu are free and doing business again.

I called on the Standard Oil agent at Kiukiang. He had returned from Nanchang the preceding day and reported that according to information from the South communistic activities had ceased. This must not be accepted as fact, although since September 18, the date of the Japanese occupation of Mukden, practically no reports of Red activities in southern Kiangsi have been received.

I spent the afternoon of October 8th in Nanking with Mr. Peck, the Consul General. He stated there was a nervous tension among government officials who feared some action on the part of radical students might precipitate trouble with the Japanese gunboats in the river. Mr. Peck told me that the government felt that a compromise with the opposition government was near; that delegates from Nanking and Canton were en route to Shanghai to discuss terms.

I left on the 7:00 p.m. train from Pukow, and arrived in Peiping at noon on October 10. There were no troop movements between Pukow and Tientsin and little military activity was observed.

<u>Conclusions.</u>

1. That the flood in the Yangtze Valley is the greatest calamity that has visited China in fifty years. The economic effect will be felt by a large part of the population of China. Words cannot describe conditions. One must actually see the results of the flood in order to get an idea of the enormous losses.

2. It is not believed the back country will be free from water to permit of cultivation before next spring.

No. 8123

3. Bandit activities will spread in the Wuhan area and in the Han River Valley due to large numbers of refugees who have lost everything in the flood and are starving. Officials in Hankow look for terrible times this winter up the Han River.

4. Aside from an indifferent attitude on the part of the Chinese toward the boycott of Japanese goods, it is not believed there will be much trouble in the Yangtze Valley this year.

Some photographs giving a slight idea of flood conditions are attached hereto.

N E Margetts

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attaché

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JAN 11
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 7 1932

CHINA (Economic)

Subject: Conditions in the Yangtze Valley.

Though the situation in the Three Eastern Provinces is of major interest, it is felt that from economic and political points of view some comments on flood relief in the Yangtze Valley are still essential in trying to visualize the crisis through which China is passing to-day. The Central Government tottors before threats of invasion from the North, Red-bandit depredations throughout the central provinces, and the misfortunes which accompany financial and political chaos. In the face of these odds flood relief goes on, a war waged against the ravages of communism and banditry as truly as it is a war waged against the ravages of famine and disease. The work of the relief commission, where successful, will do much toward strengthening the already weakened arm of the government. The effort that is being made in the Yangtze Valley is the only hopeful sign that can be seen in China's present unfortunate predicament. Interesting enough is the fact that the effort is largely under the control of foreign influences.

Units from the Peking Union Medical College are in charge of the medical relief in the city of Wuchang. Though the activities of these units are confined to a single city and the results obtained would represent the best of those found in the flooded districts, it is believed that they would serve as a good indication of the general trend of endeavor, particularly along medical lines.

A P.U.M.C. Bulletin dated November 11th states that:

"The total number of refugees in Wuchang is at present estimated to be around 36,600, a good part of whom are not flood sufferers but refugees from the Reds, coming from the bandit-infested villages in the province. The morbidity rate is high among these refugees, but it is impossible to express it in figures, because there are still many sick and dying in the camps refusing to come for medical care and because accurate numbers of refugees are very difficult to obtain."

There are at present in the city five hospitals containing 360 beds, all of which are in the hands of P.U.M.C. units. Included in these is an isolation hospital of 40 beds which is used only for small-pox and exanthematous diseases. The above mentioned bulletin states further:

"These hospitals, with the exception of the Isolation and Wireless Station Hospitals, are matsheds temporarily built near the refugee camps. All equipment available is crude and clumsy, but one will be surprised to see how neat these hospitals can be kept and how much 'P.U.M.C. Hospital Routines' carried out. To every hospital there is now a small clinical laboratory established since the arrival of the P.U.M.C. unit. All P.U.M.C. nurses have been transferred to Wuchang so that better team-work in hospitals and clinics can be obtained."

A bulletin dated December 2nd says that:

"The P.U.M.C. unit now engaged in medical relief work in Wuchang consists of 41 members including 11 doctors, 8 fourth year medical students, 11 graduate nurses, 6 pupil nurses, and 5 public health visitors. The number of cases seen at our dispensaries and 'travelling clinics' averages about 400 daily, while there are 200 or more inpatients in our emergency hospitals all the time. Cholera and dysentery cases are still not infrequently encountered despite

the advancing cold weather. Recently an overwhelmingly large number of measles cases has been discovered in the refugee camps and is almost beyond our control. Mortality due to post-measles broncho-pneumonia is abnormally high, especially in the camps. In Futaiyamen camp alone where there are about 2,000 refugees, 31 cases were found on one day last week. Hospitalization of these cases is impracticable, considering the vast number of them. It is our plan to segregate the measles cases, as many as possible right in the camps. Small-pox is becoming now an epidemic. 47 cases have been seen by our doctors in the last ten days, and we feel fairly certain that there must be some more cases in the camps as yet undiscovered. The vaccination campaign is still being carried on; but ignorance on the part of many of the refugees has offered quite a bit of resistance and opposition to our campaign."

Though the above quotations are of interest particularly as they bear on the medical problem of relief, they do indicate sound and efficient administration.

Dr. John B. Grant, head of the Chinese section of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, paints a picture of conditions which is less inspiring. The foreigner in charge of grain distribution in the Wuhan area asked for and was granted M$6,000,000 to cover the cost of his part of the project. Two unassociated Chinese later separately made estimates approximating M$2,000,000, which they stated was sufficient to accomplish the same task. Whether the Chinese hoped to make additional money from the sale of wheat or whether the foreign supervisor was most careless in his estimate is at present a matter for speculation. In passing it is of interest to note that this foreign supervisor is the John Earl Baker who has enjoyed his connection with famine relief for some years.

This same Mr. Baker was responsible for the selection of the notorious Fang Pen-jen as the chief relief administrator in the Hankow area. On his shoulders falls the blame for the use of the Ho Chien clique in Hupeh. Already the auditors have discovered large unexplained shortages of American Red Cross funds which were slated for use in that province. Dr. Grant was bitter in his denunciation of those in charge of the selection of administrators, both foreign and Chinese. He indicated that it was not only necessary to select men of absolute integrity but men who were sound in their judgment of Chinese character and long experienced in the field of Chinese business or social intercourse. He said that men were on the administrative staff in Shanghai who were perfectly capable in technical training for the work at hand but their lack of knowledge of China made them an encumbrance rather than a useful part of the relief machinery.

Indications of profiteering and pilfering have been many. Bags were needed to sack the wheat that had come in bulk from America. The result was an immediate corner on bags in Shanghai. The first shipment of grain to the flooded districts suffered an actual loss of 20% between Shanghai and Nanking. Together with these examples of selfishness and corruption are other more hopeful examples of real Chinese sacrifice, donations by individuals and losses suffered by Chinese firms for the sake of relief economics.

In addition to its internal difficulties the Flood Relief Commission is faced with obstacles forced on it by Red activities. About four weeks ago a flood survey party consisting of 120 Chinese were billeted in a village of Hupeh. During the night a Red-bandit raid took place. Forty

CHINA (Economic)

Subject: Conditions in the Yangtze Valley

of the party escaped; the remaining 60 were captured and have not been heard from. Dr. Grant stated that more difficulty is expected through the winter from the Red menace than from famine conditions. Hupeh particularly is endangered from Red depredations. The Hupeh Provincial Government issued a mandate which stated that free rice distributions would stop on November 10th as conditions were such that the people could return to their homes. Despite this declaration, refugees continued to pour in to Wuhan. They were running not from the famine but from communism.

Dr. Grant's association with government circles in Nanking gave his statement considerable weight when he said that the Reds have not been as strong in Kiangsi for the past year as they are at present. They are overrunning the province of Hupeh, being particularly well organized in the Han River Valley. All of southern Honan with the exception of the railway zone is under their control.

Thoughtful minds are troubled with the possibility of a Yangtze Valley turned communistic. Homeless bodies and hungry stomachs make fertile soil for Red doctrines. If the seed should take root it would be short shrift for Nanking and its political appendages. With the Central Government gone the resultant upheaval would not be pleasant to contemplate. And so the fight goes on to fill stomachs and find homes to delay if possible the hour when China goes Red.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

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APR 12 1932
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Peiping, March 6, 1932

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Subject: Report of Trip to Kalgan and Tatung

To: The Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China

1. Pursuant to Special Orders No. 6, February 29, 1932, of this office, I left Peiping the morning of March 1st, visiting Kalgan and Tatung, returning on the afternoon of March 5th. The information gathered from observation and numerous conversations is as summarized below.

Military.

Although there are numerous rumors of the troops of Kalgan and Shansi advancing to Manchuria via the Kalgan - Doloner - Jehol route to attack the Japanese, absolutely no positive signs of preparation are apparent. The fact that only yesterday at Nankow the special car of General Fu Tso-yi, Chairman of Suiyuan, was passed as he returned to his post following an interview with Chang Hsueh-liang, might mean that my investigation was about one week too early. The attitude and condition of the troops indicates the leaders and troops have no desire to fight the Japanese. On the contrary many residents, native and foreign, believe they will take the first opportunity of ousting Chang Hsueh-liang from Hopei.

Discipline: The strictness of the discipline of the troops in the area visited is apparently directly proportional to distance from the railway, i.e., headquarters. When rations and pay were not forthcoming several months ago what disorders took place were so sternly dealt with that none have re-occurred. At that time, in Tatung, six soldiers caught in the act of highway robbery were beheaded and their heads exhibited at the market and at four gates of Tatung for a week. It was reported that at Huailai two soldiers caught robbing peasants were killed by the lingering death method before the paraded troops.

Pay and Rations: Hopei troops have been paid but twice since the Japanese entered Manchuria. They draw white flour for two meals per week and are totally without meat.

Shansi troops are totally without meat or white flour and subsist on yu mi, hsiao mi and potatoes. They have received no pay for four months.

Location of Units:

1. Chang Hsueh-liang's in Hopei:

Ch'ing Ho - 7th Brigade under Wang I-sheng. Drill both morning and afternoon. This outfit was supposed to have fought with Japanese in Manchuria. Now has many recruits.

Suan Hua - 11th Brigade formerly at Nanyuan, Peiping.

Kalgan - 10th Brigade; also an undetermined unit of troops who volunteered for service in Manchuria. This outfit is very unpopular in Kalgan with residents and the 10th Brigade. Since their arrival, there have been numerous fights between soldiers all of which are blamed on the volunteers. Said to be the worst (most undisciplined) troops Kalgan has had for many years.

2. Yen Hsi-shan's at Tatung:

Garrison commander, Chao Chen-shou, also has one regiment of cavalry directly under him.

2nd Brigade, Chou Tuan-chien, old Chihli-Shantung troops, good troops, far superior to the Shansi troops.

3rd Brigade, Feng Ye-hsi.

Mongols. The Panchan Lama is reported to be now at the West Sunnit Prince's home and expects to return to Tibet within a few weeks. Mr. F. A. Larson told me that the West Sunnit Prince told him that the Japanese had offered him arms and ammunition. He has not accepted as yet. The Mongols northwest of Kalgan are very quiet and not concerned with outside conditions as yet. Mr. Larson feels sure there are Japanese agents working both in Mongolia and Kalgan.

Physical.

The country traversed is well known to this office. No new developments have taken place. The country is now thawing out and the fields are being prepared for crops.

Economic.

General: Due to the trouble in Manchuria, which has closed that gateway, native trade has improved in Kalgan. The fur and wool business however has suffered from the world wide depression which has left large stocks of both at Tientsin.

Peking-Suiyuan Railroad: Making the return trip from Kalgan with the Peking-Suiyuan Railroad's auditor made it possible to gather some information concerning that road. The road is now making money due entirely to its freight traffic. For the month of February the receipts at Kalgan were freight, $100,000, passenger, $14,950. The local railroad agents are thoroughly corrupt and native merchants are at their mercy. Foreign firms, however, knowing the local officials fear of the railroad director, keep them down to only moderate squeezes. Passenger traffic is dominated by the railroad guards who compete with the ticket office in that they guarantee passage from point to point at reduced rates. This in spite of the fact that the railway makes a special monthly grant of $2,400 to the military.

The railway, evidently from director down, feels bitter toward Chang Hsueh-liang. Upon returning to Peiping in 1930, he refused to return the cars to that line which his father had taken away in 1928. On March 1st of this year $200,000 was turned over to him and all officers of the road contribute 20% of their salary to him.

Trade with Outer Mongolia. Trade with Outer Mongolia continues to be at a standstill. In the past two years at least only Mr. F. A. Larson has had a permit to trade there. He states that on all trails are posted Mongol soldiers who prevent all intercourse. At the station he visited the Mongol soldiers were under a Russian officer in uniform, who treated him very courteously.

H. L. Boatner
1st Lieutenant, Infantry

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

2053-694

May 5, 1932

WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: Conditions in Eastern Szechuan and Western Hupeh

To: The Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 7 1932

1. The following notes were collected during a trip on the middle and upper Yangtze during the month of April 1932. Stops of from one to four days were made at Hankow, Ichang, Wanhsien and Chungking. At these points contact was made with consular officers, naval officers, Chinese military commanders and civil officials, and with foreign and Chinese business men.

Szechuan Warlords.

Practically all of the province of Szechuan is under the control of two warlords, Liu Wen-hui and his nephew, Liu Hsiang. Liu Wen-hui, who is nominally the governor of the province, from his headquarters in Chengtu controls from the western border of Szechuan to a point east of Chengtu. He has well over half the province in area and maintains the 24th Army, of approximately 80,000 men. His revenues, particularly from opium land and consumption taxes, are said to be enormous. Liu Hsiang has the strategic position of being in control of the water gateway into the province. His troops, the 21st Army, about 100,000 strong with subsidiaries, extend from just west of Chungking down the Yangtze well into Hupeh. In addition to the two leaders above three other commanders, General Yang Sen, who commands the 20th Army - about 20,000 strong, General Teng Hsi-how who commands the 28th Army of about 35,000 rifles, and General Tien Sung-yao who commands the 29th Army of about 45,000 men, each have smaller spheres of influence in the province.

Impending Struggle for Control.

A struggle for control of the entire province has been predicted for some years. It seems that Liu Hsiang was girding his loins preparatory to taking his uncle into camp and taking over the fat revenues of the entire province some time this spring. The Shanghai situation however made internal strife unpopular. The Central Government had also asked Liu Hsiang to dispatch troops to force Ho Lung's Hupeh Red army away from the Yangtze and additional units to take over the Wuhan area. The government troops in Wuhan area released by this move to be used either against the communists or against the Japanese. Liu Hsiang has complied with the first request and some of his units are on the Yangtze within 170 miles of Hankow. He appears to be reluctant to send any force to Wuhan and probably won't until his private quarrel is over.

The extent of Liu Hsiang's preparations may be gauged by his military purchases. In 1931 he purchased 1200 Lewis machine guns and one million rounds of ammunition from Arnhold & Co. Two new Fairchild airplanes were delivered to him this spring. Five Potez airplanes complete with armament are reported to be at Haiphong ready to be flown into Chungking. He has purchased and is building armored cars and tanks. An arsenal

is in operation at Chungking. Several requests for me to visit this plant were neatly sidestepped by Liu Hsiang. It is reported that this arsenal, in charge of a German, is turning out small arms and ammunition, trench mortars, 25 and 60-pound crude airplane bombs, and a small quantity of toxic gas.

Liu Hsiang also has a navy. In addition to one 100-ft. gunboat armed with Lewis machine guns which he has had for some time, two new ships were delivered to him this year. These, built in Shanghai, are about 130 ft. long. They are armed with eight Lewis guns and one now has one old French 75 mounted foreward and a French 42 mm gun aft. The guns were mounted in Chungking and there appears to be some doubt as to the stability of the carriages. The local officials requested the officers of the French gunboat to test the guns but insisted that the French assume all responsibility for accident. This the French naturally refused to do so the guns have not yet been proof fired. The officer personnel of the gunboats was trained at the Chinese Government Naval School; they and the sailors appear to be mainly Ningpo men. Two 30-40 ft. speed boats have been purchased. These are now being armored and equipped with Lewis machine guns at the arsenal.

General Chiang Kuei, the commandant of Liu Hsiang's air force, is, incidentally, also in charge of the navy. He told me that when he brought the two new gunboats up the river without armament he was worried lest he be attacked by communists in the middle river. He had wooden guns constructed and mounted and so passed the danger zone safely.

It is also reported that General Tien Sung-yao's 29th Army will combine with Liu Hsiang's forces in the fight against Liu Wen-hui. This is borne out by the fact that arms and munitions destined for units of the 29th Army get through Chungking without difficulty whereas military and other supplies for the other warlords are confiscated.

When this struggle for control will finally start is problematical. Should the Japanese situation ease during the summer it is probable that a start will be made then. If not next spring should see the opening of hostilities. Liu Hsiang's military expenditures have been very heavy and he feels an acute financial stringency. The territory he now controls is taxed to the limit of its revenue producing power. To take over additional impoverished territory in Hupeh, long the battleground of communists and bandits, would bring little if any revenue. He will undoubtedly stick to his original idea and turn to the rich farm land and opium producing Szechuan country now in the hands of his uncle.

Motor Roads in Szechuan.

The past few years has seen the increasing introduction of motor vehicles into Szechuan. Chungking's only modes of transport three years ago were pack animals, pack coolies and sedan chairs. Now with the building of motor roads, rickshaws and motor cars have made their appearance and are heavily patronized. An excellent motor road to Chengtu is under construction and it is stated that all but a section eighteen miles long, about twenty-five miles out of Chungking, and the

bridging of three or four streams, is now complete. The Chungking end of this road seemed especially well constructed and the engineering required to gain altitude in the approach to the mountains was of high order. It is expected that the road can be completed this year. Military reasons however may prevent the opening of this road according to schedule. A map of the present motor roads in Szechuan is appended.

The Upper River.

The Yangtze from Chungking to Ichang is now quiet and peaceful. Armed guards are no longer necessary on the foreign steamers between these points. Save for the movement of wood oil, shipping is very light just now. The ex-chief of the Szechuan Bureau of Navigation, Liu Tze-foo, is attempting to form a combine of all Chinese steamship companies with the avowed intention of driving all foreign navigation off the upper river. He has formed the Ming Sen Steamship Company in which many of the officials are financially interested. The officials have issued instructions that salt shipments hereafter must go by Chinese steamers only. It is to be doubted that much success will attend the effort to drive out foreign shipping. Most shippers now know that reasonable insurance can be had only on shipment sent by vessels under foreign flags. Vessel insurance for ships not under command of foreigners is also difficult and expensive.

Taxation is still very heavy both in Chungking and Wanhsien. All shipments out of Chungking pay a total of 17 taxes. Formerly it was necessary to go to the various tax offices in order to have the shipping order stamped and taxed, - a job that took from two days to a week. Now all taxes are collected at one bureau office to the great convenience of shippers. At Wanhsian all shipments passing through in either direction are heavily taxed. At Ichang most shipments are transhipped from upper river steamers to middle and lower river steamers, and vice versa, it being unprofitable to operate the powerful upper river steamers below Ichang. Sometimes however an upper river steamer takes a cargo through to or from Hankow. In those instances, despite the fact that the cargo is not transhipped, payment for transhipment still must be paid.

Opium is grown freely along the Yangtze from Kweifu to Chungking. The hinterland also must bear a rich poppy crop. The opium consumption tax in Wanhsien alone is said to be one million dollars monthly. The characteristic opium smoke odor can be scented almost anywhere in this area. Opium shipments to Shanghai are sent by Chinese steamer, usually under military guard. Despite all searches, small quantities find their way down by foreign steamers, also undoubtedly by arrangement between the ship's crew and the opium tax collectors.

The Middle River.

Except for a stretch of about sixty miles from about 110 miles to 170 miles out from Hankow and a small 10 mile stretch about 35 miles out of Hankow, the middle river has been fairly well cleared of communists. Both of these stretches are on the north bank and fire on passing steamers may be expected from any point in them. All foreign steamers traversing the

middle river carry from four to eight armed military or naval guards to protect the vessel and to reply to any fire from shore. The river though wide has a winding channel which brings the steamers within fifty yards of the bank and even closer at times. It is at these points that firing takes place, usually from behind a dike or trench close to the bank. The weapons carried by the armed guards, usually rifles, Lewis and Thompson guns, while effective in silencing the fire, do very little damage on account of their flat trajectory. A few trench mortars carried by the steamers or naval vessels, which could drop projectiles behind the dikes, would have a great effect in discouraging indiscriminate fire from the communists.

Communists.

Ho Lung, the communist chieftain, is reported to have anywhere from ten to forty thousand men under his command. He still remains a thorn in the flesh of the provincial governments and the river shipping. Efforts to dislodge him are progressing but seem to lack coordinated action and push. The country in which he operates, particularly along the river, due to recent floods and to being overrun by bandit bands is most desolate. Ho Lung's sister, a recent Wellesley graduate, is reported to be with him and to be taking an active part in his operations. This lady, it is said, carries a pistol on each hip and knows how and is very willing to use them. She is reported to have killed several men.

The Baker Case.

On January 26, 1932, Captain Baker, an American citizen commanding a Yangtze Rapids Transportation Company lighter, was taken and held for ransom by communist-bandits at Low Point, not far from Chenglingki, Hupeh. An abortive attempt to ransom him for $10,000 resulted in the communists keeping both Baker and the money. Pressure by the Legation on the Chinese Government finally resulted in the start of negotiations for the ransoming of Baker, using flood relief wheat as a medium of exchange. These negotiations are now in the hands of Mr. Findlay Andrew, an able and experienced negotiator who is in charge of flood relief work in that area. At Ichang on April 23rd I was informed by Mr. Reed, the local manager of the Yangtze Rapids Transportation Company, that he had been approached by three representatives of the communists holding Baker and after discussion they agreed to deliver Baker on board an American gunboat at Chenglingki for $6,000. Payment to be made after delivery. Reed's chief stevedore volunteered to bring Baker to Chenglingki and guaranteed his arrival. Reed told the communists' representatives that he would try to raise the amount necessary among Baker's friends. The representatives left Ichang April 23rd and were to await word at Chenglingki. I asked Mr. Reed to inform our Naval authorities of these negotiations and I also informed Consul General Adams at Hankow on my arrival there on April 26th.

Attention is invited to G-2 Reports No.8281 and No.8282, which give more detailed information on Liu Hsiang's air force and tank corps. Detailed information on troops procured during this trip is incorporated in the current Situation Report.

William Mayer,
Captain, Field Artillery

Encls: 1 blueprint.

2078-120

2281-G-21

No. 8291 1st Ind. PGT:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, May 5, 1932 - To: The A. G. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

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4 Enc
CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
OCT 15
2055-692

REPORT ON PRESENT CONDITIONS ALONG CERTAIN RAILWAYS AND IN CERTAIN CITIES AND PROVINCES OF CENTRAL CHINA.

WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W.D. OCT 11 1932

INTRODUCTION:

I left Peiping, China, August 6, 1932 and proceeded to Sian, Shensi, in which city I remained for a period of about two weeks, returning to Peiping on August 26th, 1932. The trip was made via the Hankow-Peiping Railroad to Changchow, via the Lunghai Railroad to Tungkuan, and thence via motor-bus to Sian. During this trip the following observations were made.

RAILROADS.

a) Peiping-Hankow Railroad.

The Peiping-Hankow Railroad was travelled from Peiping to Changchow. As this railroad is completely covered in the digest this report will deal with present conditions of this road only.

The railroad runs generally through lowlying level country except in the vicinity of the Yellow River. On both sides of the Yellow River for some distance the railroad runs through hills, none of which are of any great height.

The country along the railroad appeared very prosperous and the crops appeared to be excellent north of the Yellow River. South of the Yellow River the crops were badly in need of rain and it is not believed that they will have average crops this year. Corn, wheat and hemp appeared to be the main crops grown throughout this section with considerable kaoliang mixed in.

The road is all standard gauge. The ballast is gravel and is insufficient. The ties are wooden and the majority of them have rotted badly. By count over a distance of one mile one out of every three ties was found to be so rotten that it needed replacing. Many ties that have rotted through in the center are still in use. The loose gravel ballast contains many rather large stones and troops could not easily be marched over it. On my trip to Sian communication was interrupted between the villages of Han T'an and Ma Tou Tseng due to the fact that they had had a heavy rain which had washed away the road bed leaving the rails suspended in the air in eight different places and causing one break in the track. This section of the road has too few culverts and as the road bed was repaired by simply throwing in loose dirt and tamping it under the rails it is believed that this section will be likely to wash out with every heavy rain.

There are very few cuts and fills along the line of any size. The fills that were observed seemed to be very poor. They were made of loose dirt with no apparent effort to secure the sides. The cuts in the hilly section near the Yellow River seemed to be rather well made but lacked proper drainage.

The only important bridge along the line is the one over the Yellow River. The bridge is a screw pile bridge of great length and is reported to have been condemned as unsafe. Upon the arrival of the express train at either side of the bridge it is stopped and a man precedes it over the bridge to make an inspection.

The rolling stock appears to be in very bad condition. It all is badly in need of paint and attention. The car the writer was in, a first class coach on the fastest express train was infested with bed-bugs. The faucets would not function and according to the car boy had been out of order for some time.

The personnel on the railroad seemed far more numerous than was warranted by the traffic. There were six men on the engine during the entire trip. Though I was the only passenger in the first class there were three car boys.

On the trip to Sian due to the break in the track in the vicinity of Hsin'an the train turned back to Peiping. I proceeded by hand car for a distance of about two miles walked across the break and caught a work train that was later turned into a local and arrived in Chengchow sixteen hours behind schedule. The construction engineer in charge of the work train told me that the railroad had washed out before in this vicinity and that they had plans to put in culverts and secure proper drainage but were not able to secure the funds to do so.

b. The Lunghai Railway.

The Lunghai Railroad is at present the only east and west line in the central part of China. It extends to the sea with a proposed Siliantao Harbor in the east and with Lanchowfu, the capital of Kansu Province, its proposed western terminus. (See Encl. No. 1). This line when completed will be 1600 kilometers in length. It will without a doubt be one of the most important trunk lines of the country, politically, economically and culturally. The section the writer travelled from Changchow to Tungkwan passes through typical loess formation along the Yellow River. The greater part of the terrain traversed is very rough and mountainous causing many crossings over deep valleys and much heavy earthwork tunneling.

The railroad is being built mainly for the purposes of providing an outlet for the agricultural products and mineral wealth of Shensi and Kansu and the territory to the west and for the purpose of connecting the west closer politically with the rest of China. The recent construction work that has been done on this road has been made possible as a result of a negotiation between the governments of China and Belgium, on the disposal of the Boxer Indemnity Fund, 40% of the Fund, amounting to approximately C$1,800,000, was appropriated to the Lunghai Railroad for the buying of materials in Belgium with the object of early completion of the section between Ling Pao and Tung Kwan. (See Map 2). The amount for bridges, rails and steel sleepers for the section did not require the entire portion of the appropriation and as this fund could not be used to pay for the construction, for labor and other materials its balance was used to buy a number of locomotives and cars from Belgium for the operating section. The operating section then paid back the cost of these out of its operating revenue to finance the construction. Thus the railroad has been completed to Tungkwan.

Potentially the regions tributary to the Lunghai Railway are very rich, but as yet they are little developed. The province of Shensi has suffered from three years of draught and agriculture has failed to support her own population. Honan has likewise suffered from draught and it appears that these two provinces may face a minor famine this year. In Shensi Province there are rich bituminous coal fields, oil, salt, nickel, gold and iron. Farther to the west there are minerals of all kinds and as this road will be the main outlet for the provinces to the west it should prosper.

The area through which the railroad runs is very densely populated, over four hundred to the square mile. The people are largely engaged in tilling the soil and live in a very primitive fashion many living in caves dug into the side of the hills. The struggle for existence is so difficult that it is not believed that these people have any political leanings. There has been a good deal of fighting throughout this country and the people have been preyed upon so much by soldiers that they are against all soldiers. The only sentiment that the writer heard expressed was a desire to have Feng Yu-hsiang return as governor. The people are strong and hardy though many have the appearance of being undernourished.

There appeared to be very little local traffic originating along this section of the railroad I travelled. I was told that at other times of the year, after the crops were harvested there would be considerable. Passenger traffic is so light that there are only two trains a day over this section. The railroad is forced to compete somewhat with small boats that ply along the Yellow River. There is one local train a day from Loyang which is a combination freight and third class passenger train.

The road is standard gauge and well made. The ties along the section are Oregon pine oak with some 50,000 steel sleepers purchased in Belgium and used in the recently completed section between Lingpao and Tungkwan. The steel sleepers are used in tunnels, on curves and heavy grade. Many of the wooden ties on the older section of the road east of Lingpao are rotting already and it was noticed that there were many half ties used. Seventeen sleepers, steel or wooden, are used under each pair of rails. The rails are Chinese Government Standard 43 kg. rails of 18 meters length and are very carefully laid. It is interesting to note that in the recent construction track laying was done mostly by man power due to the lack of engines and frequent interruptions at the bridge sites. The speed of track laying was only about 500 meters a day and 800 meters in a day and night. The ballast is gravel but in many places there is no ballast at present and the writer was told by Mr. H. H. Ling, Assistant Director, Lunghai Railroad, in charge of Construction Section Lingpao-Tungkwan, and Director and Engineer in Chief, Section Tungkwan-Siamfu, that they were again having difficulty procuring funds and had found it necessary to discontinue work temporarily.

The engineers of the Lunghai Railroad evidently meant their work to be permanent. Therefore the road is very carefully aligned. There are many cuts and fills along this entire section. They are all very carefully graded and drained. Many of the more important drains are built of cement and rock and are most carefully laid.

The longest bridge of the section travelled over is the Lingpao Bridge having twelve spans of 30 meters each. Most of the bridges along this section of the road are of Deck Plate Girder type, and their design is apparently to meet the local conditions and available equipment for erection. Foundations of these bridges are all on wooden piles. On account of the topography, bridge piers are usually very tall, some of them being as high as fifteen meters.

There are many tunnels along this line. In the section just completed between Lingpao and Tungkwan there are ten tunnels with two more projected. The following table gives the length and alignment of these tunnels.

No.	Length.	Grade.	Curvature.
1.	90.50 M.	0.008	R - 600 M.
2.	621.20 M.	0.008	600 M.
3.	90.30 M.	0.008	------
4.	107.40 M.	0.008	------
5.	622.60 M.	0.007	350
			600
6.	695.00 M.	0.010	1,000
		0.009	500
7.	631.84	0.0062	---
8.	395.00	0.010	1,000
9.	909.10	0.010	1,000
10.	1,080.00	0.005	1,400
			1,500

Between tunnels four and five two more tunnels have been projected very close to each other, one with a length of 788.12 meters and

one with a length of 888 metres. The tunnels were substituted for with a variant along the Yellow River which has shown a considerable degree of safety even as a permanent substitute. A slide occurred at Tunnel No. 8 and another "variant" was run along the bank of the Yellow River.

Being close to the Yellow River the line needed protection work and for several miles near the tunnels mentioned above wooden piles have been driven in the direction perpendicular to the direction of the current, at frequent intervals, and are woven with bamboo strips surrounded by heavy pieces of stone. The above work seems to be quite effective and it is reported that similar work will be done at other points.

The last of the series of tunnels is located at the city of Tungkwan. (See Maps 3 and 4). Its eastern portal is just outside of the city wall near the East Gate and its western portal in the middle of the city. The tunnel is faced with concrete. The Lunghai Railroad used the Belgian system of driving tunnels.

The station buildings along this line are all built of stone and concrete. Are rather small buildings and are not capable of handling any great amount of traffic. However the country is so little developed at the present time that it is not believed that larger buildings will be necessary for some time to come.

The locomotives on this line are all coal burners. The fuel at the present time comes from Shansi over the Kin-Han railroad. Once the section is constructed between Tungkwan and Sian this railroad will have its own fuel supply.

The rolling stock on this railroad is comparatively new and appeared to be excellent condition. For a detailed report of the rolling stock see the Digest.

The personnel on the Lunghai Railroad appear to be very efficient. The writer was fortunate in meeting the majority of the construction engineers along the section of the railroad he travelled over and found them to be very keen and well informed. They have great pride in their work.

At the time the writer went to Sian one express was running per day from Chengchow to Shanchow. This train was met by a local train which ran from Shanchow to the east station Tungkwan which is just east of the tunnel. Upon the writer's return trip the local train was running through the tunnel to the station outside the west gate which is to be the permanent station of Tungkwan. The writer was informed that beginning September 1, the express would run all the way from Chengchow to this west station at Tungkwan, and that there would be one express train and one local train daily.

Earth work has been completed on the Tungkwan-Sianfu section for a distance of about twenty-four kilometers. This section of the railroad runs along the south of the Wei River as far as Sian, a distance of 150 Kilometers and goes over much easier country than the Chengchow Tungkwan section. According to resolutions adopted by the central government this section is to be constructed out of proceeds from the Russian Boxer Indemnity Bund. As this fund has not yet been realized construction work has been stopped at the present time. The engineer informed me that if funds were available this section could easily be completed within eighteen months.

ROADS.

The writer travelled over the Tungkwan-Sianfu-Lanchowfu-Sinningfu road from Tungkwan to Sianfu. This is the main route of communication from east to west in central China. It connects the provinces to the west with rail communication at Tungkwan.

On leaving Tungkwan the road ascends gently westward to Siamfu, following the line of the Wei River. The Wei River valley is rather wide and the ascent throughout is very gradual. The valley is intensively farmed throughout and when there is a rain or sufficient water the road becomes very soft and nearly impassable from the mud. This is particularly true of that part of the road between Tungkwan and Weinan which is considered as the half way point. Between Weinan and Sian the road crosses three streams that are very wide and would be impossible to ford in flood season. During the dry season these streams contain very little water and could be easily forded. At the time the writer went to Sian all of these streams were completely dry. This is a very unusual state of affairs for this time of the year. Upon the writer's return, due to rains, two of those streams contained about two feet of water. From five to ten miles to the south of the road is the famous Hwa Shan mountain rising to a height of around seven thousand feet and covered with considerable timber. The road runs through a very ancient and picturesque part of China.

The principal strategic point along the road is the Hwa Shan range which commands the entire valley of the Wei River for practically the entire distance.

Along the section of the road travelled by the writer, as a whole, the principal obstacles from a military point of view are as follows:

1. The villages of Hwachow, Chihshuichen, Weinan and Lintung which are each surrounded by walls, built of dirt and faced with stone and about twenty-five feet in height. The entrances to these walls, so called gates are just wide enough for a truck to pass through. Due to the height of these walls they command considerable of the surrounding country. The villages are all however commanded by the hills to the south of them.

2. The section of the road to the east of Hwachow for a distance of about ten miles, which due to the fact that there are irrigation ditches on both sides becomes water soaked and nearly impassable during certain times of the year.

3. The bridges over the three main streams, one five miles west of Weinan, one just east of Lintung, and one between Lintung and Sian, which are crossed by old style bridges. These streams are not named on any map available in the office of the military attache so it has been thought best to designate them by location rather than by name. The streams all have very soft sand bottoms with reported quick-sand. Except in flood season the crossing would not present much of a problem even if the bridgeswere destroyed as it is believed suitable fords could be located. The bridges over these streams are all old stone bridges, with stone piles and reported to have been built in the time of the T'ang Dynasty. They are all three about seventy-five yards long built with arches made of stone. The bridges are very rough and uneven due to the fact that the stones have been worn and broken by the continual crossing of carts and present a very difficult footing for animals. The bridges are wide enough for two way traffic. The approach to the bridges are very steep ramps built of stone making it a very difficult approach for animal drawn transportation.

At present daily busses run from Tungkwan to Sian. The road was re-built and improved by the China International Famine Relief in 1930 as an automobile road and is wide enough in all places for two way traffic. Due to the fact that the road has not been kept in repair and heavy carts which it was agreed would not be allowed to travel on the road have been allowed to go over it, the road at present is in a bad state of repair. Busses leave Tungkwan at 8:00 o'clock a.m. and arrive at Sian at about 4:30 o'clock p.m. with a stop of one-half hour at Weinan. People with private cars can cover the ninety miles in five hours' driving time. Running along side the automobile road for practically the entire distance is a cart road with very deep ruts and impassable for any but mounted troops.

The following different kinds of transportation was observed along this road.

The Peiking cart, with generally two to four mules and often one or and two mules in draft. These carts cover the distance in from three to five days depending on the weather.

A four wheeled cart, with a flat platform bottom about seven feet in length. This cart has no tongue and the axles both front and rear are so fastened to the cart that the wheels do not pivot. These carts generally have two oxen or two mules in draft. The platform bottom is about three and a half feet wide with no sides. The wheels are solid wooden wheels. These carts are only seen between Tungkwan and Weinan and are used largely for hauling coal and heavy materials. The draft on these carts is very low on the front axel and they are so loaded that the weight of the driver on the back of the cart raises the front wheels off the ground. This makes it possible for the driver to turn the cart by simply putting his weight on the back and, heading the animals in the direction he desires to go and turning on the rear wheels.

Rickshaws are used a good deal between Tungkwan and Sian. They travel generally in groups of six, eight or ten and haul both passengers and freight. They cover the distance in from three to five days depending upon the load. Gasoline and oil were the main articles of freight being hauled to Sian by rickshaw during the time of my visit. Each rickshaw hauls from ten to twelve five gallon tins, and is pulled by one man. They travel in groups so that they may help each other up the grades and over the rougher part of the road.

Pack mules and donkeys are also used a good deal in this vicinity. They are generally over loaded and one man will have from three to eight animals. They travel in pack trains of six to twelve animals.

It might be of interest to note at this point that nearly all the motor transportation along this road was of American Manufacture. The Dodge car was by far the most popular. The Chasis of the car is shipped to Tungkwan, driven to Sian and sold without a body. Here the body is built by the purchaser. A Truck body can be built in Sian for about $125.00 local currency and the same body built in Hankow will cost from $250.00 to $300.00 local currency so that there is no sale for trucks with bodies. The few private passenger cars of course have the body furnished by the manufacturer.

At all the villages and towns along this road the water supply is very poor and due to three years of famine and drought is only sufficient for local use. Water may be secured from the Wei River but it is muddy and of poor quality. The local inhabitants procure their water from shallow wells many of which are dry in the summer time and all water is boiled and used in the form of tea.

There are no large supplies of food along this route due to the three years of drought and famine that Shensi has passed through. In a good year it is believed that there would be some surplus of food. Animals have also become rather scarce since the famine.

Fuel can be procured in sufficient quantities all along the route and each village has a small supply of wood and a rather large supply of coal stored in it.

Camp sites could be found along the Wei River. However great care would have to be observed in the use of water. The buildings in the towns are generally of wood and brick. In most of the towns are small temples that could be used to quarter from fifty to sixty men. The buildings in the villages are all dirty and full of vermine. A telephone line with two wires strung on wooden poles about seven inches in diameter runs generally along this road.

The information concerned in this report on railroads and roads was secured from conversations with Mr. H. H. Ling, Director and Engineer of the Lunghai Railroad, Mr. O. J. Todd, Engineer of the China International Famine Relief, Mr. Leahy, of the China Inlands Water Company, Mr. E. C. Parker of the L. E. Gale Motor Company, local inhabitants and from personal observations.

CITIES.

a. Changchow.

About ten miles south of the Yellow River at the junction point of the Peiping-Hankow and Lunghai Railroads is located a miserable, dirty, poverty stricken Chinese city which is called Changchow. It is surrounded by flat, rolling country with a few gentle sloping rises that can scarcely be called hills. It is swept by winds and its streets are so level that the water simply remains in them instead of draining off when it rains.

The commercial section of the city centers around one main street which runs due east from the depots. The buildings along this section are generally two or three story brick buildings with a few of the more pretentious ones rising to four stories. The chief industries are railroading, cotton pressing and farming.

At the north end of the city on the east side of the railroad is located the Ching Te cotton pressing plant, established and operated with foreign capital. This is a very pretentious plant with a manager's house and several ware houses built of brick. Fifty percent of this plant, which was taken over as a hospital during the Feng Yu-hsiang:Yen Shih-shan rebellion of 1930, is still occupied by soldiers some of which were wounded during this trouble and others of which are stationed there by the present military commander of Changchow. The manager of this plant, who at present lives in the mission compound, states that his rather pretentious two story dwelling was originally taken over as a home for the nurses but has since been turned into a house of prostitution, and is now used by the military as a place to hold their parties.

Four blocks east of the station and about three blocks to the south of the main street is the more pretentious part of the town. In this vicinity is located the mission compound, the Standard Oil compound and the Lunghai Railroad compound, in which are the offices of the railroad and homes for their higher salaried employees. All of these compounds are surrounded by rather high walls or fences and seem like gardens layed down in all the squallor and muck of a pig pen.

Changchow is one of the most important strategic points in China for the following reasons:

1. It is the junction point of Peiping-Hankow Railroad with the Lunghai Railroad, the two main arteries of communication through central China.

2. It is the distribution point for all articles going to and from all the provinces of central western China and at the present time due to the trouble and difficulty of passage through Mongolia is the distribution point for articles going to and from the northwest.

3. It's location is such that it is on the flank of any force operating east or west along the Yellow River.

4. It's location is such that troops stationed here could control the Kin-Han bridge over the Yellow River and the tunnel to the south of that River.

The Kin-Han Railroad runs north and south and the Lunghai east and west through Changchow. The stations of these two railways are

located within one-hundred yards of each other on the west edge of the city. It is not known just how many locomotives and how much rolling stock these lines ordinarily have available at this point but the writer observed eight locomotives in the yard at one time. Both stations have large platforms and troops could readily be loaded from them.

There are several small craft that operate along the Yellow River that could be used for transportation of small articles. These craft could carry from eight to sixteen men each, are propelled with an oar and sail and similar in design to the Chinese junk.

There is a telegraph office in Chengchow located four blocks east and one block south from the station. This is part of the Chinese telegraph system.

Chengchow is also connected by telephone with towns along both railroads.

There are two radio stations reported. One for use of the military and one public station.

There is a road leading west from Chengchow to Tungkwan which follows the old caravan trail. This road was built and improved by Feng Yu-hsiang and is still in a fare state of repair. Automobiles have traversed it within the last year. However it is rapidly becoming unfit for travel by motor car but due to the care that was exercised in building it, it would be easy to recondition.

Proper food would be difficult to obtain in this town for a foreign army. In a normal year when crops were fairly good some staple articles such as corn, rice and potatoes could be purchased. Meat is scarce and of a very inferior quality though some poultry could be secured.

Forage for foreign animals would be very difficult to obtain but the mixture of black beans, straw, bran and corn that is fed the native animal is generally procurable on the local market.

The water supply is very poor and all water would have to be specially treated before it would be fit for use by troops.

There is no sewage system in the town except in that part of the town occupied by foreigners and by the Lunghai Railroad Compound.

The only electric light plants in the town are owned by private individuals or corporations and are very unsatisfactory.

During the hot season the climate is considered very unhealthy and all foreigners that can leave for the summer months. Cholera was in epidemic during the visit of the undersigned this time and an average of thirty people were dying a day.

The year is divided into four seasons. The winter season lasting from November until the end of February, the spring lasting from March until May, the hot season lasting from June until September and the fall season lasting from the last of September until November. The wind blows very often throughout the year and throughout the seasons there are many bad dust storms.

The Chinese living in Chengchow are as a rule very poor. They have been robbed so much by the military and the country has suffered so from draught and the fighting that they seem even poorer than they are. The contrast between abject poverty and wealth is very apparent. Many of the poorer people live in straw huts and holes in the ground. Theft is so common that the unwary traveller often loses his baggage.

The majority of the people are illiterate and unable to read their own language. The Mandarin dialect seems to be readily understood and

this is probably the result of the occupation of the town by the many armies. The wealthy Chinese in the town are well educated and the employees of both railroads seem above average.

There is very little public spirit shown and has been no improvements made of a public nature since the town was occupied by Feng Yu-hsiang.

b. Tungkwan.

The city of Tungkwan is located on the south of the Yellow River. The southern half of the city is built on the mountains and only the northwestern part of the city is flat and inhabited. The city within the walls is of an odd shape being about two and a half kilometers in length and about one kilometer in width, the long way of the city being east and west along the river. In order to accommodate itself to the terrain the width of the city decreases greatly toward the eastern end and the east wall is very short. At Tungkwan the Yellow River takes a great turn after meeting the Wei River, and changes its course from southward to eastward. This makes Tungkwan the point of attack of the changing current which in some places has already nearly reached the wall. The wall is however very strongly built to protect the city, is about thirty feet high and may protect the city for some time to come.

Tungkwan is an important point from a strategic standpoint because:

1. It is the point through which supplies going to the west and northwest have passed and will pass for many years to come.

2. Being at the present time the western end of the Lunghai Railroad, it will grow in commercial importance.

3. It has long been a city of military importance being the natural point to station troops to protect the Tungkwan pass and the easy entrance into Shensi along the Wei River.

4. At present, when the province of Shensi has suffered three years of draught and famine, the railroad has been built to the door way of the province, Tungkwan. This year Shensi again faces a minor famine. The troops in control of this city by expediting communication to the interior can save many from starvation and by blocking this doorway can starve the province into submission.

The railroad comes into Tungkwan from the east, and construction has been indefinitely stopped at this point.

Communication to the west is by means of the automobile road to Sian. This road also runs through Tungkwan to the east. These roads have been covered in detail in preceding paragraphs.

There is also some communication, by means of very small craft, along the yellow River to the north and east, and along the Wei River to the west.

There is communication by telegraph, radio and telephone to the east and west.

The writer was in the town for one night and movement was restricted due to the fact that the city was under martial law and hence had very little opportunity to observe this city or its inhabitants. In a short walk about the city the next morning the following points of interest were noted.

The main business section is along the street that runs east and west between the east and west gates. The buildings are usually one story, typical Chinese buildings made of brick and wood. There are a few more pretentious buildings of two stories which are hotels.

Inside the west gate, on the north side of the street and in the first block are located the bus station of the Road Bureau, the police station and the local magistrate's office or "Yamen". Due to the fact that the railroad station is located just outside the west gate this is the direction in which the town will probably grow.

The water supply is from shallow wells and from the "Yellow River". It is carried and distributed by wheel barrows.

There is no modern sewage system and no electric light plant.

The streets are not paved and are very muddy when it rains. Cars and carts sometimes get stuck in the main streets of the town due to the mud.

There is a mission station of the China Inland Mission in Tung-kwan located on the north and south cross street one block east of the west gate. It is in the middle of the block to the north of the main street. There were no foreigners in this mission at the time of the writer's visit but it is understood that as a rule there is one foreigner stationed here.

c. Sian.

Sian, the capital of Shensi Province and the most important city of that province, is located in the broad valley of the Wei river about ten miles south of the stream and about eighty-four miles from the junction of the Wei River with the Yellow River. The city is located on level ground and to the north and south can be seen the blue hills in the distance that form the Wei River valley. These hills run generally north and south and do not rise to any very great height. The valley to the east and west rolls away very gently into the distance with no very prominent landmarks.

Sian or a neighboring city was the capital of China on many occasions and it was near here according to some authorities that the founders of the Chinese race first settled, and therefore it is the most interesting city historically in all China. The city was at its prime as the capital of the Tang dynasty, when it was known as Siking. Under the name of Ch'ang-an it was the capital of the empire from B.C. 206 to A.D. 605. These names are worthy of note because the natives of the province, except those that have been educated in foreign schools, always speak of the city by one of these names and the name Sian is never heard. As late as 1900 the city again served as the capital of the country for the empress Dowager and Emperor fled here during the Boxer troubles. The city had another revival and growth during the time that Feng Yu-hsiang occupied it as his headquarters but again sank back into its lethargy after his departure. It is again trying to wake itself up, and there is a feeling that since the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, it may again regain its ancient glory and become the capital of the Chinese Republic.

The neighborhood of the city abounds in tombs, monuments and other relics of great antiquity. Many of the early yellow emperors are buried here, but the marks on their tombs have long since been effaced and few of them can be identified. It was here that one of the rulers of China was buried with such a wealth of gold and silver that his sons feared the temptation it would offer to robbers and constructed many other grave mounds so that no one could tell which contained the treasure. The large number of tumuli in the vicinity gives credence to the legend and gives the surrounding country the appearance of having many large loaves of bread set down upon it.

The walls which surround Sian are about ten miles in circuit, and thirty feet high surmounted by watch towers of equal height. They are visible for many miles across the loess plain on which the city is built. The present walls date from the reign of the founder of the Ming Dynasty, (1368-1399) are built of dirt faced with stone

and are in an excellent state of preservation. The four gates were originally built at the cardinal points of the compass. During the time of Feng Yu-hsiang one new gate was built in the north-east quarter of the east wall.

The city is divided in the center by a large watch tower which divides the new city from the old city, the new city being the western half. The new city contains wide streets which are paved with sand and tar and was laved out by Feng Yu-hsiang. This part of the city is rather sparsely inhabited and there is a good deal of vacant ground. The main business street of the new city is the street that runs from east to west from the watch tower to the east gate of the city. The post office is located on the north side of this street one block east from the watch tower. The telegraph station is located one block to the south of the post office and two blocks to the east. The buildings in this section are two or three story buildings built of brick and many of them roofed with tile. They are mostly new and in a very good state of repair.

In the northeast corner of the city is located the most important part of the city of Sian. As one enters the city, through the gate that Feng Yu-hsiang saw fit to build, he travels west upon a large wide boulevarde which is surfaced with gravel. On the north of this road is Feng's idea of a park, and in the center of the park is the great auditorium capable of seating one thousand people. On the south of the road is the Bureau of Public Roads, where all busses stop and discharge their passengers. It at present consists of a walled in area, about two hundred yards square with one small office building and a few sheds for housing automobiles built in the north-west corner of the enclosure. As one continues down the boulevard and passes beyond the park he comes to the Governor's "Yamen". This "Yamen" consists of a walled city within the city. The walls are built of dirt, are the same height as the city walls with three gates facing the east-south and west. On the north the walls join with the north wall of the city. The gates are all faced with cement and have watch towers the same as the walls of the city. As one enters any of these gates he enters first upon an open field about one hundred and fifty yards square which is the drill field for the troops housed in the Governor's "Yamen". This field is separated from the rest of the "Yamen" by a wall about fifteen feet high, running east and west with three gates, one at the center and one at each end. One enters through the center gate and precedes north into the government offices which consist first of a group of reception rooms, the Chief of Staff's office and the offices of minor officials. One continues on beyond these buildings, passes through a small courtyard in which are planted many small shrubs and flowers, goes up a stone stairway, built after the same design as the stairways entering the palace in Peiping with steps on each side and a big block with a carved dragon in the center, passes over a cement platform, and enters a large beautifully built brick building, the Governor's reception room. This building is all one great room in the center of which is a long table of beautiful wood, surrounded by heavy carved wood chairs and indeed well suited as a council table. Around the outside of the room are many smaller round wooden tables capable of sitting from six to eight people. On the wall at one end of the room hangs the picture of Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic, properly draped in flags and at the other end of the room is the picture of the governor. Many other smaller pictures are hanging on the wall rather crowded together due to the fact that there are so many windows along the sides of the room that it is rather difficult to find wall space for them. One glances into the southwest corner of the room and receives quite a shock for there in all its resplendent glory, with one red and two white ivory balls sitting in exactly the right position on the green cover, , sits a nice new billiard table.

From the porch of this reception room one has a chance to see the entire enclosure and sees that there are roads running into the inner enclosure from the gates in the east and west ends of the inner walls. These roads run around the office buildings. Between the road and the

outer wall in each case are barracks in which are quartered the soldiers and animals. Inquiry brings forth the fact that these barracks are capable of housing one division. The buildings are long one story brick and wooden buildings. They have a good many windows in them and appear to be well made.

One block west of the west gate of the Governor's "Yamen" is the Provincial "Yamen". This is a well built brick building surrounded by many small one story buildings. It is here that all the civilian affairs of the province are conducted. The governor's secretary is located here and the governor also has an office in this building.

In the old city or the western half of Sian the buildings are all one story buildings of typical Chinese architecture. There are two main business streets, the street leading from the west gate and the street one block to the south of it. The streets in this section are all small narrow streets and traffic through them is very congested.

Outside of both the east and west gates are suburbs known as the east and west suburbs respectively. The east suburb is the largest. With the exception of the mission buildings the buildings in these suburbs are of a very poor type being one story, small Chinese houses of brick and wood.

The better educated and wealthier class of Chinese as well as the ruling class live in the part of the city known as the new city. The old city is inhabited by the merchant class and the laborers. Three blocks east of the west gate and to the north of the street leading from that gate is a section of the city given over to Mohammedans. The permanent foreign population, which consists of missionaries, is scattered about living in the east and west suburbs and in the western end of the city just inside of the west gate.

Sian is important from a strategic point of view for the following reasons:

1. It is the capital of Shensi Province and it is possible that it will be used as the capital of the country in case of an invasion by a foreign foe.

2. It is located on the main east and west trade route through central China.

3. It is noted for its mules and the best mules in China can be procured in this vicinity.

4. There are two arsenals located in Shensi, barracks both in the city and one mile to the west of the west gate, and an air field just west of the west suburb.

There is a striking resemblance between the cities of Peiping and Sian. The walls of Peiping are copied from those of Sian, though those of the former city are somewhat higher. Both cities are old capitals and live in memory of a more glorious past.

The main road through Sian leads from east to west. There are however many roads and trails leading to the north and south and there are plans at present for development of these roads. Part of the grade has already been built to extend the Lunghai railroad to Sian.

There are no water routes leading from Sian though small craft and ferries are in use on the Wei River.

Sian is connected with the net of the Chinese telegraph administration.

It has both military and commercial radio and the Seventh Day Adventist Mission has a private radio with which they communicate

with other missions and coastal cities.

Sian has telephone communication to the east and west. Telephones have not been installed in many of the business houses in the city due to the cost and in the city itself its use is restricted largely to officials.

Besides the barracks mentioned under the preceding paragraph dealing with the Governor's "Yamen" there is in the city of Sian two separate groups of buildings used for quartering troops. One is located on the street south of the street leading from the West Gate, four blocks from the west wall. The other set occupies the block just east of the telegraph office in the new city. Each of these is capable of housing a battalion. One mile west of the city is a set of barracks surrounded by a dirt wall known as the "Ying P'an". A special Regiment is quartered in this barracks at the present time and the barracks are reported to be capable of quartering a brigade. The wall around this barracks has watch towers on all four corners. The enclosure is approximately one-thousand meters square. The buildings in all cases are not clean and would need complete renovating.

Camp sites could be found most anywhere along the Wei River during the dry season.

There is one new rather large two storied Chinese hotel located three blocks east of the watch tower dividing the old and new cities. It has fifty large rooms, but no baths or running water. The following public buildings could be converted into quarters, 1. The Mohammedan Mosque, 2. The Auditorium, 3. The lama temple, 4. The English Baptist Mission Hospital, 5. The English Baptist Mission Compound, 6. The Scandinavian Alliance Mission Compounds and 7. The Seventh Day Adventist Mission Compound.

Owing to the three years of draught and famine that Shensi has passed through very little food could be obtained locally. Meat is very scarce due to the fact that many animals were killed during the famine.

Extensive bituminous coal fields exist near Sian so that fuel could be procured in sufficient quantities. Wood is hauled in from the mountains to the east.

Forage is very scarce and there is no grazing. Local animals are fed chopped straw, bran and corn, and forage could be secured in sufficient quantities to supply their needs probably.

Just inside of the west gate is located the city wells that furnish the water supply for all of the city of Sian. These wells are sixteen in number all dug within a radius of fifty yards and are worked by a hand windlass. The water is distributed to the houses by means of wheel barrows and mule and horse drawn carts. There are a few private wells throughout the city and the Governor's "Yamen" has its own wells located within the enclosure. The water is not of good quality and great care would have to be exercised in its use.

The climate is generally healthy but during the hot season there are often outbreaks of cholera and dysentery.

The population of the city and its suburbs is about 250,000. The foreign population consists of around thirty.

The people are very poor and the majority of them are illiterate. Due to the famines in the province many people have drifted to the city and the town is full of beggars. Many of the people are opium addicts. The wealthier Chinese are fairly well educated.

There is no public spirit displayed by the people. They have been taxed and robbed by the military so much that they have no sympathy with the government. Some thought they might have better

times if the capital was returned to Sian but the majority seemed to doubt it. Red slogans were shouted through the streets by the students on August 1, and a meeting was held which was soon dispersed by troops. The town is at present governed by the city magistrate, who is appointed by the Governor Yang Hu-cheng and the people have no say in the government.

The principal industries in Sian are the exporting of cotton, wool, hides and skins. Of the many rich shops in the city probably the most notable are the furriers and the curio dealers. Sian is noted particularly for its good mules.

There are two arsenals in the city reported to be employing about three hundred laborers. Both arsenals are located near the western edge of the city, one to the north and one to the south of the west gate. The writer's request to visit these arsenals was refused, it is believed because of the mission he was performing. The following information was gained from interviews with missionaries.

The arsenals are under direct control of the Shensi government whose head is Yang Hu-cheng.

The arsenals produce small arms ammunition, Artillery ammunition, Trench mortar ammunition, pistols, rifles and Thompson's sub-calibre Machine Guns. The capacity is not known.

Nothing is known of the power plant or the machine equipment other than that the equipment was taken from a cotton pressing plant that was started with foreign capital and later failed. Much of the work is done by hand and with files.

No information could be obtained as to where material was secured for the manufacture of the above mentioned items.

Political Situation.

The present political situation through the northwest is much disturbed and difficult to understand. The following impressions were gained by the writer from conversations with missionaries, Chinese officials and Chinese merchants.

a. Shensi.

The governor of Shensi, Yang Hu-cheng, is responsible for maintaining peace and order in four provinces, Shensi, Kansu, Ching-hai and Ningsia. He exercises this nominal control through the 17th Route Army and the various independent military leaders. The following will give in brief the conditions as they actually exist.

The governor actually controls a very small strip of territory in Shensi province extending generally along both sides of the Tung-kwan, - Sian-Pingliang Road to the borders of the province. The troops along this section of the road are paid by the government Yang Hu-cheng represents and are thought to be loyal to him. Actually some of these troops have not been paid in full since January and as they were originally bandits who were taken into his army it is very questionable if they have any loyalty to him.

Northern Shensi is controlled by General Ching Yueh-hsiu whose headquarters are at Yulin. His command is an independent command and he obeys the orders of General Yang Hu-cheng only insofar as it pleases him to do so.

The Pinchow-Changwu districts are under the control of so called communists which are probably actually only bandits.

Southern Shensi is under control of Wang Chi-yuan who commands the first Independent Brigade, with headquarters at Hanchung. This Commander refuses to take orders from Governor Yang, and has no

disloyalty towards him.

The following brief description of the Shensi officials will assist in the understanding of the present conditions in this province.

Yang Hu-cheng, the present governor, was born in 1893, in P'u-ch'eng, Shensi. He was the commander of the 3rd Division of the Kuominchun 3rd Army in 1926, having been taken into the army as a bandit leader. In 1926 he defended Sian successfully, for eight months, against Wu Pei-fu's forces which greatly out-numbered him and in spite of the fact that many people in the city starved to death. In 1927-28 he commanded the Shensi Army in the Northern expedition and he was appointed commander of the reorganized 14th Nationalist Division in 1929. He was garrison commander of Nanyang, Honan; Commander of the reorganized 17th Division and Commander-in-chief of the 17th Route Army in 1930. During October of that year he cut off the retreat of the Kuominchun into Shensi, occupied Sian, and was appointed Chairman of the Shensi Provincial Government in December. He has been ill with tuberculosis for some time and when examined by a foreign doctor one year ago was found to have one lung collapsed. In an interview a member of the Governor's Staff, Mr. Chen Tzu-chien told the writer that this illness was also effecting the Governor's brain, that he suffered from severe headaches and was not able to conduct any conversation with reference to political or other affairs for more than three consecutive hours. That he was a powerful thinker and let minor matters worry him a great deal and became very irritable and unreasonable at times. That as a result of this the staff told him very little of what was going on and handled, everything that they could themselves, without informing him about them. The writer was waiting one day in a reception room while his cards were taken in to the Governor and the soldier orderly came back and reported to the officer in charge of the reception room that the Governor had just had a shot in the arm and gone to sleep so would be unable to see anyone. The Governor in appearance is a small thin man about five feet four with dark piercing eyes and hollow cheeks with very prominent red spots in them. Although he appears to be in great physical discomfort, he appears full of energy and apparently carries on by will power alone.

The Governor's Chief of Staff, General Wang, is a polite, sleek, bald headed individual and is the one who apparently exercises control at the present time. The writer did not hear one good report of this man. He is reported to have red tendencies and to be plotting the overthrow of the Governor. The writer received the impression that this man is self-indulgent, lacks courage and is afraid of the Governor.

Mr. Nan Han-chen, private secretary to the Governor, is a thin, rather tall Chinese with a very strong face and a quiet unassuming personality. He appeared to be capable and loyal and desirous of seeing China advance. He is also reported to lean toward communism but the writer's impression was that he was loyal to the governor and would remain so.

Mr. Chen Tzu-chien, in charge of the Bureau of Public Affairs in Shensi and Pacification Commissioner for the province of Shensi and Kansu, is a young man of about thirty years of age. He is said to be the third most influential man with the Governor. He was educated in a Mission School in Soochow which he attended from the time he was seven until he was seventeen. He speaks English but prefers to talk in Chinese. He brags that he knows the new testament by heart and according to the statement of Dr. Stockley of the English Baptist Mission Hospital who has treated them maintains five wives. He speaks with great respect of the Governor at one moment and the next moment will tell you that the Governor due to his illness is very irritable and cranky and unable to conduct a conversation along any line for more than two hours. He will show the greatest interest in affairs of state and in the middle of a conversation in which affairs are about to be settled will excuse himself to attend a dinner, leaving

castles in the air. He is very fond of society and social engagements and will not let business interfere with pleasure. He will promise anything and will accomplish nothing.

The territory ruled over by Governor Yang is very poor due to the fact that there has been three years of drought and famine in the province. It appears that this year there may be danger of another minor famine unless it rains in this territory.

People are taxed very heavy and at the time of the writer's visit in Sian the tax collectors were collecting two months taxes in advance on all the residences and stores in the city. In spite of this no public improvements are being made in the city. Every bus and truck that runs from Tungkwan to Sian pays a road tax of one hundred and sixty dollars a month but no work has been done on the road except that which has been carried on under the supervision of the China International Famine Relief. In spite of the abolition of "likin" and orders from the Nanking Government to the contrary every article of commerce is taxed when it enters the province at Tungkwan. A tax of one dollar is collected on each five gallon can of gasoline and oil and other products are taxed from twenty to one hundred percent of their value.

The streets of Sian are filled with policemen and men in uniform. The roads around the city are constantly patrolled with soldiers and each small village has its local militia to assist in maintaining law and order but in spite of this three foreigners and two Chinese were murdered and robbed and another Chinese was robbed and seriously wounded in the immediate vicinity of Sian during the month of writer's visit to the city. The missionary goat herd was stopped by four soldiers, beaten and four goats taken from his herd as he returned home, and this within one mile of the city walls. The goats were later returned when the missionary in charge sent his card to the Commanding Officer of the soldiers concerned and it was discovered that the goats belonged to a foreigner and not to some poor Chinese farmer.

Opium is smoked openly throughout the entire district between Tungkwan and Sian. In two villages in which the bus stopped the writer walked up and down the streets for two blocks, counted the opium shops and found that every fifth shop was engaged in selling opium. In the city of Sian all the necessary equipment for smoking opium is sold openly on the streets and opium pipes sell from eighty cents to thirty-five dollars each, indicating that opium is smoked by rich and poor alike. The price of an opium smoke varies with the amount smoked. The proprietor of one of the opium dens told the writer that he received an average of about ten cents a smoke.

The above incidents are sited to show the present status of law enforcement throughout this district.

In practice it is believed that the Legal System in operation at the present time is the old Chinese system of village heads, district heads and provincial governors. The writer had the opportunity to observe the government conduct an investigation of a crime. The village chiefs were called in questioned a little about the matter and made to take an oath, which they signed with their thumb print to the effect that they would submit to having their leg cut off if it was ever proven that they had given false testimony in stating that no foreigners had been in their villages during the period mentioned. This oath was taken in front of the District Magistrate who later reported the matter to the Governor.

At the time of the writer's visit to Sian it was visited by a group of about thirty professors, financiers and officials from Nanking and Shanghai. This group was in Shensi at the invitation of the Committee for the Development of the Northwest and was divided into two groups at Sian. One group preceded north to the vicinity of Lochwan and Yenan at which points there are reported to be coal and

[illegible] Shaiko. The other group proceeded south to the vicinities of [illegible], Hanyin and Hingan where there is also reported to be great [illegible]. It is expected that after these parties return from these [illegible] they will form a company and furnish capital to build an auto-mobile road to these points, followed by construction of branch rail-roads. It is still too early to state what results will materialize from this effort.

Sian has been the starting point of all those religious movements which have influenced in any degree the immobility of the Chinese Nation. As a result among the present inhabitants can be found Mohammedans, Buddhists, Confucianists and Christians in large numbers. It was here that the apostles of Nestorianism came to propagate the Christian Creed.

At the time of the writer's visit there were the following missions in Sian: the English Baptist, the Scandinavian Alliance and the Seven Day Adventist. The Missionaries in these missions were all agreed that the present government was very weak, and they all seemed much worried about their own safety. They stated that when the present Governor arrived in Sian he treated them all very well and they felt they would receive excellent treatment but that due to the Governor's illness he had been unable to handle affairs and they felt that conditions were actually growing worse. Mr. Anderson, who has been in Sian for over forty-two years, has preached to Feng Yu-hsiang's soldiers and has known all the officials of the province during this period told the writer that he was giving up and leaving. He has already notified the China Inlands Mission of this fact. That he feels that very little progress has been made in his work and that he no longer knows the Chinese people in this vicinity and has lost his nerve.

Reports were spread among the Chinese that the Japanese were poisoning the wells and that they were using the missionaries and some Chinese to assist them in this work. Due to the fact that Cholera was present in epidemic form these reports were believed by the more ignorant Chinese and there was a certain amount of anti-foreign feeling growing up which the missionaries feared would be directed against them.

Cholera was present in epidemic form throughout the country from Changchow to Sian. Accurate figures with reference to the death rate were very difficult to obtain. The death rate in Cheng-chow was reported to be thirty a day, the death rate in Tungkwan about thirty a day and the death rate in Sian from fifty to sixty a day. That Cholera was taking its toll was evidenced by the many new graves throughout the country side and by the dead bodies along the side of the road leading from Tungkwan to Sian. Entire villages were reported to be practically wiped out.

Kansu.

The following report on the present political conditions in Kansu was secured from interviews with missionaries and Chinese.

General Sun Yu-ju took command of the Seventeenth Division with Headquarters in Lanchow during last February. Almost his first official act was to invite General Ch'eng, a former military leader who had about twenty thousand men under him and was recognized by Nanking, to his hotel and have him assassinated. The 17th Division then moved on Pingliang, captured as many of General Ch'eng's men as they could and disarmed them. They then looted for three days in Pingliang without any restrictions whatever. They then forced every able bodied man and boy throughout the district to join the army. This recruiting by force extended to villages seventy "Li" in the country on each side of Pingliang. They then demanded taxes from the villages, but the wheat crop was not due until spring and the people were not able to meet the demands of the military so they took the village chiefs out and whipped them publicly. One missionary stated that to

personal knowledge one officer and fifteen men entered one village and took every stitch of clothing and every bit of food from the inhabitants.

As a result of these high handed actions many of General Cheng's troops fled to the hills with their rifles and became bandits. They were later joined by many of the men who fled from the villages rather than join the army. These men are under command of officers who were formerly with General Cheng and are fairly well organized in separate bands. As a result the province is over run with bandits at the present time and the road one hundred miles west of Pingliang is not safe for travel. The members of the famine relief who are working on the road thirty miles west of Pingliang have been held up and robbed three times. Poor travellers coming over this section of the road will report that there are no bandits along the road only soldiers but when the rich merchant starts to travel over the road he is held up.

The 17th Division occupies the bigger cities only and leaves the villages to be occupied by the bandits. People in the villages are carried off and held for ransom by the bandits and in the cities rich merchants are carried off and held for ransom by the military. The military have threatened to move into the mission hospital at Pingliang three different times and take it over but have not done so to date. There is no organized government in the province and control is exercised only through the military.

Sining.

Sining and vicinity is ruled by General Ma Pu-fang, a Mohammedan General, who is very progressive and exercises an independent control in this area. He has recently purchased two airplanes through the T. B. Gale and Company, Shanghai. The day after these airplanes were delivered they were loaded with opium and left for designations unknown. The planes were light planes and did not carry weapons. General Ma has also purchased several trucks and has placed an order for a tractor with a complete set of farming equipment. He intends to use the tractor for both farming and road building. This General apparently stands in very well with General Chiang Kai-shih having presented him with several horses about one year ago and having received in return four truck loads of ammunition which was delivered to him in gasoline tins with false bottoms, in order to get them through to him. This General apparently rules his territory well and is supported by the wealth of the Mohammedans. He is opposed to General Sun and has had trouble with him on two different occasions.

Miscellaneous.

A temple in the village of Hwachow, Shensi, has been converted into an arsenal. It is reported that this arsenal manufactures rifles and ammunition.

A foreigner returning from Suchow, Kansu, reports that the Eurasian Aviation Corporation has an engineer there who is building up the air field and establishing a gasoline dump and a small hanger.

R. H. Soule.

R. H. Soule,
1st Lt. Inf. (D.O.L.)

No. 8377. 1st Ind. WSD:cht.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, September 8, 1932 - To: The A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. This report accurately discribe present conditions along the railways, roads and in the cities and provinces mentioned.

2. It is forwarded with a suggestion that all this information is suitable for inclusion either in the digest or in a series of monograph on Chinese cities on file in the Far Eastern Section of G-2.

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

S-1

Route to Geog

also

205S-697

1436

Political Geography

CHINA (Geographic)

Subject: Cities in Manchuria

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. APR 19 1933

Names of the principal cities in Manchuria are given below. The first column gives the name as found on the Postal Map, the second gives the Chinese character for identification and the third gives the Japanese version.

Name-Postal Map	Chinese Character	Japanese Name
Aigun	瑷琿	Aikun
Angangki	昂昂溪	Kokokei
Anshan	鞍山	Anzan
Anta	安達	Anda
Antung	安東	Anto
Ashiho	阿什河	Ashiho
Chalantun	札蘭屯	Charanton
Changchun	長春	Choshun
Changtien	張店	Choten
Changtu	昌圖	Shoto
Changwu	彰武	Shobu
Chaoyang	朝陽	Choyo
Chaoyangchen	朝陽鎮	Choyochin
Chefoo	芝罘	Chifu
Chengchiatun	鄭家屯	Teikaton (Ryogen)
Chengteh	承德	Shotoku
Chengtzutuan	城子疃	Joshido
Chiaochengtzu	蛟河	Kojoshi
Chiacho	嘉峰	Koka
Chihfeng	赤峰	Sekiho
Chinchou	金州	Kinshu
Chinchow	錦州	Kinshu

From M/A, China Report No. 8530 March 13, 1933

CHINA (Geographic)

Subject: Cities in Manchuria

Name-Postal Map	Chinese Character	Japanese Name
Chinwangtao	秦王島	Shinnoto
Choushuitzu	周水子	Shusuishi
Dairen (Dalny)	大連	Tairen
Fengtien (Mukden)	奉天	Hoten
Fushun	撫順	Bujun
Fuyu	扶餘	Fuyo
Haicheng	海城	Kaijo
Haiho	海河	Kaika
Hailar	海拉爾	Hairaru
Hailin	海林	Kairin
Hailun	海倫	Kairin
Hailung	海龍	Kairyu
Harbin	哈爾濱	Harupin
Heiho	黑河	Kokka
Heilungkiang Prov.	黑龍江省	Kokuryukosho
Hingking	興京	Kokyo
Hiungyao	熊岳	Yugakujo
Hoiryung (Corean reading)	會寧	Kainei
Holikang	鶴立崗	Kakuritsuko
Hsinkiu	新邱	Shinkyu
Hulun	呼倫	Korin (Haicaru)
Hulutao	葫蘆島	Koroto
Huma	呼瑪	Koma
Hunchun	琿春	Konshun
Hwatien	樺甸	Kaden

CHINA (Geographic)

Subject: Cities in Manchuria

Name-Postal Map	Chinese Character	Japanese Name
Ilan (Sansing)	依蘭(三姓)	Iran (Sansen)
Imienpo	一面坡	Imenpa
Kailu	開魯	Kairo
Kaiping	蓋平	Gaihei
Kaiping	開平	Kaihei
Kaitung	開通	Kaitsu
Kaiyuan	開原	Kaigen
Kigan	奇幹	Kikan
Kilalin	吉拉林	Kirarin
Kingpeng	經棚	Kinpun
Kirin Province	吉林省	Kichirinsho
Kowpangtze	溝帮子	Kopantzu
Kunchuling	公主嶺	Koshurei
Kwantien	寬甸	Kaden
Liaoyang	遼陽	Ryoyo
Linsi	林西	Rinsei
Lishukow	梨樹溝	Rijuko
Liushun (Port Arthur)	旅順	Ryojun
Lungchintsun	龍井村	Ryuseison
Lungkow	龍口	Ronko
Lwanchow	灤州	Ranshu
Manchouli	滿州里	Manchuri
Maoerhshan	帽兒山	Bojizan
Mergen	墨爾根	Merugen
Mishan	密山	Mitsuzan

CHINA (Geographic)

Subject: Cities in Manchuria

Name-Postal Map	Chinese Character	Japanese Name
Ninguta	寧古塔	Ninguta
Noho	訥河	Noho
Nungan	農安	Noan
Omu	額穆	Kakuryo
Paichuan	拜泉	Haisen
Paiyintala	通遼 (白音太来)	Tsuryo (Paintara)
Peipiao	北票	Hokupyo
Penki	本溪	Honkeiko
Poshan	博山	Hakuzan
Shanhaikwan	山海関	Sankaikan
Shiakuotun	沙鍋屯	Shakaton
Shwangchengpu	雙城堡	Sojoho
Sian	西安	Seian
Sifeng	西豐	Saiho
Sinmin	新民	Shinmin
Solun	索倫	Soron
Suihwa	綏化	Suika
Suitung	綏東	Suito
Sukiatunkia	蘇家屯街	Sokaton
Sungari	松花江	Shokako
Szepingkai	四平街	Shiheigai
Tahushan	打虎山	Dakozan
Tailai	泰来	Tairai
Taku	大沽	Taku
Takushan	大孤山	Taikozan

CHINA (Geographic)

Subject: Cities in Manchuria

Name-Postal Map	Chinese Character	Japanese Name
Talai	大賚	Tairai
Tangku	塘沽	Tanku
Tangyuan	湯源	Togen
Taolaichao	陶賴昭	Toraisho
Taonan	洮南	Tonan
Tapanshiang	大板上	Taibanjo
Taru	鴨綠江	Oryokukko
Tashihchiao	大石橋	Taisekkyo
Tientsin	天津	Tenshin
Tolunnoerh	多倫諾爾	Toronna
Tsinan	濟南	Sainan
Tsingtao	青島	Chinto(Seito)
Tsitsihar	齊齊哈爾	Chichiharu
Tumenkiang	圖門江	Tomanko
Tunghwa	通化	Tsuka
Tungkiang	同江	Doko
Tunhwa	敦化	Tonka
Wafangtien	瓦房店	Gaboten
Weihsien	維縣	Iken
Wuchang	五常	Gojo
Wuncheng	穩城	Onjo
Yantai	烟台	Yendai
Yenki	延吉	Enkichi
Yinkow (Newchwang)	營口	Eiko

SVC

W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

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4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
SEP 10 1933

2055-699

August 7, 1933

WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: Report Upon Visit in Manchuria

To: The Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 1 1933

1. As a result of instructions from the American Minister, I was in Manchuria from July 14th to August 1st, inclusive, in connection with the Nielsen kidnapping case. The trip afforded an opportunity to visit Dairen, Port Arthur, Mukden and Harbin, where an especial effort was made to contact American and foreign military officers, consular officials, newspaper correspondents and other civilians. In the hope that the information gained and my impressions might be of interest they are made the subject of this report.

Troops in Manchuria

Japanese.

It seems the consensus of opinion that there are about 60,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria, although everyone realizes the difficulty of obtaining accurate information. In detail they are as follows:

			Garrison area	Headquarters
14th Division	(14,000)	(Matsuki)	C.E.R.	Harbin
10th "	(9,000)	(Hirose)	C.E.R.	Tsitsihar
6th "	(9,000)	(Sakamota)	S.M.R.	Mukden
8th "	(9,000)	(Nishi)	Jehol	Chengte
14th Mixed Brig.		(Hattori)	Fengshan R.R.	Shanhaikwan
Two Cavalry "		(Mogi)	N.E.Jehol	
Railway Guard Bns.	(16,000)	(Inouye)		Mukden

The Railway Guards are also now responsible for the Triangle, Tungpien and Taonan-Tungliao areas.

Manchoukuo.

The so-called Manchoukuo troops are ridiculed by Chinese and foreigners and despised by the Japanese. Never was a word heard of sympathy or condonement. They frankly admit they serve only to obtain Japanese money and intend to give no loyalty or service in return. When actually in combat the Japanese soldier fears them as much as their known enemies. Circumstances require that they be placed in the rear of the Japanese, although the latter know of numerous cases in which their brothers in arms have been treacherously shot by the Manchoukuo soldier. On the contrary relations between Manchoukuo and bandit are most friendly and brotherly. Gifts and sale of ammunition are so common that it is now a matter of regulation that empty cartridge cases must be turned in by the Manchoukuo soldier following a battle.

Bandit.

It is impossible to get accurate figures on the numbers of "bandits" in Manchuria. However, it is positive that Japanese announcements are deliberately falsified. In the same edition of controlled papers announcing that only "professional" bandits remain and they only in small parties of a few hundred, accounts will also be published of battles in which 3,000-4,000 bandits took part. The most recent official announcement of 60,000 bandits is obviously much less than the real figure. In many cases the "bandits" fight bravely although they are inevitably defeated. It is quite obvious that the Japanese military are extremely concerned because of their failure to quell this illusive foe, who because of their knowledge of the mountains and country, having both sympathy and fear of the local peasantry, and spies within the Manchoukuo army, hover around Japanese troops attacking and disappearing with disconcerting regularity and ease. Foreign observers who have accompanied these "flying columns" of Japanese bandit suppression report them to be in a continual state of nervous excitement and capable of accomplishing nothing.

Bandit Operations

The following statistics on banditry were given out by a minor official at the Japanese Consulate at Mukden about May 1, 1933, to an American newspaper correspondent, but then was recalled and the newspaper man was told he could not use it.

District bounded by Antung, Dairen, Koupangtse, east of Tahushan line, up C.E.R. as far as Sungari, Changchun, Kirin, Tunhua, back to Antung.

Area reported by Consular police, S.M.R. zone of influence:

In 1932 - total cases 26,946

Bandit attacks recorded as follows:

By less than 10 bandits	4,064
10-30	4,886
30-50	3,815
50-100	3,076
100-200	3,083
300-500	2,187
500-1000	1,568
1000	1,133
Uncertain	802

Conspicuous districts:

Antung	3,735
Kaiyuan	2,675
Penhsihu	2,583
Yinkow	2,416

Details -

Total number of captives taken by bandits	13,468
Civilians killed during raids	530
" wounded " "	399
Manchoukuo police killed	1,122
" " wounded	1,016
Bandit corpses left	11,614
wounded	2,134
captured	3,326
Engagements with Manchoukuo troops	2,296
Japanese police	212
Japanese army	201
Manchoukuo police & Manchoukuo army	134
Japanese and Manchoukuo troops	105
Manchoukuo police and soldiers who have been captured by bandits	557

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Police figures, Mukden Consular District only, during autumn of 1932, total number of bandits - 142,000

In February 1933 after drive 22,000

Police estimates for end of May 1933:

Tungpien area	26,000
In area between railroads -	
I. Mukden-Kirin-Changchun	Very big, uncounted
II. The Antung Railway "triangle"	7,000
District west of lower Liao River	5,000
" " " upper " "	8,000
" " " Chinchow	10,000

Excepting in I and II above all groups are now reported to be small (however, recent Manchuria Daily News carried article of attack by gang of 3,000).

In first half of April 1933, 690 cases of banditry in Mukden consular district. 369 captives were taken and 9 were killed.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The following are the latest figures upon banditry in the Mukden consular district - given in confidence about July 18, 1933:

Fengtien Province, total number of bandits - 21,300

Divided as follows:	
Tungpien	11,000
Antung triangle	2,700
Liao valley	1,700
Jehol, north	6,000

Taonan and Tungliao areas are now quiet.

It was learned in strictest confidence from a Japanese official in Mukden that on the night of July 24, 1933, a band of at least 1000 bandits appeared ten miles north of Mukden. The entire garrison, even including consular police, was assembled and rushed out of the city in order to disperse the bandits. During the same week 450 ex-bandits employed on the Mukden-Fushun highway construction rebelled, killed the Japanese Major in charge, disarmed their Manchoukuo guards and escaped to take up their former profession.

Economic Development.

Certain Japanese officials admit that the Army has absolute control of Manchuria. Parenthetically, as a result disgruntled consular officials are an excellent source of information. They admit their impotence and state that there has been a lowering of quality in Japanese civilian officials as a result. The hand of the Japanese General Staff is apparent in every new venture in Manchuria. All railways are now consolidated under one head and the couplings of ex-Chinese railway cars changed so they can be used with South Manchuria Railway cars, new lines are being built for strategic and not economic reasons, telegraph and radio have been consolidated into one organization, a "fertilizer" chemical plant is being built in Dairen although Manchuria's soya bean cake fertilizer is the country's leading export, a large oil refinery is planned and an aviation company now operates planes and fields far in excess of the normal needs of the country.

Railway Construction (see map).

The construction of railways in Manchuria is proceeding at a rapid and energetic pace. If not now, then at least within two more years the network of railways in Manchuria behind the Kinghan Mountain range will be such that Russia could neither defend Vladivostock nor invade Manchuria unless helped by unforeseen, unheard of outside forces.

The Kirin-Tunhua-Kainei connection (119 miles) has now been completed and will be formally opened September 1st. The railway, 15 kilometers, connecting line with the new port of Rashin will be finished this year.

The Lafa-Wuchang-Harbin line (150 miles) will also be completed this year, furnishing another line of transport from Japan via Harbin and Tsitsihar to the Kinghan Mountains.

The Koshan-Hailun line (105 miles) is now completed and construction started on the very strategically important line, Koshan-Peianchen-Lungchen-Aigun-Taheiho.

The Taonan-Solun line has been completed to Huayuan (52 miles).

From Koupeiyungtze, two stations south of Peipiao, construction has started on a narrow gauge line to Chaoyang, and from that place construction also started on the line to Lingyuan. It is thought that this will be completed this year and the following year extended to Chengte.

It is difficult to determine which of the projected roads will actually be constructed. A director of the South Manchuria Railway recently stated in an interview with a newspaper correspondent that a line from Yenchi through Ninguta to Ilan would soon be constructed but did not give the actual date.

Highway Construction.

In spite of official announcements concerning new motor road construction varying by many thousands of kilometers, Japanese officials have confidentially admitted progress so far has been very disappointing. This is due to bandits harassing the workers and the failure of the plan to use ex-bandits for road construction. One highway official stated that not more than 400 kilometers could be constructed during the current year.

Soviet-Japanese Relations.

During two dinner engagements with the Soviet Consul in Mukden he made the following statements:

1) Russia will not fight Japan for Manchuria now;
2) Russia will fight if her territory is invaded;
3) A railway from the Trans-Siberian line to Urga is planned but he would not admit that work had actually started. He gave the impression, however, that such was the case.

On the other hand, a Japanese consular official during a period of inebriation gave out this information: The Japanese army is not now concerned with making a greater effort to pacify Manchuria but is more concerned with preparing for a war with Russia. It is realized that the troops in Manchuria are now insufficient for the task of pacification, but the army prefers to use the money saved by limiting the expedition to its present strength, for the purchase of materiel and the establishment of supply depots in strategically important places in Manchuria.

The same source said that the Japanese army annually expends large sums within Russia proper upon espionage. That the Japanese are hard task masters with the White Russians is shown by their imprisonment during July of all White Russian leaders in Mukden for three days. A White Russian source told me this was stated by the Japanese to be a punishment and warning to them as a result of General Horvath's statements to the League of Nations Commission last summer.

Aviation.

This subject will be covered in a separate report.

Conclusion.

There is not the slightest doubt that Japan intends to keep Manchuria and all present indications definitely point to her ability to do so. A rapprochement with Russia is hindered only by their mutual natural racial hatred. Provided

Japan can forestall the advance of communism within Japan, the advantages to both nations are enormous. The same conditions are existant in Sino-Japanese relations, except that history shows that the Chinese are quick to forget and their animosity capable of being quickly changed, - for example, the change during the Boxer days from anti-Manchu to anti-foreign as well as the outcome of the numerous boycotts in the last decade. By the liberal use of money to influence public opinion and Chinese officials, it is my opinion that if Japan wishes to and has sufficient foresight she can come to a friendly understanding with China in five years, and might even successfully promote anti-foreignism within China. Aided by economic ties with Russia and China, the power of Japan would soon be such as to challenge the present position of the white race.

H. L. Boatner
H. L. Boatner,
1st Lieutenant-Infantry (DOL)

No. 8631 1st Ind. WSD:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, August 8, 1933 - To: Chief, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D. C.

1. The information contained in this report and the conclusions drawn accord with the estimates and opinions of the best informed and most impartial observers.

2. This excellent report is forwarded as being of immediate interest to G-2. Separate Digest reports will be submitted covering in detail information of a more or less permanent character that is pertinent to the Digest.

W. S. Drysdale
W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
6-1
2055-70
WAR DEPARTMENT.

MANCHOUKUO.

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2010 - Population.

MANCHOUKUO POPULATION

RECEIVED G/2 W D APR 9 1935

The population of Manchoukuo, according to the statistics compiled by the statistics bureau of the Department of Civil Affairs and other sources, shows a steady increase since the founding of the State three years ago. The increase during the three-year period is no less than 1,410,576.

The population of Manchoukuo, including the S.M.R.Zone, in December of 1932, 1933 and 1934 was as follows:

	Dec. 1932	Dec. 1933	Dec. 1934
Manchoukuo outside of S.M.R. Zone	29,606,117	30,879,717	30,905,408
S. M. R. Zone	362,718	404,316	434,002
Total	29,968,835	31,284,033	31,339,411

The population of the Kwantung Leased Territory:

	Dec. 1932	Dec. 1933	Dec. 1934
Manchurians	832,488	862,307	886,002
Japanese, including Koreans	127,937	141,275	148,204
Others	721	857	1,089
Total	961,146	1,004,439	1,035,295

Comparative population of Manchoukuo Proper and the S.M.R. Zone:

(Manchoukuo, outside of S.M.R. Zone)

	Dec. 1932	Dec. 1933	Dec. 1934
Manchurians	28,902,592	30,190,526	30,198,254
Japanese	566,471	590,760	624,482
Others (x)	137,054	98,431	82,673
Total	29,606,117	30,879,717	30,905,409
SMR Zone Manchurians	216,837	233,234	245,999
Japanese	144,545	167,754	186,780
Others	1,336	1,328	1,223
Total	362,718	404,316	434,002
Grand Total	29,968,835	31,284,033	31,339,411

M/A. Tokyo. Report No. 7698 Mar. 13, 1935.

(x) Gradual decrease among others in Manchoukuo Proper is due chiefly to the exodus of White Russians.

Population of Manchoukuo classified by nationality, including the S.M.R. Zone:

	Dec. 1932	Dec. 1933	Dec. 1934
Manchurians	29,119,429	30,425,760	30,444,253
Japanese	711,016(x)	178,630	215,057
Koreans		579,834	598,205
Others	138,390	99,759	83,896
Total	29,968,835	31,284,033	31,339,411

(x) Koreans included in 1932

Comparative population of foreigners in Manchoukuo, (outside of the S.M.R. Zone and Kwantung Leased Territory on December 31, 1934:

Japanese (including Koreans)	624,482
White Russians	42,591
Soviets	36,317
Poles	1,340
Germans	454
British	419
Americans	223
French	209
Others	914
Total	707,155

Comparative population of the principal cities including the S.M.R. Zone in Manchoukuo (December 31, 1934):

Mukden	
Manchurians	457,342
Japanese	68,029
Others	1,508
Total	526,879
Harbin	
Manchurians	334,663
Japanese	20,396
Others	64,420
Total	419,479
Hsinking	
Manchurians	181,882
Japanese	45,157
Others	1,284
Total	229,323
Antung	
Manchurians	168,047
Japanese	26,145
Others	38
Total	194,230

Kirin City	
Manchurians	136,555
Japanese	6,581
Others	114
Total	143,250
Yingkou	
Manchurians	153,756
Japanese	5,029
Others	90
Total	140,875

Source: Manchuria Daily News

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

John Weckerling,
Captain, Infantry, (DOL),
Asst., Military Attache.

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2010 - Population - General

WAR DEPARTMENT

MANCHOUKUO (Population and Social Conditions).

Subject: Foreign Population of Manchoukuo.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 18 1935

According to the Civil Affairs Department, the following is a list of the numbers of foreigners in Manchoukuo:-

Denationalized *	42,891
Naturalized	8,738
Soviets	36,517
British	419
Americans	226
French	209
Germans	454
Italians	54
Netherlanders	48
Poles	1,340
Belgians	24
Danes	95
Swiss	33
Swedes	17
Norwegians	6
Canadians	66
Turks	25
Finn	1
Spanish	5
Greeks	60
Austrians	32
Australian	1
Portuguese	14
Hindus	21
Czechoslovakians	173
Latvians	198
Hungarians	6
Estonian	1
Armenians	25
Roumanians	11
Lithuanians	3
Total	90,411

* It is assumed that the term Denationalized refers to the White Russians now residing in Manchoukuo.

The 36,517 Soviets listed above, although at present residing in Manchoukuo, may be considered as being temporary as the greater percentage are engaged in some capacity with the Chinese Eastern Railway and if the sale of this railroad to the Manchoukuo Government materializes it can be presumed that these workers will be replaced by Japanese and the Russians and their families returned to Soviet territory.

Population figures compiled by the Manchoukuo Government as of December 31, 1932, give the Japanese and Korean population residing in the Kwantung Leased Territory, South Manchurian Railway Zone and Manchoukuo proper as follows:-

From M/A, China. Report No. 9003. December 18, 1934.

G-2 Report.

2010 - Population -
General.

MANCHOUKUO (Population and Social Conditions).

Subject: Foreign Population of Manchoukuo.

Japanese	287,061
Koreans (estimated)	750,000
Total	1,037,061

Source:- Press reports, Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book and study in the Office of the M. A.

W. S. Drysdale

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2010
Population
General

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CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: The Population of Manchoukuo

NOV 7 1933

2055-70/1

WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 7 1933

Submitted herewith are statistics upon the population of Manchoukuo issued to the press by the Department of Foreign Affairs on September 9, 1933. These figures were stated to have been compiled by the Statistics Bureau of the Government of Manchoukuo to show the population as at the end of December 1932.

	Families	Males	Females	Total Population
Fengtien	2,270,418	8,228,698	6,914,722	15,143,420
Kirin	1,167,049	3,928,605	3,206,927	7,135,532
Heilungkiang	585,042	2,060,892	1,611,885	3,672,777
Jehol	518,252	1,119,113	935,192	2,054,305
Changchun (city)	23,420	77,197	49,112	126,309
Harbin (")	112,303	346,777	206,587	553,364
Heingan (sub-province)	153,397	571,072	349,328	920,400
TOTALS ----	4,829,881	16,332,354	13,273,753	29,606,107

The total population according to nationality including that of the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway zone is: "Manchurians" 28,902,000; Japanese (including Koreans) 566,000; other foreigners 137,000, - thus 97.6% of the total population is Manchurian. For the Kwantung Leased Territory and S.M.R. zone it is: Manchurians 1,049,000, Japanese (including Koreans) 272,000, and foreigners 2,000.

NOTE: Reuter in its press release states, "The population of Manchoukuo totals 30,929,000, according to the Department of Foreign Affairs". Further down in the article the population of "Manchoukuo Proper" is spoken of as 29,606,117. It is unknown whether this combining of the Kwantung Leased Territory as well as the S.M.R. zone into Manchoukuo was a mistake or is the forerunner of attempts by Japanese authorities to consider them as one country.

Japanese police figures as for July 31, 1933, give the following detailed population statistics:

(a) Kwantung Leased Territory

	Households	Individuals
Port Arthur	2,564	11,854
Port Arthur suburbs	153	571
Dairen	24,669	113,459
Dairen suburbs	1,002	3,969
Chinchow	486	2,031
Pulantien	371	1,316
Pitzuwo	410	1,529
TOTAL -	29,655	134,727

From M/A, China Report No. 8664 September 28, 1933

CHINA (Population &
Social Conditions)

Subject: The Population of Manchoukuo

(b) South Manchuria Railway Zone

	Households	Individuals
Wafangtien	978	3,660
Tashihchiao	1,002	3,930
Yingkow	736	3,294
Anshan	1,848	7,767
Sauchiatun	927	3,559
Liaoyang	951	3,768
Mukden	6,990	34,041
Pewchihu	721	2,983
Fenghuangcheng	370	1,489
Antung	2,718	12,175
Fushun	4,246	18,944
Tiehling	882	3,212
Kaiyuan	629	2,626
Ssupingkai	1,236	4,842
Kungchuling	682	2,682
Fanchiatun	170	654
Hsinking	4,127	19,897
Total -	29,213	129,523

These figures represent a total increase of 3,154 households and 19,473 persons over the returns for January 1933.

The following is additional pertinent information regarding Japanese population in Manchuria which has been gathered from press reports of Japanese origin. In Harbin the increase in Japanese population during June 1933 was 365; during August it was 390, at which time the total increase since the first of the year was 1918; all of which gave that city a total Japanese population of 8,730. In the district or hsien which included Tsitsihar in Heilungkiang Province, the foreign population was Japanese 2,777, Korean 767, White Russian 384 and Soviet Russian 10. In Peianchen, a small town on the newly completed Koshan-Hailun Railway, the Japanese population sprang to a total of 600 because of railway construction.

COMMENTS: It must be realized that all population figures concerning Chinese are estimates only and that those issued by Japanese authorities might contain many inaccuracies which are made deliberately for propaganda purposes.

The ever increasing surplus of population in Japan has had frequent utterance by those responsible for Japanese foreign policy. On many occasions it has been claimed that Manchuria is the reservoir to which this surplus is entitled to flow. The fact that to date only 566,000 Japanese subjects, which includes Koreans, live in Manchuria has convinced many well qualified observers that that region has not proven a fit colonizing country for the Japanese. Just recently two sets of pertinent

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figures have been released by Japanese authorities which is prima facie evidence that they themselves also do not believe that Manchuria will solve their problem. These statements are, first, the increase in population in Japan was over 1,100,000 last year, and secondly, the Kwantung Army hopes that 500,000 Japanese colonists will settle in Manchuria during the next ten to fifteen years. In other words, Manchuria will take only 1/20 of the annual increase in population during that period of time.

During the past two years it has been a matter of common observation that the Japanese who have emigrated to Manchuria have done so to take up government positions or to engage in commerce. The Japanese shopkeeper has already spread to many parts of Manchuria, almost invariably along the well protected railways. On the contrary however, there has not been any large increase in Japanese seeking to farm. At least three groups of armed farmers, certainly totalling not more than 500, have been transported to Manchuria and in general have attempted to settle in the Chiamussu area, the Japanese Government even providing wives for them, but so far the combination of climate, the Chinese standard of farming conditions and banditry have all kept the project from being a success.

Assuming the hypothesis stated above to be true, that is, occupation of Manchuria is not going to solve Japan's population problem, and also admitting that the Japanese have a problem of surplus population, a solution remains to be found. It is certain that China furnishes no opportunity for colonization, although it could absorb government officials and commercial people were it also to be subject to exploitation by the Japanese. Some authorities state that the South Sea Islands are not suitable for Japanese needs and that probably the Philippine Islands would not be sufficient. The most logical solution remaining therefore seems to be the industrialization of Japan, and the development by Japan of the Far Eastern market for her own use.

Another phase of the above announcement seems to warrant comment. Japanese propagandists have seen fit within the past year to class all inhabitants of the "four eastern provinces" that are neither Japanese nor Caucasian as being "Manchurians". Prior to 1931 this name was reserved for those remnants remaining from the old Manchu race which conquered China in 1644. The following quotations, all from quasi-official Japanese publications, are ample illustration of Japanese thought prior to 1931:

From "Manchuria - A Survey" by Adachi Kinnosuke, page 44:

> "Today 564 years after the passing of the greatest empire the world has ever seen into nothing more than the vaguest sort of nightmare, we face this outstanding fact: More than 90 per cent. of the total population of the present-day Manchuria are the descendants of the humble Chinese who stole into the country."

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From "Section Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1930", published by the South Manchuria Railway Company, page 13:

> "Although the indigenous peoples of Manchuria are the Manchu and Mongolian, ninety per cent. of the present population of 29,000,000 are Chinese."

From "Economic History of Manchuria" compiled by the Bank of Chosen in 1920, page 10:

> "The inhabitants of the land remained essentially native until about 1644.... .... After that period the prohibition began to be relaxed, and the Chinese began to migrate to this vast country. They increased in number as the years went by, and now 90 per cent. of the inhabitants of Manchuria are Chinese, the rest being made up of the original Manchus, the Tungus tribes living along the lower reaches of the Sungari, and the Mongols in the Khingan Mountains. So Manchuria of to-day is not the Manchuria of the Manchus but the Manchuria of the Chinese."

Now, however, their propagandists have changed the meaning of the term entirely, classing together as "Manchurians" such peoples as the pure Manchu, the numerous Mongols in Jehol and Hsingan Sub-province, the newly arrived Chinese coolie immigrant (19,505 arrived during August 1933), the Chinese settler who migrated several years ago, and those Chinese born in Manchuria.

Source: Study in M/A office.

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HLB

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2020 - Ethnic
Origin & Groupings

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CHINA (Population &
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FEB 2 1934
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 31 1934

Subject: Tribal Elements of Inner Mongolia

In 1914, three years after the formation of the Republic, Inner Mongolia was divided into the Special Administrative Districts of Chahar, Suiyuan and Jehol. Later in 1928 they were declared provinces. Jehol, where are located the Joude and Josoto leagues of Mongol tribes, is not at present under Chinese control, nor is northern Fengtien, wherein we find the Jerim league. This, then, leaves the provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan the only part of former "Inner Mongolia" now under the control of the Chinese Government. This section, with the exception of the Chinese immigrants in the south and east, is inhabited by the Silingol and Olanchab leagues to the north and the Chahar Mongols, Suiyuan Tumets and Ordos Mongols to the south and west.

Now only a semi-nomadic people, the Mongol tribal organization is still based on the aimak and the hoshun. The aimak is a collection of one or more principalities or hoshun bound together by singleness of descent and historical past, as the former possession of a single prince, ancestor of the various present reigning princes. The hoshun is the fief (landed estate held under feudal tenure) of any one ruling prince, its jassak. The term tumet or tumut is sometimes used to indicate a combination of two hoshun. Within the hoshun we find a collection of bak, which is presided over by an elder and is the smallest Mongol administrative unit.

The term league (meng in Chinese and chiguglan or Chulgan in Mongol) is a non-Mongol institution set up by the Manchus to weaken the tribal organization of the Mongols. In Inner Mongolia the twenty-four aimaks were irregularly grouped into six leagues by the Manchu regime. Each aimak contains one or more hoshun and each hoshun has its ruling prince or jassak (Khan in Outer Mongolia) as noted above. The senior jassak in ancestry of each aimak is still recognized by the Mongols as historical chief of the aimak, but has now no authority and no duties connected with the office. The jassak or ruling prince inherits his office by primogeniture and in Inner Mongolia is confirmed by the Central Government of China.

In the Manchu Dynasty the rights of these princes to rule their own hoshun were confirmed by the Throne and Manchu titles of nobility were conferred upon them. Even though titles are no longer officially used in China proper, the Mongols use them and still wear the old official robes, buttons of rank, peacock feathers, etc. Thus all jassak belong to one of the seven Mongol orders of nobility, i.e.:

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English	Mongol name	Chinese (Manchu) equivalent
1. Prince of first order	Hosho	Ch'in Wang
2. " " second "	To lo	Chun Wang
3. " " third "	To lo	Pei Le
4. " " fourth "	Ku Shan	Pei Tze
5. Duke of first degree	Ulusun Tushie Kung	Chen Kuo Kung
6. " " second "	Ulustur Tusalakchi Kung Taiji	Fu Kuo Kung
7. Son of a noble of any of the above six ranks who is over 18 years of age.		None. (The Manchus however had a 7th and 8th grade rank for nobles.)

It should be noted that under the Manchus there were no Ch'in Wang as this rank was not given to Mongols. Only since the fall of the Dynasty has this rank been conferred in Mongolia since it was formerly reserved solely for the eight most trusted officials of the court. Thus we have the anomaly of a republic conferring titles on Mongol princes through the medium of the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (Meng Tsang Wei Yuan Huai).

The six Mongol leagues are given below, there being four in the east and two in the west. It will be noted that the Chahar Mongols and Suiyuan Tumets are grouped under the eastern and western leagues respectively but they are not classed as leagues.

Eastern Leagues -

1. Jerim League

Lying in Eastern Inner Mongolia.
2 Gorlos Banners, lying west of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to the Sungari River.
6 Khorchin Banners, coming under Liaoning Province.
1 Durbet Banner, lying south of the Chinese Eastern Ry.
1 Jalait Banner, lying west of the T'aonan-Angangki Railway under Heilungkiang Province.

2. Josoto League

Lying in south-east Jehol.
3 Kharachin Banners
2 Tumet Banners
1 Khalkha Banner
1 Shireto Khurien

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3. Joude League

Lying in the northern half of the Province of Jehol
2 Jarod Banners
1 Aro-Khorchin Banner
2 Bairin Banners
1 Keshikten Banner
1 Naiman Banner, southwest of K'ailu on the Jehol-Fengtien frontier.
1 Khalkha Banner
3 Aokhan Banners, east and northeast of Ch'ihfeng
2 Ongniot Banners, west and northwest of Ch'ihfeng

4. Silingol League

Lying north of the Chahar Mongols and south of Outer Mongolia, forming part of Chahar Province.
2 Ujumchin Banners, bordering on Mongolia
2 Hochit Banners
2 Abaga Banners
2 Abaganar Banners
2 Sunit Banners

The Chahar Mongols

8 "military" and 4 "herdsman" banners.

Western Leagues

1. Olanchab League

1 Durbet Khukhet Banner, lying north of the Chahar Banners
1 Khalkha Banner, north of Kueihua
1 Minggan Banner, north and north-east of Paot'ou
3 Oirat Banners, north and northwest of Paot'ou

2. The Ordos Mongols

Lying on the west of the Yellow River in Suiyuan Province, commonly known as the Yeghe Jo League.

Suiyuan Tumets

Lying in the vicinity of Suiyuan and Kueihua.

Source: Study in M/A office.

COMMENTS: The attached map, compiled from the best available sources, gives the approximate locations of the Mongol tribes of Inner Mongolia, including areas now part of Manchuria. It should be remembered that locations of league

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and banner boundaries and of banner headquarters are only approximate. The latter are generally located in the stronghold of the leader or in some temple.

The leagues and tribal alignments of Inner Mongolia are of particular interest at this time in view of the autonomy agitation in that area and because of its geographical location with respect to Japanese control of Manchuria and Russian influence in Outer Mongolia.

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SVC

1 map attached

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DEC 21 1934

MIL. INTEL. DIV.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: PLAN FOR RURAL RECONSTRUCTION.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 18 1934

Forwarded herewith is a plan for rural reconstruction work in Kiangsi Province. About eighteen months ago Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek (both of whom are Methodists) requested the Rev. William R. Johnson in charge of the Methodist Mission at Nanchang to submit a plan for the rural rehabilitation of the province in which the Christian churches could participate. This the Rev. Johnson consented to do. Madame Chiang remitted the fund for Mr. Johnson's travel to Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping and other localities in order to consult with League experts and people with experience in rural rehabilitation in China.

The enclosed plan is the result of that study, it was submitted to and approved by Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek and is now being carried out. Funds for this purpose are being raised as follows: $[illegible] by General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek; $[illegible] to be raised by the participating church bodies; $5,000 by the National Economic Council and volunteers for work with the groups in the area selected. Nanking, Tsinghua, Ginling and other universities are furnishing graduates or selected students to assist in the rural, education and religious work in the field. Doctors and nurses, both men and women, foreign and Chinese, are being employed and field headquarters was established during October last at Linchuan, Kiangsi.

The participating Christian units called the Kiangsi Christian Rural Service Union has been formed, and have selected a Mr. Shepherd, an American missionary of long experience in the "Communist" area of Western Fukien, to take charge of the field work. Mr. Shepherd is an intelligent, energetic and earnest leader, extremely interested in the work and is now in the field with his field workers and reports satisfactory progress.

Linchuanhsien (formerly Sinchenghsien) has been selected for the exclusive work of this group. Linchuanhsien is on the Fukien border, has been freed from the "Communist Bandits" about seven months and is one of the most important and populous of the Hsien that were in "Communist" control. The Hsien had a normal population of about 700,000. When the Communists were driven out the refugees from this Hsien began to return until the total population now numbers about 400,000.

COMMENT:- Reconstruction work of the type described is essential if the danger from Communists and bandits is to be permanently or effectively removed. The military campaign has practically cleared Kiangsi of the Communist organized bands. Unless the condition of the peasant is improved in the reconquered areas and he is made to believe that his interests are being protected by the government, a return of the Communist-bandits would be only a question of time. Chiang Kai-shek and his field workers are thoroughly aware of this fact. Should this plan and the accompanying effort of the National Economic Council be made reasonably effective in the rural areas, the prospects of continued order would be immeasurably improved. The work is being conducted, in accordance with well conceived plans, by intelligent, capable and earnest people aware of the difficulties involved. Some improvement may be expected. As the work progresses pertinent reports will be submitted.

SOURCE:- Conversations with Rev. Johnson, Mr. Shepherd, and other foreign and Chinese participants in the plan at their Nanchang headquarters.

1 Encl. (only one copy of plan available)

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

From M/A, China.

Report No. 8981.

November 23, 1934.

Dryscale

DEC 21 1934
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

205-P-704

A SUGGESTED PLAN FOR RURAL RECONSTRUCTION WORK UNDER CHRISTIAN AUSPICES IN KIANGSI PROVINCE CHINA

BY WILLIAM R. JOHNSON, B.D.
KIANG, KIANGSI, CHINA

SEPTEMBER FOURTEENTH 1933

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(ABRIDGED AND REVISED)

Introductory:

Obviously a rural reconstruction program must be based on the needs of the rural population. Yet only as these needs are studied and understood, can one project a program best calculated to improve rural needs. Moreover the peasant himself must be understood, not only as to his present economical needs, his skills and customs, his prejudices, his intellectual habits and attainments, his beliefs and superstitions, but also as to his economic, political, religious and physical environment.

The Jerusalem Meeting (1928) of the International Missionary Council, gave large place to the whole problem of the relation of Christian Missions to rural problems. Papers presented and a summary of the discussions, fill one volume of the seven volume report of the proceedings. (Jerusalem Meeting, Inter-

national Missions Council, Vol VI. The Christian Mission in Relation to Rural Problems, Missionary Council, 419 Fourth Avenue, New York.) In 1930 Dr. Kenyon L. Butterfield, Councilor in Rural Work to the International Missionary Council, and long a teacher, research worker and advocate in connection with rural uplift in the West, visited several countries in the Far East, and particularly China, making an extensive study of rural conditions in these lands, and presented his findings in a volume of valuable suggestions for the work of the Church in rural areas. (The Rural Mission of the Church in Eastern Asia, by Kenyon L. Butterfield, International Missionary Council 419 Fourth Avenue, New York.) These two volumes discuss primarily the problems of the Christian Church in its approach to the rural population. The ideas there presented have been drawn upon freely, as also numerous other publications and reports, in what follows.

No effort will be made in this plan to deal with such fundamental problems as, transportation, land tenure, and taxation, the solution of which is regarded as belonging entirely within the realm of government activities.

How May the Kiangsi Farmer Be Best Served

However, our approach to the problem is somewhat different from that of the two volumes named. It may be stated as a desire to find the best practical method for the improvement of the life, physical, intellectual, spiritual, of the Kiangsi farmer, his wife and children, both as individuals, and in their economic and social relationships.

Rural reconstruction work on scientific lines in China is relatively new; and everywhere the most successful workers in this field, regard their program and techniques as distinctly experimental. Nevertheless an effort has been made to understand and in some measure to compare and evaluate the various methods being used in China, and,

in the light of what is known of conditions in Kiangsi, and the urgency of the problems there confronting us, to make specific recommendations for an attack on the very complex problem of rural reconstruction in this Province.

Five Points of Emphasis

The plan for rural reconstruction which we have to propose includes three main lines of effort, viz:

I. An Agricultural Experiment Station.

II. A team of specialists at work in a delimited area with definite aims and for a limited period.

III. A possible modification of this second method, wherein specialists attempt at once to develop a program in a larger area by extensive training of local workers on whom will devolve responsibility for the local community programs.

Two phases of the work of preparation require study and emphasis:

I. Selection and training of personnel.

II. The survey and research work necessary to give full information regarding the territory and people concerned, the facts, geographic, psychological, social, economic, and religious, on a clear understanding of which a reconstruction program may be based.

I. An Agricultural Experiment Station

As the outstanding Christian institution in this field, this work should undoubtedly be entrusted to the University of Nanking, College of Agriculture, which now carries on extensive work of this sort in various centers in China, and to whom the Christian Churches generally have entrusted the supervision of their work of this kind. The Extension Department of this College is in a position to direct this work efficiently and to correlate the work with that being done in neighboring provinces.

The purpose of such a station is to develop and improve the seeds of the agricultural crops grown in the district, to introduce new crops, especially fruits and vegetables, and to study soils and their improvement, fertilizers, animal husbandry, forestry, etc., in order to provide for the continuous improvement of the agricultural economy of the area, as a foundation for better living conditions for the farmer.

The question may be raised as to whether such a station is needed, if and when the government projects a comprehensive program of agricultural improvement into the Province. Experience in recent years has shown that a relatively small work carried on by the Missions has been able to make very real and valuable contributions, even thought near-by government institutions carrying on similar experiments have been much better provided for financially, this being due, apparently, to the relatively more stable and continuous administration provided in the Church institutions. We therefore suggest that such a station be included as a part of any considerable program projected.

The Methodist Episcopal Church at Nanchang has a suitable site for such an enterprise, consisting of about 200 mow of land, the use of which it is prepared to contribute for this purpose. This site being a part of their middle school campus, makes it the more desirable as being immediately contiguous to a middle school, a fact which will increase the value to be derived from such a station, since the school could utilize the station for its scientific work. The cooperation between school and experiment station thus secured, should result in many students giving themselves to rural work.

II. A Team of Specialists at Work in a Delimited Area for a Limited Period

By specialists we mean men or women who have had training as thorough as possible along lines of specialized endeavour which especially fits them for a particular kind of service in a rural community. Such persons should be college graduates if possible, or in any case, full middle school graduates, and have taken specialized courses fitting

for their particular form of service. In the team of such specialists sent to a given area, one or more, if possible, should be returned students; and one or more should have had some years of experience in service in a rural community. If such specialists can be secured from among students whose early home life has been spent in the county to be served, so much the better. If such are available, then local students should be sought out and given the needed training as early as possible, for, due to reasons of dialect, economy, continuity in service, and community solidarity, such procedure will be a contributing factor to permanent success.

A Delimited Area, the Cultural Unit

Students of Chinese rural life have come to recognize that the ordinary market town with the contiguous territory from which the people normally come to the market town for the purpose of trade, constitutes a distinct social and economic unit. Dr. Leonard Hsu, in charge of the Sociological Department of Yenching University, estimates that there are 15,000 such cultural units in China. These units average perhaps 15 to 20 li (5 to 7) miles in radius and contain generally 15 to 40 villages with a population of from 15,000 to 30,000, and sometimes more. As having a measure of common interest, and being not too widely separated to be organized with reasonable facility for common ends, such a territory is not too large for detailed study and for the set-up of a common program in which leaders and people can be brought together. At the same time it is large enough to support, when fully organized, a continuing program of endeavor to be carried out by local leadership, trained in the first instance by the original specialists, supplemented in some cases by further training in outside institutions. These compact geographical units are now generally recognized as the normal unit for study and for the introduction of programs of cultural improvement.

Immediate Aims of the Cultural Unit Program

We had opportunity to visit a number of stations, and to learn through their respective leaders of other programs, where such cultural units were taken as the unit for planning the program, and for carrying forward reconstruction work. Notable among these are the work conducted by Nanking Theological Seminary at Hsunhwachen, by the Kiangsu Provincial Government at Hsuchowfu, by Cheeloo University at Lungshan, by Yenching University at Tsingho. The work at Tingsien while covering a much larger area, takes account of the cultural unit as above defined, in projecting much of its work.

Varied Emphases of Existing Projects

At Tsouping the professed aim is to create a model county, at Tingsien great emphasis is placed on the problem of developing the best possible technique, while at Hsunhwachen and at Tsingho the chief purpose seems to be to furnish an opportunity for theological or sociological students to study and have a part in a forward looking program of rural reconstruction, with the Church as the central feature at Hsunhwachen. Of course it

would be unfair to imply that the aims just mentioned are in any way exclusive in the respective programs.

In contrast to these points of emphasis, the aim of the program at Hsuchowfu, as stated by Mr. P. T. Shih who has charge of that station, is, by making use of the best techniques already developed, within three years so to organize and inspire with a zeal for progress, the entire community, that the highly paid specialists who set up the program in the first instance, may be fully or largely withdrawn, leaving the work sufficiently organized and the local workers sufficiently trained, that the work will go forward successfully under these local workers, with only occasional visits from the specialists who will then be moved on to another cultural unit to repeat the program.

The Hsuchowfu station has an annual budget of $40,000 and a staff of 28 workers. Literacy, health work, boys and girls schools, kindergarten, distribution of improved seed from a nearby agricultural station, industrial training, organization for defence against bandits, with telephonic connection between villages and magistrate's yamen and the police station, as well as with the Mass Education Movement headquarters, industrial training and other features, are included in the program. In fourteen months, the work has been extended from the well built headquarters near Hsuchowfu into 14 villages, and further extension is being carried forward.

Method of Approach

Another feature of the Hsuchowfu work which so far as I know is quite unique, is the method of approach to the village. At Tinghsien, in the Baptist work in Eastern Shantung, the Methodist Episcopal work near Chengli and in other places, the first approach in introducing the larger service program, has been the literacy classes. When these classes have graduated considerable numbers of students, groups of graduates are organized into alumni associations for further study and self-improvement, and for projecting a varied program of activities into the village.

Some Opposition Factors

But often the farmers do not feel the need of being themselves literate. The program of community betterment often in one way or another, encroaches upon the private interests of local gentry and officials who often are disturbed in some profitably activity or vested interest by means of which they have long exploited the community. The stolid inertia of the unprogressive farmer, and the opposition of influential individuals who have their own reasons for opposing a cooperative community program, thus often prevents the full accomplishment of programs well conceived, adequately financed and well staffed.

The Hsuchowfu Approach

Having these possible difficulties in mind, the leaders at Hsuchowfu launched their first work on the principle of first projecting into the villages that form of service most calculated to bring immediate material benefits to the largest

possible number in the community. They first introduced improved wheat seed which greatly increased production. When the crop was gathered, they organized a cooperative society through which loans were made, so that the grain was held for higher prices, and the wheat crop is to be shipped to Shensi, where famine prices prevail. The farmers are to be given the full benefit of the increased sale price.

Before many months had passed, bandits cut the telephone wires and began their attack on one of the villages. Not knowing that the telephone system connected through to three offices instead of one, the bandits failed to cut all the wires, and so aid was speedily summoned and the bandits were routed by the local guards (also a feature of the Hsuchowfu program), which quickly assembled. One bandit was killed and another wounded.

By these means, the friendliness of the workers and the value of their service program was so quickly demonstrated, that the good will of the whole community was won, so that, in a group of villages which we visited, all the influential gentry including the "Hsiang Cheng" (Township Supervisor) and the official heads of all the groups of families had been brought into a Community Elders Association. This organization fully welcomed and supported the whole program, schools, adult classes, health programs, etc., as submitted by the staff, which made use of this Association in every case in projecting the various features of their program. The advantage of having such an influential committee to support such a program is obvious. At the time of my visit there was being introduced a new feature, a Moral Welfare Society, with its ten negative commandments and its constructive features, which include patriotism, moral principles, and support of community and national interests.

We have gone thus into detail as regards the features of the Hsuchowfu program, as this program is unique, so far as our observation goes, in at least two features (1) the method of approach, and (2) the belief that with a rightly conceived program adequately prepared for, a well trained staff should be able within a limited period to accomplish definite permanent results and then move on.

The Training of Local Talent, an Illustration

It may be well to give an instance of the training of local talent for the continuing program. At Tsingho, a group of young girls were gathered in for a training class in cross-stitch and other needlework. Attendance was very irregular. Investigation showed that most of the girls were required to attend to their younger brothers and sisters and so could not be spared from home. The word was given out that the younger children were to be brought to the community center. Here two girls were assigned to look after the whole group of younger children, who were given play things and taught games, while the rest were free to continue their industrial work. The lady in charge of the women's work, herself holding a Master of Art degree, in the two years since the gathering in of these children, has so trained the girl in charge that she is now a real kindergarten teacher, happy in her work and

receiving a modest salary of $9.00 per month paid from the earnings of the girls in the sewing class. These girls are glad to make the contribution from their increased earning in order to be free to do their work without interruption. This experience well illustrates how new needs may be met, and the service extended to new fields, the economy of having work done by locally trained workers from the community, how self-support for new work may be attained by the contribution of only a small fraction of the profit produced by new methods and enterprises, and how individuals find opportunity for larger service in the community and larger earning power.

To summarize, we would suggest as the chief objective of rural reconstruction to be conducted in Kiangsi by the Churches, the following: By means of a team of specialists working intensively in a cultural-unit area, so to project a service and training program, and so to organize the community, that, within a limited period of time, the community will be able co-operatively, and with a minimum of outside aid, to carry on a continuing program of community service and improvement, when the team of specialists may be transferred to another community to repeat their efforts.

Suggestions for possible methods for more rapid extension of program will be given below, but until experimentation has given good evidence of success, we recommend that chief emphasis be placed on such a degree of concentration within each cultural unit as is indicated in the Six-fold Program outlined below.

Success is essential, and a few communities in which a considerable degree of success has been attained along the lines indicated, will arouse such interest as will insure extensive imitation.

A Six-Fold Program of Rural Improvement

The team of specialists working within the cultural unit, should include leaders in at least six lines of specialized effort: (1) economic improvement; (2) health and sanitation; (3) literacy and continuing education; (4) home improvement-work for women and children; (5) religious education; (6) recreation and play.

These subjects will be dealt with briefly in the following paragraphs. The projects mentioned are but to suggest activities under each head, and no attempt has been made to make the list of activities complete. For a list of possible projects and activities, see the appendix below. The order in which the six phases of the program are presented, is not significant of the importance attached to the respective subjects.

1. Economic Improvement

The work in this field includes agriculture, village industries, vocational training and cooperatives.

A. Agriculture

The agricultural specialist who directs this work will

extend to the field the full benefit of improvements in seed etc., developed at the experiment station or elsewhere, and assist the farmer in securing the full results of these improvements. He will introduce new fruits and vegetables, domestic animals and other produce, and the improved strains of native products as developed for the region. In short he will be intermediary between the agricultural experiment station and the farmer, bringing to the latter all that the former can discover of interest and value for the improvement of the agriculture of the area.

Agricultural fairs have become a regular feature of the work at Tinghsien, at Pungchow and elsewhere in North China.

B. Village Industries

The term village industries is used referring to the small scale industries common in the villages in China and which occupy the population to some extent throughout the year, but especially during the slack fall and winter seasons.

One reason for the low living condition of the farmer is the fact that farming is a seasonal occupation. Though in Kiangsi two crops are usually raised annually, and though to some extent even winter crops are raised, yet, generally speaking, the late fall and winter months are relatively idle time. Generally there is an excess of labor among the agricultural population above that which can be profitable employed in agriculture. To give more profitable employment to the farmer during the slack season, and to the surplus population throughout the year, is the purpose of efforts in this field.

The Woolen Industry, an Illustration

We may illustrate possibilities in this form of service by telling of recent experiments being carried forward in North China. There certain institutions have organized the North China Industrial Service Union for the purpose, among other things, of developing village industries. Extensive plans for the improvement of the processes of manufacture of woolen cloth are well under way. These plans include the introduction of improved machinery for carding the wool fibre, spinning these into thread, weaving the thread into cloth, and thus to make cloth so cheaply that it may find ready sale in the same villages where it is produced, and supplant the heavy cotton padded clothing generally worn during the winter by the local population. The whole development involves a variety of projects each one of which should prove profitable.

The wool is produced locally and is now chiefly sold on the Tientsin market. After leaving the farmer's hands, adulterations reduce the price at Tientsin to one-half or one-third of what the wool should bring. The middleman then settles with the farmer at a fraction of the sale price. By manufacturing this wool into cloth, occupation is given during the slack time, as well as securing a higher price for the wool to the farmer.

At present the wool is carded by hand which is a very

low process. A carding machine has been found in the West, and is being introduced which costs $150. The machine will card wool as fast as fifteen women can spin it. Spinning the hand-carded wool, the women make twenty cents a day. Using the machine-carded wool, because of the improvement in the carding, the women make sixty cents daily. One-half of this gain in six months will pay for the carding machine. The machine being substantially built, is good for many years of service. The gain to the villagers is obvious, if a market is found for the product.

The weaving of woolen cloth in the West is by the use of very expensive and complicated machinery. One of the smallest of these sets up in North China costs $10,000. The farmers now use wooden looms costing about $100. There has been found in the United States a loom, used about 1820, which is so much better than the looms now used in North China, as to greatly increase production. This machine is of sufficiently simple construction to be made in the local carpenter and blacksmith shops, after some special training has been given the workmen. It can be produced there for $160 and, as in the case of the carding machine, can soon be paid for from the increased earning of the labourers using it. It is hoped that the continued use of these machines will soon provide the villagers, or a group of them, with sufficient capital so that they will be able to purchase yet another improved loom costing about $640 which will again increase production and consequently profits.

Woolen cloths are produced with the improved machines now in use which can be sold at from $.90 to $2.50 per yard. At these prices, ready sale should be found in the towns and villages of North China, as the people learn of the increased warmth and lasting quality of woolen over cotton cloth.

In an industrial school in Peiping conducted by the Presbyterian Mission, apprentices drawn from as widely scattered areas as Shensi, Suiyuan and Shantung, are being trained in the manufacture and in the use of these new machines. The machines have been especially selected with a view to having the iron parts of sufficiently simple construction that they can be reproduced in the ordinary village blacksmith shop. The apprentices now being trained will be returned to the places of their origin, prepared to train other workmen in the process taught them in Peiping. Thus improved industry will be taught quickly to the workers throughout all that region.

The results of these various improvements, and of the new processes being taught to the villagers, should soon be apparent in higher prices of wool on the local markets, in making the region much more self-sustaining as to clothing, and in the reduced imports of cotton.

Iron Manufacture in Shensi

Another project being carried out by the North China Industrial Service Union, and being in part financed by the Shensi government, has to do with the development of the methods of production of iron from native ores. Throughout Shensi, iron ore is mined by primitive methods, during the other-

the idle months of winter, and smelted in small locally built smelters. The iron produced is brittle and consequently cannot be used in lathes, though it is manufactured into nails and tools by local smiths. The product sells for from $24 to $28 a ton, as compared with the price of foreign pig-iron at Tientsin of $38 per ton. Obviously if the quality can be improved, Shensi iron could compete with the foreign product on the Tientsin market with immense profit to the local manufacturers.

At great expense, an expert British iron and steel manufacturing engineer has been brought from Birmingham to scientifically study the whole problem. The successful solution of the problem of the improvement of this manufacturing process, has great possibilities for the improvement of the economic status of the farmers of Shensi.

The above illustrations suggest some possibilities of improvement of the status of the rural population, and the great need for research, to discover just what may be done profitably and what may not. Many other lines of investigation and improvement await the scientific student. The introduction of fruits and vegetables, will improve the diet, and in consequence the health and virility of the local population. Weaving baskets, rugs and other products, needle work and simple improvements in building arrangements, will improve earning power and living conditions. Improvements in the manufacturing processes of cotton and linen goods, in introducing chemical analysis in the manufacture of porcelains, and the manufacture of modern porcelain wares, are projects which immediately suggest themselves to one even slightly familiar with conditions in Kiangsi, as offering opportunities for large benefits to the villagers of the Province.

C. Vocational Training

The need for vocational training in introducing new industries, as suggested in the last paragraphs above, is obvious, and it is not necessary to enlarge on it here. Vocational training should have a considerable place in any program of economic improvement.

D. Cooperatives

The government, with the aid of the International Famine Relief Commission, has already introduced credit cooperatives in a part of the counties affected by the floods of 1931, as a famine relief measure. By greatly reducing interest rates, as well as by furnishing capital in small amounts to individual farmers in time of distress and for constructive needs, these credit cooperatives are of great benefit. They should be extended as rapidly as possible throughout the whole province.

The field in which the cooperatives operate, also should be extended to include marketing and consumers cooperatives. Dr. R. H. Tawney credits the agricultural progress of the last half century in Europe as much to the improvement of commerical and financial organization, of which the organization of cooperatives was the chief factor, as to better methods

[illegible] (Land and Labor in China, by R. H. Tawney, [illegible] 80).

Capital as needed for the credit cooperative may be available from the [illegible] Commercial and Savings Bank, or other of the banks which are entering this field.

This is a specialized field and developments of this kind should be guided by specialists of experience and sound judgment, for the possibilities of failure, if developments are not wisely guided, are very great. Careful planning by experienced men, is called for.

Cooperatives are also of value in other spheres than the economic. They greatly assist in teaching the principles of working together, of democratic methods of procedure, and of community solidarity and public spirit.

2. Health and Sanitation

This work should be closely allied with the Fanchang (Mission) Hospital, or with the government Health Service, which should furnish an itinerant doctor for one or more visits a week, preferably to the market-town on each market-day, to hold a clinic and advise with the local workers. Some such plan as that in use at Tinghsien, or at Taingho, or at Hsunhwaehsien should be followed. A small hospital in the charge of a resident graduate nurse, should be established in the market-town, or possibly in some more healthful place near by. A six months training course for mid-wives is now offered in Peiping, which is said to give very satisfactory training in this service. Local women should be given this training, and should be available in each village or group or villages. A medicine chest with a limited supply of simple remedies for first-aid and for certain ailments easily diagnosed, in the hands of a layman specially trained in their use, one for each village, is also a feature of the plan. Each worker is carefully instructed as to what conditions he should himself treat, and he is under the strictest instructions not to treat more serious ailments, which are to be sent on to the higher trained members of the staff.

Improving the Sanitary conditions of the community is also a part of such a program.

3. Literacy and Continuing Education

The technique of this work has been carefully developed by the Mass Educational Movement, and their work is so well known that a detailed description of it is hardly necessary here. The 1000 characters and the phonetic symbols, are taught, in so far as possible to all illiterates. The graduates from this course are organized into alumni associations. These organizations are used in promoting continuing education through further class work, circulating libraries, circulation of farmers' magazines and papers, and for advancing other interests of the community.

4. Home Improvement - Work for Women and Children

Too little place has generally been given to work for women and children. Home life can hardly be elevated except as womanhood is elevated. Recent legislation has given Chinese women equal rights before the law, but years of devoted service must be given to prepare the women of China for the full enjoyment of their freedom. To carry such a program into the home to rural womanhood, and to adapt it to the varied needs of country women and children, trained and experienced women workers are required. Literacy and vocational training are needed; but even more the gospel of cleanliness, child welfare, and simple lessons in hygiene and domestic science, group and community activities, should be a part of such a program.

5. Religious Education

Christian religious training is a most essential part of a social service program; as it gives added content and meaning, and furnishes a spiritual, and therefore a more adequate continuing, motivation for such a program. Though the spirit of social service has been caught by many who profess no personal allegiance to Christ, yet we are persuaded that such service has its highest inspiration in Him, and that only as Christ is made known to men, can the results be established on the highest and consequently the most permanent plane.

Christ placed the highest value on human life, and made human service a means of access to the Divine. To omit the Christian message from the program would be to omit the highest form of spiritual service, and to fail to communicate fully that which is capable of vitalizing and giving more essential value to the whole of life. Life is essentially a single whole. We treat of economic, and spiritual factors as if they were separate and distinct, but in reality they are but different aspects of a life in which the highest is the spiritual.

For the program to succeed best, the personnel engaged should be Christian, and maintain throughout a unity and fellowship in service in Christ's name. Giving themselves fully to the service of the community, they would fail to give to the community their best, if they failed to communicate the deep abiding consciousness of the divine inspiration of their own devotion.

The Christian program offered should include a full program of work for children, young people, and adults, this service being available on equal terms to all those who are willing to hear and to participate in such activities. In no case should participation in the benefits of other phases of the program be conditioned on accepting Christianity or on participating in the services.

In any large program the cooperation of several churches and of institutions and union groups, as the National Christian Council, and the Nanking Theological Seminary, should be sought. However, we would urge that in a given cultural unit the distinctly Christian program be placed under a particular Church, thus securing at once, an a ecclesiastical connection for the work, and at the same time avoiding as far as possible at this early stage any necessary

discussion of sectarian questions. The participating Churches would thus each have delegated responsibility in a different section of the work.

6. Recreation and Play

The use of leisure time, is of scarcely less importance than the use of the time occupied with constructive labor. Calisthenics, Chinese boxing, and games of physical prowess, are of great benefit in developing physical health and skill. Group games have a distinct social and spiritual value as well. There should be much emphasis on proper forms of physical training and recreation for the various age and sex groups.

Music and drama should be developed as community enterprises.

These activities should be developed as regular features of village life, and should be made attractive elements in programs at agricultural fairs, and at commencement exercises of schools and literacy classes.

III. Multiplying the Teams-Extension Throughout a Wide Area

The team of specialists is intended for work in a single cultural unit with a population of perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 people. For half a dozen such leaders and their assistants within three years, or even within five years, to develop so large a community from the present stagnant condition of the average country village to the aggressive forward looking condition contemplated, is surely a sufficient task to challenge the powers of the very best workers in this field. And conditions in the war devastated areas of Kiangsi, as testimony from those regions indicate, are much more desperate than those of the average rural community. To successfully complete such a task would be to succeed in one of the highest forms of human service.

But the challenge is presented of providing such a service throughout a much wider area. The necessity for such an extensive progress as the Churches are asked to undertake is such that, if possible, some more rapid plan of extension should be found.

Whether a more rapid extension of the work, than by mere multiplication of teams working intensively in one cultural center at a time, is practicable, will have to be determined by experimentation. Even the success of a team concentrating on a single community is in very considerable degree experimental, though already partially successful in some areas. At Tinghsien, and elsewhere, attempts have been made to start simultaneously work throughout a single county, but even with a staff of 200 employed workers, those directing the Tinghsien experiment have recently determined to limit its major activities to but a relatively small part of Tinghsien (county), deciding that its previous work had been too greatly extended for the largest success.

In dealing with the problem of extension, it would seem best, therefore, to multiply the teams as rapidly as qualified personnel is available.

With the results of a survey in hand, as a matter of experimentation, we suggest that an area of more highly concentrated population be selected, in order to reduce, as far as possible, the travel cost in time and money; and a group of specialists may be set the task of keeping in touch with a number of cultural centers at one time, and by a more immediate and larger use of the best possible local leadership, attempt to accomplish the desired results by an intensive program of leadership training in the field.

The specialists presumably would begin by travelling throughout the area, singly or in groups of two or three, lecturing to the villagers in groups, and explaining to them the necessary steps for initiating some local improvement. After a few visits definite encouragement could be given for the initiation of some particular work, and as soon as practicable the work would be put under way. As some part of the program is brought to a measure of success, other phases of the program may be introduced and thus gradually the work extended.

By such a program, groups of villagers were brought together in the flooded regions of Kiangsi, in 1932, and loans were made through the associations thus formed. Continuous cultivation of these groups to the present has succeeded in bringing a few score of these organizations to a condition in which they have been fully recognized as credit cooperatives. A somewhat similar plan of widely extended cultivation has been brought to a considerable measure of success in the organization of public schools among the Indian peasant population of Mexico during the last decade. Though conditions are very different in Mexico, there are also points of similarity to the conditions among the rural population of China; and a close study of the Mexican plan may yield valuable suggestions. The English Baptist Mission attempted a widely extended system of cultivation in introducing literacy work as a feature of their Church program in 13 counties in Eastern Shantung, with a fine degree of success in some communities where local Church leadership welcomed the enterprise. No attempt was made however to enter new communities where there was not already a pastor and lay church leadership.

In such an effort, every possible means of training should be resorted to, lectures and conferences in local communities, training conferences for local leadership, special courses in educational institutions for numerous workers and longer courses in more distant centers for the most gifted.

In this work, as in all the work, an auxiliary agency may be found in community radios, and a broadcasting station for the whole work. Other methods will at once suggest themselves, but such techniques need not be here discussed as they can be developed by the specialists as the work proceeds.

The task will call for training, experience and versatility of a high order, on the part of the leaders of such a program.

Extension through the Christian Churches

As a means of extending this community service program, use should be made also of Christian workers and Churches throughout the Province.

It should be found profitable to assemble as many as possible of the Christian workers of the Province, or at least the workers of the participating Churches, in a summer conference for two or more weeks. Here the work of the year may be reviewed as also the plans for the coming year, with the specialists leading the discussions. Thus the Christian workers of the Province would quickly become familiar with the program, and each in his own community become an advance agent for the work. In addition to preparing the community for the coming of a team, each worker could introduce immediately some particular phase of the work, as literacy classes, distribution of improved seed, or perhaps arrange for the early opening of a health clinic, the employment of a visiting nurse and mid-wives.

IV. Training of Workers

The listing of the special forms of service enumerated above, would seem enough to convince the thoughtful person that successful work in these varied lines in the ordinary rural community, will require a specially trained personnel. Fortunately there are a number of institutions whose graduates are trained for some of these forms of service, though adequately trained workers are few in number. It has been pointed out that leaders in the six-fold program should be college graduates with additional specialized training. For many lower positions middle school graduates who have taken a course of specialized training, will be needed.

If an extensive program is undertaken, it will be impossible to secure at once sufficient personnel thus prepared, and it will be necessary to arrange to train many workers as the program proceeds. This may be done by assisting students, who are willing to prepare for this work, to complete their middle school or college work, and to take longer or shorter course in special fields.

However well trained and experienced workers may be, their efficiency can be increased by giving them opportunity to visit occasionally outside centers where successful rural reconstruction work is being carried on. Workers on the teams should be given opportunity for visiting work in other centers from time to time.

An Agricultural Middle School

In any attempt to elevate the rural population of China, increased facilities for education are imperative. Lower and higher primary schools will be opened in each cultural center, and lower primary schools in many villages. An

Agricultural middle school also will be needed for the youth of the district with a course of study based on the life needs of the rural population, and which keeps in close touch with the developing life of the people.

For the present, it seems best to strengthen and adapt the science work, and to add some agricultural features to the work of the Christian middle school at Nanchang, rather than to set up another institution. The experiment station, when established, on the adjoining site, will greatly aid such a program. The regular courses in Biology and Chemistry can be adapted so as to familiarize students with agricultural plants, and with soil and pest problems. Additional courses on rural life problems and school gardens should be added. In actual work in the soil, and in successful work growing plants and domestic animals, agricultural life should take on new meaning, and students should return to their homes to participate fully in the reconstruction of their own communities.

The Nanchang Academy is prepared to do this work with the modest amount for current expenses listed in the tentative budget submitted herewith, except that the school is already crowded, and additional class-room and dormitory space will have to be provided. The school has now a fund of $25,000 for a class building, but an additional $30,000 is required to complete the building planned. This item also appears in the tentative budget.

Whether an agricultural middle school be developed at Nanchang, or farther up in the Province, can be determined best when the scope and continuity of the program shall have been determined.

Preliminary Survey

A preliminary survey of the community in which it is planned to begin work, is needed, to acquaint the workers with the facts of the situation, geographic, social, economic, political, religious, on which the program of work will depend. This survey can best be made by organizations having experienced workers in this field, and which are more or less constantly engaged in this kind of work, as the Economic Department of the College of Agriculture of the University of Nanking, or the Sociological Department of Yenching University. The survey of the latter are more extensive and require more time than those of the former. In any event, the agency making the survey should make it having in mind the needs of this work program, and not solely to secure such information as is needed by them to supplement the information which they may be collecting for other purposes.

Continuing Research

Illustrations have already been given above of the investigations made and being made by the North China Industrial Service Union in connection with the wool industry in North China, and the iron industry in Shensi. Such studies often involve considerable expenses, especially when high

[illegible]ed foreign experts must be employed. In the end the [illegible]diture is relatively light, when the necessary facts are discovered on which may be based a profitable large scale industry. In any event, it is good policy to spend comparatively small initial sums and to take time for careful research before making considerable investments in the introduction of new seed, or of new methods into old industries, or in the introduction of new industries. Large sums have been lost in large scale introduction of new seeds and methods without first demonstrating their practicability in a particular field, as, in the introduction some years ago of Western corn and sorghum seed into North China.

Time Schedule

It is highly desirable, before work is begun in a community, that the community itself recognize the need of the service to be rendered. The program will be set forward materially, if workers are sent into the community, at the invitation of the village elders and with the good will of the officials and people. In some instances, as at Tinghsien, the rule has been to enter only those centers where urgent invitations have been forthcoming.

Before projecting a community program, and even before the preliminary survey is made, an experienced observer, familiar with the plan and the program, should spend several weeks, perhaps two or three months, living quietly in the central town. He will spend his time making acquaintances, gleaning facts as to the community life, the social grouping, and the names and connections of the leading personalities. In due time he will make definite approach to selected individuals, and secure their help to prepare the way within the community, and to arrange for an invitation for the opening of the work and for introducing the survey and other workers.

Following this the preliminary survey should be made, and more detailed facts assembled. With the results of the survey before them, the specialists should be able to outline their plans so as to win quickly the support of various leaders and of the community. They will then introduce successively the various features of the program, in such order as may seem best as the situation develops.

As the work proceeds, increasingly local lay leadership will be developed. Organizations will be formed, and developed, and some of these linked up with the government, mission, university department or other agencies which maintain a connectional relation with their constituent local organizations. These developments will continue until a stage is reached in which local leaders will largely conduct the work.

Then will come the stage of devolution when the specialists may be withdrawn, one or more at a time, as resident workers, though occasional visits may still be required to observe the course of events and to insure continuing success. Thus trained, organized, inspired and brought into organic connection with progressive institutions, the com-

[illegible]ty should continue to advance and the standard of living [illegible], while the people should be increasingly able to make use of their leisure time in beneficial ways; and moral and spiritual needs should be increasingly met, so that a firm basis for stable political, economic, social and spiritual growth will have been established.

Some General Principles

A number of principles have emerged, as this study has proceeded, which seems essential to the highest success. Among these we would emphasize the following:

1. The largest possible use should be made of all the agencies doing specialized forms of work in any of the lines projected. In the above pages reference has already been made to specific institutions whose cooperation may be solicited. Among other institutions that perhaps would lend their aid, are the Nanking Theological Seminary, and the National Christian Council.

2. In accepting the invitation to do this work, the Churches should make it clear and the principle should be maintained, that its activities are intended to supplement those of the government, and these activities are in no sense competitive with the government or with any government department or agency. The government has primary responsibility in this field. The Church enters it solely in the spirit of service in the carrying out of its duty to serve humanity. It introduces Christian teaching and preaching as a part of its service program, because it believes this to be essential to the highest possible attainment of the individual and of the community. In any event, the Church should be prepared to relinquish all or any part of the social and economic program to government agencies, whenever these are in a position to take them over, though the acceptance of the program under the present circumstances should create the presumption that work will remain under Christian auspices for a reasonable time to demonstrate its usefulness.

3. Relations with the local population are to be carefully cultivated on the basis of democracy and equality; and care must be exercised to avoid partisan bias in local issues as in feuds and quarrels. As has been pointed out already, opposition to progress often develops. In such cases participants in this program must, of course, stand for the interests of the people; but every effort should be made to secure and hold the largest possible support, even of those who may suffer personal loss in the public interest.

4. Buildings should be sanitary and carefully planned, with reasonably economical improvements over local houses, local materials being used in so far as possible. In this way, cheap but adequate quarters for staff and work rooms will be provided, and model improvements demonstrated for the benefit of the local population.

5. The work within a given cultural unit should be the responsibility of the team of workers directly involved,

consultation with the director. As specialists, they should be given large responsibility in determining policies, and the time schedule for introducing the various lines of activity.

Emergency Relief Measures

Should it be decided to project work into the war ravaged area, it seems probable that it will be necessary to do some emergency relief work. Not only is the country mountainous and much of it wooded, but roads are few and narrow and communications and transport are slow and difficult. The population is reported to be much reduced and agricultural production much curtailed.

If emergency relief is necessary, this will require a considerable organization. Following the usual lines of such work, but with special attention to the difficult problem of transport, this work should probably include the temporary rationing of women, children and the aged, and labor relief for the able-bodied. The latter might well include a program of road building. May it be presumed that the government would finance the relief program?

If well conducted over a considerable area, such emergency relief well might provide the first service approach to the population of the region, and prepare the way for the early introduction of all forms of service contemplated in this program. Only a survey of conditions in the field, will give the necessary data for the planning of a relief program, or the beginning of a more permanent program of reconstruction.

How Secure the Cooperation of the Churches

Six Protestant Churches and Missions are now at work in northern and central Kiangsi, the Protestant Episcopal Church, the China Inland Mission (also in Southern Kiangsi), the North East Kiangsi Mission, Missions in Many Lands, the Seventh Day Adventists and the Methodist Episcopal Church. Three other Missions have work in one or two counties each in southern Kiangsi entering the Province from Fukien or Kwangtung. These are the English Presbyterian, the American Baptist (North), and the Berlin Mission.

These Churches can only be committed to such a program as herein proposed by the responsible authority in each case. In the case of the Protestant Episcopal Church, this can be done by the Bishop of the Diocese. In the case of the Methodist Episcopal Church, commitment to the program must be by vote of the Annual Conference, which meets this year at Nanchang during the week beginning October 25th. The other groups may be approached through their respective leaders.

To persuade any of these organizations to accept responsibility for new undertakings at this time, that will involve any considerable expenditure on their part, will be extremely difficult if not impossible. This is due chiefly to the fact that most of them are facing a falling income. In some cases, this condition is so serious that the Churches are actually withdrawing entirely from some work, which they have long supported, and everywhere reducing staff, because their

falling income compels such action. It may be said almost certainly, that none of these organizations can undertake such a program as herein outlined, however promising the opportunity may be, except as the necessary funds are provided by outside agencies.

General Administration

For such a large scale program as is proposed, a central office for general administration will be necessary. Problems of personnel, accounting, purchase of supplies, the adequate planning of transport, assistance to special research workers, and other problems which readily suggest themselves, make such an office necessary. The tentative budget therefore includes provision for a director and, as the work develops, a number of assistants or department heads, and for a stenographer, translator, writers, etc.

An Administrative Committee

In carrying forward a large program, especially if it is interdenominationally conducted, an Administrative Committee of, say, thirteen or more members should be organized. This committee would include in its membership representative Chinese leaders in Kiangsi, representative church leaders including representatives of participating organizations, and other leaders in China who may be co-opted as having a special contribution to make. The director also should be a member of the Committee, with or without power to vote. Duties of this Committee would be, to hear reports, to adopt the annual budget to require a proper audit of accounts and to determine major questions of policy. Members of the Administrative Committee should be persons of special training and experience in their lines of work, or having special knowledge of local conditions and a large interest in the work.

Executive Committee

With so large an administrative Committee, a smaller Executive committee of, say, five members living in Kiangsi, or sufficiently near to be easily available, will be needed for more frequent meetings.

Government Registration

In setting up such an organization, presumably plans should be made at once for registration with the government as a philanthropic society. Some such name as the Kiangsi Rural Reconstruction Association may be used.

A necessary condition of registration, doubtless, would be the separation of the religious features of the program, leaving these in control of the respective churches. The policies of the organizations need not, thereby, be seriously affected, as the majority of the Administrative Committee presumably would remain Christian, as also the major portion of the employed personnel.

Appendix

Features of a Community Program

In an unpublished article entitled "Some Fundamentals of a Comprehensive Program of Rural Reconstruction in China", Dr. Leonard Hsu, of the Sociological Department of Yenching University says that, "the function of community planning may be roughly divided as follows:

I. The population aspect.
   a. Census enumeration.
   b. Vital registration.
   c. Emigration, colonization and internal migration.
   d. Naturalization and assimilation of aliens.

II. The economic aspect.
   a. Crop production.
   b. Animal production.
   c. Extension of the cultivable area.
   d. Rural marketing.
   e. Land tenure.
   f. Rural credit and cooperatives.
   g. Rehabilitation of bandit areas.
   h. Irrigation.
   i. Land survey and registration.
   j. Food supply and food importation.
   k. Rural industries.
   l. The clothing problem.
   m. Farm management.
   n. Farm standards of living.
   o. Transportation.

III. The health aspect.
   a. Public health and administration.
   b. Health statistics.
   c. Prevention of communicable diseases.
   d. Public sanitation.
   e. Infant and maternal welfare.
   f. School hygiene.
   g. Individual hygiene.
   h. Clinical service.
   i. Public health visitation.
   j. Sex education.

IV. The education aspect.

a. Literacy education.
b. Vocational education.
c. Physical education.
d. Cultural education.
e. Civic education.
f. Circulating libraries.
g. Moving pictures.
h. Radios.
i. Rural newspapers.
j. Rural customs and folk religions.
k. Preservation of natural beauty.
l. Community survey and research.

V. The Social Aspect.

a. Poverty and poor relief.
b. Unemployment and vocational guidance.
c. Social insurance and agrarian legislation.
d. Vices and their control.
e. Crime and penal administration.
f. Village litigation and legal aid.
g. Special care and training of physical defectives, and of the mentally deficient.
h. Play and recreation.
i. Family welfare.
j. Village and Community Planning.

VI. The Political Aspect.

a. Public construction.
b. Public finance.
c. Local self-government, election and suffrage.
d. Local self-protection.
e. Public policing and state militia.
f. Public education.
g. Public welfare administration.
h. Relations between local government and other governments.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

HONOLULU, HAWAII

January 14, 1935.

The Commanding Officer,
G-2, United States Army,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I inclose monographs which I have written on *Harbin, Peiping, Land Utilization in Korea, and Ch'ao Yang An -- all having to do with affairs in the Far East where I spent three months.

Will you please have them entered on my record.

John W. Coulter.

John W. Coulter,
Capt. MI-ORC

JAN

1935 JAN-29- PM 1:05

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RECORD SECTION
M.I.D.

*The Harbin study appeared in Pacific Affairs, vol. 5, no. 11, Nov. 1932, pp 967-972. I have not an extra copy to send.

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OF PHILADELPHIA, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, October, 1934
Printed in U. S. A.

CH'AO YANG AN: A STUDY IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

JOHN WESLEY COULTER
University of Hawaii

In the summer of 1932 the writer and a few friends visited the plain of North China and observed closely a small area in the vicinity of Ch'ao Yang An, an old Buddhist nunnery on the lower slopes of the Western Hills, renovated and used as a hostel. The visit was at the season when crops on the Great Plain were flourishing in warmth and moisture. Grains and vegetables were nearing maturity and there was a general cessation of agricultural operations. The trip to Ch'ao Yang An was in July, the month of heaviest rainfall. We visited three Buddhist monasteries in the Western Hills, hamlets and villages at their base, and in a peasant



FIG. 1.—A Buddhist Monastery in the Western Hills. (Photograph by J. W. Coulter.)

farmer's home got an acquaintance with a way of life and manner of living in general representative of those of the great agricultural population of North China.

The scene along the route northwest from Peiping was typical of mid-summer. The road, thickly bordered with spreading willows,

was ditched on both sides. Heavy rains had made the ruts deeper and partly filled the ditches. Fields were thick with tall kaoliang which, in low-lying areas, stood deep in water. Closely planted millet grew with drooping heads, heavy with grain. Patches of pale violet sesame flowers and clusters of light yellow blooms of cotton were interspersed with plots of leafy sweet potatoes. Low, bushy soya beans adjoined tall, stringy varieties, neatly rodded for support. At scattered intervals on the roadway, shabby men scooped dried animal droppings from the surface for fertilizer for next year's planting. Groups of tiled roofs above compounds inclosed by high, brick walls, marked villages and hamlets scattered along both sides of the route. We passed a few farmsteads, inns, and roadside restaurants.

Crops on the Great Plain, nearly ripe, needed little attention. Only here and there a peasant grubbed the late weeds from about beans and potato vines. In front of a farmstead a woman, assisted by her children, slowly revolved one millstone over another by means of radial levers and ground some of last year's grain into flour.

Tall mounds of earth and elaborate tombstones in some millet fields stood conspicuously above the heads of grain, and in kaoliang appeared indistinct behind the tall, leafy stands. Graves are found on the surface of the ground in China, for the Chinese did not have the proper implements to dig deep into the earth. So arable land, especially near the cities, is rendered unproductive and encumbrance with ancient burial mounds prevents easy cultivation of that used.

About nine miles from Peiping we turned from the highway along a narrow lane through puddles of water and over deep ruts to the base of the Hsi Shan or Western Hills. These hills, bordering the great plain on the northwest, consist of a series of ranges running in various directions. They rise to heights of from five hundred to a thousand feet, in some places abruptly from the surface. Dissected by one large river, several small rivers and numerous gullies, their ridges and valleys stood out distinctly in a clear atmosphere. They are for the most part bare of trees and in many places devoid of any vegetation. In the vicinity of Ch'ao Yang An, sandstone and shale outcrop on the slopes and along crests fronted with precipitous bluffs and steep gullies, thickly strewn with loose boulders.

The narrow lane ended abruptly at a hamlet near which were several others. Hamlets and villages in the vicinity of Ch'ao Yang An are rectangular inclosures surrounded by high walls of rock, straw, and mortar, fifty to one hundred yards long. Part of the compound is formed by the walls of the houses in which are small latticed win-

dows. Thoroughfares between them are narrow lanes, or trails one to two feet above the general level of the ground so as to be easily traversed in wet weather. The paths follow devious directions and others lead from them at various angles. Several routes converge on the lane which joins the road to Peiping.

From the vantage point of the old nunnery is viewed a wide expanse of the Great Plain which stretches south and southeast as far as the eye can see—flat without any undulations. In the foreground diminutive fields stand out in irregular patterns; in the center and background there is no visible line of demarcation between fields or farms, no roads, lanes, fences nor ditches; in the far distance the plain disappears into an unbroken horizon.



FIG. 2.—A Hamlet on the Great Plain of North China near Ch'ao Yang An. Millet grows in the foreground and corn near the wall of the hamlet. (Photograph by J. W. Coulter.)

Scattered across the flat, monotonous expanse, walled hamlets and villages rise from the surface. Clumps of shade trees protect the dwellings from the glare of the summer sun. Groups of light brown walls, dark brown tiled roofs, and dark green protecting trees give a mottled appearance to the unencumbered flatness.

The view from the vantage point brought out specially well the contrast between the plain and the broken, dissected hills in the immediate vicinity. Valleys in the hills are terraced for five to six hundred feet from the bottom; narrow tiers of kaoliang and millet are fronted by stout stone walls. Meager streams rippling over rocky beds debouch on the plain in gentle flows. The Hun Ho, the

largest river in the district, breaks through a gap in the hills in the west and, entering the plain, flows in a broad, winding bed, to disappear in the distance.

Here and there among the hills, in rugged, scenic valleys and in steep ravines are walled inclosures containing five or six buildings situated about two or three courtyards. In each group an ornate structure, somewhat dilapidated, is a temple erected to Buddha. Buddhists have a predilection for naturally beautiful places as sites for their temples and monasteries. Their strongholds are retreats from the world for monks or nuns vowed to lives of contemplation and worship. One of the buildings in each group is a hostel where travellers or visitors reside as guests of the monks.

The location of the temples in the Western Hills is in part responsible for the fact that the villages and hamlets on the plain at their foot are more numerous than farther away from the base. Peasant farmers sell some of their produce to guests; part of it is given to monks and nuns in return for their prayers and protective influence. A linear pattern of the rural centers is due to a water supply readily obtained from wells near the base of the hills.

The houses in each hamlet are homes of members of the same family, members of the same clan, or perhaps of people of no relationship whatever. A cookhouse serves a group of families but each family provides the fuel for its own cooking.

One of the hamlets visited was representative of others. At the thresholds of its homes women and children sat and gossiped. Some of the elders smoked long-stemmed pipes. A donkey gazed over a barn gate and its foal stood sleepily in the yard. Pigs lay asleep in pens adjoining the homes. A shaggy dog was stretched out in a shady corner and two scrawny kittens sunned themselves in the warm morning rays. A few chickens lurked about, squinting for scraps of food.

The peasant home where we called was a house of two rooms typical of many on the plain. Both rooms, scantily furnished, devoid of ornaments, and lighted by small, latticed windows, were dark and unattractive. In each a bed, built of mud and stone, three feet high, stretched across one side. Underneath the beds were flues connected with fireplaces in the floors. In the inner room stood a sack of grain and a few farm tools, in the outer, on a shelf, a teapot and a nest of teacups. A closet for bedclothes was built partly into a wall. On top of the projecting edge were small shrines fronted with glass, and attached to the wall above them were pictures of religious significance.

The home of the poorest peasant in China is not devoid of some

tokens of religion. Private or family religion is a special trait of the Chinese. Gods and goddesses are represented by small images or written characters. The character may merely represent the name of a god or perhaps it is an ideograph signifying longevity, happiness, prosperity or the abundant production of offspring. To the characters themselves are attributed mysterious powers of attraction and a capacity for radiating invisible forces.

Before the shrines in the homes incense sticks and candles are lit on special occasions, and offerings of food are made at the proper

FIG. 3.—Scene Inside the Walls of the Hamlet Shown in the Previous Picture. (Photograph by J. W. Coulter.)

seasons. The family depends on domestic rites of immemorial antiquity for its well being, indeed for its very existence.

The home of the Chinese farmer, a center of religious observances and a roof for the family, is also a storehouse for grain. It is a depository for farm tools and for seeds for planting; a work shop also for materials of domestic economy. Cotton cloth, purchased by farmers for clothing, is made up by the women in it. Cotton yarn and padding for winter garments is made there from home-grown fiber. It is a place for seeding sesame flowers and expressing the oil for cooking.

Farms in the vicinity of Ch'ao Yang An vary in size from about a third to half an acre. Each farm unit is generally in three or four scattered plots, a circumstance which, it is claimed, gives an equitable distribution of different grades of land. The soil, sandstone and shale, weathered from the Western Hills, is infertile. Some patches

are thin and rocky, others are covered with sand deposited by the overflow from rivers and gullies. Still others are shallow depressions where the rain collects. Farms are in general owned or leased by operators who have possession through inheritance. Different plots on some of them have been acquired at different times. Those who rent, pay on a cash-crop or share-rent basis. Each farmer and his family operates a farm. In the mornings the men go out to work in the fields and the women stay at home to cook, sew, grind grain, and perform the miscellany of household tasks.

Seed is sown in April or May when the danger from frost is past. July rains and high temperatures promote the rapid growth of crops which mature in the late summer or early fall. Kaoliang, a staple food, is generally planted in April and harvested in September or early October. Corn, sesame, sweet potatoes and other crops are generally planted after kaoliang and harvested before it.

A little winter wheat is raised on the floors of valleys in the Western Hills, in the bottoms of gullies or in other places which in winter are less dry than most of this district. Only two per cent of the rainfall comes during the latter season, and then also cold, dry winds blow from the northwest.

Farm labor is almost entirely manual and donkey power. Donkeys draw small wooden ploughs, grind grain and are used as pack animals. When not working on the farm they are rented for riding to visitors who go to temples in the Western Hills.

Economy is practised in every conceivable way. Crops raised are almost entirely for human consumption directly. Grain stalks are used as food for donkeys, for fuel, and for roofing for houses. Family expenditures are very meager—a few yuan a year for cloth, tea, and tobacco, and a little for recreation and religion.

Children are ubiquitous in villages and hamlets in the vicinity of Ch'ao Yang An. About all those visited, youthful progeny disported. Many of them were unclothed. Some sat in the shade of trees or of the walls of the village compound; others splashed in a swimming hole.

In spite of poverty, to have at least one male heir is, according to their religion, a moral obligation of the Chinese. It is the highest duty of a son to have posterity who, when he is dead, may continue the worship of parents and ancestors. On the occasion of a wedding, in order to secure the bride's fruitfulness in procreation, religious ceremonies are performed.

A high birth rate is accompanied by a high death rate. One child out of three dies before reaching five years of age. Undernourishment and ignorance of sanitation are the principal causes of infantile

deaths. But as the Chinese proverb says: "The spring wind blows and again produces people."

Many families are so poor that in winter they go to bed early to save the expense of fuel and oil for cooking and lighting. During that season people practically hibernate. They eat two meals a day or less, huddle together on their beds to keep warm, and remain generally inactive to save expenses in living.

Nearly all the farmers and their families are on a subsistence basis. There is no reserve for less than normal yields, and crop failures in successive years spell ruin. The balance between production and consumption is so nearly even that anything which disrupts it brings distress. Disrupting factors in the vicinity of Ch'ao Yang An are drought and flood. The total annual precipitation is



FIG. 4.—Graph of the Rainfall and Temperature in Peiping. (Photograph by J. W. Coulter.)

only about twenty-five inches. Approximately one-third of it comes during July. During that month heavy thunderstorms precipitate one to two inches, much of which runs off the surface and is, therefore, of no value to crops. In a July of unusually heavy precipitation, the collective run off from the bare hills causes serious floods and washing away of the soil and crops. In years of subnormal

rainfall, crops yield a meager return, and in seasons of drought famines occur.

On occasions of excessive rainfall or destructive drought, Buddhist monks hold special services and recite their sutras. At such times Taoist priests may be seen officiating, performing religious magic of their own.

Among a people like those of Ch'ao Yang An, where agricultural pursuits barely furnish the necessities of life and farm economy merely ekes out a living, social life and institutions have but little place. Drinking tea with friends is a diversion indulged in by all. Tea drinking functions have special social values as they are the farmers' chief means of obtaining and exchanging news. Gambling is a popular recreation—with very small stakes. Sometimes a travelling theater group comes to a communal temple built and supported by the people of neighboring hamlets. The coming of the players depends on their estimate of the ability of the peasants to pay for attendance at the shows. There are three festivals a year which are observed with a semblance of social gaiety—New Year's, the Dragon Boat Festival, and the Mid-Autumn or Harvest Moon Festival. At those times people spend a little for entertainments and for "joss money" which is sacrificed to gods and family ancestors. Few farmers can read or write and few children attend school. Most of the people cannnot name the magistrate of their *hsien* or county nor the immediate official of the local district.

Contacts with occidental civilization have had little effect in changing the modes of life and manner of living in the vicinity of Ch'ao Yang An. From the early days of European settlement in Peking it has been customary for occidentals to rent houses in temple compounds in the Western Hills during the hot summer season. Peasant farmers have been in touch with western manners for seventy years. Their women have worked as servants in European homes, seen their ways of living and helped to take care of their children. They have witnessed the part which European women play in home life. Men have seen occidental ways of doing things and in recent years have witnessed the advent of the automobile. In spite of such contacts there seems to have been little attempt on the part of the peasants to bridge the gap between oriental culture, customs, and traditions and those of the occident.

LAND UTILIZATION MAPS OF KOREA*

John Wesley Coulter and Bernice Bong Hee Kim
University of Hawaii

EIGHTY per cent of the population of Korea are engaged in cultivation of the soil. The accompanying maps, Figures 1 to 8, show in a broad way certain relationships between the distribution of the population and the use of the land. The areas of heavy crop production are also the areas of dense population. By far the larger part of the arable land is devoted to the raising of grain. Rice, most important of the cereals produced, occupies one-third of the acreage and is the food staple. Barley, wheat, and millet have a prominent place among other grains. Soy beans are in high esteem, and radishes also. A considerable area is given over to mulberry trees for sericulture.

Agriculture and the Crop Maps

The similarity of the population and rice-distribution maps is striking. Both express the effect of topography. The rugged relief of northern Korea offers little opportunity for agriculture: the mountain arc that runs southward near the east coast stands out clearly as backbone and watershed, descending steeply to the east and more gently to the west. The effect of climate is less reflected in the picture. The climate of Korea is of a modified continental type, the north distinctly more extreme. Fusan, in South Keisho Province, has mean temperatures of 2.1° C. in January and 25.6° in August; absolute extremes range from 35.3° to −14°. Yuki, in North Kankyo, has January and August means of −9.4° and 21.4° respectively and absolute extremes of 36.4° and −24.3°. Even more pronounced is the continentality of the northern interior. Tyukotin has recorded temperatures of 38° and −41.6°. The northern basins have less rainfall, mean annual precipitation ranging from nearly 150 centimeters around the south coast to 50 centimeters in the Tumen River basin. Most of the rain falls in summer; Fusan, for instance, has nearly four-fifths of its yearly total between April and September inclusive.

Thus, while the average population density of Korea, with its 21 millions (1930), is 227 a square mile, the provinces show a range of from 85 a square mile in rugged North Kankyo to 420 in North Zenra, with its open plains and valleys. South Zenra has 396 a square mile, North Keisho 309, and South Keisho 413. In part this greater

*This study is based on statistics obtained from the office of the Governor-General of Korea (Chosen), published in March, 1932, and from the Annual Report on Administration of Chosen, 1928–1929, and on a visit to Korea in June and early July of 1932. Acknowledgment is made of information furnished by Dr. Hoon K. Lee, Union Christian College, Pyengyang (Heijo).

density in the south is related to the intensive use of the land by double cropping. Twenty-eight per cent of the area of paddy rice is so used, with barley and wheat as the winter crops.

Nearly all the rice is paddy rice. Half of the area of paddy land is watered by rainfall only; the remainder is irrigated. The importance of rice farming in the western half of Korea is in part due to irrigation on the flood plains of many rivers. The growing season for rice ranges from 150 days in southern Korea to 100 days in the north. Planting begins the first week in June in the south and about the last week in that month in the north. Some ten varieties are raised, and the average yield is about 25 bushels an acre.

An increase in the area devoted to rice and a greater yield per acre have been brought about by the encouragement and assistance of the Japanese government, which finds in Korea a convenient granary for helping to feed the large population of the home country. The total amount exported is now more than ten times as much as in 1910.

Barley, millet, and wheat are cultivated largely for home consumption. The acreage used for the first two is much larger than that for wheat: barley is especially important in the south, millet in the north. The province of Kokai, in west-central Korea, leads in wheat production and exports an appreciable amount to Japan proper.

The raising of soy beans, radishes, and mulberry trees is widely distributed. Soy beans rank next to rice as an article of export. Radishes are popular for making "kimchi," an indispensable adjunct to the Korean menu. Sericulture is a family industry, generally carried on as a side line.

Other Occupations and the Population Map

The fisheries are an important supplement to agriculture in Korea. The south and west coasts are deeply indented, fringed with islands and islets, and have many good harbors. The coast line is long—5400 miles, or nearly twice that length if the islands are included. The tidal range on the west coast is great—ten meters in some places. The peninsula is also a meeting place of warm and cold currents. All these features have a bearing on the fisheries, notable for the abundance and variety of their product.

During the last two decades considerable improvements have been introduced into the fishing industry, especially with regard to types of boats, gear, and methods of operation. The value of the catch, 8,000,000 yen at the time of annexation, increased to 65,000,000 yen in 1929; that of prepared aquatic products increased during the same period from 2,650,000 yen to 44,815,000 yen. Dried fish is an important article of food throughout the peninsula. No little of the recent progress of Korean fishery has been brought about by



FIGS. 1 to 4—Maps of Korea showing the distribution of population and of rice, mulberry trees, and soy beans respectively.



FIGS. 5 to 8—Maps of Korea showing the distribution of radishes, millet, barley, and wheat respectively.

the introduction of skilled Japanese fishermen. They have taught the native fishermen the art of deep-sea fishing—a new venture for the Koreans.

Mining is of little importance compared with agriculture. Gold is the most important mineral extracted. The largest mine is at Unsan, in North Heian Province. Among minerals mined in other parts of the country are coal, iron, and copper. Manufacturing also plays little part. In 1929 the country boasted only some 5000 establishments, which employed about 100,000 people.

Nearly all the larger cities and towns in Korea are centers for the assemblage and distribution of various kinds of agricultural produce. Many of them owe their size and importance partly to activities carried on in connection with affairs of government at present or in the past. Others are chief ports and fishing centers. Koreans carry on the larger part of their internal trade at markets held every five or six days in towns and villages. There are more than 1300 market centers, and their annual transactions amount to over 180,000,000 yen.

The number of large towns and cities in the west and south bears a direct relationship to the importance of agriculture in those parts. From North Heian down to South Zenra populous centers are found in the wide, intensively cultivated valleys. Heijo (Pyengyang), the largest city in South Heian Province, lies in the valley of the Daido. Keijo (Seoul), in the Han Valley in Keiki Province, is the present capital and was for five centuries the capital—the last—of old Korea. Kaijo (Songdo), 45 miles northwest of Keijo, was the capital before the latter supplanted it. Jinsen (Chemulpo), 24 miles west of the seat of the peninsular government, is the second port in Chosen. Fusan, the seat of the provincial government of South Keisho, is the oldest and largest port on the peninsula. It is also a fishing center of importance, and so is Gensan (Wonsan), in South Kankyo.

The population of Korea has increased by more than six millions since Japanese annexation, partly by the immigration of Japanese, of whom there were 488,478 in the country in 1929. It is likely that increase in population will continue. Improvements and expansion in agriculture will make possible a greater yield in crops. Strenuous efforts are being made by the Japanese government to modernize the Korean agricultural system. Model farms have been instituted on which demonstrations are given in grain cultivation, sericulture, horticulture, and stock farming. The principal problem in agriculture is the rejuvenation of worn-out soil. This is being gradually solved by the use of legumes and the application of fertilizer. Untilled land also is being brought under cultivation. It has been estimated that about a million *chobu* (2,450,000 acres), comprising hillsides, marshes, and beaches, can be made productive by terracing and reclamation.

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JOHN WESLEY COULTER Capt. MI-ORC

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PEIPING

JOHN WESLEY COULTER
University of Hawaii

To spend part of a vacation in the most interesting city in the Far East, visit its palaces and temples, and wander thru its maze of crooked lanes, to see the same bridge which Marco Polo saw in the thirteenth century, to have tea with Mei Lang Fang—greatest actor in North China—and see him play a part at the Chung-Ho theater, to meet Hu Shih, outstanding Chinese philosopher—to Chinese literature what Mei Lang Fang is to the drama—such was the happy experience of the writer in the summer of 1932.

Peiping is a China in miniature, a link between the past and the present, but so closely chained to the past that the present cannot break away. The metropolis of North China, it has carved a permanent niche for itself in history thru its fame as a capital of imperial dynasties. It is a city of strange contrasts, of long vistas in beautiful parks and dirty, crowded alleys, of gilt-edged palaces of splendid dimensions, and miserable hovels of confining limits. With a record of 4500 years, an often-times capital of China and known by various names, the experiences of its generations of people have been many and diverse. The Peiping one sees now is the city elaborated by the great Ming builders and the name, Peiping, which it bore in the early part of the Ming dynasty, is the name it again bears today. Foreign influence and the establishment of the Republic have made few changes and the city remains the same mysterious, picturesque, interesting place it has been for centuries.

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE CITY

From the top of Coal Hill the outline of the machicolated walls of four cities which comprise Peiping are easily traced. Immeditely at the south lies the Forbidden City, the innermost, with its vivid yellow imperial roofs. During centuries it was a mystery to the outside world. Until Peking was captured by the Allied troops in

1900, the Forbidden City was inaccessible to foreigners. Outside the Forbidden City is the Imperial City, formerly the residence of Manchu and Chinese officials. There is from Coal Hill a vista of its North Lake, across which rises a mound crowned by the White Dagoba of the Winter Palace. Outside the Imperial City again is the Tartar City—the "City of Nine Gates." The ramparts of the Tartar City, outlined by Kublai Khan during the thirteenth century, were stormed and rebuilt by the Mings in the fifteenth. Two hundred years later the Tartar City was reserved by the conquering Manchus as a garrison for troops charged with the defense of the Capital. Far to the south lies the Chinese City or Outer City to which the Manchus relegated the people they defeated. The southern wall of the Tartar City is the northern wall of the Chinese City. A canopy of trees hides within the Tartar and Chinese cities thousands of one-story and two-story houses, the dwellings of one and one-half million people.[1]

Street Scenes

A ricksha ride thru the streets of Peiping presents a very different picture from a bird's eye view of the four cities from Coal Hill. The main streets, running north-south east-west, lie between long rows of one-story shops with brilliant façades decorated with elaborately carved lions and gaping dragons. In front hang gaily-colored symbols signifying the type of business carried on inside. Locks, hinges and ornamental bits of metal painted on a small board indicate that a brassworker is ready to serve his customers. A kettle, pitcher, bowl and ornamental vase grouped together on another sign suggests to the passerby that perhaps his copperware needs to be replenished. A row of narrow tinselled cylinders betoken a dealer in dyes of various colors and shades. A square suspended at opposite corners between two triangles marks the shop where an apothecary dispenses plasters, salves, herbs, and drugs.

Street merchants offer fruits, just ripened, spread on open stands, velvet-skinned peaches and luscious persimmons. Watermelons cut in huge, juicy slices are stacked on long tables. Roadside bakers mix pasty dough and lay it in discs in cylindrical street ovens. Side-walk restaurateurs offer from their canopied shelves ring-shaped crullers, buns covered with sesame seeds, fritters, and

[1] The population of Peiping in August, 1932 was 1,530,890. Petermanns Mitteilungen, 1933, Heft ¾, p. 90.



FIG. 1. Outline map of Peiping showing a few of the principal places of interest.

pancakes. Others fry mutton chops and carve ducks and chickens in full view of prospective customers.

Hawkers peddle cucumbers, cabbages and egg-plants on wicker trays slung on carrying sticks, and call their wares in lusty notes, prolonged to catch the ear of a possible customer. Water vendors fill one-wheeled carts at wells and push them, groaning, creaking

hall, exhibition halls, and spacious paved courts with tiers of marble steps leading to magnificent yellow tiled buildings. Besides the grand halls of historical interest, there are many rooms which are used for exhibiting objects of Chinese art. There are to be seen the imperial gardens where the emperor used to spend his leisure hours and give feasts, the residential palaces of the emperor, the empress and the palace ladies. There is the residential palace of the Empress-Dowagers of different periods and the many courts associated with it.

FIG. 3. A street vendor in Peiping.
Photo by J. W. Coulter

The so-called Sea Palaces of Peiping, one of which is The Winter Palace, are built in and around a long lake, the origin of which has been traced as far back as the Chin dynasty, that is, to the early part of the twelfth century. Edifices constructed by the Mongols were replaced in later years by many buildings erected by the Manchu rulers: residential quarters, reception halls, temples, theaters, pavilions and boat-houses. They may be divided into three groups—each group associated with a lake—the North Lake, the Middle Lake, and the South Lake.

During my stay in Peiping I visited the Northern Lake or Pei Hai several times. The architectural characteristics of the old buildings and their historical associations impressed me less than the charm of the scenery. After walking by the lake one cannot forget the ailanthus and the weeping willows, the thick rushes near the shore and the lotus flowers far out on the surface. For those who are in a hurry, anxious to do the sightseeing as quickly as possible, Pei Hai is simply a decaying park with a few picturesque buildings, deserted and denuded of their ancient beauty, but for those who

take time to linger and reflect on the bygone ages it suggests, there is conjured up a story of the intimate and human side of a court-life which, in spite of its outward splendor, sought repose and reflection in the beauties of nature.

Temples

Having viewed the palaces of the old Imperial City a visitor is next drawn to the temples. The Temple of Heaven in the Chinese City probably heads the list of temple attractions, with perhaps the Lama Temple in the Tartar City coming second. The Temple of Heaven was second only to the Palaces in splendor and surpassed them in holiness. It was a marvel of architectural beauty, but is now slowly falling to ruin. Juliet Bredon states "No other sanctuary on earth has a more profound or grandiose conception, or more adequately expresses the instinctive desire of humanity to show reverence for a Power above and beyond its puny self."[9]

The enclosure of the Temple of Heaven is surrounded by walls three and one-half miles long. The grounds are beautified with gnarled cypress, fir, and pine trees; cedars flanking the avenue from the gate to the temples are nearly a thousand years old. Near the principal entrance to the grounds is the Palace of Abstinence where the Emperor spent the night in fasting before the semi-annual ceremony performed only by him. In the grounds there are also the Temple of the Imperial Tablets and the Temple of the Happy Year. Other buildings include guard rooms and structures for the storage of paraphernalia of worship.

The principal structure within the Temple enclosure is the Altar of Heaven, the most sacred object in Old China. It is built of white marble in three circular terraces with balustrades and triple staircases at the four cardinal points to ascend the upper terrace which is thirty yards wide. In the northern part of the upper terrace is a seat where Shang-ti, the Ruler of Heaven, was supposed to sit during the ceremony performed semi-annually by the Emperor. Beside the seat were the shrines of "witnessing saints," ancestors of the Emperor.

Every conqueror of China took to himself the privilege and responsibility of worshipping at the Altar of Heaven, and the chief functionary has at various times been of Chinese, Mongol or Manchu blood. One man and only one, the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, was thought fit to ascend that worshipping place and do homage

[9] Juliet Bredon, Peking, p. 132. 2nd edition, Shanghai, 1922.

FIG. 4. The Altar of Heaven. Photo by J. W. Coulter

to the Supreme Being. No foreigner was ever privileged to see the Emperor officiating in his capacity of High Priest. Just before the Imperial Visit to the Temple took place, special notices were sent out warning foreigners not to approach or attempt to look on the Imperial procession. Chinese were ordered to remain indoors and to put up their shutters along the line of route. In absolute silence, the sovereign made his journey and his sacrifice. No priest of any religion ever officiated and the elaborate ceremonies were carried out by court officials who, in preparation for it, underwent months of training and instruction.

The walls which surround the Temple Grounds have become dilapidated. Repairs to the temples, altars and grounds have been neglected and, unless renovated, in a few decades they will be in ruins overgrown with vegetation. Weeds have grown between the marble tiles of the Altar and in the space about it grows a jungle of brush.

Among the several temples in Peiping devoted to Lamaism, an unattractive form of Buddhism, the Lama Temple, really a monastery, is the most interesting. It is known to the Chinese as Yung Ho Kung, or "Lamasery of Eternal Peace." "Built by the Chins in 1084 to contain relics of Buddha, it was magnificently embellished by Kublai Khan in 1271 as a Lama temple dedicated to the Bodhisatva Manchushri, or 'Buddha of wisdom.'"[8]

[8] Juliet Bredon, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

On entering the temple grounds, one passes thru a long, wide avenue, past the living quarters of the monks, poorly ventilated cells that have accumulated the filth of centuries. The monastery consists of a series of semi-detached buildings grouped about courtyards. The buildings, in a sad state of decay, are ornamented with intricate carvings and the courtyards are paved with broken and dilapidated flagstones. The principal object of interest is the great Buddha, sixty feet high, carved, it is stated, from a single tree trunk and brought from Tibet. The poverty stricken monks, dirty and decrepit, are all Mongol or Tibetan, and have scorned to learn Chinese, but many of them have picked up a little pidgin English to help them beg money from foreign visitors.

Among other temples in Peiping which engage the attention of a visitor is the Temple of Agriculture, situated across an avenue from the Temple of Heaven, and known in Chinese as Shen Nung Tan, that is the "Altar dedicated to Shen Nung," Shen Nung is a mythical emperor who ruled China about 3,000 B.C., and who is credited with the invention of the plow, the institution of markets, and the discovery of the value of herbs. The Temple of Confucius, very near the Lama Temple, is located in the grounds of the old national university of China. The chief object of interest in the large hall of the temple is the ancestral tablet of the sage enshrined in an alcove. There are many other temples in the Chinese City, the Tartar City, the Imperial City and the Forbidden City.

Hutungs

After seeing the temples we may pass on into the byways and side streets. The maze of crooked lanes which constitute the *hutungs* of Peiping are always a source of interest to the stranger. Not a few of them are associated with historical events of former dynasties. Tung Ch'ang Hutung is reputed to be the scene of infamous tragedies carried on by Wei Chung-hsien, a profligate character of Ming times. In Ch'eng Hsiang Hutung lived a cruel monster, Yen Shih-fan, depicted as a one-eyed, bull-necked brute who was eventually executed for his crimes. Liu Luan Su Hutung during the Yuan or Mongol dynasty was the site of a temple called the T'ien Ching Ssu, a name which was subsequently altered to Yuan Tu Sheng Ching. Small temples found in the *hutungs* today are hoary with the rime of ages.

A trip thru the *hutungs* does not give a visitor any idea of the beautiful homes hidden behind their ugly walls. The magnificence

of a home is always carefully concealed from passers-by, and some palatial residences are hidden behind dilapidated-looking structures of brick, mud, and plaster. A gatekeeper opens an unimposing entrance to the stranger and upon proper identification permits him to pass into a courtyard from which access to the home is obtained. The homes of affluential and influential Chinese in Peiping cover large areas and are attractive for the spaciousness of their courtyards as also for the buildings themselves. Many for-



FIG. 5. Chinese wooden, springless carts approaching An Ting Men, a gate in the north wall of the Tartar City. Photo by J. W. Coulter

eigners have rebuilt and furnished Chinese homes very attractively.

The presence of foreigners[4] in Peiping is betokened most by the Legation Quarter which dates from the time of the Boxers, for since that time a definitely marked and adequately protected quarter has replaced the older group of legations which were separated by Chinese residences and official buildings. Adjoining the southern wall of the Tartar City, the quarter is separated on all sides from the city itself by walls and open spaces. Under the terms of the Boxer protocol no Chinese are allowed to reside in the Legation

[4] 62,983. *Op. cit.*, p. 90.

Quarter, and no foreigners except missionaries are supposed to live outside. However, in times of stress and political uncertainty the quarter is filled with Chinese refugees and, as its area is restricted, foreign business men reside in scattered districts of the Tartar City.

Industries

Peiping is not an industrial city. Most activities of that kind arose in connection with the old court life and imperial needs. Today an odd assortment of industrial pursuits are picturesque rather than important. In thousands of homes busy families work long hours making articles of many kinds which eventually find their way to distant parts of the world. Hundreds of small shops are miniature factories. Modern efficiency is virtually unknown but art and craftsmanship are found in high degree. Household and shop work is generally on a piece price basis and workers put in long hours to turn out their variegated wares. Because of the scattered locations of the homes and shops, it is very difficult to obtain accurate statistics of the nature of the manufactures, their value, and the amount of the output. It is also impossible to find out just how much is shipped from Peiping, as products of the city are mixed with shipments from the surrounding area and exported from Tientsin.

Industries in Peiping include the manufacture of rugs, laces, artificial flowers, lanterns, cardboard boxes, hats, toys, paper or joss money for the dead, carts, and harness. Knitting woolen yarn, wool dyeing, wool carding, embroidery and tailoring of various sorts are carried on. The making of jewelry, cloisonne, brassware, lacquerware are also among the many lines of industrial activity. There are a few small woolen mills where blankets and other textiles are made, and a few tanneries and shoe factories.

Transportational activities are an important feature of Peiping's industrial life. The city is the terminus of the Peiping-Hankow, Peiping-Suiyuan and Peiping-Mukden Railroads. Railway officials and workers in the railway yards have their homes there. Camel trains add a colorful aspect to the city's transportation system. Much of the coal used in Peiping comes by camel-pack from the vicinity of the Western Hills.

Part of Peiping's industry depends on trade with thousands of visitors. The city is one of the more important tourist centers in the Far East. In addition to manufactures for the tourist trade, and

transportation activities dependent in part on it, there are hotels and hostelries where visitors are cared for during their stay in the old Capital.

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

One cannot close a sketch of Peiping without mentioning its educational institutions, the hope of the future. Since the success of the Nationalist movement in the summer of 1928, and the consequent removal of the Capital to Nanking and the substitution of the old name Peiping for Peking, the city has become less important politically and commercially than it was before. Educationally, however, it still maintains a predominant position. In Peiping are found not only universities established by the Government, but also educational institutions maintained by Foreign Missions and the Rockefeller Foundation. Of the national universities the best known is Peking National University, popularly called "Peita." Owing its origin to the Reform Movement of 1898, it is one of the oldest government universities of the modern type in China. Of the various departments the Philosophy Department is one of the better known on account of the work of Dr. Hu Shih. The youngest, but the largest university in the city, is the Peiping National University. It has eight colleges, all of which were formerly independent universities but were merged by an order of the Nanking Government. The Peiping Union Medical College admits students of both sexes to a four year course in medicine, conducted in English. Facilities are also provided for graduate study in all the departments represented by the faculty.

Among other educational institutions in the city is the well known North China Union Language School, the comfortable living quarters of which are in the summer put at the disposal of visitors in the city. The National Library of Peiping, another institution of great educational value, built in beautiful Chinese style, is well stocked with books and current periodicals.

Perhaps on account of its educational institutions a new Peiping will arise on the old Peking. A democracy may grow and develop on the ruins of ancient imperialism. We hope, however, that the relics of the old dynasties will remain; landmarks of the past, they remind us of the old society on which the new is built, of the past ineffaceably bound to the present.

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4000 -Economic General

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
20575-707

WAR DEPARTMENT
AUG 12 1935

CHINA (Economic)

Subject: Conditions in Sinkiang Province

MID 9162 8/2 W. S.

Sinkiang Province, better known by its older name of Chinese Turkestan, is next to Tibet the least accessible of China's border territories. Definite information is lacking but that given below has been compiled from best available sources. All facts relating to this area must be considered in the light of the following premises:

1) Though a component part of China, Sinkiang is no more Chinese than India is British.

2) Chinese Central Asia is undergoing a fairly rapid process of desiccation.

3) Sinkiang is in the heart of the largest continent in the world, which makes it the most inland section of the globe. The route from Sinkiang to any seaport is the longest or the most difficult known to transportation.

Topography.

The Province of Sinkiang (Hsin Chiang) is the largest of the provinces of China, having an area of about 425 thousand square miles. It extends further to the west than any other and also further to the north, now that Heilungchiang Province is under Japanese occupation. It looks quite like a large, broad horse shoe, having mountains on the west, north and south, with the open part of the shoe extending toward the east. Even the eastern part has some mountain ranges. This mountain barrier accounts for the relatively small rainfall of Sinkiang.

The great Karakoram, Kwenlun and Pamir mountain ranges effectively shut out all moisture that could reach this area from the Indian Ocean and this makes the province almost entirely dependent upon water from the melting glaciers in these mountains. Investigation has shown that the glaciers in the Kwenlun and other southern ranges do not obtain enough moisture from the air to make up for the melting and evaporation. Hence the supply of water for the Tarim River is slowly decreasing and desiccation is being accentuated, though of course being measured in centuries.

In the entire area there is only one large river system, the Tarim and its tributaries, which flow into the Lob Nor. There are several small rivers but none of great importance. All rivers in Sinkiang are land locked.

Population.

The best available statistics show that the majority of the population in Sinkiang is Chanto, a Turki tribe using one of the purest of dialects, the Djaggatai Turki. The Chantos in spite of their Turkish origin resemble the Europeans. They are a tall people with long heads, long noses and large eyes.

CHINA (Economic)

Subject: Conditions in Sinkiang Province

The trouble makers in the province are the Tunganis who are fanatical Mohammedans though they know very little about that religion. They use the Chinese written and spoken language and their mosques are quite Chinese, omitting the idols. They are a proud, overbearing race and fight with or without provocation.

There are many Mongols in Sinkiang. Some of the Chahar tribes were assigned the Borotala district by the Emperor Chien Lung when the Manchus were endeavoring to remove the menace of the Mongols from along the Great Wall north of Peking. In addition to the Chahars, there are the Torguth Mongols who came into the province from Russia in the last of the sixteenth century. Kashgar is still the headquarters of their reigning Prince. The Mongol tribes have always remained loyal to the Chinese Government. They are under the influence of their Princes and the Lama church and it is believed that they will not welcome any increase of Russian influence.

Minerals.

The mineral wealth of Sinkiang is supposed to be considerable though no mining surveys have been made. The standard of living is so low that a demand for the development of mining does not exist. Also the geographical location of the area is such that export of any metals would be prohibitive due to transportation costs. The nearest market is Russia whose adjacent territory contains the same minerals as are found in Sinkiang.

Salt, copper and silver are found and used locally. Coal is prevalent and the important cities all have abundant coal outcrops nearby. Gypsum, manganese and zinc are present but in unknown quantities. Iron has been located in many places but only the deposits near Barkul and Urumchi have been worked. Most of the iron used comes from Russia according to U.S.S.R. Customs statistics.

Gold is present in many streams. The main producing areas appear to be in the Shi-ho district and in the Khotan-Kariya valleys of the Kuenlun mountains. Alluvial gold is the only type that has been worked. Much jade is found in the river bed of the Yurungkash in the Khotan district, and for almost two thousand years was shipped to the Imperial Chinese court.

Oil.

The Tienshan range is apparently abundantly supplied with oil but no information is available as to oil reserves nor extent of fields. No oil analysis has been made. The Urumchi oil field has been worked when Russia was unable to supply oil.

Industries.

The low standard of living and the primitive needs of the population together with their limited purchasing power prohibits all but the most primitive types of industry. Kashgar, Khotan and the Yarkend districts produce considerable thin silk

CHINA (Economic)

Subject: Conditions in Sinkiang Province

fabric. This is made by the women in their homes and is neither very beautiful nor valuable. The finished product is used for clothing, shawls, etc., by the local population and some is exported to Afghanistan and India.

The carpet industry is more prosperous and woollen carpets and some silk rugs are made on hand looms. Aniline dyes have almost replaced the natural ones and the present carpets do not stand up well in use. Most of the rugs are absorbed locally and few are exported.

The major industry of Sinkiang is the manufacture of the coarse, native cotton cloth called "matta". It varies in quality from a white, well bleached, evenly woven fabric to a coarse, yellow packing cloth. Turfan, Kashgar and Khotan districts produce the most of this material.

Several attempts have been made to install modern machinery to make flour, leather and spin and weave cloth. These have not been successful.

Source: Study in M/A Office and conversations with Mongol travellers.

COMMENTS: The location of Sinkiang adjacent to Siberia and Outer Mongolia, and the distance and difficulties of communication with China assure that Russian influence will constantly be striving for a place in the affairs of this area. According to travellers the Soviets are using a rather unqiue method of propaganda along the border. In the sections which come into contact with the natives of Sinkiang, the Soviet Government has built model villages and has spent considerable money in starting useful industries, regardless of whether or not the propositions are paying ones.

The standard of living of the inhabitants of Sinkiang is very low indeed and when they see the much better living conditions of the people under Soviet rule they cannot but be dissatisfied with their own lot. The results of this cannot be predicted but the problems presented are certainly worthy of consideration.

S. V. Constant
S. V. Constant
Major, Cavalry
Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

No.9162

No.9162 1st Ind. JWS:slh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, July 13, 1935 - To: Chief, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C.

Approved.

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

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6-1

AUG 27 1935
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Geographic)

Subject: Geographical - General

Boundaries of Mongolia

Confusion over the actual limits of Mongolia seems to be general. As a geographical unit, Mongolia used to consist of the territory bounded on the west by Sinkiang, on the north by Siberia, on the east by Manchuria and on the south by Hopei, Shansi, Shensi and Kansu. It is a vast arid stretch of land with the Gobi desert in the middle and a strip of arable land to the north and south. Outer Mongolia is the term used to designate the northern portion across the desert from China, and Inner Mongolia used to be the southern portion along the Chinese border. Outer Mongolia is completely under Soviet control and Inner Mongolia no longer exists as a geographical unit; it is entirely absorbed in the Chinese provinces of Ninghsia, Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol. The population can only be roughly estimated; probably there are one to two millions in Jehol, something over a million in the rest of Inner Mongolia, and from one to two millions in Outer Mongolia.

Outer and Inner Mongolia, so-called, come together at their eastern extremities, where Chahar touches Heilungkiang. At this point Outer Mongolia pushes a salient in between Heilungkiang and Chahar, and it was in this salient that the Hailastengol incident occurred. Hailastengol is the Chinese Ha Lo Ch'in Miao, and the detention of a small Japanese surveying party there was the cause of Japanese demands for the removal of Mongol troops west of Tamusukusumu, - in Chinese T'a Mu Su K'o Kiao. With the Japanese in control in Chahar and Heilungkiang, the existence of this salient is a disadvantage if they intend to control a frontier facing the Gobi, and it seems certain that they will take further steps to clear it entirely of Mongol troops and bring it under their control. By so doing, they will have established a defensive front in a fairly straight line from Manchuli to the northwest corner of Shansi, and can easily extend such a line along the Yellow River, which forms the western boundary of Shansi and is a very serious obstacle.

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

1 map attached

Distribution:
6 MID
1 Legation
1 File

From M/A, China Report No. 9172 July 31, 1935

ADDRESS REPLY TO
CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, U. S. ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

REFER TO FILE No. _____

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS

WASHINGTON

6-4

FEB 1 1939

OFFICE CHIEF OF ENGRS
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2055-709
[redacted]
WAR DEPARTMENT

January 31, 1939.

Major Oliver J. Todd, Engr-Res.,
1445 Hamilton Avenue,
Palo Alto, California.

NOTED
J. A. CRANE

Dear Major Todd:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of January 25, 1939.

I am sending a copy of your letter to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to whom Major Barrett's report on the Yellow River was made. Notation will also be made in this office of your willingness to be of service in case such an investigation were desired.

Many thanks for the extra copy of the "Yellow River Problem" from the proceedings of the A.S.C.E.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

S. G. Godfrey,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Executive Officer, Military Division.

COPY FOR ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2.

COPY

FEB 1 1939
OFFICE CHIEF OF ...
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2055-709
WAR DEPARTMENT

OLIVER J. TODD
Consulting Engineer

1445 Hamilton Avenue
Palo Alto, California.

January 25, 1939.

Colonel S. C. Godfrey,
Corps of Engineers,
Executive Officer, Military Division,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Col. Godfrey:

I appreciated getting your letter of January 11th in which you note having seen my paper on the Yellow River in the December Proceedings of the A.S.C.E.

Let me thank you for the copy of Major Barrett's report which bore on this subject of the Yellow River. I have known Major Barrett for many years as he is now on his third tour in China and we have been friends for a long time. His suggestion about an investigation is a wise one, I believe. It would be a pleasure to me to undertake such a job for our Army should I be asked to do so. I know the country pretty thoroughly and how to get through to the objective even in spite of present upset conditions. Should this recommendation from Peking be endorsed I would be at the command of our Govt. in case it was thought I might be useful in the case.

I shall send the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army a copy of the reprints of my Yellow River paper that have just come to me from New York since an additional copy may be useful in his office.

With best wishes to you, I am

Sincerely,

/S/ O. J. Todd
/T/ O.J. Todd.

COPY FOR ASST.CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2.
For Est Section

COPY

G-2 Report

1140

DEC 10 1938
DEPT. OF STATE
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

6-1

2653-709

CHINA (Geographic)

Subject: Floods

Trip to the Kaifeng
Flood Area

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 8 1938

On July 3rd the undersigned proceeded, by plane in a party of newspaper men under the guidance of the local Japanese Military Spokesman, to Kaifeng, Honan, stopping enroute at Tsinan, Shantung, and on the return trip at Changte, Honan.

Few observations of military importance were made on the flight between Peking and Tsinan. It was observed, however, that much of the country between Peking and Tsangchow was badly flooded, so that military operations in this area would have been almost out of the question at that time. Just before reaching Tsinan the plane flew low over the Yellow River Bridge, which the Japanese had just finished repairing and over which the first train in some months had passed only a day or two before. From photographs which had been seen of the bridge in its damaged condition and from the amount of new steel work which was visible, it was evident that the repair of the bridge was an engineering feat of no small proportions, and credit must be given to the Japanese Army for the efficiency with which it was carried out.

The installations and general layout of the Tsinan Air Field seem entirely adequate for military purposes, but a hill about three hundred feet in height just west of the field appears as somewhat of a danger to safe aerial navigation.

Flying along the Yellow River after leaving Tsinan, I was struck by the fact that the bed of the river was almost dry and no boats could be observed thereon, indicating that most of the water normally carried by the stream was flowing through the break above Kaifeng. The economic effect of this diversion of water will thus be felt not only in the flood areas but in the lower reaches of the river.

On arrival at Kaifeng I was interested to note that as we flew over the city at a height of about a thousand feet, the flags painted on the roofs of foreign owned buildings stood out with starling distinctness. Landing at the Kaifeng air field, we were met by Father F. X. Clougherty, an American Catholic priest, head of a mission school in Kaifeng and at that time prominently identified with the relief work being carried on among flood refugees.

No evidences of the flood were visible from the air field, which is located south of the city. No installations of note are located at the field which resembles a smoothed-off cow pasture of large extent.

From M/A China Report No. 9698 November 8, 1938

RESTRICTED

Father Clougherty informed me, as best he could in the presence of our Japanese host that the Japanese troops had behaved in a scandalous manner after the capture of Kaifeng, looting and raping all over the city for several days. According to him scarcely so much as a box of matches remained in the shops of Kaifeng after the Japanese had completed the loot of the city, and no females except very small children and old crones dared be seen on the street for fear of being raped for several days after the Japanese entered.

We were taken to interview the Japanese major general in command of the troops garrisoning the city, his headquarters being located in the best Chinese hotel in town. Evidences of the destruction attending the capture of the city were clearly visible as we passed through the streets, particularly near the railway station which was practically in ruins. The town had evidently been ruthlessly bombed and shelled. Particularly interesting to me was the sight of a British mission house with a large Union Jack painted on the roof, through which flag an air bomb had passed squarely.

The interview with the Japanese general consisted in the exchange of the usual platitudes. He appeared very tired and said his men had exerted themselves to the point of exhaustion in rescuing Japanese soldiers and Chinese trapped by the flood west of Kaifeng. According to him, however, no Japanese lives had been lost and he believed that deaths among the Chinese by drowning had not been numerous. He gave it as his opinion that the Chinese had contemplated cutting the dykes of the Yellow River for some time before they actually did so, as the Japanese had found tunnels driven into the dykes apparently solely for the purpose of placing explosives.

After leaving Kaifeng a flight of a few minutes brought us to the break, above which the plane circled for a short time at a height of about one thousand feet. The sight of the flood waters pouring through the break was an impressive one. The break appeared to be about three hundred yards in width. It was of course impossible to estimate the depth of the water flowing through the break, but to my inexpert eye it did not appear that the closing of the break would have been an engineering task of great difficulty, had the necessary man power and equipment been available. South of the break the waters of the river had spread out in a great sheet of which the limits were not visible from our plane. On this sheet of water isolated villages and high points of ground stood out at many points, so that it appeared unlikely that many persons could have been drowned in the flood. Of the terrific economic destruction however, there could be no doubt even from the brief inspection which we were enabled to make.

Leaving the flood area we flew to Changte which is located near Anyang, beneath which city have been found Shang dynasty remains of great ethnological historical

importance. All that we could see at Changte, however, was a poorly-equipped and very dusty air field. One young Japanese lieutenant on duty at the field seemed eager to talk with a foreigner, and judging from the appearance of things at Changte, I did not blame him for welcoming any diversion whatsoever.

The Japanese military spokesman in Peking stated today that it was a mooted question in Japanese army circles whether or not the breaks in the dykes of the Yellow River could be repaired. In the opinion of the undersigned, it could be done without much difficulty this winter.

I recommend that an American engineer, either military or civilian but preferably the former, be detailed to make a thorough study of the results of the changing of the course of the Yellow River as the result of the Chinese action in cutting the dykes last June. It is believed that valuable information could be obtained from such a study, as it is apparent that the course of political and sociological history may be profoundly altered as a result of this phenomenon.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

See 2610-36/114 for letter of Dec 12-38 from G-2 to MIA China inviting attention to p.18 Standing Instructions requiring that recommendations for action should be in letter form.

Lenard D. Barrett
David D. Barrett
Major, Infantry
- Assistant Military Attache

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
JUL 23 1940
2055-710
WAR DEPART

RESTRICTED

June 14, 1940

Subject: Observations made on a trip to Inner Mongolia and Shansi Province.

To : The Military Attache

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 24 1940

1. Narrative
2. Comments on cities visited
3. Military activities
4. Rail communication

1. Narrative.

In accordance with your instructions, I requested permission from the North China Military Headquarters to make a trip to Kalgan, Tatung, Kweihwa and Paotow, thence back to Tatung and south to Taiyuan - returning to Peking via Shihmen (new name for Shihchiachwang). I was told that due to unsettled conditions between Tatung and Taiyuan I would have to return to Peking from Mongolia and proceed to Taiyuan via Shihmen. The local liaison officer also explained that since the Mongol area was under the separate jurisdiction of Lieutenant General Abe's headquarters at Kalgan, I would have to secure permission for further travel from that unit. Arriving in Kalgan on May 24th I called on General Abe's headquarters where I was courteously received by a staff officer - Major Morita. After an unnecessarily lengthy explanation of the perils of rail travel to the northwest he flatly told me I would only be allowed to go as far as Tatung, where the local authorities would meet me and "look after" me.

The local representative of the British American Tobacco Company - a young Britisher at whose house I stayed - had recently gone to Paotow and back with no trouble at all, and reported the trains running regularly. At Tatung I called on the division headquarters of Lieutenant General Kuroda and met the adjutant, Lieutenant Colonel Funabashi, who was an old friend since he had been aide to Lieutenant General Tatekawa who was the commander of the 10th Division with which I served in Himeji in 1935-6. Lieutenant Colonel Funabashi gave me a military passenger car and an escort of a corporal and five men and sent me off to see the famous caves about 20 miles from the city. The countryside was, of course, peaceful and the guard was superfluous, especially since the truck they were in kept breaking down and was usually a mile or so back of my car. I returned to Kalgan the next day and arrived back in Peking the 27th.

On June 3rd I left Peking and arrived in Taiyuan on June 4th after spending the night in Shihmen. The 5th was spent in looking around Taiyuan and I left for Shihmen on the 6th, arriving back in Peking on the 7th. At no

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time did I have any trouble with the Japanese military police except when I arrived at the station in Taiyuan. The train was late and we arrived about 11:00 p.m. after a 15 hour ride in a very crowded coach. The only other foreigner - an elderly Swedish missionary - and I were segregated from the Japanese passengers and asked to wait in the military police office in the station. A very officious young M.P. corporal then thoroughly searched the person and suitcase of the missionary, including his wallet and all his private letters. After the Swede had been allowed to leave he ordered me to open my suitcase which I promptly refused to do. He seemed surprised when I used the not too flattering form of military Japanese but said he had to inspect my suitcase to see if I had any firearms. I told him I was not used to arguing with enlisted men and asked him to call his detachment commander which he said could not be done due to the lateness of the hour. I then asked to be taken to the M.P. headquarters where I could call the Peking headquarters on the telephone and explain my reception in Taiyuan. At this he laughed and suddenly became more courteous. He even left the station and personally conducted me through the gate and to a very clean Japanese inn. Other than this one instance I was treated with the greatest of respect.

2. Comments on cities visited.

The same observations apply in general to Kalgan, Tatung, Shihmen and Taiyuan. All these have received a terrific influx of Japanese and Koreans since the beginning of the incident and in spite of this the trend of business in general seems practically at a standstill. In Kalgan there were 200 Japanese before the incident and there are now more than 17,000 Japanese and Koreans. The main streets of these cities are filled with Japanese stores selling cheap chinaware, celluloid toys, hats, military uniforms and photographs. There are also many beer cafes, opium and heroin shops and brothels. The Japanese merchants themselves complain that the Chinese will not buy their wares and there are too many of each kind of shop to prosper from the purchases of the Japanese population. This situation now prevails throughout the occupied areas of North China and is, no doubt, one of the reasons the Tokyo government is prohibiting the emigration of its nationals to China.

3. Military activities.

All the cities visited seemed very peaceful, but there were an unusually large number of soldiers in Taiyuan. I counted about 500 wandering around the various shops in the morning on liberty. I also noticed seven trucks of infantry leaving the gates on outpost duty. A military police sergeant with whom I talked had been in Taiyuan for two years and said that although the general situation was quiet, detachments were continually being sent into the

neighboring foothills to suppress communist bandits. He said it was well known that these men, though they wore native garb, were not real bandits but were actually communist troops. He said their tactics were to cause trouble in a small village till the Japanese came and then to retreat slowly to the hills hoping to lure the Japanese after them. Apparently the Japanese are content to chase them out of the villages and then return to Taiyuan. The only Americans in Taiyuan, Dr. and Mrs. Meyers of the Baptist Mission, stated that restrictions on foreigners had tightened up in the last few months and admitted not leaving the Mission compound unless necessary.

I noticed an increasing number of officers and men of the Chinese puppet army. These wear the same uniform as the Japanese except for the cap and rank insignia. In many instances these men were guarding bridges and railroad stations, but there was always a small Japanese garrison nearby. In the station at Tatung there was a train of eleven new hospital cars. There were four armored trains at stations between Peking and Shihmen and we passed one on the way to Taiyuan. One of these, in addition to the one pounder and heavy machine gun cars, had two flat cars on which were two light tanks each. I heard there were about twenty of these trains between Peking and Hsinsiang (on the Pinghan Railroad in north Honan). The usual conversation between the Japanese officers and men on the trains was about Japan's international situation and about the war in Europe. They had little to say about the operations in China.

4. Rail Communication.

All trains were crowded and all seemed to run approximately on time. There was no interruption between Tatung and Paotow nor between Tatung and Taiyuan. The train guards still consisted of a non-commissioned officer and from five to eight men. The Japanese have converted the line from Shihmen to Taiyuan and it is now standard guage. Fortunately for them the bridges and tunnels permitted this but in some instances the tunnel wall was only a few inches from the car window and all curves must be taken very slowly. The distance is 150 miles and the scheduled time is fourteen and one half hours. The line from Taiyuan north to Tatung is also standard guage but it takes two days due to the stop over at Ningwu. This point is the military boundary line between the separate Kalgan area and North China. I was told that the Kalgan Railroad administration refused to allow their rolling stock below Ningwu for fear that the North China Communications Company would convert it to their own use. Just another example of two Japanese companies failing to work out a cooperative plan for the benefit of all.

There is a large amount of construction going on throughout this whole system of railroads. From Peking to Kalgan the line is being double tracked except for the tunnel in the pass. This will facilitate the shipping of

Tatung coal. Between Peking and Shihmen all bridges are being repaired or new steel and concrete ones being built. The sharp cliffs bordering the track between Shihmen and Taiyuan make work on this line continuous - particularly during the rainy season - and it struck the undersigned that a little systematic sabotage would keep it out of order for long periods of time. Surprisingly enough the Japanese trainmen and foreigners in both Shihmen and Taiyuan said that no bridges or tunnels had been damaged by the Chinese. The Tatung coal mines are functioning - I do not know to what per cent of their capacity, and I saw thousands of tons of fine large lump anthricite piled up by the tracks at Shouyang in Shansi. There appeared to be insufficient rolling stock to haul it away.

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Captain, F.A.
Assistant Military Attache

No.9898 1st Ind.
Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Peiping, China, June 14, 1940. To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

The objectives of Captain Munson's trip were to get a bird's eye view of conditions in Inner Mongolia and first hand information on the Tatung - Taiyuan and Shihmen - Taiyuan Railways. Japanese restrictions make travel impossible without a Japanese military pass. As a general rule missionaries and business men who can show proper reasons can travel to Kalgan with little trouble. Beyond Kalgan, the local Japanese authorities exercise much more rigid control. Especially difficult to secure is authority to travel on the Mongolian plateau. A number of Swedish-American missionaries whose missions lie in that area have been delayed in Kalgan for weeks and months at a time. Since the British American Tobacco Company has come to an arrangement with both the North China and Mengchiang authorities, which gives the Japanese puppets a certain amount of foreign exchange, BAT agents have a little more facility to travel. However, that facility will probably be short lived for the Japanese are taking active steps to keep the BAT. products off the market and to supplant them with their own.

With regard to coal, practically all Tatung coal is shipped direct to Japan. Some is probably furnished to the blast furnaces at Shihchingshan (about 15 miles west of Peiping) for coking purposes. None is available on the local market. Shansi anthracite is fairly plentiful on the local market.

William Mayer
Major, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Gene.
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

JAN 31 1941

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WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF INFANTRY
WASHINGTON

January 28, 1941

Burma Road

MEMORANDUM TO: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Inclosed herewith is a report with covering letter which may be of interest to your division. It may be retained by you, if you so desire.

For the Chief of Infantry:

E. W. Fales

E. W. FALES,
Colonel, Infantry,
Executive.

1 incl.
(Report - American Red Cross)

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1-1

AMERICAN RED CROSS

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Major-General George A. Lynch
Room 3028
Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.

To G-2

January 25, 1941

Dear General:

It was good to have talked with you again at the Army and Navy Club last Saturday. Things have been in such a rush for me the past eight months that I have had little or no opportunity to meet those with whom I have served and enjoyed.

Enclosed please find a copy of a report sent to the Vice Chairman of the American Red Cross in charge of Foreign War Relief from Walter Wesselius, who has been my friend and associate in Disaster Relief work. He is now directing relief work into Interior China.

This report gives a very illuminated description of the conditions along the Burma Road. If the contents are not of value for military purposes, at least, the report provides interesting reading.

The report is confidential in the ordinary manner that all communications are held to be with any organization and therefore should be limited to a restricted distribution.

When the opportunity is afforded me to visit Washington, I will take advantage of your invitation to visit.

Respectfully yours,

W. C. Conover

W. C. Conover
Capt. USA, Ret'd.

WC:BC
Enclosure

AMERICAN RED CROSS

China Relief

1-1

LETTER NO. 1

Enc. 2

JAN 31 1941
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2055-711
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WAR DEPARTMENT

Lashio, Burma

Rangoon, Burma
December 12th, 1940

Mr. Ernest F. Swift,
Vice Chairman,
American National Red Cross,
Washington, D. C., U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Swift:

It is difficult to realize that a month has elapsed since our extended reports of November 9th and 11th were submitted from Rangoon, in letters numbered 2 and 3. Without having the ready facilities for report writing, such as an office, typewriters, papers, carbons, etc. it has not been too conducive to the writing of reports at length, despite my good intentions to see to it that a full report of each weeks activity would be submitted. Therefore, I wish to preface this report with an expression of good intentions to see that such reports are henceforth actually forthcoming, as it now appears we are to be in the full swing of things, with the establishment of an office during the coming week; and proceeding from here to Lashio, with our goods actually in transit.

LASHIO

I advised you previously regarding the establishment of our office at Lashio. During our stays there, we have been the guests of the Chinese Red Cross, who rent a residence building, used both as sleeping quarters and their office. A few cots have been available, and they have served us as well as facilities would permit; supplied auto transportation as needed, and taking the majority of our meals with them. As reflected in our cable November 15th, I left Rangoon, the last of the week for Lashio, to make definite arrangements for godown space, office, coolie shacks, and living quarters.

We have been well served by the authorities in the selection of a piece of ground approximately one half mile from the railroad station. It is high ground, well drained, but still in its natural state of semi jungle growth of bushes, small trees, etc. Immediate arrangements were made for the clearing of the land with Indian coolies.

Considerable delay was experienced from several angles; First we were unable to the land specifically marked off for us by the Governmental authorities until had cleared the land. Secondly, the official surveyor has been seriously ill, and hospitalized with malaria, with no alternate to take his place. At this point, we received the hearty co-operation of Superintendent Porter, of the English authorities, who passed word down the line, that our work was to be facilitated in every way, and we were advised that we could construct our godowns and other necessary buildings, without the requirements of prior approval, and that such approvals would be given after the fact. We selected a piece of ground approximately 235 feet in length (frontal) along the road, running to a depth of approximately 200 feet. Thirdly, it was necessary to submit formal site plan, three copies of formally drawn plans, for each of the building. This was arranged for, and contracts were finally let.

Our major godown is 40 x 80 feet, made of bamboo poles rafters, jungle wood posts, bamboo waterwalling, bamboo rafters with thatch roofing. The flooring of the godown, constructed on bamboo joints 12" centers, is also constructed with the use of split bamboo, double thickness, crosswise, which Mr. S. L. Wang, Chinese Red Cross architest informs me is capable of sustaining great weight. The size of the Godown will enable us to stack as much as 600 tons, although it is hoped that we will never be forced to accumulate that much at any one time. However, consideration was given to the unusual light character of some of our goods, namely, absorbent cotton, and cotton gauze.

We also let contract for an office 20 x 20; similarly to be walled with bamboo matting, but glazed windows, but likewise will have thatched roof. The flooring of this building will be mud cement.

A smaller supplementary godown is also being constructed on the property, to be used jointly by the American and Chinese Red Cross.

Two separate coolie sheds are embraced in the contract, where Indian guards, and work coolies will be housed, and do their own cooking.

The area of our land will be completely surrounded with a 6' high bamboo fence.

Although the foregoing sounds rather formidable, the cost factors are very reasonable; all of the buildings will be constructed at a total cost of 2165 ruppees, which however does not include the fence. In order to expedite construction, the terms of the contract were drawn to include a bonus of 50 ruppees if the terms of the contract were fulfilled by December 13th. At exchange rate of 3.30 which we are getting for U. S. dollars, our warehouse facilities will cost only $670.00 U. S.

Great difficulty was experienced in the matter of trying to get any kind of living quarters for members of our staff. It was out of the question to remain in the Chinese Red Cross quarters indefinitely, where at times 15 or more drivers, and others would be accommodated for days at a time, sleeping on cots throughout the building, on floors, etc. Lashio is a mushroom, frontier town, awakening from a long sleep and not yet fully alert as to what is going on. There are no places to rent, few suitable places left in which to build, where water, or electric lights are available. The few contractors in the vicinity are engaged in building godowns, and many other buildings now under construction for the many agencies now opening offices on account of business over the Burma Road. To construct a residence we were advised would require three to four months. After much conversation, and negotiations, I have been able to afquire the use

The residence of Mr. Andrew Lecky-Thompson, Manager, of Vertannes Brothers trucking company, which he was willing to consider, as his wife is to be in Rangoon for some time; I suspect he is most anxious to raise some money, to do some private trucking himself, and make hay while the sun shines. I have committed ourselves to eight month rents at 125 rupees per month, or approximately 40 U. S. dollars per month. These quarters leave much to be desired, but will serve the purpose. It is out of the city water area, and is also without electric lights. Incidentally, Lashio does boast of electric lights, in the new section, which is turned on around dusk, and remains available until early in the morning. The building is of mat construction, thatch roof, but has concrete floor. It is well located. Its major difficulty is the matter of not being mosquito proof, and netting will need to be used generously, for protection of staff members health, inasmuch as Lashio and this entire region is known to be the most seriously affected malaria region, which has interested our own Public Health Services, the Rockefeller Foundation, and others.

Staff members will be urged to follow the recommendation of Dr. Louis L. Williams, of the United States Public Health Service, (who spent one year in this area, returning to Washington in September 1940) that six grains of quinine be taken every other day, as a specific prophylaxis against the contraction of malaria. This precaution must be followed, as nearly every one in Lashio, seem to be ex-patients, or just getting over a spell.

When I left Lashio last week, for Rangoon, the construction was well under way, and I feel assured that the terms of the contract will be met, and the bonus of 50 ruppees well earned. During our absence, Mr. Wang, and Mr. Lim, of the Chinese Red Cross, are assuming responsibility for carrying one.

Incidentally, another feature of the construction work, from a labor angle, involves a gasoline dump, to take care of 500 drums of gasoline. This will be constructed by Mr. Wang, with his coolies without any appreciable cost to the Red Cross.

THE BURMA ROAD.

We previously advised you of our plan to make a personal inspection trip over the Burma Road, to become wholly familiar with all of its aspects, problems, and likelihood of its remaining open. This we were able to do, through courteous invitation extended to Mr. Baker and myself to accompany Dr. Francis Pan and Mrs. Pan, and Paul Wang, also of the Ministry of Communications. Dr. Francis Pan, is Director of General Affairs of the Ministry, who was given the responsibility to see that Red Cross supplies were brought in. As a consequence, our trip over the Road, was carefully planned by his orgainsation, we travelled in a new Buick, and a new Chevrolet, with a new Ford "pickup" truck following, carrying the valuable and necessary gasoline, and oil cargo, and excess baggage, Advance word was sent along the road of the arrival of our party, and resulted in extraordinary care for our welfare, and a Chinese feast at every stop. We are therefore in no position to speak about any hardships of the Burma Road.

The road is a monument to the accomplishment of a Nation forced by circumstances to do the impossible. Throughout the entire trip, I lost none of the initial feeling of amazement, that a road of this character could possibly be built in a period of six months, with trucks rolling over it from one end to the other in six or seven days, in contrast to the interminable camel, donkey, human carry systems, which have been in vogue in this entire area since long before the days of Marco Polo. That mode of

is by no means abandoned, for everywhere, one could see lines of humans carrying baskets, and donkey trains slowly meandering through the hills with their cargo, probably destined for points far shorter than the long trek from Lashio to Kunming.

I certainly need not take any time to describe the need for the Burman Road, and the circumstances which compelled its construction. The closing of the various avenues of traffic, encroachments down the East Coast, final closing of Haiphong, end of the Indo-China Railroad, left the Burma Road as the major alternate, in the quest of the largest country in the world seeking a back door. Hence came a birth of a great Oriental Highway, the Burma Road.

The road was started early in 1938, and completed in the Fall, This in itself perhaps is not so amazing, unless one takes into full appreciation, the methods which had to be followed in its Construction. Absolutely no road machinery; no scrapers, no bull dozers, no tractors, and literally few shovels. From all I can gather, the road seems to have been built by local Yunnan Province labor, farmers from miles on the side of the road, thousands imported, and with the use of hand tools, mainly of the farm tool variety. It seems utterly unbelievable, but the fact remains that a couple of hundred Chinese Engineers, using 200,000 laborers (mainly conscripted) with this very primitive type of hand equipment, are responsible for one of the most extraordinary road building feats in history. Wicker baskets swinging on bamboo poles were the machinery, and human sweat and muscle the power. Here a mountain was carried away in these small wicker baskets, and there a valley was filled in by hand.

The length of the road is 726 miles with an average width of only 9 ft. It starts at Kunming and runs for approximately 600 miles to the Burma border and 116 miles from the border to Lashio, Burma, where it connects up with the Burma Railroad. The road crosses two mighty rivers, then Mekong and the Salween and climbs to a height of 8500 feet. It has 289 bridges with a load capacity of 5 to ten tons, and 1959 culverts.

Of special significance is the fact that much improvement of the road is going on constantly. Everywhere, one could see large numbers of men at work, repairing, taking out bad turns, making tunnels, and strong evidence of a determination to keep the road open, and improve its condition. We were particularly impressed with the calibre of the road engineers whom we met; fine intelligent men who seemed to know what they were doing, but recognizing the handicaps under which they were laboring, and the necessity of using hand labor to do the impossible. For the major part of our trip, we were accompanied by a Mr. Tan, Director of the Road, the man in charge of all operations, who impressed us most favorably with his executive ability, and vision. The road is a better one than I had any reason to expect; the road is very rough in spots, dusty in the extreme much of the way; there are a number of mountains to be crossed where the grades are very severe, with a consequent grinding of gears, heating of motors; there are many dangerous turns, many hairpin turns, hundreds of them; at one point we could look across in the morning, to the pin stripe of the road across on the mountain on the other side where we arrived late in the afternoon.

I have spoken of the road as being somewhat dangerous; yet I do not consider it very much worse than many roads over which I have travelled in some parts of the U.S. before the days of concrete highways, and advanced road building. We saw a considerable number of accidents, trucks laid up for repairs, and a number of derelicts of once-called trucks, lying down the ravine, or off the road. In our own party, the accident rate was 100%. As previously reported, our party had a new Buick, new Chevrolet, new Ford pickup, and later Mr. Tan joined the party in his Buick. Casualty No. 1, was the Ford

[illegible], which was run into by a truck, damaging right front fender, and caused a [illegible] radiator, which gave some trouble for the balance of the trip. Casualty No. 2 [illegible] Mr. Francis Pan's Buick, which was side swiped by a truck, damaging his right front [illegible]; Casualty No. 3 was the Chevrolet in which I rode with Paul Wang, and Dr. C. Pan, Secretary General of the Chinese Red Cross. In passing a line of trucks, held up at a landslide, we slipped into a deep hole, with front, right, from which it was impossible to be extricated by lifting, and from which we were dragged with a steel cable behind an immense eight ton truck. Aside from a squeaky motor, little damage seemed to have been done, and the squeaks wore out shortly. Later in the day, a donkey in a donkey train, got out of control as we passed and bashed in our left front door, and left rear fender. Casualty No. 4, was Dr. Tan's car, which developed motor trouble, and also was hit on right front fender by a truck. I mention these things, as it may illustrate that the road is still not too safe, or the drivers on it, leave much to be desired. That is my diagnosis, but the casualties above described are an actuality.

We left Lashio November 23rd 4 P. M. and reached Kunming 3 P. M. November 28th. The first night we stopped at Kutkai, Burma, 77 kilometers from Lashio; second day travelled to Lungling, 235 kilometers; third day to Paoshan 168 kilometers fourth day to Tali (north of Hsiakwan) 242 kilometers; next day to Tsouhiong 234 kilometers; and the last day to Kunming 192 kilometers. If one were permitted the time, and poetic license, much could be said about the trip, its peoples along the route, and the interesting Buddhist temples, taken over as hostels by China Travel Service at Paoshan and Tsouhiong, located high on hills, to which we were led in the dark. After a day of travel, we were always ready to stop for the night. Of one thing I am certainly convinced; that the poor truck driver dearly earns his pay, which is most meagre, scarcely sufficient to keep body and soul together, and responsible for the great amount of "squeeze" that goes on with gasoline, cargo, spare parts, etc. Living costs are tremendously expensive, with meagre dishes to be had for 2 or three dollars, Chinese, which the drivers cannot afford from their small salaries of 60 Chinese dollars per month.

The peoples along the road, deserve more than passing mention, with their interesting dress, customs of the various tribes, etc. Yunnan is the most remote of Chinese provinces, and in the Chinese parlance is known as the "no man's land". It has been the least affected by the Western Influences. At the Western extremity of the road, one goes through the Northern Shan States, with the Shan tribes, the Chings, the Katchins, and one travels for several hundred miles before there is any strong conviction of being in China. There seems no sharp dividing line as to where that happens. In many places, we seemed to be the source of considerable curiosity, as whites. In the towns, one could see a large part of the women with tiny bound up feet, walking along as if on stilts; on the other hand, young girls, with bobbed hair, and dress customs, acquired no doubt in provincial schools, and missionary schools. Primitive methods of living, everything hand done, tools hand made, water supplies of streams serving both as water supply, and sewage disposal simultaneously, etc. are all subjects of which much could be written.

The physical condition of the people all along the road is pitiful in the extreme. Poverty is in evidence everywhere, and clothing of poorest quality, and much of it in rags. This is particularly true of the thousands working along the road. It should be stated that the malarial problem along the road is general; there is much opium smoking amongst these peoples; one hears about considerable "Black Water Fever" which kills many, but I did not learn its scientific name; many of the workers seemed like dwarfs, gnomes, which almost required a second look to see whether they were wholly human. The tragedy of the province however, which should receive the real attention of the

[illegible]ies is the problem of goitres. Yunnan salt, is reported to be wholly deficient [illegible]. The majority of the population suffer from goitres which defy description. [illegible] of thousands of cases were seen; some of them suffer from goitres which literally hang like sacks from their throats, or bulge from the side of their necks from one half to six inches. And yet, it is these people, who built the Burma Road, carrying it in wicker baskets, scraping rocks, gravel, mud with hand tools. It takes more than my poor ability at writing to portray the picture. Trachoma is also a major problem.

I trust that I have not already exhausted your patience, in what seems to be an interminable discourse about matters not strictly pertaining to the matter of transportation over the Burma Road, and that of getting our medical supplies over it. I trust that they may at least in part convey some of the problems of transportation. The road is usable, and I believe is going to stay open. The road does not seem to carry one tenth of its possibilities. One Engineer commented two hundred trucks travelled each way each day at any one point. My guess is that 75 is a closer estimate from my observation. Many trucks return empty, for which there can be no possible excuse. Much cotton yarn is being brought in by private contractors, at exherbitant rates, commented upon in my previous report, i. e. 700 to 750 ruppees per ton, or over 200 per ton U. S.

One further comment with respect to damage done by the Japanese to the road. No further raids have been conducted on the road, since the raids on the Salween, and Kokong Bridges, October 27th and 28th. I am advised that the Japs send scouting planes over that area frequently, but we saw none. There are strict regulations in the vicinity of these two bridges; for example, no traffic is permitted over the bridges, from nine o'clock in the morning until three. Presumably this regulation has the motive, of no traffic, when scouting planes might otherwise report much traffic, and cause further bombings. The Salween River, at point of the bridge along the Road, is 70 feet deep; it is spanned by an excellent suspension bridge, about 300 feet long. Shrapnel fragments severed a couple of the suspension strands, which have since been repaired. A direct hit was scored on the far side of the bridge, directly on the large bridge footing. There is no question but that the footing was severely shaken, and has been moved. The engineers told us privately that the bridge footing was severely damaged, and it is questionable how long it will remain effective. At any rate, the traffic goes over it, without any difficulty, and a large crew is constantly at work there. A ferry is under construction, to serve, in the emergency should the bridge ever go out. Across the Mekong, there is one old suspension bridge, used for many years, which was temporarily damaged, likewise through shrapnel breaking strands, which have been repaired. A small, ancient Chinese foot bridge, directly adjacent to this bridge was undamaged. We want over the wagon bridge, and it seemed entirely useable. Both of these bridges are wholly supplemental. The major bridge over the Mekong, is a very creditable suspension bridge, of heavy steel, just completed, which was not touched at all in the raids. The aforementioned two old bridges span the river at a point below the junction of a tributary to the Mekong which enters the Mekong below the new bridge. Therefore, after crossing the new bridge, one travels about 3 kilometers, or less, before coming to a small steel bridge, which spans the tributary, to get back on the Burma Road. That bridge likewise has not been affected in any degree.

It appears that the Burma road will be kept open, if the determination of the engineers, and the numbers of people available to work are the determining factors. Another determining factor is the marksmanship of the Japanese. What they aim at, they seem to miss. The fact remains that the Road has been closed but two days since its official reopening October 18th.

CHINA

Two objectives were in mind in going to Kunming. The first was the opportunity provided us to make the personal inspection trip over the Burma Road. Secondly, we were unable to complete transportation arrangements in Rangoon, excepting for the trip from Lashio to Kunming, and at request of Dr. Francis Fan, further discussion, for transportation beyond Kunming, was postponed until we could get together at Kunming with members of his organization there.

We reached Kunming on the afternoon of November 28th, just as the "all clear" was sounded from an air raid warning. Actually, no air raid was experienced that day. The following day, no meetings were planned for us, and was utilized in contacting Red Cross representatives, and former contacts known to Mr. Baker.

Kunming is a splendid city of excellent buildings; deficient water supply, fair streets, electric light power, has several theatres, and gives one the immediate impression of a substantial city. There is very little evidence of Japanese destruction. There are a miscellaneous few places throughout the city, where bombs struck. While we heard from several, that this or that place was badly hit, we saw relatively little destruction. Certainly in contrast with Chungking, Kunming has no complaint. It is true that one of the hospitals was struck; we heard that a copper wire plant in the vicinity had been bombed. Nevertheless, Kunming is going along in comparative well being.

AIR RAID WARNING SYSTEM

Reference to previous reports will give a fairly clear idea regarding the warning system which has been developed for Chungking. The Kunming system is very similar. When Japanese planes leave the feilds at Hanoi, and other points in Indo China (French) the first air raid ball goes up in Kunming. Actually there has been no air raid for two weeks prior to our arrival, and none during our visit. When the second alarm is announced, the second ball goes up, and twenty minutes is still allowed to make an exit from the city. When the urgent alarm siren blows, the air raid is imminent. The constant air raid warnings, has produced a situation, where the entire city is closed up, all businesses, post office, banks, and everything, until three o'clock in the afternoon. When the first alarm goes on, the city takes to the hills, fields, and countryside. This occurs almost daily. To fully appreciate what this means, one needs to consider that Kunming prior to the war, was a city of 120,000 which has now grown to 200,000 with refugees from Canton, Shanghai, and many other points throughout China. The business of the city is completely stifled until three o'clock, and then goes on only until 7 or 8 in the evening. Conferences are impossible.

Many of the official offices have left the city, and before established in the country. This is true of some of the Chinese Red Cross offices; emergency hospital; the post office general headquarters for the country; National Health Administration offices, the Suifu-Kunming Railway, etc.

We reached Kunming on the 28th; no air raid on 29th, nor warning. On Saturday 29th, Sunday the 30th, Monday the 1st and Tuesday the 2nd, air raid warnings were sounded between nine and nine thirty A.M. Therefore, we, together with the other 200,000 left the city, for the fields, and spent the day on the road, or visiting some of the offices above mentioned, guests of the post office department, railroad administration, etc. It is a pathetic war picture, to see tens of thousands of men, women, and children, packing the highways and byways, in their rush to get out of the

[illegible] spend the entire day sitting on the side of the road, seeking safety perhaps [illegible] of the many cemeteries where there is safety from machine gun fire, sitting [illegible] trees, along drainage canals, or go to the hills. And this goes on day after day. Every mode of transportation is used; many trucks; private automobiles, rickshaws with one or two passengers, with bedding, suit cases, and other possessions piled high so that one can scarcely see the passengers; women and men carrying unusual prized possessions, which might be a clock, or a pig, a suitcase with clothes, or carrying some dishes; one unusual sight reported was one carrying a coffin; A coffin seemingly is not in unusual possession, and is considered a worthy present for a dutiful son to give to his parents; women carrying, in the usual way, the stick across the shoulder, with baby in one basket at one end, and basket at other end filled with prized things; pigs carried, so as not to have them lose weight by having to run for miles; carts of every description; donkeys, etc. etc. Just an endless stream of humanity, seeking shelter from bombs from the air, with which they have had some experience, and against which there is utterly no protection, nor defenses. Kunming is flat, and there are practically no air raid shelters in the city.

KUNMING LIVING COSTS

Living costs in Kunming, are somewhat comparable with Chungking as described fully in previous reports. This has caused unusual hardships on the salaried classes, and student bodies. For the former group some allowances for "food" are now being made, over and above established salaries. No special effort was made to study cost of special items, but information given to us by Consul Perkins, and many other contacts, leads me to believe the increase in costs over normal times is about ten times. A few items which I recall were mentioned, is Ovaltine which costs 65.00 per ton; Klim, dried milk 36.00 per tin; cabbage, of lettuce variety, 40 and 50 cents per head; gasoline 28.00 per gallon; sugar, 10.00 per lb; locally raised pears 1.20 each; tangerines raised locally 40 cents each; small can milk, similar to our small cans in U. S. 5.00 can; rice 80.00 for 100 catties; bread 1.50 a loaf; 300 to 400 for a suit of clothes; 60.00 to 70.00 for pair of shoes; 35.00 for one lb. of coffee, or 1.80 per cup in hotel, and 1.50 noted elsewhere.

Inflation seems to be in swing, but the life of the city goes on, notwithstanding the handicaps of losing much time. Kunming is a fine city, with excellent climate, fine clear skies, refreshing air, beautiful hills surrounding, with a pretty lake adjoining the city.

ARRANGEMENTS MADE IN KUNMING FOR TRANSPORTATION BEYOND.

We were received by the Provincial Governor, Young Lim (?) who was most cordial, and wished us to convey to Washington, his appreciation of the American attitude, and present gifts to China. He extended his offer to do anything which might be asked of him in making arrangements at Kunming. One of our special problems was to locate a suitable godown, not within the city, for reasons described above. He immediately stated that he would appoint a committee of three, to seek a suitable place, and we should indicate the type of godown desired. We later found that he had especially raised the question with a Mr. Niao, or Miu Yune-tai, head of the Provincial Bank, who is reported to be second to the governor in influence, The following day, we were the guests of the Director and Engineer in Chief of the Suifu-Kunming Railway Company, Mr. F. K. Sah, and his assistant, Mr. M. H. Yuen. When he learned of our needs, he made available to us one of his own godowns, which is ideal for our purposes.

This godown is located about three kilometers out of the city, on the Kunming-Kwaiyang highway; the railroad runs right along side of the godown, so that if and when railroad service may be available, it will be possible to load from the godown, through

[illegible] arrangements which Mr. Sah can provide of spotting cars there. This co-[illegible]tion of Mr. Sah settled a real problem for us, as we had spent considerable time [illegible]iting prospective sites, and many godowns which would not serve the purpose at all; further we wished to avoid the expense and delay of building a godown.

[illegible]-KUNMING RAILWAY COMPANY.

Mr. Sah, director of the above road, is also responsible for work that is currently going on, in the hopes of some day, having a railroad connecting Kunming, China and Lashio, Burma. The sincereity of the effort is attested by much work, which we witnessed on our trip over the Burma Road, in tunnels, and embankments, for the future Road. Actual railroad construction, however, is stopped because of lack of railroad rail, and equipment, and inability to get it in.

However, actual construction of a railroad is going on at present; one section is completed between Anning and Kunming. Anning is located 34 kilometers West of Kunming; we were advised that the section between Kunming and Sutsing, 160 kilometers East, towards Kweiyang will be finished by February 1st, and which will utilize all the available rail, taken up from the Indo China railroad. If this rail-road materializes as planned by February 1st, it may be most practicable for us to consider a rail haul for that distance to save gasoline, and perhaps be economical. If this proves to be the case, it will be necessary to establish a godown at Anning and one at Sutsing, for unloading and reloading. This whole question needs consider-able further study on the ground, which has been thoroughly discussed with my Super-intendent of Transportation and Godowns, Mr. John L. Hendry, with whose name you are familiar, as his employment was authorized through Washington to the Shanghai Committee. Further details of this organization, will be discussed in later reports, when I get back to Kunming, to further set up organization and procedures.

Suitable conferences were most difficult to arrange in Kunming for reasons described. Dr. Francis Pan, was busy with members of his own organization for much of the time; one conference scheduled by him had to be postponed; the second one, at which any conclusions were reached, were terminated within 30 minutes because of air raid warning; during the interim Dr. Pan received urgent request from his Chungking office to return there, which he did the following morning.

TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENT BEYOND KUNMING.

I was unwilling to enter any plan beyond Kunming, which would embrace supplying gasoline and oil, plus uncontrolled bonus plans. In the first place, this arrangement would again have put us into the gasoline business, for which there is little reason, as other can purchase gasoline and oil at the same rate we do, and be shipped at the same rates, excepting perhaps the most insignificant transit tax, which we have no assurance of getting on gasoline, as other relief agencies are required to pay it. Further, the difficulties are great to clear gasoline and oil through the customs, requiring special papers for the gasoline, separate papers for the drums, special papers for oil, greases, containers, etc, which the transportation companies must carry on any way, and there is no reason for the Red Cross to go into gasoline supplies, especially inasmuch as it has never been contemplated that we would do more than subsidize transportation up to a certain point, to be decided upon. I was there-fore much pleased when this question did not come up at all.

Our brief conference was held with Dr. Francis Pan, Dr. C. Pan of the Chinese Red Cross, Mr. Paul Wang of the Ministry, Mr. Frank Ling, who has jurisdiction over all highway transport. He is with the National Highway Administration, and I believe he has headquarters at Kunming; also Mr. P. K. Sih, in charge of the Kunming Central Office, commercial trucks, for the China Transport Corporation. Dr. Francis Pan, immediately announced that the China Transport Corporation would be responsible for the transportation of our goods beyond Kunming. This is in direct contrast with the arrangements for the Lashio Kunming section, where the China Transport Corporation is obviously unequipped to undertake the assignment wholly, although they will participate with some of their trucks, and other agencies are providing trucks, all of which will operate under the jurisdiction and control of the Ministry of Communications, under the plan whereby we will provide gasoline and oil for round trip, plus 20 dollars U. S. for every ton delivered, based on truck capacity, rather than actual weight delivered. The whole story about the China Transport Corporation is still somewhat of a mystery, and Dr. Francis Pan is strangely quiescent about it. Our diagnosis is, that the whole plan of a centralized transportation agency fell through when Bassi, Van Patten, and Sheehin, left the picture. This seems to be the consensus of opinions heard.

Agreement

Our agreement, to carry supplies from Kunming to Kweiynag and Kunming to Luchow, is to pay the lowest official scheduled RATE for transportation of supplies, the same as the government itself pays, NAMELY, 2.00 Chinese National Currency, per metric ton, kilometer mile. The actual rate is 2.06 (dollars) Chinese National Currency, which, however, includes 6 cents road tax. I announced that we of course should not be expected to pay taxes in China, and Mr. Baker was assigned to clear the matter officially at Chungking. It is not my intention to pay these taxes, and I trust no difficulty will be experienced in getting this waiver.

It is also my understanding that this rate is based upon cost, without profit. For our files, I shall endeavor to obtain a statement clarifying this understanding.

Also, I wish to leave no question, that this rate is based strictly upon actual weight carried this time, without any question of truck capacity. If that question is raised again, I firmly believe it will be necessary to reopen the whole question of costs, and arrive at a flat gold sum allotment of money which we will pay as a subsidy to these two points. Kunming to Kweiyang is 662 kilomenters, which at exchange rate of 20 to 1, which prevailed when we were in Kunming, will cost approximate 60 dollars U. S. per ton, and from Kunming to Luchow, 913 kilometers or approximately 83 dollars U. S. Per ton. This is exclusive of the road tax. The time element, did not permit of adequate discussion of the whole issue. It is my plan to get back into Kunming and Chungking at the earliest possible date, to prevent any wrinkles developing. I wish to say at this juncture however, that we have met up through out with the finest spirit possible, of appreciation, and cooperation.

As the program degelops, we will bear in mind, the possibilities of whether or not the agencies receiving our supplies may or may not be able to handle them themselves perhaps out of Kunming. I have been very favorably impressed with the calibre of the entire Chinese Red Cross organization; also with such contacts as I have been permitted to make to date with the National Health Administration, such as Dr. P. Z. King, its head. Little knowledge is had concerning the Army Medical Supply Corps, although it is known that they have entrusted to the Chinese Red Cross much responsibility for transportation of medical supplies all the way from Rangoon.

[illegible] conceivable that a plan for the future could work out to release our responsibility [illegible] than Kweiyang and Lashaw. This will receive current consideration of Mr. [illegible] and myself, as we move along in the program. Certainly the present is not the time for any conclusions.

GASOLINE OIL LUBRICANTS

In an earlier cable, I advised that immediate commitments were to be made for purchases of gasoline, oil, and lubricants. This has not been done, as approval of and for a gasoline dum at Lashio, and construction thereof, has been deferred pending the formal approval of the Governmental authorities. Further, Dr. Pan advised they had some oil and gasoline on hand for thearly shipments. We are supplying 100 gasoline gallons, U. S. standards, 3 gallons mobiloil, one lb. grease 3/4 lb. gear fluid for round trip, for each ton, truck capacity, delivered Kunming. Plans are being worked out this week with Mr. C. On, Manager of Ministry of Communications here, as to time of delivery, and clearance of customs arrangements. The purchases will be made from Standard Oil. This is one of the factors, which has contributed to delay in the preparation of an all inclusive budget. You may be interested also in the fact that gasoline and lubricants used within Burma, require payment of full customs or 11 annas per gallon tax, approximately 22 cents, which brings our cost of gasoline in Burma to about 55 U. S. cents per gallon. 15.91% of entire gasoline consumption Lashio to Kunming, is used in Burma. Oil and grease costs are also proportionately high. A rough estimate, is that it will cost us over one hundred dollars per ton delivered in Kunming, including costs from boat at Rangoon to Kunming, with intermediate expenses. The detail of all this will be provided in my comprehensive budget.

SHIPPING ARRANGEMENTS.

This will confirm final arrangements were concluded by me this week, with Steel Brothers & Co., Ltd., of Rangoon, for handling all of our supplies to be received on the "Express" and "Washingtonian", quinine shipments, and subsequent shipments. They are the oldest establishment, and largest in Burma, and fully competent to act in that capacity. Our dealings with Kenneth Lockley, Manager of the Import Department have been very cordial, and he has expressed himself as not desiring to make any undue profits on Red Cross business.

Final authorisations were extended by me today to them and to the Customs authorities, to have them act for us, in any and all matters, in clearing shipments through Rangoon.

The railroad as previously advised, have given us the benefit of a rate of 8 rupees, two annas, six pies per ton, which is a negligible rate, as compared with regular rate of 64 ruppees per ton for that classification. Documentary application and certification is required, to be signed by a Red Cross representative. This certification until this week, was required through the representatives of a local organization, which is a branch of the Chinese National Red Cross, and called the Burma Chinese National Red Cross Fund Society, whose officers, W. T. Kho, or his brother, W. T. Shan, were authorised to sign. Arrangements have now been made, whereby the Manager of the Rangoon Branch Office, of the National Red Cross Society, C. T. Chen, is the only representative authorised to sign for any Red Cross reduced rates, and will act for us in this manner.

The railroad arrangements, and clearnace between Mr. Chen and Steel Brothers, was clarified in personal conference arranged by me in Steel Brothers office. Confirmation has gone by letter.

CUSTOMS AT WANTING CHINA.

Arrangements have been made, for the regularly assigned Chinese Red Cross representative at Wanting, to act for us, in clearing the customs at Wanting. He is Mr. Go. Young.

We have failed to receive customs releases from Dr. H. H. King, Minister of Finance. Mr. Baker who proceeded to Chungking from Kunming was requested to clear this matter and to advise me in writing.

CUSTOMS AT RANGOON BURMA

On my return to Rangoon, I found that Governmental orders had not yet been issued covering our supplies. Inasmuch as our ship was arriving today, this question received my immediate attention. Through Mr. Lees, Revenue Secretary, the matter was expedited, and orders were issued yesterday. It is now cleared, and seemingly has been generously acted upon, and will include our office equipment and supplies used in Burma. We probably will have to pay the duty on food supplies, although Mr. Lees said he "would have no objection, if we could persuade Mr. Oxbury, Customs Collector to pass them without duty". At any rate this is a negligible question.

SHIPPING PAPERS

The Shipping reports and waybills, for the "Express" and "Washongtonian", were received in good order, and I wish to compliment our General Supply Officer on the manner in which it was handled. The information required was furnished in such detail, that no problem existed in the customs and with Steel Brothers.

It would be helpful if we can obtain six copies of the shipping lists. We were furnished with only three copies, two of which are required to be sent back signed, and one copy for Steel Brother forwarding agents. We will need one copy for our own files, and extra copies for customs authorities at Wanting, China, and Khuykok, Burma.

On the shipping lists for the "Express" cubic measurement and gross weight are both provided, whereas on shipping lists for the "Washingtonian" only gross weight was given. It will be very helpful for us to know in advance, the cubic measurement of the various items, in order that careful advance planning may be given to godown arrangements, space requirements, truck loading arrangements, etc. Will you kindly refer this request to amiable George C. Smith, who knows how to smile, even though bowed down with grief, woe, and labor, to which I am sure I am contributing my share.

Unfortunately, all of our office supplies, forms, equipment, etc. are on the Washingtonian, which will not arrive until the 31st, we are informed by their local agents, McKinnon McKenzie and Co. This produces some little problem but the smaller shipment arrived today, and will give us some needed experience.

SHIPMENTS.

I trust my cable, 11th, reached you without delay, confirmed as follows:

CABLE TWO BURMA ROAD CONDITIONS VERY SATISFACTORY CLOSED BUT TWO DAYS SINCE REOPENING STOP RETURNED RANGOON SATURDAY SHIPPING LISTS RECEIVED EXPRESS DUE THIRTEENTH WASHINGTONIAN THIRTY FIRST ANALYSIS WEIGHTS CUBIC CONTENTS BOTH SHIPMENTS REFLECTS DISPROPORTIONATE AMOUNT GAUZE COTTON AVERAGE LESS THAN NINE POUNDS CUBIC FOOT COMPARED AVERAGE TWENTY EIGHT OTHER GOODS WILL CAUSE EXPENSIVE TRUCK LOADING NEED MORE HEAVY CARGO FOR MIXED LOADING SUGGEST SECOND INSTALLMENT BE SHIPPED IMMEDIATELY EXCLUDING COTTON GAUZE ABSORBENT COTTON ALSO SHIP ONE HUNDRED TONS EACH GREY DRILL YELLOW DRILL SHEETING NEED SIX SIGNED COPIES SHIPPING LISTS REQUEST AUTHORIZATION PURCHASE NEW OR SECOND HAND CAR LASHIO LETTER TO MCCOY OCTOBER TWENTY FIFTH YOUR CABLE 1299 RECEIVED LASHIO REMAINING RANGOON UNTIL SHIP UNLOADED

The sheeting, drilling is heavy, and will go far in helping us arrange economical loading. Analysis of the two shipments being received this month reflects some interesting comparisons on space occupied by gauze and cotton, compared with other goods. This may prove an expensive actuality, and needs our careful working out, since we are paying on truck capacity, and not weight. One partial solution is more heavy goods for mixed loading.

The ship which arrived today, is being unloaded; the pile of cotton and gauze was startling, and I imagined all of our trucks piled high with those items, most of which is wind.

Please have a study made whether or not it is possible to compress gauze to the same pressure, and tightness as cloth. On the face of it, it would appear that this could be done without detrimental action to the gauze. Why not? I shall also make inquiry of the medical authorities here and get their reaction. Trucking seems too valuable in this part of the world for such light commodity, when other more expensive goods might be needed more. This whole question needs some further exploration also with the National Health Administration and Army, and Chinese Red Cross, which will be raised on appropriate opportunity.

TRAFFIC CONGESTION ON RAILROAD

The traffic congestion on the railroad is still the same as previously reported. In discussing this matter with Mr. Milne, traffic manager, he stated that the freight run between Rangoon and Lashio, should be done on an average of three to four days, Experience has shown that it will take ten days from date of loading at Rangoon.

Our first boat, the "Express" is in, with the American Flag painted in duplicate, fore and aft, on both sides of the ship. The flag develops a greater significance to one away from the country; and it was good to see.

It began unloading immediately, and our supplies are piling high in the Government customs godown. The ship will finish unloading Saturday the 14th. No railroad wagons will be loaded before Monday the 16th, so it appears that it will be about Christmas before our supplies actually reach Lashio.

We have been assured by the Railroad that they will be able to place [illegible] wagons at our disposal.

What the railroad question will be when the great credits granted by the United States become operative, remains to be seen. An even greater question will be, what will happen on the Road so far as truck capacity is concerned to haul things over into China. Trucks are at a great premium, and thousands could, and ought to be used.

STAFF AND PERSONNEL

I expect that you have heard from Mr. Baker either from Chungking, or Hongkong, where he had gone after leaving Kunming, December 2nd.

Mr. John L. Hendry, whom I have appointed as Superintendent of Transportation and Godowns for West China operations, arrived at Rangoon on November 20th, and immediately proceeded to Lashio, He carried through on building plans, during period we were en route over the Burma Road, and return to Lashio December 2nd, P. M. he is with me in Rangoon at present. As an item of unusual interest, wish to report that in order to proceed on his journey to get to Rangoon out of China, proceeding from Foochow, Kukien province, he had to walk from Foochow, or rather Kanchang to Kulangsu, a distance of 219 miles. I enclose a copy of Mr. Hendry's letter to me December 9th, which I asked him to prepare describing the trip. It tends to illustrate some of the transportation problems which exist in China, where trains, and buses are non-existent, or a great rarity, with streams blockaded, etc.

A copy of Mr. Hendry's personal application form is also enclosed for your official records. I am delighted to have the services of Mr. Hendry, who is a splendid, dependable person, and will prove a valuable asset to us in the transportation and godown field of responsibilities.

I have also employed a Mr. Lim, Chinese member of the Chinese National Red Cross, staff member at Lashio. English trained and educated in London, speaks Chinese, Hindustani, and has had the desired experience in English, and in Chinese customs clearances. His service will therefore be valuable to us at Lashio. The only uncertainty seems to be the extent to which the Chinese Red Cross may continue to look to him for service, as his attainments are not equalled by other members of the staff.

I have also employed a Mr. Soderbom, whose parents are known to Mr. Baker, who will be the Lashio representative of transportation and godowns under Mr. Hendry's field organization. Soderbom has been connected with the Sven Hedin Exploration organization in charge of trucks, etc. Mr. Baker does not know the boy, nor does Mr. Hendry, — We have agreed on a salary of $200.00 per month. A detail of his qualifications, and whether completely suitable to the assignment will be reported upon later.

Adequate help is at a premium in this section of the country. No Americans, and Lashio offers no attraction.

In Kunming to the contrary, there are many skilled, trained office people, refugees from Shanghai, Canton, etc. While the best have been picked up and assigned by businesses, and agencies now established there, we have reason to believe that with the assistance of contacts which we have there, a distinctive, fine organization can be developed with Chinese. Incidentally, Mr. Hendry speaks Chinese fluently, was born in China, and spent his life there. Mr. Soderbom, who is a son of Missionary parents, also speaks Chinese.

We will need additions to our staff at Lashio such as accountant clerk, [illegible] and office clerk. These will be retained in Lashio through commercial houses, or schools located here. One of our problems continues to be the selection of a "good" cook. We shall probably be content to get any kind of a cook.

FORMS AND PROCEDURES

When we left Rangoon November 16th, orders had been placed for several forms. It illustrates the speed of the territory, to tell you that while these were promised for within a week or ten days, we are still awaiting the release of the forms, which are now promised for today.

With next week's report, I hope to give you a detail of procedures, and copies of forms for your information and file.

Considerable work has been done in developing a system for conduct of godowns and transportation; perpetual inventories, weekly reporting system, cost factors, etc. These will be reported upon subsequently, when the system is completed, and after further conference with the Ministry of Communications here.

BUDGET

I previously commented about a budget. I request your indulgence, until after the first week in January before submitting same, when I shall be in a position to more adequately assay all of the interim items to be included in the budget, some of which are still hanging in the balance.

Mr. Baker shall be expected to submit a detail of the Hongkong budget, and set up the accounting procedures there; that whole operation, out of Hongkong, is still in state of organization, and action to be taken likewise to make it an American Red Cross operation. The Foreign auxiliary of the Chinese Red Cross there, is indeed a splendid, interested group, wholly English, and is doing a fine job. Previous report gave names of some of the persons engaged in bringing supplies in through that route.

ACCOUNTING AND BANKING

We appreciate your approval for use of the National City Bank of New York, for reasons previously expressed. They are the only New York Bank represented here, are very cooperative, and served us well, when we were seeking information, in contrast to the other institution where the best we could get was that too many things could not be done, with the suggestion that we could get the details of the banking restrictions from a copy of the acts, which he would be glad to provide us.

We have a dollar account at the National City Bank, Rangoon Branch.

We also have a ruppee account at the National City Bank.

There is one bank in Lashio, a branch bank of the Bank of China.

In Kunming, there are several good banking institutions, (a) Large branch of the Bank of China, which is a government institution , and therefore perfectly safe, as long as the country stands (b) Bank of Indo Chien, a French institution, (c) Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, represented throughout China.

In any of the Kunming banks, it is possible to have an unlimited dollar account, where drafts can be purchased, bills paid, etc.

****

It was found necessary on my return to Rangoon, to make formal application to the Reserve Bank of India, for exemption from the Government of Burma Notification issued on the 23rd of November 1940 under Defence of Burma Rule 92 (2) calling upon all residents in British Burma to tender to the Reserve Bank of India, their holdings in United States Dollars. This exemption was quickly granted, with Mr. Brady's assistance, and we can now draw on our dollar account at will, for appropriate expenditures, and obtain drafts from the National City Bank, for payment of our bills, requiring dollar payments.

With this report, I enclose copy of correspondence regarding the 2000 U. S. dollar contribution to Chinese Relief from International Rotary, which is self-explanatory.

****

It shall probably be necessary to open up our general accounting office in Kunming later on, as it becomes more apparent daily, that the majority of our payments could be handled there. It appears that we shall be required to pay for transportation to the China Transport Corporation in advance, in other words prepay their accounts, although I asked Mr. Baker to clear this in Chungking. If this is done, it shall be possible I am sure to have the Ministry of Communications submit their bills there for payment instead of Lashio, thereby centralising under Mr. Fifer, payment of all, or the major part of bills there, and arrange for a dual signature plan, as required.

As the matter stands now, for transportation from Lashio to Kunming, payments will be made on audited bills in Lashio, and Kunming, we will be obliged to pay prepaid trucking charges, as we are using the organized agency. However, our credit should be unquestioned, and be permitted to pay on weekly, or monthly account, which may enable us to continue the Lashio accounting headquarters, free from restrictions of air raids, etc. which must be borne in mind at Kunming.

In Kunming we will need (1) a dollar account, which will be established, and maintained by remittances by dollar drafts from our account in the National City Bank of Rangoon and (2) Chinese National Currency account to be established and maintained by conversion of dollar exchange in Kunming.

I propose that we use the Bank of China in Kunming as our banking agency, as I believe the Bank to be as safe as the country, and we can control the size of our account there, within the limits of our need. In other words buy drafts in restricted amounts, and deposit them, and convert them as needed.

The selection of Kunming as the central auditing and payment location is also predicated upon the fact that thousands of dollars in fact tens of thousands of our payments will be made for commitments out of Kunming. Please refer to previous sections of this report as to the approximate cost per ton to Kweiyang, and Luchow.

A dual signature plan could be maintained than at Kunming, with Mr. Fifer as accountant; and myself and perhaps Mr. Hendry as the alternate for the Director. The dual signature plan is of course effective at the National City bank on our account here, and will be continued in the operating account which we shall have to have in the Bank

[illegible], for rupees in Lashio.

I am still struggling with the necessity of knowing how to restrict individual advances. Mr. Baker has been given the necessary personal advances for travel, etc. Likewise Mr. Fifer, Mr. Hendry and myself. These henceforth will be cleared each two weeks, i. e. submission of expense vouchers for credit, etc. I have approved a total of 2000 00 U. S. for Mr. Hendry who leaves for Kunming today to begin setting up office arrangements. I do not believe it proper, nor sound to continue to advance large sums to Mr. Hendry to pay personally, the large sums necessary for transportation out of Kunming. It seems necessary to set up a dual arrangement, by having Mr. Fifer stationed there, or employing an assistant accountant.

Mr. Fifer has been requested to give this whole plan serious consideration. I understand that he is writing Mr. Simons, to get his reactions, and suggestions, and I will likewise appreciate any comments, suggestions, or advice which can be forwarded to me by cable or letter. Large individual advances to Mr. Hendry, or any other member of the staff, must be restricted.

I will write you again air mail, on the latter questions, and decisions reached, within the next week or ten days.

Air mail is slow, taking an average of month to reach us.

Respectfully submitted,

(signed) Walter Wesselius,
Associate Director.

P. S. I am still my own best stenographer. Tell Miss Winmel I need her here, and Mrs. Willetts, that my correspondence is stacking up, and she should come and set up my files.

Rangoon,
December 9, 1940

Mr. Walter Wesselius, Associate Director,
American National Red Cross, China Relief,
Rangoon, Burma

Dear Mr. Wesselius,

Acting upon receipt of a telegram, emanating from Mr. W. Judd of the American National Red Cross, China Relief Committee, of Shanghai China, informing me that my engagement by the American Red Cross for work in the field in West China had been confirmed and that I should report in Shanghai at the earlies date possible, I left Foochow on Oct. 16th, 1940 to proceed overland to Amoy to take passage on a steamer to Shanghai.

From Foochow I travelled down the Min River by a small junk to Kanchong, which is at the head of a tidal creek running into the Min, a distance of 18 miles. At Kanchong I called two load carriers to carry my baggage and I walked to Futsing, where I stopped over night with Dr. Skinner of the American Mission. While there we received word that a steamer was expected to run thru the Japanese blockade of the China Coast, and would arrive in Haikow, a small sea port about 17 miles distant within two days time and that it would be returning to Shanghai promptly. So, I decided that I should attempt to save time and money by travelling on this steamer, rather than continuing my long overland trec to Amoy. On the following day, the 18th, I walked to Naikow from Futsing, accompanied by the two load carriers with my baggage. Before reaching the town, three Japanese airplanes were seen to be circling around over the environs of the town. Upon arriving the Chinese Customs Officer said that the blockade running steamer was expected in port on the following day. On the second day, Japanese airplanes again came over and bombed surrounding villages. On the third day of waiting in Haikow, the planes came over out town and machine gunned some of the streets, but dropped no bombs. After waiting three days with no news of the steamer I decided that I would have to carry out my original plantto walk to Kulangsu (Amoy), where I would be able to catch a steamer on its regular run to Shanghai. I again called load carriers and got an early start the next morning, at about 3:00 o'clock, as we knew that we would have to make a distance of about forty miles that first day, to Hankong, where I would find lodging accomodations with a family of the American Methodist Mission. From Hankong we had five days more of hiking across country before reaching Kulangsu (the international concession at Amoy).

After waiting two days in Amoy I boarded the S. S. Tjisadane and arrived in Shanghai on the evening of Oct. 31st. I am attaching hereto a travel schedule, showing the detailed expenses of this trip from Foochow to Shanghai.

At Shanghai I conferred with Mr. Judd and Maj. Arthur Bassett and was instructed to proceed by first available steamer to Rangoon, where I was to report to Dr. Baker and yourself. They suggested that I should proceed via Hongkong to Bangkok and thence by airplanesto Rangoon. Owing to my American passport having expired, it was necessary for me to take out a new passport at the American Consulate, before leaving Shanghai. I took the SS Heinrich Jessen (a Danish vessel under charter to a British company) from Shanghai, via Hongkong to Bangkok, on Nov. 4th and arrived at Bangkok on the 17th, just two hours after the Imperial Airways plane (on which I had made reservations) had left for Rangoon. So, I had to spend three days in Bunkok at the Oriental Hotel, waiting for the next plane.

On the morning of November 20th I boarded the Imperial Airways plane, arriving in Rangoon after three hours of travel. I met Mr. Fifer and received a letter from

Dr. Baker, instructing me to proceed to Lashio by train immediately, bringing sleeping equipment with me. By the time I had visited the Rangoon Police Headquarters to report (as required) and had also obtained other necessary permits to travel over the railway to Lashio, I had only thirty minutes time left, in which to check out of the hotel, make the purchases and catch the train. Unfortunately, the taxi driver understood little or no english and instead of taking me to "Row's Store", I soon found that he had taken me directly to the station. So I had to have the taxi turn around and make another attempt to locate the department store and by this time there was only before train time. Upon locating the store and after finding the articles required (camp cot and blankets), I had to hastily hand the salesman the amount and grab up my purchases and run for the taxi, without waiting for them to make out the usual sales slip or to wrap up the articles. Consequently, I am unable to produce the sales slip covering the purchases. Attached hereto I am handing you the statements of my travel accounts from Foochow to Shanghai, from Shanghai to Bangkok and from Bangkok to Rangoon and on to Lashio.

Yours very truly,

(signed) John L. Hendry

AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS
CHINA RELIEF

REPORT OF TRIP MADE BY J. L. HENDRY FROM
FOOCHOW, FUKIEN PROVINCE TO SHANGHAI.

Date	FROM	TO	DISTANCE MILES	MODE OF TRAVEL
1940 Oct. 16	Foochow	Kanchong	18	Sanpan (boat) down the Min River
" 17	Kanchong	Futsing	17	Walking
" 18	Futsing	Haikow	12	"
" 19	Haikow	-----	--	Waiting
" 20	"	-----	--	"
" 21	Haikow	Hankong	40	Walking (fifteen hours)
" 22	Hankong	Tsungfei	22	"
" 23	Tsungfei	Chuanchow	30	"
" 24	Chuanchow	Yungchuan	28	"
" 25	Yunchuan	Tungan	26	"
" 26	Tungan	Hai Yuan	24	"
" 27	Hai Yuan	Kulangsu	20	" (Kulangsu is the international Concession in Amoy)
" 28	Kulangsu	-----	—	Waiting two days at the Seaview Hotel for the SS Tsijidane to proceed to Shanghai, a distance of 620 miles.
Total distance walked			237	

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Classification

Enclosure 2055-712

Record Section File No.

Copy No. 4-1

For Record Section Only

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT Indo-China

Country Reported On

Subject Indo-China - General. I. G. No. 5900

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: Interview.

Reliability: Questionable.

Summarization of Report When Required

Informant is a Swiss citizen, a commission importer-exporter in Saigon.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Heading Here

1. Informant states that the Japanese apparently are trying to take Indo-China food-stuffs in exchange for manufactured goods. The Japanese, however, can only deliver a few items, with the result that the IndO-China merchants are acquiring balances in yen which are of no practical value.

2. Rubber sold to the United States is paid for in dollars, but the dollar currency is appropriated by the government. The result of this maneuver forces business houses into dealing with the Japanese, due to lack of dollar credit.

3. At the present time, there is a shortage of essential materials, and it is the opinion of the informant that business will soon cease.

J. T. H. O'Rear

J. T. H. O'REAR,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

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From HPD, G-2 Report No. 36 Date March 17, 1941.
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WAR DEPARTMENT
OCS Form 17

Manila—1-27-41—2,000

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 4 1941 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL., INTEL. DIV. 2055-712 WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

In reply refer to:
350.05—Indo China

MANILA, P. I.

January 27, 1941

Subject: Indo-China

To : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department

1. This office has established contact with a number of thoroughly dependable and loyal prominent business men, who are affording us an opportunity to meet and to obtain the confidential views of visiting business associates.

2. An interview was thus obtained, on January 23, with a grain and cereal exporter from Saigon, temporarily in Manila to arrange transshipments. This informant, in discussing the situation in Indo-China, corroborated some of the conclusions this office had already reached through other means. He also submitted, even if biased, a clearer insight into the conditions faced by Indo-China.

3. According to this informant, Japan is facing a 40% decrease in her rice crop. The accuracy of this estimate is inconsequential, but the expected decline in the crop furnishes a plausible motive for the Japanese occupation of Indo-China. Japan wants rice from Indo-China, rather than bases for military operations against the Burma Road or Chungking, according to our informant.

4. The informant was very positive in stating that Japan engineered the operations of Thailand against Indo-China. He was likewise emphatic in stating that Japan fomented the recent communist uprising in Cambodia. The uprising was put down by inflicting some three to four thousand casualties, but he added that a recurrence may be expected, implying "if negotiations with Japan include too much recalcitrance on the part of Indo-China."

5. Indo-China has three major items of export available annually: 1,750,000 tons of rice; 500,000 to 600,000 tons of maize; and 75,000 tons of rubber. Japan can no longer obtain rice from Burma or Thailand; in the first case blocked by the British, and in the second case blocked by the refusal of the Thailand Chinese millers to deal with the Japanese. This leaves Indo-China as a source. Negotiations are now being held, the Japanese endeavoring to contract for 700,000 tons of rice annually with periodic shipments throughout the year. The Japanese want to pay for the rice with blocked yen. Indo-China already has a considerable balance of blocked yen in her favor, and does not want to acquire more. The informant expressed it, "Japan has nothing but junk to offer us, and what do we want with more shirts?"

CONFIDENTIAL

File

6. Indo-China is doomed to submit to the Japanese, states the informant, if for no other reason than to stop the Thai operations before complete Japanese occupation. Indo-China lacks military forces worthy of the name. With an enemy hammering at the border, communists straining at the leash at home, and the Japanese pushing in day after day, Indo-China must perforce make the best deal she can with Japan so that her people can resume the normal struggle to exist.

7. Japan will succeed in obtaining the 700,000 tons of rice, probably at her own terms, which means practically for nothing, and will also take the 75,000 tons of rubber. What Indo-China will do with her maize is a new major problem.

8. Politically, the "Free France" versus "Vichy" cleavage no longer exists in Indo-China. DeGaulle lost his following at Dakar. Our informant stated that the "Free French" would have accepted a British occupation of Dakar, but cannot condone DeGaulle's part in the fiasco. The cleavage now in Indo-China delicately leaves France out of the picture. It is "pro-British" versus "anti-British" entirely. The informant adds that nearly every Frenchman in Indo-China has relatives at home. Retaliation upon the home people is greatly feared, another explanation for the "British" cleavage whenever political sentiments are expressed with the greatest of discretion.

9. This office believes that the value of the opinions expressed by the informant lies in the perspective afforded for viewing current events in Indo-China rather than in the absolute accuracy of his statements.

10. Inclosed herewith is a press clipping, "Collapse Near in Indo-China Says Traveler." The article implies that it is an interview held in Manila, but it is really a dispatch which was smuggled out of Indo-China.

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MAR - 4 - AM 3:20

J.T.H. O'REAR,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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BULLETIN

JAN 24 1941
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Enclosures

205-5-713

Record Section File No.

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For Record Section Only

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT

Country Reported On

Subject Hongkong-Canton Area. I. G. No.

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: Intelligence summaries, South China Patrol, U.S. Asiatic Fleet. Reliability: Good.

Summarization of Report When Required

The following are extracts from intelligence summaries written by the Commander of the South China Patrol, U.S.S. Mindanao.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 15 1941

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Heading Here

1. During the latter part of 1937, several Chinese maritime customs cruisers took refuge from the Japanese by entering Hongkong waters. Since that time they have been lying idle. The Japanese made representations to the British Government from time to time in an effort to obtain custody of the vessels but with no success. Six of these ships, one about 1,000 tons and the others from 600 to 700 tons each, have now (March 17, 1941) left their anchorage and are in the Royal Navy Dockyard at Hongkong, being refitted. It is not known definitely the intended disposition of the cruisers. From conversations with British naval personnel, there is reason to believe that these former Chinese customs cruisers will be sent to Malaya for duty as patrol boats of the Royal Navy Reserve. Some regular British naval personnel have already been assigned to these vessels for duty.

2. On arrival of the U.S.S. Mindanao at Canton on March 17th, it was learned that there would be a "black-out" exercise and air raid precaution drill conducted on the 17th, 18th, and 19th. The Commander of the South China Patrol was able to witness these drills. The following are some of his observations:

a. Considering the fact that Canton has a large population of Chinese who, although under Japanese domination, have not been entirely subjugated, the problem of handling this horde of people is interesting. Control of traffic was accomplished by Japanese sentries being stationed throughout the city on main streets. When the alarm was sounded, all traffic - vehicular, rick-shaw, and pedestrian - was halted on the spot. The pedestrians were told to seek shelter in buildings or under over-hanging balconies. The sentries prevented the movement of traffic until the "all clear" signal was sounded.

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From M. A. HPD G-2 Report No. 82 Date April 9, 1941

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WAR DEPARTMENT OCS Form 17

Manila—1-27-41—2,000

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Hongkong-Canton Area.

h. The "black-outs" apparently were successful from what could be observed. Japanese civilians as well as Japanese troops, functioned as air-raid wardens, and made inspections during the "black-outs". It was expected that the great numbers of sampans, moored near the Bunds with lights and fires, would be a major problem, but the Japanese Harbor Police made inspections in motor boats, shouting orders to douse lights, and it was noted that these orders were obeyed with alacrity.

g. On Wednesday, March 19th, drills were held at odd hours, as surprise alarms. Signs of improvement were noted as a result of the previous day's exercises. During the night of Wednesday and Thursday, alarms were sounded, some for short intervals and one for a long period. The "black-outs" were successful.

f. The residents of Shamseen, the British gunboat "Seamew" and the U.S.S. Mindanao carried out "black-outs". There were three Japanese Navy vessels, two destroyers, and one mine-layer anchored near the U.S.S. Mindanao, and these vessels darkened ship each night from sunset to sunrise.

j. The Commander of the South China Patrol reports that these "black-outs" were the first held since the Japanese occupation of Canton. Canton, situated inland with a water approach, a railway line to the interior, with food supplies available, and with sufficient man-power, is of strategic importance. In the hands of the Chinese, it could be used as a most important base for operations in South China and would give the Chinese a route from the sea to inland China. The reason for the "black-outs" may be a result of the realization of the importance of Canton. There have been persistent rumors, but confirmation has not been received, that the Chinese recently attacked the Japanese airfield at Canton with bombers.

J.T.H. O'Hear

J.T.H. O'HEAR,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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REC'D, M. I. B., O. C. S. NOV 26 1918

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
M.I. Br. Branch

SUBJECT . . . USE OF CHINESE TROOPS. . . . . .

. . . . . .

FROM. . . H. A. . . . . .

NO. . . 1264. . . . . DATE. . . . October 23rd, 1918. . . .

REPLYING TO NO. . . . . DATE. . . . . .

NOV 29 1918

2009-9

WAR DEPARTMENT

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On Oct. 3, 1918, I reported to the Chief of the Military Information Bureau that I considered it possible to organize as many as may be needed of one hundred thousand Chinese troops for use in guarding the Railway lines of communication, arsenals, bridges, supplies, etc., between Vladivostock and the Ural Mountains or the Volga River, thus releasing Allied and Russian troops for duty at the front.

My idea was that the fighting strength of the Russian and Allied troops in European Russia would be increased by whatever units may be relieved from the duties of guarding the long lines of communications incident to any active military operations if such should be undertaken next spring by the Czechs, Russians and Allied troops.

The Chinese troops are probably unable to undertake even in conjunction with Allied troops, any military operations involving combat with a well-trained enemy, but their use as a guard of the lines of communication would be more in the nature of a police, protecting the supplies and railways from individuals unfriendly to the Allies or whatever political factions may be in control in Russia, rather than a military operation against trained troops. These Chinese troops could be mobilized and trained much in the same manner as the Chinese laborers sent to France by the British and French except that we would arm and equip them as infantry, which would involve more training.

My idea was that a battalion of 1000 men (four companies) would be the largest organization, and after consulting with some of the British that were interested in getting coolies for France, I feel that we would have no difficulty in recruiting 100 battalions of 1000 men each. Mobilization camps could be established at Peking, Tientsin, Chefoo, Nanking, etc., and as battalions are available they could be sent to designated points to relieve Allied troops.

The greatest difficulty will be in securing properly qualified officers. My idea was that we could establish Officers' training camps at the places designated for camps of mobilization and before starting to recruit request the Chinese Government to designate (or ~~rather~~ otherwise assign) say 5000 suitable men to attend these officers' training camps, and

after

after a three months' course designate 2500 or whatever number seems necessary to report on a fixed date at the camps of mobilization and on that date begin recruiting. By paying $15.00 Chinese currency per month, I am told wecouldg get all the recruits we could possibly use.

The cost to the British of their laborers is about $30.00 Chinese currency per month per man, including all overhead charges. I believe we could keep within that amount except that we would have to equip our men, which the British and French did not.

If these Chinese troops were to be used at all they would be used in small detachments that would make it difficult to ration, but by paying each man say $5.00 per month extra and require him to feed himself the men would probably be better satisfied and we would be relieved of the trouble and expense of feeding them. It seems the British and French both have had some trouble in the feeding of their laborers, but the scheme suggested is the one used in China know and may be used to advantage by us. However, it is a detail that could be worked out later.

We could secure the services of ten or fifteen Chinese-speaking Europeans or English-speaking Chinese at each camp and finally one or two for each battalion, use the drill and other regulations now in use by the Chinese army, and I believe that by next spring, say five or six months after beginning work, we would be able to send out battalions well enough trained for the work intended.

My idea is that the American Government would organize these troops under American control and pay exclusively, for as long as the trouble between the North and the South continues it would be impossible for the Chinese Government to accomplish it.

However, if there should be a settlement between the North and the South, I believe that, provided sufficient funds were loaned to China, the Chinese Government itself would gladly undertake such a mobilization, as most Chinese officers are eager to take a more active part in the war, and would gladly accept such an opportunity to form a National army such as this would offer.

The above matter is submitted to you by direction of the Chief of Military Intelligence, Washington, D. C.

The following comments by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Legation, who is very well qualified to advise regarding the difficulties such an undertaking will meet in China, are added:

The Chargé believes that since the operation of the Sino-Japanese agreement, it would be next to impossible to carry out the scheme proposed, as the Japanese would consider that the scheme was opposed to their interests and influence in China and that on account of Japanese "silent" opposition the Chinese would neverreply to requests for authority to

proceed

pressed with the organization and mobilization of Chinese in China.

The Minister concurs, that at present the Japanese would be able to successfully oppose such an undertaking, basing such opposition on the provision of the Chinese-Japanese agreement. The Minister states that he sees great merit in the scheme but that he is of the opinion that were it not for the Japanese opposition, that the Chinese Government would carry out the plan outlined provided the Chinese Government were paid a specific amount for fixed numbers of troops.

REC'D, M. I. B., O. C. S. NOV 26 1918

SUBJECT . . . . REPORTS. . . . . .

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FROM. . . H. A. . . . . .

NO. . . 1607. . . . . DATE. . . . October 22nd, 1918. .

REPLYING TO NO. . . . . DATE. 1918

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
Mil. Int. Branch.

NOV 26 1918

2009-10

WAR DEPARTMENT

CAPT. ORISPEIL

NOTED: M.I.B.

COMBAT.

Destroyed 11/27/27

Reports are inclosed on the following subjects:-

1.- Disposition of Northern and Southern Forces in Fukien and Northern Kwantung.

2.- Same for Szuchuan,-Hupeh Front.

3.- Plan for establishment of an American Press Service in China.

4.- Memorandum of approximate cost of same.

A PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AMERICAN PRESS SERVICE IN CHINA.

There are about 450 Chinese newspapers at present (February 20,1918) being published in the Republic of China and of these 450, about one hundred have been in continuous publication for a period of two years and may be said to have some stability. The native press of China is of comparatively recent development and it is only in the last ten years that the Chinese newspapers have been able to gain circulations of any size. The average circulation of the entire 450 papers would not be in excess of 3,000 copies daily, but the Chinese custom of selling a paper over and over again, greatly increases the circulation. The matter is handled in this way: the news boy brings the paper around to the readers early in the morning and then later in the day calls and gets the paper and sells it again and so on. This custom is especially noticeable in Shanghai, the chief commercial port, and the leading center for Chinese newspapers.

China has no national newspaper. The Peking Gazette, which has been suppressed, came nearer to being a national paper than any other Chinese paper, owing to the circulation of its Chinese section in all of the provincial capitals, due to its containing the official governmental mandates, and to the subsidy that the Chinese Government extended to the paper. There are two Chinese newspapers in Shanghai that have circulations of about 30,000 daily and there probably one or two in Peking and Canton that have circulations in excess of 20,000 daily.

Practically every verhacular newspaper in China got its start through a subsidy either from a political party, a governmental official (central government or provincial) and in the last few years from some foreign government or interest. The Japanese have probably lead all other outside governments in working to control the newspapers of China either through direct subsidy or through extensive advertising of Japanese merchandise, patent medicines and cosmetics being the chief commodities. In Shanghai, both the British and the French have subsidized Chinese newspapers since the beginning of the war. In addition to the foregoing attempts to control the press of China, the British American Tobacco Company, through its heavy advertising patronage exercises considerable influence on the press of China.

China. This is done to prevent the Chinese Government from taking any radical steps in relation to the foreign tobacco business in China. Opposed to the British American Tobacco Company is the native (Cantonese) Nanyang Tobacco Company which is working through the Chinese press to have the (foreign) British American Tobacco Company either excluded from China or to have its efforts handicapped. The Nanyang Company has recently purchased a Chinese newspaper in Shanghai and another in Hangchow as part of the campaign. In addition to this it supplies all Chinese newspapers with editorial material urging the Chinese to "buy the native brands and cease patronizing the foreign monopoly, that is sending money out of China".

In addition to these conflicting interests in the journalism of China, there is no question but what the Germans are still working to bolster up their cause through the Chinese press. Before the war the Germans had a plan to supply the Chinese newspapers with a press service at a low cost, and each newspaper that took the service was assured of a liberal supply of advertising from the German firms in China. The advertising of German firms in China in the native press preceding the war was more extensive than that of other nationals, and it was continued up to a few months ago when the Chinese Government issued a mandate forbidding the native papers from accepting German advertising. As a result of this practically all of the advertising has been discontinued as such, but much of it is still appearing over the names of Chinese firms that have taken over the German businesses, presumably until the close of the war. To say that the Germans have discontinued their efforts to control or influence the press of China, would be crediting them with doing something in China, where there is practically no restraint, that they have been doing in other countries in spite of the strongest governmental restraint against their activities.

In the face of these conflicting elements that are working to control the press of China it is of the highest immediate importance that America should be doing something to raise the plane of journalism in China and at the same time to acquaint the Chinese with America's aims and purposes in the war. Outside of perhaps a half dozen editors who have been educated abroad or in mission schools in China, the average Chinese editor has practically no knowledge of outside or international affairs from the standpoint of China. He knows nothing about the modern management of his paper in the American sense. He takes what is offered him in the way of editorial material or advertising usually without question. In Shanghai, it is a common practice for foreigners who have material they desire to get printed in the Chinese newspapers, to employ a Chinese to translate the material into Chinese and then provide him with sufficient funds to get the material printed in the papers and no question is ever asked as to how it was done.

A PLAN WHEREBY AMERICA CAN BE OF SERVICE IN RAISING THE STANDARD OF JOURNALISM IN CHINA AND AT THE SAME TIME BE OF SERVICE IN KEEPING THE CHINESE IN TOUCH WITH AMERICAN ACTIVITIES.

Within the last year there has been organized in Shanghai a Chinese Journalists Association that is composed of the editors of practically all of the leading vernacular newspapers in the Settlement. This organization was formed through the Chinese Y.M.C.A. in Shanghai, for the purpose of giving a course in journalism and advertising to the Chinese editors, similar to courses in these subjects that are given in many American universities. The Course in Shanghai is being given by the writer of this report, (J.B. Powell, who was a member of the faculty of the School of Journalism at the University of Missouri) and has been most successful in getting the Chinese editors interested in improving their profession. The Chinese Journalists Association, formed as a result of this course, is now working to extend the organization throughout China and it is planned to assist the publishers of Chinese newspapers through the organization of a news service and also through the organization of an advertising agency service that would facilitate the matter of placing foreign advertising in the newspapers of China.

In the opinion of the writer much good can be accomplished in raising the standard os journalism in China and in keeping the Chinese editors informed of American and Allied affairs in connection with the war, by working through this organization of Chinese editors. This may be done in the following ways:

1. Assist the Journalists Association through advice and financial help if necessary incompiling a directory of all of the Chinese newspapers in China, this directory to contain the names of the editors and publishers and information about each paper, and the city or province where it is published.

2. Establish a small trade journal to be published monthly for circulation among the editors, this journal to contain material designed to be helpful to the editors in publishing their papers, and also to contain pictures and personal material of special interest to the editors.

3. Assist the Journalists Association in establishing a small press service for Chinese newspapers, said press service to be under foreign (American) supervision, but to use the service of a foreign educated Chinese journalist who has the confidence of the Chinese editors.

4. Assist the Journalists Association in organizing an advertising department or agency to handle the matter of placing foreign advertising in the Chinese press, similar to the work done by the American Newspaper Publishers Association, and other organizations of publishers in America. This department can easily be made self supporting because of the present lack in China of an advertising agency in the modern American sense.

The foregoing plan of assisting the Press of China would be strictly in line with other American efforts to help China similar to the Rockfeller Foundation for medical education and research, the work of the Y.M.C.A. and of the various missionary enterprises now working in Ch ina, and of the flood relief and conservancy work by the American Red Cross, and similar enterprises.

Because of the conflicting elements that are constantly working to control or influence the Chinese newspapers, the editors in general are suspicious of material that comes to them without invitation and naturally expect to be paid for material that occupies much of their space. Chinese readers also have learned to be skeptical of much of the materialthat appears in their own newspapers and naturally assume that the editor received pay for unusual items. Well informed Chinese will immediately tell the questioner, which of his papers are subsidised by the Japanese, British, French and so on, and in consequence discounts the source of his news just that much.

The Japanese at present maintain two news services in China which they use mainly in circulating Japanese news and also in circulating Japanese interpretation of news from other countries. One of these services, the Eastern News Agency supplies the Chinese newspapers with a service at the cost of ten dollars a month, and some of the Chinese editors state that they pay nothing for it. Reuter is the other chief service that supplies news to the Chinese press, the price being around twenty dollars a month. In addition to these services, the Chinese themselves maintain one or two small services.

In spite of the many services supplying news to the Chinese press, the space occupied by news despatches in the average Chinese paper is probably less than ten per cent of the entire space in the paper. This is due to the fact that the average Chinese newspaper hasn't sufficient time or help to translate the longer articles into Chinese text for their papers, in fact only the very few larger papers ever touch the longer articles such as President Wilson's recent addresses on America's war aims.

Another important lack in the Chinese newspapers is cartoons. In the writer's knowledge only one Chinese newspaper in Shanghai has attempted to use cartoons since the beginning of the war, and although there is no proof it is fairly certain that the Germans supplied this service. Finally one cartoon was printed that showed Great Britain herding all of the other nations (in the form of pigs and cattle) into his barnyard, and upon the advice of the British Consul General at Shanghai, all British firms with drew their advertising from this paper. This caused a discontinuance of the cartoon service. It is unnecessary to speak in this connection of the importance of cartoons and pictures in China where the standards of literacy are so low, not more than ten per cent of the population having a good reading knowledge of their own language.

Since the most important form of advertising in China to reach the illiterate multitudes is the poster, this might well form an important part of a campaign of enlightment on the part of America and the other members of the allied group. Posters similar to the American Red Cross posters and the Liberty Loan Campaign might well be used in China with tremendous effect. The picture should of course be accompanied with appropriate Chinese text in the simplest possible form. It is not unusual for such firms as the British American Tobacco Company, the Standard Oil Company, the Palmolive Soap Company, the Asiatic Petroleum Company, the Singer Sewing Machine Company to spend as much as $50,000 on one poster campaign

campaign alone. Because of the Chinese love of pretty pictures and the lack of thede things in the average Chinese home, the Chinese take these pictures and give them a place of honor in their houses and keep them for years.

If the American Government could extend the necessary assistance, all of the foregoing suggestions could be handled through the Chinese Journalists Association. There is a demand at the present time on the part of the Chinese papers for commercial articles, especially articles designed to improve China's native industries and businesses. In the last year the writer has assisted the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in getting articles on the improvement of the silk industry printed in the Chinese papers and the papers without exception used the articles without question after the purpose had been explained to the editors. The same thing was true with articles dealing with currency reform and native banking reform, which it was desired to have printed in the native press. Another article dealing with Pacific shipping conditions as they affected Chinese commerce was printed by many of the papers in installments, owing to its length being too much for one issue.

On a recent visit in Peking, the writer in company with an interpreter, spent nearly two entire days interviewing Chinese soldiers on the war. The interview usually started by asking the Chinese soldier what make of guns he carried. Since most of the guns are of German make, this opened the conversation, and out of possibly sixty or seventy soldiers interviewed, only one or two knew that China is at war with Germany, and all of the soldiers without question said that the "Germans are fine people and treat the Chinese well". To this I might add the statemen of Viscount Hioko, former Japanese Minister to China, who in an interview following an extended trip into the interior of China, said that in spite of the fact that China is at war with Germany, the Chinese still think more of the Germans than they do of any other foreign nationals in China with the sigle exception of the Americans.

It should also be stated in this connectionthat many Chinese in official position still think well of Germany and many of them are outspoken in their beliefs. They are open in their admiration of the German system that is able "to stand against the whole world". There are also in official life many Chinese who have been educated at German universities. The agent of an American law book publishing concern recently interviewed every member of the Supreme Court of China Two of the judges favored the American or British legal code. All tge rest (eighteen) most of whom had been educated in Japan, favored the German code, and one openly stated that he could scarcely wait until the close of the war, because of his desire to go to Germany for study.

Because of the possibilities of German activities in Russia and Siberia, it is important that America should be doing something to get her war aims, desires and ideals before the Chinese. The circulation of stores dealing with German atrocities and such matters in China is practically without effort, because that is exactly what the Chinese expect a victorious army to do, witness their own activities when a central government or rebel army takes a town. Pillage and beheading of opponents is the first thing thought of. The only thing that can be of benefit in China would be an effort to work with the Chinese for their own betterment, instead of attemptin.

The only thing that can be of benefit in China would be an effort to work with the Chinese for their own betterment, instead of attempting to "work" the Chinese press and public as has been done too often in the past. Americans do have the confidence and esteem of the Chinese who look to America as their strongest champions at the Peace Conference. The Chinese newspapers regardless of their other affiliation would gladly accept news and material from American sources providing the effort was made at the same time to help the Chinese newspapers in their own problems and difficulties, as outlined in the foregoing.

Respectfully submitted by

J.B.POWELL

Associate Editor, Millard's Review
Shanghai, China

Memorandum of approximate cost for conducting the foregoing plan for one year is attached.

MEMORANDUM OF APPROXIMATE COST FOR ESTABLISHMENT AMERICAN PRESS & PUBLICITY SERVICE IN CHINA

(Amounts are in Chinese Currency and cover perios of one year)

1. Salaries of two Chinese journalists whose main duty would be to travel in China and visit every Chinese newspaper office in the interest of the Chinese Journalists Association.....$ 7,200

2. Travelling and entertaining expenses of the above..... 6,000

3. Two expert translators..... 4,800

4. Two stenographers..... 3,000

5. Office rent..... 800

6. Typewriters, duplicating machines and office supplies..... 1,000

7. Stereotyping and plate making..... 3,000

8. Subscriptions to Chinese newspapers for inspection clipping and filing..... 1,000

9. Publication of directory of Chinese newspapers 1,500

10. Office Furniture, desks, filing cabinets, tables, etc..... 2,000

11. Telegraphic tolls, postage and express charges.....2,500

12. Posters, bulletins and art work, in case it is desired to include this feature in the campaign 50,000

13.. Salary and expenses of educated Chinese lecturer to visit all Chinese and mission schools to lecture on the war(in case it would be desired to include this feature)..... 8,000

14. Cost of publishing small trade journal for circulation among Chinese editors, said journal to contain small amount of advertising if possible to obtain same.....10,000

15. Cost of subscribing to a few foreign newspapers and magazines to be sent complimentary to the editors of Chinese newspapers with marked articles for translation purposes if desired..... 2,500

Grand Total..... 102,300
Exclusive of poster campaign and traveling lecturer..... 58,000

$ 44,300

NUMBER OF COPIES 3

COPY NO. 1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
Mil. Int. Branch

FEB 11

SUBJECT. . . . . DEMOBILIZATION OF THE CHINESE ARMY. . . . . .

. . . . . .

FROM. . . . . M. A. . . . . .

NO. . . . . 1756. . . . . DATE. . . . JANUARY 14th, 1919

REPLYING TO NO. . . . . DATE. 1919

2009-24

WAR DEPARTMENT

COMBAT

1.- Enclosed with this report is a copy (#1755) of a report of the Legation to the Secretary of State entitled "An Estimate of Expenses of Disbanding Chinese Troops" and Explanatory Notes referring to the same. These were prepared by the Counsellors of the President and were in turn handed to the American Minister by the President personally. This is probably a preliminary to the expected discussion regarding the demobilization of the Chinese Army.

2.- Probably the most important problem to be solved in China today is the disposition to be made of the troops now under the control of the military commanders throughout China. A permanent peace between the North and South depends in large measure on what steps are taken to reorganize and demobilize the several hundred thousand Chinese now under arms, or to place these troops under proper control.

3.- It would be impracticable to disband all of these troops for very large forces will be needed for the suppression of bandits and police duty is general. It is impossible to disband the existing army without in some way placating the present army commanders.

4.- Instead of demobilization there should at first be a reorganization, the country being divided into Military Districts. Troops stationed in each of the districts would be charged with the suppression of bandits and other police duty.

5.- The position of Military Governor ("Tuchun") should be abolished and the position of Commanding Officer of Troops of Military District created. Provincial armies should be abolished and organized into a Chinese army whose divisions (the highest unit) can be moved at will by the Central Government.

6.- A gradual change will be necessary, as it would be impracticable to accomplish a rapid reorganization. Use must be made of the present prowerful Military Governors, probably best by their being appointed Commanders of Military Districts. Prominent Northerners would at first necessarily remain in the Northern Districts and prominent Southerners in the Southern Districts.

7.- The first reorganization may include all the Chinese troops now actually enrolled, and as tranquillity becomes restored their number could gradually be decreased. The original loan agreement, under which the funds necessary for this reorganization would be obtained, should contemplate a military commission, composed of individuals representing the foreign Governments participating in the loan. This Committee to advise and assist a similar Chinese Commission, but to have full powers to release these funds only as the troops are actually equipped and brought under the exclusive control of the Central Government. The Chinese Army, if such is organized along the lines suggested, would probably be too powerful an instrument to put under the unrestrained control of such a Government as now exists in China, or is likely to exist for some time to come.

In order/

In order to obviate any danger from this source, the Military Committee representing the Governments participating in the loan should be given a controlling voice in the use which is to be made of the reorganized Army. This control to extend to the stations of brigades and of divisions, movements of troops, etc., and to continue as long as the Army is maintained in whole or in part by the foreign loans which made it possible.

7.- A tentative division of the country into Military Districts, with the number of troops appropriate for each, with suitable Commanders is suggested as follows: -

First Military District.

Commander, Chang Tso Lin.
Troops, 50,000.
Territory, - Manchuria (Heilungkiang, Kirin, Shin-Kiang) and Inner Mongolia, east of Longitude 116 East of Greenwich.

Second Military District.

Commander, Tsao Ju-lin.
Troops, 50,000.
Territory, - Chihli, Shensi, and Shensi north of the Hwei Ho.

Third Military District.

Commander, Li Shun.
Troops, 50,000.
Territory,--Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei.

Fourth Military District.

Commander, ?
Troops, 50,000.
Territory, - Shensi south of the Hwei Ho, Honan, Hupeh.

Fifth Military District.

Commander, ?
Troops, 50,000.
Territory, - Chekiang, Fukien, Kiangsi.

Sixth Military District.

Commander, Suitable Southerner.
Troops, 50,000.
Territory, - Kwangtung, Kwangsi.

Seventh Military District.

Commander, Suitable Southerner.
Troops, 50,000.
Territory, - Hunan, Kweichow.

Eighth Military District.

Commander, Present Tuchun of Yunnan (?) Tang Gee-yao.
Troops, 50,000.
Territory, - Yunnan, Szechuan.

SEC'D. M.I.B. O.C.S. FEB 11 1945

Ninth Military District.

Commander, Suitable Mohammedan.
Troops, 50,000.
Territory,- Kansu, Tibet.

Tenth Military District.

Commander, Suitable Northerner.
Troops, 50,000.
Territory,- Outer Mongolia, West of Longitude 116 East, Sinkiang, Chinese Turkestan.

8.- This is to be considered as an interim report which will be supplemented in about six weeks or two months, by a final report on this subject, data for which is now being collected by extended personal investigations in the field and interviews with influential Chinese officials of both North and South.

Reg. 1755.

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1 Enc

[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT

NOTED M.I.5

NOTED
G.B.T.
M.I.1.

NOTED
H. D. L.
M. I. 5

NOTED W. J. D.
CAPT. TOWNSEND
M.I.6.

Dup.

DESPATCHED
1919 MAR 13 PM 3 42
M.I.B. MAIL ROOM

Copy and enclosure to the Director, War Plans Division., to note and return.

Mar.11-19.

W.P.D. Mch 13/19
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2009-25

WAR DEPARTMENT

Supplementary Notes.

When the Republic was first established, there were in the country more than one million troops. Later, efforts were taken to disband them but owing to the various political disturbances in the last few years, more troops were recruited than disbanded. In 1916 and 1917, there were some 900,000 men, including the army and the gendarmes. A year and half ago, when the Southern Provinces took up arms, the number of men recruited by the Central Government and the provinces amounted to some 400,000. Thus there is at the present time a total of 1,416,000 troops in the country. Unless steps are taken to reduce as well as to disband them immediately, the situation cannot be improved.

Considerable thought has been given to this subject. It is proposed to reduce the existing number of troops to 700,000 men, including the army, the garrisons and the gendarmerie, and reorganize them. As for the other 700,000 men, they will be disbanded. According to the plan adopted in the first year of the Republic, the average allowance provided for each officer at the time of disbandment has $200, and that for each private $24. This will be sufficient. In regard to the payment of arrears due to the troops, the old plan was based on a three-month pay; but this does not seem to be feasible in the present case, the reason being that this time, the period of military operations is comparatively longer which makes the situation more complicated. Ever since the time of Hangchuen (December 1915), debts incurred in connection with the various military operations have not been settled; and besides there has been fighting for upwards of another year which has made the financial stringency of the Government more acute. The troops in the field have mostly been receiving just their food allowance, and no pay. Even their outfit was purchased mostly

with

NOTED W. J. D.

[illegible] have been chosen by methods which have not yet been [illegible]. For this reason, it does not seem possible to follow the Commonwealth precedent in the payment of arrears due to the troops, and in order to forestall all difficulties that may arise, it is proposed to place the men on a six-month pay basis. To carry out this plan of disbandment of 700,000 men, a sum of approximately $80,000,000 silver will be required.

The official salary schedule for military men in China has not yet been promulgated. In disbanding these 700,000 troops, account must be taken also of the 40000 officers and their staffs. If this number be reduced by one-quarter, that is by dismissing the 10,000 odd secretaries, writers etc, there are still some 30,000 officers left. It does not seem wise to compel these officers, once their connection with the army is severed, to find their livelihood in other walks of life. Hence it is proposed to accord to these 30,000 unemployed officers a special treatment by providing them with their annual salaries aggregating to approximately $30,000,000 silver, and in addition to the salaries with which their families may be supported, an opportunity for an advanced education at the military colleges to be established for them. This measure is undertaken as a matter of precaution, so that they may be kept in the proper path. Thus gradually they may retire from the military service, and the problem of disbandment is solved. For the establishment of these military colleges including their current expenses, it is estimated that a sum of over $10,000,000 silver will be required; and adding to this the above-mentioned salary provision, the amount under this heading will approximately be $30,000,000 silver.

The provision made for meeting the extraordinary mili-

tary

Pay expenses of the troops in the field has long ago been exhausted. In order to maintain these troops from now till the time when they return to their various depots for the purpose of disbandment and reorganization, another thirty million military expenses amounting to approximately $12,-000,000 silver will have to be provided; and for expenses in connection with their return to the various depots, an additional million dollars silver will be necessary. Thus the two items of expenditure under this heading will amount to approximately $15,000,000 silver.

The total of the three above-mentioned expenditures will approximately be $125,250,000 silver.

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REC'D, A.

MAR 7 - 1919

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
Mil. Int. Branch.

MAR 10 2009-28 1919

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

SUBJECT . . . . . CHINESE MILITARY EXPENSES. . . . . .

. . . . . .

FROM. . . . .H. .A. . . . . .

NO. . . . . 1795. . . . . DATE. . . . . JANUARY 27,1919.

REPLYING TO NO. . . . . DATE. . . . . .1919.

COMBAT.

NOTED W. J. D.

1.- Following is a translation of documents received from the Chinese Government setting forth in detail the military estimates for the month of January 1919.

NOTED
H. D. L.
M. I. 5.

SUMMARY OF MILITARY EXPENSES FOR ALL UNITS DIRECTLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE MINISTRY OF WAR.

I

1.	The 1st Division	$ 157,764.
2.	" 2nd "	139,603.
3.	" 3rd "	142,702.
4.	" 4th "	141,651.
5.	" 7th "	154,911.
6.	" 8th "	137,743.
7.	" 9th "	142,249.
8.	" 10th "	138,542.
9.	" 11th "	142,877.
10.	" 12th "	144,926.
11.	" 13th "	156,740.
12th	" 20th "	153,896.
13.	" 2nd Mixed Brigade.	64,070.
14.	" 4th " "	41,739.
15.	" 7th " "	68,322.
16.	" 8th " "	42,472.
17.	"13th " "	51,829.
18.	"16th " "	73,527.
19.	"17th " "	45,812.
20.	"18th " "	49,219.
21.	"20th " "	42,000.
22.	"70th Reorganized Division 1st Brigade	29,875.

23.	The 70th Reorganized Division 2nd Brigade	$ 35,881.
24.	" 1st Chihli Mixed Brigade	66,726.
25.	" 2nd " " "	66,726.
26.	" 3rd " " "	66,726.
27.	" 1st Mixed Regiment	22,456.
28.	" 1st Suiyuan Regiment	30,327.
29.	" Mounted Chahar "	19,583.
30.	6 Battalions Cavalry & Infantry at Ninghsia	13,622.
31.	The 50th Regiment of the Gendarimine . . .	1,301.
32.	Headquarters Department of the Model Peking Army.	9,698.
33.	The Model Army Brigade.	5,758.
34.	Honan Shock Troops	31,124.
35.	Chahar Patrol Troops	7,763.
36.	Jehol Mountain Artillery Company	2,278.
37.	T'u-mo-tê Cavalry	2,755.
38.	Wireless Guard	837.
39.	Guard for Ministry of War	14,578.
40.	Changchia Fo Guard	1,333.
41.	Urga, Kiaochta, Kabdo, Uliasutai Dyslomatic Guards, ...	16,373.
42.	President's Palace Machine Gun Company. . .	655.
43.	Presidential Palace Fire Department	1,066.
44.	Troops of Commissioner of Defence for East Chahar	35,150.
45.	Patrol troops & troops of Commissioner of Defence for West Chahar	10,615.
46.	Peking Intelligence Force	2,930.
47.	Peking Military Police	4,096.
48.	Upper Yangtze Defence Department	40,000.
49.	Suiyuan City Force (No. 4)	13,600.
50.	Support of Families of 7th Brigade troops at Urga.	2,890.
51.	Bonus for the 16th Brigade	569.
52.	2nd Regiment of 18th Brigade	22 ,000.
53.	2nd Mounted Brigade of 29th Division, . . .	30,643.
54.	The 5th & 6th Patrols of Chahar	22,000.
	TOTAL . . .	$.2,864,528

II

VARIOUS BUREAUS.

1.	Metropolitan Prefecture Recruiting Station .	$ 1,000.
2.	Honan, Loyang, Recruiting Station	1,000.
3.	Chahar Stables	9,253.
4.	Supplies for Mongol Ranches	1,497.
5.	Auditor's Department for Army & Navy. . . .	9,220.
6.	Higher Court of Martial Law	223.
7.	Military Prison	2,085.
8.	Lower Military Court	3,279.
9.	3 Wireless Stations	1,752.
10.	Paotingfu & other Military Storehouse . . .	10,437.
11.	Honan, Hsinyang, Commissionary Depot . . .	5,146.
12.	Hygiene Station	2,943.
13.	Printing Bureau	1,665.
14.	Remount & training stables	3,400
	T O T A L . . .	$ 52,900.

I I I

SCHOOLS.

1.	Officers Training School	$ 31,565.
2.	Quartermasters' "	7,600.
3.	Veterinary "	5,681.
4.	Model Army "	3,370.
5.	Army Medical "	10,946.
6.	Support of Students Abroad	15,071.
7.	Officers School	88,562.
8.	Army Preparatory School	27,526.
9.	Bureau for the Preparation of Military Text Books.	13,475.
10.	Drill Bureau	390.
	T O T A L :	$ 204,186..

IV

MISCELLANEOUS.

1.	Military Orders (Badges)	$9,969.
2.	Pensions	7,500.
3.	Salaries of Advisors, and officers in training awaiting appointment	155,300.
4.	Salaries of officers awaiting appointment	25,778.
5.	Purchase of munitions	83,333.
6.	" " food	133,560.
7.	" " hygiene supplies	20,903.
8.	Clothing	289,858.
9.	Furnishings	66,667.
10.	Horses and Mules	36,165.
11.	Public Works	58,333.
12.	Rental of Quarters	6,532.
13.	Miscellaneous Expenses	40,000.
	TOTAL:	$933,898.

V.

Advances by Provincial Authorities for Maintenance of Troops.	$382,499.
TOTAL:	$382,499.

- - - - - - -

Above Five Groups of Expenses

TOTAL per month.	$ 4,438,011.
TOTAL per year	53,256,132.

MILITARY ESTIMATES, January 1918.

SUMMARY OF NECESSARY MILITARY EXPENSES DURING JANUARY 1919.

- - - - - - -

Recalling Soldiers	$ 1,400,000.
Disbanding, Special stations of troops Officers 4650 at $300.) Soldiers 58500 " $ 24.)	2,800,000.
Pay of regualr soldiers under Ministeries of Fiance War and other Military expenses	11,460,000.
Back Pay of soldirs (The actual amounts of back pay are $29,600,000 but the amount specified above, at least, should be paid.)	4,000,000.
T O T A L	$19,660,000.

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MILITARY ESTIMATES, January 1919.

SUMMARY OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS DUE FROM THE MINISTRY OF FIRNACE

ON MILITARY AND NAVAL ACCOUNTS.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Expenses of Naval Vessels	$ 450,000.
I Chun (Chiang Kuei-t'i)	227,600.
An-wu Chun (New) (Ni Shih-ch'ung)	300,000.
The 15th Division (Peking)	185,000.
" 16th " "	229,000.
Chen Wu Chun (Lung Chi-kuang)	93,000.
Feng Chun (Chang Tso-lin)	378,000.
Naval Land Forces	11,600.
Ch'a-har (T'ien Chung-yü)	4,500.
Sui Yuan Cavalry (Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsun)	24,900.
Expenses of Arsenals at Shanghai, Han-yang, Techou, Kung Hsien	212,200.
Chi-lin Mixed Brigade	39,500
T O T A L :	$2,864,700.

SPECIAL EXPENSES FOR NEW ORGANIZATIONS.

Ts'ao K'un's as Inspector of Four Provinces and other military expenses.	$314,000.
Also special expense fund.	500,000.
Chang Huai-chih's Yamen, as Pacification Commissioner and other military expenses.	323,000.
Chung Ching-yao's expenses	200,000.
Ni Shih-ch'ung's Army transport expenses	230,000.
Hunan Newly recruited 12 bodies of troops.	129,000.
Fukien Salt Inspection troops, now on active service . . .	100,000.
Fukien Newly recruited soldiers 12 regiments.	100,000.
Hupei Special Expenses	150,000.
Lung Chi-kuang's old troops	206,000.
Chekiang troops in Fukien	112,000.
Feng-t'ien troops, Special	245,000.
General Fan Kuo-chang's 20th Division (Hunan)	60,000.
General Li K'uei-yuan 11th " "	60,000.
" Wang Ju-hsien's 8th Div. (Hupei)	60,000
General Chang Tsung-ch'ang's 6th Brigade (Hunan)	56,000.
General Chang Hsi-yuan's 4th Brigade (Hunan)	50,000.
General Sun Ch'uan-fang's 21st Brigade	57,000.
Chen Sung Ch'in (Honan troops in Shensi)	40,000.
Fukien Mixed Brigade	25,000.
Additional expenses of the Arsenals.	245,000.
Lui Ts'un-hou's Military Expenses (3 months)	300,000.
War Participation Bureau's New troops.	186,000.
Additional Pay for 9th Division troops sent to Valdivostok.	79,000.
Additional Pay for 4th Regiment sent to Kulun.	13,000.
Newly recruited Regiment in Chekiang.	18,000.
General Wu Kuang-hsin's troops, Special expenses.	200,000.
Also another body of troops.	100,000
TOTAL:	$4,158,000.

MAY 24 1919

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
Mil. Int. Branch.

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2009-35

SUBJECT . . . TROOPS AND BARRACKS AT HONANFU

NOTED: M.I.B.

. . . . . .

FROM . . . . . .H.A. . . . . .

NO. . . . 2028 . . . . . .DATE . .April 17, . 1919.

REPLYING TO NO.. . . . . .DATE . . . . . .1919.

The information contained in this report was obtained principally from interviews with Ma Chung Lung, Brigadier General of the 3rd Infantry of Ichun, Commander of the local detachment of provincial troops stationed in Honanfu city, and General Chang Ting Hsien, Commander of the 4th Mixed Brigade of the Northwest frontier defence army, stationed outside Honanfu city.

The barracks occupied by the toops outside Honanfu city are very extensive, and were completed about 1915. They have accomodations for between fifteen and twenty thousand men, and are now substantially all filled. There is also stable accomodations for one Regiment of Cavalry, but there is no Cavalry there at present. The buildings occupy altogether about 1000 mo of land, one mo being equivalent to about one-~~half~~ of an acre. The buildings are substantially constructed of brick, with tile roofs and glass windows. The officers quarters are heated by foreign style stoves, and the soldiers' quarters by small Chinese stoves, burning hard coal. There is no steam heat system whatever. The water supply is obtained from wells and from a small river which flows by the barracks. There are no sewers, except a few brick drains. The barracks are located about two thirds of a mile from the main line of the Lung-Hai Railway, but there are no spurs or sidings. The barracks are about two to three miles distant from the town of Honanfu, and ~~as~~ the road is extremely poor, being no better than any ordinary Chinese country road, and very ill adapted to the movements of troops and supplies.

one-eighth

At the present time there are four classes of troops stationed in these barracks:

1. The Northwest Frontier Defence Army.
   The First Mixed Brigade of this organization arrived in May of 1918, and the 4th Division arrived in October of the same year. They were newly recruited, mostly from Anwei. They have no Japanese instructors, but their arms and ammunition are of Japanese manufacture.

2. The Second Mixed Brigade is recruited up to their full strength, and no new recruits have been received for some two months. The General in Command naively explained that the purpose

of the Northwest Frontier Defence Army is to resist Japanese encroachment in Inner Mongolia. No orders have yet been received in regard to proceeding to Mongolia, but the General expected them in the near future. The new recruits drill three hours in the morning, from eight to eleven, and three hours in the afternoon, from three to six. The older soldiers drill two hours in the morning, and two hours in the afternoon. The troops are supported by funds furnished by the Minister of Finance, and the soldiers pay is reported to be six months behind at the present time. Each of the two Mixed Brigades is composed of three Regiments of T'uan, -Each Regiment of T'uan being composed of three Battalions of Ying of 600 men each, together with one machine gun Section of 120 men for each Regiment. In addition to the three Regiments of Infantry, there are also one Artillery Battalion of 600 men, one Cavalry Battalion of 500 men, and one Battalion of Poineers of 200 men.

The second class of troops, stationed outside of Honanfu city, is made up of Fengtien soldiers about 48,000 in number. There appears to be some discrepancy in the information as to the precise status of all of these Fengtien soldiers. It appears that originally there were two Regiments under the control of the Consul of Chang Tao Lin. Owing to some internal disagreement among the officers of one of these Regiments was divided into two, one-half taking the name of Tu Li, meaning Independent. This independent half regiment is under the control of the War Participation Bureau, thus forming the 3rd class of troops at Honanfu city.

The fourth class of soldiers is composed of three Battalions, or Ying of 500 men each, of the 7th Division which have been recently recruited, principally from Shantung bandits, and are being trained to be sent to Hunan. It is these newly recruited Shantung soldiers that are responsible for most of the looting and robberies reported from Honanfu, although the soldiers of the other organizations also take part in such activities.

They pay of all of the Fengtien and 7th Division soldiers is reported to be up to date.

None of the four classes of troops mentioned above, all of which are stationed outside of Honanfu city, are under the control of, nor are they supported by the Province of Honan. Inside Honanfu city is one Battalion of Ying of about 500 men of the Ichun, and at the south gate are about 300 men of Special Constabulary supposed to be used principally in hunting bandits. These 800 men are under the control of the Honan Tuchun.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Section
Military Intelligence

2009-37

SUBJECT . . . DISBANDMENT OF TROOPS IN CHINA . . . .

. . . . . .

NOTED: M.I.S.

FROM . . . . . M.A. . . . . .

REC'D, M. I. B., O. C. S. JUN 11 1919

WAR DEPARTMENT

NO. . . . 2054 . . . . . DATE . . April 28, 1919.

REPLYING TO NO. . . . . DATE . . . . . 1919.

Noted T.C.C., M.I.-5

1. The following is a copy of a letter giving suggestions regarding the disbandment of troops in China, which has been received from a very good source:

"The Chinese Army is variously estimated, but I feel that the total would not mean over sixty Divisions under arms. I believe that President Hsu Shi Chang has stated that there are some one million, four hundred thousand troops in China today, and while I was in Canton, the Chief of Staff of the Southern Government declared there were seventy five Divisions comprising some seven hundred and fifty thousand men. This is practically one-half of the estimate made by the President. Mr. Wu Ching Lien, the President of the House of Representatives at Canton, insisted that there were some one million odd men in the northern and southern army. The great trouble in accepting the statements of any of these men is the fact, as you know, that they are desirous of making quite a bit of money out of any loan that is contracted for the disbandment of troops. I have made quite as careful an investigation as it is possible in a most casual way to avoid suspicion, and have come to the conclusion that there are only sixty Divisions which are equipped and could go into battle. Of this number of Divisions, forty could be allotted to the north, and twenty to the south.

The scheme that I suggested yesterday for the disbandment of superfluous troops would be according to my figures, the disbandment of thirty five Divisions, leaving a standing army of two hundred and fifty thousand men, which I believe would be more than sufficient for the use of the Chinese Government in preserving order. Of the two hundred and fifty thousand men thus remaining in the National Army, at least one-half would be stationed on the borders of Mongolia, Manchuria, Yunnan and Kwangsi. This would leave some five thousand troops to be stationed in each of the Provincial capitals, and these forces would represent mobile units which could be easily used in suppressing disturbances which are beyond the power of the police in the Provinces, and would be subject only to the orders of the Ministry of War.

I feel that it would be a simple matter for the Peace Conference now in session in Shanghai, or for that matter, the Foreign Powers, to suggest the following scheme for the disbandment of troops and the organization of a National Army:

1. That China should be divided into five Military Departments, as follows:

(a) The Military Department of the Northwest.
(b) The Military Department of the Northeast.
(c) The Military Department of the Center.
(d) The Military Department of the Southwest.
(e) The Military Department of the Southeast.

2. That each Department should have a Commander-in-Chief, and under him five Divisions comprising fifty thousand men and officers.

3. That the President should at once appoint the five Departmental Commanders.

4. That the Departmental Commanders, acting under the direction of the Minister of War, should form the Disbandment Commission.

5. That the Consortium should appoint a Financial Commission for the disbandment of troops.

6. That the Disbandment Commission and the Financial Commission for the disbandment of troops should each delegate two representatives to form a Public Works Commission under the chairmanship of the Minister of War.

My idea is that the actual disbandment of troops should be undertaken by the Chinese themselves to avoid the suspicion of Foreign intervention. In fact, the simplest way in which foreigners could actually assist in the disbandment of troops would be the employment of foreign troops, and this undoubtedly is impossible, and it is to be doubted whether such intervention would be of benefit x either to China or the Foreign Powers. The turning over of a large sum of money to the Chinese for disbandment purposes without a strict auditing of the expenditures would also be an unwise policy, and as we have already experienced, the failure of the Chinese to properly administer funds borrowed for the disbandment of troops, it would be foolish to repeat such a failure at this time, especially that the situation today is far more critical than at any other period during the eight years of the Republic. I would suggest that the only manner in which a strict auditing could take place would be that the Financial Commission act as a medium between the Disbandment Commission and the Public Works Commission. In other words, for every soldier disbanded, gk there should be handed over to the Financial Commission at least one rifle and one hundred rounds of ammunition, and that the Financial Commission should act as custodian for arms so received until the disbandment has been completed; that the soldier so accepted by the Financial Commission should at once be turned over to the Public Works Commission for employment. In this manner, I believe, that a strict auditing could be obtained, and there is no other way in which we could be assured of a proper disbandment of the armies. The fact that the soldier and the Government are not paid for the rifle and ammuniton so handed over would mean that the Government would find it impossible to sell arms by importation from Japan,

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as it would simply mean a loss of money. If we take any other basis for auditing the expenditures, there can be no certainty, and to my mind, the only method to be employed is the actual taking over of arms. There is no need in mentioning any other than rifles and rifle ammunition, for all other equipment would naturally be needed by the National Army to be formed. Some people have suggested that there are some one hundred and fifty thousand armed robbers in China, who might take advantage of this to turn in their rifles and ammunition in order that they might receive employment. Nothing would be better for China or the Foreign Powers if this were to come true.

The Public Works Commission should have as its work the building of public roads and the necessary conservancy of water-ways. In other words, there should be no other work undertaken that would require the purchase of materials. In the conservation of water-ways and the building of highways, it is largely a question of labor, and there is little or nothing to be expended upon the purchase of materials either from abroad or at home. A system of military roads could be easily surveyed, and work upon them started immediately. Naturally, there would mean quite a larger number of laborers than say three hundred and fifty thousand men, but I believe that these men could at all times be given employment over a period of years. In the employment of approximately three hundred and fifty thousand men at the average of $8.00 a month per laborer, would mean an expenditure of something like thirty six million dollars a year, when foremen and engineers' salaries are also included in the supervision of the work, and this would mean an expenditure of something like one hundred and eighty million dollars over a period of five years, which would mean a very small amount of money as compared to the benefits received from same. The estimates now made by various Chinese military and political experts range anywhere from one hundred and fifty to two hundred and fifty million dollars ~~and fifty to two hundred and fifty million dollars~~ for the disbandment of troops.

There is another item that will have to be taken into consideration in justice to the troops disbanded, and that is the question of arrears in pay. I do not feel that it would be difficult to make an average estimate of arrears of say $12.00 per man, which would mean an extra allotment of $1.00 a month to each soldier disbanded, or $12.00 for the first year to wipe out all arrears. The arrears should not be paid to any soldier in a lump sum, but should be divided into twelve monthly payments in order that the soldier might at once be employed instead of allowing him to return home to take up the profession of a highway-man. In making such an estimate, there would be an expenditure the first year in excess of the following four years of approximately four million dollars.

I do not feel that the soldiers would object at all to having $8.00 a month to come to hand regularly for a period of five years, and with the exception of the troops in the northeast, there would be no particular trouble in getting them to undertake the work

outlined for the Public Works Commission.

In considering the six hundred thousand men at present under arms, it would be safe to say that only one-half of this number are really well trained and disciplined troops. My experience has been the Provinces that when you find three or four Divisions you will constantly hear of only one Brigade or one Division as being well equipped and trustworthy, and I believe that the well equipped men cannot exceed the number determined upon, that is, ~~xx~~ two hundred and fifty thousand men for the National Army, and while there would be necessarily a great deal of fighting before the other three hundred and fifty thousand men could be disbanded, there is no doubt that the two hundred fifty thousand men selected for the task of disbanding their colleagues in arms would be sufficient in force to carry out the work outlined for them. As an example, we can take the province of Kiangsu, not considering, of course, Shanghai. In this province, there are some five Divisions of troops, so-called, and I am positive that the 5th Division alone could without any amount of trouble disband the other four. In fact, there would be no hesitancy upon the part of the other four Divisions to disband were they to be given employment assured of a livelihood.

This would be the logical time for such a scheme to be undertaken, and there would be no difficulty at present in selecting the Departmental Commanders. In the southwest, Tang Chi-yao is in supreme control; in the southeast Lung Ting Ying; in the northwest Ma Fu Hsiang; in the northeast Hsu Hsu Cheng; in the Yangtze, Li Shun. These five men today could ~~xxxx~~ without any difficulty whatsoever select out of the Divisions now stationed within the areas specified five well equipped Divisions, which could without any serious obstacles disband all other troops within the areas so specified. If the President upon the suggestion of the Peace Conference or the Foreign Powers were to adopt such a plan, his hands would at once be strengthened, and a National Army created. As pointed out above, in placing half of these men along the frontiers, there would at no time be more than a brigade of say five thousand men in the Provincial capitals.

I have written this as a mere outline of my plan, and would be glad to go into detail at any time. I feel that it is not the time for us to accept the statements of the Chinese, but for us to find out what can be done, and insist upon its being done. Any other plan of action would be foolish and accomplish nothing but harm. With a well policed China, an army of two hundred and fifty thousand men well drilled would certainly be sufficient to safeguard the nation, and this is specially true when the systems of communication are improved. As regards the arming of the police in the various provinces, I also suggested to the Tuchun of Yunnan, that the number of ~~xxxx~~ arms allowed to police should be determined upon the population of the Province, and that all arms should be issued by the National Army, and there is no need in my mind of having more than some five to six ~~x~~ thousand armed police in any province. These

police would be so scattered in the various cities and townships that there would be no danger of their effecting a union with the troops. As to the matter of police, if you have any desire to consider my suggestions, I would be glad to some other time to submit same to you."

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NOTED: MAB

2009-42

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF CHINESE TROOPS. - Jan 1 - 1919.

Part 1 - A - Troops of the 3 Manchurian Provinces.
B - Troops of North China, including Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.

From: M.A. Part 2 - C - Troops of South China.

No. 2024 Date: May 20, 1919.

Replying to No. Date, 19

REC'D, M. I. B., O. C. S. JUN 30 1919

Noted D. W. P., M. I.-6

1. The accompanying sheets are a rough translation of data concerning Chinese troops, the source of which information is confidential. A revision of this manuscript will be prepared by this office and forwarded later.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
War Dept. Brigade

9

SUBJECT . . . . . MANCHURIAN TROOPS MAPS . . . . . .
. . . . . PROVINCES 2009-428
FROM . . . . . M.A. . . . . WAR DEPARTMENT
NO. . . . . DATE . . . May 5, . 1919.
REPLYING TO NO. . . . . DATE . . . . . 1919.

Name of Troops and Commanders.	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			I - Troops of Mukden Province.
Tu-chün (Commander of the Troops) Chang Tso-lin.			
Shing-chang (Civil Governor): Chang Tso Lin appointed Military Inspector of the 3 Manchurian Provinces August 25, 1918.	"		"
(a) Lu-chün Troops (Regular)			
20th Division Fang Kuo-chang			Parts of the 20th Div. (59th Brigade with 1 ying of Cav., 9th Battery, 1 platoon of Engineering troops, and 1 Machine gun Company) at end of Dec. 1915 arrived in Mongolia to fight the bandits. Jan.17th,1916, they came here to Peking. Feb.28 they were despatched with other parts of their Div. to Hunan Province in ordr to support the 3rd Revolution which began by the separation of Yunnan Prov. (15th Dec.1915). By middle of Aug. Div. began to retrn. to Chihli (Paotingfu) from where it was to be despatched to south of China -Hunan & Hupeh Provinces- to fight coalition of the southern provinces. May'18 whole Div. was concentrated in Yunnan Prov. Nov.16-18 (the time of the order to suspend fighting bet. the north & the south) the Div. was partly in Hunan Prov. and partly in Provinces of Hupeh and Chihli.
Staff	despatched		In Hunan Province.
39th Brigade			
Chang Chi Staff	See remarks	688 m/m rifle made in the Hangang factory.	In Hunan Province.

Name of Troops and Commanders.	Station	Equipment	Remarks
77th Inf.Regiment. (Wang Yung-shou) Staff and 3 yings	See remarks		in Hunan Province
78th Inf.Regiment. (Shih Shao-ming) Staff and 3 yings	"		
40th Inf. Brigade (Sung Chi-fu) Staff	"		
79th Inf. Regiment (Hui Pao-sing) Staff and 3 yings	"		
80th Inf. Regiment (Ts'ao Shu-tung) Staff & 3 yings.	"		In Hupeh Province.
20th Cavalry Regt. (Wang Tao-ts'ai) Staff	"	6.5 m/m Japan carabines. 30 Meichi.	
1st Ying	"		In Hunan Province.
2nd and 3rd ying	"		On Chihli Province.
20th Artillery Regt. (Chou Tyu-ying) Staff.			2 ying in Chihli. 1 ying in Hunan.
Staff and 3 ying			
20th Engineer Ying 4 companies.	"		In Yuehchou Province.
20th Transport ying (T'un Ching-mun) 4 Companies.	"		2 Companies in Yuehchou Province. 2 Companies in Chihli Province.
Machine guns - 4 Companies. 1 ying of Gendarmery. Musical Band.	"		Attached to the regiments.
O.K. 27th Division			
(Sun Luh-ch'eng) Staff.	Mukden	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle. 1888 yr.pattern.	
53rd Inf. Brigade. (Chang Ching-hui) Staff.	"		
105th Inf. Regiment (Yang Yü-ch'eng)	"		The 3rd ying ran away with the ex-Commander of the 53rd Brig., Tang Yü-ling in Mch.1917 for

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			The reason the command of the Brigade, owing to some misunderstanding with the police commissioner, Wang, was dismissed; unwilling to submit he fled away with the 3rd ying of the 108th Inf. Regt., and the 2nd ying of the 107th Inf. Regiment.
106th Inf. Regt. (Chi Tao) staff & 2 ying	Mukden		
54th Inf. Brig. (Chang Tso-hsiang staff.	"		In the beginning of March 1918, the Brig. was gathered at the Lang-fang station (Chihli prov.) & in Apr. was despatched to Hupeh Prov.
107th Inf. Regt. (Sin Yung-fu) staff & 3 ying	See remarks Despatched		
108th Inf. Regt. (Liu Hsiang-tsu) staff & 3 ying.			
27th Cav. Regt. (Yang Chung-fang) staff & 2 ying.	Mukden	7.9 m/m Mauser carabines.	
3rd ying	Sinningfu.		
27th Artillery ying (Lu Cheng-ch'eng) staff & 2 ying.	Mukden	36 Fld. guns 6 Mount. guns 75 m/m, Krupp	
3rd ying	See remarks Despatched	last mpdel	12 guns in Hupeh - 4 pontoons and 3 bridges that can be taken to pieces.
27th Engineering ying (Chao Ming-ti) 4 companies	Mukden		
27th Transport ying (Ts'ai Ming-shan) 4 comp.			
Machine guns: 1 Ying of Gendarmery.		12 Mach. guns. 7.9 m/m	and 12 Mach. guns attached to the 107th and 108th Reg.
Musical Band	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks.
28th Division (Lu Hung-chang) staff	Paicheng-hsiang	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle - 1888 yr.pattern.	
55th Brigade (Chang Hsi-ping) staff.	Hsinglit'un		
109th Inf.Regt. (Wu Pao-kuei)	Paicheng-hsiang		
1st ying	[illegible]		
	Kunglehsiang		
2nd ying	Yehanhsiang		
3rd ying	Hsinglit'un		
110th Inf.Regt. (Chang Wang-fu) staff & 1st ying	Hoshanhsiang		
2nd ying	Ipsiang		
3rd ying	Kao Ts'ao.		
56th Brigade. (Kao Ing-chen) staff.	Chinghsiang		The Brigade under the number of the 2nd Mixed Mukden Brigade was despatched in March 1918 to the south(Chinese Prov. in the middle of Oct.arrived at Tientsin, and came back to Mukden Prov.in Nov.
111th Inf. Regt. (Ch'ung Shang) staff & 3 ying.	"		
112th Inf. Regt. (Li Hung-wen) staff.	Kaots'ao		
1st ying	Hoshanhsiang		
2nd ying	Paichenghsiang		
3rd ying	Singcheng-hsiang		
28th Artillery Regt.(Shi K'uie-yang)staff & 1st ying	Peicheng-hsiang	26 Fld guns 8 Mount.guns 75 m/m Krupp-last model.	
2nd ying	Chinhsiang		
3rd ying	Suichung-hsiang		
28th Cav. Regt. (Yang Ti-sheng) staff & 3rd ying.	Chinghsiang	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle, 1888 yr.pattrn	
1st ying	Hsinglit'un		
2nd ying	Ch'ingtoui-tyu		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
28th Engineer ying 4 companies	Ch'inghsiang		1 iron pantoon and 1 bridge that can be taken apart.
28th Transport ying (Chang Pai-hsiang) 4 companies	Peichinghsiang	24 Mach.guns 7.9 m/m	Attached to the regiments. Attached to the Division.
Machine guns - 4 companies 1 ying of Gendarmes.			
25th Division (Wu Tsung-sheng) staff	T'ao nan-hsing.		The Division is formed by the back detachment "hsiung-fang-tui", and the former second separate cavalry brigade
57th Brigade (Kong Tui-tian) staff	"	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle	
115th Inf. Regt. (Tsao Yung-cheng) staff	Huaijenhsiang		
1st ying	Huaitehsiang		
2nd ying	Hsiaochengtyu		
3rd ying	Shuangshan-hsiang		
114th Inf. Regt. (Wanfuling) staff	Liaoyuanhsiang		
1st ying	Koupingpaoto'u		
2nd ying	Kaitounghsiang		
3rd ying	Ta'onanhsiang		
58th Brigade (Cheng Hsi-Wu) staff	Liaoyuanhsiang	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle 1888 yr.model	The Brigade bears the name of "Temporary Cavalry" - and has horses.
115th Inf. Regt. (Li huan-Ying) staff and 1st ying	T'ungliao-cheng		
2nd ying	T'aonanhsiang		
3rd ying	"		
116th Inf. Regt. (Cheng Tu-sheng) staff -1st ying	Chengt'ung-hsiang		
2nd ying	Angkuang-hsiang		
3rd ying	Mukden		
29th Art. Regt. (Shi Te-shan) staff	Liaoyuan-hsiang	18 mount.guns & 6 field guns.	
1st ying	Kailung-hsiang	7.5 m/m Krupp last model	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd ying	Hailunghsiang		
3rd ying	Selungshan		
29th Cav. Regt.		7.9 m/m Mauser rifle	
(Ping Ching-shan) staff	Liaoyüanhsiang		
1 ying	Chisinwusp'eng		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Shanyuihsiang		
29th Engineer ying (Tung Shu-hsiang) 4 companies	Liaoyüanhsiang		
29th Transport ying (Ma Sin-ming) 4 companies.	Taonanhsiang	Mach.guns 24 mach.guns	4 Companies attached to the Regiments.
O.K. ~~1st Mukden Div.~~ (Chang Ching-hou)			After the despatch to South China, part of Mukden troops (end of Feb.1918) the Tuchun of Mukden asked permission of the Central Gov. to form new troops, and by the beginning of May of the same year, 7 Mixed Mukden Brigades were formed, but there was no order for nominations. Some Brigades were despatched to South China for fighting against the coalition of the southrn. Provinces. From those 7 Brigades were formed 5 so-called "Mixed Temporary Mukden Brigades" and the 1st Mukden Div. The 1st Mukden Div. is formd. of the 1st & 2nd Brigades. The nomination of the Commander of the Regt. was issued Aug.11,1918, & that of Comm. of Brigades Aug.18,1918.
Staff	see remarks Despatched		In Hupeh Prov. Nov.1918, the Div. received order to come back to Mukden Prov.
1st Brigade (Ts'ou-feng) staff			
1st Inf. Regt. ( ) staff and 3 yings	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. ( ) staff and 3 yings	"		
2nd Brigade (K'ang Chao-si) staff	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
3rd Inf. Regt. ( ) staff & 3 yings	Despatched		
4th Inf. Regt. ( ) staff & 3 yings	"		
Artillery: 3 Battalions. Mach. guns. 4 comp.	" " "		
1st Mixed Temporary Mixed Brigade. (Liang Chao-t'ung) staff	"		Formed in Sept.1918 from former 3rd Mukden Div.. In Hunan Province.
1st Inf. Regiment (Chao Yu-chu) staff & 3 yings	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (K'uan Wen-pa) staff & 3 yings 1 battery.	"		In Hunan Province
Mach.guns; 1 Co.	"		"
2nd Temporary Mixed Mukden Brig. (Cheng Tsin-sheng) staff	Sinminghsiang	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle	Formed from former 4th Mixed Mukden Brig.Sept.1918
3rd Inf. Regt. ( ) staff & 1st ying:	"		
2nd ying:	Tsiangchintsai		
3rd ying:	Yinminghsiang		
4th Inf. Regt. ( ) staff & 3rd ying:	Tieling		
1st ying:	Kaiyuan		
2nd ying:	Changt'iofu.		
3rd Temporary Mixed Mukden Brig. (Mai Ying-peng) staff	Mukden		Formed from former 5th Mix. Mukden Brig.in Sep.1918.
5th Inf. Regt. ( ) staff & 2nd ying:	"		
1st ying:	Haicheng		
3rd ying:	Liaoyang		
6th Inf. Regt. ( ) staff & 3 yings.:	"		
Mach.guns. 1 Co.:			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
4th Temporary Mixed Mukden Brig. (Liu Hsiang-cheng)			Formed from former 6th Mukden Brig. in Sept. 1918.
staff	Despatched		In Hunan Province.
7th Inf. Regt. ( )			
staff & 3 yings.			
8th Inf. Regt. ( )			
staff & 3 yings	"		
1 Battery	"		To Hunan Province.
1 Mach.gun Comp.	"		
4th Temporary Mixed Mukden Brig. (Liu Hsiang-chi)			Formed from former 7th Mix. Mukden Brig. in Sept. 1918. There are rumors that it is proposed to form in each Mixed Mukden Brig. 1 ying of Cav. 1 ying of Art. 1 Mach.gun Company. 1 Engineering Company 1 Transport Company.
staff	Sifenghsiang		
9th Inf. Regt. ( )			
staff & 2nd ying	Sianhsiang		
1st ying	Sifenghsiang		
3rd ying	Hailunghsiang		
10th Inf. Regt. ( )			
staff	T'ungfenghsiang		
1st ying	Shanchengcheng		
2nd ying	Ch'aoyangcheng		
3rd ying	Hailunghsiang		
The Escort of the Mukden Tuchun			
1 Inf. ying	Mukden	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle - 7.9m/m Mauser rifle	
1 Cav. ying	"		
1 Mach.Gun ying	"	16 Mach.guns & Maxim	
Guard of the Mukden Gun Bases	"		
2 Mach.guns Comp.	"	16 mach.guns Maxim	
B - The troops of Hsiun-Fang-Tui			
8th Detachment (Ma Lung-tang)			The Commander of the Detachment is also Commander of Defence of the Eastern parts of the Prov. (Tung-pian-chenshoushi). The Cavalry Divisions are under the command of his Asst. Pang Liang-chen.
staff	Fenghuacheng		
3rd Inf. ying	Chunghohsiang	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle and 6.5 m/m Jap. Carabine of 30th yr. of Michi.	
5th Inf. ying	Angtunghsiang		
6th Inf. ying	Kuantunhsiang		
7th Inf. ying	Fenghuangcheng		
8th Inf. ying	Lingkut'ou		
2nd Cav. ying	Lingchunhsiang		
3rd Cav. ying	Fenghuacheng		

Name of Troops and Commanders	STATION	Equipment	Remarks
Rear Detachment			Formed the 29th Division.
The troops of Chin Pei Pai (police)			
2nd separate Gov. Bgt. ( )			It was begun to be formed in December 1917 in Mukden.
staff	Singminghsiang	Different equipment	
1st ying	Changwuhsiang		
2nd ying	Taianhsiang		
3rd ying	Tak'uhsiang		
Separate yings			
1st Gov. ying	Changchiang		
2nd " "	Antuhsiang		
3rd " "	Hailunghsiang		
4th " "	Chantuhsiang		
5th " "	Huaitehsiang		
6th " "	Linhohsiang		
7th " "	Luishuhsiang		
The "Hai-fang-liang-tsing" (Guard of the shores)			
1st Inf. ying	Yingk'ou		
	The Cheng-shou-shi of T'ung-piang - Ma Lung-tan.		
	The Cheng-shoushi of Tao-liao		
	The situation was annulled on the 10th of Oct.1917.		
	II - Troops of the Kirin Province.		
A - Lu Ching Troops			Tuchun - Meng Ch'i-yuan Sheng-chang - Kuo Tsung-si
23rd Division			Reformed on July 2,1915 into 2nd & 3rd Mix.Kirin Brig. It was caused by nomination of Division Commandr. to post of Kirin's Tuchun; and the last by personal & economic motives insisted on the reform.
1st Kirin Div. (Kao Shi-ping)			On 1st Oct.1918 was finishd. organization of Division's staff, & on 14th Oct.commnd. of Div.received the "seal of the Commander of the Lu-Ching troops of the 1st Kirin Division". In order to accelerate the formation of the Div.it was decided to reform th4e 4th Mixed Kirin Brig.adding some parts from the 2nd,3rd&5th Mix.Kirin Brigades.The Official Order for the nominations of the Commanders is not yet issued.
Staff	Harbin		Former staff of the 4th Mixed Brigade.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Inf. Brig. (Chang Te-Kang) staff	Harbin		Composed from 2nd and Inf.Regt.of 4th Kirin Mixed Brig.
1st Inf. Regt. ( )	"	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle	
1st, 2nd Inf.yings 3rd Inf.ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. ( ) staff & 3 ying	"		
2nd Inf. Brig. (Wangs Tui-meng) staff	Nenganhsiang		Composed from 2nd and Inf. Regt.of 5th Kirin Mix. Brig.
3rd Inf. Regt. ( ) staff & 3 yings	"		
4th Inf. Regt. ( ) staff & 3 yings	Shuangyanghsiang		2nd ying is in Harbin.
1st Cav. Regt. ( ) staff & 3 yings	Potune	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle	of the Cav.Regt.of the 4th Kirin Mixed Brigade.
1st Art. Regt. ( ) staff	Kirin	12 Fld.guns 6 Mount.guns 75 m/m Krupp-last model.	Formerly Art.Regt.of 2nd Mixed Kirin Brigade.
1st sapper ying 4 companies	Changch'ung		Formed once more.
1st Transport ying ( ) 4 companies	"		Formerly transport ying of 3rd Mixed Kirin Brigade.
Machine guns: 1 Co.		6 mach.guns	From the 4th Mix.Kir.Brig.
1st Kirin Mixed Brigade (P'ei Ch'i-hsiang) staff	Changch'ung ~~Changchun~~	7.9m/m Mauser ~~7.9m/m Mauser~~ rifle, 1888 yr. pattern.	Formed from the "Kirin Mixed Brigade". It changed name on the 17th of March 1915.
1st Inf. Regt. 1 Liang K'o-ming) staff & 3 yings	Harbin		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Meng Tu-ti) staff & 3 yings	Tuchiation ~~Changchun~~	~~7.9m/m Mauser rifle, 1888 yr. pattern~~	~~Imperial Department Changchun.~~

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Cav. ying ( )	Ch'angch'ung	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle, 1888 yr. pattern.	And Small parts at Kuangchentzu.
2nd Cav. ying (T'sui Peng-tan)	Yaomeng, Loshakou		
1 Mach. Gun Comp.	Tuchiatien	6 Mach.guns	
2nd Kirin Mix. Brig. (Hsu Tang-cheng) staff	Kirin		Formed of 45th, former 23rd Div. in July 1915. The Art. Regt. gave over the cadre to the forming 1st Kirin Div. The Commander of the Brig. is the "Tangkung Chengshoushi."
1st Inf. Regt. (Li En-jung) staff & 3 yings	"	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle, 1888 yr. patrn.	
2nd Inf. Regt. (Chao Cheng-kang) staff & 3 yings	Hangch'ung		
1 Art. Regt. (T'ao Hsiang-yui)	Ch'angch'ung		12 guns of the 2nd ying - at Fuchiatun.
1 sapper ying (Chao Ti-shing) 4 m companies	Huatinchsian		
1 Mach. Gun Co.	Tuchiatun	6 Mach.guns	
3rd Kirin Mix. Brig. (Tao Haian-kou) staff.	Harbin		Formed of 46th Brig. ex 23rd Div. Commander of the Brig. "Ningaliang Chengshoushi"
1st Inf. Regt. 1 Wang Ling-geh) staff & 3 ying	Ninganghsian	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle, 1888 yr. pattern & 6.5 M/m Manlicker rifle	
2nd Inf. Regt. (Meng Sing-k'mi) staff & 3 yings	Achenghsian		
1 Cav. Regt. (Tui Ling) staff & 3 yings	Kirin	7.9 m/m Mauser carbines.	ex 23rd Cav. Regt. Part of the 1st ying-Loskarou, Sanchiho. Part of the 2nd ying-Skuanchengpu, Uchia. The cadre was assigned to form the 1st Kirin Division.
1 Transport ying			
1 Chao Ku-cheng)	Fushiatun		
1 Mach. Gun Comp.	"	6 Mach.guns	
4th Kirin Mixed Brigade. (Kao Su-shang) staff	Kirin		Formed in Oct. 1916 under name of 4th Kirin Brig.; in July 1918 was recalled into "4th Kirin Mix. Brigade".

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Inf. Regt. (Chang Chi-Kang) staff & 3 yings	Kirin	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle, 1888 yr.pattern	Both Inf.Regts.assigned a big cadre for the 1st Brig. of the 1st Kirin Div.
2nd Inf. Regt. (Sun Tung-cheng) staff & 3 yings	Ch'ang Linhsian		
1 Cav. Regt. (Chang Yui-cheng) staff & 3 yings	Chuangcking-hsian	7.9 m/m Mauser carabines	Assigned a big cadre for the Cav.Regt.of the 1st Kirin Div. Small parts station Yaemen.
1 Transport ying	Sansing		
1 Mach.Gun Comp.	Fuchiatun	6 Mach.guns	Assigned a cadre for the 1st Kirin Division.
5th Kirin Mixed Brigade (Yao Pei-cheng) staff	Kirin	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle	Formed in August 1918. Commander of the Brig.was appointed on 7th Aug.1918.
1st Inf. Regt. (Wang Tui-cheng) staff & 3 yings	Yangchihsian		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Wang Shu-tang) staff & 3 yings	Yitunghsian		
1 Cav. Regt. (Chang Ti-hai) staff & w yings	Omaksian, Meshantyu, Puhei	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle	6th & 7th esquade. Fuchiatun - Kuhsiantun village.
1 Mach.Gun Comp.	Kirin	6 Mach.guns	

Cheng-shou-shi

Chi-ch'ang	Pei Ch'i-suan.
Yang-hun	Kao Feng-ch'eng.
Ning-a-lan	Tao Hsiang-Kuei.
Fu-sing	Kao Shi-pin.

III - Troops of the Hei Lung-chiang Province.

1st Hei Lung-chiang Div.		Reformed into 1917.	Mixed Brigades at end of

In Tsitsikar from the 30th May to 15th Oct.1917 there were big misunderstandings between the Commanders of different troops, chiefly between the Tu-chung(also the ~~Commander~~ Civil Governor) Pi Kuei-fan and his Assistant (also the Commander of the ex 1st Hei Lung-chiang Div.). Sui Lang-chou; the last applied many times for the position of Tu-chung. With the support of the troops, Sui ~~offered~~ demanded to Pi Kuei-fan to leave the Province,

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			and the last in the beginning of June departed to Peking with a report of the situation, giving up the parts of the Tu-chüng and Civil Governor to the General Sui Lang-shen. But Ying-Shun(Commander of the 4th Cav.Tsitsikar Brig.)and Pa Yong-e(Commander of the 1st Brig.of the ex-1st Heilung-chiang Div.)did not acknowledge the power of Sui Lang-chou, and decided to march against him with their troops. Temporary this conflict was settled,owing to the intervention of Chang Tso-Ling, who reconciled the fighting sides and intereeded for Sui in order to confirm his appointment of Tu-chüng.
Tu-chüng - Pao Kuei-chin - Sheng-chang id.			In the meantime the Peking government appointed to that post Pao Kuei-ching, who arrived ~~to~~ Tsitsikar on the 30th July; and Sui was called to Peking to be adviser to the Chiangchün administration. But Sui refused to have Tsitsikar motiving his refusal by the reason that his ~~aff~~ appointment was settled without his assent. On the 30th Aug.was received the order to appoint Sui Lang-chou to the post of Tyun- -ling in the Mukden Province with the permission to take with him 8 yings of Tsitsikar troops, and he left the Hei Lung-chiang Prov.on the 7th Sept.1917 for the town of Sifenghsiang(Mukden Prov.)from where in March 1918, he was despatched to the Honan Prov. and further to the Szechuen Prov.to help Liu Ts'ung-hou against the southerners. But Sui, reaching the southern frontiers of the Shengshi Prov.remained there, and formd. of the troops that he took away with him a Brig.(16 Inf. yings, 2 Cav.yings, and 2 Mach.Gun Comp.)that was called 1st (and often 3rd) Mukden Mixed Brig. This Brig.began to be formed from the 10th Dec.1917 in Sifenghsiang. In the Shensi Prov. the 2nd Mukden reserved Brig.was dependent on Sui Langchou.
			After the departure of General Sui, as the riots on the account of the post of Commander of the Div.,did not cease, Pao Kueichin in order to avoid the concentration of a considerable amount of troops in the hands of one person, abolished with the Government's assent the post of the Commander of the Div., and formed of all the troops Mixed Brigades, and he for that 1) Ports of the 1st Hei Lung-chien Div. 2) The ex-4th Cav. Brigade. 3) A part of the Mukden siunfantoin, that Pao Kouei-chin brought himself from the Mukden Prov., those parts once completed with recruits. The artillery-54~~m~~ - was only partly divided between the brigades. There are 36 mach.guns in the Prov.,but they also are not yet divided.
1st Tsitsikar Mixed Brigade. (Li-Chin-lu) staff	Soui Hua-hsian	6.5 m/m Japan carabines & rifle of the 30 yr.Meitsi, also 7.9 m/m Mauser rifle &carabines of 1888 yr.patrn.	Formed in July 1918 of th former Tsitsikar troops.
1st Inf. Regt. (Li Te-yi) staff & 1st ying:	"		
2nd ying:	Paichüanhsian		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
5th Cav. Regt. (Yang En-chung)			
staff & 1 ying	Hailunghsian		
2nd Tsitsikar Mixed Brigade (Wang Ming-chin)			Formed in July 1918 of the former Tsitsikar troops.
staff	Hulanhsian		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Chiang Sian-chang)			
staff & 1st ying	Payanghsian		
2nd ying	Lansihsian		
6th Cav. Regt. (Hu Yung-kuei)			
staff and 1st ying	Suihuahsian		
2nd ying	Payanghsian		
3rd Tsitsikar Mixed Brigade. (Pa Ying-o)			
staff	Heiho		
~~Independent ying~~			
1st Inf. ying	"		
7th Cav. Regt. (. . . . . .)			
staff & 1st ying	Aihunghsian		
2nd ying	Heihohsian		
3rd ying	Morgen		
4th Tsitsikar Mixed Brigade. (Liu Te-ch'uan)			
staff	Tsitsikar		
3rd Inf. Regt. (. . . . . .)			
staff. 1st ying	On the line of the China East. Ry.		
2nd ying	Manchuria Sta.		
3rd ying	"		
8th Cav. Regt. (. . . . .)			
staff. ~~Independent ying~~	Nohohsian		
1st ying	Tsitsikar		
2nd ying	Nohohsian		
3rd ying	Morgen		
1st Equestrian Tsitsikar Brig. (Yuan Ching-ying)			Formed in July 1918.
staff	Antahsian		
1st Cav. Regt. (Liu Tsung-yao)			
staff and 1st ying	"		
2nd ying	On the line of the C.E.Ry.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks.
2nd Cav. Regt. (Tai Sheng-cheng) staff and 1st ying	Anta		1st, 2nd Anta 3rd [illegible], Manhou 5th Sun
2nd ying	Tsitsikar		6th Sart'u 8th Lamatunchi
3rd Cav. Tsitsikar Reg. (Chang Kuei-yu) staff	Tsitsikar		Formed in July 1918.
3rd Cav. Regt. (Chang Kuei-yu) staff -1st ying 2nd & 3rd yings	Manchuria Sta. Hailar		
4th Cav. Regt. (Li Hsiang-ying) staff-1st ying 2nd & 3rd yings	Chingsingchen on the line of C.E.Ry.		
19th Mixed Brig. (Pao Kuei-chin) staff	Tsitsikar		Is still forming (Commander Pao Kuei-chin was appointed on the 21st Feb.1918) Probably will be formed of the 2 Mixed Regiments.
1st Tsitsikar Mixed Regt. (Tu Shi-Tye) staff			The Commander was appointed June 21, 1918.
1st Inf. ying	Aihunghsian		Commander of the 1st ying - Chu Ch'ang-hui.
2nd Inf. ying	Moho, Heiho, Kumar		
1st Cav. ying	Heiho, Aihunghsian		
2nd Cav. ying	Aihunghsian, Hunmo, Hsiho.		
2nd Tsitsikar Mixed Regiment. (Li Meng -Ren) staff	Heiho, Cikete, Yang-chang		Commander - Ching Yang-sheng
2nd Inf. yings	Tsitsikar		The commander was appointed the 21st June 1918.
1st Cav. ying	"		
1 sapper ying	"		
1 Mach. Gun Comp.	"	6 Mach. guns	
1 Gendarme ying		18 Fld. guns,	
Musical band.		75 m/m Krupp	
		7.9m/m Carabines	

It is intended to establish the posts of Cheng-shou-shi:

Hu-lung. . . . . .
Hu-ho . . . . . .
Hu-pa . . . . . .

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
A - The Troops of North China.			
1 - Troops of the Chihli Province.			
(military governor)	Tu-chün	Ts'ao-kung	
(civil governor)	Sheng-chang	Ts'ao-jui	
1) Troops dependent on the Central Government and of the Administration of the Capital Region.			
(a) **Lu-Chün Troops**			
Guards Division			In Sept.1917 received the name of 16th Div.in the Chiangsu Province.
1st Division (Ts'ai Ch'ang-sung) despatch			In Peking(in the temple Chiao-sheng-s'i)500 men guard the property of the 1st Div.The whole Div.was despatched to Mongolia to fight the Mongolian bandits (Aug.1916).
1st Div.of the troops "Ku-fang-chün" (Chui-t'ung-feng)	(War Participation Bureau Troops)		The troops"Ku-fang-chün " (troops of the Government's Defence)are formed by T'uan Chi-jui,the ex-Premier, Minister, and Minister of War. He was appointed on the 5th Dec.1917 to the post of Chief Administrator in the affairs of the War with Germany, and Austria. When China declared war on Germany and Austria,China decided to form troops in order to send them to Europe and gave them the name of"Ts'an-chang-chün".The Commanding body was filled by officers taken from courses,established on that purpose;Courses for officers and under-ofcers.(Chün-Kuang Chiao-tuan and chün-shi-chiao-tao-tuan). But those troops have never been sent to Europe. By Dec.1918 the troops"Chan-chang-chün" received the name of "Ku-fang-chün", and were destined to guard the northern & southern frontiers of China The Southern say that those troops are formed to support the political party of Tuan Chi-jui & insist on their disbanding. But the formation still continues.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Staff (Pei Chian-shang)	Peking(Peiyang)		
1st Brigade (Tsang Shang-ping)	"	Japan rifle of the 38th yr. of Meichi.	
1st Inf. Rgt. (Li Chang-ling) staff & 3 yings	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Chiang Ping-yang) staff & 3 yings	"		
2nd Brigade (Che'ng Cha'ng-fa)	"		
3rd Inf. Regt. (Kang Pin-li) staff & 3 yings	"		
4th Inf. Regt. (Ma Ten-ying) staff & 3 yings	"		
1st Artillery Reg. (. . . . .) staff & 3 yings	"		Is still formed
1st Cav. Regt. (. . . . .) staff & 3 yings	"		Is still formed
1st Engineer ying (Li Chia-ling)	"		
1st Transport ying (Chiang Ming-cheng)	"		
~~2nd Division of the troops "Ta-lan-chian"~~ (Ma Liang)			Is formed in the Shantung Prov.(see page 54)for that is unfolded the 47th Mixed Brigade.
~~3rd Division of the troops "Ko-fang-chian"~~ (Cheng Weng-yung) staff The Staff's Comm. Yangs-tye.	Paotingfu.		The Division has now only the commanding body. The recruitment of soldiers is made in the Honan Prov.to where had been despatched i in Jan.1919 the Brigades' Commander & a part of ofcrs
5th Brigade. (Chang Chi-kuang) staff.	Luiliho		
9th Inf. Regt. (Sui Wei-chao) staff & 3 yings	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
10th Inf. Regt. (Wu Chin-tien) staff & 3 yings	Lailiho		
6th Brigade (Sun Tui-feng) staff	Chengtingfu		
11th Inf. Regt. (An Kuei-sing) staff & 3 yings	"		
12th Inf. Regt. (Ts'ai Liang-pi) staff & 3 yings	"		
3rd Art. Regt. (. . . . . .) staffk 3 yings	Paotingfu		
3rd Cavalry Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings	Yaotsun		
3rd Engineering ying (Ku- Hao)	Paotingfu		
3rd Transprt. ying (Chao Se-chang)	"		
1st Mixed Brig. of the troops (Kaifang-chun") (Wang Yung-chun)			It is the 1st Mukden Reserve Brig.now situated in the Fuchien Prov. The recruitment of soldiers for the Brig.was done in June 1918 in Honan Prov.by Sui Shi-cheng. 4 Brigades were enlisted; they had to be sent against the southerners. In Aug.1918 two Brigades were put under the dependence of the Administr.of the affairs of the war with Germany(Chan-ch'ang-chun) The 2nd & 4th were placed under the dependence of Sui Lang-chou to help the Prov.Szechuen, and Honan in their fight against the Southerners. It was supposed at first to enlist these Brigades in Mukden Prov.&to keep them on the resources of the same Prov. and so they were called "Mukden"Reserve Brigades. The Mukden Treasury gave money for the recruitment of these brigades, but when soldiers began to be enlisted in the Honan Prov. the Tuchün of Mukden reclaimed back the money that had been given to Tui Shih-cheng for the recruitment, but the last did

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			not return them, and on that ground arose a misunderstanding between Sui Shi-cheng and the Mukden Tuchün, Chang Tso-ling. The conflict was settled when a relative of Chang Tso-ling was appointed to the post of Vice-Pres. of the Lower House of the Parliament in return of the payment of the money.
~~3rd Mixed Brig. of the troops "Ko-fang-chün"~~ (Wan Fang-hang)			This is the 3rd Mukden Reserve Brig; situated in the Honan Prov.
~~3rd Mixed brig. of the troops "Ko-fang-chün"~~ (Wu Chi-hsian)			Is not yet formed.
~~4th Mixed Brig. of the troops "Ko-fang-chün"~~ (Chang Ting-si)			Is not yet formed.
~~2nd Division~~ (Wang Chang-yuan)	Despatched		In Hupeh Province. The Division from Dec.1915 was gathered in Hupeh Prov. to suppress the Yunnan riot (3rd revolution). From July 1917 it was concentrated near Tuechou, Hunan Prov. against the coalition of the southrn. Provinces. In the end of Dec.1917, the Div. was recalled (nearly the whole of it) to the Hupeh Prov. in view of the failure of the Govt. troops in Hunan Prov. & also because the Hupeh Tuchün was frightened at the invasion of the South. troops in this Prov. The former Commander of the Div., Wang Ching-ching was deprived of his ranks & function (23rd & 29th Jan 1918) because he surrendered to the Southerners Tuechou; the Div. was put under the disposal of the Hupeh Tuchün, Pang Chang-yuan. The 1st ying of the 2nd Cav. Regt. of this Div. had been despatched to Mongolia.
~~3rd Division~~ (U Pei-fu)			The Chihli Tu-chün, Tsao-K'ung is the Commander of the 3rd Div.; at the head of the 1st Army he went to fight against the Southerners; on the 17th of Jan. 1918 he was appointed "peace-maker" (sun-ue-shi) of the Hupeh & Honan Prov. He came back to Chihli in Dec. 1918 & took charge of his place as Tu-chün. By the time of its fighting with the Southerners, the Div. was enlarged in its complete, besides its ordinary compleet. Belong to it - the escort of the Tu-chün & 3 Chihli Reserve Brigades
Staff	Despatched		Honan Province.

~~5th Inf.~~

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
9th Inf. Brigade (Chang Sun-yang)	Despatched		To Honan Dec. 1917.
9th Inf. Regt. (Feng Shou-ming) staff & 3 yings	"	7.9 m/m Mauser rifle, 1888 yr.patrn.	
10th Inf. Regt. (Ying Wen-hao) staff & 3 yings	"		
8th Inf. Brigade (Chang Wu-lai) staff	Despatched		In Honan Prov.
11th Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Chin-yuang) staff & 3 yings	"		
12th Inf. Regt. (Tun Cheng-Ko) staff & 3 yings	"		
3rd Cav. Regt. (Wang Chi-Kuei) staff & 3 yings		7.9 m/m Mauser carabines, 1888	
3rd Art. Regt. (Wang Yang-chung) staff & 2 yings	"		
3rd ying	Paotingfu	18 Fld.guns 75 mm	18 Fld.guns 75 mm 8 Mount.guns, 75 mm
3rd Engineer ying (Lü Yung-hao) 4 companies	Despatched		
3rd Transport ying: (Miu Hsiang-ch'eng) 4 companies	"		
Mach.guns; 4 Comp.	"		16 mach.guns .
Gendarmery			Attached to the staff -
Musical Band	Paotingfu		198 men.
~~The Guard of Ts'ao Kun, composed of 1 Mixed Brig. Staff~~ (Chou Fu-ling)	"		Ts'ao Kun's Guard was orderd. to a Mixed Brig.in Aug.1918, when it was despatched against the Southerners. It returned in Dec. 1918.
1st Regt. (Ch'eng Si-sheng)			
1st Inf. ying			
2nd Mach.gun ying		12 Mach.guns	
3rd Cav. ying			
2nd Regt. (Ts'ao Ching-tung)			
1st Inf. ying			Private guard with ancient armament.
2nd Inf. ying			3 Inf.Comp.& 1 fluvial Co.
3rd Inf. ying			4 Inf. Companies.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Artillery ying	Paotingfu	10 mount.guns 8 mach. guns	1st Batt. 3 platoons.16guns 2nd batt.2 platoons: 14 guns & 2 Mach. Gun Companies.
1st Chihli Mix. Brigade (Wang Hung-ying)		The former reserve Brigade of the 3rd Div. was called 1st Chihli Mix.Brigade in Mch. 1917. In Aug.1918 3 more Reserve Brigades were enlisted under the name of "Chihli" and added to the 3rd Division.	
1st Inf. Regt. (Wang Yu-Kai)			In Honan Province.
3x Inf. yings			
2nd Inf. Regt. (Sung Ta-shung)			
3 Inf. yings			4 machine guns
1 Mach.gun Comp.			
2nd Chihli Reserve Brigade (Kuo Hung-chi)			
3rd Inf. Regt. (.....)	Paotingfu		
3 Inf. yings			
4th Inf. Regt. (.....)			
3 Inf. yings 2 Mach.gun comps.		8 mach.guns	In Shantung Prov. Attached to the Regiments.
3rd Chihli Reserve Brigade. (Peng Shou-sing)			
5th Inf. Regt. (.....)			
3 Inf. yings	Paotingfu		
6th Inf. Regt. (.....)			
3 Inf. yings			In Honan Prov.
4th Division (Yang Shang-te)			In Chechiang Prov. It stayed before in Chiangsu Prov.
		On the 20th of Dec.1916,with the appointment of Yang Shang-te Tuchun of Checkiang theDivision in Chechiang.	
4th Cav. Regt.		2nd ying at Ute; 1st & 3rd yings at Urga were despatched, to Mungolia from Suiyuan-ch'eng in July 1918.	
1 Reserve Regt. 3 yings	Mach'ang	Formed in Dec. 1917.	

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
6th Division (Tuan Sie-yuang)			In Chiangsu Prov. It went there from Chiangsi Prov. after the nomination of Li Ch'ung tuchün of Chiangssu in Nov.1917.
8th Division (Chang Ching-yao)			The former 7th Div. - in Sept.1914 was despatched to Shensi Prov. where it was called 15th & 16th Mix.Brig. The present 7th Div. was formed in Oct.1914 of the 3rd Mixed Brigade. On Dec.14,1915, the Div. was expedited to Chihli Prov. to suppress the Yunnan riot (beginning of the 3rd revolution) which began on the 13th Dec.1915. In July 1916 the Div. was gathered in Honan Prov. from where in Nov.1917 it went to Chiangssu & Hunan to fight against the Southerners who rose up against the Northern government after the dismissal of the Parliament, May 30, 1917.
staff			Honan Province.
13th Inf. Brig. (Hsia Weng-jung) staff		6.5 mm Japanese rifle, 30 yr. of Meitsi	
25th Inf. Regt. (Wei-ming-shang) staff & 3 yings			
26th Inf. Regt. (Liu Ch'ao-cheng) staff & 3 yings			
14th Inf. Brig. (Wu Sing-tin) staff.			
27th Inf. Regt. (Li Ch'ang-ming) staff & 3 yings.			
28th Inf. Regt. (Liu Pao-shan) staff & 3 yings.			
7th Cav. Regt.		1st ying (old) with 8 mach. guns: 200 men	in Mongolia at Urga, 50 m - Kiachta, 50 m - Uliasutai: 50 m - Kobdo: this ying under the command of Yang Fu-Kuei exists for the guard of Chinese residents in Mongolia.
1st ying (new)		6,5 mm Jap. carabines.	Honan Prov.
2nd ying	Peking	30 year of Meitsi	
3rd ying			Chianssu Prov.
7th Art. Regt. (Chang Chin-yui) staff & 3 yings.		36 mount.guns	18 Fld.guns.

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
7th sapper ying (Wang Chi-ying) 4 companies			
7th Transport ying (Wang Si-peng) 4 companies			
Machine guns: 4Co.		16 mach.guns	
1 Cav. ying			The guard of the Division's staff.
1st Reserve Brig. of the 7th Div. (Ku Chao-Ting)			2nd Inf.Regts.formed in during latter part of 1917.
2nd Reserve Brig. of the 7th Div. (Liu Ch'ao-ch'eng)			2 Inf. Regts.formed first part of 1918.
3rd Reserve Brig. of the 7th Div. (Liu Cheng-yui)			2 Inf. Regts.formed first part of 1918.
8th Division (Wang Yu-hsian)			Hupeh Province.
		This Division Sept.1917 against the Southern coalition near Tuihchou; for the surrender of which the Division's Commander, Jan.23,1918, was deprived of his ranks (but retained his duties), the Division suffered great loss. In consideration of its infidelity it was recalled from the scene of war and temporarily sent to Hupeh Province.	
15th Inf. Brig. (Wang Yu-ching) staff			Hupeh Province.
29th Inf. Regt. (Liang Te-sheng) staff & 3 yings.		7.9 mm Mauser rifle, 1888 yr. pattern.	
30th Inf. Regt. (Tun Ching-chang) staff & 3 yings.			
16th Inf. Brig. (Chang Chiu-chin) staff.			
31st Inf. Regt. (Liu Yui-ch'ung) staff & 3 yings.			
32nd Inf. Regt. (Liu Chiang-chang) staff & 3 yings			
8th Cav. Regt. (Y Yan Chin-pu) 4 squadrons.		7.9mm Mauser carabines, 1888 yr.patt.	The Regt.is composed of 4 squadrons, 18 detachments. In all 480 men. The rest of

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			the Regt. was left as it was when in the 1st Cav. Brig. before its recalling - 8th Cav. Regt.
8th Art. Regt. (Sung Shu-ling) staff & 3 yings		18 Fld. guns	36 mount. guns, 75 mm. Krupp of the Shanghai Arsenal.
8th Engineer ying (Li Ming) 4 companies			
8th Trans. port ying (.....) 4 companies			
Mach. guns: 4 Cos.		16 mach. guns attached to the Regts.	
Musical Band.			
1st Reserve Brig. of the 8th Div.			2 Inf. Regts. formed the beginning of 1918.
~~9th Division (Wei Chun-han)~~		The 9th Div. was formed 4 times: 1) March 1914 it was formed of the 1st Shansi Div.; and in Sept. was called 13th and 14th Mixed Brigades. 2) Sept. 1914 it was formed of the 1st Honan Div., & in Jan. 1915 it was reformd. into the 1st and 2nd Honan Mixed Brigades. 3) Jan. 1916 it was formed of the 11th Div. in Hupeh Prov.; in Dec. 1917, the Div. declared its independence, but the 18th Brig. soon joined the Government's troops & formed in Feb. the 17th and 18th Mixed Brigades. 4) July 1917, the Div. was again formed of the 5th Mixed Brig. (ex-standard Regt.). The nomination of the Regts. Commander took place June 21, 1918.	
17th Brigade (.....)			
33rd Inf. Regt. (staff & 3 yings			Vladivostok from the 6th Aug. 1918.
34th Inf. Regt. (Keng Si-lings) staff & 3 yings.			Fukien Prov. from the 23rd June 1918.
18th Brigade (.....)			
35th Inf. Regt. (Tung Shi-yang) staff & 3 yings.	Peking		
~~36th Inf. Regt.~~			

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
26th Inf. Regt. (Pa Hung-miang) staff & 3 yings.			
9th Cav. Regt. (Hi Ch'iang) staff & 3 yings			1 ying in Vladivostok.
9th Art. Regt. (Liu Weng-hang) staff & 3 yings.		36 Fld. guns 10 mount.guns	Besides this- 4 mount.guns in Fukien and 4 mount.guns in Vladivostok.
9th sapper ying (Sie Chung-tsou) 1 company	Peking		
5 companies			Vladivostok.
9th Transprt. ying (Feng Tê-jun) 4 companies			"
1 mach.gun ying (Lei P'an-lin) 4 companies		16 mach.guns	Attached to the Regts.
O.K. ~~10th Division~~ (Lu Yung-hsiang)			Chiangsu Province. The Commander of the Div. went to Shanghai on the 2nd of Dec.1915, to take up his duties as Shanghai Huchünski; keeping hispost of Commander of the Div.; the Div.accompanied him.
~~11th Division~~ (Li Hsei-huang) staff			Hupeh Prov. From the 27th Dec.1918 some of these troops began coming back from the south. The 11th Div.began to be formed Oct.1915 in Paotingfu, and the 14th & 15th Jan.1916 followed the nominations of the Commanding body. Soldiers were enlisted in the Peking district,& Honan Prov. Officers and under-officers were nominated, among those who passed the course of the Peking model Regt.When the 12th Div.left Peking, the 11th was called to Peking, where it arrived June 12,1916. From Nov.17,1917,the Div.began to be despatched to Hupeh Prov.to fight bandits that stopped the railway communication Uch'ang-Suichou. After the surrounding of Yuihchou(Jan14,1918)the Div.was recalled from Hunan Prov.where it was sent Nov.25,198,to Hupeh Prov.,because the Southerners menaced Hankow and Wuchang.
21st Inf. Brig. (Chang Lung-huang) staff		7.9 mm Mauser rifle of the yr.1888 patt. from the Han-yan factory	

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
41st Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings			
42nd Inf. Regt. (Liu Kuang-wen) staff & 3 yings			
22nd Inf. Brig. (Chou Ying-jeng) staff.			Hupeh Province.
43rd Inf. Regt. (Wang Ying-t'ang) staff & 3 yings.			
44th Inf. Regt. (Wei Chin-hsi) staff & 3 yings.			
11th Cav. Regt. (Chao Weng-chuan) staff & 3 yings.		7.9 mm Mauser carabines - 1888 yr. patt. of the Hangan factory.	
11th Art. Regt. (Li Shi-pai)		36 Fld.guns, 75 mm, Krupp. 18 mount.guns, 57 mm Krupp, of the Hanyan factory.	
11th sapper ying (.....) 4 companies	Peking (Kanyuan)		The 1st Comp.was despatched to Hupeh Prov.
11th Transport ying (.....) 4 companies.	" "		
Mach.guns: 4 Comp. Musical Band.	" "	16 mach.guns	Attached to the Regts.
~~12th Division~~ (Ch'eng Kuang-yuan)			Chiangsi Prov. The Div. began its formation from Nov.1915 in Pao-tingfu; the nominations of the Commanding body followed on the 13th Jan.1916; soldiers were enlisted in Peking district and Honan Prov.
23rd Inf. Brig. (Chang Chi-chieh) staff.			The Brig.was despatched 19th March 1916 to Shanghai to fight against the revolutionists(3rd revolution);it returned to Peking in Aug.& went to Chiangsi during end of 1917,when the Division's Commander was appointed to the post of Chiangsi Tuchun (Nov.19,1917).

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
45th Inf. Regt. (Chang Shi-tien) staff & 3 yings.		Same equipment as in 11th Div.	
46th Inf. Regt. (Li Hun-ju) staff & 3 yings			
24th Inf. Brig. (Tuch-Chang-ling) staff.			In Chiangsi Prov.. The Brig.was despatched May 11th,1916 to Shantung Prov.in view of the breaking there of a revolutionary movemnt. During latter part of 1917,the Brig.was sent off to Chiangsi to fight against the southerners.
47th Inf. Regt. (Wang Wei-ch'eng) staff & 3 yings.			
48th Inf. Regt. (Sui Ten-chao) staff & 3 yings.			
12th Cav. Regt. (Kao Wang-kuei) staff & 3 yings.	Peking(Nanyuan)		
12th Art. Regt. (Ch'eng Pao-tsung) staff & 3 yings.		36 mount.guns 57 mm. 18 Fld.guns 57mm.	
12th Engineering ying (Wang Yuei-Kuei) 4 companies.			
12th Transport ying (.....) 4 companies.			
Mach.guns:4 Comp.		12 mach.guns	Attached to the Regiments.
13th Division. (Li Chin-ts'ai) staff.	Peking(Siguan)	7.9 mm Mauser rifle - 1888 yr.pattern.	Formed of the troops "kun-wei-chün" - June 27, 1916.
25th Inf.Brig. (Tien Yu"-wang) staff.	"		
49th Inf. Regt. (Ko Kuei-ling) staff & 3 yings.			
50th Inf. Regt. (Wang Yu-chiang) staff & 3 yings	Peking (Hsiammen)		Mongolia. The 50th Inf.Regt.took an active part in the defence of Peking on June 29,1917,helping Chang Hsün to restore the monarchy; this provoked the dissatisfaction of the other Regts.of the Div.; therefore it is intended to give it the name of the Guard Detachment of Tuang Chin-kuei,and to form a new 50th Regt.

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
26th Inf. Brig. (Hsu Ju-yu) staff	Peking(Siyüan)		
51st Inf. Regt. (Wang Ke-tien) staff & 3 yings.	"		
52nd Inf. Regt. (Tsui Wei-fang) staff and 3 yings	"		
13th Cav. Regt. (Li Te-sheng) staff & 2 yings 1st ying	"	7.9 mm Mauser Carabines, 1888 yr. patt.	Honan Province.
13th Art. Regt. (Wang Chuang-sheng) staff & 2 yings	Peking(Siyüan)	30 Fld. guns. 75 mm Krupp	
3rd ying			1 Batt.(6 Fld.guns)in Mongolia. In Honan Province(18 mount guns, 75 mm Krupp.
13th sapper ying (Wu Kuang-yao) 4 companies.	Peking(Siyüan)		
13th Transp.ying (Li Cheng-lung) 4 companies.	"		
Machine gun ying 4 companies. (Lo Ming-ch'eng)		12 German pack mach.guns	and 6 mach.guns attached to the 49th Inf. Regt.
15th Division (Liu Hsing) staff.	Peking(Nanyüan)		Formed of the ex 5th Mix. Brig.(See Honan Prov.). The Commanders of Brigades and Regts.were nominated on 5th Sept.1917 and in Nov.of same yr.the recruitment was completed. Located for a while in Chiangsu Prov.; arrived at Peking Nov.24,1917. Was the guard of President Feng Ko-chang. From Jan.12,1918 was despatched to Hupeh Prov.in view of the advance of the Southerners towards the town Wuchang. From March 1918 was gathered again in Peking(Nanyüan).
29th Inf. Brig. (Chang Ko-jung) staff.		79 mm rifle 38 yr.of Kuangksü.	
57th Inf. Regt. (Pu Sheng-chia) staff & 3 yings	Peking(Nanyüan)		
58th Inf. Regt. (Liu Yu-tsang) staff and 3 yings.	Tamengfu		

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
30th Inf. Brig. (Chi Ko-chang) staff	Peking (Sanyuan)		
59th Inf. Regt. (Chang Kung-ch'eng) staff & 3 yings	"		
60th Inf. Regt. (Fung Kai-ping) staff & 3 yings	"		
15th Cav. Regt. (Ch'eng Shi-ai) staff & 3 yings.	"		
15th Art. Regt. (Feng Chin-tsung) staff & 3 yings		36 Fld.guns, 75 mm 12 mount.guns 75 mm Krupp.	
15th sapper ying (Wei Lo-sang) 4 companies	"		
15th Transp.ying (Feng Fu-ch'ang) 4 companies.	"		
Machine guns - 4 companies.		12 Hotchkiss m.guns. 4 Maxim m. guns.	Attached to the Regts.
16th Division ~~(Wang Ting-cheng)~~ staff	Peking(SiyMan)	6,5 mm Japan rifle - 30 yr of Meitsi.	Changed its former name of Guard Div.in Sept.1917. The Commanding body was nominated Oct.27,1917.
31st Inf. Brig. (Kuang Chung-ho) staff.			Chingsi Prov.(1 Mix.Brig.).
61st Inf. Regt. (Fu Chung-en) staff & 3 yings			Chiangsu province.
62nd Inf. Regt. (Chai Ting-ling) staff & 3 yings	Peking		Near the Sheng-wumang gates (Guard of the Ching's Court
~~Brig~~ 32nd Inf. Brig. (Tun Hsian-chang) staff	Peking(SiyMan)		
63rd Inf. Regt. (Lo Shou-hing) staff & 3 yings.			1st & 2nd yings at Hsiling.
64th Inf. Regt. (Liu Si-ling) staff & 3 yings.			Chingsu province.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
16th Cav. Regt. (Ma Chin-shong)			
Staff	Peking(Siyüan)	6.5 mm Jap.	
1st ying		rifle, 30th yr	
2nd ying		of Meitsi.	Chiangsu Province.
3rd ying	Peking(Siyüan)		
16th Art. Regt. (Ma Chia-hu)		36 Fld.guns	
		75 mm Krupp	
Staff & 1st ying			Chiangsu Province.
2nd ying			(18 mount.guns)
3rd ying	Peking(Siyüan)		
16th Engineer ying (Chao Si-kuang)			
2 companies			
2 companies			Chiangsu Province.
16th Transport ying (Chang Chih-shêng)			
2 companies			"
2 companies	Peking(Siyüan)		
Machine gun ying (Chang Ch'üan)			
2 companies	"	12 mach.guns	Chiangsu Province.
2 companies			(12 m. guns)
Gendarms			Attached to the Brigades.
Musical Band	Peking(Siyüan)		
Reserve Regt.			
1st ying	Peking(Wanshoushan)		For the completion of parts
2nd ying	" (Yüch'üanshan)		of the Division.
3rd ying	" (in the exterior Honan).		
Reserve Brigade of the 16th Div. (Ho Shao-hsian)			Was formed of the guard of the ex-President Feng Ko-chang during end of Oct.1918.
1st Regt.	Peking.	2nd ying of the 2nd Regt.is situated at	
2nd Regt.	Peking(Nanyüan)	Hotien(Chihli prov.)-birthplace of Feng Ko-chang.	
1st Brig.of the Metropolitan.		On Oct.6,1917 took the name of 1st Brig.of the Capital region, and was called "ching-chi lüchün fu-ping ti-yi-lü". July 8th it was despatched to Mongolia to suppress riots in the Chaharhsing-feng-tuei, and returned to Peking beginning of Nov.1917. On 20th of Nov.the 1st Regt.was again sent to Mongolia to fight against the bandits. On 12th Apr.1918, the Brig.was despatched to Shantung against bandits. In June1918 the Brig.took the name of 20th Mix.Brig.	
4th Mix.Brig. (Chang Si-yüan)		For the 1st time, the Mix.Brig.under #4 was formed in Aug.1914 from the 39th Brig.of the 20th Div. In 1916 it was despatched to Szuchuen prov.&afterwards to Hupeh Prov. where it was demobilized. The present 4th Mix.Brig.get its name in Aug.1917 from the ex 1st Brig.of the Capital region.	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
staff			Shensi Prov. It was dispatched there in Nov.1916 from Hunan Prov.
1st Inf. Regt. (Kiang Ko-chang) staff & 3 yings.		7.9 mm Mauser rifle from the Shanghai Arsenal.	
2nd Inf. Regt. (Chang Ching-piao) staff & 3 yings.			
1 battery		6 guns	
1 squadron			
2 mach.guns comp.		8 mach.guns	Attached to the Regts.
5th Mixed Brig.			The 1st formation took place in Aug.1914 from the Chihli Mix.Brig.in Chiangsu Prov.; the last was in Aug.1916 and developed into the 15th Div. The 2nd formation took place in Oct.1917 from the 2nd Peking standard Regt.; 2nd emission in Peking(Nanyuan); and in June 1918 the Brig.was developed into the 9th Div. The 3rd formation took place in Honan Pr. July 1918, from 1st Honan Inf.Brig.
13th Mix. Brig. (Li Ping-chi)			The 1st formation took place in Sept. 1914 from parts of the 9th Div.situated Shansi prov.; then the Brig.was and called 1st Shansi Mix. Regt. The 2nd formation was in spring 1915; then was formed the so-called "temp.1st Mix.Brig."of the 3rd Regt.of the 1st Div.of 2 esquadrons of the 2nd Cav.Regt.of the 2nd Div., 2 Batt.& 12 mach.guns of the 2nd Div. The Brig.arrived in Szechuen March 12, 1915 with Cheng Yi, where on the 1st of Jan.1916 it was called the 13th Mix.Brig. In Sept.1916 the Brig.went to Hupeh Prov. where it occupied the district Yicha'ng-Hankou.
staff		Hupeh Province.	
1st Inf. Regt. (Liu Hu-cheng) staff & 3 yings			
2nd Inf. Regt. (Chang Pei-yui) staff & 3 yings.			
2 squadrons			
2 batteries		12 mount.guns	
Mach.guns: 2 comp.		8 mach.guns	

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
4th Mix. Brig. (Chang Hung-ch'ang)			1st formation in Aug.1914 was formed of the Reserve Brig.of the 2nd Div.in Hupeh Prov. In Nov.1917 the Brig.was developed into the 18th Div. (Hupeh Prov.). 2nd formation in Feb.1918 was formed of the 1st Regt. of the 74th Brig.& of 3 yings of the Chiangsu yu-chi-tuei (Chiangsu Prov.).
16th Mix. Brig. (Tang Kuo-hsiun)			Was formed in Sept.1914 of the 14th Brig. of the ex 7th Div. The Brig.took an active part in the suppression of Chang-Hsün's meeting (restoration of the monarchy - June 18-29,1917). In Dec.1917 it was despatched to Fukien to defend this Prov.against the troops of the Southern coalition that invaded it. But when it reached Pukow - Chiangsu prov. - it stayed there till the 16th Jan.1918; then it was despatched to Hupeh to defend this Prov.against the Southern coalition. According to latest information, it is inded to develop the Brigade into a Division.
staff			Hunan Province.
1st Inf. Regt. (Tsou Sing-ching) staff & 3 yings.			
2nd Inf. Regt. (Chang Chi-tien) staff & 3 yings			
1 Cav. ying			
2 Art. yings (Lu Chung-ling)		18 mountl.guns 18 Fld. guns	Is called Regiment.
1 Mach.gun ying 4 companies		16 m.guns	8 Maxim and 8 Hotchkiss m. guns.
1 Reserve Regt. 5 yings.			
2 Guard companies 1 exempl.company			
14th Mix. Brig. (Tsang Chi-ping)			1st formation in Sept.1914; formed of a part of the 9th Div.that stayed in Shansi. In Aug.1915 it was reduced & called 2nd Shansi Mix.Regt. - - -2nd formation in June 1916, of the 7th Brig.of the 4th Div.that stayed in Chiangsu it was then called 19th Brig.of the 10th Div. In Apr.1916 this Brig.was despatched with Liu Kuang-hsiun to Fukien,after the separation of Chekiang, in order to help the Kuangtung Prov.in its fight with the revolutionists. When the 3rd revolution ended, the Brig. remained in Fukien Prov.

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
20 Mixed Brig. (Wu Ch'ang-chi) staff.			Formed of the ex 2nd Brig. of the Metropolitan district (page) in June 1918. Shantung Province.
1st Inf. Regt.		7.9 mm. Mauser rifle, Shanghai arsenal. Made in 1915.	There remained in Peking about 150 men to keep the property of the Brig. in "Ji-tang" (beside the Chao-Yang-ming gates).
2nd Inf. Regt. (Hsüen Wen-lang) staff & 3 yings			Went in April 1918 to Shangtung against the bandits.
Machine guns 2 companies. 1 Battery 1 Cav. ying.		8 mach. guns	Attached to the Regts. This is the 7th batt. of the 3rd Ying of the 13th Art. Regt. Began to be formed Nov. 1918.
1st Chihli Mix. Brigade. (Wang Ch'eng-ping) staff			Was formed Mar. 1917 of the Reserve Brig. of the 3rd Div. Despatched to Hunan on 30th Dec. 1917 & from there in Jan. 1918 to Hupeh Prov. The Commander of the Brig. was nominated May 11, 1917.
1st Inf. Regt. (Kung Hang-chi) staff & 3 yings.		7.9 mm. Mauser rifle, 1888 yr. of the Hanyan factory.	
2nd Inf. Regt. (Yan Chi-tang) staff & 3 yings.			
1 Cavalry ying (Yü Mao-te)			
1 Artillery ying (Yang Pao-chung)		18 Fld. guns 75 mm. Krupp	
2 Companies of Mach. guns.		8 Maxim m. guns	
2nd Chihli Mix. Brig. (Yang Hsian-weng)			Was formed in Apr. 1917 in Shantung Prov. Despatched to Hunan prov. on 23rd Oct. 1917 (Yüechou) & in Jan. 1918 to Hupeh Prov. From the middle of Nov. 1918 its Divisions are returning to Chihli.
staff	Paotingfu	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle of the Hupeh factory.	
3rd Inf. Regt. (Yüi Mao-ti) staff & 3 yings.			

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
4th Inf. Regt. (Wang Chin-ch'eng) staff & 3 yings	Paotingfu		
2nd Art. ying	"	18 guns, 57mm. gruson	
2nd Cav. ying	"	7.9 mm. Mauser carabines.	
Mach.guns: 2 Comp.		8 mach.guns	Attached to the Regts.
3rd Chihli Mix. Brig. (Hsüe Yao-nang) staff			Hunan prov.
5th Inf. Regt. (Ts'ui Huie-weng) staff & 3 yings.	"	7.9 mm. Mauser carabines	Formed in June 1917.
6th Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Te-Ling) staff & 3 yings	"		
3rd Art. ying (Hsung Cheng-chung)	"	18 guns, 57mm. gruson.	
3rd Cav. ying (.....)			
Mach.guns. 2 Comp. (Li Ch'eng-shang)	"	8 Maxim m. guns.	Attached to the Regts.
4th Chihli Mix. Brig. (Chao Ying) staff	Mach'ang		The Brig. was formed Oct. 1917; nomination of the Commanders followed on the 19th Oct. 1917 To form this Brig. and part of the Left Detachment of Chihli's hsiun-fang-tui (ex 1st & 2nd Regts. It was intended a long time ago to change them into Liu-chün & so they had the organizatic of luchün. The 2 yings of this detachment left were given to the recently formed 5th Chihli Mix. Brig.
7th Inf. Regt. (Liu Chin-yuan) staff	"	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle -1888 yr. pattern	
1st ying	"		
2nd & 3rd yings	Chinliangch'eng		
8th Inf. Regt. (Mu Weng-shan) staff & 3 yings	Paotingfu		Returned from the Honan prov. in Jan. 1919, where it was despatched in Febr. 1918.

Name of troops of Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
4th Inf. ying (Tang Fu-li)	Mach'ang	Manlicher's carabines.	
4th Art. ying (Yeh Mao-lin)		18 mount.guns 57 mm.gruson	
Maching guns: 2 companies (Tang Ping-fang)		8 mach.guns	Attached to Regts.
4th Chihli Mix. Brigade.			The Brig.was formed in Oct. 1917 of the Eaght Detachmnt. of the Chihli's hsiunfangtui (in which were 9 yings of Inf. No.10-18, 1 Art.ying, 1 Cav.ying)& of 2 yings of the Left Detachment. The Commanders were nominatd on Oct.19,1917.
staff			Shantung Prov.
9th Inf. Regt. (Tu'ao Ching-tung) staff & 3 yings.			
10th Inf. Regt. (Chang Shao-hsui) staff & 2 yings ~~Ex~~ 3rd ying			Chiangsu prov.from Nov.1918. In Mongolia. This ying is composed of the 13th & 15th yings of the ex Rightm detachment.
5th Art. ying (Ts'ui Lai-fa)		12 mount.guns 6 Field guns	Mongolia
Mach. guns 2 companies		8 m. guns	Attached to Regiments.
6th Chihli Mix. Brigade. (.....)			Is formed from Jan.1918 of recruits of Honan Prov.& districts; Paotingfu & ~~Tien~~ Tientsin. 1 Regt.is already enlisted & stands near the Langfang station.
1st "Mukden" Reserve Brigade. (Wang Yung-chüen)			See page 18 - 1st Mix.Brig. "Ko-fang-chün". In June 1918 Sui Shu-cheng gathered in the prov.Chihli, Honan 4 reserve Brigades called "Mukden Reserve Brigs Each Brig.consists of 2 Inf. Regts.& 2 m.gun companies; in a Regts.there is about 2000 men. An official order of nominations and list of officers is not yet issued.
1st Inf. Regts. (.....) staff & 3 yings			In Fukien province.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings.			
Mach.guns:2 Comp.			
2nd "Mukden" Reserve Brigade. (Lao Ta-shan)			Shensi prov. Depending of Gen. Suilanchow
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings.			
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings.			
Mach.guns:2 comp.			
3rd "Mukden" Reserve Brigade. (Hsun Fang-hang)			Bears the name of 2nd Mixed Brig. "Ko-fang-chün".
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings			Honan prov.
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings.			
Mach.guns:2 comp.			
4th "Mukden" Reserve Brigade. (Hsing Yi-ching)			
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings			Shensi Province.
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings			
Mach.guns:2 comp.			
Gendarmes: (Ch'eng Ping-ya)			
Metropolitan Gendarme ying (Ching-shi hsian-ping-ying. 4 squadrons.	Peking.		
Gendarme ying of the Metropolitan district (Ching-shi hsian-ping ying)4 squadrons	"		

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Guard and Detach. of the President. Hsui Shi-ch'ang 2 Inf. yings. of yi-chun troops (No. 13 & No.15)			Beside this, 1 Regt. of the 15th Div., 1 squadron &mach. guns, Situated at Hsinhsaien Chenghai & Hsiu Peihai; and also 200 men for the inner Guard.
Guard Detachment of the ex-Pres. Feng Ko-cheng			It arrived at Peking with Feng Ko-cheng, who took up his duties on June 23rd. On the 18th of July 1917 it was brought to 6 Inf. yings, 1 Cav. Detach. & 1 mach. gun comp taken from the troops of the ex-Guard Div. On Oct. 10th, 1918 Sui Shi-ch'ang took up his duties as Pres. the Guard Detach. of the ex. Pres. was given up to the 15th Div.
Guard Detachment of the Ministry of War. 1 Mixed Regt. 2 Inf. yings 2 Batteries 2 m.gun comp. 1 squadron	Peking.	12 mount. guns 8 mach. guns	Hsu-Shih-chang
Guard Detachment Administration of the Gen. Staff 1 Detachment	"		
Guard of the Ministry of Marr the Navy. 1 ying of Naval Infantry. (M'un Hsian-yung)	"		
2nd ying of Naval Infantry. (Ling Yung-hai)	"(Nanmen)		
1 mach. gun comp.	"(Nanmen)		
B - The Troops Hsiun-Fang-Tui.			
Guard Detachment of the Metropolitan region (ching-chao-ying-hsiun) (Kao Chin-shang) 40 inf. & 20 Cav.	Peking ("chia-tao-kou street)		This detach. (see its formation page dislocation up to the 1st Oct. 1916) was dis-banded during latter part of Dec. 1916 & the officers were despatched to the Ministry of War. Now only the administration of the detachment's Commander is left with a small guard.

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Troops Pu-chün (1 Metropolitan Manchurian Police) (Ai Chang-tai) staff.	Peking.		Are divided into 5 yings ("wu-ying") & 2 scout detachments: Left wing "tso-yi yu-chi-tui". One ying is composed of 12 companies. (chung-tui). There is a plan of a new organization for these troops; to unite them into 5 inf. regts., 1 Cav.Regt.,1 Art. ying, 1 sapper ying, 1 transport ying,1 m.gun ying.
Wu-Ying(5 yings): Middle ying	Haichiun(5 miles n.w. of Peking.		
North ying West ying East ying South ying	In different parts of Peking	7.9 mm.Mauser rifle, 1888 year pattern.	
Left wing of the scout detachment: 5 chung-tui 8 chung-tui	Peking. Peking's environs.		
Right wing of the scout detachment: 13 chung-tui	Peking.		
Police (Wu Ping-hsian) staff.	Peking.		The Peking Police consist of about 20,000 men & are divided: 1)Hsiun-chün. 2)Pacang ching-cha-tui;at the head of it is the Norwegian Munte:its principal function,the guard of the Diplomatic Quarter. It is divided into four detachmnts each consisting of 200 men. 3)Pao-ang ching-cha ma-tui-Cavalry police (about 50 men). 4)Hsiao-fang-tui -Fire Commander.
Troops Yi-Chün (Chiang Kuei-ti)			Formation of these troops - see "dislocation of 1914". After the disbanding of the troops "ting-wu-chüng"(Gen. Chang-Hsiun's troops)during the latter part of August 1917 - a part of the troops "ting-wu-chüng"was given to the troops"Yi-chün". There are about 300 men in an inf. ying. A ying is divided into 5 shao(company); a shao into 6 partitions; one shao has 8 partitions. In a Cav.ying - 280 men. In an Art.ying- 320 men (5 shao). Chiang Kui-ti is the Commander of the troops & also the Tu-chün of Yeho. A section of the staff's

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			chancellery exists in Peking in "chi-hua hu-tung" The chief of it is Yang Han-chün - the assistant of the 4th Detachment's Commander. 30 soldiers are attached to the Section.
Staff			Mongolia.
1st Detachment (Chou Ching-ch'eng) 5 Inf. yings.		7.9 mm Mauser rifle, 1888 year - 6.5mm Jap.carab. 30th. year of Meitsi & Manlicher's carabines.	The 1st Detachment was formed of a part of troops "ting-wu-chün" in Aug.1917 after the unsuccessful try of Chang-Hsiun to restore the Monarchy in China 18th June 1917.
2nd Detachment (Mi Cheng-piao) 7 Inf. yings (No. 8 and 9)			The Commander of the Detachment, Linghsi Chengshoushi is in fact the Commander of troops "yi-chün" Honan Province.
3rd Detachment (Ma Liang-pu) 5 inf.yings (No. 17) (No. 13, 15)	Peking.		Mongolia ~~[illegible]~~ Honan Prov. ~~[illegible]~~ The Guard of the President's palace.
4th Detachment. (Chiang Chang-yuan) 5 Inf. yings (No. 19)			Mongolial Honan Province.
Left Detachment (Ch'ang Tsesheng) 6 Cav. yings. (No. 4)			Shantung Prov. Honan Province.
Right Detachment (Chang Ch'ang-ju) 4 Cav. yings			Formerly there were 3 Cav. yings, but in Aug.1916 the number was increased with enlisted bandits, 1800 men.
Van-Guard detach. (Chang Ming-shang) 3 Art. yings.	"	21 guns, 57mm gruson. 6 mount.guns, 75 mm.	2 yings - Mongolia. 1 ying - Honan Province.
Guard Detachment of the Commander (Chang Kuei-ti 1 Inf. ying 1 Cav. ying Mach. guns.	"	24 mach.guns	Mongolia 4 m. guns. in 6 Detachments.
~~Chihlis~~ Haian Pang-Tui			The left and right detachment are reformed into 4th & 5th Chihli Mixed Brig. (pages 34,35). The other detachments took the name of "Chihli shou-pei-tui", except the 3rd & 4th Detachments that remained in Mongolia.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
3rd Detachment (Chang Pao-cheng) 8 Inf. yings 3 Cav. yings 1 Art. ying		7.9 mm. Mauser rifle, 1888 yr. & Manlicher carabines.	Some yings are from the 5th Detachment. Mongolia (35) 12 guns, 75 mm. Krupp.
4th Detachment (Wang Huai-chin) 3 Infantry yings 3 Cavalry yings			
Chihli's ~~Shou-fang-tui~~ ~~1st District -~~ Tientsin's staff	Tientsin Tientsin's circuit.	-ments of the 7.9 m.m. Mauser rifle of the Hanyan factory.	Formed in Nov.1917 of detach ex"Chihli hsiun-fang-tui". It depends on the correspon-ding chengshouski of Chihli Prov.& is divided into 4 Districts, 10 yings in each; 7 Inf. yings & 3 Cav. yings. There ~~in~~ are 260 men in an Inf.ying as well as in a Cav.ying.
2nd District Chinan staff 7 Inf. yings 3 Cav. yings	Tamingfu In the Southrn part of Chihli Province.		Hsiu-Shi-ying assistant of the 1st District's Commander Nie Yu-hsian - assistant of the 2nd District's Commander Tun Hsi-cheng - assistant of the 3rd District's Com-mander. Chao ~~y~~ Yui-shan - assistant of the 4th District's Com-mander.
3rd District Chigui staff 7 Inf. yings 3 Cav. yings	Shanhaikuan In the ~~east~~ eastern part of Chihli Prov.		1st District - from remains of rights Detachment. 2nd District - from 1st & 2nd Detachment. 3rd District - from 6th & 8th Detachment. 4th District - from 5th & 7th Detachment.
4th District Hupeh staff. 7 Inf. yings 3 Cav. yings.	Hsuanhuafu In the Northern part of Chihli Province.		1st, 2nd, 5th yings by the Peking-Pukow Ry. 3rd, 6th yings - Tamingfu. 4th, 7th yings - Peking-Pao-tingfu Ry. 1st, 2nd Cav. yings - Tushikou 3rd Cav. ying - Pingcheng. 4th Cav. ying - Tamingfu.
Chihli Yu-chi-tui staff.	Mach'ang, Han-chiashu		Was formed by the Chihli Governor in Aug.1918 & de-pends on the Chengshouski. These troops stay in differ-ent parts of Peking distric in aid to troops "Ching-pei-tui."

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Middle Detachment 8 tui			
Western Detach. 4 tui			Yings are divided into small detachments - "tui" - 16 men.
Eastern Detach. 4 tui		Mauser rifle of the Hanyan factory.	In all about 416 men.
Northern Detach. 4 tui			
Southern Detach. 6 tui			
Ching-pei-tui of the Peking District. (Wang Ta) staff	Peking.		It was formerly called "shung-tun-fu" & depended on the Commander of the Peking district. The function of the detachment was to fight against the bandits.
1 Infantry tui	"		
1 Cavalry tui	"		
Eastern Detach. (Kao Chin-shang) staff	Tunghsian		It was composed of 3 Mix. Yings of Inf., Cav., & Art. In 1914 these troops took the name of "ching-chao ching-pei-tui" & are divided into 4 Detachments. May 19,1917 there was a riot in the East Detachment & the Commander of this Detach. ran away with 200 men to Nanshan, & only 40 men were left in the Detach.
3 Infantry tui			
3 Cavalry tui			The Commander's assistant "cheng-pei-tui" Kao Shao-cheng.
Western Detach. (Wang Ko-han) staff	Lianghsian		This Detachment is composed of several companies (tui), 40 men in each.
2 Inf. tui	In the distr.		
2 Cav. tui.	Lianghsian, Chaohsian, Tanshan.		
Southern Detach. (Ch'eng Kuang) staff	Chiüchoucheng Langfang station)		
2 Cav. tui	In the districts: Wuchin, Anchi, Kuan, Yunchen		
Northern Detach. (Chi Pao-tung staff	Shunhsian (northward from Peking).		
3 Inf. tui	In the districts: Shunyi, Pingko, Migüan, Chanhsian		
3 Cav. tui			
Chihli ~~troops~~ guarding the Salt Sabella. (Sung Ming-shan) staff	Nankaichuang (near Tangku)		They were formerly called - "yan-hsiun-ying" - salt guard yings: now - "chi-ki-ying" - yings to catch contra-bandits.

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Front ying (Liu Ching-ying)	Taku		Their full name "chih-yü liang-huai ch'ang-lu chi-chi-ying" "chih" means Chihli, "yü" - of Honan - "liang-huai" - both sides of the Huai river - "chang" of Chang-chou (Chiangsu Pr.) "lu" - of lutai. Hsung Cheng-sheng is the assistant of the Commander of the troops; soldiers from the Prov. Chihli, Anhui, Honan: officers and under officers from soldiers of the same troops.
Rear ying (Ping Chang-kuei)	Yunpingfu (in 7 districts)		These troops have in Chihli Prov. 2 junks with guns.
Left Inf. ying 2 companies.	"		There is in Chihli Prov. 2 1/2 yings of Inf. & 1 ying of Cav., about 1.5 70 mm.
Rear Cav. ying		Mauser rifle-1888 year pattern.	There is in a ying 5 or 2 tui (company) - in each company 9 peng (divisions) - 12 men in each. In all 1 Inf. ying-580 men. " " 1 Cav. ying-180 " These troops are quartered near the salt deposits of the Peking & Tientsin districts.
Guard Detachment of the Ministry of the Interior			
2 Inf. Comp.	Peking.		100 men.
Guard Detachment of the Senate (Ko-wu-yuan) 2 Inf. companies	"		100 men.
Guard detachment of the Commissariat Department. 1 Inf. company.	Peking		70 men. The guard has a provision of 1000 rifles in the work-houses (lu-chün pio-fu-ch'eng).
c Troops that were sent from other Provinces.			
From 20th Div. 20th Cav. reg. 2 yings	Paotingfu		From Mukden Province. (Page 2)
20th Art. reg. 2 yings	"		
20th Transport ying - 2 comp.	"	36 Fld. guns, 75 mm. Krupp of the Hanyan factory	
Troops "cheng-wu-chün". staff	Hsiaochang		After the declaration of the independence of the Kuangtung Prov. (June 1917), Lung Chi-kuan, who had the

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
3rd Inf. Regt. 3 yings	Hsiaochang		post of "sun-yke-shi" in the Prov. Kuangtung and Kuangsi, took the side of the Northern Govt.& sent his troops "cheng-wu-chün" against Lu Yung-ting(Kuangtung Tu-chün). But as he lost the greater part of his troops, Lung Chi-kuan went to Peking where he received permission to form new troops "cheng-wu-chün" to continue the fight against the southerners. The recruitment began in June 1918 in the Prov. Shantung & Chihli; Most of the recruits were taken among bandits(Kuto-ling's band). In all were formed 13,000 men - 7 Reg.(only the 7th Regt.was enlisted in Mukden Prov.).When the order was issued to stop the military actions(Nov. 16th,1918)the further formalities were stopped &as by this time those who had been despatched to the Fukien Prov.came back, and as there was very little money to pay the soldiers disbanding of the troops was begun. At first it was proposed to go away to those whom wished to,and about 2400 men left;then were disbanded the 1st Inf. Regt.(Commander Cheng Ying-chi)and the 2nd Inf.Regt. (Commander Ti Yi-kuei). Now only about 7000 men are left and it is intended to form of them a Mix. Brig. At first these troop were quartered in Tangen, & then sent to Hsiaochang. The majority have no equipment. Lung Yüng-chiang is the Commander of all the troops: Liu Fe-chuang is the staff's Commander. 1 ying of the 7th Regt.remained in Kuangtung. In a ying there are about 400 men.
4th Inf. Regt. (Wang Pu-yung) 3 yings	"		
5th Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	"		
6th Inf. Regt. (Liu Wu-hang) 3 yings.	"		
7th Inf. Regt. (Liu Pien-chia) 2 yings.	"		

Chang-shou-shi of the Chihli Province.

Tientsin - - - - - Chao Yüi-ke
Chigüi - - - - - Ts'ao Ying
Chinan - - - - - Wang Huai-chin
Koupei - - - - - Wang Sue-chian.

Cheng-shou-shi - It is a function established to guard the order in certain regions and to fight against the bandits. By his rank and position Cheng-shou-shi is equal to a

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			Division's Commander, or to a Brigade's Commander. Under their control are the troops "ching-pei-tui" or often "lu-chün" troops. In the Provinces they appear as assistants of the Tu-chüng in the matter of guard of the provinces. The function "chengshoushi" were constituted during the 1st year of the Republic (1911). Similar functions, but highr in rank are the functions "hu-chung-shi", but only one of these functions remained The Shanghai huchungshi.

II The Troops of the Shantung Provinces.

Tu-chün - Chang Shu-yüan.
Sheng-chang - Sheng Ming-ch'ang. 12/2/18.

I Stationary Troops.			In the course of the 3rd
(a) Lu-chün troops			Revolution which began by the mutiny of the Yunnan Province, Dec.10,1915, many revolutionary troops were enlisted in the Shantung Province. With the death of Yuan Shi-kai (May 24,1916) the anti-monarchist movement was ended and ~~the~~ the reformation and disbanding of the revolutionary armies was begun. During the latter part of 1917 new divisions of lu-chün were formed for fighting with the coalition of the Southern Provinces; the Shantung tu-chün, Chang Huai-chih was appointed Commander of the 2nd Army (order to continue war activities against the Southerners - Jan.17,1918), and the troops of the 2nd Army had to be despatched to Honan Prov., but went to ~~the~~ Hupeh Prov. because Wuchan was menaced by the Southerners.
1st Temporary Shantung Div. (Shi Chun-ping)			The Commander of the Div. was nominated Dec.22,1917. The Div. was formed of the 1st Mix.Brig. & of the front detach. of the Shantung hsiun fang tui; the last was formed of revolutionary troops. The Div. was destined to fight against the Southerners & was included in the 2nd Army. On Dec.19,1917 parts of the Div. reached Hsuichou (Chiangsu prov.) but as the 16th Mix.Brig. that also had to be included in the 2nd Army, took a double position and the President Feng Kuochang delayed the edition of the order for the continuation of the War activities, the Div. returned to Shantung. After the fall of ~~T~~ Yüchou (Jan.14,1918)

Feng-Kuo-Chang

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks.
			and the edition of the order for the continuation of the war activities against the Southerners, the Div., from the 26th of Jan. 1918 was despatched to the South - to Chiangsu Prov., and then to Hunan and Hupeh. In June 1918 the Div. was disbanded; of its 1st Brig. the 1st Mix. Brig. was formed, and of the 2nd Brig. the 1st Shantung Brig. was formed.
8th Div. (Cheng Shu-yuan) staff	Chinanfu.	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle, 1888 yr.	
9th Inf. Brig. (Hsin Hung-ping) staff	"		
17th Inf. Regt. (Chou Tyu-l'sai) staff & 2 yings	Yenpinghsian		
3rd ying	Tenghsian		
18th Inf. Regt. (Chang Pei-hsiun) staff & 2 yings	Chinanfu	The old 18th Regt. was despatched on Dec. 4, 1915 to Honan to suppress the 3rd revolution, and returned July 12, 1916. In June 1917 the Regt. took the name of "1st temp. Mix. Regt. & was to be included in the 2nd Army, as guard of the Army Commander.	
3rd ying	Tingt'aohsian.		
10th Inf. Brig. (Cheng Shi-chi)	Hanchun (East of Chinanfu).		A new Regt. was enlisted instead of the old one.
19th Inf. Regt. (Hsung Tsunghsian) staff and 2 yings	Wuhsian		
3rd ying	Chimo.		
20th Inf. Regt. (Wang Han-chang) staff & 1st ying	Chinanfu.		
2nd ying	Wangtechan		
3rd ying	Hanchan		
5th Cav. Regt. (Yüe Shu-yun) staff	Chinanfu	7.9mm. Mauser carab., 1888yr.	1 squadron passed to the 1st Mix. Brig.
1st ying	Houchen		2nd ying completed the Inf. Division.
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Tanhsian		
5th Art. Regt. (Hsun Chia-leng) staff & 2 yings	Chinanfu	12 Fld. guns 75 mm Krupp 18 mount. guns	1 Batt. passed to the 1st temp. Shantung prov.
5th Engineer ying (Wang Yü-kuei) 3 companies.	"	75 mm. Krupp 6 guns of small calibre	112 Batt. in Chining. 1 Company passed to the 1st Mix. Brigade.
5th Transp. ying. (Wu Ke-chen) 3 companies.	"		id.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Mach.guns:4 Comp.	Chinanfu	16 mach.guns	In the Regts.
Musical Band			Formed ~~twice~~ during first part of 1915.
~~2nd Div.of the Troops "Ts-fang-chün"~~ (~~Ma-Ming~~) staff (staff's Commander) Hsin Fe-mao)	Chinanfu	7.9mm. Mauser	See pages 18 and 19. Is formed of the 47th Mix. Brig.; the supplementary enlistment is done in the districts Chening, Weihsian, Taian - from Jan.10,1919.
3rd Inf. Brigade (Ting Ching) staff	"		
5th Inf. Regt. (Wu Yü-ling) staff & 3 yings	"		
6th Inf. Regt. Yang Ch'ang-tze) staff & 3 yings.	"		
4th Inf. Brig. (Wang Te-chih) staff	"		
7th Inf. Regt. (Li Chai-ling) staff & 3 yings	"		
8th Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Kuei) staff & 3 yings	"		
2nd Cav. Regt. (Feng Yü-jung) staff & 2 yings			The recruitment is going on.
2 Art. Regts. (Yang Chi-huei) staff & 2 yings.		4 guns	
2 Engineer ying Ao Yang-hsiang) 4 companies	"		
2nd Transp.ying (Wang Mei)4 Comp.			
Mach. guns 4 companies (Yü Pang-chiao)		8 mach.guns.	
~~1st Mix. Brig.~~ (Pang Hung-chung) staff	Huanghsian		1st formation in Aug.1914. The Brig.was formed of the 10th Brig.of the 5th Div.in Jan.1918 developed into the 1st Temp.Shantung Div. - 2nd formation in July 1918 of the 1st Brig.of the 1st temp. Shantung Div. The Brig. returned from Hunan Prov. Nov.1918.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd Inf. Regt. (Wang Keian-chil) staff & 3 yings	Huanghsian	7.9mm Mauser rifle, 1888 pr.	
1 Cav. Regt. (Tang Chi-yi) staff & 3 yings	"		
1 Art. ying	"	18 Fld. guns.	
1st Shantung Brigade. (Chang Ka-yao) staff	Chinanfu.		Formed in June 1918 of the 2nd Brig. of the 1st temp. Shantung Div. The Brigade returns from Hunan Province.
1st Inf. Regt. (Fang Liang-chiu) staff & 3 yings	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Lei Chang-lu) staff & 3 yings	"		
1st Shantung Mix. Brigade. (Ho Feng-yü) staff.	T'enghsian		In the time of the anti-monarchist movement in the Shantung Prov. many detachments of revolutionary troops were enlisted. By the time of this reformation (Oct. 1916) they were in the towns ~~[illegible]~~ Wuhsian, Kaomai, Chuch'ung and Chouchun. The troops in Wuhsian were united in the 1st temp. Shantung Mix. Brig. & the Brigade's Commander was Chuh Chi-chin; Commander of the 2nd Regt. was Wang Kuang-ch'eng with 1 ying of Art., Mach. guns, 1 Engineer company and transport. By this time were called from Chouchun to Weihsian the troops of Pao Tyu-ming in order to be reformed 11 Brig.). In Nov. 1916 disorders occured among these troops (in the 2nd Regt.). The Commander of the Regt., Wang, was arrested and shot, and the Commander of the Brig., Chah, arrested; 2 yings were disbanded. Afterwards these brigades were united into one, under the general ~~xx~~ supervision of the Inspector "Ho Feng-yü" (Apr. 12, 1917). ~~[illegible]~~. The following troops, revolutionary troops, also formed the 1st Shantung Mixed Brig. 1st Mixed Regt. in Kaomi, composed of 2 Inf. yings, 1 Art. ying, and 1 Cav. ying; 1st Detachment of the new hsiunfangtui in Chuhcheng under the supervision of Ma-Hai-lung, and the 2nd detach. of the hsiunfang-tui in Chouchun under the supervision of Hsuh Pao-hsüan.
1st Inf. Regt. (Tai Ch'ung-ch'eng) staff	Chinanfu.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remark
1st & 3rd yings	Yüeh'eng, Kaot'ang.		
2nd ying	Chinanfu.		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Wang Te-chih) staff & 3 yings.	T'ai-erh-chuang and T'enghsian		
3rd Inf. Regt. (He Tan-hsi) staff	Chihanfu		
1st ying	Yütaihsian		
2nd ying	Tungpinghsian		2nd ying - Cav.
3rd ying	T'anghsian		3rd ying - former Art.ying.
~~2nd Shantung Mixed Brigade.~~ (Wuh Pang-ts'ao) staff	Yant'ai (Chihfu)		Formed of the former left detachment of the Chefoo hsiunfangtui in Oct.1917. The brigade depends on the Chefu (Yant'ai) chenshousuki.
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings	Chefoo & environs.		
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings	In Chefoo district.		
1 Art. ying	Chefoo	?	
1 m.gun Company		18 guns 4 mach.guns	In the Regts.
~~3rd Shantung Mixed Brigade.~~ (Fang Yü-fu) staff	Ts'aochou		Formed of the rear detach. of the Shantung hsiunfantui (of Ts'aochou) in Nov.1917. There is not yet an official order of the Commander's nominations.
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings	Ts'aochou		
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings	"		
1 Cav. ying	"		
1 Art. ying	"	18 guns	
~~4th Shantung Mixed Brigade.~~ Chang Shang-yi) staff.	T'enghsian.		The formation began from Nov.1917 of Huiming & the new hsiunfangtui; and also were taken from the right detachment of Shantung hsiun-fang-tui 8 Inf.yings, 2 Cav.yings & 1 Battalion.

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings	T'ungchsian and Kingchinchen		
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings			
1 Cav. ying	"		
1 Battery	"	4 guns	
~~5th Shantung Mixed Brigade.~~ (~~Wang Ai-jun~~) staff	Yihsian		The Brigade was formed in Nov.1917 of the Yichou & first part of Shantung hsiunfangtui.
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings	"		
1 Cav. ying	"		
1 Battery	"	6 guns.	
~~47th Mixed Brig.~~ (~~Ma Liang~~)			The Brig.is reformed into the 2nd Div.of the troops "Ko fang-chün".
~~1st Reserve Brig. of Shantung troops.~~ (~~Ch'eng Pao-ling~~) staff	Hsinchuang		
1st Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Pao-lung) staff & 3 yings	Yuch'eng, Hsintai, Chininchou.		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Yi-an) staff & 3 yings.	"		
~~2nd Reserve Brig. of Shantung troops.~~ (Chang Huei-ping) staff	Tungling		~~mix~~ id.
3rd Inf. Regt. (Chang Huai-ping) staff & 3 yings	"		
4th Inf. Regt. (Ho Meng-hsian) staff & 3 yings	"		
~~1st Mix. Regt.~~ (Shang-Kuang Tun-hsiun) staff	Yanchou		The Regt.was formed in Dec. 1917 and is the guard of the tu-chün; in Jan.1918 was despatched to the South & returned in April 1918.
3 Inf. yings	"		
1 mach.gun comp.	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2. - - Troops Hsiun-Fang-Tui.			Reformed in Oct.1917 into Mixed Shantung Brigades, under supervision of the cheng-shou-shi.
The Shantung ~~Chin-pei-tui~~ (Tai Li-yuan) staff	Utingfu		
3 Inf. yings	"		
1 squadron	"		
~~Shantung shing-wei-tui~~			
1st, 2nd tui	Tsinanfu		1 Inf.tui - 80 men.
3rd Cav. tui	"		1 Cav.tui - 40 men.
Guard Detachment of the Governor			
1 Inf. company	"		
1 squadron	"		
~~Hsung-ta-tsung~~ Yings guarding the salt ~~shells~~			
5 Inf. yings	Tsinanfu and plans of salt deposits		
2 Inf. yings	Chinchou		
Railway ~~chin-pei-tui~~ (Sheng Shi-kuei) staff			80 men in each detachment; in all about 2,000 men.
24 detachments	Tientsin guard the Tientsin-Pukow Ry.	7.9mm.Mauser rifle,1888 yr.	
Naval model Battalion			
1 Inf. ying	Chefoo		
Troops despatched from other Prov.			
7th Mixed Brigade (T'angTien-hsi)			From Honan Province.
staff	Yanchou		Arrived on the 28th July, 1916.
1st Inf. Regt. (Li Yu-heng)			In an Inf.ying - 5 companie (shao);1 comp.8 divisions;
staff & 1st ying	Yanchou	6.8mm Mauser	-in the middle comp.6 div.
2nd ying	Chinin	rifle,1915yr.	In an Inf.company 36 men;
3rd ying	Wengshan	of the Hanyan factory.	In a Cav.ying 4 squadrons; (6 Divisions in each);in each 96 men.
			In an Art.ying 3 battalions (8 Divisions) - 36 men.
2nd Inf. Regt. (Chi Ping)			
staff, 3 yings	Yanchou		
3rd Mixed Regt. (Liu Hung-en)			
staff	"		
~~1st~~ 1 Inf.ying	Chinin.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1 Artillery ying (Ch'eng Wang-ts'ai)	Yanchou	6.5mm.Mauser carabines of the Hanyan factory.	
1 Art. ying (Cheng Ku-cheng)	"	6 mount.guns	
1 mach.gun comp.	"	4 mach.guns	In the reg.staff guard of the Brigade's command.
1 Inf.ying(wei-tui)	"		
20th Mix. Brig. (Wu Ch'ang-chih) staff	Yüch'eng		From Chihli Prov.
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. 3 yings	Chiho, Yungch'eng		
Mach.guns: 2 comp.		8 mach.guns	In the Regiments.
1 battery	Yücheng		
1 Cav. ying			
5th Chihli Mix. Brigade. (Shan Te-chuan)			From Chihli Prov.
9th Inf. Regt. 3 yings	Anhsian		
2nd Chihli Reserve Brigade.			From Chihli Prov.
4th Inf. Regt. 3 yings	Hanchuang		
1 mach.gun comp.	"	4 mach.guns	
Troops "Yi-chün" Left detachment (Ch'ang Te-hsiun) 5 Cav. ying	Tanhsiun, Ts'ao-hsian, Yütai		From Chihli Prov. Arrived in the beginning of Nov.1918, from Honan Prov.
Cheng-shou-shi of Shantung Province.			
	Chinan - - - -	-Ma Liang	
	Yanchou - - -	-T'ang Tein-si	
	Ts'aochou- - -	-Fang Yü-pa	1/4/18.
	Yantai - - - -	-Yu Pang-ts'ao	20/6/18.
Troops of Shansi Province.			
	Tu-chün	- - - - Yang Hsi-shan	
	Sheng-chang - - -		id.
(a) Lu-chün troops 12th Mix. Brig. (K'ung Yang-yu) staff	T'aiyuanfu		The Brig. took its name from the 17th Brig. of the 9th Div. in Dec.1914, that was in its turn formed of the ex-1st Shansi Div. After the

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			riot in Paoton, Aug. 1914, this 9th Div. was changed into the 12th & 13th Mix. Brigade.
1st Inf. Regt. (Kao Te-t'ai) staff & 3 yings	Ta'iyuanfu		
2nd Inf. Regt. (T'ai Yung-chiao) staff & 2 yings		7.9mm. Mauser rifle, 1888 yr.	
3rd ying	Yanmenkuang		7th, 8th companies in Hsin-chou.
1st Cav. ying (Wang Yi)	T'aiyuanfu	7.9mm. Mauser carabines.	6th squadron in ~~Yangch'~~ Yangch'Chsian,
2nd Cav. ying (. . . . . .)	"		8th & 9th squadron in Yanmenkuang.
Art. ying (Wu Hsin-fu)	"	16 mount. guns 75mm. Krupp of the Hanyan factory.	
Engineer ying (Lui Eng-jungo)	"		
Transport ying (Ying Ming)	"		
Gendarme squadron	"		
Mach. guns: 2 comp.		8 mach. guns	Attached to the Regiments.
~~1st Shansi Mixed Regiment~~ (Li Ming) staff	Tat'ung-fu.		Formed of the ex 13th Mixed Brig. in July 1915.
1st Inf. Regt. (Hao Sheng-cheng)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	Huaijenghsian		
3rd ying	Tat'ungfu		
1st Cav. ying (Ma Kai-hsun) 2 squadrons	Tat'ungfu		
1st Art. ying (Ku Hsian-ling)	"	18 guns	
Mach. guns: 1 comp.	Tat'ungfu	4 mach. guns	The comp. is usually called 13th - by the number of the former Brigade.
~~2nd Shansi Mixed Regiment~~ (Li Tse-ling) staff.	Pingyanfu		Formed from the 14th Mixed Brig. in July ~~1914~~ 1915. Dependent on Chinan chengshouski.
~~Inf~~ 2 Inf. yings			
2nd Cav. ying (Yang Cheng-~~wei~~)	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Shansi ~~Mixed Brigade~~ (Hsueh-cheng) staff	Tat'ungfu		Formed in May 1917, but of what parts it is not exactly known. In Nov.1917 the Brig.was despatched to Hunan against the Southerners. But in view of great losses, it returned in Shansi on Dec.2nd, composd of only 1 Regt. According to rumor it will be completed.
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings	"		
1 Cavalry ying	"		
1 Artillery ying	"	18 guns	
2nd Shansi ~~Mixed Brigade~~ (Ma Kui-hsun)			Was formed in July 1917. The Commander of the Brig. was was nominated July 19,1918. Formation unknown.
Guard Detachment of the Shansi Tu-chun			
1 Inf. Company	Tat'ungfu		60 men.
1 squadron	"		60 men.
(b) Troops Hsiunfangtui.			
Shansi ching-pei-tui. (Ching Yung) staff	Taiyuanfu		Formed of former hsiunfang-tui & dependent on Governor.
8 Inf. yings	" & its neighbor-hood.		One inf.ying - 250 men. One Cav.ying - 125 men. In all 24 yings, quartered in different parts of the Prov. In each Canton 20-30 men.
1 Inf. ying	P'ingyangfu		
1 Inf. ying	Tat'ungfu		
9 Inf. yings	In the Prov.		
3 Inf. yings	Yangkao, Tien-cheng		
1 Cav. ying	Hotung		
1 Cav. ying	Taiyuanfu		
Guard Detachment of the Salt Gabelle.			
1 Inf. ying	Hotung		

Chengshoushi of the Shansi Province.

Chinan - - - - - - - Chang Pei-mei
Chinpei - - - - - - - Chang Shu-chih.

IV - Troops of Shensi Province.

Tu-chun - - - - - Ch'eng Shu-fang
Shongchang - - - - Liu Cheng-hua.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
I Stationary Troops			
(4) Lu-Chün Troops			Since the declaration of the independence of Shensi Prov.(during the 3rd revolution,that began with the Yunnan riot,Dec.13,1915)there were formed many troops"Hu-ko-chün"(troops for the state's defence) - about 20,000 man. At the close of the 3rd revolution,the troops were gradually disbanded or transformed into brigades: From Jan.1918;with the support of the Southerners,riots took place in the Prov..The 2nd:Inf.Regt.of the 1st Brig. separated,and:also the 1st Detach.of trps. "chingpeichün",and some other small divisions that were once part of brigand's bands. These troops formed the so-called "chün-ko-chün" under the general supervision of Yü Yu-jin. In 1912 Yü Yu-jin was Vice-Minister of the Communications in the Nanking Govt.,but he appropriated the fiscal money and had to seek safety in Japan. Returning from there, he hid himself for a long time in South China; in 1918 he appeared in Shensi Prov.and was chosen head of the troops "chün-ko-chün" and conducted the activities against the Northern Government. His assistant, Chang Fang was officer under the Ch'ing Dynasty. In 1912 he collected a Div.of brigands bands that was called "2nd Shensi Div.". After the disbanding of this Div. he was nominated chengshoushi of the southern part of Shensi Prov.;after his discharge,he again enlisted a brigands' band(early part of 1918)and occupies himself with robbery. The troops "chün-ko-chün" are from the point of view of the Northern Govt.only bandit bands,but the Southerners insist on their acknowledgement as revolutionary troops. When in the first part of 1918 the Northern Govt. changed its plan of fighting against the Southerners and decided to send its forces in Kuangtung Prov.through Fukien Prov. the southerners despatched their troops to Shensi Prov. Therefore, by the time of the beginning of the Peace Conference (latter part of 1918)there were very many troops in Shensi Prov.,southern & northrn. The Southerners feel themselves so much masters of the Prov.that they even nominated their own tu-chün,the above mention-ed Yü Yu-cheng,and their Governor,Chang Fang.	
1st Shensi Mix. Brigade. (Liu Shi-lung) staff	T'ungchao		Formed in Nov.1916 of the former Shensi Division.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Inf. Regt. (Chang Ching-ying) staff & 3 yings	T'ungchao		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Shi-tye) staff & 2 yings 2	"		On Jan.13,1918 the Regt. separated and occupied Nan-yuan(North from Hsianfu). The ex-commander of the Regt., Hu Ching-yi, was forxerly groom of the Tu-chün, Ch'eng, and received the Regt. for its the that he rendered to the Tu-chün during the 3rd revolution; from the end of 1917 he took the role of Commandr of the 4th Detach. "chünko-chün.
1st Mixed Regt. (Yang Chi-peng) staff	"		
1st Cav. ying	"		
2 Infantry yings	"		
3rd Inf. ying	"		
1st Cav. Regt. (Ch'eng Shu-tyu) staff & 3 yings	"		
Gendarme ying (Lu Hsiao-yü)	Hsianfu		
2nd Shensi Mixed Brigade (Tseng Chi-hsian) staff	Puche'ng		Formed in April 1917.
3rd Inf. Regt. (Tseng Chi-hsian) staff & 3 yings	"		
4th Inf. Regt. (Li Tien-tso) staff	Luhsian		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	Fushihsian		
3rd ying	P'anglungcheng.		
2nd Cav. Regt. (Ts'ao Wei-k'ang) staff	Yanan.		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	Sanyuan		
3rd ying	Hsianfu		
2nd Mixed Regt. (Chin Yui-hsia) staff	Yanan		The Commander of the Regt. id. Shengpei Chengshouski.
2 Inf. yings	Yanan		
1 Art. ying	"	18 guns	
Mach.guns: 2 comp.		8 Maxim m.guns	In the Regt.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
3rd Shensi Mixed Regiment (Wang Fei-hu) staff 3 Inf. yings.	Hanchuang	6.5mm.Jap. rifle. 30 year of Meitsi. 18 guns, 57mm. Gruson.	Wang Fei-hu, ex-commander of the 3rd Detach. of the Shensi ching-pei tui was nominated on the 16th Apr. 1917. By unofficial reports, ~~this Regiment~~ is formed the 3rd Shensi Mixed Brigade & its Commander will be, it is supposed Chang Pao-ling. The recruitment is made in Yao-chun (near Paotingfu).
1 Artillery ying	"		
1 Cavalry ying 4 squadrons.			The inf. Regt. No. 6 and 1 Reserve ying were despatched from Yaochun to Hanchuan in ~~F~~ September 1918.
15th Mixed Brig. (Kuang Chin-chun) staff	Fenghsian		The Brig. was formed in Sept. 1914 of the 13th Regt. of the ex 7th Div.
1st Inf. Regt. (Wang Hung-en) staff & 3 yings	In the southrn. part of Shensi Province.		In Dec. 1917 one part of the Brig. was despatched to Hssuchuan to fight against the Yünnan that separated itself; but soon was recalled to Shensi because many brigands bands appeared ~~x~~ there.
2nd Inf. Regt. (Lo Yü-shang) staff & 3 yings	Hanchou		In Nov. 1918 the Commander of the Brig. arranged a re-volt against the Tu-chün, wishing to get the power; the revolt was suppressed by the Commander of the 1st Regt. of this Brig., Wang Weng-ping (Wang Hung-en).
1st Cav. ying (Chü Te-sheng)	"	6.5mm. Jap. rifle and carabines of the 30th year of Meitsi.	
~~[illegible]~~			
1st Artillery ying (Lui Yü-shan)		12 guns. 4 mach. guns.	
1 mach. gun comp. (Wu Cheng-hai)			
B. - Troops Hsuinfangtui			
Troops "chingpeitui"			Formed in July 1914 of the ex-hsiunfangtui and comple-ted after the end of the 3rd revolution. with troops "hu-ko-chün". When revolts began in the Prov. (beginning of 1918) a big part of ~~[illegible]~~ "cheng-pei-tui" and "yu-chi-tui" passed on the side of the mutineers that formed their own detachments. Up to this time the troops "ching-pei-tui" were divided into 1st Detach. (Ko Chiang) - 3 Inf. yings, 1 Cav. ying, 1 Art. ying, 2 mach. gun comp., 18 maxim guns.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			2nd Detach. (Yan Chi-peng) formed in July 1916 of hu-ko-chün - 1 independent ying (1 Inf.ying, 1 squadron, 4 mach.guns) 3 Inf.yings, 1 Cav.ying, 4 mach.guns. 3rd Detachment (Wang Fei-hu) - 3 Inf.yings, 1 Cav.ying, 8 batteries (8 guns). Troops "yüchitui" (Hulicheng) -3 Inf.yings, 1 Cav.ying, 1 Art.ying, (12 guns), 1 mach. gun ying (6 mach.guns).
Guard Detachment of the Shensi Tu-chün staff	Hsianfu		
3 infantry yings	"		
1 Cavalry ying	"		
1 mach.gun comp.	"	6 mach.guns	
Troops desptached from other Provinces.			
4th Mixed Brig. (Chang Hsi-yuan)			
2 Inf. Regts.	In the Northrn.		
1 Battery	part of Shensi Province.	6 guns	
1 Squadron			
2 mach.gun comp.		8 mach.guns.	
Troops of the Gen. Hsiu Lanchou staff	Hsianfu		From Tsitsihar Province.
1st Inf. Regt. (.....)			
staff & 3 yings	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Lo-Cheng-pan)			
staff & 3 yings	Hsinping		
2 Cav. yings	Hsianfu		
mach.guns: 2 comp.		8 mach.guns	Attached to the Regiments.
2nd Mukden Reserve Brigade. (Pao Te-shan)			From Chihli Province. Dependent on General Hsui Lan-chou.
2 Inf. Regts.			
Mach.guns: 2 comp.		8 mach.guns	Attached to the Regiments.
4th Mukden Reserve Brigade. (Hsun Ti-chin)			From Chihli Province.
2 Inf. Regiments			
Mach.guns: 2 comp.		8 mach.guns	Attached to the Regiments.
21st Division (Liu Chun-hou)			From Szechuan Province. The Div. was formed of the 2nd Szechuan Div. in Jan. 1918. When the
41st Inf. Brig. (Tien Hsun-yao)			
81st Inf. Regt. (Hsun Cheng) staff & 3 yings.			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
82nd Inf. Regt. (Wang Shi-tse) staff & 3 yings.		Southerners occupied the town Chengtu, the tu-chün Liu Chun-hou (Commander of the 21st Div.) ran away with the Governor Chang Lang and with his Div. to Shensi in Feb. 1918. As the Div. was incomplete ~~xx~~ ~~xxx~~ Reserve Divisions were added to it (from the 3rd and 4th Brigades), which belonged to the same Division. The nominations of the Commanders of the 22nd Division and of the Commanders of the ~~Brigades of the 21st and 22nd Div.~~ Brigades of the 21st and 22nd Divisions - April 22, 1918; the Commanders of the Regiments were nominated on the 16th of Oct.	
42nd Inf. Brig. (Lai Hsin-kuei)			
83rd Inf. Regt. (Li Ya-ts'ai) staff & 3 yings	Hsianfu		
84th Inf. Regt. (Li Hung-k'ung) staff & 3 yings	"		
21st Cav. Regt. (Shu Yung-hsian) staff & 3 yings	"		
21st Art. Regt. (Wu Ting-yuan) staff & 3 yings		12 Field guns, 75 mm. Krupp. 6 mount. guns, 75mm. Krupp.	
22nd Division (Chung T'i-tao)			The Div. was formed in July 1918 of the 3rd Szechuan Div.
43rd Inf. Brigade. (Wu Cheng)			After the fall of Ch'engtu (in Feb. 1918) the Div. remained faithful to the Northern Govt., retreated from Szechuan Prov. in Shensi, & quartrd. them near the Southern frontier.
85th Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Ping-tse) staff & 3 yings			
86th Inf. Regt. (Pang Weng-hua) staff & 3 yings			
44th Inf. Brig. (T'ang T'ing-mu)			
87th Inf. Regt. (Yan Chiang-jeh) staff & 3 yings			
88th Inf. Regt. (Li Yü-hang) staff & 3 yings			
22nd Cav. Regt. (P'eng Tou-sheng) staff & 3 yings			
22nd Art. ying (.....)		The no. of guns is unknown	
~~Transport~~			

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Troops "chün-ko-chün" (Yü Yu-cheng) staff	Hsanyuan		There are about 3 Divisions of Revolutionary troops, "chün-ko-chün", besides the troops despatched by the Southerners from Szechuan, Hupeh & Yunnan. These troops are divided into detachments. At their head is Yü Yu-cheng. In view of the Peace Conference that began between the North and the South, war activities were stopped. But the bigger part of these troops continue to pillage; the troops of Gen. Hsiu Lang-chou struggle with them rather successfully.
Guard Detachment of the Staff			
2 Inf. yings	"		
1 Cav. ying	"		
1st Detachment (Ko Cheng) staff	Chianwu		Ko Cheng was born in Shensi Prov. He took to pillage already under the Chin dynasty. At one time the Tu-chün of Shensi took him at his service; then his band, in 1915, was reformed into ching-pei-tui and he was Commander of the 1st Detachment of these troops. From 1918 he again took to pillage
3 Inf. Regiments			
3 Cav. Regiments			
2nd Detachment (Chang Fang) staff	Yichih		Chang Fang is Yü Yu-cheng's assistant. By information the Commander of the 2nd Detachment is Fang Chung-hsin. He was born in Honan. His work consisted of pillage from the time of the Ching Dynasty. He was taken at one time into the service of the Shensi tu-chün.
3 Cav. Regiments			
3rd Detachment (Ts'ao Shi-ying) staff	Chiaokou and Kaoling		Ts'ao Shi-ying (born in Shensi) under the Ching Dynasty served in the militia and pillaged at the same time. In 1913 he entered the service of the tu-chün, but afterwards he took to pillage again and had to run away to Japan in order to evade punishment. He was taken again into the service in 1915, after his return from Japan, but in 1918 again mustered a band of brigands.
4 Inf. Regiments			
2 Cav. "			
1 Reserve Regt.			
4th Detachment (Hu Ching-yi) staff	Sanyuan		Hu Ching-yi, ex-Commander of the 2nd Regt. of the 1st Shensi Mix. Brig. was formerly groom of the ex-tuchün Ch'eng Shu-fang. On Jan. 13, 1918 first rose the revolt in Shensi and separated from the Northern Government.
4 Inf. Regiments	"Chingyan"		
2 Cav. "	Fupe'ng		
1 Art. Regt.			
2 Mach. gun comp.		THE no. of guns is unknown	
5th Detachment (Kao Chung) staff	Paishuikuan		Kao Chung Was born in Shensi; served in 1912 in the escort of the Shensi tu-chün. His band took the name of "paoweit'uang" troops (village militia), and afterwards "chingpeichün". When the tu-chün began to disband the chinpeitui, Kao Chung went away and mustered a new band.
3 Inf. Regiments			
1 Cav. Regiment			
1 mach. gun comp.			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
6th Detachment (Lu Chang-kuei) staff 4 Cav. Regiments 3 Inf. yings 1 Art. ying	Yachsian	Lu Chang-kuei: is a Mongol chahar. From 1917 he was strongly pillaging near Hsui-yuanch'eng, and afterwards entered into the service of Chahar tuchün. Later he again took to pillage. The Chahar tuchün sent troops against his band. ~~[illegible]~~ He was defeated and ~~[illegible]~~ fled to Kansu, but afterwards joined another band in Shansi.	
Hupeh chün-ko-chün. 2 Brigades Wang Ang-lang staff	Hsinan	Wang Ang-Lang: was born in Hupeh. Under the Ching dynasty he was at the head of a big brigand band in Hupeh. He and his band were taken into the service, and his band was reformed into the 3rd Hupeh Div. In 1913 this Div. was disbanded. In 1917 Wang Ang-lang was appointed Kirin tao-ying, but didn't go there. He mustered a new band and went to Shansi where he aided the Southerners in their struggle with the North.	
1st Brigade of Wang Tien-chung		Wang Tien-chung was born in Honan and under the Ching dynasty was a bandit. In 1912 his band entered the service in Honan and took the name of "cheng-hsung-chün" troops (guard of the place "Hsun"). Afterwards Wang received the position of Commander of the military police in Pekiag, but he resigned it in 1917, and went to Hupeh where he took the side of the Southerners. During 1918 he joined a big bandit band.	
Szechuan chün-ko-chün			
1 Division (Hsuin Ke-wu) staff	Ningchiang		From Szechuan Prov.
1 Brigade (Shi Chin-yang)	"		"
1 Mixed Brigade (Yang Te-chi)	Mianhsian		"
Yunnan Chün-ko-chün			From Yunnan Prov.
1 Div. of Yah-Chuan staff. Divisions are situated	Fengchian " & Chianghsian & Fufeng.		
1 Inf. Regt. of Yao Yi-tse staff	Chengta.		

Cheng-shou-shi of Shensi Province.

Shenpei - - - - - - -Ching Yüch-hsiu
Shennan - - - - - - -Kuang Ching-chü

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
	V - Troops of Honan Province.		
	Tu-chün -	- - - - -Chao T'i	
	Sheng-chang	- - - - id.	
I Stationary Troops			
(a)			
Troops Lu-chün			
1st Honan Mixed Brigade. (Ch'eng Sheng) staff	Hsinyangchou	1st and 2nd Honan Mixed Brigades were formed on the 9th Div. The 1st Honan Div. on the 1st Sept.1914, when the 9th Shensi Div.was reformed into the 12th and 13th Mixed Brigades.	16th June 1915 of the old latter took its name from the
1st Inf. Regt. (Chang Yang-piang) staff & 3 yings.	"	7.9mm. Mauser rifle,1874 & 1884 year.	Guard of the Peking-Hankou Ry.from Jan.1918.
2nd Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Kuang-sheng) staff & 3 yings.	"		
1st Mixed Regt. (Yao Hsian-yü)			
1st Cav. Ying (Wang Yü-chi)	"		
2nd Cav. ying	"	7.9 mm.Mauser carabines, 1888 year.	
1st Art. ying (Ch'eng Ho-chang)	"	18 guns,75 mm. Arisak.	
2nd Art. ying (Yü Te-cheng)	"	18 guns,75 mm. Arisak.	
2 Engineer comp.	"		
2 Transport "	"		
2 mach.gun "	"	8 mach.guns	
2nd Honan Mixed Brigade. (Chai Te-kuei) staff	Lushan	7.9 mm.Mauser carabines of the Hanyan factory.	See above.
3rd Inf. Regt. (Hsin Chang-kuei) staff & 3 yings	Lushan, Chah-hsiancheng		
4th Inf. Regt. (Ko Liang-yi) staff & 3 yings	Chengliu, Chi-hsian		
2nd Mixed Regt. (Wang Cheng-piao) staff	"		

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Cav. ying (Yuan Ka-shih)	Chenglin, Chihsian	7.9 mm. Mauser carabines, yr. 1888	
1st Art. ying (Hsun Ming-hsian)	"	18 Field guns Gruson -1888 year.	
2 Engineer comp.	"		
2 Transport "	"		
2 mach.gun "	"		
Honan Reserve Regiment (Cheng Yan-tien)			
3 Inf. yings	K'aifengfu		
(b) Troops Hsiunfangtui			
Brigade of the troops "Cheng-Hsun-Chun" (Liu Hsieh-yu) or Liu Cheng-hua staff	Loyang		To guard the place Hsun(Ying are divided into 3 shao(companies);shao are divided into 8 peng(divisions)-10 men in each. With the appointment of Liu Chenghua Governor of Shensi, it was intended to send these trps. to Shensi Prov.on the frontier of Honan. It is intended to increase the number of yings to 15.
6 Inf. yings	" on the frontier of Shensi prov.		
3 Cav. yings	"	6.8 mm.rifle & carabines of the Hanyan factory.	
1 Art. ying	"	3 Field guns, 75 mm. Krupp. 10 Field guns; 75 mm. Krupp.	
Honan hsiun fang-tui.			
Southern detachment (Ma Chun-lung)			
4 Inf. yings	Nanyang & neighborhood.		
2 Cav. yings	"		
West Detachment (.....)			Dependent on Kueitecheng-shouski.
3 Inf. yings	Kueitefu		
Right Detachment (Tien Tso-ling)			
3 Inf. yings	Hsinyanchou		Guard of the Peking-Hankow Ry.
Guard of Honan Tuchun (T'u-wei-chun)			
8 Inf. yings	K'aifengfu		
1 Gendarme ying	"		Enlisted in Jan.1918.
1 Mach.gun comp.	"	4 mach.guns	In 1 Gendarme & 1 Cav.ying 300 men: In 1 mach.gun ying 60 men.
1 Cav. ying	"		
Troops "yuchitui"			
2 Inf. yings	"		500 men; 1 ying. 1 ying temporarily in Yanch'eng.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Guard of the Salt Administration			
1 Inf. Company	K'aifengfu		
1 squadron	"		
II Troops despatched from other Provinces.			
From the 7th Div.			From Chihli Province.
7th Cav. Regt. 1st ying	Sh'engchou		
From the 13th Div.			
13th Cav. Regt. 1st ying	Changtepu		From Chihli Province.
13th Art. Regt. 3rd ying	"	18 guns	
3rd Mukden Reserve Brigade.			
(Hsun Pang-hang) 2 Inf. Regiments	Tungkuang		
2 Mach.gun comp.	"	8 mach.guns	
3rd Chihli Reserve Brigade.			From Chihli Province.
(Peng Shou-hsin) 6th Inf. Regt.	Tangkuang.		
Troops "Yi-chun"			
Of the 2nd Detach. 8th, 9th yings	Yuning		
Of the 3rd Detach. 17th ying	Pochou		
Of the 4th Detach. 19th Inf. ying	"		
Of the Left Detach. 4th Cav. ying	"		
2nd Mixed Brig. (Liu Yueh-lung) staff	Sent to Hupeh Prov.		Formed in Aug.1914 of the 2nd Mukden Mixed Brigade. ~~Hupeh Province.~~
1st Inf. Regt. (Chao Fu-chiao) staff & 3 yings	"		In Jan.1916 the Brig.was sent to Hankow against the revolutionists; from there on Feb.2nd it went to Honan.
2nd Inf. Regt. (Liu Chang-piao) staff & 3 yings	"		In July 1916 the Brig.returned to Hupeh, where it was put on guard of the Peking-Hankow Ry. In 1917
1 Cav. ying (Liu Ch'ang-ling)	"		the Northern troops took a hand in the defence of ~~Hsu~~ Yuetchou (Honan Prov.) ~~in the~~ during latter part of Dec. it was recalled to Hupeh.
1 Art. ying (Li Huan-chang)	"		
1 Engineer ying 4 companies	"	6.8 mm.Mauser rifle & carabines -1913 of the Hanyan factory.	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1 Transport ying: 4 companies	Sent to Honan Prov.		
1 Mach.gun comp.	"	4 mach.guns.	
7th Mixed Brigade. (Ts'ang Tien-hsi)	Sent to Shantung Prov.		The Brig.was formed of the 1st Detach.of the former "peipuchün" troops (reserve) in March 1914; in March 1916 it was sent to Hunan, from there, in June of the same year, it was sent to Shantung
8th Mixed Brig. (Wang Cheng-Tung) staff	Chengchou		Was formed in Aug.1914 of the 2nd Detachment of the troops "peipuchün"(reserve).
Guard of the Staff.			
1 Inf. ying 1st Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Chao-Ling) staff & 3 yings.	Hsüchou, Chuhmatien, Hsinyancheng, Loho.	6.5 mm.Mauser rifle,1913,of the Hanyan factory.	
2nd Inf. Regt. (Ching Yün-ü) staff & 3 yings	In the neighborhood of Loyan.		
Chengshoushi of the Honan Province.			
Kuei-te	- - -	- - - -	Pao Te-chuan.
Yüpei	- - -	- - - -	Fang Yu-tien
Nanyan	- - -	- - - -	Wu Chin-t'ung.

VI - Troops of Kansu Province.

Sheng-chang	- - - - - -	Chang Kuang-chian.
Tu-chün	- - - - - -	id.

(a) Troops Lu-Chün.

Kansu Mixed Brig. (. . . . .) staff	Lanchou	7.9mm Mauser rifle,model of the yr.1888.	
1st Inf. Regt. (. . . . .) staff & 3 yings	"		
2nd Cav. Regt. (. . . . .) staff & 3 yings			3 Cav.yings were formed in June 1918;at their head is Ma Chi.
3rd Inf. regt. (. . . . .) staff & 3 yings	"		
~~Artillery ying~~			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Artillery ying	Lanchou	6 mount.guns	On the 11th June 1918/were sent to Szechuan under the command of Wu Fang-kuei(Inf., Cav., Art.).
Engineer ying	"	75 mm. Krupp	
Transport "	"	6 mount.guns, 50 mm.of the Hanyan factory.	
		6 mount.guns, 50 mm. of the Nanking factory.	
Troops Hsuin fangtui.			
East Detachment.			
3 Inf. yings	Lanchou, Hsuchou and neighborhood.		
2 Cav. yings	"		
West Detachment			
3 Inf. yings	"		
2 Cav. yings	"		
South Detachment:			
3 Inf. yings	Lanchou, Hsuchou.		
2. Cav. yings	" "		
North Detachment:			
3 Inf. yings	Lanchou, Suchou;		
2 Cav. yings	and neighborhood.		
Hsinfantui: formed of the old troops "lu-ying"			
1st District: 4 Inf. yings	Lanchou		
2nd District: 4 Inf. yings	Hochou		
3rd District: 3 Inf. yings	P'engliang.		
4th District 3 Inf. yings	Chinchou.		
5th District. 3 Inf. yings	P'enghsia		
6th District. 3 Inf. yings	Hsining		
7th District. 3 Inf. yings	Lanchou		
8th District 3 Inf. yings	Suchou		
Guard Detachment of the Kangsu ti-tu.			
2 Inf. yings	Lanchou		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Guard Detachment of the Ta-chun			
1 Inf. ying	Lanchou		
1 Cav. ying	"		
Guard Detachment of the Treasury			"Pu-cheng-ssu" - 40 tax collectors are attached to the Detachment.-
1 Inf. ying - 100 men.	Lanchou-		
1 Cav. ying.			
4 new Banner yings for the appeasing of the Southern troops of the Prov.			
4 Inf. yings	In the eastern part of the Prov.		
Troops of the old type		The equipment is old and various	Mohammedan troops
Chung-kai chün:			
7 Inf. yings	Hanchou, Lanchou		
3 Cav. yings	" "		
Ching-jui chün:			
6 Inf. yings	Hochou		
4 Cav. yings			
Chao-wu chün:			
3 Inf. yings	Southern part of the Prov.		
1 Cav. ying			
Hsui-ching chün			
3 Inf. yings	"		
1 Cav. ying	"		
Cheng-wu chün			
5 Inf. yings	Lanchou, Chinchou		Banner Troops.
Chiang-wei chün			
3 Inf. yings	Lanchou & western part of the Prov.		
4 Cav. yings			
1 Art. ying			
Hsiao-jui chün			
1 Inf. ying	Western part of the Province.		
3 Cav. yings			
Lo Chün			
3 Inf. yings	Chinchoa.		
Tung chün			
3 Inf. yings	Lanchou		
2 Cav. yings			
Cheng-feng tui			
1 Inf. company	Lanchou		100 men.
1 Cav. ying	"		
Kao-liang hsian-chün			
1 Inf. ying			
1 squadron			100 men.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Chengchouchi of the Kansu Province.			
	Lung-tung	Lu Hung-t'ao	
	Ning-hai	Ma Chi.	
	Ying-p'ing	Wu Peng-kuei.	
	Kan-chou	Ma Anglian	(before his arrival Ma Ling).
	VII - Troops of the Hsinchiang Prov.		
	Tu-chün	Yang Tseng-hsin.	
	Sheng-chang	id.	
(a) Troops Lu-chün			
Troops of the Lu-chün Ili District.		Jap.Arisak rifle(36th yr of Meitsi) 2500 pieces, for each rifle 700 cartridges.Mauser rifle,1000 pieces for ea. rifle,2000 cartridges. Mauser carabines - 800 pieces for ea. carabine.2500 cartridges.	Depends of the Cheng-shou-shi Yang Fei-hsia. The average number of the troops is 3000 men.
Mixed Brigade (.....) staff	Kuldja	Mauser-1888yr.	-9 shot repeating guns - 800 pieces.
		Mauser - 1 shot guns - 1700 pieces. Carabines - 1	shot guns - 1000 pieces.
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings			Officers-chinese;soldiers-chinese and tungans. Stations: 2 yings-Chakuchak 2 yings-Kuldja 1 ying -Chenko 1 ying -Hsihu.
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) staff & 3 yings.			
Cav. Regiment (.....) 4 squadrons.	Kure and in the valley of the river Tekess; near Russian frontiers.		Kure(or Huiyuanch'eng)-is the only fortress;situated 50 versts from the Russian frontiers. In the Regt.are 520 men-Chinese,Manchurians and Tunyans.
Cav. Regiment (.....) 4 squadrons	Chinho,Luchakou, Santai,Kuldja.	16 guns, Field & mount.	Formed in May 1918,of the troops "ching pei tui".
Art. ying	" "		
Altai lu-chün Cav. Regiment staff & 3 yings	Shamasume & frontier places; Palung-Toloksi; Palgapai,Burchum, Kopu,Cheminei.	(12	2 Cav.yings(1 stationary, the other of Hsinchiang) 1 Inf.ying,2 Batteries, guns), 1 mach.gun comp., (4 mach.guns). In all 2000 men.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1 Battery	Shara-sume	6 mount.guns 57 mm.Hotchkiss, 6 mount.guns of the Hanyan factory.	Kept in the Altai Governors Arsenal.
Tarpakatai Mixed Regiment.			
2 Inf. yings	T'ach'eng		
1 Cav. ying	"		
(b) Troops of the type -"hsiun fangtui".			Approximate quantity -about 4800 m.guns-about 100pieces. 50 old guns are more or less good, the others are entirely useless(of the time of Yakup-bek);in Yankishar (new Kashgar)there is a provision of cartridges - about 2280 cases. All the troops are dependnt of the Kashgar titu(chief Commander of the troops) dwelling in Kashgar,and of the hseihtai's(Commanders of the garrisons)in Kashgar, Uch-Turfang and Aksu. Troops are mostly concentrated in Kashgar, Yankishar,Yarkend,Kotan, Aksu, Karashal. Less concentrated in Kiria,Uch, Turfang,Kuchor,Kargalak, Bai,Gum. Soldiers are recruited from the worst of the local population.
12 Inf. yings	On the road to Kashgar-Kasasher (by the way to Turfan)&Kashgar, Tarkend-Hotan-Nia(on the road to Loob-ror).		
12 Cav. yings			
The escort of the Hsinchiang tu-chün.			
500 Inf.soldiers	Urumchi		
30 Cav. "			
50 junior ofcrs.			The ofcrs.are alternately on duty at the tu-chün's. They were under the supervision of Li Kuang-tai,who was executed Feb.4,1916, accused of conspiracy against the tu-chün.
300 Inf. yings.			
200 Cav.soldiers			Chinese troops formed an Art.Detachment under the command of the tu-chün's assistant,Hsia,who was executed Feb.4,1916;accused of conspiracy against the tu-chün.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
	Chengchoushi of the Hsinchian Province.		
		Yang Fei-hsia.	
VIII	THE TROOPS OF MONGOLIA		
	Tu-t'ung-Chiang Kuei-ti.		

A part of the Chihli Province is included in the Yeho district(the part situated to the North of the Great Wall)and the hoshun:Chohsot'u and Chouta.
In this districts are the following cantons:

Ch'angte-hsian(Yeho)	Chaoyanhsian(residence of the Commissioner of Defence).
Luanp'inghsian,	Chianyp'inghsian,
Fengninghsian,	Hsuitunghsian,
Lunghuahsian,	Ch'ihfenghsian,
P'ingchuanhsian,	K'ailanghsian,
Lingyuanhsian,	Linghsihsian,(residence of the Commissioner of Defence).
Chaoyanhsian,	Weich'anghsian,
Fuhsinhsian,	Chingpenghsian.

I Stationary troops			
(a) Lu Chün troops.			
Yeho Mixed Brig.			One part of the Brig.,as well as the Brigade's staff were gradually disbanded on account of deficiency of money from Feb.1914. Remainder of this Brigade are simply called "Yeho Lu-chun" and are under the supervision of the Yeho tu-t'ung.
Yeho lu-chün staff	Yeho(Ch'angle)	6.8 mm.Mauser rifle of the Hanyan factory.	
1st Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Weng-yuan) staff & 2 yings	K'ailuhsian.		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Hsi-yi) staff & 2 yings	Chifenghsian		
3rd ying	Chaoyanhsian		
1st Cav. ying (Wang Fao-tu)	Yeho	Carabines of the same patt.	
1st Art. ying	P'engchuanhsian	18 mount.guns	
	Yeho	12 mach.guns	
Mach.guns.			Attached to the Inf.Divisions.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Separate Cav.Detachment.			Formed in 1914 of recruits
(Tu-lin-ch'ang)		6.8 mm.cara-	of the Yeho and Hsinanhsafu
staff	P'engchuan	bines of the	Districts.
1st ying	"	Hanyan factory.	
2nd ying	Fengninghsian		
3rd ying	Luanp'inghsian		
4th ying	Yeho		
5th ying	"		
(b) Troops Hsiunfangtui			
Yeho Hsiun-fang-tui.			
staff	Yeho		
Infantrying			
Troop detachment			
(Yang Fu-li)			
staff	"	7.9 mm.Mauser	
1st Cav. ying	"	rifle & cara-	
		bines,yr.1888.	
2nd Inf. ying	Chuityushen		
3rd Inf. ying	Fengninhsian		
4th Inf. ying	Linhsihsian		
5th Inf. ying	"		
Middle Detachment.			
(Li Hang-yuan)			
1st Cav. ying	Komentsa(45 versts from Dolon-nor)		
2nd Cav. ying	"		
3rd Inf. ying	"		
4th Inf. ying	"		
5th Inf. ying	"		
Rear Detachment.			
(Chang Yü-chun)			or "northern".
1st Cav. ying	In the hoshun Barim.		
2nd Cav. ying	"		
3rd Inf. ying	Kailuhsian		
4th Inf. ying	Tsakantolokoi		
5th Inf. ying	Ch'ihfenghsian		
1 Artillery ying	"	12 mount.guns	
2)Troops sent from other Provinces.			
Troops Yi-chün			From Chihli Province.
staff	Yeho		
1st Detachment			
5 Inf. yings	"		
2nd Detachment			
5 Inf. yings	Linhsihsian		
3rd Detachment			
2 Inf. yings	Chingpeng		
4th Detachment			
4 Inf. yings	Mawangmiao		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Right Detachment: 4 Cav. yings	Yeho, Kailuhsian		
Vanguard Detach. 2 Art. yings	Yeho	22 Gruson guns 57 mm.	
Guard detachment of the Commander of the troops "yi-chün"			
1 Inf. ying	"		
1 Cav. ying	"		
Musical band	"		
Mach. guns		20 mach.guns.	
	Chengshoushi of Yeho district.		***
	Linghsi - - - - - - -	Mi Cheng-piao	
	Chaoyang - - - - - -	Ying Kuei.	
B - Hsui-Yuan District.			
	Tu-t'ung - Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsuan.		
I Stationary Troops			
(a) **Lu-Chün Troops.**			
1st & 2nd Kwei-sui Mixed Brigades.		Kuei-sui (Kueihuach'eng-Hsuiguanch'eng) Mixed Brigades were gradually reformed into Regiments by economic combinations, and also in view of the unfaithfulness of the soldiers, that was the reason of the ~~unfaithfulness of~~ revolt ~~in~~ during the latter part of 1915 and the beginning of 1916, and, finally, in view of the incompleteness of the Brigades, because the soldiers continually deserted and became brigands. Early in the year 1917 the Suiyuan Brigade was formed and on the 17th ? ,1917 Wang Fei-huan was nominated Commander; On the 6th of Nov.1917 he was deprived of his rank because he ran away during the riots in this district. In 1918 the Suiyuanch'eng Mixed Brigades were again formed, and Li Huang-chang was nominated Commander of the 1st Brigade on 28th Feb.1918, and Chang Ping-hsian Commander of the 2nd Brigade. The Brigades will be probably formed of the Hsinyuan Mixed Regiments.	
1st Hsuiyuanch'eng Mixed Brigade. (Li Huang-chang) staff	Hsuiyuanch'eng		Is formed
2nd Hsuiyuanch'eng Mixed Brigade (Chang Peng-hsian)			Is formed

***A part of the Shansi Prov.is included in the Hsuiyuan District - the part situated to the north of the Great Wall and hoshun - Ulantsap and

Hohhotsu. In this district are the following cantons: Salachihsian, Kueihsuihsian, Wuyuanhsian, Tektohsian, Chinshuihsian, Holingerh-hsian, Fungshenghsian, Wuchuahsian.
The District was divided in March 1918, in view of defence against the brigands, into 4 Sections, guarded by local troops, and troops of the 1st Division:
1st Section - Salachi, Chinshuiho; 2nd - Ulangpulak, Tachihshan; 3rd - Kueihuach'eng, Hsuiyuanch'eng, Holingerh; 4th - Wuyuan, Fungsheng, Wuchuan.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Hsuiyuan Mixed Regiment (Peng Ta-chun)			Formed in Feb.1916 of the old 80th Inf. Regt.of the 20th Div.& was completed with soldiers of Kueihsui Brigades.
staff	Kuaihuach'eng	6.8 mm.Mauser rifle of the Hanyan factory.	
1st Inf. ying	Paot'ou		
2nd Inf. ying	Kuaihuach'eng		the 1st company of the 1st ying and 3 squadrons are the guard of the tu-t'ung.
3rd Inf. ying	"		
1st Cav. ying (Li Ming-shan)	"		
1 Art. ying	"	6 mount.guns	
Mach. guns		4 pack mach. guns.	
2nd Hsuiyuan Mixed Regiment (Cheng Ching-sheng)			Formed in March 1916 of the Kueihsui Mixed Brigades.
staff	Salachi	7.9mm Mauser rifle and carabines - year 1888.	
3 Inf. yings			
1 Cav. ying (Li Chung-hsiu)	Salachi;Toch'eng.		
1 Art. ying	" "	18 mount.guns	
Mach. guns	" "	4 mach. guns	
3rd Hsuiyuan Mixed Regiment (.....)			Formed in March 1916 of the Kueihsui Mixed Brigade.
staff	Paoto'u		The ex-Commander of the Regiment, Wang Shi-chin, was discharged April 27, 1918.
1st Inf. ying	"		
2nd Inf. ying	"		
3rd Inf. ying	Ulangpulak		50 versts from Paotou.
1 Cav. ying	Paot'ou		
1 Art. ying	"	18 mount.guns	
Mach. guns	"	4 mach. guns	
Hsuiyuan Reserve ying			
1 Inf. ying	Kueihuach'eng		Formed in March 1916.
Hsuiyuan Mixed Regiment (Banner)			Soldiers are Manchus.
staff	Hsuiyuanch'eng		
3 Inf. yings	"		
1 Cav. ying	"		
1 Art. ying	"	18 mount.guns	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
b - Troops Hsiung-fang-tui.			
Hsuiyuan "ching-pei-tui".			Formed of the former Kueihuach'eng Guard Detachment and of the left and right Scouting Detachments. In view of the big number of Mongolian bands, and of the difficulty in fighting them, the Hsuiyuan tu-t'ung took into the service the well-known brigands under Lu Chang-kuei, with his band, which consisted one time of several thousand men. In April 1916 six Cavalry yings were formed of his band, but by the end of Oct. when the tu-t'ung decided to diminish these yings, Lu Chang Kuei escaped with his soldiers to the mountains, taking all the arms with him. War activities were begun against him, and when his band suffered several severe defeats, they went to Shensi Prov., where he acted under the the pretense of Southern revolutionary troops.
Hsuiyuanch'en ching-pei-tui Detachment	Hsuiyuanch'en's neighborhood.	Equipment	The tu-t'ung himself is considered the Commander of the tui. In 1 detachment - 1 ying- 250 men.
Paot'ou ching-pei-tui. 4 Inf. yings	Paotou and neighborhood		
2 - Troops despatched from other Provinces.			
1st Division (Ts'ai Cheng-hsiun)			The Div. arrived at Peking, from Mongolia, May 8, 1916, and was soon sent to Honan, in view of the revolutionary movement in Shantung and Shensi provinces. (3rd revolution - result of the anti-monarchist movement). During the latter part of July, the Division returned to Peking, & in Aug. of the same year was sent to Kalgan for the destruction of Mongolian brigand's bands.
staff	Hsuiyuan	From Chihli Province.	
1st Inf. Brigade (Yang Yi-lai) staff	"	6.5 mm. Jap. rifle. 30th year of Meitsi.	
1st Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Chuan-heng) staff & 3 yings	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Liu Yü-chi) staff & 3 yings	"		
2nd Inf. Brigade (Chu En-jung) staff	Paotou.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
3rd Inf. Regt. (Lu Yung) staff, 3 yings	Paotou		
4th Inf. Regt. (Ching Yun-t'ai) staff & 3 yings.	"		
1st Cav. Regt. (Feng Shao-ming) staff & 3 yings	"	6.5 mm. carabines, 30th year of Meitsi.	
1st Art. ying (Ch'uh Chi-hsian) staff & 3 yings	Paot'ou, Hsui-yuan.	18 Field guns; 75 mm, Arissak; 18 Field guns; 57 mm. Gruson. 6 mount. guns, 75 mm. Krupp, model of 1904.	There is 1 battery in the 3rd ying.
1st Engineer ying. (Li Yu-chung) 4 companies	Hsuiyuan.		
1 Transport ying (Chang Chih-hao) 4 companies	"		
Mach. guns: 4 comp.		16 mach. guns	Attached to the Inf. Regts.

C - Hsinho (Kalgan or Chahar) District.

In the Chahar District are included a part of: Chihli Prov. (Western part - north from the Great Wall) lands Chahar, Fiscal pasturages and hoshuns of Shilingkol . . . . . .
In the district are the following cantons:
Changpeihsian, Dolon-ror, Hsinho (Kalgan), Tushihsian, Fengchenghsian, T'aolinhsian.

Tu-t'ung-Tien: Chung-ju - 16/3/18.

I Stationary Troops

(a) Lu-Chün troops

3rd Separate Cav. Brigade	The Brigade was disbanded in Feb. 1915; the 5th Cav. Regt. was made dependent on the Chahar tut'ung and took the name of "independent Chahar Cav. Regt.", the 6th Regt. helped to complete the Cav. divisions of the 4th, 7th and 10th Divisions. The disbanding of the Brig. was caused by the false report of the Chahar tut'ung, Ho Chung-liang, saying that the Brig. was unfaithful, but when the Commander of the Brig., Chang Chu-chin, presented a personal request to Tuan-Shi-kai, the latter sent an inquiry regarding the matter, and it appeared that the reports were false, and that the tut'ung simply wished to set free

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			from this Division, that embarrassed his actions. A new tut'ung was then nominated Tun Chung-jê, and the Brigade's Commander was appointed Commander of the 16th Brig. of the 8th Div.
Independent ~~Chahar Cav. Regt.~~			Formerly 5th Cav. Regt. of the 3rd Separate Cavalry Brig.
Li Yeng-fu)			
staff	Shibartai.	7.9 mm. Mauser carabines.	
1st ying	Shibartai-Erhtasho.		
2nd ying	" "		
3rd ying	Taoling-Wute (on the road to Kalgan).		
Mixed Brigade			It was begun to form the 1st Mixed Brig. on the 3rd of July 1917. According to rumor, 2 Mixed Brigades will be formed of the local hsiun-fantui. The tu-t'ung received the permission for its formation on the 16th of Nov. 1918, but the formation has been delayed on account of lack of funds.
(b) Troops Hsuin	Fang Tui.		
Chahar 8th Banner			Composed of Mongols and Manchus. Organized as a Regiment in Aug. 1915. The left wing formed the 1st Regiment; the right wing the 2nd Regiment. The Regt. is divided into three yings - 120 men in each. These Regiments form the Guard of Fiscal Pastures. It is intended to reform them into a Mixed Brigade.
Left wing			
1st Cav. Regt.			
(Ting Ch'ang-fa)			
staff	Tolokoi	Mauser rifle.	
2 yings	On the road from Kalgan to Dolonnor		
1 ying	Penghung		
Right wing			
2nd Cav. Regt.			
(Yü Tyu-ching)			
staff	Taoling		Revolted on the 29th June, 1917. The Commander, Yü-fu, was killed; a part of the soldiers fled away to Dolon-nor and Fengcheng; the 2nd Brig. of the Metropolitan District that was staying then in Kalgan was sent against them.
2 yings	"		
1 ying	Tolokoi.		
Guard Detachment of the Chahar tut'ung.			
1 Inf. company	Kalgan.	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle of the yr. 1888.	100 men; the Commander is Yung Weng-chin.
1 squadron	"		
Machine guns	"	6 mach. guns	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Chahar hsuin-fang-tui			
1st Detachment (Ta'yao Chiang-ts'ai)			
staff	Fengcheng	7.9 mm Mauser rifle - year 1888.	
2 Cav. yings	Fengcheng-Taoling		
2 Cav. yings	"		A 5th ying is being formed.
	Liangch'eng.		
2nd Detachment. (Ting Ch'ang-fa)			
2 Cav. yings	Taoling, Shantu.		
3rd Detachment (.....)			There were 3 Cav. yings in the Detachment, but ~~xxxx~~ at present only 1 ying is left.
1 Cav. ying	Shibartai		
4th Detachment (.....)	From Kalgan to		2 yings were formed in May 1918.
5 Cavalry yings.	Shibartai.		
Chahar Shou-pei-tui			Formed during latter part of 1915 of Shantung natives.
3 Cav. yings	Hsinho, Fengcheng,		In 1 Cav. ying - 3 squadrons.
~~[illegible]~~	Kalgan.		In 1 squadron - 120 men.
1 Inf. ying	Kalgan.		In an Inf. ying - 3 shao; in each 120 men.
Chahar ching-pei-tui			1 platoon of Mongols.
2 Cavalry yings	Kalgan.		1 ying- 80 men. Enlisted in Oct.1916 in Hsuanhuafu and Huaihsian.
Railway Police.			
(t'uh-lu hsiun-ching).	Between the stations Peking-Fengcheng		6 Divisions (about 400 men).
2 - Troops sent from other Provinces			
From the 13th Division.			From Chihli Province.
49th Inf. Regt. staff & 3 yings	Fengcheng		Sent during latter part of 1917.
1 Mach.gun comp.	"	6 mach.guns	
1 Battery	"	6 Field guns	
From the 10th Division			From Chihli Province.
10th ~~R~~ Cav.Regt. staff & 3 yings	Hsuiyuanchen		Arrived in Mongolia during first part of Jan.1917 to fight the brigands.
Chihli hsiun-fang-tui			From Chihli Province.
3rd Detachment (Chang Pao-sheng)			In an Inf.ying- 300 men.
staff	Dolon-nor	7.9mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888.	In a Cav.ying - ~~150~~ 190 men.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Cavalry ying	Dolon-nor		Guard of the Dolon-nor chengshoushi.
2nd Cav. ying	Tungchan (1,5 versts north of Dolon-nor.		
3rd Cav. ying	Dolon-nor		
4th Inf. ying	Chuangshantyu	- 20 versts east of Dolon-nor.	
5th Inf. ying	Pangchinhren	- 50 versts east of Dolon-nor.	
6th Inf. ying	Shuangmaopao	- 20 versts south-east of Dolon-nor.	
7th Inf. ying	On the road from Dolon-nor to Kalgan. Shantienho.	on the road to Yeho.	Hapachiao, Talingti.
8th Inf. ying	Erhhao	- 80 versts south east of Dolon-nor.	
1st Art. ying	Tungchan	12 mount.guns	240 men.
4th Detachment (Wang Huai-chün)			
staff	Haichan(1,5 versts north of Dolon-nor		According to other information received, T'ang Chin-ling is the Commander. They are called troops "huai-chün".
5 Inf. yings	"		
2 Cav. yings	Hsiaoyingp'ang: 12,5 versts east of Dolon-nor).		
Huai-chün chieh-chi-tui. (Auxiliary for the transport of troops).			
1 Cav. ying	Dolon-nor		
1 Art. ying	Hsiaoyingp'ang	18 guns	
Scouts' Detach.	Dolon-nor	57 mm.Krupp	90 men.
Mach.guns: 1 Col	Hsiaoyingp'ang	4 mach.guns	

Chengshoushi of Kalgan District.

Chaotung (Dolon-nor) - Tang Chi-yao.
Chahsi - Chia Tien-t'sai.

Number of copies 3

Copy No. 1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
MI. Int. Branch

2009-46

WAR DEPARTMENT

Noted D. W. P., M. I.-5

SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION POLICIES AND DISBANDMENT OF TROOPS.

(Chinese Troops).

From: M.A.

NOTED:
H. W. B.
M. I.-10

No. 2087 Date June 2, 1919, 19

Replying to No. 1756 (2009-4) Date January 14, 1919, 19

REC'D, M. I. B., O. C. S. JUL 22 1919

1. The following is a copy of State Department correspondence regarding the above subject:

"Peking, May 19, 1919.

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose copies of a memorandum written by Roy S. Anderson, an American citizen, concerning re-organization policies, particularly with respect to the disbandment of troops. As Mr. Anderson has an exceptional knowledge of Chinese affairs, and keeps himself very thoroughly informed, his views deserve attention. In my opinion his proposals with respect to disbandment are sound and practicable; in fact, unless this or a similar plan can be adopted, no particular good can be expected from the expenditure of money.

By way of contrast, I have the honor to enclose a preliminary "Estimate of Expenses for the Disbandment of Troops" which was confidentially handed to me on behalf of President Hsu. This memorandum contains the official estimate of troops. As it rests upon the returns made by the Generals, it is believed to be extravagant, and that with proper control, the number of troops actually under arms whose disbandment expenses have to be provided for will be found to be considerably less. The President's estimate provides also for the payment of officers. It is believed by many that as the officers have been well taken care of, it will not be necessary to spend a large amount of money in enabling them to tide over the period of getting into other employment; and that the idea of providing them with an annual salary on pension could also be considerably modified. On the other hand, the President's idea of providing schools in which disbanded officers may be ~~fit~~ fitted for other employment, such as teachers, is not without merit.

(Signed) American Minister.

Enclosures: Copies of a memorandum prepared by RoyS. Anderson.
Copies of an estimate prepared for President Hsu.

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~~MEMORANDUM~~

~~ON DISBANDMENT AND REORGANIZATION~~

Binding Margin

SUBJECT

From

No. 2087 Date 19

Replying to No. Date 19

Enclosure #1.

MEMORANDUM

ON DISBANDMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE

CHINESE ARMY. (by Roy S. Anderson).

"It is, ~~x~~ in my opinion, useless to consider government documents as to plans for reorganization, for every one of them is drawn up for purposes other than the interests of the Chinese nation. This is true as regards both the North and the South. The records furnished by either side cannot be depended upon, and it is practically a waste of time to take statements of the Canton Military Government or the Peking Government seriously.

I have felt for a long time that it would ~~x~~ be an extremely wise policy for the American bankers and the Consortium as a whole to make investigations independent of Peking and Canton. It would pay the financial groups contemplating a reorganization loan to appoint representatives to travel in the provinces in search of information as to real conditions. In justice to both the Peking and Canton governments, it may be said that the information they have of the provincial doings in those provinces that fall nominally under their influence, is very inaccurate. There is so much jealousy among the officials of the various provinces that none of these officers are going to tell the truth as to their real strength or weakness.

The official statements of government expenditures in Canton and Peking are worthless. The bankers will have to go outside of these statements to secure the real facts, and without them, any plan for reorganization would be futile. Just at this time, when everything is topsy turvy in the provinces, there is an opportunity to secure very valuable knowledge from officials and prominent business men. In other words, this is the time that "each fellow is more than ready and willing to tell on the other fellow".

My experience in travel about the country for the last two years has taught me that we have paid too much attention to Peking, and too little to the provinces. Peking is powerful only to the extent that it has the recognition of the foreign Powers, and is able to contract loans for the sole purpose of purchasing or retaining support. In event foreign recognition of the Peking Government is removed, the present personnel of the administration in the capital would undergo immediate change.

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SUBJECT

From

No. 2087 Date 19

Replying to No. Date 19

I spoke to you the other day in the presence of Mr. John J. Abbott, of a plan for the reorganization of the military in China. While this plan cannot be presented in detail in the brief outline which I have undertaken in this letter, I hope that it will serve to give you my personal impressions as to what should be done - impressions received in my meeting with various civil and military officials in the provinces as well as many of the more prominent business men.

The number of soldiers in China is estimated variously as between 750,000 and 1,400,000. The inference always given by officials when rendering an estimate of the number of troops is, that these men are all armed. In my opinion, it would be more than liberal to state that there were not over 600,000 armed men in the northern and southern armies. I have come to this conclusion by the casual statements made by leading military men in the North andthe South.

I take it that in any loan made by the Powers for the disbandment of troops, that troops must be men under arms, and not a few hundred thousand "hangers-on". If this is the case, as it should be, there should be no difficulty in so organizing as to disband all superfluous ~~military~~ soldiery in a most economical manner. If we are to accept the official statements of both sides, we will undoubtedly have to take care of some million odd men that never had a rifle in their hands.

As a first step in the disbandment of troops, and the creation of a national army, I would suggest that China be divided into five military departments. These departments would be:

(a) Department of the Northwest.
(b) Department of the Northeast.
(c) Department of the Center.
(d) Department of the Southwest.
(e) Department of the Southeast.

The President should appoint five Departmental Commanders, and five deputy Departmental Commanders, and each Commander should have full and complete control of the troops in his Department subject at all times to the control and direction of the Ministry of War.

I consider that five fully equipped divisions of ten thousand men each would be sufficient as a force capable of protecting the provinces included in any of the Military Departments. This would mean a national army of some ~~250,~~ 250,000 men, and in this time when the Paris Conference is discussing the limitation of armaments, I do not think that the representatives of the various Powers in France would consider such a force inadequate to the needs of the Chinese Republic.

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SUBJECT

From

No. 2087 Date 19

Replying to No. Date 19

China has an extensive frontier, which she should rightfully protect. The Yunnan, Szechuan, Mongolian and Manchurian borders would not require a force of over 125,000 men for the preservation of order. This would mean that the remaining 125,000 men in the national army would be stationed in the provinces. I would suggest that the 125,000 stationed in China should be divided into brigades of 5,000 men each, and one brigade stationed in each provincial capital.

Tuchun Tang Chi Yao, of Yunnan, is of the opinion that the "division" should be abolished, and that the largest unit should be a "brigade". Owing to the difficulties of transportation, and the fact that the military will be largely for the purpose of home use, I feel that he is right in his contention.

For the protection of the provinces in the quelling of any disturbance beyond the power of the police, a mobile unit consisting of 5,000 men would be able to cope with any situation.

By adopting the plan mentioned above, there would at no time be a force of over 5,000 men in any one province, and this force would not be in a position to make trouble. A Departmental Commander would have at all times 25,000 men under his orders, but these men would be scattered in the provinces coming under his Military Department. The deputy Departmental Commanders would be in direct command of the troops stationed on the frontiers.

It should be so arranged that the troops enlisted in any one Department should be placed on duty in those provinces other than the ones in which they were recruited. In other words, I would suggest that the troops recruited in the Southwest should be stationed in the Northeast, etc. This will have to be done for some years, at least until the provincialism of the army is broken down. With 50,000 men of the Southwest stationed in the Northeast, there will be no fear of either doing damage - the one is the check upon the other. Another reason is that of the broadening influence that travel and rubbing up against new surroundings will have upon the men. Some people have suggested that the men when enlisted from several provinces be brigaged together, for the present this would not be expedient owing to a difference in language and customs, but in time there would be no particular difficulty in doing this.

The forces stationed in the provinces this year should be made to do frontier duty the next, and as much changing about as it is possible will have more than anything else to do with the nationalizing and unifying of the national army.

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SUBJECT

From H.A.

No. [redacted] Date, 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

An army as described above is the aim of the plan I wish to advance for the disbandment of troops. I believe that all will agree that a national army x that is really a unit under the direction of the central government is what is needed about all else to prevent further revolutions and counter-revolutions. Many Chinese have advanced the idea that too much power will be in the hands of the central administration - all arguments of this nature are to us invalid, and should be to any right thinking Chinese. The provincial army must go before there can be any permanent union of the provinces.

It is suggested that three distinct commissions be organized for the disbandment of troops, as follows:

(a) The Disbandment Commission.
(b) The Financial Commission for the Disbandment of Troops.
(c) The Public Works Commission for the Employment of Disbanded Troops.

These three Commissions would be the one dependent upon the other, and each an organ of the central government, and appointed by Presidential Mandate.

The Disbandment Commission should be composed of the five Departmental Commanders already referred to, and would be under the direction of the Minister of War.

The Financial Commission for the Disbandment of Troops would be representatives appointed by the Consortium, and given the added appointment of Chinese Government officials by Mandate.

The Public Works Commission for the employment of disbanded troops would be composed of two representatives (Chinese) delegated by the Disbandment Commission, and two representatives delegated by the Consortium, who would act under the Chairmanship of the Minister of War (or the Minister of Communications).

The duty of disbanding the troops in each of the departments would rest upon the Commander of the Department, who would have under his command the five divisions selected by him because of their training and equipment. Every military man, either European or Chinese, will agree that 50,000 of the best troops in any one of the departments would find no difficulty in disbanding the other troops within the same area. There may be some fighting, but I doubt very seriously whether such fighting would amount toanything.

In the matter of disbanding, there would not be northern

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From H.A.

No. 2087 Date, 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

troops disbanding southern troops, or vice versa, for it would be simply a question of the Southwest disbanding troops of the Southwest, and the Northeast disbanding troops of the Northeast. The question of sectional issues as well as political would be immediately done away with.

In all of the investigations that I have made, it has been hard to find over twenty divisions - 200,000 men - in the whole of China who have been properly trained and equipped. In fact, 200,000 well equipped soldiers would be a most generous estimate of drilled troops. I am firmly convined that when we select from the present armies 250,000 of the best, they could easily cope with the disbandment of the other 350,000 under arms.

As already mentioned, it is useless to disband a soldier without taking his military equipment away from him. It is proposed that the soldier when disbanded shall be turned over to the Financial Commission for the Disbandment of Troops, and that with each soldier so handed over, there shall also be given to this Commission one rifle, and at least 50 rounds of rifle ammunition. Disbandment must mean disarmament, or there is no good in it. This means would give the Financial Commission an easy way to check expenditures, and accurate auditing would result.

The Financial Commission would then turn the soldier over to the Public Works Commission for employment, and all arms held until the completion of disbandment. The Financial Commission would act as custodians of the arms so received, and same could be transferred to Shanghai pending the decision as to disposal of same.

The Public Works Commission should give employment to the disbanded soldiers upon the construction of national highways and necessary conservancy of waterways. I feel that these two items will be sufficient to keep a disbanded army of ~~$~~ 350,000 men fully occupied for some years. In building roads and general conservancy work, the main item of expense is, of course, payment for labor. There is little or no need in the purchase of material at home or abroad. It is purely a matter of labor. There is little or no need in the purchase of material at home or abroad. It is purely a matter of labor. Some Chinese have often spoken of employing disbanded soldiers in cultivating land - this I do not believe would work, and it would mean an immense expenditure of funds. The soldier that finds employment in constructing public roads, and finds that he can save a little out of his salary to establish a homestead. I would suggest the grant of land system as a reward for all laborers that have filled out their time. This matter will be discussed later.

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From H.A.

No. 2087 Date , 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

It would be well for the Consortium to arrange matters so that any financial assistance given will be sufficient to carry on the work of the Public Works Commission for a period of no less than five years. This would mean roughly an expenditure of some $60,000,000 per annum for labor and supervision of labor. I do not profess to know what the actual cost of supervision will amount to, but the following figures covering my own ideas as to labor and supervision are given you for what they are worth:

350,000 laborers at $8.00 per month	$2,800,000.00
Cost of food - $4.00 per man	1,400,000.00
Cost of supervision per month.	200,000.00
Average monthly expense	$4,400,000.00

This would mean an average yearly expenditure of some $52,800,000.00.

In addition to the above expenditures there will be the necessary initial expenditures connected with surveys, etc., as well as the payment of arrears in the salaries of disbanded troops.

As regards the matter of arrears, my idea is that a compromise will have to be made upon some figure that will give a fair average. In talking with various Chinese I find that $24.00 per man would satisfy him as to arrears, for without foreign supervision of accounting, the poor devil would never hope to get even this much. There is hardly a soldier that is not due back pay, and we would be safe in stating that practically the whole 350,000 would come in for arrears of pay. As suggested the other day, this amount of arrears should not be paid to any soldier in a lump sum, but should be spread over twelve monthly payments during his first year of service as a laborer. This would mean that the expenditures of the first year, owing to payment of arrears would be in excess of the following four years of an amount approximately $9,000,000.00.

The item of employment of engineers in making the preliminary surveys for public roads, conservancy work, etc., would mean an outlay of no less than $5,000,000.

In short, I feel that an annual expenditure of some $60,000,000.00 would practically cover all the expenses attached to the work of the Public Works Commission in the support of 350,000 disbanded soldiers. This would mean a Consortium loan of some $300,000,000.00 over a period of five years. I do not feel that the estimates of the Government will fall very far below this amount anyway, and unless a

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From H.A.

No. 2087 Date 19

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definite plan is determined upon, the 2 or 3 hundred million dollars loaned will be so much money wasted.

After the disbandment of the troops has been completed, the Disbandment Commission and the Financial Commission for the Disbandment of Troops can be abolished, and all of their work undertaken by the Public Works Commission. This Commission should be eventually incorporated in the Ministry of Communications to avoid useless duplication of Bureaux. The Consortium could treat directly with the Public Works Commission which would contain representatives of the Consortium.

In outlining the work of the Public Works Commission, I have mentioned the matter of conservancy of waterways. I have mentioned this because of the general wish of the people with whom I have talked. Personally, I feel that the work of the Commission would be far simpler if all of its efforts were devoted entirely to the building of public roads. It would mean easier supervision, and the whole matter of construction of roads would be far more economicall There would be far less wrangling about the work. A definite program of national road building could be undertaken, and there would be no slighting of any particular province. This is not true of the conservancy of waterways. As to purchase of material, there is practically none in road building.

To encourage the laborers, it is suggested that each province give a grant of land alongside the roads, or within easy reach of the roads constructed by disbanded soldiers to each man that remained in his job over the period of five years. This would mean a great deal, not only to the individual, but also to the province.

All disbanded soldiers should be returned to their native provinces for work under the Public Works Commission. The matter of their travelling expenses can easily be taken care of by the Government without any expenditure on the part of the Commission from funds borrowed from the Consortium.

The disbandment of officers should be undertaken entirely by the Government, and the provincial authorities. I do not believe that these men should be paid by the Commissions organized for the disbandment of troops. For the most part, they have all participated in the squeeze that has been going on for years, and have received their posts largely for their allegiance to their senior officers who have paid them well for their services. It would be more than foolish for the Consortium to entertain for one moment any expense in this connection. The Peking and provincial authorities can more than take care of the matter of disbandment of officers. I have no sympathy whatever with any attempt to treat the officers as you do the men. The Government can find enough positions for all officers

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From N.A.

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that are likely to be of any annoyance. Since the rank and file of the officers are men who have been personally selected by their superiors, the superiors should disgorge to the extent of paying them off, if there is any paying off necessary. The millions that have been squeezed by Tuchuns and Division commanders all over the country should be used for some of this disbandment of officers. In referring to officers, I mean all commissioned officers.

The cry will be that the troops are under the command of the officers who will refuse to disband unless they are paid off too. This is all rot. The officers will have to go as well as the men, if the Departmental Commanders have five good divisions at their disposal. I would suggest a real Chinese method in securing peaceful disbandment upon the part of the soldiers, that is, have the Government to issue a statement announcing the plan of disbandment, and such statement be given full credit by the Foreign Powers. The average Chinese will take the word of the Foreign representatives where he will discount what is said by the Government. The Legations would have to take an active part in the publicity work, so that the Chinese will fully understand that what the Government promises will be fulfilled.

In suggesting the above plan for disbandment and the reorganization of the army, I am satisfied that the plan can be made a success. If the Chinese Government declares that there are more than 350,000 armed men to be disbanded before the national army can be reduced to 250,000 armed men, it would be safe for the Consortium to agree that for every soldier possessing one rifle and fifty rounds of ammunition, the Consortium will give employment to the soldier upon the basis of the employment of the 350,000, and, further, that the Powers expect China, and will insist upon China to disband and disarm until there are only 250,000 armed men in the army.

If the Powers will state plainly to the Chinese Government that the armed rabble of China are a menace not only to China, but to the Treaty Powers, and that China will be forced to disband, whether or no, upon the basis outlined, there will, I am sure, be no trouble in carrying out the disbandment. In my opinion, it is the duty of the Powers to insist upon disbandment and disarmament, and it is for the Powers to determine the plan by which disbandment will be carried out. The greatest mistake will be made by the Powers if they consult the Government. The Government must be told to do thus and so, and not until the Powers take such a stand will the Government ever do anything. There is not a right thinking official that would oppose such a step upon the part of the Powers, and we can rest assured that the people of China will welcome foreign intervention of this nature.

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From H.A.

No. 2087 Date 19

Replying to No. Date 19

I would suggest that the representatives of the Powers get together upon some such scheme as proposed, and upon an agreement with the Consortium to represent matters fully to their respective Governments asking support and instructions to force the Chinese Government to follow out the policy agreed upon by the Powers. I am firmly convinced that any more talking with the Government, South or North, is so much wasted effort. We have got to treat the Chinese Government in the same way as the people of China would treat their Government had they the power to do so. I have talked to nearly every high official of any importance upon these matters, and have come to the conclusion that there is no use in listening to them.

In dividing the country into five military departments, you at once abolish the Tuchun-system, and remove from politics all military politicians. There can be no politics played beyond the appointment of the Commanders, and the President would appoint as Commanders those having the greatest military authority now in the Departments proposed, and as Deputy Commanders he would most naturally appoint those who are second in influence. This is as it should be. The man with the best trained troops would be the logical man to disband the mob. It would be impossible for the President to appoint any other than the most powerful individual in any one Department as Commander. He couldn't do so if he even desired to do so.

The whip-handle that Japan has on China today is because of the military domination of China through one military group. If France, England and the United States were to absolutely agree upon a plan of action, Japan would have to follow. In determining upon a plan the Japanese are checked. There is no plan that could be proposed that would destroy Japan's wicked hold upon China more than the nationalization of the Chinese army as outlined in this letter.

In my Memorandum to Tang Chi Yao I proposed that a certain amount of the Consortium loan be set aside for a military school for the training of officers. I feel that this would be an excellent idea, if same could be agreed upon by the bankers participating in the reorganization loan.

It was also suggested that sufficient funds be set aside for a national arsenal to be erected in the Yangtze Valley - near Pukow. This is the most logical place, and the Fenghuangshan iron deposits are from expert reports the best for the manufacture of steel to be used in the manufacture of arms. These deposits near Nanking should be taken over for purely governmental use, and a steel plant erected for industrial purposes as well as for the manufacture of arms. I think that the Consortium would do well in insisting upon this point, as it is not only to the advantage of China, but to the Powers as well.

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SUBJECT

From H.A.

No. 2087 Date 19

Replying to No. Date 19

In discussing the question of a reorganisation of the army, it is necessary also to take into consideration the matter of police. The only question which would have any connection with the Consortium regarding the policing of China is that of armed police. I would strongly urge the Powers to consider the matter of armed police along with that of the army. The number of police in any province, city or village is not for the Powers or the bankers to decide, but the number of armed police is a serious matter, and is a question with which the Powers must concern themselves.

I would suggest that no Province be allowed an armed force of police of over 5,000 men. These men would naturally be scattered over the Province, and would be of no use in the matter of official intrigue. I feel that as far as armed police are concerned, this would be a sufficient number. I think that if an investigation is made into the matter of local armed police in an average town of say thirty thousand inhabitants, that you will not find more than forty or fifty armed men acting aspolice.

It should be so arranged that the police as well as the army shall receive their arms from the national arsenal. In the disbandment of armed police, the question would not be one of dismissing the police from service, but would be solely a matter of disarming a certain number of them. This is a most important matter, that is, the matter of disarming police, for you will find the Government making a distinction between police and soldiers, and then they would crowd a host of armed ~~police~~ soldiers into the police force. This matter ofarmed police should under no circumstances be overlooked. We do not care how many police each province has as long as the armed members of the force do not exceed 5,000 in any one Province.

In Peking one of the most formidable military forces is the police force under the command of General Wu Ping Hsiang. This man has been hated by every President since the days of Yuan Shi Kai, but no President has had the power to dismiss him from office. He is the autocrat in every sense of the word. Today most of the intrigues are carried on in Peking under the power of the police under Wu Ping Hsiang. He is stronger than any Division Commander. He has access to any and all houses, and his men are posted for the "protection" of the high officials - in reality spies. I remember that when Liang Shi Yi was suspected of opposing Tuan, Wu Ping Hsiang placed a strong detachment of police to "protect" him. He was watched day and night by these spies, and it became so bad that Liang's most intimate friends were afraid to meet him in his house.

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SUBJECT

From H.A.

No. 2087 Date 19

Replying to No. Date 19

I hope that you have not tired of this long story of army disbandment. There are a few other matters touched upon in our conversation last Sunday that I would like to mention again.

The political chaos now existing in China is the result of the military, and none of the political parties at present in power could have half a chance of success were the army reorganization to be carried out as suggested. This is true in the South as well as in the North. I feel that it is useless to discuss civil ~~and~~ or financial reorganization until we first settle the matter of disbandment and disarmament. I am sure that you will agree that the past eight years have taught us this fact, if no other.

The real danger now is a compromise between the northern and southern military men. This would mean a continuation of the military in power, and we would have revolution following upon revolution as a result. The South is supporting quite a force without foreign financial aid, and the southern military leaders know that they cannot do so much longer. In the North the Tuan faction is the only one that is gaining strength, and that strength is secured by the aid of Japan. The other military leaders in the north who are in any way patriotic, if such there be, are afraid of Tuan's power, and are falling under his influence. The southern "heroes" know this to be true. They have no other way than to make a compromise with the North - such a compromise would in fact mean a compromise with Tuan and the Japanese. Is this to be desired?

Hsu Shih Chang as evidenced by his conversation with me today is afraid to do anything. He is willing to let things drift along as he can be assured of the Presidency. He is unwilling to take any action, and we would be foolish to believe for one moment that he will. He is simply a "jelly-fish", and one without a sting. He will not oust Tuan until some other military faction ousts him, that is, when some other military group is strong enough to lick Tuan then Hsu will issue a Mandate dismissing Tuan from office. There is at present no hope of securing the aid of a stronger military force than the one possessed by Tuan to overcome Tuan. This being the case, Tuan will remain unmolested by Hsu Chih Chang.

If the matter of disbandment be left to the Chinese naturally Tuan will get the best of it, and will be in a position to oust Hsu, and establish his own as well as Japanese influence. The only power that is strong enough to break Tuan and Japan is the insistence by the Powers upon the disbandment of troops as outlined in this letter. Hsu cannot, or we had better say, will not do anything to Tuan. He is attempting all kinds of schemes that will excuse him from taking any action against Tuan.

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SUBJECT

From H.A.

No. 2087 Date , 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

Now, as soon as the military reorganization takes place the political parties in the north and the south will break up. The people will at once take an active part in the government of the nation, and China will go along well when this is the case. If we want to show any sympathy towards the politicians there is only one way, and that is before it is too late for them to act to secure their support for the following plan:

(a) That the Old Parliament elect Hsu Shih Chang as President of the Republic.

(B) That the Old Parliament immediately promulgate new election laws in order that the new Parliament may be reduced by at least half.

(c) The transference of the right to draft the Constitution to an inter-provincial constitutional drafting convention.

In payment for their "patriotic services" the members of the Old Parliament would be paid a sum equal to their arrears in pay due to their dissolution.

I have reason to believe that such a step would strengthen Hsu and would weaken Tuan. At any rate, it is the only plan left to the Old Parliament to save their face.

I think that it would be wrong to recall Parliament. It would be better to leave them where they are, and have them do the work outlined in Canton. If we were to assist in bringing this body to Peking, we would have a repetition of 1913 and 1917. This would do no one any good. I feel that if the Powers could in some indirect way assue the members of their back-pay, that they would more than gladly follow out the above suggestions. The main reason they are holding out is in the hopes that they will secure their arrears in pay. They know that they haven't much longer to sit anyway according to their own statements, and if we could assure them of their pay, we would do quite a bit to secure a peaceful settlement as regards the troubles caused by the professional politicians.

I am satisfied that Hsu would more than welcome his election by the Old Parliament. I know that he as well as most of his friends feel that he would be a legal President were he to be elected by this Parliament. This means a lot to Hsu, and he would do a good deal to have the Parliament take such action.

The new Parliament would then be treated as never having existed. The members have been paid well to elect Hsu, and the northern militarists who bought them can easily disperse them

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SUBJECT

From H.A.

No. 2287 Date 19

Replying to No. Date 19

by giving them a little more ready cash. If the Old Parliament were to be reasonable enough to take the action proposed, there would be no difficulty in securing the dissolution of the new Parliament.

Unless we can get the Old Parliament to undertake such a scheme, there is no use in our further considering the wishes of its members. We will have to drop them out of all settlements. The new Parliament under no circumstances should be recognized. If the Old Parliament will not take the action mentioned, then it would be the "big thing" for the President to dissolve both parliaments showing his generosity - the Chinese official term would be generosity.

I feel that the Powers in insisting upon the reorganization of the army should also plan the reform of Chinese currency, and general financial reorganization including the matter of railways. On the subjects I have certain ideas, but being nothing of a financial or railway expert will not presume to even suggest a plan.

I feel that all reorganization schemes should be presented to the Chinese Government at Canton and at Peking simultaneously by the Powers, and the officials made to understand that we were going to interfere in Chinese affairs to the extent of giving the Chinese people a fair deal.

- - - - - - - - - -

An Estimate of Expenses for Disbandment of Troops.

1. For expense in connection with disbandment of, and defrayment of arrears due to, the 700,000 troops under the respective control of the Central Government and the Provinces.
Silver $80,000,000.

2. For salaries of unemployed officers after disbandment, and cost of establishing military colleges.
Silver $30,330,000.

3. For payment of three months' military expenses for troops in the field, and for expenses in connection with their return to the various depots.
Silver $13,000,000.

Total Silver$123,330,000.

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SUBJECT

From H.A.

No. 2087 Date 19

Replying to No. Date 19

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

1. When the Republic was first established, there were in the country more than one million troops. Later steps were taken to disband them, but owing to the various political disturbances in the last few years, more troops were recruited than disbanded. In 1916 and 1917, there were some 956,000 men, including the army and the garrisons. A year and half ago, when the Southwestern Provinces took up arms, the number of men recruited by the Central Government and the Provinces amounted to some 460,000. Thus there is at the present time a total of ~~[illegible]~~ 1,416,000 troops in the country. Unless steps are taken to reduce as well as to disband them immediately, the situation cannot be improved.

2. Considerable thought has been given to this subject. It is proposed to reduce the existing number of troops to 700,000 men, including the army, the garrisons and the gendarmerie, and reorganize them. As for the other 700,000 men, they will be disbanded. According to the paln adopted in the first years of the Republic, the average allowance provided for each officer at the time of disbandment was $300, and that for each private $24. This will be sufficient. In regard to the payment of arrears due to the troops, the old plan was based on a three-month pay, but this does not seem to be feasible in the present case, the reason being that this time, the period of military operations is comparatively longer which makes the situation more complicated. Ever since the time of Hung-hsien (December 1915) debts incurred in connection with the various military operations have not been settledand besides there has been fighting for upwards of another year, which has made the financial stringency of the Government more acute. The troops in the field have mostly been receiving just their food allowance and no pay. Even their outfit was purchased mostly with loans advanced by merchants which have not yet been returned. For this reason it does not seem possible to follow the three-month precedent in the payment of arrears to the troops, and in order to forestall difficulties that may arise, it is proposed to place the same on a six-month pay basis. To carry out this plan of disbandment of 700,000 men, a sum of approximately $80,000,000 silver will be required.

The official salary schedule for military men in China has not yet been promulgated. In disbanding these 700,000 troops, account must be taken also of the 40600 officers and their staff. If this number be reduced by one-quarter, that is, by dismissing the 10,600 odd secretaries, writers, etc., there are still some 30,000 officers left. It does not seem wise to compel these officers, once their connection with the army is severed to find their livelihood in other walks of life. Hence it is proposed to accord to these 30,000 unemployed officers

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From H.A.

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a special treatment by providing them with their annual salaries aggregating to approximately $20,330,000 silver, and in addition to the salaries with which their families may be supported, and opportunity for an advanced education at the military colleges to be established for them. This measure is undertaken as a matter of precaution, so that they may be kept in the proper path. Thus gradually they may retire from the military service, and the problem of disbandment is solved. For the establishment of the military colleges including their current expenses, it is estimated that a sum of over $10,000,000 silver will be required; and adding to this the above-mentioned salary provision, the amount under this heading will approximately be $30,330,000 silver.

The provision made for meeting the extraordinary military expenses of the troops in the field has long ago been exhausted. In order to maintain these troops from now till the time when they return to their various depots for the purposes of disbandment and reorganization, another three months' military expenses amounting to approximately $12,000,000 silver will have to be provided; and for expenses in connection with their return to the various depots, an additional million dollars silver will be necessary. Thus the two items of expenditure under this heading will amount to approximately $13,000,000 silver.

The total of the three above-outlined expenditures will approximately be $123,330, silver.

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2009-43

SUBJECT . . . . MILITARY CONDITIONS IN CHINA

. . . . . .

FROM . . . . . H.A. . . . . .

REC'D, M. I. B., O. C. S. JUN 30 1919

NO. 2058. . . . . DATE . . . . May 19, 1919.

REPLYING TO NO. . . . . DATE . . . . . 1919.

Noted D. W. P., M. I.-5

1. Every Chinese will admit that for national defence the Chinese army is utterly useless. A few Chinese officials, whose painful duty it is to explain to foreigners why there is an army at all, will try to tell those who have never been further inland than Peking, that it is essential to the preservation of internal order, that it is valuable as a constabulary force, and that without this precious institution, anarchy would reign throughout the Republic. No Chinese, however, ever attempts to make such an explanation to a foreigner who knows a little Chinese, and who has travelled beyond the bounds of the Treaty Ports in any one province. The more soldiers the more disorder, the more soldiers the less trade, the more soldiers the more bandits, the more soldiers the more opium and vice, the more soldiers the poorer the accommodations and means of transport for travellers - all these are axiomatic in the minds of the Chinese people.

2. Each community in China has its quota of bad characters, thieves and brigands. A local constabulary force, if properly armed and efficiently led, can always more than deal with the lawbreakers. But it is the fashion now to use the presence of bandits as an excuse for inflicting upon the people of a country community a detachment of soldiers. Their arrival marks the end of peace and prosperity. The inns, schools and temples are filled with disorderly bullies who are never more than half paid, and who never more than half pay for anything. Their commander at once becomes the biggest man in the community because he is the nominal chief of a band of really dangerous characters. He extorts money from the merchants and gentry under the pretext that he must pay his precious following, or it will revolt and sack the place. He invents all manner of direct and indirect taxes and in addition commandeers all that he can find an excuse for taking. Public buildings are filled with his men who tear out the woodwork and break it up to cook their food. Merchants are forced at the point of the rusty rifle to sell their commodities for whatever the soldiery choose to pay. Countrymen transporting their products to town are met by the wayside, and relieved of whatever pleases the fancy of the troops. Farmers are encouraged to raise opium and then when the crop is ripening along comes a troop of armed villains, full of self-righteous importance, who announce that they have come to see the crop ploughed under and to arrest the farmer. After some little show of putting this into effect, an understanding is reached by which the crop is left standing on condition that the farmer pay the soldiers something more than half its value. He has no ready money, so the ranks open and forth comes the opium broker who announces that he will advance the

required funds at an interest of 12 percent, a month on condition that the crop is sold to him when harvested at a little less than the market value. For the privilege of working with the soldiery he pays a generous tax to the military officials. If any person in uniform wishes to travel, or to haul anything in which he is interested, he seized whatever means of transport he desires, makes the cartman, boatman, muleteer or wheelbarrow coolie unload any persons or freight that he may be carrying and enter into the service of the man with a gun, compensation for which does not buy him or his animals their food. This is known as "ch'ai-shih" and is an ancient official prerogative now shared by every man in uniform. It is the "ch'ai-shih" tradition which gives the soldier his imaginary right to travel first class on the railways without paying, to camp in dining cars, sleep on the tables, spit on the walls, and otherwise make himself at home, while the first-class passengers take their meals in their coupés. The result of this practice in the country is the speedy elimination of all means of transport from the roads upon which soldiers are known to be garrisoned. Trade comes to an end because there are no carts, boats or mules to do the carrying. Prices go up upon imports, and prices upon local products, which cannot be shipped, go down to nothing. The number of the desperately poor increases by leaps and bounds, and within a very short time the community realizes that it has to deal with many more thieves and highwaymen than formerly. The soldiers go unwillingly forth to fight the brigands. If they meet them they are defeated; if the bandits elude them they pillage the country people and hold up traffic on their own account. It is decided that the soldiers are not enough, so more are brought. Again the number of bandits increases, and soldiers and robbers take turn about in looting the villages. Then the Military Commander who has found his income falling off on account of the decline in trade and the poverty of the people, fails to pay his men; they mutiny and join the bandits; fresh troops come, go out to meet the augmented forces and are defeated; so it becomes necessary to send out a diplomatic agent and buy over all the mutinied soldiers and all the bandits, put them all in uniform and pay them all a salary for the first month, or so. There are then about ten times as many soldiers in the community as it should never have needed, and the money appropriated for their support is wholly inadequate. Discipline becomes particularly lax, the men forage for everything that they get, the docile element among the country people starve, while the spirited arm themselves and organize fresh bandit forces, and the whole performance repeats itself, the evil of it multiplying itself with every repetition, and the people becoming more miserably. The Commander of such a force dare not disband it. He can only exert authority over it when directing it upon some nefarious exploit, but just this power to turn such a horde of armed villians loose upon the people gives the Commander a prestige which few decent men would envy him, but which seems to afford some satisfaction to the spirit of the Chinese military official.

57 3. With the exception of a few units, which are maintained at a comparatively high standard for show purposes,

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the Chinese army receives no training designed to fit it as a fighting force or to make it dangerous to any but the unfortunate folk among ~~x~~ whom it is quartered. Each soldier gets a rifle of some sort, but no chance to practice with it unless he mutinies and loots a city. There is a good deal of drilling for parade purposes, but there is very little training in fighting tactics, chiefly because the officers know as little about it as the men and partly because no one, officer or man, ever joins the arms expecting to fight. In former times a Chinese soldier had a good deal of practice with the bow, the sword, the spear, and with other primitive weapons. He was then a fairly dangerous opponent and a battle between Chinese soldiers entailed considerably ~~mk~~ bloodshed. A Chinese soldier with a rifle is now dangerous to no one at more than a few yards range. A battle is scarcely more sanguinary than an old-fashioned American 4th of July celebration was before there was any attempt to make it "safe and sane". Rifles and machine guns are discharged with much enthusiasm at the sky. The artillery usually kills as many friends as foes, and in a day's engagement, in which 30 or 40 thousand men are involved, killed and wounded may not exceed a hundred.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
Mil. Int. Branch

SUBJECT MISDIRECTION OF CHINESE TROOPS. 2009-60

WAR DEPARTMENT

From H.A.

No. 2156 Date August 5, 1919., 19

Referring to H.A.2064. Date May 20, 1919., 19

1. The attached data is a continuation and conclusion of that sent May 20, 1919, - our number 2064. It is a translation in the form as received from the Russian Legation.

REC'D, M. I. B., G. S. SEP 5 1919

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
Mil. Int. Branch

SEP 23 1919

2009-60

WAR DEPARTMENT

HUPEH PROVINCE

Tuchun (Commander of the Troops) - Wang Chan Yuan.

Sheng-chang (Civil Governor) is not appointed; the Tuchun is Acting Governor.

Chen-shou-shi (Military Commander of the District)
1. Hankou - Tu Hsi-chun.
2. Hsian-yun - Chang Lian-sheng.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
I. Stationary Troops			During the 1st revolution 8 Divisions were formed in Hupeh. In Mar.1913 they were organized into 4 Divisions. When the revolution was ended the 2nd, 3rd & 4th Divisions were disbanded; only the 1st Div. was left. The 1st Brig. of this Div., without the Commanders, passed on the side of the southerners in 1917. The 2nd Brig. was called 4th Mixed Brig. on the 3rd of Jan.1918.
1. Lu-chun Troops.			
1st Hupeh Div. (old)			
1st Hupeh Div. (new)		7.9 mm Mauser rifle; model of yr.1888; made at Hanyang factory.	Division was begun to be formed during middle of 1918 & is still in existence. Commander of Div. is not yet appointed.
Staff	Wu-chang		
1st Inf. Brigade (Nan Yuan-chao)	"		The 1st Brig. is formed of the 1st & 2nd Regts. of the Provincial Guard; 2nd Brig. is formed of 3rd & 4th Regts. of same guard.
1st Inf. Regt.	"		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt.	Yi-chang		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Brigade (Ying T'ung-yu)	Wu-chang		
3rd Inf. Regt.	"		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		Special kinds of troops are not yet formed.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
11th Inf. Div. (the former 1st Chiang-nan Div.)			Took its name from the 1st Chiang-nan Div. on the 10th of Apr. 1915; in Jan. 1916 was called 9th Division.
9th Infantry Div.			Took its name from the 11th Div. on Jan. 13, 1916. When its Commander, Li T'un-tsai declared independence during latter part of 1917, the Div. was abolished, but soon after its 17th Brig. took again the side of the Government and formed the 17th & 18th Mixed Brigades.
5th Model Inf. Regt.			Took the name of 5th Regt. of the 3rd Hupeh Mixed Brigade.
3rd Hupeh Mixed Brigade. (Lu Chin-shan) Staff	Hsin-ti	7.9 mm Mauser rifle of yr. 1888.	Began to be formed during end of 1914;
5th Inf. Regt. (Hsun Tai-p'ei)			The 5th Regt. is formed of the 5th model Inf. Regt.
1st ying	Hsian-yan		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
6th Inf. Regt. (Lu Chun-yi)	Faag-ch'eng		The 6th was again formed of recruits of Anhuei and Honan provinces.
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
~~Inf~~ Artillery ying (Chang Yü-p'eng)	"	4 Krupp guns 75 mm; 5 Fld. guns, 53 mm; 3 mount. guns, 53 mm; 6 mount guns, mm 12 cm; 6 mach. guns, 7,9 mm, Krupp model.	
Engineer Company	Hsian-yang		
Transport "	"		
Mach. gun "	"		
4th Hupeh Mixed Brigade (Liu-Tso-lung) Staff	Te-an		Took its name Jan. 3, 1918 from 2nd Brig. of 1st old Hupeh Division.
7th Inf. Regt. (Li Sheng-mei)			
1st ying	Fang-hsian		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Ying-ch'eng		
8th Inf. Regt. (Hsieh-chao)			
1st ying	Fang-hsian		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd ying 3rd ying	Huan-chou Yan-hsian		
Artillery ying (Tao)	Te-an		
Cavalry ying (Chou-fu-t'ang)	Hsian-ning		Formed of the cavalry ying of the old 1st Hupeh Div.
2 squadrons			
Engineer ying (Chi Chin-ping) 1 company	Yun-meng		Formed of recruits of Hupeh Province.
Transport ying (Liu Che-chi) 1 company.	Wu-chang.		Formed of the transport ying of the old 1st Hupeh Div.
Machine Gun Company	Fang-hsian	6 m. guns; Krupp model; made at the Hanyan factory	Formed of recruits of Hupeh Prov.
Tu-chün Wei-tui (Guard of the tu-chün) 1 Inf. Regiment 3 yings	Wu-chang	7,9 mm Mauser rifle - yr. 1888.	Its formation was begun in April 1916. Formerly there were two Inf. yings, then one more ying was formed of a Brig. of the 2nd Div. There are 500 men in a ying.
Hu-wei-chün (Guard troops)		7,9 mm Mauser rifle - yr. 1888.	These troops (5 yings) were formed during first part of 1916. In Mar. 1917 they helped to complete the 3rd Div. and the Chihli Mixed Brigade.
Hsiun-chi-tui of the Hankou cheng-shou-shi. 1st ying 2nd ying 3rd ying	 Yi-chang Han-kou "		Formerly these troops were called "yu-chi-tui" and there were only two yings. Later 3 new yings, called "yu-chi-tui" were formed, and the old two took the name of "hsien-chi-tui", Later one more ying was added to them.
Yu-chi-tui 1st ying 2nd ying 3rd ying	 Erh-chou " Fang-hsian	7.9 mm Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Formed of recruits during latter part of 1918.
Cheng-chi-tui (Scout detach.) 1 Inf. ying	Fang-hsian		Formed in the middle of 1918 of recruits of the Hupeh Province.
Hupeh hsüeh-ping ying. (Hupeh model Batt.) 400 men	Wu-chan	Japanese 6,5 mm guns; 30th year of Michi	Serves as model battalion to the troops of the Hupeh lu-chün. It has the following detachments.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			1) Infantry, composed of 3 Commanders - 360 men. 2) Cavalry. 3) Artillery. 4) Engineers. 5) Transport - 120 men.
Chiao-lian-ying (instructor ying)		7,9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888.	It serves as model battalion to the Hupeh troops.
1st Command (300 men)	Hsian-ho		
2nd Command (800 men)	Wu-chang.		
Hun-ch'eng-t'uan (Mixed Regt.)	Hankow	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Depends on the Hankou cheng-shou-shi.
1st Inf. ying	"		
2nd Inf. ying	"		
3rd Inf. ying	"		
1 Squadron Cav.	"		
1 Battery.	"	3 Field guns, 75 mm, 3 mount. guns, 53 mm. of the Hanyan factory.	
Engineer Co.	"		
Mach.gun Co.	"		
Sub Sheng-fang-chun (Troops of the Provincial Grd.)		7,9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888.	These Regts. were formed of the Honan troops that arrived at Hupeh during 3rd revolution and of the Hupeh chin-pei-tui. They were at first composed of 6 Regts., the 1st & 2nd Regt. helped in the formation of the 1st Brig. of the 1st Hupeh Div.; the 3rd & 4th Regts. formed the 2nd Brig. of the same Div. The 5th & 6th Regiments remained. During latter part of 1918 the two Regts. were again formed, which later formed the 21st Mixed Brig. It is intended to reorganize the 5th & 6th Regts. into the 5th Hupeh Mixed Brig.
5th Inf. Regt.	Wu-chang.		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Han-kow		
6th Inf. Regt.	Yi-chang		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Cavalry ying	Wu-chang		
Transport ying (12 companies)	Hankow.		
Pei-fu-t'uan. (Guard troops of the Hsian-yun- cheng-shou-shi).			Formed of recruits of Shantung in December 1918.
1st ying	Erh-chou		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Fang-hsian		
4th ying	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Troops of the Hsiun-fang-tui type			
Troops Chin-pei-tui 5 companies.	Dispersed in the whole province to fight the Brigands.		Depend on the Governor. At first there were 6 yings. 4 more yings were formed in April 1917. At the end of same year regiments were formed of the provincial guard. 5 companies then remained.
Pao-an-tui or Hsiun-chi-tui (Guard Detachmnt) 1 Inf. ying	Wuchang	7,9mm Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Was formed to keep order in the province. In 1 ying are 4 companies, 154 men in each company.
Troops from other Provinces.			
2nd Inf. Div. (Wang Chang-yuan) staff	Wuchang	7,9 mm Mauser rifle - year 1888; made at Hanyang factory.	Arrived from the North during latter part of 1915.
3rd Inf. Brigade (Liu Ting-cheng)	Han-yang		
5th Inf. Regt. (Fang Shou-cheng)	Wuchang		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Hanyan		
6th Inf. Regt. (Kuan Chi-yan)	Wuchang		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
4th Inf. Brig. (Chu T'ing-ts'an)			
7th Inf. Regt. (Meng Chao-yueh)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
8th Inf. Regiment (Mu En-tang)	Yi-chang		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Cav. Regt. (Nan-Yuan-chao)	Wuchang		The 1st ying has not arrived from the North; in 2nd ying 2 squadrons are missing.
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd Artillery Regt. (Pang Te-chuan)	Wuchang	12 Field guns 75 mm; 6 mountlguns, 75 mm; 6 mount. guns, 53 mm; 6 guns, 12 cm.	1 Battery is left in the 3rd ying as the 7th & 8th Brigades went into the formation of the 13th Mixed Brigade.
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	Hanyan		
3rd ying	Wuchang		
2nd Engineer ying (Wang Lan-jui) 4 companies	"		
2nd Transport ying (Kaiu Te-hsian) 4 companies	Hankou "		
Mach.gun ying 4 companies	Attached to the regiments	32 mach.guns.	
Attached to the Divisions.			
Model ying(hsuch-ping-ying).	Wuchang		
Attached to the model ying: pu-chung-tui(reserve) 800 men	"		
13th Reserve Inf. Regiment attached to the 2nd Div.			Completed the 8th Regt.of the 2nd North Div.
The Brigade added to the 2nd Div.			During the early part of 1918 it was intended to enlist 10 yings in Shantung to form a police detachment. But only 6 yings were enlisted. They formed a brigade & were added to the 2nd Div. In 1918 3 yings helped to complete the 2nd Div. & 3 other yings partly were disbanded and partly formed the 3rd ying of the tu-chün guard.
8th Infantry Div. (Wang Yu-hsian) staff	Hankow	7,9 mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Formed in 1913.
15th Inf. Brig. (Wang Yu-chin)	"		Arrived from the North latter Part of 1917.
29th Inf. Regt. (Lian Te-sheng)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
16th Inf. Brig. (Chang Chiu-chin)	"		30th & 32nd Inf.Regts.went to the North.
31st Inf. Regt. (Liu Yu-jung)			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st ying	Hankow		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
8th Cavalry Regt. (Yang Chin-pu) 4 squadrons	"		There are 4 squadrons in a Cavalry Regiment.
8th Artillery Regt. (Hsun Shu-lin)		36 mount.guns; 75 mm. Krupp model; made in Shanghai arsenal; 18 Field guns.	
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
8th Engineer ying (Liu Ming) 4 companies	"		
8th Transport ying; 4 Cos.	"		
Mach.gun ~~xxx~~ ying 4 companies.	In the Regts.	16 mach.guns	
Attached to the Division.			
Pu-chung-tui Regt. (Reserve)	Hankow		
17th Inf. Div. (Chang Fu-chu) Staff	Chin-chou		Div.was formed early part of 1918 of 2nd old Hunan Div.& transferred to Hupeh latter part of 1918.
33rd Inf. Brig. (Chu Chiu-huang)			
65th Inf. Regt. (Chou Chung-yao)	"		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
66th Inf. Regt. (Mao Shu-chun)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying			
34th Inf. Brig. (Chu Tse-huang)			
67th Inf. Regt. (Mao Chu-chun)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
68th Inf. Regt. (Chou Chun-yao)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
17th Art. Regt. (Chao Meng-yan) 2 yings	Chinchow		
Mach. gun ying (Chang Chi-chuan) 4 companies	Attached to the Regiments		
18th Inf. Div. (Wang Hou-shang) Staff	Hankow	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle, year 1888.	Formed in October 1917 of the 6th Mixed Brigade.
35th Inf. Brig. ( )			
69th Inf. Regt.			
1st ying			
2nd ying	Yi-chang	?	
3rd ying	P'u-chi		
70th Inf. Regt. (Chang Yun-ming)			
1st ying	Yeh-shan-kuan		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
36th Inf. Brig. (Liu Hsi-kuan)	Sha-shi		
71st Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
72nd Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
18 Cavalry Regt. 1 ying	Hsian-feng		
18th Art. Regt.			
1st ying	Wuchang	38 Field guns & 18 mount. guns; Krupp model; of the Hanyan factory	
2nd ying	Yi-chang		
3rd ying	"		
18th Engineer ying; 4 Companies	Hsian-feng		
18th Transport ying; 4 Companies	"		
2 Mach. gun Cos.	Wuchang	8 mach. guns	
Mixed Brigade of the Northern Troops. (Liu Yueh-lung) Staff	Yi-chang.	6.8 mm Mauser rifle - year 1913; made at Hanyan factory.	Formed in 1914 of 2nd Mukden Mixed Brigade.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Inf. Regt. (Chao Fu-chiao)			
1st ying	Chia-yü		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Liu Chang-piao)			
1st ying	Ta-yeh		
2nd ying	Chung-yang		
3rd ying	Chia-yü		
Cavalry ying (Liu Chang-ling)			
2 squadrons	Chia-yü		
Art. ying (Li Huang-shang)			
Engineer company	Hankow		
Transport Co.	"		
Mach.gun Co.	"	4 mach. guns	
6th Mixed Brigade			Was formed in Oct.1917 and called the 18th Inf. Div.
13th Mixed Brig. (Li Ping-chin) Staff	Wuchang		Formed ofparts of 1st & 2nd North Divisions & was despatche under the name of 1st Temporary Mixed Brigade to Szechuan; there it was called 13th Mixed Brig. Came from Szechuan latter part of 1916.
25th Inf. ying (Yan T'ien-chu)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
26th Inf. ying (Chang P'ei-yü)			
1st ying	Hankow		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Artillery ying (Li Yü-sheng)			
2 Batteries	"	12 mount.guns	
2 Cav.squadrons	"		
2 Mach.gun Cos.	"	8 mach.guns	
17th Mix. Brig. (Ch'ang Lian-sheng) Staff	Wuchang	7,9 mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888.	
1st Inf. Regt. (Wang Chun-chuan)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Liu Weng-jui)			
1st ying	"		There is no information about special kinds of troops.
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
18th Mixed Brig. (Kao Feng-hua)			
Staff	Hankow	x 7.9 mm Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Was formed of 17th Brig. of 9th Div. during early part of 1918.
1st Inf. Regt. (Hsun Chian-yeh)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. ( )			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Artillery ying (Yu Hsiao-ch'ung)			
21st Mixed Brig.			
Staff	Wuchang	7.9mm Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Formed in Oct. 1918 of Regts. of Provincial Guard.
41st Inf. Regt. (Kao Feng-chih)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	Kuang-huao		
3rd ying	Wuchang		
42nd Inf. Regt. (Yen Ch'eng-chang)			
1st ying	Ku-cheng		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Chah-shan		
Cavalry ying	Han-yan		
Artillery ying 3 Batteries	"	6 Field guns, 75 mm; Krupp model, 4 Fld. guns, 53 mm. & 5 mount. guns, 75 mm.	
Engineer Company	Yun-hsian		
Transport "	Chuh-shan		
Mach. Gun "	"	6 Krupp mach. guns, made at Hanyan factory.	
4th Mukden Mixed Brigade. (Wang Liang-cheng)			
Staff	Yi-cheng		
7th Inf. Regt.	"		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
8th Inf. Regt.	"		
1st ying	"		There is no information about special kinds of troops.
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Pei-Yan 2nd Mixed Regt.			Arrived from the north.
Staff	Wuchang		
1st ying	Puchi		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Mach.gun company	"		
HUNAN PROVINCE			
Tuchun -(Commander of the troops) - Chang Chin -Yao.			
Sheng-chang:(Governor) - T'an Yan-k'ai.			
Chen-shou-shi (Military Commander of the district).			
1. Ling-lin - Liu Chian-Fang			
2. Chang-pao - T'ien Shu-Hsiun.			
3. Chang-Li - Wang Ch'eng-Ya			
4. Hsian-hsi - Feng:Yu-Hsian.			
5. Yo-Yan - Wu Hsin-T'ien.			
6. Hsian-pei - Tao Yung-Hsin.			
I. Stationary Troops.			
1 Lu-chun troops.			
1st Hunan Div. (Yu Hsu-pin)	In the northern part of the Province.	7,9 mm.Mauser rifle of year 1888.	By the end of the 3rd revolution there were 4 Divisions in Hunan prov. At the end of 1916 the 1st Hunan Div.was formed of the 2nd & 4th Divisions,and the 2nd Hunan Div. of the 1st & 3rd Divisions. In July 1918 the 5th Mixed Brig.was formed of the 1st Inf.Brig. It is not known whether the 1st Inf.Brig.is restored.
2nd Inf. Brig. (Ling Hsiu-mei)			
3rd Inf. Regt. (Hsun Ho-chin) 3 yings.			
4th Inf. Regt. (Yao Chia-tung) 3 yings.			
Mach. gun ying. (Chen Fan) 4 companies.			The 1st Art. Regt.was disbanded during latter part of Sept.1917 on account of its riot.
2nd Hunan Div.			Was formed during latter part of 1916 of 1st & 3rd Hunan Div. In the beginning of 1918 it was called the 17th Inf.Div.stationed in Hupeh.
2nd Hunan Div. (Yu Tse-hung) Staff	Yo-chou		Began to be formed in April 1918 of stationary Hunan troops enlisted during the revolution.
3rd Inf. Brig. (Chung)	"		
5th Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks.
6th Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	Yo-chou		There is no information about special kinds of troops.
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
4th Inf. Brig. (Yao)			
7th Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
8th Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
1st Hunan Mixed Brigade.			This Brigade was formed in 1914 of model yings (mo-fang-tui) and was completed with recruits from Honan, Chihli & Shantung. During 3rd Revolution 1 part of these troops deserted from Hunan with the Chian-chün T'ang Hsian-ming; another part entered the service of Hupeh troops. This Brigade was again formed in 1918 of 42nd Regt. of 2nd Div.
(Chang Chin-t'ang)			
Staff	Chang-sha.		
1st Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Ko Lian-feng)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Cavalry ying (Chang P'ing-wei)			
Artillery ying (Lian Chun-p'n)	"		
2nd Hunan Mixed Brig.			According to information of the agent for commissions, this Brig. is formed, but there is no other information regarding it.
2. Troops of the type Hsiun-fang-tui.			These troops before the 3rd revolution were formed of the troops shou-pio-tui and lu-ying in the quantity of 32 yings. When in July 1915 the office of Ling-lin-chen-shou-shi was established, they were put under his supervision. During latter part of 1917 12 yings were chosen amongst them and served in the formation of the 3rd detachmnt. of new troops, shou-pei-tui; the others were disbanded.
Troops Shou-pei-tui. (old)			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Troops Shou-pei-tui. (new).			Formed during latter part of 1917.
(Guard troops).			
1st Detachment (Wu Kuch-chun) 6 yings	Changhsa and neighborhood.		1st and 2nd detachments are dependent on the Chang-yueh chen-shou-shi. 1st Detach. is formed of troops of the old 2nd Hunan Div. 3 yings of the 2nd Detach. of the Regt. of the 7th Brig. of the old 4th Hunan Div., and 2 yings of troops of the Railway Guard. 3rd Detach is formed of shou-pei-tui of the Ling-lin Chen-shou-shi & is dependent on him. 4th Detach. is formed of 6th. Brig. of old 3rd Hunan Div. & is dependent on the Hsien-nan chen-shou-shi.
2nd Detachment (Chou-Wei) 5 yings.	Pao-Chin and neighborhood		
3rd Detachment (Chin Heng) 12 yings	Heng-chou and neighborhood.		
4th Detachment (Chou Tyu-fang) 6 yings.	Feng-huang & neighborhood.		
Railway Guard			There were formerly 4 yings of Railway Guard troops. They were formed in 1915 of recruits. In Apr. 1917 2 yings were disbanded; the other two entered in the 2nd detachment of troops shou-pei-tui.
Troops hsiun-fang-tui			Enlisted in Apr. 1916 among the nations of Hunan and serve as police troops.
1st Inf. ying	Hsiun-ying		
2nd " "	Ning-hsian		
3rd " "	Hsian-hsian		
4th " "	Hsian-t'an		
5th " "	Li-ling.		
6th " "	Liu-yang.		
River Troops.			
Flotilla "Hsuan-fang"			Each ying has 20 battle junks with 12 sailors in ea. It is intended to disband these troops.
Middle ying	Changsha.		
Rear ying	Hsian-tan.		
Front ying	Lichou		
Left ying	Anhsian		
Right ying	Yi-hsian		
Flotilla "Fei-hang"			
Middle ying	Sheng-ho		
Front ying	Hsian-ying		
Left ying	Chang-te		
Right ying	Nanchou		
Rear ying	Yuan-chian.		
Flotilla "Chang-sheng" 2 yings	Cheng-hsi & Huang-chou		
Flotilla "Cheng-hsian" 2 yings			Heng-shui & Yo-chou.
Flotilla "Yao-yuan" 2 yings			Lin-hsian & Han-chou.

Name of troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
II - Troops despatched from other Provinces.			
3rd Mix.Inf.Div. (Ma Fei-ru) Staff	Heng-yang	7.9mm Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Arrived from the north during latter part of 1917.
5th Inf. Brig. (Chang Kuah-yan)	"		
9th Inf. Regt. (Kung Shou-hsin)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
10th Inf. Regt. (Ying Weng-hao)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
6th Inf. Brig. (Chang Fu-lai)			
11th Inf. Regt. (Cheng Chin-yuan)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
12th Inf. Regt. (Tung Chang-ko)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
3rd Cav. Regt. (Wang Chi-kuei)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
3rd Art. Regt. (Wang Yun-chung)		18 Field guns 18 Mount.guns 75 mm.	
1st ying	Heng-yang		
2nd ying			3rd ying is in the North.
3rd Engineer ying (Lu Yang-hao) 4 companies	Heng-yang		
3rd Transport ying (Niu Hsian-cheng) 4 companies	"		
Mach.gun ying 4 companies	Attached to the regiments	16 mach.guns	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Equipment Station	Equipment	Remarks
Attached to the Div. 5 Regts."pu-chung-tui" (Reserve).			
7th Inf. Div. (Chang Chih-yao) staff	Chu-chou	6.5 mm rifle 30th year of Meichi	Formed in Oct.1914 of the 3rd Mixed Brig. Arrived from the north in ~~1916~~ 1917.
13th Inf. Brig. (Chang Hsian-yu)	"		
25th Inf. Regt. (Wei Ming-shang)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
26th Inf. Regt. (Liu Chao-cheng)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
14th Inf. Brig. (Wu Hsin-t'ien)			
27th Inf. Regt. (Li Cha'ng-ming)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
28th Inf. Regt. (Liu Pao-shan)			
1st ying	Chu-chou		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
7th Cav. Regt. (Feng Chang-yuan)			1st & 2nd yings are in the north.
3rd ying	"		
7th Art. Regt. (Chang Chin-yü)			
1st ying	"	36 mount.guns and 18 Field guns.	
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
7th Engineer ying (Wang Chi-ying)			
4 companies	"		
7th Transport ying (Wang Hsi-p'ing)			
4 companies.	"		
Mach.gun ying 4 companies Attached to the Div. 4 Regts."pu-chung-tui" (Reserve)	Attached to the Regiments	— 16 mach.guns	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
4th Inf Div. (Li Wei-Yuan)		7.9 mm Mauser rifle - year 1888; made at Hanyan factory	In Hupeh Prov.; took its name from 1st Chiang-nan Div.; In Jan.1916 the Div.was called the 9th Div. The present 2nd Div.arrived from the north in 1917.
Staff	Yo-chou		
21st Inf. Brig. (Chang Lun-huang)			
41st Inf. Regt. (Wei Hsui-t'un)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
22nd Inf. Brig. (Chou Yin-jen)			The 42nd Inf. Regt.during the latter part of 1918 formed the 1st Hunan Mixed Brigade.
43rd Inf. Regt. (Wang Yin-t'ang)			
1st ying	Yo-chou		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
44th Inf. Regt. (Wei Ch'ing-ho)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
11th Cav. Regt. (Chao Weng-chuan)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
11th Art. Regt. (Li Shi-pai)		36 Field guns; 75 mm., of Krupp; 18 mount.guns, 57 mm., of Krupp, made at Hanyan factory.	
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Mach.gun ying	"	16 mach.guns	Engineer and Transport yings are in the north.
20th Inf. Div. (Fang Ko-chang)		6.8 mm.rifle of the Hanyan factory.	Arrived from the North during latter part of 1917.
Staff	Yo-chou		
39th Inf. Brig. (Chang Chi)	Hsin-chian		
77th Inf. Regt. (Wang Yung-shou)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
78th Inf. Regt. (Shi Shao-ming)			
1st ying	Hsian-yin		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
40th Inf. Brig. (Kuan Chi-fa)	Fo-chou		
79th Inf. Regt. (Kai Ssu-hsin)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
80th Inf. Regt. (P'eng Shu-t'ing)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
20th Cav. Regt. (Wang Tao-ts'ai)			2 Cav.yings, 2 Art.yings, Engineer and Transport yings have gone to the north.
1 ying	"		
20th Art. Regt. (Chou Tyu-ying)			
1 ying	"		
Mach.gun ying 3 companies	Attached to the 1st three Regiments.		1 mach.gun company has gone to the North.
Attached to the Division: 2 yings "pu-chung-tui" (Reserve)			
o.k. 1st Mukden Division.			Formed during the middle of 1918 of the old 1st & 2nd Mukden Mixed Brigades, that came from the North. They kept their name in the DIVISion.
(Chang Ching-hui) Staff	Heng-shan		
1st Mixed Brig. (Tsou Feng)	Chi-yang		
	"		
1st Inf. Regt.	"		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Mixed Brig. (Kan Chao-hsi)	Hsian-tan		
3rd Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
4th Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
1st temporary Mukden Mixed Brigade			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
5th Mixed Brig. (Hsiung Hsun-tang)			Formed of the old 3rd Hunan Mixed Brig. in September 1918.
Staff	Changsha.		
1st Inf. Regt. (Chao Yu-chuh)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Kuan Wen-po)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		There is no information about special kinds of troops.
5th Mixed Brigade. (Chu Tse-huang)			
Staff	Heng-shan	7,9mm Mauser rifle - of year 1888.	The first formation was in Aug.1914 in Chiang-hsi of Chihli Mixed Brigade; in Aug. 1916 it was developed into the 15th Div. The second formation was in Chihli where it was developed into the 9th Div. in July 1918.
1st Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt.	Heng-shan		Was formed in July 1918 in Hunan of the 1st Brig. of the 1st Hunan Div.
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Cav. ying (Chu Lin-shu)	"		
Art. ying (Yu Hsiun-ch'iang)	"		
6th Mixed Brig. (Chang Tung-chang)			The first formation was in Hupeh in Aug.1914 of the Reserve Brig. of the 2nd Div.; in Nov.1917 it was developed into the 18th Div. The second formation was in Chiang-hsu Prov. in Feb.1918, of 3 yings of the Chiang-hsu "yu-chi-tui", and of the 147th Inf. Regt. of the 74th Mixed Brig. Arrived at Hunan during middle of 1918.
Staff	Yo-chou		
1st Inf. Regt. (Tung)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Wang Wan-ching)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"	18 guns	
Artillery ying			
Squadron of Cav.	"		
Engineer ying 2 companies			
Transport ying 2 companies	"		
Mach.gun company	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
16th Mixed Brig. (Fang Yu-hsian) Staff	Chang-sha	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle of the Hanyan factory	Formed of 14th Brig. of the former X 7th Div. in Sept. 1914. Arrived from the North during latter part of 1913.
1st Inf. Regt. (Hsu Hsin-chin)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Chang Chi-ch'ien)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Cavalry ying			
Artillery Regt. (Lu Chun-lin)		18 mount. guns and 18 field guns.	
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
Mach. gun ying 4 companies	"	8 Maxim mach. guns & 8 Hotchkiss mach. guns.	
OK 1st Chihli Mixed Brig. (Tseng Cheng-pin) Staff	Yochou	7.9mm. Mauser rifle, year 1888; made at the Hanyan factory	Formed in March 1917 of the reserve Brig. of the 3rd Div. Arrived from the north in during first part of 1918.
1st Inf. Regt. (Kung Hang-chih)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Yan Chih-t'ang)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
1st Cav. ying (Yü Mao-tê)			
1st Art. ying (Yang Pao-chün)		18 Krupp Field guns, 75 mm.	
2 Mach. gun Cos.	Attached to the Regiments	8 Maxim mach. guns.	
OK 2nd Chihli Mix. Brigade (Hsiao Yao-nan) Staff	Changsha.	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle	Arrived from the north in 1918.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
5th Inf. Regt. (Ts'ai Tsui-weng)	Changsha		
1st ying	Changsha		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
6th Inf. Regt. (Cheng Ts-ling)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
3rd Art. ying (Hsun Cheng-chun)	"	18 Grusen 57 mm. guns.	
3rd Cav. ying	"		
2 Machine gun companies	Attached to the Regiments	8 Maxim mach. guns.	
1st Kuang-hsi Division. (Lu Ts-luang)	In southern part of Hunan Province.	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle, year 1888.	This Div. arrived at Hunan under the name of 1st Army of Kuang-hsi troops to help Hunan in its fight with the North.
1st Inf. Brigade (Ching Pu-chu)			
1st Inf. Regt. (Pen Ke-chao) 3 yings.			
2nd Inf. Regt. (Cheng Hun-pei) 3 yings.			
2nd Inf. Brigade. (Mo Yung-hsin)			
3rd Inf. Regt. (Liu Ping-yü) 3 yings.			
4th Inf. Regt. (Liu Cheng-huang) 3 yings.			
1st Cav. Regt. (Hsüan Tsung-hui) 3 yings.			
1st Art. Regt. (Chao Yao-shan) 1 ying.			
1st Transport ying; 4 companies			
1st Engineer ying; 4 companies			
2 Machine gun companies.			

ANHUI PROVINCE

Tuchün - (Commander of the troops) - Ni Ssu-Ch'ung.

Sheng-chang (Civil Governor) - "

Chen-shou-shi (Military Commander of the district).

1. Yüan-pei - - -Ying Kung-Hsian.
2. Yüan-nan - - -Ma Lian-Chia.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
I. Stationary Troops.			
II Lu-chün Troops.			
1st Anhwei Div.			Formed in March 1913 of the 1st and 2nd united Brigades. Was disbanded in May 1915 on account of its unfaithfulness.
Model ying	An-ch'ing		Formed of the best men of the River and land police;400 men.
II Troops of the "Hsiun-fang-tui": An-wu-chün(troops of the Gen. Ni Ssu-ch'ung)	type	7,9mm.Mauser rifle and carab.,1888 yr.	The origin of the troops "an-wu-chun" is as follows: During the 1st Revolution, Yüan-Shi-Kai having been appointed Hukuang General Gov. formed the rear detachment of the Hupeh hsiun-fang-tui, which was soon after called the "wu-wei-yu-chün, and divided it into 2 wings (left - "tso-yi"and right - "yu-yi") Tuan Chi-jui was appointed Commander of one of these wings;that wing was later called "kung-wei-chün". Ni Ssu-ch'ung was appointed Commander of the other wing. With this wing which kept the name of "wu-wei-yu-chün",Ni Ssuch'ung during the revolution passed to Anhui Prov. where on June 18,1914, he was appointed Anhui tu-chün; Jan. 6th,1915 the title "an-wu" was granted to him. From this time the troops took the name of "an-wu-chün".
Staff	An-ch'ing.		
Guard Detachment of the tu-chün Ni Ssu-ch'ung formed of troops "an-wu-chün". (Commander Ni Tsao-ch'ung nephew of Ni Ssu-ch'ung).			
1 Inf. ying	An-ch'ing.		
1 squadron	"		
1st Detachment (Ma Liangchia)			
1st ying	Ning-ko		
2nd ying	Huei-chou		
3rd ying	Peng-p'u.		
4th ying	"		
5th ying	"		
2nd Detachment (Li Ch'ung-yeh) 5 yings.	Peng-p'u.		
3rd Detachment (Kao Cheng-sheng)	In northern part of Anhui		
4th Detachment (Ni Yü-feng)	Peng-p'u.		
5th Detachment (Ch'iu Chang-huei)	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
6th Detachment (Ch'ang Tyu-liang)			
1st ying	An-ch'ing		
2nd ying	Wu-hu		
3rd ying	P'eng-p'u.		
4th ying	"		
5th ying	Wu-hu.		
7th Detachment (Li Peng-shun) 5 yings	An-ch'ing		
8th Detachment (Shi Hsing-shen) 5 yings.	"		
Cavalry ying 2 squadrons	Peng-p'u.		
Artillery ying 2 batteries	An-ch'ing	18 mount.guns	
1 Transport ying (Chai Cheng-te)	Peng-p'u.		
2 Mach.gun Coe.	"		
Musical Band.	"		
Gendarmery ~~xxx~~ squadron.	"		
2 Model yings (hsuah-pin-ying)	"		
Troops hsin-an-wu-chün. (New "an-wu-chün" troops). (Li Chuan-yeh) 15 yings.			These troops were formerly called "ting-wu-chün" and were commanded by Gen. Ch'ang Hsuen. After the attempt to restore monarchy in China which was unsuccessful, his troops were partly disbanded, partly put into the dependence of Ni Ssu-ch'ung and took the name of "new troops" "an-wu-chün". Their organization is unknown.

4 KIANGSU PROVINCE

Tu-chün (Commander of the troops) - Li Ch'un.

Shang-chang (Civil Governor) - Chi Yao-Lin.

Fu-chün-shi (Military Commander of the District) - Lu Yung-Hsian.

Chen-shou-shi (Military Commander of the district).

1. Chiang-ning - Ch'eng Yao Yuan.
2. Hsü -chou - "
3. T'ung-hai - Chang Yan-Kuei.
4. Huai-yan - Ma Yü-Jen.
5. Hai-chou - Yan Ch'un-P'u.
6. Hsu-chang - Chu Hsi.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
I. Stationary Troops			
1. Lu-chün Troops			
2nd Kiangsu Div. (Chu Hsi) Staff	Suchou	7,9 mm Mauser	Formed in Aug.1913 of the 1st Su-chou Brig.of the Chiang-ning Inf.Regt. and other troops of the Yuchou District. The Div.is not complete; in some yings there are only 3 companies - ineach company 72 men. The explanation of this is that the Div.began to be disbanded, but later the disbanding was stopped on account of the dissention between the North and South.
3rd Inf. Brig. (Chang Ting-hsiun)	T'ung-chou		
5th Inf. Regt. (Chang P'ang-nian)			
1st ying	Su-chou		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
6th Inf. Regt. (T'sao Chi-cheng)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
4th Inf. Brig. (Su Ch'un	Chuan-sha-t'ing (Hsun-chiang neighborhood).		
7th Inf. Regt. (Tung Chi-chuan)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
8th Inf. Regt. (Tung Yeh-shu)			
1st ying	Su-chou		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Cavalry ying	Feng-hsian (Hsun-chiang) neighborhood.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Artillery ying (Wang Shao-cheng)	Feng-hsian (Sung-chiang) (neighborhood)	12 Krupp mount guns, 75 mm.	There is only 2 batteries in an Artillery ying.
2nd Engineer ying; 2 Companies	Chuan-sha-t'ing.		
2nd Transport ying; 2 Companies	"		
Mach.gun company	"	6 machine guns	
~~4th Chiang-su Division.~~ (Yang Chun-p'u) Staff	Cheng-chiang	7,9 mm.Mauser rifle- year 1888.	Formed in Apr.1914. Of the 73rd & 75th Regt.of this Brig. with the artillery was formed a temperary Mixed Brigade which was sent to help Kiangsi in 1918.
37th Inf. Brig. (Lu Wang-hsu)			
73rd Inf. Regt.	Kiangsi Prov.		
74th Inf. Regt. (Chang Chin-ao)			
1st ying	Cheng-chiang		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
38th Inf. Brig. (Temp.Comm. Yang)			
75th Inf. Regt.	Kiangsi Prov.		
76th Inf. Regt. (Wu-shi-fang)			
1st ying	Cheng-chiang		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
~~kk~~ 19th Cav. Regt. (Chou Liang-ts'ai) 2 squadrons.			
19th Art. Regt.	Kiangsi Prov.		
Engineer Company	Cheng-chiang		
Transport comp.	"		
~~74th Mixed Brig.~~ (. . . . . .) Staff	Hsü-chou	7,9 mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Formed of the 3rd Kiangsu Div. in Nov.~~1918~~ 1913.
147th Inf. Regt. (Ku Cheng-ko)			The former 147th Inf.Regt. served to form the 6th Mixed Brig.of Kiangsu troops. The new Regiment was formed in Aug.1918 of Kiangsu fortress Regt.
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
148th Inf. Regt. (Ying)			
1st ying	Hsü-chou		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Artillery ying 2 Batteries.	"	18 mount.guns	1 Art.Battery and 1 Cav.squadron went to the formation of the 6th Mixed Brigade.
Mixed Engineer Transport ying.			
2 Engineer comp.	"		
2 Transport "	"		
Mach.gun comp.	"	4 Marin mach. guns.	1 Mach.gun company served to form the 6th Mixed Brigade.
75th Mixed Brig.			Formed in May 1913 of the old 11th and 12th Div. that remained in Kiangsu. In May 1916 it joined the side of the revolutionists when the independence of the fort "Chiang-yin" was declared, and disbanded during the first part of June. One ying which remained loyal was sent to the 76th Mixed Brigade.
~~76th Mixed Brig. (Chang Teng-kuei)~~ Staff.	Yang-chou	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Formed in Nov.1913 of the 16th Inf.Regt.of the 4th Div.which remained in Kiangsu.
151st Inf. Regt. (Cheng Chao-feng)			
1st ying	Shao-po-cheng		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Shi-t'a-ssu.		
152nd Inf.Regt. (Ku T'ing-fang)	Yang-chou.		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
3 Ying of the 75th Mixed Brig.	"		
Artillery Battery	"	6 guns	
Cavalry squadron	"		
Engineer comp.	"		
Transport comp.	"		
2 Mach.gun comp.	"	12 mach.guns.	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Chiang-su Mixed Brigade. (Hsu Ping-yen)		7.9 mm. Mauser rifle - 1888 year.	Formed in April 1916 of "yu-chi-tui" and different Ching-hua troops.
Staff	Chang-chou neighborhood.		
1st Inf. Regt. (Yu Heng-kuan)	Ching-chiang-pu.		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	Cheng-chiang		
3rd ying	Ching-chiang-pu.		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Ma Yu -Kuai)	P'ukow.		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Yan"ch'eng, Huai-an neighborhood.		
3rd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.			There is no information about the 3rd Regt., but it appears that it exists because Commanders of the 3rd Regt. were officially appointed.
2 Transport comp.	Cheng-chiang-pu.		
Mach. gun comp.	Pukow.		
2nd Kiangsu Mix. Brigade.	Nanking.		Began to be formed in July 1918 of recruits.
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	"		
1st Mixed Brig. "pu-chung-tui" of the Kiangsu lu-chun.			Formed of recuits during 1918.
1st Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	Yang-chou		
2nd ying	Nanking.		
3rd ying	Yang-chou		
2nd Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Nanking.		
Artillery ying	Yangchou		
2 mach. gun comp.	Cheng-chiang and Yang-chou.		
2nd Mixed Brig. "pu-chung-tui" of the Kiangsu lu-chun.		Guns of different systems of old models.	Formed during latter part of 1918 of recruits of Chihli Prov.
1st Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	Nanking		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	Nanking		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
3rd Mixed Brig. "Pu-chüan-tui" of the Kiangsu Troops.	"		Formed during latter part of 1918 of recruits of Kiangsu Prov.
1st Inf. Regt.	"		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Kiangsu "chiao-lian-tui". (Kiangsu instructor command). Company (140-150 men).	"		Formed during latter part of 1918 of soldiers of the "lu-chün" troops of the Kiangsu Prov.
Kiangsu "yao-sai pu-ping ti-yi-lü" (1st Brig. of the Kiangsu fortress Infantry).			Helped to form the 147th Regt. of the 74th Mixed Brig. in August 1918.
Tu-chün wei-tui (Personal guard of the Kiangsu tu-chün). 1 ying.	Nanking.	Japanese 6,5 mm. rifle - 30th year of Meichi.	Arrived with the new tu-chün Li Chun from Kiangsu Prov.
Troops of the type "hsün-fang-tui":			
Yings on the Huai river to catch the contrabandeists of salt. (Liang-huai chi-ssu-ying).			
18 Inf. yings.	In the salt places of districts. Shi-erhpyü Yang-chou Hai-chou Tai-chou		
Guard Detachment of the Hsü-chou tao-yin. 1 Inf. ying	Hsü-chou		There are 300 men in the ying.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Guard Detachment of the Hsui-an tao-yin. 1 Inf. ying	Hsui-an		500 men in the ying.
River troops of the Hsui-chou district.			
Flotilla of the lake T'ai-hu. (Tai-hu shoui-shi) 4 Inf. yings.	T'aihu Lake	4 gun boats.	
Flotilla of speedy boats. (Pei-hua shuei-shi) 4 Inf. yings.	Stationed on the rivers and lakes of the Province.	4 small steam transport boats.	
Flotilla of the interior water-ways. (Nei-ho shuei-shi) 4 Inf. yings.	"	4 gun boats.	
Flotilla of the river Sung-chiang (Sung-chiang shuei-shi) 5 Inf. yings.	By the river Sung-chiang	6 gun boats.	
Shanghai Guard Flotilla (Hu-fang-shuei-shi). 3 Inf. yings.	Shanghai neighborhood	4 steam transport boats.	
River Troops of ~~Kiangsuei~~ Chiang-pei district. (Chian-pei hu-ho ~~heiwuchuei~~). 3 Inf. yings.	By the rivers & lakes of the Prov.	2 gun boats.	
Troops "ching-pei-tui". (guard)			Depend on the Governor. There are 4 companies in a ying; in a comp. 4 platoons - 30 men in each, but in reality there are only 20 men.
1st Inf. Regt. (Yu Yu-fu)	Ch'ang-chou.		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
4th ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Cheng Yu-ch'eng)	Nanking		
5th ying	"		
6th ying	"		
7th ying	"		
8th ying	T'ung-chou		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Troops "hsun-chi-tui" (police) (Ku Kuai-hsiang)			Formed on account of unsettled conditions during the latter part of Apr. 1916 of recruits of Anhui and Kiangsu Provinces. - In a ying there are 300 men.
1st ying	Yang-chou		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Troops "yu-chi-tui".			Helped in the formation of the 6th Kiangsu Mixed Brigade in Feb. 1918.
Troops "ting-wu-chün" (formerly troops of Chang Hsun).			At the present time it is impossible to say anything definite about these troops because some divisions that took a part in the restoration of the monarchy were disbanded; some deserted; the remaining troops depend on the Anhui tu-chün, but their number is not known.
II. Troops detailed from other provinces.			
Guard Division.			This Div. in July 1917 got the name of "hsuan-wei-chü"- Guard of the Feng Ko-chang, and on the 31st Aug. was called the 16th Div.
4th Inf. Div. (Yang Shan-te)			Formed in 1913 of the 2nd Army of Hsü Pao-shan - 11th and 12th Divisions.
15th Inf. Regt. (Lui Yun-sheng)	Hsun-chiang		
1st ying	"		Other parts of the 4th Div. were sent to Che-chiang Prov. in Dec. 1916 when its commander was appointed to the post of Che-chiang tu-chün.
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
Mach. gun comp.			
6th Inf. Div. (Wei Hsieh-yuan)		6,5 mm. rifle - 30th year of Meichi.	Formed during first part of 1915 in Kiangsi Prov. Came from that Prov. in 1917 when Li Chun was appointed to the post of Kiangsu tu-chün.
Staff	Nanking.		
11th Inf. Brig. (Ch'ang Chung-ho)			
21st Inf. Regt. (Lei Feng-hsui)	"		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	Hsui-chou		
3rd ying	"		
22nd Inf. Regt. (Pi Hua-tung)	Nanking.		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
12th Inf. Brig. (Kung Pang-tye)	"		
23rd Inf. Regt. (Wu Heng-tsan)			
1st ying, 2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks.
24th Inf. Regt. (Shao Chun-lin)			
1st ying			
2nd ying			
3rd ying	Pu-cheng.		
6th Art. Regt. (Wang Chi-feng)	Nanking	18 mount.guns & 36 Field guns, 75 mm, Schneider-Creusot.	
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
6th Cav. Regt.	"		
1st ying	"		2nd and 3rd yings are in Chihli.
6th Engineer ying (Pan Tyu-han)			
4 companies.	"		
6th Transport ying (Fu Hsian-t'ai)			
2 companies	Ta-sheng-kuan		
1 company	Chiang-p'u-chen.		
1 company	Pukow.		
Mach.gun ying 4 companies.	Attached to the Regts.		
10th Inf. Div. (Lu Yang-hsian)		7,9 mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Arrived from Chihli Prov. in Dec.1915 with its Commander who was appointed Shanghai "Wu-hsung hu-chun-shi".
Staff.	Lung-hua (Shanghai).		
19th Inf. Brig. (Wang Pin)	Arsenal.		
37th Inf. Regt. (Chen Shao-chun)			
1st ying	Cha-pei (Shanghai).		
2nd ying	Pu-tung (").		
3rd ying	Arsenal(at the bridge of St. Catherine).		
38th Inf. Brig. (Yung Tao-yi)	Wu-hsung (fort Nan-shi-t'ai).		
39th Inf. Regt. (Chang Mu-han)	Lung-hua		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
40th Inf. Regt. (Chu Sheng-kuan)	Wu-hsung (fort Nan-shi-t'ai).		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Fort Shi-tyu-ling.		

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Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
10th Cav. Regt. (Chang Tsung-yao) 2nd ying	Fort Shi-tyn-ling.		
10th Art. Regt. (Chang Ch'eng-lin)	By the bridge of St. Catherine.	36 Krupp Fld. guns, 75 mm. and 18 mount. guns, 57 mm.	
1st ying	Arsenal by the bridge.		
2nd ying			
3rd ying	Fort Nan-shi-t'ai.		
10th Engineer ying. 4 companies.	Arsenal.		
10th Transport ying. (Li Kuei-shan) 4 companies.	Lung-hua.		Completed Nov.26th with recruits from the north.
Mach.gun ~~xx~~ ying ~~xxx~~ 2 companies.	Arsenal	16 mach.guns.	
1 company	Lung-hua.		
1 company	Fort Nan-shi-t'ai.		
Independent Regt. (Chang Ch'ang-lin) 3 yings.	On the forts Wu-sung.		Formed in July 1917. Entered in the 10th Div.
1st Mixed Brig.			Went to Shantung.
5th Mixed Brig.			Was developed into the 15th Div. in Aug.1916.
15th Inf. Div.			Went to Chihli.
OK 16th Inf. Div. (Chang Ting-chen) Staff.	Peking.	Japanese rifle 6,5 mm.;30th year of Meichi.	Formed of the former guard Div in Aug.1917.
31st Inf. Brig. (Kuang Chung-ho)	Pukow		
61st Inf. Regt. (Fu Chun-en) 3 yings.	"		62nd and 63rd Inf.Regts.went to the north.
32nd Inf. Brig. (T'ien Hsian-chang)			
64th Inf. Regt. (Lui Hsi-lin) 3 yings.	"		
16th Cav. Regt. (Wu Chin-sheng) 2 yings.	"		2 yings are stationed in the North.
16th Art. Regt. (Feng Chin-hu) 2nd ying.		18 Fld.guns, 75 mm. of Krisk	1st & 3rd yings are in the north.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
16th Engineer ying (Wang Hsi-kuang) 2 companies.	Pukow		2 Engineer companies are in the north.
16th Transport ying. (Chang Chi-hsin) 2 companies.	"		2 Transport companies are in the north.
2 Mach.gun comp.	"	12 mach.guns.	2 Mach.gun companies are in the north.

KIANGSI PROVINCE.

Tu-chün (Commander of the Troops) - Chen Kuang-Yuan.

Sheng-chang (Governor) - Chi Yang.

Chen-shou-shi (Military Commander of the District).

1. Kung-Hsi - Fang Yen-Piao.
2. Kung-pei - Wu Chin-Piao.
3. Kung-nan - Wu Kung-Cheng.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks.
I. Stationary Troops.			
1. Lu-chün Troops.			
1st Kiangsi Div. (. . . . .) Staff.	Kiukiang		Formed on the 2nd of April 1917.
1st Inf. Brig. (Fu Ke-mao)			
1st Inf. Regt. (Liu Ta-t'ing). 3 yings.	P'ing-hsiang. "		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Wan T'ing-nan) 3 yings.	Lian-hua. "		
2nd Inf. Brig. (Chen K'un-pei)			
3rd Inf. Regt. (. . . . .) 3 yings.	Lung-nan.		
4th Inf. Regt. (. . . . .) 3 yings.	Ta-yü-ling. "		There is no ifnormation concerning the special kinds of troops.
3rd Mixed Brig. (Chen Kuang-kuei, brother of the Kiangsi tu-chün, Chen). Staff.	Kan-chou.	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888; made at Hanyan factory.	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Inf. Regt.	Kanchou		
1st ying	Kanchou		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Lo Te-sheng)	Hsin-feng.		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying.	"		
Artillery ying	"	18 Krupp, 75 mm. Mount. guns	
Troops of the Provincial Guard (Liang-shang-fang-t'uan).		7,9 mm. Mauser rifle, year 1888.	
1st Inf. Regt. (Liu Ting-kuei)	P'ing-hsiang		
1st ying			
2nd ying	Yi-feng.		
3rd ying	Lian-hua.	P	
2nd Inf. Regt. (Hsung Huan-ts'ai)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
3rd Inf. Regt. (. . . . .)	Chiang-nan.		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Ting-nan.		
4th Inf. Regt. (Hsiu Shi-fa)			
1st ying	Kiukiang		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
1st Art. ying 2 Batteries.	P'ing-hsiang	Gruson mount. guns.	The former 5th Inf. Regt. is disbanded.
1 Mach. Gun comp.	"		
2. Troops of the type "Hsiun-lang-tui"			
Ching-pei-tui. (Chang Tsung-liang)		7,9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888.	The formation began in May 1915 when the 1st ying was formed. By the 1st of Jan. 1916 there were 5 yings, but after mutiny in these troops, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th yings were disbanded. During the latter part of the last year they were again formed of natives of Honan. There are 300 men in a ying.
1st ying	Nan-ch'ang.		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Chiu-chiang		
4th ying	Ching-te-chen.		
5th ying	Kan-nan.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Wei-tui of the Nan-chang. (Guard Detach.) 1 Inf.ying 1 Cav.squadron.	Nan-ch'ang		
Old troops of Gen. Ts'ai Sheng.			These troops served to fill complete the troops of the Provincial Guard.
Yu-chi-tui 20 yings.	In the whole Province.		Yings Nos.11 to 20 are formed of the old 3rd Kiangsi Div.
Chiang-fang-tui. (River Guard) 10 yings.	By the rivers of the Prov.		
II. - Troops detailed from other Provinces.			
6th Inf. Div.			Went to Kiangsi Prov. during first part of 1915.
9th Mixed Brig. (Ting Hsiao-lan) Staff	Kan-chou.	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888;	
1st Inf. Regt. (Chao Hsueh-tao) 1st ying	"		
2nd ying	Yao-chou		
3rd ying	Wuchung		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Ma Meng-hsiang)	Yi-chun (of Yuan-chou district)		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
1st Art. ying. (Chang Yu-hsiun) 1 Battery	Kan-chou	6 mount.guns.	
1 Engineer ying (Chu T'ai-meng) 1 company	Kan-chou		
1 Transport ying (Wang Chang-feng) 1 company	Nan-ch'ang.		
2 Mach.gun comp.	Kan-chou	8 mach.guns.	
12th Inf. Div. (Chen Kuang-yuan) Staff.	Nan-chan	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888; made at Hanyan fact.	Arrived from the north during the latter part of 1917.
23rd Inf. Brig. (Liu Chi-yuan) Staff.	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
45th Inf. Brig. (Chang Chi-tye) 3 yings.	Nan-chan		
46th Inf. Regt. (Ch'eng Kuang-kuei) 3 yings.	Chi-an.		
24th Inf. Brig. (Tuah Chao-lin) Staff.	Nan-ch'ang.		
47th Inf. Regt. (Wang Wei-cheng) 3 yings.	"		
48th Inf. Regt. (Hsui Teng-chao) 3 yings.	"		
12th Art. Regt. (Ch'eng Pao-tsung) Staff.	Chiu-chiang	In the 1st ying - 18 Krupp, 75 mm. Fld. guns. In 2nd and 3rd yings - 36 mount. guns, 75 mm.	
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	Nan-ch'ang		
3rd ying	"		
12th Cav. Regt.			As yet there are no horses in the Cavalry Regiment. Rifles are of the Infantry model.
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Feng-ch'eng		
12th Engineer ying. (Li En-jung)			
1 company.	Chi-an.		
3 companies.	Nan-ch'ang.		
12th Transport ying.			
1 company	Chi-an.		
3 companies	Nan-ch'ang.		
2 mach. gun companies.	Attached to the 47th & 48th Regts.		
Temporary Mixed Brig. formed of the [illegible] remaining troops of the 19th Chiang-su [illegible] (Yang Ch'un-p'u)			A temporary Division - taken from the 19th Division to help Chiang-hsi. The Commander of the Brigade is the Commander of the 19th Division.
73rd Inf. Regt. (Kao Pao-heng) 3 yings.	Chi-an.		
	"		
75th Inf. Regt. (Chang Hsin-hso) 3 yings.	Chi-an.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Artillery ying (Yang Li-yan) 4 batteries.	Chi-an.	24 mount. guns.	

CHEKIANG PROVINCE.

Tu-chün -(Commander of the troops) - Yang Shan-Te.

Sheng-chang (Governor) - Chi Yueh-Shan.

Chen-shou-shi (Military Commander of the District) -

1. Chia-hu - - - Wang Kuei-Lin.
2. Ning-t'ai - - Ho Feng-Lin.

I. Stationary Troops.			
1. Lu-chün troops.			
6th Chekiang Div.			Formed during latter part of 1919. In Aug. 1916 was called 1st Chekiang Div.
1st Chekiang Div.	Sent to Fu-chiang.	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Took its name in Aug. 1916 from the ex-6th Chekiang Div. Went to Fu-chiang Prov. in 1918.
49th Mixed Brig.			Was formed in Aug. 1914; in May 1916 was developed into the 25th Div.
25th Field Div.			Developed from 49th Mixed Brig. in May 1916; in Aug. took the name of 2nd Chekiang Div.
2nd Chekiang Div. (Chang Chiang-yang) Staff	Hankow	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Took its name in Aug. 1916 from 25th Inf. Div.
3rd Inf. Brig. (Yeh Huang-hua) Staff.	Ning-po		
5th Inf. Regt. (Liu Ping-shu) Staff	"		
1st ying	Cheng-hai.		
2nd ying	Ning-po		
3rd ying	"		
6th Inf. Regt. (Shang Kao-ti) 3 yings.	Shao-hsing		
4th Inf. Brig. (Pan Ko-kang) Staff.	Hangkow.		
7th Inf. Regt. (Tung Yung-hsiung) Staff.	Yü-yao (Shao-hsung) (vicinity.)		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st ying	Yan-chou		
2nd ying	Yü-yao		
3rd ying	"		
8th Inf. Regt. (Shi Ch'ang-cheng)			
Staff	Hankow		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	Wan-chou		
3rd ying	Hankow		
Reserve troops of the 2nd Chekiang Div.			These Regts. consisted of 3 yings and were counted in the 25th. Inf. Div. The 1st & 2nd yings were later called the Reserve Chekiang Brigade,- May 1916; the 3rd ying went to complete the Chekiang Mixed Brigade in Aug. 1916.
Reserve Chekiang Brigade.			Developed from the 1st & 2nd yings of Reserve troops of the 2nd Chekiang Div. in May 1916; in Aug. 1916 it was called the Chekiang Mixed Brigade.
Chekiang Mixed Brigade.			Took its name in Aug. 1916 from the Reserve Chekiang Brigade. The 3rd ying of the Reserve troops of the 2nd Chekiang Prov. was used in its formation. During the first part of 1918 ~~Developed~~ it was developed into the 1st and 2nd Mixed Brigades. The Commander of the 1st Regt. was appointed Commander of the 1st Brigade; the Commander of the 2nd Regt. was appointed Commander of the 2nd Brigade.
1st Chekiang Mixed Brigade. (Chen Chiang) Staff	Hangkow		Developed during the first part of 1918 from the Chekiang Mixed Brigade.
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings	"		
2nd Chekiang Mixed Brigade (Cheng Ping-yung) Staff	Hankow		Developed during first part of 1918 from the Chekiang Mixed Brigade.
3rd Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings	"		
4th Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Hotel ying (500 men).	Hankow		
Gendarmie ying (Pao Huan-ch'eng)			
Staff	"		
4 squadrons	"		
II. Troops of the type "hsiun-fang-tui".			
T'ai-chou yu-chi-tui.			Took the name of Hang-chou yu-chi-tui.
Hang-kow yu-chi-tui			
7 Inf. yings	Hankow		Depend on the Governor.
Troops ching-pei-tui.			Formerly there were 4 sections ;In July 1916 they were developed into 6 sections. Depend on the Governor. In each section the yings are numbered from 1st to 6th.
1st Section (Cheng Pu-t'ang) 6 yings	Hankow		
2nd Section (Chang Yin-keng) 6 yings.	Chu-chou		
3rd Section (Shang Yung-ching) 6 yings.	Ning-po and Shao-hsing.		
4th Section (Huang Chikiang 6 yings.	T'ai-chou		
5th Section (Mei Chan-kuei) 6 yings	Ch'u-chou		
6th Section (Tai-Yen) 6 yings.	Wen-chou		
Troops ching-chi-tui			This organization is unknown. They have the character of troops of the Inner Guard of the Province.
32 yings	In the whole province		
Ching-hai pao-tui-ying. (Fortress) 1 ying	On the Ching-hai fortifications.		500 men.
Wei-tui Regt. (Guard) (Chou Chin-cheng) 3 yings.	Guards the district Hsun-chiang		Was formed of recruits in during first part of 1918.
II. Troops detailed from other provinces.			
4th Inf. Div. (Yang Shan-te) Staff	Hankow	Japanese 6,5 mm. rifle - 30th year of Meichi.	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
			Was sent at first from Chihli Prov. to Kiangsu prov.; in Dec. 1916 it was sent from Kiangsu to Chekiang prov., when its Commander was appointed Chekiang tu-chün.
7th Inf. Brig. (Ch'eng Cheng-jen) Staff.	Hankow		
13th Inf. Regt. (Fang Hsian-chung) 3 yings.	"		The 13th Inf. Regt. was changed into the personal guard of the tu-chün. It has been decided to enlist a new Regt. from the recruits of Chihli and Shantung provinces.
14th Inf. Regt. (Hsiao Chao-ling) 3 yings.	"		
15th Inf. Regt.	Kiangsu Prov.		
16th Inf. Regt. (Wang Ming-ke) 3 yings.	Hankow		
4th Cav. Regt. (Kao Tsai-t'ein) 1st ying	"		2nd and 3rd yings are in the north.
4th Art. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.		36 Arisak 75 mm. Field guns and 12 Arisak 75 mm mount. guns.	
4th Engineer ying? (Wang K'ang) 4 companies.	"		
4th Transport ying. (Wang En-yan) 4 companies.	"		
Mach. gun ying 3 companies	Attached to the Regiments	18 mach. guns	
Attached to the Division: 1st Regt. pu-ch'ung-tui (Reserve).			
1st ying	Hsung-chiang		
2nd ying	Chiang-chiao		
3rd ying	Hangkow		

FUKIEN PROVINCE

Tu-chün (Commander of the troops) - Li Hou-Chi.

Sh'ang-chang(Civil Governor) - "

Chen-shou-shi (Military Commander of the District).

1. Hsia-men - T'ang Ko-Mou.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
I. Stationary Troops.			
II. Lu-chün Troops.			
1st Fukien Mixed Brigade.			Formed during latter part of 1916 of recruits from Chihli Prov.; in May 1918 it was developed into the 1st Fukien Div.
1st Fukien Div. (. . . . .) Staff.	Fu-chou	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888.	The Div. was developed in May 1918 from the 1st Fukien Mixed Brigade.
1st Inf. Brigade (Yao Chien-p'ing) Staff.	Huai-an.		
1st Inf. Regt. (Hsung Yün-hsi) 3 yings.	"		1st and 2nd Regts. were formed of Regts. of the 1st Fukien Mixed Brigade; the 3rd & 4th of campaign commands (Shu-hsung-tui).
2nd Inf. Regt. (Chang Ching-ju) 3 yings.	Chuan-chou		
2nd Inf. Brig. (Shen Yung-fu) Staff.	Fuchow		
3rd Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	"		
4th Inf. Regt. (.. .....) 3 yings.	"		
Artillery Regt. 3 yings.	"		
Cavalry Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	Fuchow.		
Engineer ying. (.....) 4 companies.	"		
Transport ying (.....) 4 companies	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Mach.gun ying. (.....) 4 companies.	Fuchow		
Reserve yings. (Pu-ch'ung-tui) are attached to the Division.			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
4th ying	"		
5th ying	Ma-chiang		
6th ying	Nan-t'ai.		
Reserve yings of Fukien troops. (pu-ch'ung-tui)			50 yings were formed in 1918. 24 yings served to form 8 reserve regiments (pu-ch'ung-t'uan); 6 yings entered in the 1st Fukien Div.; 8 yings in the 10th Mixed Brigade; 10 yings in the 14th Mixed Brig. and 2 yings composed the Guard Detachment attached to the tu-chün administration.
Pu-ch'ung-t'uan (Reserve Regts.) Staff.	Amoy.	7,9 mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888 and Japanese 6,5 mm. rifle - 30th year of Meichi	The Regts.were formed in 1918 of recruits. These Regts. fought against the Southerners. After the battle of Chüan-chou, the 3rd Regt. deserted, the 7th surrendered to the Southern troops and only 1 ying remained of the 8th.
1st Inf. Regt. (Wang Ke-t'i) 2 yings.	Nan-an "		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Wang Wen-tsao) 3 yings.	Yung-an "		
4th Inf. Regt. (Ken Te-tsai) 3 yings.	Lio-hsian "		
5th Inf. Regt. (Shi Shu-nian) 3 yings.	Amoy		
6th Inf. Regt. (. . . . .) 3 yings.	Feng-shuei-kuan. "		
8th Inf. Regt. (Wang Shu-lin) 1 ying.			
2nd Fukien Mixed Brigade. (Wang Chi) Staff	Fuchow	7,9 mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Formed in 1917 of 27th Fukien Mixed Brigade.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Inf. Regt. (Shing Ke)	Yu-hsi		
1st ying	"		2nd and 3rd yings came to the side of the Southerners.
2nd Inf. Regt. (Sheng Ke-ko)	Yan-p'ing		
3 yings	"		
Artillery ying (Wang Sheng)	Yu-hsi	18 mount.guns	Q
3 batteries	"		
Engineer company (Ling Wen-ying)	"		
Transport company	"		
2 mach.gun companies.	Attached to the Regts.		
II. Troops of the type "hsiun-fang-tui".			
Troops "ching-pei-tui". (Hsui Shao-an) Staff	Fuchow		Formed of troops "hsiun-fang-tui and yu-chi-tui during the latter part of 1914; were composed of 11 yings divided into 4 detachments. In Aug.1915 it was reorganized into 4 Inf. Regts. In 1918 the 2nd & 4th Regts.came back to the side of the Southerners.
1st Inf. Regt. (Chang Tsu-yan) 3 yings.	Ch'uan-chou		
	"		
3rd Inf. Regt. (Hsui Ching-ju) 3 yings.	Yung-fu.		
	"		
Troops "chi-sou-tui". (Salt Guard).		P	Formed during the latter part of 1916; were formerly composed of 2 yings, and in 1917 increased to 5 yings. During the first part of 1918 developed into the Fukien Brig.of troops that catch the contrabandits of salt.
Fukien Brigade (yan-chi tui" (To guardthe salt) (Yan Chi-sheng) Staff	Fu-chow		Developed during the beginning of 1918 from troops "chi-ssu-tui (Salt Guard). Formerly was composed of 2 Regts.; the 2nd Regt.dispersed after the defeat it suffered from the Southerners.
1st Inf. Regt. (Liu Huei) 3 yings.	Located in the maritime cities near the salt factories.		
River Police ying of the river Min-chiang (Chang)	By the river Min-chiang.		Formed in September 1914 of old troops "yu-chi-tui and consisted at first of 3 yings that were reorganized into 2 yings in 1918.
1 ying on lower part of river Min-chiang (Ma Pao-yung)	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Wei-tui of the tu-chün (Escort Detachment). 2 yings.	Fuchow		The escort detachment was formed in 1918 of reserve (pu-ch'ung-tui) yings.
II. Troops detailed from other Provinces.			
10th Mixed Brig.			Formed in 1914 of the 14th Regt. of the 4th North Division and 5th Infantry Regt. "pu-ch'eng-tui of the 4th Div. Was called 1st Mixed Brig. in 1918.
Reserve yings (pu-ch'ung-tui) attached to the 10th Mix. Brigade.			8 Reserve yings were attached to the 10th Mixed Brigade during the first part of 1918. After the defeat a part of them were dispersed; special parts of the 1st Mixed Brig. were formed with the others.
1st Mixed Brig. (Ma Wei-hsian) Staff	Ch'ang-t'ing	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888.	1st formed in Kiangsu Prov. in ~~July~~ Aug. 1914 of the 10th Brig of the 5th Div. In Aug. 1915 went to Shantung and there during the latter part of 1917 was developed into the 1st temporary Shantung Div. 2nd formation began during latter part of 1918 of the ~~1st~~ 10th Mixed Brigade.
1st Inf. Regt. (. . . . .) 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Hsin Kuei-fang) 3 yings.	Yung-ling.		Special divisions of troops of the 10th Mixed Brigade during their fight with the South were disbanded. They are again formed for the 1st Mixed Brigade of surplus troops of reserve yings which were attached to the 10th Mixed Brigade.
	"		
19th Mixed Brig.			It took its name during the first part of 1916 from the 7th Brigade of the 4th North Division; in June 1916 it took the name of 14th Mixed Brigade.
14th Mixed Brig. (Tsang Chi-p'ing) Staff.	Amoy		1st formation in Sept. 1914 of a part of the 9th Div. in Shansi; in Aug. 1915 took the name of 2nd Shansi Mixed Regt. 2nd formation in Fukien Prov. June 1916 of the 19th Inf. Brig. of the 10th Div. that took its name from the 7th Brig. of the 4th Div.
1st Inf. Regt. (Kao Chuan-chung) 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Cheng Wen-hsiun) 3 yings.	"		
Artillery ying (Cheng Fang-jui)	"	Mount. guns	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks.
1 Engineer comp.	Amoy		
2 Mach.gun comp.	Attached to the Regiments	12 mach.guns.	
Reserve yings (pu-ch'ung-tui) attached to the Brigade. 10 yings.			Formed in 1918 of recruits.
9th Inf. Div. (Wei Tsung-k'ang)			1st formation in Shansi of the 1st Shansi Div. In Aug. 1914 it was ~~remained~~ renamed 12 and 15th Mixed Brigades.
Staff.	Fu-chow		
37th Inf. Regt. (Keng Hsi-lin) 3 yings.	"		2nd formation in Honan Prov. of the 1st Honan Div., Sept. 1914. In June 1915 was renamed 1st & 2nd Honan Mixed Brigades.
	"		
Artillery Battery.	"	6 mount.guns	3rd formation in Hupeh of 2nd Inf.Div., Jan.1916. In Dec. 1917 in consequence of the declaration of its independence, it was abolished. The 17th Brig.was transformed into the 17th Mixed Brigade; the 18th into the 18th Mixed Brigade.
Mach. Gun Company.	"		
Cheng-wu-chun (Lung Yung-t'ien)	Amoy	6,5 mm.Jap. rifle - 30th year of Meichi	This Regt.consists of 3 yings formed by Lung Chi-kuang in Chihli Prov. Arrived at Fukien Prov.in Aug.1918.
1st Inf. Regt. (Cheng Wen-huei) 3 yings	"		
	"		
1st Che-chiang Div. (Tung Pao-hsuan)		7,9 mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Took its name in Aug.1916 from the former 6th Chekiang Div. Arrived in Fukien Prov.in 1918.
Staff.	"		
1st Inf. Brigade (Li Wei-chang)			1st Inf.Regt.with 1 battery and 1 mach.gun comp.in 1918 joined the forces of the Southern troops where it was reorganized into the 1st Chekiang Brig. There are 2 1st Chekiang Brigades now, one in Kwantung Prov., and the other in Chekiang Prov.
2nd Inf. Regt. (Cheng Fan) 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Brigade (Wu Wen-yuan)	Tung-shan		
3rd Inf. Regt. (Li Chuan-wei) 3 yings.			
4th Inf. Regt. (Shi Ko-chu) 3 yings.			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Cav. Regt. (Yu Hsiang-wen) 1 ying	Tangshan		
1st Art. Regt. (.....) 2 yings.	"	30 mount.guns; 75 mm.	In the 2nd Art.ying one battery is missing.
1st Engineer ying. (Hsui Keng-sheng) 4 companies	"		
1st Transport ying. (Hsui Chen-fang) 4 companies.	"		
Machine gun ying 3 companies	Attached to the Regiments		
II. Troops of the Southern Provinces that are fighting the Fukien troops under the leadership of Chen Chung-ming.			
Kuangtung ching-wei-chün.			
5 yings of Li Ping-jung.			
2 yings Li Tyšu-kao;			
3 yings Hsiung Lio;			
Kwantung troops (chao-chün" 2 old yings Lan Kuei-fan.			The troops are called by the name of the town Ch'ao-chou; they are also called "Ch'ao-chou ching-wei-chün". 4 new yings were formed by Chen Chün-ming.
2 old yings of the Yui-ts'ai.			In Fukien Province in 1918.
2 new yings of Hung.Chao-lin.			
2 new yings of Hsieh Wen-fing.			
Kwantung troops of General Hsui Ch'ung-chih. 10 yings.			These troops were formed by General Hsui Ch'ung-chih by the order of Chen Chün-ming in Kwantung Prov. Formed of recruits during first part of 1918.
Kwantung troops Ching-pei-tui. 4 yings wei-tui of Chen Chün-ming, 2 yings of Hung Chao-lin. 2 yings of Lo Shao-hsiun;			Formed of natives of Kwantung in 1918. 4 yings compose the guard of Chen Chün-ming.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Kwantung troops yu-pei-tui or hsin. ching-pei-tui. (Hsiun Lie) 2 yings.			Were again formed in 1918 and depend on Hsiun Lie who commands 3 yings of ching-wei-chün.
Kwantung troops of Tung-chiang ching-wei-tui. (Lan Kuei-fang) 6 yings.			Formed in October 1918 of natives of Kuangtung to suppress the brigands. They received their name from the district Tung-chiang which they guard.
Kwantung troops xing-chün (militia) 31 yings.			Formed during first part of 1918.
Troops of the Fukien ching-pei-tui.			Joined the side of the Southern troops in 1918.
2nd Inf. Regt. (Fu Kai-ming) 3 yings.			
4th Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.			

All the above mentioned Kwantung troops and the Fukien ching-pei-tui composed one army under the leadership of Chen Chün-ming to fight against Fukien troops.

This army is organized in the following way:

Army opposing Fukien Province.		The equipment of the Army, except 10,000 7,9 mm. Mauser rifles and 6,5 mm. rifles, 30th year of Meichi, taken from the Northern troops, is of old model and different systems; for instance, Japanese rifle, 28th year of Meichi, Japan rifle Murata of 22nd year, even Russian 3 lines rifles are found, but in very poor condition.
Commander of the Army: Chen Chün-ming.		
Commander of the Staff: Teng Keng.		
Staff	Changchou.	
Escort Detachment of Chen Chün-ming:	"	
4 yings of Chen Chün-ming Wei-tui.	"	
2 Mach.gun comp.	"	
Vanguard. (Hsiu Ch'ung-chih)	Hsian-yu.	
~~[illegible]~~ 10 yings of Hsui Ch'ung-chih.	"	
2 new yings of troops "chao-chün" (Hsieh Wen-ping)	Fe-hua	
4th Regt. of Fukien ching-pei-tui	Situated bet. Yung-t'ai and Fukien.	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st ying (P'ao Chih-pin).			
2nd ying (Chu Te-ts'ai).			
3rd ying (Wu Hou-tye).			
Militia: 4 yings (Chao-kuang) 3 yings (Huang Ko-hua). 1 ying (Tu Chi-yang). 1 ying (Ling Li).	P'u-chien neighborhood. Between Yung-t'ai and Pu-chien.		
1 Artillery Batt. 3 mach.gun comp.	P'u-chien. neighborhood.		
Chief forces.			
1st Detachment. (Li Ping-jung) Staff.	Chang-t'ai.		
Troops ching-wei-chün: 3 yings of Li Ping-jung.	Kuan-kou (near Amoy).		
2 yings of Li Ty'u-kuo.	Swatow.		
Troops "ch'ao-chün"			
2 old yings of Chu Yui-chui.	Kuan-kou.		
2 Art.Batteries	Kuan-kou.	8 mount.guns.	
2 Mach.gun comp.	"		
2nd Detachment. (Chiang Chung-li) Staff.	Yui-hsung-kuan.		
3 militia yings.			
3rd Detachment. Lo Shao-hsiung) Staff	Chiao-wei.		
Troops ching-pei-tui.			
2 yings of Lo-Shao-hsiung.	"		
2 militia yings	"		
1 Artillery Batt.	"	4 mount.guns	
1 mach.gun comp.	"	4 mach. guns	
4th Detachment. (Hung Chuo-lin) Staff.	Chang-chou.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Troops "chao-chün" (old ying of Hsieh Wen-ping).	Chang-chou.		
2 new yings of Hung Chao-lin).	Shi-ko-hsiu. (near Amoy).		
Troops ching-pei-tui.			
2 yings Hung Chao-lin.	"		
2 Artillery Batt.	"	8 mount.guns	
1 mach.gun comp.	"	4 mach.guns	
5th Detachment. (Kuan Ko-hsian) Staff	Tung-hou.		
Troops "shing-wei-chün"			
2 yings of Li-Ping-jung.	"		
2 Militia yings.	"		
6th Detachment. (Teng Pen-yin). Staff.	Yü-hsung-kuan; Chang-chou		
3 militia yings.	neighborhood.		
7th Detachment. (Wu Chung-hsin) Staff.	Hsan-cha-ho Chang-chou		
3 militia yings.	neighborhood. "		
1st Reserve Detachment. (Hsiung-Lio)	Huang-p'u.		
Troops "ching-wei-chün."			
3 yings of Hsiung-Lio.	"		
2 yings yü-pei-tui.	"		
2 Art. Batteries	"	8 mount.guns.	
1 mach.gun comp.		4 mach. guns.	
2nd Reserve Detachment. (Hsung Yuan-yuan)	Ch'ao-t'ien-ling (Changchou neighborhood.		
3 militia yings.	"		
Rear Guard.			
3 militia yings. (Chiang Ko-ting)	Wu-p'ing and Shang-ho.		

Name and Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
3 militia yings (Yang Fu-tien).	Yung-ting and P'ing-ho.		
2nd Regt. of the Fukien ching-pei tui.			
1st ying	Ting-chou.		
2nd ying	Lian-ch'eng.		
3rd ying	Lung-yan.		
Tung-chiang ching-wei-tui.			
6 yings.	Wu-p'ing.		

KWANTUNG PROVINCE.

Liang-kuang hsun-yüeh-shi.
(General-Inspector of the provinces Kwangtung and Kwanghsi.

Lu Yung-T'ing. Tu-chün (Commander of the troops) -Mo Yung-Hsin.

Sheng-chang (Governor) Li Yao-Han..

Chen-shou-shi (Military Commander of the District).

1. Kwanghuei - - - -Li Fu Lin.
2. Chao-yang-lo. - -Tsai Wang.
3. Ch'ao-mei - - - - Chen Chiung-Ming.
4. Kao-lai - - - - - Lin Hu.
5. Chiung-yai - - - -Shen Hung-Ying.
6. Chin-lian - - - -Huang Chih-Huang.
7. Ching-chou - - - -Lung Yui-kuang.

I. Stationary Troops.

1. Lu-chün Troops.

1st Kwantung Div. (Chen K'un-pei) Staff.	Canton	6,8 mm. Mauser rifle and carab. made at Canton factory.	Formed in Jan. 1913 of local natives. When Lung Chi-kuang, Inspector of Kwantung Prov. and Kwanghsi Prov. joined the side of the Northern Governor, the Kwantung Tuchün, Lu Yungting, a native of Kwanghsi, who previously had been tuchün of Kwanghsi Prov., fearing that the Kwantung troops would join his troops, changed the Commanding Staff of the Div. by substituting natives of Kwanghsi Prov.
1st Inf. Brigade (P'an Chi-chan) Staff.	"		
1st Inf. Regt. (Men Wei-shan). 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (T'ang T'ing-yü) 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Brigade (Li En-ssu) Staff.	"		
3rd Inf. Regt. (Wang Kuang-tsung) 3 yings.	Shao-chou		
4th Inf. Regt. (Lu Ch'ao-chen) 3 yings.	Canton		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
1st Art. Regt. (Liang Chih-fen) 3 yings.	Canton	36 Krupp, 75 mm. Field guns, and 18 Krupp, 75 mm. mount. guns.	
1st Engineer ying. (Hsiung Shi-hsiu) 4 companies.	Hsiu-shi. Nan-tan.		
1st Transport ying. (Yeh Lui-feng) 4 companies.	Canton.		
2 mach. gun comp.	Attached to the Regiments	12 mach. guns of the type "Rex"; made at the Canton factory.	
Musical Band.	Canton.		
~~2nd Kwangtung Div. (Li Yao-han)~~			1st formation in Jan. 1913 of local natives. Disbanded after the 2nd Revolution. 2nd formation in Apr. 1916 of 15 yings of troops "chao-chün". In view of the deficiency of ~~many~~ money, Li Yao-han asked to disband the division and to form of its men "chao-chi-ching-wei-chün". The division was disbanded in 1918.
~~1st Kwantung Mixed Brigade.~~ (Ma Chi) Staff.	Canton.	6,5 mm. Mauser rifle, year 1910.	Formed ~~in~~ during latter part of 1918 of the Kwantung ching-wei-chün of yings Nos. 3, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 36, 62, 63 and 73.
1st Inf. Regt. (Cheng Tu-ch'un) Staff.	Swatow.		
1st ying	Lei-chou		
2nd ying	Chao-chou		
3rd ying	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Liang Chin-wen) Staff.	Canton.		
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Huei-chou.		
Art. Regt. (T'ien Ch'un-fa) 2 yings.	Canton.	36 guns	
Engineer ying. (Wu Tyu-chen) 4 companies.	"		
Transport ying (Ma T'eng-hsiang) 4 companies.	Swatow.		
Mach. gun ~~comp.~~ command 2 companies	Attached to the regts.	8 mach. guns.	

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd Kwantung Mixed Brigade (Ho-lung-hsin) Staff.	Ch'ang-ti		Formed in 1918 of local natives.
1st Inf. Regt. (Li Pu-cheng) Staff.			
1st ying.	Kuang-yik-shan. (By the station Shi-lung).		
2nd ying.	Po-yung-shan.		
3rd ying	Canton.		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Li Wen-yung) 3 yings.	Canton.		
Artillery Regt. (Wu Tung-chen) 2 yings.	"		
Engineer ying. (Lung Sheng-tsui) 4 companies.	"		
Transport ying. (Ma Yu-hsiang) 4 companies.	"		
Machine gun Command. 2 companies.	Attached to the Regiments	8 mach.guns.	
1st Separate Kwantung Mixed Brigade. (Huang Ming-t'ai)			Formed in May 1916 and disbanded in June 1916. The 9th, 11th and 12th yings Ching-wei-chün are formed of it.
2nd separate Kwantung Mixed Brigade. (Wei Tang-p'ing) Staff.	Chao-ching.		Formed of local garrison yings of the towns Shun-te and Hsiang-shan. 1st Regt. is formed of 2 local yings of Hsiang-shan. 3rd ying is again enlisted. 2nd Regt. is formed of 3 local yings of Shen-te.
1st Inf. Regt. (Wei Tu-wen) 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Ma Yü-fang) 3 yings.	"	6,5 mm. rifle of the Canton factory.	
Fortress Hu-men troops (Hu-men yao-hsai shou-pei-tui). (Kuang En-hsi).			
1 Inf. ying.	Hu-men.		150 men.
II. Troops of the type "hsiun-fang-tui."			
Hai-chou ching-wei-chün. (Guard of the isle Hai-nan). 9 yings.	Hai-chou.	6,5 mm. rifle of the Canton factory.	Was formed of natives of the isle Hai-nan; at first numbered 2 yings; in 1917 increased to 9 yings. Is in the 6th army.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Troops "Chao-chün" (Fu Wang) (His assistant - Ku Yih-Kuang).			First troops "chao-chün", numbering 15 yings, were reformed into the 2nd Kwantung Div. During the 3rd Revolution 18 yings were again formed of local natives. It appears that there are five yings, as the names of the following Commanders are known: Li Ching, Chang-Chung, Chang Chu Ke-yung, Lei-Chang-Kung, Cheng-Chün-ji, Cheng Yuan-yung.
Staff.	Chao-ching.		
1st ying.	"		
2nd ying.	"		
3rd ying.	Hsin-hsei.		
4th ying.	Feng-chuan.		
5th ying.	Kuang-p'ing.		
6th ying.	Chao-ching.		
7th ying.	"		
8th ying.	Hsian-hsing.		
9th ying.	Lo-ting.		
10th ying.	"		
11th ying.	Yü-nan.		
12th ying.	Canton.		
13th ying.	Chao-ching.		
14th ying.	Yang-ch'ung.		
15th ying.	"		
16th ying.	Canton.		
17th ying.	"		
18th ying.	"		
Troops "Chao-chün". 8 yings.	Sent to Fukien Province.		The troops received their name from the town Ch'ao-chou and depend on the Ch'ao-mie chen-shou-shi. At the same time they are called Ch'ao-chou cheng-wei-chün. There were 8 yings at first, but when the chen-shou-shi Mo Ching-tyu declared his independence and was defeated, only 4 yings were left. They are now in Fukien Prov. at the disposal of Chen Chiung-ming. The last formed 4 new yings again in Shan-tou.
Troops Chao-chi-ching-wei-tui. (Guard troops of Chao-yang-lo chen-shou-shi).			17 yings of these troops are formed of the old 2nd Kwant-tung Div.; the 18th ying is formed of the ying of Ning-yang. Railway guard during latter part of 1918.
1st ying	Ho-shan.		
2nd ying	Kao-ming.		
3rd ying	"		
4th ying	Chou-ching.		
5th ying	Kuang-p'ing.		
6th ying	Chou-ching.		
7th ying	Tang-shan.		
8th ying	Hsing-hsing.		
9th ying	Tang-shan.		
10th ying	Lo-ting.		
11th ying	Wu-nan.		
12th ying	Yun-fu.		
13th ying	Yang-chiang		
14th ying	"		
15th ying	"		
16th ying	Chou-ching		
17th ying	"		
18th ying	Kao-yao		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Troops of the General Hsui Ch'ung-chih. 10 yings.	Sent to Fukien Prov.		These troops were formed during the first part of 1918 by the General Hsui Ch'ung-chih by the order of Chen Chün-ming in the limits of Kuangtung Prov. of local natives.
Troops ching-pei-tui. 4 yings. (Guard of Chen Chun-ming) 2 yings. (Hung Chao-lin) 2 yings. (Lo Shao-hsiung)	Sent to Fukien Prov.		Formed of Kwangtung natives in 1918.
Yü-pei-tui or Hsin-ching-pei-tui. (Hsiung Lio) 2 yings.	Sent to Fukien Prov.		Formed of Kwantung natives in 1918.
Tung-chiang-cheng-wei-tui. (Lan K'uei-fang) 6 yings.	Sent to Fukien Prov.		Formed of Kwantung natives in 1918 to suppress the brigands; they are called by the Tung-chiang district which they guard.
Min-chün. (Militia) 31 yings.			Formed during first part of 1918.
Pao-shang wei-lu. (Guard of the Merchants). 2 yings.	Canton.		Formed of the 8th and 75th yings of Ching-wei-chün.
Salt Guard. 1 ying.	Located at sea shore.		Formed of the 35th ying of cheng-pei-tui.
Cheng-wu-chün. 1st Detachment. (Wang Chung-lian) 5 yings.	On the isle Chung-ai.		Formed of the revolutionary troops of General Ts'eng Ch'un-hsuan left by the tu-tu Lung-Chi-Kuang during the latter part of 1918.
2nd Detachment. (Po Huai-an) 5 yings.			It appears that it has been decided to give these troops the organization of lu-chün, as the Commissioner of the Div., Lung Yü-kuang (brother of Lung Chi-kuang), the Commanders of Brigades, Hu Lingshan, P'u To, Li Chin-ping, Ma Chung-fa, Commanders of the Regts., Liang Ching-wen, Na Shun-kung, Wang Chung-tian, Chao Yüeh, Tung Chao and Wa Tung-jeng have already been nominated.
3rd Detachment. (Li Chia-ping). 5 yings.			
4th Detachment. (Na Shun-hung) 5 yings.	Canton.		
5th Detachment (Chao Yüeh) 5 yings.	"		
~~Chi-Ching-pei-chün~~			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Old Ching-wei-chün.		Partly 7.9 mm Mauser rifle-year 1888; partly Jap. rifle, 30th and 20th year of Meichi.	Depend on the tu-chün. Were formerly called Ching-ssi-tui. There are 108 yings in the whole province for the police service. Most of these were gradually disbanded. The yings that remained were called Ching-wei-chün.
Ying No. 4) " " 6) Kuang Ko-hsiung. " " 7 Lao Ko-ts'ai.	Hsei-chou.		
Ying No. 9) " " 12) " " 13) Wei Pang-p'ing. " " 14) " " 18 Cheng Ko-hsüeh.	In the 5th Army. Kao-chou.		Yings Nos. 3,10,11,15,17,24, 25,36,62,63 and 73 served to form the 1st Kwantung Mixed Brigade during the first part of 1918.
Ying No. 19) " " 20) Hu Man-ching. " " 21)	Kao-chou.		Yings Nos. 26,27,28,23,30,31 and 32 served to form the 9th Yün-nan Mixed Brigade.
" " 22) Hsieh Chao. " " 23)			Yings Nos. 8 and 75 were called Pao-shang wei-lu (Merchant Guard), No. 35 - Salt Guard.
" " 37) " " 38) Huang Chih-huan. " " 39)	Chung-chou and Yai-chou.		Yings Nos.1,2,16,33,34,74,97, 98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105, 106,107 and 108 are disbanded.
" " 41) " " 42) Hsiung Lie. " " 50)	In Fukien.		
" " 43) Fang Ming. " " 44)	Chin-chou.		
" " 40) " " 45) Feng " " 46) " " 47)	Hsiang-jung. Chin-hsian Ling-shan and Fang-cheng.		
" " 48) " " 49) Li Ping-jung. " " 76)	In Fukien Province.		
" " 51) " " 52) " " 53) Huang Ho" " " 54) " " 55)	Fo-shan " Hsamhsui. "		Yings Nos. 51-61 depend on Li Fu-lin, Kuang-hsei cheng-shou-shi and by his second hiaroglyph bears also the name of [redacted] "fu-chün".
" " 56) " " 57) Li " " 58)	Hsiung. Hsamhsui.		
" " 59) " " 60) Li Fang. " " 61)			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Ying No. 5) " " 64) Ma Chi " " 65) " " 68)	Canton.		
" " 66) Liu Chih-lu. " " 67)	In the 4th Army.		
" " 1269) " " 70) T'ang Wei-ching.	Lei-chou.		
" " 71) Li Tyu-kao. " " 72)	In Fukien Province.		
New ching-wei-chün. (Chang Chin-fang) 3 yings.	Kao-chou.		
Old yu-chi-tui. (Mo Yung-hsin). Ying No. 1)	Canton	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle, 1888 year.	The whole yu-chi-tui depends on Lu-Yung-t'ing, Inspector of Kwantung and Kwangsi Provinces.
" " 2)	"		
" " 3)	"		
" " 4)	"		
" " 5) Meng	In the 5th Army.		In 1918 eight yings were formed for the police service; by the end of 1918 their number was increased to 63 yings.
" " 6) Yen-	Kao-chou.		
" " 7) chian.	"		
" " 8)	"		
" " 9)	Canton		
" " 10)	In the 5th Army.		There is no information about the yings Nos. 41-50.
Ying No. 11) Teng			There are 300 men in a ying.
" " 12) Wen-	Kao-chou.		
" " 13) huei			
" " 14)			
" " 15)	In the 4th Army.		
" " 16) Liu			
" " 17) Chih-			
" " 18) lu.			
" " 19)	Canton		
" " 20)	"		
" " 21)	"		
" " 22)	"		
" " 23)	Pai-yun-shan.		
" " 24) Shen	Shun-te.		
" " 25)	Canton.		
" " 26) Pao-	Nos. 26 and 30 in 3rd Army.		
" " 27) p'an			
" " 28)	Nos. 27, 28, 29 are in 3rd (4th-?) Army.		
" " 29)			
" " 30)			
" " 31)			
" " 32)			
" " 33)	From No. 31 to No. 39 in 2nd Army.		
" " 34) Lin			
" " 35)			
" " 36) Hsu.			
" " 37)			
" " 38)			
" " 39)			
" " 40)	Kao-chou.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
Ying No.31)	In the 3rd		
" " 32)	Army.		
" " 33) Shan			
" " 34) Hung-			
" " 35) ying.			
" " 36)			
" " 37) Lu			
" " 38) Lan-	T'ai-shan.		
" " 39) ching			
" " 40)	Chin-chou.		
" " 41) Chen	"		
" " 42) Te-	Nos.42 and 43		
" " 43) ch'un	are in 3rd		
	Army.		
New yu-chi-tui. (Huang Chih-huan) 25 yings.	In the Armies		Was formed of old troops of Lung Chi-kuang when the southern troops took Chinag-chou. Yings from No.1 to 5 are in the 2nd Army; from No.6 to 9 in 4th Army; from No.11 to 14
Kuang-tung tu-chün wei-cheng-tui.		7,9 mm. Mauser rifle; made at the Canton factory.	
(Guard of the tu-chün)			All the soldiers were enlisted in Aug.1918 from Kwangsi natives.
(Lu Yih-hsin)			
1st ying.	Canton		
2nd ying.	"		
3rd ying.	"		
4th ying.	"		
2 mach.gun comp.	"		

From the troops "ching-wei-chün", "yu-chi-tui" and 1st Kwantung Mixed Brigade were formed the following armies to fight with the north: The Kwantung tu-chün: Mo Yung-hsin is their commander-in-chief.

Kwantung hu-ko lui-chün.			
(6 Kwantung armies defending the state).			
1st Army.			
(Ma Chi)			Ma Chi is also the commander of the 1st Kwantung Mixed Brigade. He is a native of Kwangsi.
1st Kwantung Mixed Brigade.	On the Hunan Prov. frontier		
2nd Army.			Lin Hu is a native of Kwangsi.
(Lin Hu) Staff.	Canton	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle - year 1888.	The army consists of 3 yings of the old yu-chi-tui from No. 31 to No.33 brought into 3 regiments and 5 yings of the new yu-chi-tui.
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	Tung-wan. "		
2nd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	Canton. "		
3rd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	On the Hunan Prov. frontier		
New yu-chi-tui. (Huang Yeh-hsing)			
1st ying	K'ai-p'ing.		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Ssu-p'ing.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
4th ying	T'ai-shan		
5th ying	Canton		
1 mach.gun comp.			
3rd Army. (Shen Hung-ying) Staff.	Canton	7.9 mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Shen Hung-ying is a native of Hung Kwangsi Prov. The Army is composed of 10 yings of the old and 5 yings of the new yu-chi-tui.
Old yu-chi-tui.			
Ying No. 51	Lian-chou.		
" " 52	Canton		
" " 53	"		
" " 54	Ho-pu		
" " 55	Canton		
" " 56	[illegible]		
	Lian-chiang.		
" " 26	Lian-chou.		
" " 30	Chiun-chou		
" " 62	Chin-chou.		
" " 63	"		
New yu-chi-tui. (Cheng Chi-yu).			
Ying No. 11	Chiun-chou.		
" " 12	"		
" " 13	"		
" " 14	"		
2 Artillery Batt.	Lian-chou.		
2 Mach.gun comp.	Canton.		
4th Army. (Liu Chih-lu)	On the Fukien Prov.frontier	Old rifle of Mauser and Japanese rifle	Liu Chih-lu is a native of Kwangsi Prov. The Army is composed of 5 yings of the old and 4 yings of the new yu-chi-tui, and of 2 yings of the old ching-wei-chün.
Old yu-chi-tui. (Chou Huei-p'u).			
Ying No. 14.			
" " 15.			
" " 16.			
" " 17.			
" " 18.			
New yu-chi-tui.			
Ying No. 6.	On the Fukien Prov.frontier		
" " 7.			
" " 8.			
" " 9.			
Old ching-wei-chün. (Liu Chih-lu).			
Ying No. 66.			
" " 67.			
1 Artillery ying			
2 mach.gun comp.			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
5th Army. (Wei Pang-p'ing)	Canton.		Wei Pang-p'ing is a native of Kwantung Prov. He is the only official (Kwantung official) who has a considerable military force under his command in Canton. He is also the chief of the Canton police.
New yu-chi-tui. (Wang Chen-shen)			
10th ying	Chiang-men.		
15th ying	Canton		
16th ying	"		
17th ying	Chiang-men.		
Old yu-chi-tui.			
5th ying.	Canton.		
10th ying	"		
Old ching-wei-chün.			
9th ying	Shi-lung.		
12th ying	Pao-an.		
13th ying	Canton.		
14th ying	"		
1 Artillery Batt.	"		
1 Mach.gun comp.	"		
6th Army. (Liu Tu-ching)	Canton	7,9 mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Liu Tu-ching is a native of Kwantung Prov. This army was formed during the time of the fighting against Lung Chi-kuang, but was never sent against him and remained all the time in place. It is composed of 6 yings of the new, and 22 yings of the old yu-chi-tui, and of 9 yings of the Hui-chou ching-wei-tui.
New yu-chi-tui. (Wang Mo Cheng)			
18th ying.	"		
19th "	Chiang-men.		
20th "	"		
21st "	Canton.		
22nd "	"		
23rd "	"		
Old yu-chi-tui.			
19th ying.	"		
20th "	"		
Huei-chou ching-wei-chün.			
9 yings.	Huei-chou.		
II. Troops detailed from other Provinces.			
3. ~~Sheng Div.~~ (Li Tieh-pao)		Old Mauser rifle - year 1888, and Japanese Murata rifle, 22nd year.	All the Yunnan troops in Kwantung ~~[illegible]~~ are under the supervision of T'ang Chi-yao, Yunnan tu-chun, General Li Ken-yuan and Li Lieh-chün. The last-named commands all the troops on the frontier of Kwantung and Kiangsi provinces. Misunderstandings frequently occur between them all.
Staff.	Shao-chou.		
5th. Inf. Brig. (Sheng Yung-chi)			
Staff.	"		
31st Inf. Regt. (Yang Wei-liu)			
1st ying	"		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	"		
6th Inf. Brig. (Li Feng-chi)			
Staff.	Nan-hsiung.		

Name of Commanders and Troops	Station	Equipment	Remarks
34th Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	Nan-hsiung.		The 33rd Inf. Regt. was reorganized with a Mixed Brigade. Therefore the Div. has only 3 Inf. Regts.
36th Inf. Regt. (Hsun K'ai-yun) 3 yings.	"		
Art. Regiment. (.....) 2 yings.	"		
2 Cavalry Squadrons.	Shao-chou	Japanese 1 shot carabines.	60 to 70 horses.
1 Mach. Gun Comp.	Attached to the 31st Regt.	4 mach. guns.	
4th Yunnan Div. (Chu Fe-p'ei) Staff	Canton	German rifle-year 1888.	Formed of revolutionary trps. of Li Lieh-chün. All of the officers of this Div. and 3/4 of the soldiers are Kiangsi natives; served before in the lu-chün of this Prov. when Li Lieh-chün was their tu-chün.
7th Inf. Brigade. (The Commander of the Brigade is the Div. Commander.)			
38th Inf. Regt. (Wang Hsueh-chiang) 1st ying	Shi-hsing		
2nd ying	"		
3rd ying	Canton		
41st Inf. Regt. (Tang Ch'eng-t'ao) 3 yings.	"		
2 mach. gun comp.	Attached to the Regiments		
Artillery Regt. (Ho Tyu-chi) 2 yings.	Canton.	Only 6 mount. guns and 2 field guns, but the last are old and useless.	
8th Inf. Brigade. (Wu Liu-jui).			The 8th Brigade was reorganized into a Mixed Brigade. Therefore the 4th Div. has only 1 Brigade.
Yunnan Mixed Brig. (Yang Yi-chien) Staff.	Shao-chou.	Old Mauser rifle.	The Brigade was developed from the 33rd Regt. of the 3rd Yunnan Division.
1st Inf. Regt. (Is commanded by the Commander of the Brigade).			1st Regt. is the former 33rd.
1st ying.	Shao-chou		
2nd ying.	"		
3rd ying.	Yen-hua		
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	Lian-chuu.		The 2nd Regt. has again enlisted.
2 Artillery Batt.	"		
1 Cavalry Squadron	"		Has no horses.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2 Mach.gun comp.	Attached to the Regts.		
Yunnan Mixed Brig. (Wu Liu-jui)			Developed from the 8th Inf. Brig.of the 4th Yunnan Div. and is predestined to fight against Fukien Prov.
Staff.	Huang-kang.		
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	Chao-an		
2nd Brigade Cheng-ko-chun of Yunnan troops. (Lui Chuin-hsieh)			This Brigade was formed by Li Lieh-chun of old Chiang-hsi soldiers of lu-chun, but is regarded as part of the Yunnan troops.
Staff.	Lian-ping.		
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	"		
9th Yunnan Mixed Brigade. (Hsia Shu-t'ang)			The Brig.was formed of troops Kwantung Cheng-wei-chun of yings No.26-32, but bears the name of Yunnan Brigade.
Staff.	Yao-p'ing.		
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	"		
1 Artillery ying 2 Mach.gun comp.	"	8 old mount. guns. 8 old mach. guns.	
Tu-li-t'uan. (Independent Regt. of Yunnan troops) (Wu Shu) Staff.	On the Fukien Prov.frontier	Japanese rifle, 22nd year of Murata.	This Regt.is regarded as a Reserve Regt.of Yunnan troops Formed in 1918 of pu-chung-t'uan of Yunnan troops.
1st ying.			
2nd ying.			
3rd ying.			
Yunnan yu-chi-tui. (Ch'a Ping-huan)		Old rifle of different models.	Formed in Nov.1918 of Kiangsi soldiers under the name of Yunnan yu-chi-tui.
Staff.	Shao-chou		
1st ying.	"		There are 300 men in a ying.
2nd ying.	"		
3rd ying.	Yen-hua.		
1st Mixed Brigade. of Che-chiang troops. (Chen Chao-ying)		Mauser rifle-year 1888 of Canton arsenal.	Formed of the 1st Inf.Regt. of the 1st Chekiang Div. which joined the side of the Southern troops. 1 Battery and 1 Machine gun company also joined the Southern troops at the same time.
Staff.	Huang-kang.		
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	"		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	Huang-kang.		
1 Art. Battery	"		
1 Mach.gun comp.	"		

KWANGSI PROVINCE.

Tu-chün (Commander of the troops) - Tan Hao-Ming.

Sheng-chang (Governor) - Lui Cheng-En.

Chen-shou-shi (Military Commander of the District).

1. Kuei-p'ing. - - - -Wei Yang-Ch'ang.
2. Kuei-lin - - - - - --Lin Chun-Ting.
3. Lung-chou - - - -- Huang Pai-kuei.

I. Stationary Troops.			
1. Lu-chün troops.			
Kuang-hsi Mixed Brigade.			Was formed in May 1913 of trps. "hsiung-fang-tui", and in 1914 developed into the 1st Kwan-tung Div.
1st Kwangsi Div. (Lu Yu-kuang) Staff.	Nan-p'ing. Other parts of Hunan Prov.	7,9 mm.Mauser carabines and rifle - year 1888.	The Div.was developed in 1914 from the Kwangsi Mixed Brigade; in 1917 under the name of 1st Army came to Hunan Prov.to fight with the North. Only the Staff remained in Nan-p'ing.
2nd Kwangsi Div. (T'an Hao-ming) Staff.	Ho-chi.	7,9 mm.Mauser rifle - year 1888.	Formed during the latter part of 1913 of stationary troops "hsiun-fang-tui".
3rd Inf. Brig. (.....) Staff.	Chen-an.		
5th Inf. Regt. (Li Hsiang-lu) 3 yings.	Hsi-lung. "		
6th Inf. Regt. (T'ang Chi-chang) 3 yings.	Kuei-shun. "		
4th Inf. Brig. (Lin Chun-t'eng) Staff.	Kuei-lin.		

No. of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
7th Inf. Regt. (Tseng Kuang-yi) 3 yings.	Hsin-chou. "		
8th Inf. Regt. (Mo Tyu-hsiung) 3 yings.	Liu-chou.		
2nd Cav. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	Tung-t'ing.		
2nd Artillery Regt. (Huang P'ei-kuei) 3 yings.	Ma-kan-shan	Number of guns is not known.	
II. Troops of the type "hsiun-fang-tui".			
Troops "hsiun-fang-tui.			Formerly there were 85 yings of troops "hsiun-fang-tui". During the last revolution 20 yings were called troops "jung-tyu-chün", 50 yings "yu-chi-tui", and 15 were used to complete the lu-chün.
River Troops. 8 Inf. yings.	Stationed along the rivers of the Province.		
Troops "jung-tyu-shün". (Troops of Lu Yung-t'ing). (Cheng Ping-k'un) 20 yings.	Kuei-lin.	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle of years 1888 and 1905.	Formed in 1917 of 20 yings of hsiun-fang-tui. 10 yings are in the 2nd Army.

Name of Troops & Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
troops yu-chi-tui. Distributed 50 yings.	through the whole province	7.9 mm. Mauser rifle - 1888 and 1905 yrs.	Composed in 1917 of 50 yings of troops. Called "hsiun-fang-tui". Yings from Nos. 1 to 12 are in the 3rd Army.
Guard of the Kuei-lin chen-shou-shi. 2 Inf. yings.	Kuei-lin.		These yings are in the 2nd Army.

In 1917 the Kuang-hsi Prov. formed 3 armies to help Hunan Prov. fight against the North. The 1st Army composed of the 1st Kwangsi Div. went to Hunan Prov.; the 2nd and 3rd Armies have not left Kwangsi.

The Armies are composed as follows:

2nd Army. (Lin Chun-t'ing) Staff.	Kuei-lin.		The commander of the Army is in the same time Kuei-lin chen-shou-shi.
10 yings of troops, "Yung-tyu-chün"	"		
2 yings of the Guard of Kuei-lin Chen-shou-shi.			
3rd Army. (Wei Yung-ch'ang) Staff.	Kuei-p'ing.		The commander of the Army is at the same time Kuei-ping chen-shou-shi.
12 yings yu-chi-tui.	"		
1 Artillery Batt.	"		
1 Mach. Gun Comp.	"		

YUNNAN PROVINCE.

Tu-chün (Commander of the troops) - T'ang Chi-Yao.

Sheng-chang (Governor) Yen K'e-Chen.

I. Stationary Troops.

1. Lu-chün troops.

1st Yunnan Div. (Ku P'ing-chen)	Detailed to Szechuan Prov.		
2nd Yunnan Div. (Liu Chu-wu) Staff.	Men-tyu.	6.8 Mauser rifle, 1888 yr.	
3rd Inf. Brigade. (Liu Yung-feng).			
5th Inf. Regt. (Shi Hsui-po) 3 yings.	"		
6th Inf. Regt. (Chian K'ai-chia). 3 yings.	Lin-an.		
4th Inf. Brig. (.....) Staff.	P'u-erh.		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Stations	Equipment	Remarks
7th Inf. Regt. (Yang Chen). 3 yings.	P'u-erh.		
8th Inf. Regt. (He Kai-ching) 3 yings.	K'ai-hua.		
Artillery ying. (.....)	Mon-tyu.	18 Krupp 75mm. mount.guns with shield; model of year 1908.	
Mach.gun ying. (.....) 4 companies.	Attached to the Regts.		
D.K. 3rd Yunnan Div. (Li Tien-pao).	Detailed to Kwantung Prov.		
D.K. 4th Yunnan Div. (Yang Sheng-tou)	Detailed to Kwantung Prov.		
5th Yunnan Div.			No information.
6th Yunnan Div.	Detailed to Szechuan.		
7th Yunnan Div. (Chao Yu-hsin)			" "
1st Yunnan Mixed Brigade.	Detailed to Szechuan Provl.		All of these Brigades were formed in 1917 of the former revolutionary troops. There is no information about their formation and numbers.
2nd Yunnan Mixed Brigade.	" " "		
3rd Yunnan Mixed Brigade.	" " "		
4th Yunnan Mixed Brigade.	" " "		
5th Yunnan Mixed Brigade.			
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	T'a-li and Yung-ch'ang.		
2nd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	Sheng-yueh.		
6th Mixed Brig.			
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	Meng-tyu.		
2nd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	K'ai-hua.		
7th Mixed Brig.			
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	Yunnan Prov. frontier.		
2nd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	"		
8th Mixed Brig.			
1st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	Tung-chuan. "		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	Tung-chuan.		
9th Mixed Brig.	Detailed to Kwantung Prov.		
Independent Mixed Yunnan Brigade.	Detailed to Szechuan Prov.		
Yunnan Mixed Brigade.	Detailed to Kwantung Prov.		
Yunnan Mixed Brigade.	"		
2nd Brigade "ching-ko-chün"	"		
Independent Yunnan Regt.	"		
Independent Mixed Yunnan Regt.	Detailed to Szechuan Prov.		
1st t'i-t'uan.	"		
14th Field Div.			Formed of Yunnan Reserve trps. in Szechuan Prov. Formation unknown.
II. Troops of the type "hsiun-fang-tui":			
Troops "ching-pei-tui" 60 companies, 100 men in each.	In different parts of the Province.		It is intended to form Regts. of these troops as the Commander of the 1st Regt, T'ang Chi-yu and the Commander of the 2nd Regt, Chao Shi-ming, have been appointed.
1 Battery.		6 guns.	
Troops yu-chi-tui.	In Kwantung Province.		

SZECHUAN PROVINCE.

Tu-chün (Commander of the Troops) - Hsiung Ke-Wu.

Sheng-chang (Governor) - Yang Shu-K'an.

Chen-shou-shi (Military Commander of the District).

1. Chuan-pian - - - -Chen Hsia-Lin.
2. Chuan-nan - - - -Lin Fa-Kun.
3. Ch'ung-ching - - -Wang Wen-Hua.

I. Stationary Troops.		
1. Lu-chün Troops.		
1st Szechuan Div.		Formed of natives of Szechuan Prov. during the first part of 1913; took the name of 15th Div. on Feb.16,1916.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
15th Inf.Div.			Took its name from the 1st Szechuan Div.with the addition to it of the 1st Mixed Szechuan Brigade on Feb.16,1916. It appears that this Div.had not existed before because the 5th Mixed Brigade in Kiangsu Prov.took the name of 15th Div.It is possible that the 15th Div.in Szechuan will again be called 1st as on the 4th Aug.1916 the Commander of the Div., Chou Tao-kang, was appointed.
1st Szechuan Div. (Chou Tao-kang)			
Staff.	Ch'ung-ching.		
1st Inf. Brigade (Hsui Hsiao-kang)			
Staff.	Ch'ung-ching.		
1st Infantry Regt. (.....)			
3 yings.	"		
2nd Inf. Regt. (Wang Chiu-kuei)			
3 yings.	Ch'ung-ching.		
2nd Inf. Brigade (.....)			
Staff.	"		
3rd Inf. Regt. (Wang Chih-chui)			
3 yings.	"		
4th Inf. Regt. (.....)			No information about the special troops.
3 yings.			
2nd Szechuan Div.			Formed of revolutionary elements of the Prov.in July 1914; in Jan.1918 took name of 21st Div. When the Southerners took the town Cheng-tu, the tu-chun, Liu-Chun-hou (Commander of the 21st Div.) fled with the Governor Chang Lan and with his Div. to Shensi in Feb.1918.
21st Inf. Div. (Liu Chan-hou)	Detailed to Shensi Prov.		
41st Inf. Brig. (T'ien Hsung-yao)			
81st Inf. Regt. (Hsun Chen)			
3 yings.			
82nd Inf. Regt. (Fang Shi-tyeh)			
3 yings.			
42nd Inf. Brigade. (Lai Hsin-huei)			
83rd Inf. Regt. (Li Ya-tsai)			
3 yings.			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
84th Inf. Regt. (Li Hung-k'un) 3 yings.			
2nd Cav. Regt. (Shu Yung-hsian) 3 yings.			
2nd Art. Regt. (Wu Ting-yüan) 3 yings.		12 Krupp 75mm. Field guns and 6 Krupp 75mm. Mount. guns.	
2nd Engineer ying. (.....) 4 companies.			
2nd Transport ying. (.....) 4 companies.			
3rd Szechuan Div.			Formed in July 1914 of revolutionary elements of Szechuan Prov. In July 1918 took the name of 22nd Inf. Div.
22nd Inf. Div. (Chung T'i-tao)	Detailed to Shensi Prov.		Took its name from the 3rd Szechuan Div. in July 1918. When the Southerners took the town Cheng-tu, the Div. which remained faithful to the Northern Govt. retreated in Feb. 1918 to Shensi Prov., when it took the name of 22nd Div.
43rd Inf. Brig. (Wu Cheng)			
85th Inf. Regt. (Cheng P'ing-tyeh) 3 yings.			
86th Inf. Regt. (P'ang Wen-hua) 3 yings.			
44th Inf. Brigade:			
87th Inf. Regt. (Yang Chian-yeh) 3 yings.			
88th Inf. Regt. (Li Yu-han) 3 yings.			
~~22nd~~ 22nd Cav. Regt. (P'eng Tou-sheng) 3 yings.			
22nd Art. Regt. (.....) 1 ying.			
22nd Engineer ying: (Liu Pao-ho) 4 companies.			
22nd Transport ying. (Chao Hsi-chih) 4 companies.			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
4th Szechuan Div. (Liu Ch'ung-hsium).	In western part of Kwan-tung Prov.		Was formed in 1914 of troops "hsium-fang-tui; was disbanded in March 1917; was then formed again by Liu Ch'ung-hsium of the 1st Mixed Brigade and of disbanded soldiers of the 4th Div. Has only 1 Brigade.
7th Inf. Brigade: (.....)			
13th Inf. Regt. 3 yings.			
14th Inf. Regt. 3 yings.			
5th Szechuan Div. (Hsiung Ke-wu) Staff.	Ch'ung-ching		Formed in 1917 of the 2nd Mixed Szechuan Brigade.
9th Inf. Brigade: (.....) Staff.	Wan-hsian.		
17th Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	"		
18th Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	"		
10th Inf. Brigade: Staff.	K'uei-chou.		
19th Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	"		
20th Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	"		
Mixed Brigade on the Szechuan frontier. (Chen Ho-ling) Staff.	On the Tibet frontier.		No information about the special troops.
1st Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.			
2nd Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.			
			It is proposed to form of all the field troops of Szechuan 3 Divisions and 1 Mixed Brig. The 2nd & 3rd Divisions would ~~[illegible]~~ not change; the 1st and 5th will compose the 1st Div., and the 4th will be changed into a Mixed Brigade.
1st Szechuan Mixed Brigade.			Served to form the 4th Szechuan Div.
2nd Szechuan Mixed Brigade.			Served to form 5th Szechuan Div.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
II. Troops of the type "hsiun-fang-tui".			
Model ying. (500 men)	Cheng-tu.		
Yings that guard the Salt Gabelle (Chi-szu-yings) 5 Infantry yings.	In the districts of the Province where salt is extracted.		1080 men.
II. Troops detailed from other Provinces.			
1st Yunnan Div. (Ku P'ing-chen).	On the Yunnan Prov. frontier.	6,8 mm. Mauser rifle, year 1905.	Formed in 1916 during the war between the North and the South.
1st Inf. Brigade (Hsun Yung-an).			
1st Inf. Regt. (Teng T'ai-chiao). 3 yings.			
2nd Inf. Regt. (Li Hsiu-chia). 3 yings.			
2nd Inf. Brig. (Chao Chung-chi).			
3rd Inf. Regt. (Li Yu-hsiung) 3 yings.			
4th Inf. Regt. (Hua Feng-ko). 3 yings.			
1st Cav. Regt. (Lui Fa-k'un). 3 yings.			
1st Art. Regt. (Li Kao-yang) 3 yings.		36 Krupp mount. guns, 75 mm. with shield; 4 Krupp Field guns, and 14 field guns of other models.	
1st Engineer ying. 4 companies.			
1 Transport ying; 4 companies.			
Mach. gun ying. 4 companies.	Attached to the Regts.	24 mach. guns.	
Music Band.			
Gendarme ying. 4 squadrons.			
Sanitary company.			

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
6th Yunnan Div. (Liu Yung-teng) Staff.	Tyu-liu-ching		The Commander of the Div. is also the chen-shou-shi of south Szechuan Province.
11th Inf. Brigade. (.....) Staff.	Lu-chou.		
21st Inf. Regt. 3 yings.	"		
22nd Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	"		
12th Inf. Brigade (.....) Staff.	Hsui-chou		
23rd Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	"		
24th Inf. Regt. (.....) 3 yings.	"		
14th Field Div. (Ku Ping-chen)	South Szechuan frontier.		Formed of Yunnan troops. Composition is unknown.
O.K. 1st Yunnan Mixed Brigade. (Li Cheng).			Composition is unknown.
O.K. 2nd Yunnan Mixed Brigade. (Feng T'ai-chung)			"
O.K. 3rd Yunnan Mixed Brigade. (Li Yu-hsiun).			"
O.K. 4th Yunnan Mixed Brigade. (Yang Te-cheng)			"
O.K. Independent Yunnan Mixed Brigade. (Chao Shi-ling)			"
Independent Mixed Yunnan Regt.			"
1st Yunnan t'i-t'uan. (T'ien Cheng-hsu).			

All the above mentioned Yunnan troops came to Szechuan in the composition of the following armies:

1st Army.			
1st Yunnan Mixed Brigade.	Tyu-chou		

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd Yunnan Mixed Brigade.	Tyu-liu-chin.		
1st ~~tt~~ t'i-t'uan. (T'ien Chang-hsin).			
2nd Army. (Chao Yu-hsin).			
3rd Yunnan Mixed Brigade.	Lu-chou.		
4th Yunnan Mixed Brigade.	Yung-ning.		
8th Army. (Yeh Chuan).			
1st Yunnan Div.	Chiang-an and Hsing-wen.		
Army T'ing-ching-~~shinx~~ chün). (Reserve). (Ho Ko-chün).			
Independent Yunnan Mixed Brig.	Hsui-yang.		
Independent Yunnan Mixed Regt.	Hui-li.		
Kuei-chou Mixed Brigade. (Hsiung Chi-hsiun).			
	KWEICHOU PROVINCE.		
	Tu-chün (Commander of the troops) - Lui Hsian-Shi. Sheng-chang (Governor) - Liu Cheng-Yin.		
I. Stationary Troops.			
1 Troops lu-chün:			
Kweichou Mixed Brigade.			During the 3rd Revolution was developed into the 1st Kweichou Div. (temporary).
1st Temporary Kweichou Div. (Wang Wen-hun). Staff.	Kuei-yang.	7,9 mm. Mauser rifle -yr.1888	1st formation in Apr.1912 of local natives. During the same year the Div. was sent to Honan Prov. & took the name of 21st Div. During first part of 1913 it returned to Kweichou and on Feb. 21,1913 was disbanded.
1st Inf. Brigade (Li Yan-ping) Staff.	"		
1st Inf. Regt. (Yüan Ch'u-ming) 3 yings.	"		2nd formation in July 1913 of local natives. Disbanded in 1915.
2nd Inf. Regt. (Yang Tyeh) 3 yings.	"		3rd formation: developed during 3rd Revolution from the Kweichou Mixed Brigade.

Name of Troops and Commanders	Station	Equipment	Remarks
2nd Inf. Brigade (Lu Tou). Staff.	Kwei-yang		
3rd Inf. Regt. (Wu-Shi) 3 yings.			
4th Inf. Regt. (Ho Ying-ching) 3 yings.			
1st Cavalry Regt. (Huang Ping-wen) 3 yings.	Kwei-yang		
1 Artillery Regt. (Ku Chen-chan).		Number of guns is unknown.	
5th Inf. Regt.			
6th Inf. Regt.			Formed the temporary Kwei-chou Mixed Brigade in August 1916.
Temporary Kweichou Mixed Brigade.	Detailed to Szechuan Prov.		